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    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 1 / 41

    Risk Analysis

    An Introduction

    Marvin Rausand

    Department of Production and Quality EngineeringNorwegian University of Science and Technology

    [email protected]

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    IntroductionWhat is ..?

    Brief history

    Cons. spectr.

    Accident categ.

    Standards

    ProcedureAcceptable risk

    ALARP principle

    Assessment

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 2 / 41

    Introduction

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    What is risk analysis?

    IntroductionWhat is ..?

    Brief history

    Cons. spectr.

    Accident categ.

    Standards

    ProcedureAcceptable risk

    ALARP principle

    Assessment

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 3 / 41

    A risk analysis is:

    u Systematic use of available information to identify hazardsand to estimate the risk to individuals or populations,

    property or the environment IEC 60300-3-9

    u A systematic approach for describing and/or calculating risk.Risk analysis involves the identification of undesired

    (accidental) event, and the causes and consequences of theseevents

    NS 5814

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    Consequence spectrum

    IntroductionWhat is ..?

    Brief history

    Cons. spectr.

    Accident categ.

    Standards

    ProcedureAcceptable risk

    ALARP principle

    Assessment

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 5 / 41

    A consequence spectrum (or, risk picture) of an activity is a

    listing of its potential consequences and the associatedprobabilities (e.g., per year). Usually, only unwantedconsequences are considered.

    Activity

    C1

    C2

    C3

    Ck

    p1

    pk

    p3

    p2

    Risk is sometimes defined as:

    Risk = C1p1 + C2p2 + + Ckpk =k

    i=1

    Cipi

    This requires that all consequences may be measured with a

    common measure (e.g., as monetary value)

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    Categories of accidents

    IntroductionWhat is ..?

    Brief history

    Cons. spectr.

    Accident categ.

    Standards

    ProcedureAcceptable risk

    ALARP principle

    Assessment

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 6 / 41

    - Traffic accidents- Occupational

    accidents, etc.- Air trafic accidents- Railway accidents- Major industrialaccidents

    - Nuclear accidents

    - Catastrophies

    Severity (log scale)

    Frequency(lo

    gscale)

    1.

    3.

    2.

    Low risk

    High risk

    Based on Rasmussen (1994)

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    Standards for risk analysis

    IntroductionWhat is ..?

    Brief history

    Cons. spectr.

    Accident categ.

    Standards

    ProcedureAcceptable risk

    ALARP principle

    Assessment

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 7 / 41

    u IEC 60300-3-9: Risk analysis of technologuical systemsu EN 1050: Safety of machinery Risk assessmentu EN 50126: Railway applications The specification and

    demonstration of reliability , availability, maintainability amd

    safety (RAMS)u ISO 17776: Petroleum and natural gas industries Offshore

    production installations Guidelines and tools for hazardidentification and risk assessment

    u NORSOK Z-013: Risk and emergency preparedness analysis

    u EN 1441: Medical Devices - Risk Analysis

    More standards on: http://www.ntnu.no/ross/srt

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    Risk analysis procedure

    IntroductionWhat is ..?

    Brief history

    Cons. spectr.

    Accident categ.

    Standards

    ProcedureAcceptable risk

    ALARP principle

    Assessment

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 8 / 41

    Planning and

    organizing

    Description

    of object

    Hazardidentification

    Frequencyanalysis

    Consequenceanalysis

    Riskevaluation

    Risk reducingmeasures

    What is

    acceptable risk?

    Other measuresdesirable?

    Acceptable?No

    Yes

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    Risk analysis procedures - (2)

    IntroductionWhat is ..?

    Brief history

    Cons. spectr.

    Accident categ.

    Standards

    ProcedureAcceptable risk

    ALARP principle

    Assessment

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 9 / 41

    Accidental

    eventCausal

    analysis

    Consequence

    analysis

    Methods

    - Checklists

    - Preliminary hazardanalysis

    - FMECA*

    - HAZOP

    - Event data sources

    - Fault tree analysis*

    - Reliability blockdiagrams*

    - Influence diagrams*

    - FMECA*

    - Reliability data

    sources*

    - Event tree analysis*

    - Consequencemodels

    - Reliability

    assessment*

    - Evacuation models

    - Simulation

    (a)(b) (c)

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    Acceptable risk

    IntroductionWhat is ..?

    Brief history

    Cons. spectr.

    Accident categ.

    Standards

    ProcedureAcceptable risk

    ALARP principle

    Assessment

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 10 / 41

    Several principles can be used to determine the acceptable risk:

    u The ALARP principle (As low as reasonably practicable)u The precautionary principleu

    Risk acceptance as defined in NORSOK Z-013u Minimum endogeneous mortality (MEM)u Globalement au moins aussi bon (GAMAB)

    Risk acceptable is generally a complicated and multifaceted issue.

