rise to globalism - ch. 1

5/11/2018 Rise to Globalism - Ch. 1

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[ returned and saw under the sun that the race is not to the swift;.nor the battle to me !lrrong. neither ye{ bread to the wise norriches to men of understanding, but time and chance happeneth'to tllem all,

( I JThe Twisting Path to War

''t'e are willing to help people who believe m e wa y we do, tocontinue to l1\\'e the way they want to l ive. [ hate war.

FRAN,KUN DELANO ROOSEVELTUNACHESON

The ~igg~st rt;ting that has happened in the world in my l ife. inour hye . I.li wu: By the grace oflGod. America won the Cold War.GEORG! 'SU H

The United States felt fairly sewn: in the world of 1998.Neither of the great tetalitarian political forces of thecentury, F ascism no r Communism, was a threa t, S o lO ong'as Britain and France continued to stand. against Hitlerand the Nazis, the United States had n.othing to fearmilitarily from Germany. Elsewhere, anti-Communi mwas triumphing in Spain. while in central and easternEurope governments he tile 'to the Soviet. Uni.on contin-ued [0contain Communism.On the ocher side of the world the United States, incombination with tbe British, French .and DUICh, stillruled the Pacific. American control of Hawaii and thePhilippines, Dutch control of the Netherlands Ea t In-die (N.E.I., today's Indonesia), French control ofIndochina (roday's Laos. Cambodia [Democratic Kam-puchea], and Vietnam), and British control of India.Burma. Hong Kong. and Ialaya gave m e Western pow-er a dominant position in Asia. Japan. ruled by hermilitary. was aggressive. determined to end white man' .rule im Asia, and thus a threat to the status quo. ButJapan tackled crucial natural resources, most notably oil,and was tied down by her war !R China.On the great land mass connecting Europe and A ,jdl,R u sia was relatively weak and nonexpansive.Jn the Mid-dle Ea t and Africa" European coloniali m dominated.In Latin America. American economic imperialismguaranteed cheap ra vmaterial for American indu trie .and a dependable market.


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R is e to G lo ba lis mThe : nited S[at~s in 1938 aw nOI pre iog need to

play any gre~[ rolel~ (he wo:ld. Isolationism reigned j,nthe Congress, r~Aectmga national mood. The - ye Com-mntee, coaducting a Senate investigation, bad "proved"that Wall Street had dragged the Unit d S .w . Id W ' . . rn elate mroor. . ar L The aftermath led many [0believe thatentering World War 1 had been a rni stak. . . ~. e- 0 man asto make disarmament and neutrality th d . - f'. . e 'omlnant ac-tor InA~encan for,eign polic I in the 1920 and t - 0 .The attitude of the Pre ident him .....f . r .d9~I. . "._emrorce I 0-3tlo.msm. Un.ike Winsmn Churchill H'd h Jan ' I d - d unli , I er; or t e ap-. ese ea ers an unlike his cousin Theodo R I, k" D R- ore 00 eveu,rail 110 . ooseveh sawneithe r l . 'war, nor did h ~ I hat i r gory nor romance Infiber If not e ~e t at It strengthen.ed the national. . a p a cifist, FD R was certainJ 'I:.'On a number "'f' Y no mlutaJlrJ t.- . '" OCGIISlons. he decl"d ith dtion "J h"t" - . areu, with eep emo-. .. e W3iIi.Americanforeigll polie in J 8 -stan quo, but onl throuYh ~g was to supp rt m eRoosevelt Secreta!y f s.cvaguely worded. s la L em . e .n t 'r 0 tate ordell H U d . ..a ~he American peo le did .. u , an a maJont,nauon of E . P - not wanr a German dOIDI.-. .- urope Or a Ja p anese d ' .. ' .-neIther were they read t d. Omtnauon of Ala. butall were they Willing to .Y_0 0 much to stop it. Lea r of'[he nited .States co' 'ldlmhPro\pe the armed forcles 0 thatI, I . . l t rea ten to p ish .n ntl:d~March of 193 Hitl' .ums aggre ion.o lo va kia . R o os ev elr fa il9d' er s a rrrJ.les overran Czech-

