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Part I: Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) Analysis 7.1 Introduction
Accidental risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some
accident consisting of an event or sequence of events resulting into fire, explosion or
toxic hazards to human health and environment.
Risk Assessment (RA) provides a numerical measure of the risk that a
particular facility poses to the public. It begins with the identification of probable
potential hazardous events at an industry and categorization as per the
predetermined criteria. The consequences of major credible events are calculated for
different combinations of weather conditions to simulate worst possible scenario.
These consequence predictions are combined to provide numerical measures of the
risk for the entire facility.
MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident
with maximum damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis
does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In
practice the selection of accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the
basis of engineering judgement and expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in
accident analysis.
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.2
A disastrous situation is the outcome of fire, explosion or toxic hazards in
addition to other natural causes that eventually lead to loss of life, property and
ecological imbalances.
7.1.1 Methodology of MCA Analysis The MCA analysis involves ordering and ranking of various sections in
terms of potential vulnerability. The data requirements for MCA analysis are:
Operating manual
Flow diagram and P&I diagrams
Detailed design parameters
Physical and chemical properties of all the chemicals
Detailed plant layout
Detailed area layout
Past accident data
Following steps are involved in the MCA analysis:
Identification of potential hazardous sections and representative failure
cases
Visualization of release scenarios considering type and the quantity of
the hazardous material
Damage distance computations for the released cases at different wind
velocities and atmospheric stability classes for heat radiations and
pressure waves
Drawing of damage contours on plot plan to show the effect due to the
accidental release of chemicals
7.2 Past Accident Data Analysis Analysis of events arising out of the unsafe conditions is one of the basic
requirements for ensuring safety in any facility. The data required for such analysis
has either to be generated by monitoring and/or collected from the records of the
past occurrences. This data, when analysed, helps in formulation of the steps
towards mitigation of hazards faced commonly. Trends in safety of various activities
can be evaluated and actions can be planned accordingly, to improve the safety.
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.3
Data analysis helps in correlating the causal factors and the corrective
steps to be taken for controlling the accidents. It is, therefore, of vital importance to
collect the data methodically, based on potential incidents, sections involved, causes
of failure and the preventive measures taken. This helps to face future eventualities
with more preparedness.
A) August 25, 2012, Paraguana Refinery Complex, Punto Fijo, Venezuela On 25 August 2012 at 01:11 (05:41 GMT), an explosion caused by the
ignition of a leaking gas at the refinery killed 48 people, primarily National Guard
troops stationed at the plant, and injured 151 others. According to Refinery Vice-
President Eulogio Del Pino a leak of propane and butane gas was detected an hour
before the blast. However, the contingency plan was not implemented. No operating units
were reported damaged by the blast but three storage tanks were burning. All three
burning storage tanks were extinguished by 28 August 2012.
In addition to the refinery, more than 1,600 homes were damaged by the
shockwave.
B) April 30, 2013, Marathon oil’s Refinery, Detroit, USA A tank of sour water, a mixture of hydrogen sulfide and ammonia
generated from refining crude oil, exploded at the Marathon Detroit Refinery in
southwest Detroit during maintenance work on 30th April 2013 evening. No injuries
were reported. It was unclear whether the maintenance check or some other factor
sparked the explosion. In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, a mandatory
evacuation order was issued for 3,000 residents of Melvindale, a suburb of Detroit,
due to concerns of deteriorating air quality caused by the resulting fire. Residents
were told to go to the city’s ice arena-civic center. The fire that erupted after the
explosion just before 6 p.m. on Saturday was extinguished within two hours by a
combined crew of Marathon, Detroit and Melvindale fire fighters. Despite the
relatively small scale of the fire, similar to the scale of a previous fire at the refinery in
2011, it raised the specter a much larger industrial catastrophe.
C) August 06, 2012, Chevron Richmond Refinery, California, USA On August 6, 2012, a large fire erupted at the refinery at about 6:15 p.m.
and reported to be contained at 10:40 p.m. Flames were seen issuing from at least
two of the refinery's towers. Private Health Services responded by notifying
residents shelter in place. The shelter-in-place order was lifted at 11:15 p.m. Initial
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.4
reports estimated that 11,000 people sought treatment at area hospitals and later
reports placed the number above 15,000 people.
A refinery spokeswoman stated that the fire erupted in the number 4 crude
distillation unit, or CDU. Just before 6:30 p.m., an inspection crew discovered that
there was a diesel leak in a line in the CDU—and that the leak was growing. Three
refinery workers were given first aid at the refinery. On April 15, 2013, the US
Chemical Safety Board released their preliminary report citing Chevron for a chronic
failure to replace aging equipment and called for an overhaul of regulatory oversight
of the industry to prevent such accidents from happening again
D) October 29, 2009, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Jaipur A massive fire broke out on 29th October at an oil storage depot in the
western state of Rajasthan, killing at least 11 people and injuring 135 others. Two
huge explosions were heard before the fire ignited and spread. The fire broke out
around 19:30 local time at the Jaipur storage depot run by Indian Oil Corporation
(IOC) Ltd. and was visible from over 25 kilometers away, according to reports.
Company officials said the depot covers an area of several square kilometres and the
oil tanks store gasoline, diesel and kerosene fuel for several state-owned oil
companies. Reports said the depot had a 100,000-kilolitre capacity. Initial estimates
indicate that products valued at 1.5 billion rupees have been burnt, and the
petroleum stocks were insured.
7.3 Hazard Identification Identification of hazards is an important step in Risk Assessment, as it
leads to the generation of accidental scenarios. The merits of including the hazard for
further investigation are subsequently determined by its significance, normally using
a cut-off or threshold quantity.
Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to evaluate it in terms of
the risk it presents to the employees and the neighbouring community. In principle,
both probability and consequences should be considered, but there are occasions
when either the probability or the consequence shown are sufficiently low or
sufficiently high, decisions can be made on just one factor.
During the hazard identification component, the following considerations
are taken into account.
Chemical identities
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.5
Location of process unit facilities for hazardous materials
The types and design of process units
The quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release
and
The nature of the hazard (e.g. airborne toxic vapours or mists, fire,
explosion, large quantities stored or processed handling conditions)
most likely to accompany hazardous materials spills or releases
7.3.1 Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) is useful in identification of areas in which
the potential risk reaches a certain level. It estimates the global risk associated with a
process unit and classifies the units according to their general level of risk. FEI
covers aspects related to the intrinsic hazard of materials, the quantities handled and
operating conditions. This factor gives index value for the area which could be
affected by an accident, the damage to property within the area and the working days
lost due to accidents. The method for evaluation of FEI involves following stages.
Selection of pertinent process unit which can have serious impact on
plant safety
Determination of Material Factor (MF): This factor for a given
substance in the process unit gives intrinsic potential to release energy
in case of fire or an explosion. Material Factor can be directly obtained
from Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index Hazard classification Guide of
American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York. The factor can
also be evaluated from NFPA indices of danger, health, flammability
and reactivity
Determination of Unit Hazard Factor: The Unit Hazard Factor is
obtained by multiplication of General Process Hazard (GPH) factor and
Special Process Hazard (SPH) factor. GPH factor is computed
according to presence of exothermic reactions and loading and
unloading operations. The penalties due to each of these reactions /
operations are summed up to compute GPH factor. Similarly, SPH
factor can be evaluated for the operations close to flammable range or
pressures different from atmospheric. Penalties of these operations for
both factors can be obtained from Dow’s EFI index form
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.6
Fire and explosion index is then calculated as the product of Material
Factor (MF) and Unit Hazard Factor. Degree of hazards based on FEI is given in the
following Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Degree of Hazards Based on FEI
FEI Range Degree of Hazard 0 - 60 Light 61- 96 Moderate 97 - 127 Intermediate 128 - 158 Heavy 159 and Above Severe
Preventive and protective control measures are recommended based on
degree of hazard. Therefore, FEI indicates the efforts to be taken to reduce risks for
a particular unit. FEI computed for various pipeline are given in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 Fire and Explosion Index for Chemicals
Sr. No.
Chemical FEI Category
Aromatic Compounds 1 Naphtha 86 Moderate 2 Benzene 68 Moderate 3 Paraxylene 65 Moderate 4 Phenol 46 Light Aliphatic Compounds 1 Vinyl Acetate Monomer 128 Heavy 2 Acetic Acid 63 Moderate 3 Glycol 15 Light Others 1 Diesel 33 Light
7.4 MCA Analysis MCA analysis encompasses defined techniques to identify the hazards
and compute the consequent effects in terms of damage distances due to heat
radiation, toxic releases, vapour cloud explosion etc. A list of probable or potential
accidents of the major units in the complex arising due to use, storage and handling
of the hazardous materials are examined to establish their credibility. Depending
upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.7
effect on the surrounding environment and the respective damage caused can be
assessed. Flow chart of accidental release of hazardous chemicals is presented
in Fig. 7.1.
Release of Chemical
Instantaneous Continuous
Bottom Top
Two Phase Outflow Liquid
Ignition Vapours
Ignition ?
Pool Formation
Ignition ?Flare
Pool Fire
Evaporation
Dispersion
Vapour Cloud Formation
Ignition ?
Detonation
Toxicity
Vapour Cloud Explosion
Pressure Wave
CONSEQUENCE MODELLING
Heat Radiation
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
TOXICITY COMPUTATION
Fig. 7.1: Accidental Release Scenario
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.8
Hazardous Gases, on release can cause damage on a large scale. The
extent of the damage is dependent upon the nature of the release and the physical
state of the material. In the present report the consequences for flammable hazards
are considered and the damages caused due to such releases are assessed with
recourse to MCA analysis.
Flammable Gases on release may cause Jet fire and Flash Fire and less
likely unconfined vapour cloud explosion causing possible damage to the
surrounding area. The extent of damage depends upon the nature of the release.
The release of flammable gases and subsequent ignition result in heat radiation
wave or vapour cloud depending upon the flammability and its physical state.
Damage distances due to release of hazardous materials depend on atmospheric
stability and wind speed. It is important to visualize the consequence of the release
of such substances and the damage caused to the surrounding areas. Computation
of damage distances are carried out at various atmospheric stability conditions for
various wind velocities and the result is tabulated. Pasquill-Gifford atmospheric
stability classes with corresponding weather conditions are listed in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3 Pasquill – Gifford Atmospheric Stability
Sr. No.
Stability Class
Weather Conditions
1. A Very unstable – sunny, light wind 2. A/B Unstable - as with A only less sunny or more windy 3. B Unstable - as with A/B only less sunny or more windy 4. B/C Moderately unstable – moderate sunny and moderate wind 5. C Moderately unstable – very windy / sunny or overcast / light wind 6. C/D Moderate unstable – moderate sun and high wind 7. D Neutral – little sun and high wind or overcast / windy night 8. E Moderately stable – less overcast and less windy night 9. F Stable – night with moderate clouds and light / moderate wind 10. G Very stable – possibly fog
7.4.1 Fire and Explosion Scenarios Combustible Gases within their flammable limits may ignite and burn if
exposed to an ignition source of sufficient energy. During transportation this normally
occurs as a result of a leakage or spillage. Depending on the physical properties of
the gas and the operating parameters, the combustion of gas in a pipeline may take
on a number of forms like jet fire, flash fire and pool fire.