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    ALARP principle

    IntroductionWhat is ..?

    Brief history

    Cons. spectr.

    Accident categ.

    Standards

    ProcedureAcceptable risk

    ALARP principle

    Assessment

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 11 / 41

    Negligible risk

    Unacceptable region

    The ALARP or Tolerabilityregion (Risk is undertaken only

    if a benefit is desired)

    Broadly acceptable region(No need for detailed work to

    demonstrate ALARP)

    Risk cannot be justified exceptin extraordinary circumstances

    Tolerable only if risk reduction isimpracticable or its cost isgrossly disproportionate to the

    improvement gained

    Tolerable if cost of reductionwould exceed the improvement

    gained

    Necessary to maintainassurance that risk remains at

    this level

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    Risk assessment and management

    IntroductionWhat is ..?

    Brief history

    Cons. spectr.

    Accident categ.

    Standards

    ProcedureAcceptable risk

    ALARP principle

    Assessment

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 12 / 41

    Risk analysis

    - Scope definition

    - Hazard identification

    - Risk estimation

    Risk evaluation

    - Risk tolerability

    decisions- Analysis of options

    Risk reduction/control

    - Decision making

    - Implementation

    - Monitoring

    Riskassessment

    Risk

    management

    IEC 60300-3-9

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    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 13 / 41

    Main Steps

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    Planning and organization

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 14 / 41

    u Identify relevant laws and regulationsu Clarify internal policies and risk acceptance criteriau Define the purpose and objectives of the risk analysis

    3 What type of risks should be studied? (Major accidents vs.occupational accidents; random hazards, deliberate actions, and/orenvironmental loads)

    3 Which life phases should be included? (Normal operation, start-up,end-of-life, major overhaul, etc.)

    u Organize the work, multidisciplinary team where selectedexperts provide the required expertice

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    Description of the analysis object

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 15 / 41

    Description encompassing everything that can incluence theanalysis results

    Main questions:

    u What is the system dependent upon? (inputs)u What activities are performed by the system? (functions)u

    What services does the system provide? (outputs)

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    Description of the analysis object - (2)

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 16 / 41

    u Technical, personnel, and organizational relationshipsu Significant political, social, and economic relationshipsu Association with and dependency on the wider worldu External support if an accidental should occur

    u Indicate special relationships that are significant to safety

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    Description of the analysis object - (3)

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 17 / 41

    u Large enterprises can be broken down into smaller elements(i.e., objects and/or functions)

    u A breakdown that constitutes too many too small elementswill demand much resources, whereas insufficient breakdown

    of the enterprise can lead to unintentional omissions of rarebut significant events

    u A possible technique for breaking down a system ishierarchical breakdown

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    Hierarchical breakdown

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 18 / 41

    1.

    Company

    1.2.2

    Building 2

    1.2

    Production unit

    1.1

    Design offices

    1.2.3

    Building 3

    1.2.1

    Building 1

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    Identification of hazards

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 19 / 41

    u Potential hazards related to the activity must be identified(e.g., mechanical hazards, fire, explosion, toxix materials,radiation)

    u In which part(s) of the system are the hazards relevant (e.g.,

    pressure vessels, cranes, storage)

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    Methods and tools

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 20 / 41

    u Checklistsu Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), also known as:

    3 Hazard identification (HAZID)3 Rapid risk ranking (RRR)

    u Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA)u Hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP)u Brainstorming

    u Experience data - data bases

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    Accidental events

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 21 / 41

    Some questions to consider when defining accidental events:

    u What type of event is it?

    3 Describe the type of event (e.g., fire, gas leak, falling object)

    u Where does the event take place?

    3 Describe where the event occurs (e.g., in process area A)

    u When does the event occur?3 Describe the conditions under which the event occurs (e.g., normal

    operation, start-up, during maintenance)

    Example: Contamination of water supply by bacteria duringflood conditions

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    Accidental events - (2)

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 22 / 41

    u The list of accidental events arising from the PHA orbrainstorming should be sorted and filtered (i.e., events maybe disregarded due to insignificant consequences or likelihoodof occurrence are closed out without unnecessary delay)

    u The different accidental events are considered for each of theelements to be analyzed. Where are the events relevant? Inthis relation one can use a simple event/element matrix.