that would have repeal:d t~~uPPOrt a Senate re olu~onInca e of war b the ne ' ann 'embargo (reqUiT dand allowed A~erican' :~aIJl:y.acts 'O f lhe mid-thirri )France and Britain 0 Uh'tn(!5o. sell war good [0FD R d ' n a cas ~and-c - ba si .an a m3Jority ofth arry aSI, Althougbsympathies J a y with the d:~eopJe had declared that theiroms,t~a[ed 10 Hitle:r that in thl,}c~ac,es. 't~ ,e y h ad a l 0 dem-nothing to fear from the U ~ Imm.edlate future he had1,939.Hitler-announced til m~~ S[a~es. On Augu l~3,'illded for the di , . azi- O\lle[ Pa t 'WI..; h proV ISIon of Poland ,11.. -errna ny a nd relieved G . between Ru ia andtw o-fro m w a r, On e t erbmany of (he niglumar of ap em r I 1 939. the cui snuck

The Twisting Path to ' WarPoland; two days later Britain and France declared waron Germany, and World War II was under way.Americans split sharply over (he question of how toreact. Isolationists resisted any steps that migbt lead toaid for the democracies, fearing [hal the United Stateswould thereby become so commated to an Allied victorythat, as in 1'917. she would be drawn into war againsther will . . Interventionists, meanwhile, wanted [0abandonneutrality and :give military aid to Britain and France.Roosevelt took a middle ground. In a speech, to a pecial. ession of Congress FDR declared fmn rimes 'that hispolicy was designed to keep the United States out of war.He then asked for repeal of the emhaego on 8ilimS andapprovalof a cash-and-carry system. Congressagreedin November 1939.Cash-and-carry symbolized much that was to follow.It aligned the United States with the democracies, rei-terated American concern and. friendship for We ternEurope. and made it dear that the ,mantr}, would resistany attempt 1:0 up et the balance of power inEurope.But it also indicated 'mat the United States was unwillingto p a y a high price [0stop Hitler. Al!tflerica would sellarms to. 'the democracies as long as the democraciespicked them up and carried them off America was tak-ing uncommonly large risks by not doing more.Just how great tho e risks were, Roosevelt knew a didfew others in the world. On October ill I, 1939. world-renowned physic t Alben Ein tein, a Jewih refugeefrom the Nazis, warned FDRthat the Germans were\,..orking on the problem of harnessing atomic energyinto a bomb. If Hitler get an atomic bomb, he would

surely conquer Europe. Reosevelt was impressed b Ein-stein's message, He conferred privately with key congre -siolilal leaders and together they started the Manh!ll:t ' tanProject, This secret project was designed to bui1d anatomic bomb capable of being dropped from an air-plane, and to gelLit built before Hitler could completehis own plans.The Manhattan Project wa the beginning of the mar.


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Rise t o G l obal ism:riage between science and government in th . nitedSlates" and thus one of the most important legacies ofWorld War II It was a lso th e c. - - f

, '- iii. ~Irs~use '0 extreme secrecya~ut govern~ent aCU1,1ltles,jusnfied on [he grounds ofnational secunry In the, case of the Manhattan Project,most members of Congress did not even know wherethe funds they had app'ro-pr13'' ''d W" .- , " " I - l... : . re gmn,g.B ut a lth ou gh Roosevelt wa wj_ll ing to t d- .. I .th ' '. ' ,ac', eaSlve, In.: e ~ce. for, an iUomIC bomb, the,re was otherwise'" dl' unCl urrur on 'th, Am . '. .., ,I Af - "e erl~an cont :nDUtion to topping Hit.cr. ner ~r~a n arnue~ overran P oland! in the fa ll of1939',3 period of stagnation set in Oil th ' frontAmencans called it a" hon " - e western r~m.. pony war and saw no nre-smgrea o~ to strain themselves to build u '.,' I:"" ,. 'FDR Increased the I p their stength.,-, ~, regu_~ar army fr':lU7,000 and asked ~ _' om 210,000 toh - or an arm}" b U d g e t of it s ' 1 1 ' W ich the C onlTr"ss c t b ,1 . . .. 53 01 ron-0.. - u y near y La p e Th'tr)' figures constituted a . , . TCent. ese pal-the United States did n ~ ~nnoudncemenr to Hide, r thath or mten to figcht - E ..t e near future. !I D urop mThe Gerlllan spring offensive fa l~lUghverbal but limited ra _. 0 19~0brought forthUnited tares The Presid PCtklcaI resp,onse from the. .- '. , . ent as ed f, , 1appropr .wt lon to raise troop st " -h'or a ,supp emental- f .rengt to ' 1 : 5 Cgres~. a ter hearing Army Ghief of Sta " 5.000; on-shan s desperate app-eals . d h ffGeorge C. Mar-Th' ", rinse t e fot(, . e . N3l!IS, meanwhile, rolled on' , e to 375.000.Bmlsh Prime Mi n is te r, W i : Il!tOI} ChOn f v ! a y .1 5 the newque ted forty or f i f t - y Am' urchdl. urgentJ re-B . , .' 'enca.n de trr~tam s Adamic supply lin C h ~ _oyer to protectof "life or death." R~oseVelt:as u r Jull'ca11ed ita matter