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.9
7.4.1.1 Jet Fire Jet fire occurs when flammable material of a high exit velocity ignites. In
transportation lines this may be due to design or an accidental release. Ejection of
flammable gases from pipes or pipe flanges may give rise to a jet fire and in some
instances the jet flame could have substantial “reach”. Depending on wind speed,
the flame may tilt and impinge on pipeline, equipment or structures. The thermal
radiation from these fires may cause injury to people or damage equipment some
distance from the source of the flames.
7.4.1.2 Flash Fire A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a vapour cloud resulting
from a release of flammable material into the open air, which after mixing with air,
ignites. A flash fire results from the ignition of a released flammable cloud in which
there is essentially no increase in combustion rate. The ignition source could be
electric spark, a hot surface, and friction between moving parts of a machine or an
open fire.
Flash fire may occur due to its less vapour temperature than ambient
temperature. Hence, as a result of a spill, they are dispersed initially by the negative
buoyancy of cold vapours and subsequently by the atmospheric turbulence. After the
release and dispersion of the flammable fuel the resulting vapour cloud is ignited and
when the fuel vapour is not mixed with sufficient air prior to ignition, it results in
diffusion fire burning. Therefore the rate at which the fuel vapour and air are mixed
together during combustion determines the rate of burning in the flash fire.
The main dangers of flash fire are radiation and direct flame contact. The
size of the flammable cloud determines the area of possible direct flame contact
effects. Radiation effects on a target depend on several factors including its distance
from the flames, flame height, flame emissive power, local atmospheric transitivity
and cloud size. Most of the time, flash combustion lasts for no more than a few
seconds.
7.4.1.3 Vapour Cloud Explosion The Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) begins with a release of a large
quantity of flammable vaporizing liquid or gas from a storage tank, transport vessel or
pipeline producing a dangerous overpressure. These explosions follow a well-
determined pattern. There are basically four features, which must be present for an
effective vapour cloud explosion to occur with an effective blast. These are:
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.10
First, the release material must be flammable and at a suitable condition of
temperature and pressure which depends on the chemical. The materials which
come under this category, range from liquefied gases under pressure (e.g. Methane,
butane, propane); ordinary flammable liquids (e.g. cyclohexane, naphtha) to non
liquefied flammable gases (e.g. ethylene, acetylene)
Second, before the ignition, a cloud of sufficient size must have been
formed. Normally ignition delays of few minutes are considered the most probable for
generating the vapour cloud explosions
Third, a sufficient amount of the cloud must be within the flammable range
of the material to cause extensive overpressure
Fourth, the flame speed determines the blast effects of the vapour cloud
explosions, which can vary greatly
The flammable content of a gas cloud is calculated by three-dimensional
integration of the concentration profiles, which fall within the flammable limits. If the
gas cloud ignites, two situations can occur, namely non-explosive combustion (flash
fire) and explosive combustion (flash fire + explosion).
7.4.1.4 BLEVE If the liquid is stored under pressure at a temperature above its boiling
point, the initial physical explosion that breaks the receptacle produces a sudden
decompression giving rise to a massive evaporation of the saturated liquid. This is
known as Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE). These explosions
are of great destructive power due to the high increase in pressure caused by the
sudden incorporation of liquid into the gas phase. The ignition of BLEVE produces a
mass of gases at high temperature known as ‘fireball’ with significant thermal effects.
Historically, BLEVEs have been produced with some frequency and have almost
caused human casualties.
7.4.1.5 Lower and Upper Flammability Limit In case of any spillage and leakages of hydrocarbons / flammable material,
probability of getting ignited is depending on whether the air borne mixture is in the
flammable region. The Lower flammability limit corresponds to minimum proportion of
combustible vapour in air for combustion. The Upper flammability limit Correspond to
maximum proportion of combustible vapour in air for combustion and the
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.11
concentration range lying between the lower and the upper limit is called as
flammable range.
7.4.2 Models for the Calculation of Heat load and Shock Waves If a flammable gas or liquid is released, damage resulting from heat
radiation or explosion may occur on ignition. Models used in this study for the effects
in the event of immediate ignition (torch and pool fire) and the ignition of a gas cloud
will be discussed in succession. These models calculate the heat radiation or peak
overpressure as a function of the distance from the torch, the ignited pool or gas
cloud. The physical significance of the various heat loads is depicted in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4 List of Damages Envisaged at Various Heat Loads
Sr. No.
Heat loads (kW/m²)
Type of Damage Intensity Damage to Equipment Damage to People
1 37.5 Damage to process equipment 100% lethality in 1 min. 1% lethality in 10 sec
2 25.0 Minimum energy required to ignite wood
50% Lethality in 1 min. Significant injury in 10 sec
3 19.0 Maximum thermal radiation intensity allowed on thermally
unprotected equipment
--
4 12.5 Minimum energy required to melt plastic tubing
1% lethality in 1 min
5 4.0 - First degree burns, causes pain for exposure longer
than 10 sec
6 1.6 -- Causes no discomfort on long exposures
Source: World Bank (1988). Technical Report No. 55: Techniques for Assessing Industrial Hazards. , Washington, D.C: The World Bank.
7.4.3 Model for Pressure Wave
A pressure wave can be caused by gas cloud explosion. The following
damage criteria are assumed as a result of the peak overpressure of a pressure
wave:
0.03 bar over pressure wave is taken as the limit for the occurrence of
wounds as a result of flying fragments of glass
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.12
Following assumptions are used to translate an explosion in terms of
damage to the surrounding area:
- Within the contour area of the exploding gas cloud, Casualties are
due to burns or asphyxiation. Houses and buildings in this zone will
be severely damaged.
- In houses with serious damage, it is assumed that one out of eight
persons present will be killed as a result of the building collapse.
Within the zone of a peak over pressure of 0.3 bar the risk of death
in houses is 0.9 x 1/8 = 0.1125, and in the zone with a peak over
pressure of 0.1 bar the probability of death is 0.1 x 1/8 = 0.0125,
i.e. one out of eighty people will be killed
The significance of the peak over pressure 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar, 0.03 bar and
0.01 bar are depicted in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5 Damage Criteria for Pressure Waves
Human Injury Structural Damage
Peak Over Pressure (bar)
Type of Damage
Peak Over Pressure (bar)
Type of Damage
5-8 100% lethality 0.3 Heavy (90% damage)
3.5-5 50% lethality 0.1 Repairable (10% damage)
2-3 Threshold lethality
0.03 Damage of Glass
1.33-2 Severe lung damage
0.01 Crack of windows
1-1.33 50% Eardrum rupture
- -
Source: Marshall, V.C. (1977)’ How lethal are explosives and toxic escapes’.
7.4.4 Vulnerability Models Vulnerability models are used in order to determine how people are injured
by exposure to heat load. Such models are designed on the basis of animal
experiments or on the basis of the analysis of injuries resulting from accidents, which
have occurred. Vulnerability models often make use of a probit function. In this
function, a link is made between the heat load and the percentage of people exposed
to a particular type of injury.
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.13
It is assumed that everyone inside the area covered or gas cloud will be
burnt to death or will asphyxiate. Human fatality is a function of heat flux and
exposure time. The probit expressions for the prediction of mortality due to thermal
radiation from fire scenarios are proportional to the product of t and q4/3. The probit
equation usually used is that proposed by Eisenberg and coworkers*
Pr = -14.9 + 2.56 In (10-4 q4/3 t)
In which,
Pr = Probit the measure of the percentage of people exposed to a
particular injury
t = exposure time in seconds
q = thermal load in W/m²
For 1% lethality in the exposed persons the corresponding probit value is
2.67. Table 7.6 gives time is seconds for percentage of fatality at various heat
radiations.
Table 7.6 Range of Thermal Flux Levels and their Potential Effects
Heat Flux (kW/m²)
Seconds Exposure For % Fatality 1% 50% 99%
1.6 500 1300 3200 4 150 370 930
12.5 30 80 200 37.5 8 20 50
*Eisenberg, N. A., Lynch C. J. and Breeding, R. J. (1975) Vulnerability
Model. A Simulation System for Assessing Damage Resulting from Marine Spills
National Technology Information Service Report AD-A015-245, Springfield, MA
7.5 Computation of Damage Distances Damage distances for the accidental release of hazardous materials have
been computed at 2F, 3D and 5D weather conditions. In these conditions, 2, 3 and 5
are wind velocities in m/s and F and D are atmospheric stability classes. These
weather conditions have been selected to accommodate worst case scenarios to get
maximum effective distances. DNV based software PHAST Micro 6.51 has been
used to carry out consequence analysis. Damage distances computed for Loading
Arms and Transfer pipeline are described below:
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.14
Jet Fire: This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50
mm in Motor Spirit Loading Arm at various heat radiation levels under the different
atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distances for naphtha
due to 50 mm leak at stability class 5D conditions are 30 m, 47 m, 76 m for heat load
37.5 KW/m², 12.5 KW/m² and 4 KW/m² respectively.
The computed damage distances for other compounds for 25 mm and 50
mm leak sizes at heat loads of 37.5 KW/m², 12.5 KW/m² and 4.0 KW/m² are given in
Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 respectively for loading arms and pipelines.