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    Event-element matrix

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 23 / 41

    Admin. building

    Production unit

    Loading area

    Storage

    Laboratory

    Fire

    Collision

    Droppedobject

    Toxicexposure

    Explosion

    Ar

    ea(Systemelement)

    Accidental event

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    Accidental events - (3)

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 24 / 41

    The results from this step are:

    u A listing of all relevant hazardsu

    A listing and description of all potential (and relevant)accidental eventsu Identification of where each accidental event may occur

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    Causal analysis

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluation

    Risk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 25 / 41

    The causes of each accidental event must be identified anddescribed

    HumanfactorsTechnical

    factors

    Organizationalfactors

    Environmental

    factors

    Societal

    factors

    Accidental

    event

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    Methods and tools

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 26 / 41

    u Fault tree analysisu Bayesian belief networks (Influence diagrams)u Cause-effect diagramsu Reliability block diagramsu Root cause analysisu Experience data - data bases

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    Causal analysis results

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 27 / 41

    u For each potential accidental event:

    All combinations of events (technical failures, human errors,environmental loads, etc.) that may lead to the accidental

    event (minimal cut set)u The minimal cut sets may be used to reveal weaknesses in the

    system and form a basis for improvements

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    Frequency analysis

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 28 / 41

    u After the causes of the accidental event have been identified,one is better placed to estimate the frequency (and how theaccidental event may be avoided)

    u The frequency of the accidental events may be estimated

    based on:

    1. Data from previous incidents (and data bases)2. Fault tree analysis3. Expert judgement

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    Consequence analysis

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 29 / 41

    u What is the result?u Identify consequences - bot immediate and delayed, given the

    accidental event

    When analyzing consequences, do not forget:

    u The whole chain of events triggered by the accidental event(can a relatively benign event ultimately end up in adisaster?)

    u Both immediate consequences and those that are notapparent until some time after the event.

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    Consequence categories

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 30 / 41

    It is often desirable to classify consequences into differentcategories:

    u

    Personnel (i.e., health and safety)u Environmentalu Economicu Operational

    u Company reputation

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    Consequence chains

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 31 / 41

    u All potential event chains following an accidental event mustbe identified and described

    u Most systems have one or more safety functions (barriers)that may stop or mitigate the effects of the accidental event.

    The event chains will depend on whether or not these safetyfunctions are functioning or not.

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    Methods and tools

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 32 / 41

    u Event tree analysisu Cause consequence analysisu Fire and explosion calculationsu Simulationu Experience data - data bases

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    Risk evaluation

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 33 / 41

    u Which risks are present in my enterprise?u Risk classification matrices should be developed for each

    consequence category.

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    Risk evaluation - (2)

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 34 / 41

    u Risk is a function of the frequency of the accidental eventsand the consequences of the accidental events

    u Higher frequency of occurrence higher risku More severe consequences higher risk

    u A useful tool for describing risk is a risk classification matrix

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    Risk classification matrix

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 35 / 41

    Frequency/consequence

    1Very unlikely

    2Remote

    3Occasional

    4Probable

    5Frequent

    Catastrophic

    Critical

    Major

    Minor

    Acceptable - only ALARP actions considered

    Acceptable - use ALARP principle and consider further investigations

    Not acceptable - risk reducing measures required

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    Risk evaluation - (2)

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    Methods

    Accidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 36 / 41

    u What do we do with accidental events once classified?u Part of risk management: guidelines for what should be done

    with individual events dictated by the risk category to whichthey belong (Shouldnt this have been done during the

    planning phase?)

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    Risk elimination

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    MethodsAccidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 37 / 41

    u All accident causal factors (hazards) should be eliminated!We may, however, not have the resources to accomplish it

    u We must therefore prioritize our corrective actions byaddressing high risks before low risks

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    Risk analysis report

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Planning

    System descript.

    Hierarchy

    Hazard ident.

    MethodsAccidental events

    Event matrix

    Causal analysis

    Frequency analysis

    Consequences

    Risk evaluationRisk matrix

    Risk elimination

    Report

    Conclusions

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 38 / 41

    1. Summary and conclusions2. Objectives and scope3. Limitations, assumptions and justification of hypotheses4. Description of relevant parts of the system5. Analysis methodology

    6. Hazard identification results7. Models used, including assumptions and validation8. Data and their sources9. Risk estimation results

    10. Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis11. Discussion of results (including discussion of analytic difficulties)12. References

    IEC 60300-3-9

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    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Criticism

    Challenges

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 39 / 41

    Conclusions

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    Criticism

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Criticism

    Challenges

    Marvin Rausand, October 7, 2005 System Reliability Theory (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004 40 / 41

    We sometimes hear that:

    u A risk analysis takes too much time and resourcesu The risk analysis is used to slow down decision processesu Risk analysis can be a manipulative tool

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    Challenges

    Introduction

    Main Steps

    Conclusions

    Criticism

    Challenges

    M i R d O b 7 2005 S R li bili Th (2 d d) Wil 2004 41 / 41

    u Where data lacks, qualitative assessments through expertjudgment is unaviodable

    u Confidence in achieved results highly depends on:

    3 the confidence in the experts (i.e., their qualification and

    competence)3 the effectiveness of assessment procedures

    u However, uncertainties will be revealed and documented,rather than suppressed

    u When properly performed, a risk analysis is very transparent

    Adapted from IACS (2002)

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