5. with th e f~.of France immin:~~~lant t~a~t. OnJunebe left standmg aJone. he told a C, ~d Bntam. about towould requir,e an act of Can ress 'toablneL affinal that iters to England and .implied ~h he transfer the deHroy-for such a bill, at, e Was not ready to askH: was ready La speak OUt. On .Pr.esl.d~!nltold the graduatin das June ro, .1940, theVirginIa that [he United g ,5 of Ithe Unlversi y of- tates Would follow "two ob -

The Twist ing Path to War 5vious and simultaneous courses," extending to Franceand Britain "the material resources! of this illation" andspeeding up the development of these resources so matthe American armed forces could be strengthened. Thespeech was hailed by interventionists in the United Statesas etting < II new course, but the French quick.ly discov-ered its limits. OnJune 14 French Premier Paul Reynaudappealed to Roosevelt to end American troop Ito Eu-rope in France's hour of need. Roosevelt refu ed, Evenhad he wanred co act, he had no troops available to endoverseas. Within the week the French signed an armisticewith Germany.The fall of France was a shanering blow. No one hadforecast it. The United States now faced an entirely newsituadon. No longer could the nation comfortably expecttba!l the British and French would stop the Germans.The British. staoding alone, might survive. althougheven tbat was questionable, but would never be able toroll back the. -azis b y themselves, The be.st-diciplinedand most highly educated and productive nation in IEu-rope now dominated the Continent. The balance ofpower was gone. Hider posed no immediate militarythreat to the New Wodd, but if he could conque'r En-gland and get control of the British fleer, then overrunRussia-suddenly real po ibilities-c- he would commandthe greatest militar might the world had ever known.What could happen then 'Was anyone's guess" but it wasbecoming increasingly apparent that it behooved Amer-icans to do something more than sjr by and watch. Hilleroldd be .stopped and ' o rne kind of balance could bere tored in Europe only if others came to Britain's aid.Isolationism was ob...ou ly an obstacle to fonbrightpresidential action. out FIDR had an jnner conf1ictthatreflected the public confusion. He was very much of hi stime and place. sharing general attitudes on the mistakeof entering World War I. Ln a famous campaign peechin Boston on October 30. 1940, FDR declared: "Andwhile I am talking to y ou mothers and fatber I gi'\!',eau one mace as urance, I have aid this before, but 1


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vice tor one year. Both measures limited the employmentof troops to the Western hemisphere.In November 1940 Roosevelt won the election. Chur-chill, among others, thought that the reelected Presidentwould he willing to assume a more active role, in thestruggle against Hitler. The Prime Minister sent FDR alengthy and bleak description of the British situation,emphasizing that his nation was running out of money.Ca h-and-carry would no longer suffice, for "the mo-ment approaches when we shall no longer be able to paycash for shipping and other supplies."Roosevelt responded sympathetically. On December 7,1940, he called in (he press outlined the Br~tish di-lemma. and said he believed that "the best defense ofGre,at Britain is m e ' best defense of the United State .,"Seeking [Q avoid the mistakes of Woodrow Wilson andthe long controversy over World War I war debts, Roo-seveh said he wanted 10 simply lend or lease to Englandthe supplies she needed. He compared his scheme tothe idea of lending a garden hose to a neighbor who, ehouse was On fire.In a radio addres to the nation a ~ewdays later, Roo-

sevelt justified [end-lease as essential ~onational security.If England fell. "all of us in. the Americas would be livingat the poinr of a gun." He said th e best way to keeptheUnited States out of the war was to "do an we can nowto support the nations, defending themselves again. t at-tack by the Axis.'; He declared again that he had nointention of sending American boys to Europe; his solepurpo e was to "keep war away from our country andour people." He would do this b y making America the"great arsenal of democracy." _The isolationists were furious. They charged thatlend-lease was a most unneutral act, placing the UnitedStates squarely on the British side. Senator Robert Taftfound the idea of loaning military equipment ab UI"d.He aid it was rath r like looming chewing gum: 'Onceit had been used, you didn't want it back."By early March 1941, however, the Administration