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.15
Table 7.7 Consequence Analysis for Jet Fire Scenario: Loading Arm Handling
Various Chemicals
Scenario Considered
Leak
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Weather Conditi
on
Damage Distance (m) for Various Heat Loads
37.5 kW/m²
12.5 kW/m²
4.0 kW/m²
Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 25 5.14 2F 13 27 45
3D 17 28 47 5D 17 27 44
50 20 2F 27 52 86 3D 30 50 84 5D 30 47 76
Line Rupture 764.48 2F 66 123 203 3D 75 130 215 5D 85 137 227
Benzene 25 5.71 2F 8 27 45 3D 15 28 47 5D 19 30 48
50 22.84 2F 21 52 86 3D 31 53 89 5D 34 54 87
Line Rupture 848.79 2F 55 114 187 3D 79 138 228 5D 87 140 232
Paraxylene 25 5.8 2F 9 24 39 3D 14 24 41 5D 16 26 42
50 23.24 2F 19 41 68 3D 26 43 72 5D 29 45 73
Line Rupture 863.96 2F 28 56 93 3D 46 76 127 5D 52 82 135
Phenol 25 6.06 2F - 6 11 3D - 7 12 5D 5 8 13
50 24.24 2F - 11 19 3D - 12 21 5D 9 15 24
Line Rupture 625.66 2F - 13 23 3D 5 19 32 5D 18 28 45
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.16
Scenario Considered
Leak
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Weather Conditi
on
Damage Distance (m) for Various Heat Loads
37.5 kW/m²
12.5 kW/m²
4.0 kW/m²
Aliphatic Compounds Vinyl Acetate Monomer
25 6.19 2F 1 20 36 3D 6 23 38 5D 15 24 40
50 24.76 2F 37 40 69 3D 17 43 71 5D 28 45 74
Line Rupture 637.74 2F 30 92 155 3D 58 119 194 5D 86 139 231
Acetic Acid 25 6.72 2F - - 2 3D - - 3 5D - 2 4
50 26.91 2F - - 5 3D - - 6 5D - 4 7
Line Rupture 640.04 2F - 5 22 3D - 14 26 5D - 19 31
Glycol 25 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
50 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Line Rupture - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Others Diesel 25 5.85 2F - 2 5
3D - 2 5 5D 2 3 5
50 23.40 2F - 5 8 3D 3 5 9 5D 4 6 10
Line Rupture 850.46 2F - 4 7 3D 3 6 10 5D 6 9 14
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.17
Table 7.8 Consequence Analysis for Jet Fire Scenario: Pipelines Handling
Various Chemicals
Scenario Considered
Leak
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Weather Conditi
on
Damage Distance (m) for Various Heat Loads
37.5 kW/m²
12.5 kW/m²
4.0 kW/m²
Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 25 13.6 2F - 34 60
3D 17 35 59 5D 22 34 57
50 54.41 2F 15 59 104 3D 28 61 101 5D 36 59 99
Line Rupture 8087.9 2F 156 444 782 3D 199 448 745 5D 233 441 709
Benzene 25 15.10 2F - 39 68 3D 22 42 70 5D 25 40 67
50 60.42 2F 22 71 123 3D 36 72 119 5D 42 69 115
Line Rupture 2245.41 2F 128 325 556 3D 154 321 527 5D 168 299 486
Paraxylene 25 16.1 2F 11 38 67 3D 20 39 65 5D 24 38 63
50 64 2F 18 66 116 3D 32 68 112 5D 40 65 109
Line Rupture 4242. 2F 98 252 430 3D 118 245 401 5D 153 271 443
Phenol 25 15.45 2F - 17 32 3D 6 21 35 5D 18 29 49
50 61.80 2F - 32 57 3D 15 36 60 5D 31 49 81
Line Rupture 2296.89 2F 20 66 112 3D 36 73 120 5D 55 86 145
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.18
Scenario Considered
Leak
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Weather Conditi
on
Damage Distance (m) for Various Heat Loads
37.5 kW/m²
12.5 kW/m²
4.0 kW/m²
Aliphatic Compounds Vinyl Acetate Monomer
25 15.78 2F - 28 54
3D 10 33 55 5D 22 34 58
50 63.13 2F 8 56 103 3D 26 64 104 5D 40 66 110
Line Rupture 2346.07 2F 126 317 540 3D 151 312 512 5D 163 290 472
Acetic Acid 25 17.16 2F - - 6 3D - - 10 5D 13 37 60
50 68.64 2F - - 14 3D - 8 17 5D - 12 20
Line Rupture 2403.44 2F - 17 45 3D - 25 45 5D 9 29 47
Glycol 25 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
50 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Line Rupture - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Others Diesel 25 5.85 2F - 12 20
3D 7 13 22 5D 9 14 23
50 23.40 2F - 18 31 3D 9 18 30 5D 14 22 36
Line Rupture 850.46 2F 17 36 60 3D 20 34 57 5D 26 41 66
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.19
Flash Fire: This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and
50 mm Leak of Cyclohexane pipeline at LFL concentrations under the different
atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distances due to Leak
are 22.31m, 18.26m, 16.98m for stability classes 2F, 3D and 5D conditions
respectively. The computed damage distances for other process units at LFL
distances are given in Table 7.9 and Table 7.10 respectively for loading arms and
pipelines.
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.20
Table 7.9 Consequence Analysis for Flash Fire Scenario: Loading Arms Handling
Various Chemicals
Scenario Considered
LFL Concentration
(ppm)
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Weather Condition
LFL Distance
(m) Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 10000 25 5.14 2F 9
3D 11 5D 11
50 20 2F 15 3D 17 5D 22
Line Rupture
764.48 2F 260 3D 190 5D 185
Benzene 12000
25 5.71 2F 8 3D 11 5D 13
50 22.84 2F 12 3D 14 5D 22
Line Rupture
848.79 2F 245 3D 202 5D 192
Paraxylene 11000
25 5.8 2F 9 3D 11 5D 11
50 23.24 2F 11 3D 13 5D 21
Line Rupture
863.96 2F 68 3D 34 5D 7
Phenol 15000 25 6.06 2F 7 3D 9 5D 10
50 24.24 2F 8 3D 11 5D 16
Line Rupture
625.66 2F 2 3D 3 5D 6
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.21
Scenario Considered
LFL Concentration
(ppm)
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Weather Condition
LFL Distance
(m) Aliphatic Compounds Vinyl Acetate Monomer
26000
25 6.19 2F 6 3D 6 5D 4
50 24.76 2F 9 3D 11 5D 13
Line Rupture
637.74 2F 162 3D 133 5D 107
Acetic Acid 27000
25 6.72 2F 8 3D 6 5D 5
50 26.91 2F 15 3D 16 5D 14
Line Rupture
640.04 2F 3 3D 3 5D 7
Glycol - 25 - 2F - 3D - 5D -
50 - 2F - 3D - 5D -
Line Rupture
- 2F - 3D - 5D -
Others Diesel 5000 25 5.85 2F 11
3D 13 5D 11
50 23.40 2F 14 3D 15 5D 24
Line Rupture
850.46 2F 4 3D 4 5D 8
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.22
Table 7.10 Consequence Analysis for Flash Fire Scenario: Pipelines Handling
Various Chemicals
Scenario Considered
LFL Concentration
(ppm)
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Weather Condition
LFL Distance
(m) Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 10000 25 13.6 2F 10
3D 9 5D 9
50 54.41 2F 30 3D 26 5D 22
Line Rupture 8087.9 2F 2184 3D 1414 5D 1312
Benzene 12000
25 15.10 2F 16 3D 13 5D 11
50 60.42 2F 32 3D 30 5D 32
Line Rupture 2245.41 2F 1360 3D 970 5D 737
Paraxylene 11000
25 16.1 2F 9 3D 8 5D 7
50 64 2F 28 3D 25 5D 20
Line Rupture 4242. 2F 37 3D 27 5D 49
Phenol 15000 25 15.45 2F 8 3D 7 5D 7
50 61.80 2F 27 3D 23 5D 20
Line Rupture
2296.89
2F 20 3D 17 5D 33
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.23
Scenario Considered
LFL Concentration
(ppm)
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Weather Condition
LFL Distance
(m) Aliphatic Compounds Vinyl Acetate Monomer
26000
25 15.78 2F 4 3D 4 5D 4
50 63.13 2F 9 3D 8 5D 8
Line Rupture 2346.07 2F 760 3D 440 5D 120
Acetic Acid 27000
25 17.16 2F 4 3D 4 5D 4
50 68.64 2F 9 3D 8 5D 9
Line Rupture 2403.44 2F 36 3D 30 5D 56
Glycol - 25 - 2F - 3D - 5D -
50 - 2F - 3D - 5D -
Line Rupture - 2F - 3D - 5D -
Others Diesel 5000 25 16.02 2F 9
3D 9 5D 8
50 64.10 2F 34 3D 27 5D 22
Line Rupture
9528.49 2F 46 3D 32 5D 58
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.24
Pool Fire: This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50
mm and catastrophic rupture of Methanol pipeline at various heat radiation levels
under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage
distances due to catastrophic rupture at stability class 3D conditions are 115.5m,
158.3m and 232.2 for heat load 37.5 kW/m² 12.5 kW/m² and 4.0 kW/m² respectively
and damage contour are shown in Table 7.11 and Table 7.12 respectively for
loading arms and pipelines.
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.25
Table 7.11 Consequence Analysis for Pool Fire Scenario: Loading Arms Handling
Various Chemicals
Scenario Considered
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Pool Radius
(m)
Weather Condition
Damage Distance (m) for Various Heat Loads
37.5 kW/m²
12.5 kW/m²
4.0 kW/m²
Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 25 5.14 0.01 2F 15 23 31
3D 21 29 36 5D 34 39 44
50 20 0.02 2F 24 32 51 3D 26 36 56 5D 38 50 58
Line Rupture
764.48 0.15 2F - 85 173 3D - 84 185 5D - 88 205
Benzene
25 5.71 0.01 2F 15 25 41 3D 18 30 45 5D 26 42 54
50 22.84 0.02 2F - 29 55 3D - 31 59 5D - 40 70
Line Rupture
848.79 0.15
2F - 80 164 3D - 80 176 5D - 82 193
Paraxylene
25 5.8 0.01 2F - 19 36 3D - 23 42 5D - 31 53
50 23.24 0.02 2F - 28 56 3D - 30 62 5D - 40 76
Line Rupture
863.96 0.15 2F - 83 166 3D - 83 178 5D - 87 197
Phenol
25 6.06 0.01 2F 17 24 39 3D 20 29 43 5D 26 38 50
50 24.24s 0.02 2F - 26 52 3D - 32 58 5D - 40 67
Line Rupture
625.66 0.13 2F - 69 132 3D - 70 139 5D - 73 150
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.26
Scenario Considered
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Pool Radius
(m)
Weather Condition
Damage Distance (m) for Various Heat Loads
37.5 kW/m²
12.5 kW/m²
4.0 kW/m²
Aliphatic Compounds Vinyl Acetate Monomer
25 6.19 0.01 2F 15 24 36 3D 20 31 41 5D 24 37 47
50 24.76 0.02 2F - 27 47 3D - 31 52 5D - 42 61
Line Rupture
637.74 0.13 2F - 72 141 3D - 71 148 5D - 73 159
Acetic Acid
25 6.72 0.01 2F 37 48 67 3D 43 54 71 5D 57 67 84
50 26.91 0.02 2F 54 74 106 3D 63 81 112 5D 77 95 124
Line Rupture
640.04 0.13 2F 120 177 270 3D 124 179 271 5D 132 182 273
Glycol 25 - - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
50 - - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Line Rupture
- - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Others Diesel
25 5.85 0.01 2F 20 31 45 3D 26 39 51 5D 32 46 58
50 23.40 0.02 2F - 33 57 3D - 36 61 5D - 48 74
Line Rupture
850.46 0.15 2F - 80 154 3D - 81 164 5D - 85 179
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.27
Table 7.12 Consequence Analysis for Pool Fire Scenario: Pipelines Handling Various
Chemicals
Scenario Considered
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Pool Radius
(m)
Weather Condition
Damage Distance (m) for Various Heat Loads
37.5 kW/m²
12.5 kW/m²
4.0 kW/m²
Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 25 13.6 0.01 2F - - -
3D - - - 5D - - -
50 54.41 0.02 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Line Rupture
8087.9 0.15 2F - 186 3158 3D - 174 322 5D - 186 353
Benzene
25 15.10 0.01 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
50 60.42 0.02 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Line Rupture
2245.41 0.15 2F - 118 210 3D - 112 215 5D - 122 234
Paraxylene
25 16.1 0.01 2F 50 54 61 3D 60 64 67 5D - - -
50 64 0.02 2F - 66 83 3D 71 73 74 5D 136 139 141
Line Rupture
4242.63 0.15 2F - 160 271 3D - 150 277 5D - 171 316
Phenol
25 15.45 0.01 2F - 57 78 3D - 64 85 5D - 98 118
50 61.80 0.02 2F - 75 107 3D - 76 111 5D - 118 156
Line Rupture
2296.89 0.13 2F - 118 199 3D - 116 205 5D - 133 232
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.28
Scenario Considered
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Pool Radius
(m)
Weather Condition
Damage Distance (m) for Various Heat Loads
37.5 kW/m²
12.5 kW/m²
4.0 kW/m²
Aliphatic Compounds Vinyl Acetate Monomer
25 15.78
0.01 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
50 63.13 0.02 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Line Rupture
2346.07 0.13 2F - 111 190 3D - 106 193 5D - 112 200
Acetic Acid
25 17.16 0.01 2F 124 140 166 3D 351 367 393 5D - - -
50 68.64 0.02 2F 168 196 243 3D 227 254 299 5D 514 540 583
Line Rupture
2403.44 0.13 2F 198 275 399 3D 198 272 395 5D 230 300 420
Glycol 25 - - -
- - -
2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
50 - - -
- - -
2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Line Rupture
- - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Others Diesel
25 16.02 0.01 2F - 97 124 3D - 129 157 5D - 363 394
50 64.10 0.02 2F - 137 178 3D - 121 167 5D - 261 311
Line Rupture
9528.49 0.15 2F - 210 332 3D - 197 333 5D - 223 378
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.29
Vapour Cloud Explosion: This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50
mm and catastrophic rupture of paraxylene loading arm at various overpressure
waves under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The
damage distances due to catastrophic rupture at 3D conditions are 554.9m, 351.3m,
275.5m for 0.03bar, 0.1 bar, and 0.3 bar respectively.