R is e t o G lo h ali sm The Twisting Path to Warh~ll ay it again and again and azain: v b og be senr i 0- . reur )' are notom ~ to e .sent I nto a llY foreign wars." -Neither, It seemed, was a great deal of'equipment. The B r iti sh s ti U o b ta in ed SU l ies Am,encancash-and~caITY basis and the la cked th P P only enaessa ry to p rotect 'IL. e Y e. destroy ers nee- Ul cOn\roy s tra ns ' .IL.they could afford to p h. porung mo e goodCb . U fe a se, On luIUTchill made another I.. . Y 21, ~940""Mr . Pr1esiden(, w ith -ea lc oquem plea fo r de lToyer :

lhelon,g history of t f e wor~ p : ~ must, tell you tna't inThe British w,ere losm. r l IS ~ thing to do now."of the Atlantic in apPaf~~efcha:t shIpping in the Battlewas reaching its peak ._ ~u~ ers, lh,e Battle of Britainwas preparing p~ans f~ta;, .~he ~erman Cenetal StaffThe P r es id ell .t aUOwe-d 'p . InVaSIon of the British Isles.d . rU/3[e groeta !Js o f a d clitroy er 0 b -. up s to work out 'the( -[I f- ases d ai hi -epteDIbe~ 2) gave' the BriLishfit w ieh e\lent~lIyde troyers m return for fre ty overage Am.encan. , rent- t-ee bse Ion from Ber-mudaJto British a' ~ s on Briti h pos-There was, Ineanwhi.1 . GUIana .W D e; a grow ing [ . L_ar epartmem and the W h i t enslon IlJIC'tween(heshall reasoned that th.1 e House. General Mar-fight and defeat the GC on y way to defeat Hic]er was to-.. erman arm .rope. To do that M.,. h J l _ Y In northwestern Eu-tha rh . ..rs a needed. -at . ;e n~eded conscri tion. .. ' a mass army; to gels ev elr s t?lrd-term cam ~a i B ut gwen the tenor of R oo-

b t h i l l -e PreSIdent could ' "V~ _ p g n U b J l ~ h e r e wasno po.ssibility that 0" I e SL lppon t ' -.o a cen cripnond Congr~SS proved morewiHinI ~nt. Prl\!are. groups. fed b. g to ac~ than the Pre i- tuns.on and Elihu D~~t J Y IRepublu:ans Henry L.lavon' . n.uu, r., pers d -. bo ng L1nen-entlon to i n - o r d sua ted C.ongressmenIII th h Ouce a II I ' "b ~OU s:eso f C o nln' - R o e ectlve~serVlce billut he did Olive G e a-eSS. oseveh ire, " d .the biU. t 0" .. noal Marsha ll. ' .. maJrl.e aloof.an ". ,he ~res.[d.ent also he-l~d' ~.tnns.s[on to. uppartin~ervellb " ,r- uyap . .I .. . O mSl. Sec:reta r 0 POIntmg Stimson,t ~~. Congress au'thOnled r h ~fpWa~. In late August ofon Guard and other.... . e. reSIdent [0 call the a-Y ea~ and 0 0_ ... se,rves 1'0a -"J n:'p temL . - COve duty r -- uct J 6 n p . . lor onefOVlded for selective ser-

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8 Rise 10 Glnbalismhad o"hert:ome [he opposition, and (he lend-lea e billwem t T'ough C ongre . h .. ,b illio . - . ~Wit a n u ntia l appropriation ofI 7, n. Secrctar_r SUm so n c orrec tly c alle d irva dec-antl,on of economic war." But it h dlsustain a Brirain on the d fe ._ was ar y enough [0cause f aT' concern. e enssve, m uch less give HillerWhat was needed was a more . "\lolvement Re I' . .> . eX[ensno' ,e Amencan!n-. - a lZUlg this Roose' I d dneutrality zone lh~t exte'nd d aJ~e[ _e ar.ed an Atlantic - e most [0 I I d d-Ing the N,av),to patrol th ee an ,or er-of German :submarin-e e areha.an~ ,report the locationA ., s to t e British I A '1 me _f lc an tro op s m o ved int' n -pn 19 41mg H i . t I . er's ihvasion of R O G_reenh~and,.n J u l y , folIo. w -A . US51a IS fir-t b' . I., mencan Lroops, occupied [cela~d ' -5O . 19 mlsta~e,I sh L .r oo p s for th e M 'd dl Ea - , wh.lch released Bm-