The computed damage distances for other compounds for 25 mm and 50
mm leak sizes and catastrophic rupture for overpressure waves of 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar
and 0.03 bar given in Table 7.13 and Table 7.14 respectively for loading arms and
pipelines.
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.30
Table 7.13 Consequence Analysis for VCE Scenario: Loading Arms Handling Various
Chemicals
Scenario Considered
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Weather Condition
Damage Distance (m) 0.03bar 0.1bar 0.3bar
Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 25 5.14 2F 68 35 22
3D 61 32 21 5D 52 28 19
50 20 2F 206 145 122 3D 130 72 51 5D 118 67 48
Line Rupture 764.48 2F 639 429 359 3D 596 391 318 5D 598 404 335
Benzene 25 5.71 2F 69 35 22 3D 64 33 21 5D 67 40 30
50 22.84 2F 190 132 111 3D 137 81 60 5D 122 69 49
Line Rupture 848.79 2F 604 387 327 3D 611 400 330 5D 617 412 338
Paraxylene 25 5.8 - - - - - - - - - - - -
50 23.24 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Line Rupture 863.96 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Phenol 25 6.06 2F - - - 3D 20 30 58 5D 18 26 49
50 24.24 2F - - - 3D 28 46 95 5D 25 40 82
Line Rupture 625.66 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.31
Scenario Considered
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Weather Condition
Damage Distance (m) 0.03bar 0.1bar 0.3bar
Aliphatic Compound Vinyl Acetate Monomer
25 6.19 2F - - -
3D 17 24 44 5D 16 22 38
50 24.76 2F 87 43 26 3D 80 40 25 5D 80 45 32
Line Rupture 637.74 2F 474 296 233 3D 456 292 231 5D 393 265 217
Acetic Acid 25 6.72 2F - - -
3D - - - 5D - - -
50 26.91 2F 91 44 27 3D 97 53 36 5D 82 46 33
Line Rupture 640.04 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Glycol 25 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
50 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Line Rupture - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Others Diesel 25 5.85 2F 92 36 23
3D 64 33 21 5D 65 39 29
50 23.40 2F 112 53 31 3D 104 50 30 5D 113 59 39
Line Rupture 850.46 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.32
Table 7.14 Consequence Analysis for VCE Scenario: Pipelines Handling Various
Chemicals
Scenario Considered
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Weather Condition
Damage Distance (m) 0.03bar 0.1bar 0.3bar
Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 25 13.6 2F 85 48 34
3D 81 46 33 5D 72 42 31
50 54.41 2F 180 99 69 3D 169 95 67 5D 156 95 72
Line Rupture 8087.9 2F 2947 2530 2503 3D 2541 1984 1941 5D 2770 2201 2055
Benzene 25 15.10 2F 16 22 39 3D 15 21 36 5D - - -
50 60.42 2F 191 104 72 3D 184 101 70 5D 170 101 75
Line Rupture 2245.41 2F 2074 1657 1598 3D 1833 1477 1413 5D 1881 1456 1297
Paraxylene 25 16.1 2F 86 48 34 3D 80 45 32 5D 72 42 31
50 64 2F 178 99 69 3D 168 94 67 5D 156 95 72
Line Rupture 4242. 2F 772 495 392 3D 934 651 545 5D 898 555 427
Phenol 25 15.45 2F 78 44 32 3D 73 42 31 5D 56 29 19
50 61.80 2F 166 94 67 3D 154 88 64 5D 136 81 60
Line Rupture 2296.89 2F 302 140 80 3D 222 100 55 5D 403 189 109
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.33
Scenario Considered
Leak Size (mm)
Source Strength (kg/sec)
Weather Condition
Damage Distance (m) 0.03bar 0.1bar 0.3bar
Aliphatic Compound Vinyl Acetate Monomer
25 15.78 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
50 63.13 2F 102 55 37 3D 98 53 36 5D 86 48 34
Line Rupture 2346.07 2F 1152 939 924 3D 1032 868 858 5D 1159 907 813
Acetic Acid 25 17.16 2F 19 29 56 3D 17 25 46 5D - - -
50 68.64 2F 117 67 48 3D 102 55 37 5D 91 50 35
Line Rupture 2403.44 2F 458 212 121 3D 498 229 129 5D 529 254 152
Glycol 25 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
50 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Line Rupture - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -
Others Diesel 25 16.02 2F 98 59 44
3D 84 47 33 5D 75 43 31
50 64.10 2F 203 121 90 3D 183 106 78 5D 163 98 74
Line Rupture 9528.49 2F 615 285 162 3D 671 303 166 5D 792 366 208
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.34
Part II: Risk Mitigation Measures 7.6 Introduction
The scope of the study covers mitigation measures based on Maximum
Credible Accident (MCA) Analysis. The Fire and Explosion Indices were computed
for the identification and screening of vulnerable sections and consequence analysis
was carried out for the accidental release scenarios of hazardous chemicals at
various atmospheric conditions. The following are mitigation measures for pipeline
hazards.
7.7 Pipeline Hazards Pipeline External Corrosion Protection and Monitoring:
Pipeline should be epoxy coated line with 4” PUF insulation and HDPE top
sheath. Periodic intelligent pigging survey and pipe-to-soil potential surveys shall be
conducted for pipeline health monitoring in accordance with the requirement of codes
and best industry practices. Following are some common design criteria used in
insulation system design for piping application
Providing personnel protection
Limiting or retarding surface condensation
Providing process control
Economic optimization or energy conservation
Providing fire protection
Providing freeze protection
Providing noise control
Pigging Facilities: For maintenance of the pipeline, pig launching and pig-receiving facilities
should be provided at the beginning and end. The launchers and receivers should be
suitable for intelligent pigging.
Pigging is partly an experience-driven technique. From a wide selection of
pig types, the knowledge operator must choose an appropriate model, design the
pigging protocol including pig speed, distance and driving force and assess the
progress during the operation. The evaluator should be satisfied that the pigging
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.35
operation is indeed beneficial and effective in removing corrosive products from the
line in a timely fashion.
Pipeline Testing: All welds should be radio graphed and hydrostatic testing of the pipeline
should be performed at a pressure up to 1.4 times the design pressure of the pipeline
system based on the design code requirements. The test pressure should be held for
a minimum period of 30 minutes. This will ensure complete structural integrity of the
pipeline.
Leak Detection System: State-of-the-art Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system
supported by leak detection software module, precision instrument and dedicated
communication system should be installed to monitor the integrity of the pipeline. The
shut down system of the pipeline will act to close the sectionalizing valves based on
leak detection system and will alert the pipeline operator about the potential leaks
along the pipeline route. Typically, time required to detect/confirm a leak, raising
alarm and taking action to isolate the leaking section is around 100-150 seconds.
The entire pipeline system should be monitored continuously from a control station
having a SCADA system. The remote control and monitoring is typically done from a
centralized system on a 24/7 basis. The systems are typically computer based and
most have a back-up computer and other redundant features. The centralized
SCADA system typically communicates with the field and remote devices through a
dedicated communication network such as land telephone lines, satellite system,
microwave towers, or directional radio frequencies with most systems having
reluctant communication frequencies.
The measures that should be employed to protect security of SCADA
systems include:
Maintain integrity of communication parts through out the system
Verification of transmitted signals on regular basis
Inspection of status of field devices through fixed time schedule
Regular feedback of control signals to check its reliability
Database protection from viruses to avoid system failure
Accessing control to the control centre by defined procedure
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.36
Other Safety Aspects:
The pipeline will be physically patrolled by walk-through during day to
day operational and maintenance activities, company employees
should be aware of all activities occurring around the pipeline and
report such activities to the appropriate authorities
Pipeline appurtenances like valves and meters should be painted to
prevent atmospheric corrosion
Nearby population, if any along the pipeline route should be made
aware of the safety precautions, to be taken in the event of any mishap
due to pipeline.
7.8 Pumps Preventive Maintenance Inspection Schedule for Pumps
All the following items shall be checked / recorded after the specified
period:
After 1000 running hours or 3 months whichever earlier:
Bearing lubricant (for water contamination and sediments)
Oil ring for performance
Deflector for looseness
Constant level oiler for leakage
Mechanical seal for leakage
Seal flushing/quenching system (of Mechanical Seal) for clogging and
chocking.
Cooling water flow in both the bearing housings
Condition of bearing by sound and temperature (in running condition)
Performance of all measuring instruments (Pressure/Temperature
gauges and Flow meters)
After 4000 running hours or 1 year whichever earlier:
Repeat all checks given above
Flushing of bearing with lube oil and refilling of oil to required level,
whether carried out or not
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.37
Flushing of cooling water lines and strainers to ensure proper flow of
cooling water.
Foundation, foundation bolts and supports
Replacement of old packing with new ones and condition of gland
follower, lantern ring and sleeves (in case of gland packing)
Condition of coupling, coupling bolts, nuts, spring washers and their
conformity to uniform size. Change grease in half coupling in case of
gear type
After 8000 hours or 2 years whichever earlier:
Repeat all checks given above
Condition of outboard bearing, lock nut and lock washer (in case lock
washer found damaged and lock nut loose, shaft axial play shall be
checked)
Following items of Journal bearings:
- Clearance of I/B and O/B bearings
- High spot (High Spots shall be scrapped)
- Condition of thrust bearing, lock nut and lock washer (in case lock
washer found damaged and lock nut loose, shaft axial play shall be
checked)
Pump float (adjust, if necessary)
Condition of mechanical seals
Alignment (Misalignment shall not be more than 0.05 mm)
Painting of equipment, whether carried out or not
After completing the checks listed above the pump shall be started and the
following shall be checked during the trial run (the trial run duration shall be half to
one hour for electric driven and 3 to 4 hours for diesel driven):
Discharge pressure
Suction pressure
Condition of Mechanical Seal/Gland Packing
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.38
Electric Motor load current at discharge valve shutoff and open
condition
Condition of bearing by sound and temperature
Any leakage
Vibration and shock pulse reading.
7.9 General Recommendations Fire prevention and code enforcement is one of the major areas of
responsibility for the fire service. Following are the general recommendations for the
proposed facility
Following fire fighting facilities can be used to tackle the fire
- Water supply
- Fire hydrant and monitor nozzle installation
- Foam system
- Water fog and sprinkler system
- Mobile Fire fighting equipment
Surrounding population (includes all strata of society) should be made
aware of the safety precautions to be taken in the event of any mishap
due to pipeline. This can effectively be done by conducting the safety
training programs
Shut off and isolation valves should be easily approachable in
emergencies
Periodical mock drills should be conducted so as to check the
alertness and efficiency of the DMP and EPP and records should be
maintained
Signboard including phone numbers, no smoking signs and type of
emergencies should be installed at various locations
7.10 Specific Recommendations Specific recommendations for some of the hazardous or flammable
chemical/material, equipment which is to be transported or handled on the jetty are
as follows:
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.39
Benzene: It is highly flammable and slightly toxic.
As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak area for at
least 50 meters (150 feet) in all directions
Use water spray, fog or regular foam do not use straight streams move
containers from fire area if you can do it without risk
Eliminate all ignition sources (no smoking, flares, sparks or flames in
immediate area)
All equipment used when handling the product must be grounded. Do
not touch or walk through spilled material. Stop leak if you can do it
without risk
Prevent entry into waterways, sewers, basements or confined areas
A vapour suppressing foam may be used to reduce vapours
Absorb or cover with dry earth, sand or other non-combustible material
and transfer to containers
Use clean non sparking tools to collect absorbed material
Paraxylene: It is extremely flammable and toxic. It may form explosive mixtures with air
and form vapour that can cause vapour cloud explosion.
As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak area for at
least 50 meters (150 feet) in all directions
Small fire: Dry chemical, CO2, water spray or regular foam
Large fire: Water spray, fog or regular foam. Do not use straight
streams. Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk
Eliminate all ignition sources (no smoking, flares, sparks or flames in
immediate area)
All equipment used when handling the product must be grounded
Do not touch or walk through spilled material
Prevent entry into waterways, sewers, basements or confined areas
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.40
A vapour suppressing foam may be used to reduce vapours
Phenol: It is extremely toxic and combustible at high temperatures. It is very
hazardous in case of skin contact, eye contact, and inhalation.
Special measures such as reduced loading rates and increased
monitoring must be observed during “switch loading” operation (i.e.
loading this material in tanks or shipping compartment that previously
contained middle distillates or similar products)
Personal protective equipment (PPE), including neoprene gloves and
apparel / laboratory coat, splash goggles and face shields should be
provided
Safety showers, eye wash/shower unit, supplied breathing air and self-
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) should be readily available and
properly maintained in the immediate area around phenol storage
Store phenol in a cool, dry, well-ventilated area, away from heated
surfaces or ignition sources
All personnel engaged in phenol operations must at all times wear full
protection
Vinyl Acetate: It is flammable and toxic.
Personal protective equipment (PPE), including approved respirators,
impervious gloves and apparel, splash goggles and face shields should
be provided
Vinyl acetate should be controlled at all times by storing the material in
a cool, well-ventilated location, in properly grounded vessels that
prevent static build-up
Vinyl acetate containers should be equipped with appropriate pressure
relief devices and properly vented routes for the material
Full protective personal protective equipment should be used during
any clean-up procedures
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.41
Always refer to the (Material) Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for guidance
on the appropriate personal protective equipment to be used and on
the safe handling of this material
Acetic Acid: Acetic acid is corrosive and flammable liquid.
Eliminate all ignition sources (no smoking, flares, sparks or flames in
immediate area)
If concentration is more than 10 %, the worker should immediately
wash the skin when it becomes contaminated
All equipment used when handling the product must be grounded. Do
not touch or walk through spilled material. Stop leak if you can do it
without risk
Prevent entry into waterways, sewers, basements or confined areas
A vapour suppressing foam may be used to reduce vapours. Absorb or
cover with dry earth, sand or other non-combustible material and
transfer to containers. Use clean non-sparking tools to collect absorbed
material
A wind direction pointer should be installed at storage site, so that in an
emergency the wind direction can be directly seen and downwind
population cautioned
- Signboards including phone numbers, no smoking signs and type
of emergencies should be increased to cover all the locations of the
plant
Glycol: Glycol is combustible and non-toxic.
Extinguish with alcohol-resistant foam, carbon dioxide, dry powder or
water fog
Self-contained breathing apparatus and full protective clothing must be
worn in case of fire
Wear protective gloves. Avoid contact with skin and eyes. Provide
adequate ventilation
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.42
Avoid spilling, skin and eye contact
Use protective gloves Wear approved safety goggles wear rubber
apron
Wear rubber footwear
Following are the additional measures recommended based on study
finding and the extent of damage distances and precautions.
A wind direction pointer should be installed at storage site, so that in an
emergency the wind direction can be directly seen and downwind
population can be cautioned
7.11 Electricity Hazard All electrical equipments shall be provided with proper earthing.
Earthed electrode shall periodically tested and maintained
Emergency lighting shall be available at all critical locations including
the operator’s room to carry out safe shut down, ready identification of
fire fighting facilities such as fire water pumps and fire alarm stations
All electrical equipments shall be free from carbon dust, oil deposits,
and grease
Use of approved insulated tools, rubber mats, shockproof gloves and
boots, tester, fuse tongs, discharge rod, safety belt, hand lamp,
wooden or insulated ladder and not wearing metal ring and chain
Flame and shock detectors and central fire annunciation system for fire
safety should be provided
Temperature sensitive alarm and protective relays to make alert and
disconnect equipment before overheating
Prevent higher humidity and temperature near electric insulations
Danger from excess current due to overload or short circuit should be
prevented by providing fuses, circuit breakers, thermal protection
Carbon dioxide, halon or dry chemical fire extinguishers are to be used
for electrical fires
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.43
7.12 Oil Leak Plan An Oil leak contingency plan is an important working document that
identifies the oil leak risks, the appropriate response strategies, the
resources required to submit a response and the training and exercises
necessary to ensure practicality and effectiveness of the plan. The
purpose of this document is to provide guidance for the Disaster
Management groups of the Reliance Jamnagar Marine Terminal
(RJMT)
7.12.1 Causes of Disasters Human failure
Accident
Sabotage
Act of God/Natural calamity
7.12.2 Types of emergency that could arise in jetty berths, anchorage Leak during cargo transfer operations Spill during berthing / collision
Slop tank over flow at jetty / ship
Grounding of ship
Mishaps at the tanker terminal.
7.12.3 Levels of Oil Spill Oil spills have been categorised based on tiered response according to the
guidelines given by IMO. These are as follows:
Tier 1:
Operational spillage, which can be dealt with using the resources
immediately available
Tier 2:
Medium sized spillage, which exceed operating companies resources
and require ICG assistance
Tier 3:
Large spillage, which may require National level response
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.44
7.12.4 Objectives of the Oil Leak Plan This plan is intended to assist in dealing with an accidental
discharge/leak of oil
Its primary purpose is to set in motion the necessary actions to stop or
minimise the discharge and to mitigate its effects
This plan guides the HOD Marine and his Duty Staff through the
decisions which will be required in an incident response
For this plan to be effective, it must be:
- Familiar to those marine terminal staff with key response functions
- Regularly exercised
- Reviewed and updated on a regular basis
The pollution control team response should be within 15 minutes
To prepare an organisational chart identifying personnel to coordinate
during oil leak and assign responsibilities on specific functions to be
carried out
To ensure efficient communication process as the communication
plays an important role in the efficient management of an oil leak
response
To identify mutual aid programmes with nearby industries
To ensure adequacy and efficiency of pollution response equipment
such as booms, skimmer etc, personnel protective appliances, medical
services & safety and pollution response training of staff
To prepare a map for showing linkage with other areas and display
them at vantage locations
To maintain weather conditions of each season of local areas
(temperature, wind speed and wind direction) for the instant
identification of evacuation procedure
To maintain the surrounding area map showing location of villages,
industries, hospitals, police stations, rehabilitation centres and
evacuation routes
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.45
7.13 Risks to Personnel Good safety management, strict adherence to safety management
procedures and competency assurance will reduce the risk. Safety practices are
needed to carry out jobs safely and without causing any injury to self, colleagues and
system.
For total safety of any operation, each team member must religiously
follow the safety practices / procedures pertaining to respective operational area. If
every team member starts working with this attitude, zero accident rates is not a
distant dream.
Any operation is a team effort and its success depends upon the sincerity,
efficiency and motivation of all team members. Safety in such operations is not a duty
of a single person, but it is everyone's job.
7.14 Training On job training to the engineers on various facets of risk analysis would go
a long way in improving their horizon which in turn is expected to reflect in the
operation of the facility, especially from the safety stand point. In order to combat with
emergency situations arising out of accident release of hazardous chemicals, it is
necessary for industries to prepare an exhaustive offsite and onsite emergency
preparedness plan.
7.15 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) provides additional protection to
workers exposed to workplace hazards in conjunction with other facility controls and
safety systems.
PPE is considered to be a last resort that is above and beyond the other
facility controls and provides the worker with an extra level of personal protection.
Table 7.15 presents general examples of occupational hazards and types of PPE
available for different purposes. Recommended measures for use of PPE in the
workplace include:
Active use of PPE if alternative technologies, work plans or procedures
cannot eliminate, or sufficiently reduce, a hazard or exposure
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.46
Identification and provision of appropriate PPE that offers adequate
protection to the worker, co-workers, and occasional visitors, without
incurring unnecessary inconvenience to the individual
Proper maintenance of PPE, including cleaning when dirty and
replacement when damaged or worn out. Proper use of PPE should be
part of the recurrent training programs for Employees
Selection of PPE should be based on the hazard and risk ranking
described earlier in this section, and selected according to criteria on
performance and testing established
Table 7.15 Summary of Recommended Personal Protective Equipment
According to Hazard
Objective Workplace Hazards Suggested PPE
Eye and face protection
Flying particles, molten metal, liquid chemicals, gases or vapors, light radiation
Safety glasses with side-shields, protective shades, etc.
Head protection
Falling objects, inadequate height clearance, and overhead power cords
Plastic helmets with top and side impact protection
Hearing protection
Noise, ultra-sound Hearing protectors (ear plugs or ear muffs)
Foot protection
Failing or rolling objects, points objects. Corrosive or hot liquids
Safety shoes and boots for protection against moving and failing objects, liquids and chemicals
Hand protection
Hazardous materials, cuts or lacerations, vibrations, extreme temperatures
Gloves made of rubber or synthetic material (Neoprene), leather, steel, insulation materials, etc.