> let. a nd th U Sescortmg convoys." C. I . .> atvy began.. laf a eeland B S '" a vy wa s fully a t w ar w ith G . .y . ep tem ber theWhen a German sU bm . c. ermany m the Atlantic,. - anneJlreda t d: .an destroyer stalking it. FDR . orpe 0at the Amer-raule flakes of the Atlanti " f b~enly denounced theoked an and ordered th c or e supposedly unpro-Ge tman submaril1es they:n avy to sh oo r o n ight at a llper uaded Congress to rem coumered.ln October FDR

A. me ri ca n o omme -r ce ' L- o~e neady a ll restrictions on, I .lIence~orLh A .y es e s could cany 1Tr-~.J B . .' m enca n. .rnerchamte r d d I ovuuS to Tltlshn - if en~~lease to R us ia. ports. He also ex-Roo eve l r s tone, in public and .ber of 1'941 one of Unre traineJJnl'a.(C. wa s b y Novern-ad.vance [0 [h e gales of M' beLhgel"ency. rmantm .d . .0 Ow mad . . eresllmate the threat R. e ItIWpo sible tooned that H~tlet could n~ t l~~sevelt s~ems to have real-to lransp0rt goods to Bri ta in TghPennnAmerican shipto order their submarine capt' e Germans would have~ es se ls >FDR c ou ld t he n. aID to _ s i n k th e AmericanIn C . . OV eroom e IS ,. . .ongress and obtain ad. I ' 0 3r!omst opposition'Whether he wa . h c:caralll)n Q f war:is el h ng t or nOt will - .. ear t at b y December .- never be known. It~~u.ro~ehad failed toma~~!~ ~~e~ican foreign policyslOpplng-much le OV ,Y ~gn'fkanlCOntributioner ornmg H " U - -- I er, 1 1 ' 1 1 retrn-

The Twi s ti '1 l ;gPa th to War .9speer, the steps: the Pre idem and Congress took to pro-tect American interests :in Europe were halting and lim-ited. Everything hinged on Russia. and Britain. If theykept going, America could~e\l,enmally-supp,ly themwith the tools and men to do the job, The U'llll~d State in the meantime, was taking great risks.The American ship of state was drifting, without arudder or power in a storm. The world's greate t in-dustrial democracy could not tem the tide of Fascism.Roosevelt's caution was so great mat in September 1941,when the-original selective service bill TaD out and hadto be repassed if the oldier already partly trained wereto be' retained in the Army, be refused 'Itopressure Con-gress, either privately OJ " publidy. Working behind thescenes, General MarshaU was able 1[0 get the draft 'billpassed-by one vote. Even this left the U.S. Army ri-diculously small (w.6 million men) if the nation ever in-tended to p , [ o t y a role in 'the conflict raging in Europe.Fortunately lor the United States, the Briti h and Rus-sians held out against Germany, making it possible for

America to later exert her power to help win the Wall'.Fortunately;, 100, the Japanese solved Roosevelt's problemof how [0get fully involved in the war.japan was the aggressor' in the Pacific, as Mus olini

was in the Mediterranean and Hitler w,as in Europe.Since the mid':thirtie ,Japan had been involved L D a warof conquest in China. From the ~ginnilng [he United' tates had protested, but because FDR had not up-ported his demands with action, the jap,ane e ignoredhim,The overall Japane e program ca~led for A ia for theAsians (although some Asians were going to be moreequal than others). The Japanese proposed (0substitutethemselves for the white rulers inChina., Indochina. M a-laya, Burma, the Phihppmes, and the N.E.1. It was es-ential (0the Japanese that they control the e area ifJapan were to be a great power. for despite her humanre ources Japan was almost devoid of critical raw rna-