Respiratory protection
Dust, fogs, fumes, mists, gases, smokes, vapors
Facemasks with appropriate filters for dust removal and air purification (chemical, mists, vapors and gases). Single or multi-gas personal monitors, if available
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.47
Part III: Approach to Disaster Management Plan 7.16 Disaster (Emergency)
A disaster or an emergency in a jetty occurs as a result of a malfunctioning
of the normal operating procedures or an intervention of outside forces such as
cyclone, earthquake, flood or sabotage, and may affect several sections within it
and/or may cause serious disruption outside the works. Apart from earthquakes,
cyclones, flood, arson and sabotage, accidents may take place through explosion in
the boilers, heavy leakage and/or subsequent fire in the oil storage tanks, streams
etc.
Reliance Jamnagar Marine Terminal (RJMT) has a Liquid jetty, marine
terminal dedicated for handling of liquid and gaseous chemicals which are
transferred through pipelines to new berths. The jetty handles products like HSD,
Paraxylene, Benzene, petrochemical naphtha, MEG, Acetic acid etc. A Disaster
Management Plan (DMP) has been delineated to tackle emergencies which may
arise due to handling of chemicals at the jetty.
7.17 Objective of ‘On-site Emergency Plan’ An on-site emergency is caused by an accident that takes place in the jetty
and the effects are confined to the jetty premises involving the people working over
there. The On-site Emergency Plan dealing with eventualities is the responsibility of
the occupier, who is to prepare/implement necessary measures to contain the
severity of cause of disaster to the bare minimum.
Apart from the provisions in the Hazardous Chemicals Rules 1989,
Section 41B(4) of the Factories Act, 1948 (as amended) also states that every
occupier is to draw up an On-site Emergency Plan with detailed disaster control
measures for the factory premises. The obligation of an occupier of hazardous
chemicals to prepare an emergency plan are stipulated in Rule 13 of the
Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989. The
general public living in the vicinity are also to be informed and educated about
safety measures and actions required to be taken in the event of an accident.
The preparation of an on-site emergency plan furnishing relevant information
to the District Emergency Authority for the preparation of the off-site
emergency plan are statutory responsibilities of the occupier of every industry
and other units handling hazardous substances. An on-site emergency plan
should contain the following key elements:
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.48
Safeguard the personnel located in the premises
Minimise damage to property and environment
Organise rescue and treatment of affected persons
Initially contain and ultimately bring the incident under control
Identify any casualties
Provide authoritative information to the news media
Secure the safe rehabilitation of affected persons
Preserve relevant records and equipment for the subsequent enquiry
into the cause and circumstances of emergency
7.18 Identification of Major Hazard Potential 7.18.1 Major Hazard Potential Assessment
The major disasters or emergencies usually occurs from one or any
combination of the following
Slow isolated fires
Fast spreading fires
Explosions
Bursting of pipe lines/vessels
Uncontrolled release of flammable gases/dust.
Floods
7.18.2 Fire Hazard Cables in galleries and on trays in all sections
Fuel oil handling and oil tanks during transfer
Transformer oil handling and oil tanks
7.18.3 Explosion Hazard Turbo generators
Transformer
Boiler
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.49
7.18.4 Bursting of Pipe Lines and Vessels Steam pipes due to high pressure/temperature
Natural Gas lines
7.18.5 Release of Gases/Dust Flue gases from the ducts
7.18.6 Release of Liquid Handling and storage of chemicals
Fuel oil tanks in fuel oil handling section
7.19 Facilities Envisaged 7.19.1 Fire Fighting Facilities at the Jetty
The jetty would be protected against fire hazard and would be well
equipped with fire protection systems. The jetty would also have its own fire fighting
Team. The details of the fire fighting facilities that should be planned at the
jetty are furnished below.
7.19.1.1 Fire Protection System A comprehensive Fire detection and protection system is envisaged
for the complete jetty. This system shall confirm to the recommendations of TAC
(INDIA)/IS:
3034 & NFPA-850: The following protection systems are envisaged:
i) Hydrant system for complete jetty covering main jetty building,
boiler area, turbine and its auxiliaries, all pump houses and miscellaneous buildings
of the jetty. The system shall be complete with piping, valves, instrumentation,
hoses, nozzles, hose boxes/stations etc.
ii) Foam injection system for fuel oil/storage tanks consisting of foam
concentrate tanks, in-line inductors, valves, piping & instrumentation etc.
iii) Automatic high velocity water spray system for all transformers
located in transformer yard and those of rating 10 MVA and above located
within the boundary limits of site, main and unit turbine oil tanks and purifier,
turbine oil/lube oil piping (zoned) in turbine area, generator seal oil system,
lube oil system for turbine driven boiler feed pumps, boiler burner fronts etc.
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.50
This system shall consist of detectors, deluge valves projectors, valves, piping
&instrumentation.
iv) Automatic medium velocity water spray system for un-insulated
fuel oil tanks storing fuel oil having flash point C and below consisting of QB
detectors deluge valves, nozzles, piping, instrumentation, etc.
v) A analogue, addressable type early warning for detection and
alarm system is provided to cover the complete jetty. An ionisation type smoke
detection system is installed particularly for the Control rooms, Switch gear ,Battery,
UPS rooms, MCC room of DM Jetty, Air Compressor, Pump house, Switch
yard control rooms, Fuel oil system, areas below false ceiling of main jetty
and switch yard control room, and inside the cubicles of main jetty and
control equipment room.
7.19.1.2 Fire Fighting System A full-fledged fire fighting system has been set up at the jetty that
would be operated by the fire fighting personnel. The fire fighting system is
equipped with the required facilities to handle the fire promptly and actively .
Apart from all necessary safety and fire fighting appliances, the fire fighting
team is equipped with the following special facilities like breathing apparatus
set, fireman fire suit (NOMEX-3 layer), aluminised fibre glass suit. Adequate
staff will be deployed for fire fighting system in emergencies.
7.19.1.3 Other Aspects available in the Existing Jetty Additionally, following aspects are also functional in the existing jetty:
Emergency water showers are provided near the storage area of acid
and alkali
Emergency Control Centre (ECC): Emergency Control Room will
be set up and marked on the site plan for the knowledge of all
concerned. ECC is the focal point and it will be connected with the
internal and external telephones and furnished with list of personnel
and their addresses, wireless, wind direction and speed indicator etc.
The ECC will be manned by Site Main Controller and Site
Incident Controller. Emergency Co-ordinator, officials nominated as
key personnel and senior officers of outside services called in or
assistance
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.51
Assembly Points: Assembly points, the predetermined safe places,
where people are directed after evacuation from the hazardous locality
have been set up
Alarms: suitable sirens are provided in the jetty for fire, off-site
emergency and “all clear”. The coding of the siren will be as per the
codes given in the DMP
Mutual Aid: There is a mutual aid arrangements made with the
neighbouring facilities which would help in the case of a major disaster.
7.20 Medical Facilities In an emergency, the nearest hospital equipped with all necessary
following facilities should be informed:
Ambulance
Beds
Doctors
Specialists
Medical Staff (other than Doctors)
Emergency Organisation: An emergency organisation is established depending upon the level of
emergency. The organogram of the emergency management team showing the
reporting of various key members for different levels of emergency are as per the
charts below:
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.52
Organization Chart for Oil Leak Management:
(On Scene Commander) Duty Port Captain / HoD Marine
Shift Security Officer
Jetty Officer Jetty Pilot Captain of
the VesselVTC
Officer
Shift Fire Manager
Shift Male Nurse
Fig. 7.2: Level-1 Emergency Organogram
RJMT Organogram:
Fig. 7.3: Level-2 & Level-3 Emergency Organogram
CHIEF, MARINE OPERATIONS
DEPUTY HEAD OF DEPARTMENT
MARINE
E & M
SECTION HEAD ELECTRICAL / MECH / INSTR
CHIEF PORT-
ENGINEER
DUTY PORT CAPTAIN (S)
DAY PORT CAPTAIN
PILOT(S)
IMS Co-ordinator & OR PFSO
Engineer Superintendent
Technical Officer (Dy. Manager)
MECH / ELECT / INST MAINT
ENGR (S)
BOARDING OFFICER (S)
MEDICAL OFFICER(S)
JETTY OFFICER
(S)
VTCO (S)
PANEL OFFICER (S)
(MTF)
HEAD OM& S
SITE PRESIDENT
CHIEF OF OPERATIONS
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.53
Key Members & their Responsibilities: Level-1 Emergency Responsibility of Jetty / SPM Officer
Jetty/SPM Officer
Responsibilities Observe or receive report of oil spill incident
Initiate measures to prevent/reduce further spillage
Maintain communication with other all vessels
Step Actions Additional Information
Alert Duty Port Captain Tugs and other support / response craft
VHF Channel 67
Initial Actions Stop all cargo operations
Verify incident details
Advise all relevant information to Duty Port Captain or SPM Pilot
Initiate personal log
Place tugs/other response craft on stand-by
Further Actions Brief Duty Port Captain / SPM Pilot as necessary
Mobilise response equipment / personnel as directed by Duty Port Captain
Maintain personal log of communications and events
Act as instructed by Duty Port Captain / SPM Pilot
Final Actions Submit personal log to HOD Marine
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.54
Responsibility of Jetty Pilot:
Jetty Pilot
Responsibilities Assist Duty Port Captain
Unberthing / movement of vessels
Step Actions Additional Information
Alert
Initial Actions Proceed to incident location or POC as requested by Duty Port Captain
Assume role of On-Scene Co-ordinator until relieved by Duty Port Captain
Communicate relevant information to Port Office
Initiate personal log
Assist Duty Port Captain in conduct of response
Further Actions Liaise with response craft / response teams as instructed by the Duty Port Captain
Keep full log of communications and events
Final Actions Submit personal log to HOD Marine
Attend debrief
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.55
Responsibility of Duty Port Captain / HOD Marine:
Duty Port Captain / HOD Marine
Responsibilities Initially assess situation
Verify classification
Provide accurate situation reports to Port Office/HOD Marine
Collect evidence and / or statements
Liaise with Head-Environment (if applicable)
Liaise with incident vessel regarding status of oil spill (if applicable)
Follow Notification Matrix
Step Actions Additional Information
Alert
Initial Actions Proceed to incident location, assume role of On-Scene Commander
Investigate cause / source of spill
Communicate all information to HOD Marine
Ensure samples of spilled oil taken
Initiate personal log
Take photographic evidence
Collect evidence and take statements
Stopped or ongoing
Instruct boat crew directly or via Port Controller.