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R is e t o G l ob a li smterials, especially oil, which was available in outheastA ia ,The Am eric an co lo ny of the Philippines la y dire t1 I

athwart the japanese proposed line of ad vance. Whethercorrectly or not, the Japanese were convinced thai theUnited States would never allow them to advance' intoMal ay a , or t~e ~ ,E .I. w ith ou r strik ing a ga inst their lineo f commu~cCl ll lon s. More fundamentally. they bel ievedthat the United Stare would never willingly allow themto ~come a great power and would consistentl oppo ethel; advance southward. Thus, although the Japane ere~12ed, that ~hey were doomed if they goaded theUmL~dStates .lnto war and the United State chose tofight H t o " a ' f imsh. they felt they w ere a lso doomed with-OU l w ar. ,Ja p an ente,re d (h,e w ar" a ' 'f .1b., J -. , prince 0 Llle 8 1 p a , -nese unpenal family later wrote .. -~1l. d, ". ' , Wlu~ a tragIcetermmanon and In desperate self-ab d "The fall f F ' . _ an onment.it h G _ 0 ranee In1940and Britain' preoccupationJWI ~many opened the door to Southeast A ia for~dPand' ag,ged down in he r w ar w ith China Japa n de-ci e to overcome her cr i I" h ',1 \ pro a ,_ '" _ rpp mg S ,ottage of oil thr-oughUnion':nmd' t l - s o U u t . ,~ward expans,lon, O n l y the nviet, , , lie ,olted State ' .enough in the P a ' 1 . s were potentially strongcall", to mini . C I 1 I. ~ to mterfere; japan moved poli t i-, mue me e threats I h I r1940 sh e si ed a 6,re. ',. n [ e, ate umr:ner o~oviets, an~g:reem tye~ nona~gresslon pact with thehapp'), to sign. en t t Stalin, fearing Hider, waJapan also entered into th Tri ,Germans and Italian,


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12 R is e to G l ob al is mmove. The effect of the freeze was to create an economicb]ocka.d~ of ~apan. She could not buy oil, steel, or othernece s lues. Wt ! l1QULRoosevelt's p erm iss io n .. The embargo made' it deaf to the .Iapanesethec theyeither had to pull back from Indochina and China andthereby reach an agreement 'With the United States that'w o uld . p r ov id e th em :w ~ thaccess to o il, or go to war. Theone lun hope 'remammg was that America's fear of aLwo-oce~n wa~ w~uld impel Roosevelt to cornprorni e.From August until November 1941, the japanese ought~~e form of acceptable poLitil:al compromi e all thewhile sha rp eni t11' '1 ,, ' ..- - ~gelr nu ltary plans and preparations.lfthe dlplomall.c off~llsi\leworked, the military offen ivecould be called off, mc1uding the planned attack on theU .. Heet a t P ea rl Harbor.I n essence, the Ja,panese demanded from th _ dt a t e s . a free hand in Asi a . .There were varj_a'tionseLhr~~geha senes of preposals but th - _ .. I . - '. - e central points alwavsme uded an Anglo-Amerl ....'ft. 1_ . _ -" "- promise' not to "meddleIn nOT un:errupt a settlement b t. -Chi . . e ween Japan and1Oa, a recogruuon of Japan's" _ I -.....French Indochin .. speo . p oslltJon m- a, an agreemem not t" . S'-gapore and the Ph'I' . 0 rem,orce un -. '- JJJp pm es, and a T o G : ! - . ' f~omn:'erC1al relarions with ja,-pan whi I.. .S W Tl , , ~,tJdon Il109 oil. CII me liJue seu-Although the Americans w u to compromis'e, m e would n:;~ WI Ing [ I ? ~'o p a n wa tanese a free band in China. Sill o.nslder gt\'~ng the Jap'~point that the japana e . ce U ~ precIsely on thi. . were mOSL adama t Himevltable. Neither side wann .d . ' n, con ne t wasld : e war Inlhe ense rh hwou have preferred 1'0gai ._ -. se mat eac_ ~ am It s ob1ecll ' . hmg to fight for 'them, but both we/ . .v~s wit out hav-to a showdown. In J ap31~l it h e ~iUlQg r o move on~. . . was t e m Ilua J:" b dor action, over the protests of th '. r w .0 presse . ,America the situation was rev sed e c~"'dlans. while in. erse Prim M"' Fmlmaro Konoye of Japan re ined'. . e mistier u-

w a s unable to secure miLitar g InOctober when hedtawM from China in ord~r3i~~~val of a par,tial with-the crisi of a Japane e-A . sa\'e OUf elve from- mcncan war" u r:US U ce OT,

The Twisting Palh to War 13eneral Hideki ojo, wa willing to continue negctia-

nons with the United tale, but only until late 0-vember, Ifno progress was made by 'then. Japan wouldstrike.In [he United State, ROQScvelt stoodfir:m, eventhough his mllitar y advi er strongly urged him to avoid

a crisis with Japan until he had dealt with German.Se re[ary Hull made one la t effort for peace, sugge lingon overnber 21 that the United States hould offer athree months' ruce. Japan might have accepted, butbiang Kai-shek, the Chinese leader, protested vehe-

mently. and Roo evelt would not allow Hull to make theoffer. "I have washed my hands of [he Japanese situa-tion," Hull mid Stimson on November 27. "and it i nowin the hands of the Army and Navy . "A little over a week later, on unday, December 7.