Refer Mar-Ops-05
Further Actions Ensure resources are being deployed as required
Provide co-ordination of the at-sea response
Direct any dispersant spraying operations
Provide detailed situation reports to HOD Marine
Survey the shoreline
Liaise with Head-Environment
Liaise with Head-Fire (if appropriate)
Final Actions Submit personal log to HOD Marine
Attend debrief
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.56
Responsibility of HOD Marine:
HOD Marine
Responsibilities Confirm / amend initial classification Manage the RJMT response Authorize expenditure Brief President Liaise with Coast Guard Monitor as appropriate Approve press statements for release
Step Actions Additional Information
Alert Coast Guard External organizations
Refer Section 9
Initial Actions Verify / amend spill classification Confirm external organizations have been alerted Convene Oil Spill Management Team Predict slick movement Authorize mobilization of contract labour for shoreline clean-up if appropriate Liaise with vessel Agents / Owners as appropriate
Refer Section 5 Refer Section 9
Further Actions Chair the Oil Spill Management Team meetings Constantly review the strategy being employed and advise of changes where necessary Approve all expenditure commitments Brief President Attend all press conferences as required Agree press statements with Corporate Public Relations Chief /President Confirm formal samples have been taken Advise Coast Guard Monitor if oil migrates outside of Local Area
Final Actions Terminate the clean-up Collate personal logs Prepare the incident report Hold full debrief involving all members Amend contingency plan as required
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.57
Responsibility of VTC Officer:
VTC Officer
Responsibilities In-charge of communication, notification Log keeping in emergency logbook, coast guard forms
Step Actions Additional Information
Alert Harbour Chief HOD Marine Tugs and support crafts Ships in the terminal area Coast guard (Under the instructions of On scene commander) Follow Notification Matrix
VHF Channel 71 VHF Channel 71 Telephone/Fax directory Annexure XXI Annexure XXII
Initial Actions Raise alarm Alert all vessels/ support crafts/tugs on VHF channel 71 and advise them to change over to VHF channel 67 Alert all concerned people as per notification matrix under the instruction of On scene Commander Record all events in emergency log and blank forms as per Coast Guard requirement Send Navigation warning to all crafts
VHF Channel 71/67 Telephone/Fax directory Annexure XXI
Further Actions Co-ordinate communications with On Scene Commander and other parties as required Maintain watch on VHF Channel 67 Maintain personal log of communications and events Act as instructed by On scene Commander
Final Actions Submit personnel log to HOD Marine Attend debrief
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.58
Responsibility of Panel Officer:
Panel Officer
Responsibilities In-charge of product/crude transfer operations
Communication with plant personnel
Keeping log of actions taken during Emergency
Step Actions Additional Information
Alert MTF Control Room
Fire Control Room
Fire water pump room
Follow Notification Matrix
Telephone/Fax directory
Annexure XXI
Annexure XXII
Initial Actions Raise alarm
Take actions to stop the leak by way of stopping pumps, activating ESD, etc.
Record all actions taken in emergency log
Further Actions Maintain personal log of actions taken
Act as instructed by On scene Commander
Final Actions Submit personnel log to HOD Marine
Attend debrief
7.21 Action Plan The action plan has been drawn which comprises the following features:
First information
Responsibilities of Site Main Controller (SMC)
Responsibilities of Site Incident Controller (SIC)
Responsibilities for declaration of emergency
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.59
Responsibilities of Emergency Co-ordinator (EC)
Responsibilities of key personnel
Responsibilities and actions to be taken by essential staff and
various teams during emergency
Responsibilities for all clear signals.
7.21.1 First Information The first person who observes/identifies the hazardous incident shall
inform, by shouting or by telephone, to the Shift Engineer/Control room about
the hazard. The Shift Engineer will inform to Site Main Controller (SMC), Site
Incident Controller (SIC) and Emergency Co-ordinator, who shall communicate it
to all key personnel about the incident.
7.21.2 Responsibilities of Site Main Controller (SMC) The Site Main Controller on knowing about the hazardous incident
will immediately rush to the incident site and take overall charge and inform the
same to SIC. On arrival, he will assess the extent of emergency and decide if a
major emergency exists and inform the Emergency Co-ordinator, Liasoning officer
accordingly. Following are the responsibilities of Site Main Controller
Decide (if not already decided) whether a major emergency exists or is
likely requiring the emergency services and the off-site emergency plan
Exercise operational control of emergency situation (other then
jetty operational activities) in consultation with the Site incident
controller
Take overall charge of Fire fighting and other emergency operations
Continually review and assess developments and determine the most
probable course of events
Direct evacuation of all, in consultation with the site incident controller
and key jetty personnel
Ensure the casualties are receiving proper attention/first aid and
send to hospital if necessary
Liaison with the fire service and police services
Control the traffic movement within the works
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.60
Co-ordinate with accident management teams
Direct all operations to stop within the affected area taking into
consideration priorities for safety of personnel, minimize damage
to the jetty property and environment and minimize loss of materials
7.21.3 Responsibilities of Site Incident Controller (SIC) The Site Incident Controller will assume overall responsibilities for the
factory / storage site and its personnel in case of any emergency. His responsibilities
would be:
Assess the scale of the incident and take decisions as may be required
Initiate the emergency procedures with the help of available Jetty
Personnel (Field Engineer, Support staff) to secure the safety of
employees, minimize the damage to jetty and property and minimize
the loss of material
Direct rescue and fire-fighting operations
Search for casualties
Arrange for evacuation of non-essential workers to assembly areas
Setup a communication point with the emergency control center –
Jetty Control room
Assume the responsibilities of the site main controller till the person
arrives
Provide support to the emergency services as requested
Issue jetty shut down Instructions in consultation with Jetty Head
(if time permits). Otherwise, depending on the nature of emergency,
he is authorized to initiate any action for protection of Life and Jetty
property
Issue verbal communication to maintenance engineer after
completing all necessary isolations and precautions, this will be
treated as permit to attend emergency situations
Ensure that all clear siren is given in consultation with Site Main
Controller when emergency has been brought under control
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.61
7.21.4 Responsibility for Declaration of Major Emergency The Site Main Controller on hearing the hazardous incident shall proceed
to the scene of the incident, make an informal assessment of the situation and
decide whether a major emergency exists or is likely to develop. He will take the
decision to inform the Jetty Head, SIC and Emergency Co-ordinator and
activate the major emergency procedure. The Site Main Controller who has
knowledge and experience to recognise the occurrence of a major emergency
or the potential for it, will declare a major emergency in consultation with the
Site Incident Controller. Once the emergency alarm is raised, the works
emergency procedures will be activated.
7.21.4.1 Making the Emergency Known inside the Jetty The major emergency will be made known to everyone inside the jetty by
re-sounding the alarm.
7.21.4.2 Emergency Message On receiving the intimation that emergency has been declared,
SMC/SIC will rush to the affected/likely to be affected areas and announce
through fixed/mobile The announcement would be made by the concerned
official in local language and English. Similarly, announcement of termination of
emergency would also be made.
7.21.5 Responsibilities of Emergency Co-ordinator (EC) Panel engineer in control room will assume the charge of emergency
co-coordinator till any of safety committee member reports at control room and
assumes the charge of emergency coordinator On hearing the emergency alarm, he
will proceed to the emergency control centre. His responsibilities would be to:
Communicate between the emergency control teams and with the
outside world viz. the fire, police & medical services
Seek help from external agencies under the instructions of SIC & / or
SMC
Establish communication and intimate other jetties in the vicinity
of the probable danger to their jetty and the precautions that can be
taken
Take down all communications coming to the emergency control room
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.62
Pass emergency messages as is required
Monitor the situation continuously
A range for vehicles to be available on standby
A range to gear up the first aid centre for casualties depending upon
the type of accident
7.21.6 Key Personnel Apart from Site Main Controller and Site incident controller, other works
personnel will play viral roles in providing advice and in implementing the decisions
made by the Site Incident Controller. The key personnel would include:
Safety Committee and First-Aid: This team will be headed by one of the Safety Committee members.
The responsibilities of this team are:
Confirm that partly loaded tankers leave the premises.
Ensure that people who are not assigned any work during the period of
the emergency are assembled in the assembly area.
Control traffics and keeps route open for external help.
Provide First Aid to the injured personnel.
Inform the nearest hospital and call ambulance as needed or co-
ordinate with SIC and arrange vehicle to move injured to the hospital.
Liaison Team: The PRO or the nominated person shall carry out all liaison
activities with the factory inspector, the pollution control board, the media, district
collector, the port trust authority, NGOs etc in consultation with Jetty Head.
Maintenance Team:
Mechanical Maintenance
C&I Maintenance
Electrical Maintenance
Chemist
Head of Personnel and Administration.
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.63
Head of Safety
Medical Officer
Fire & Security Officer
Head of Safety
Medical Officer
Fire & Security Officer
A list of key personnel and their phone numbers shall be provided to all
concerned. If necessary, they will decide the actions needed to shut down jetty,
evacuate personnel, carry out emergency engineering works, arrange for supplies of
equipment, personnel etc, carry out air quality tests, provide catering facilities,
liaison with police, informing relatives of the victims, press media etc.
7.22 Responsibilities of Key Personnel 7.22.1 Departmental Heads
The department heads will provide assistance as required by the Site Main
Controller. They will decide which members of their departments are required at the
incident site.
7.22.2 HOD (Personnel & Administration) The following duties would be assigned:
Report to Site Main Controller
Ensure that all non-essential workers in the affected areas are
evacuated to assembly points in consultation with the Site Incident
Controller
Receive reports from nominated persons from assembly points
and pass on the required information service
Keep liaison with other coordinators to meet the requirements of
services such as materials, security management, transportation,
medical, canteen facilities etc as required during emergency
Be in constant touch with the Site Main Controller and feed him
with correct information of the situation
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.64
Give information to press, public and authorities concerned on
instructions from the Site Main Controller/Site Incident Controller
Ensure that the injured receive adequate attention at medical
centres and arrange necessary additional help and inform relatives of
the injured
Make the entire auto base vehicles ready to proceed for
evacuation or other duties, when called for
Make all arrangements regarding transportation
7.22.3 Medical Officer/Male Nurse The Medical Officer/Male Nurse will render treatment to the injured
and if necessary, will shift the injured to nearby hospitals. Medical Officer will
mobilise extra medical help from outside if necessary. Medical Officer will keep a list
of qualified first aiders of the factory.
7.22.4 Fire & Security Officer On hearing the siren, he will:
Arrange to control the traffic at the gate and the incident area
Direct the security staff to the incident site to take part in the
emergency operations under his guidance and supervision
Evacuate the people in the jetty or in the nearby areas as advised by
the Site Main Controller after arranging transportation through transport
in-charge
Allow only those people who are associated with handling emergencies
Maintain law and order in the area, if necessary with the co-
operation of the police
Maintain communication with Site Incident Controller/Site Main
Controller and Emergency Co-ordinator
Guide the fire fighting crew i.e. firemen and trained jetty personnel and
shifts the fire fighting facilities to the emergency site
Take guidance of the Site Main Controller for fire fighting as well as
assessing the requirement of outside help
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.65
7.23 Essential Staff In the affected areas or likely to be affected areas as decided by
the Site Main Controller/Site Incident Controller, efforts will be needed to
initiate shutdown and make the process units safe. The following employees/staffs
will also be required to help in the above works.