1941, the Japanese launched their attack, hittin PearlHarbor, the Philippines, Mala a, and Thailand." Thesoon added [he N.EJ. 1:.0 the fist, On De ember theAn lo-American declared war en japan, but the nitedrates tU I had no more rea. on [0 go LOwar with Germanythan it had had on Decem ber 6, so even in the excitementover Pearl Harbor, FDR did not ask Congress for a dec-laration of war on Germany. All earlier war plans hadassumed mal the nited State and the United Kin dornwould concentrate their efforts against Germany; ud-denl it seemed that the war would take an entirel ' un-xpected cour e, with the mericans fighdng onJ the

"One of [he most P rsi '{ent m ihs in American hi [or is thatFDR knew (he attack on Pearl Harbor was coming but refu edLO give the commanders in Ha",,'aii advance notice. 1'1'1fact,Washington gave the military in Hawa i i plenty of warningabout the imminem outbreak of 110 rileties. There . .. .35 no p -eifi warning about an auaek on Pearl Harbor becau e no oneima ined rh e Japanese were apable of such a daring rid.M GIC was no h Ip becau e th japane e Heel maintainedradiosil nee.


8/8

APOLEON

Ris to Globa{tsmJapanese. On December 1 I Hitler ended the un ertaintby declaring war on the United Slates.'"The United tales wa fina lly a n war with the xi .

The status quo ill Europe and in Asia had been chal-lenged and wa s being upset, America had been unableto preserve it short of war. The need now wa n o de~eatthe ~xis On the field o r battle, a task of tagg ring pro-poruons ~LH~ne that carr~ed with it greal opportunitieror.[heeXLenslon of American power and influence. TheUnited Stales was quick to gra p them, even while 3,\.jngthe w.orld from the unimaginable horror of being rul dhl' Hitler and the Japanese Army .

(2]The War in Europe-

Give me allie to fight against!

~ ~IJ'I ': is crrly one thing worse man fightin with allie ,and thai is fighting without them.

WI.NSTON CHURCHILl..

AIlI i ne xp li ca ble ' a ct io n. N odid it He was nO L requh d-o.nedhas eVe r explained ' W h y Hitler. - - retoosobh "panne PaC[; he did not disc hi . I e term of the Tri-~eaders or foreicrn offi. .. .. us. 15actloilS with hi! own milnarHitl 0" "" nor mdeed . hIte r, a f l[ e r ,8 long L r - wn a n 'one rei . Thube rmg 0 SUccess[Ween June and Decembe _ r es, ma~e I.wo fatal errorsand [he declaration of lr 0. 194 I -the inva ion of Ru iaw ar a ga inS t the United States.

The Grand Alliance of World War II, sometime calledthe "Strange Alliance," joined together Britain, (heworld', greatest c lonial power , led by Chu['chiU_: withRus ia, the world' only Communist nation. Jed b talin;with the United Statesvthe world's greatest capitali tpower, led by Roosevelt. nly Hider could have brought[hem together, and only the threat of Nazi Germanycould have held them together through four years o rwar. The Big Three mi tru 'ted each other, but each ofthe partners knew he needed both of [he other. 0combination of two wa powerful enough to defeat Ger-man . It took all three to do the job.So the Grand llian e was successful Despite man

stre ses and strain. ilheld together to the end, a greatachievement. In the process, however, nerve and re-sources were stretched almost [0the breaking point.The process began in January 1942. when Chu.n::hiUand his military leaders carne to Was.hmgton LO'diSCUSSstrategy. Churchill advocated III series of operationsaround [he periphery of Hitler's European fortr, combined with bombing raid against German itself andencouragement LO Resi ranee forces in the. cupiedcountrie but no direct inva ion. He called this "d ingthe ring."

rise to globalism - ch. 1

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