Attendants
First Aiders
Personnel for emergency work engineering, such as providing extra
lighting and providing temporary bypass of the works
Personnel for transporting equipment to the incident site from other
parts of the works
Personnel for moving tankers or vessels from areas of risk
Personnel for acting as messengers in case of communication
difficulties
Personnel for manning jetty entrance in liaison with the police to
direct emergency vehicles entering the jetty, to control traffic leaving
the jetty and to turn away or make alternate arrangements for
visitors and other traffic arriving at the jetty. It is the responsibility of
the Site Incident Controller to identify the above essential staff and
form a task force which would report at defined jetty control centres
so that they can be readily contacted. It is the responsibility of the
Site Incident Controller to remove all non-essential staff to assembly
points
7.23.1 Maintenance Team This group would assist:
Isolate the remaining jetty and keep this area in safe condition
Organize safe shutdown of jetty if necessary
Attend all emergency maintenance jobs on top priority
Organise all support services as operation of fire pumps, sprinkler
system etc.
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.66
Take steps to contain or reduce the level of hazard created due to
disaster
Organise additional facilities as desired
7.23.2 Fire Fighting Team In case fire erupts and emergency is due to fire, the fire fighting
team would be required.
Rush to the spot and extinguish the fire
Seek help from outside fire fighting agencies
Evacuate persons affected due to whatever reasons
7.23.3 Security Team Their responsibilities would include:
Manning of all gates
Barring entry of unauthorised persons
Permitting with minimum delay the entry of authorised personnel
and outside agencies, vehicles etc.
Allowing the ambulance/evacuation vehicles etc. to go through the
gates without normal check
7.23.4 Administration Team This team would be responsible for:
Rescue of the casualties on priority basis
Transporting the casualties to first aid places or medical centres
Accounting of the personnel
Helping to search the missing personnel
Passing information to the kith and kin of the fatal or seriously injured
persons
7.23.5 Safety Team This group would be dedicated to:
Arrange required safety equipment
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.67
Measure gas concentration in case of gas leakage at various places
Guide authorities on all safety related issues
Record accidents
Collect and preserve evidences in connection with accident inquires
7.23.6 Medical Team The medical team would be entrusted with the following duties:
To arrange first aid materials/stretchers immediately and reach them to
the site of incident
To arrange for immediate medical attention
To arrange for transporting the casualties to various hospitals and
nursing homes etc.
To ask specific medical assistance from external agencies including
specialists in consultation with SIC/SMC
7.24 Oil / Chemical Spill Contingency Plan The oil spill could occur due to various reasons at SPMs, Product jetty,
anchorage or approach channel. The spills beyond these areas are not covered in
this plan. These can be broadly classified into the following scenarios.
7.24.1 Leak during Cargo Transfer Operations During cargo transfer operation oil spill can occur either on the shore side
or the ship side due to leakage from flange joints, rupture of hose, etc. Most of these
leaks will be minor in nature due to the various safety interlocks/ other features
provided in the design. Further during cargo transfer operation supervision by
operating personnel is also carried out.
7.24.2 Spill during Berthing / Collision During berthing operation damage to the ship can occur due to contact
with tugs, jetty or other ship due to improper handling or machinery failure, leading to
leakage of bunker or cargo. The quantity of spill will depend on the nature of / extent
of damage.
7.24.3 Slop Tank Overflow at Jetty / Ship Overflow possibility is very remote. It can occur if the instrumentation
system fails and the pump does not start automatically or level instrument is faulty.
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7.68
On ship, it can happen if watch-keeping practices are poor or due to poor ship/shore
co-ordination.
7.24.4 Grounding of Ship This can occur if steering or propulsion system of the ship fails in the
channel.
7.24.5 Fire and Explosion Fires and explosions on board ship represent a safety hazard with the risk
of oil.
7.24.6 Spillage of Fuel Oil Fuel oil bunkers will not be supplied to tankers moored to the SPM buoys.
It may, therefore, be necessary for vessels to undertake the internal transfer of fuel
oil for trim or other operational reasons. A bunker tank overflow during such
operations could result in spillages of <1 tonne.
7.24.7 Spillage due to Cargo / COW Piping Failure Spillage of cargo can occur due to failure of deck piping or valve glands
during discharge operations or during COW operations. Good ship board
maintenance and efficient watch keeping will ensure that these are kept to minimum
and detected early to avoid any spillage into water.
Important Contacts: Reliance Industries Ltd. HOD Marine
Sector Chief Tel: 6613607 6613675/6613863
Coast Guard Station Vadinar
Commandant Dy. Commandant
Tel: 256534 Tel: 256560/256970
Gujarat Maritime Board, Jamnagar
The Port officer Tel: 0288-2711806 / 05, 2755207 Fax: 0288-27111815
Gujarat Maritime Board, Gandhinagar
Ex. Officer (GMB)
Tel: 079-23238346/47/48 Fax: 079-23234703/04
Indian Oil Corporation Limited
DGM in Charge of Terminal
Tel: 256527 (office hours) Tel: 256567 (out of hours)
Essar Oil Ltd., Vadinar Capt. Deepak Sachdeva, COOVOTL
Tel: 02833-241377 M : 9925153618
Bharat Oman Refineries Ltd., Vadinar
Sh P. R. Thatte (VP, Projects)
Tel: 02833-256451 (M): 91-9727206501
Kandla Port Trust, Vadinar
Chief operation Manager
Tel: 02833-256749 / 256540 Fax: 02833-256749 / 256540
State Pollution Control Board, Jamnagar
Regional Officer Tel: 2753540/ 2752366 / 2756514
Kandla Port Trust, Gandhidham
Ex. Officer (KPT) Tel: 02836 238055 / 233001 Fax: 02836 232040
Ministry of Environment Gujarat
J K Vyas Director (Environment)
Tel: 079 23222095/96 Fax: 079 23232161
Jamnagar Police (Control room)
Tel: 2550200
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.69
7.25 Natural Disaster 7.25.1 Earthquake
An earthquake is the result of a sudden release of energy in
the Earth's crust that creates seismic waves. At the Earth's surface, earthquakes
manifest themselves by vibration, shaking and sometimes displacement of the
ground. The vibrations may vary in magnitude. Earthquakes are caused mostly by
slippage within geological faults, but also by other events such as volcanic activity,
landslides, mine blasts, and nuclear tests.
Emergency management professionals are responsible for assessing risks
and hazards and identifying potential emergencies and disasters. Emergency
operations personnel recommend appropriate prevention or mitigation strategies that
can reduce the impact of potential emergencies. Large, complex emergencies such
as earthquakes often affect multiple departments or multiple agencies and require
data to be collected and assembled from a variety of locations quickly under adverse
conditions. Part of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) role is to understand the
details of the emergency, order the required response resources, coordinate with
adjoining agencies, and determine the immediate actions necessary to contain the
incident.
Flow chart for Earthquake Emergency Response Plan is given below:
PORT/ TERMINAL CONTROL
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM
DUTY MANAGER
TERMINAL CONTROL
HARBOUR MASTER / PORT MANAGER
HARBOUR TUGS / HARBOUR CRAFTS
LIQ. CARRIER / PILOT
COUNTRY CRISIS MGT TEAM
MEDICAL
INCIDENT CONTROLLER
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7.70
Following are the actions to be taken by various key persons and jetty
teams to tackle floods caused by earthquake effectively.
Observation Action
Port Control Room Inform Terminal Control
Inform Liquid Jetty Carrier / Pilot
Inform Harbour tugs/ crafts
Terminal Control Inform Duty Manager
Stop discharge from Liquid Jetty Cargo
Terminal Superintendent
Stop Liquid Jetty Cargo discharging
Head Count / Safe Rescue of Personnel
Isolate / water curtains
Stop Terminal Operations
Liquid Jetty Cargo Inform Pilot
Stop Discharge of Liquid Jetty, Isolate/ESD
Master Pilot to bridge
Vessels engines to immediate readiness
Prepare for vacating the berth
Pilot Tugs/mooring boats standby for use
Consider vacating the berth
Port Manager/Harbour To be in VHF contact with Pilot
Master Inform Emergency Response Team
Assess situation
Medical Medical assistance
7.25.2 Flood Following mitigation measures are recommended to tackle flood disaster.
Focus resources on minimizing the spread of water into other areas of
the jetty
Protect property and records by removing items from floors and /or
covering with water resistant coverings
Attempt to move items of value to "higher ground" if possible
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
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Evacuate personnel as needed. Utilize the fire alarm system if an
immediate evacuation is required
Mitigation measures can be structural or non-structural. Structural
measures use technological solutions, like flood levees. Non-structural measures
include legislation, land-use planning (e.g. the designation of nonessential land like
parks to be used as flood zones), and insurance.
The response phase includes the mobilization of the necessary emergency
services and first responders in the flood area. This is likely to include a first wave of
core emergency services, such as fire-fighters, police and ambulance crews. They
may be supported by a number of secondary emergency services, such as specialist
rescue teams.
7.25.3 Cyclones and Severe Storms
Land use management should provide protection from wind and storm
surge. Engineering of structures should withstand wind forces and
water damage (including storm surge)
Building should be constructed with higher wind-resistant capacity.
Securing of elements such as metal sheeting, roofing, and fences
should be done to avoid severe damages
Safety shelters are to be arranged to tackle cyclones and storms.
Cyclone and severe weather warning systems should be installed.
Community awareness regarding cyclone risk and evacuation plan
should be properly addressed
7.26 Man-made Disaster Emergency Action Plan for Bomb Threat:
When bomb threat call is received the following measures are to be taken.
The site may receive unidentified call / information from intelligence
sources about plantation of bombs in ships, jetty, terminal, offices, vehicles and
expats residence. Safe evacuation of all staff would be ensured at the site in small
groups but away from normal assembly points. Care would be exercised to distribute
the staff in small groups preferably away from known assembly points. This is
required as terrorists may send bomb scare at site and then explode devices by
remote at assembly points to inflict greater damage. Bomb snuffing and diffusing
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan
7.72
squad would be requested from the police. All transport vehicles incoming and
outgoing would be checked for unidentified objects.
In The Location Premises: Keep the Fire Hydrant System/all Fire Fighting and Personnel protective
Equipment in readiness. Every one entering the Location must be frisked at the
Gate/check all Hand Bags, Parcels etc., for suspected explosive/dangerous objects.
Have thorough inspection of the Location for any suspected dangerous object.
Materials and other Boxes to be brought in to the Location must be
deposited at Gate for minimum curing period of 48 Hrs.
Organize Employees Vigilance cell for round the clock observation of
industry Premises.
If Suspected object is found: In case of finding of suspected Article, do not disturb its position, but the
area around it should be cordoned off to a distance of 100 meters and more
depending upon the gravity of situation. Adequate Staff or Police Squad posted to
prevent any unauthorized entry into the enforced cordon.
Contact Controller of Explosives immediately, who on reaching the Site will
decide suitable action for defusing and disposal of the suspected object.
Evolution of thick billowing smoke is an indication of impending explosion
and in such a case, with draw or evacuates all personnel from the spot, which has
been identified.
As a general measure regulate the movement of the outsiders inside our
Premises and restrict.