Risk Brief: Mohammad bin Salman’s Power

Consolidation in Saudi Arabia

January 23, 2018

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Generated By:

Geordie Jeakins

Atul Menon

Vanessa Hayford

Nick Richard

About Us

The Global Risk Observatory (GRO) is a student organization that monitors traditional and non-

traditional risks to the public-sector, private-sector, and civil society. As Master of Global

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All Rights Reserved, 2018.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The following risk brief will elaborate and analyze the causes and evolving risks of Crown Prince

Mohammad bin Salman’s (MbS) consolidation of power and sweeping reforms in Saudi Arabia. The risk

brief is outlined as follows:

❖ Environment

▪ Given the evolving nature and inherent uncertainties associated with MbS’ actions and

newfound power in Saudi Arabia, this section will present relevant metrics for

understanding and assessing the risks associated with the rapid pace of developments in

the Kingdom

▪ Framing and categorization of the Risk

❖ Measurement

▪ Perception: MbS’ efforts to modernize and liberalize the Saudi economy and society,

thereby attracting foreign investment and approval are tempered by both domestic and

international trepidation regarding the pace and uncertain outcome of the crown prince’s

reforms.

▪ Key Stakeholders: Saudi citizens, House of Saud, the religious establishment, the Saudi

economy, Saudi Aramco, and the oil industry, foreign investors, and international workers.

❖ Evaluation

▪ Evaluation of the risk is backed by the assumption MbS reforms will occur.

▪ Based on the GRO intensity scale outlined in our methodology document, we describe

and prioritize scenarios into first, second, and third order events.

❖ Risk Management

▪ Identifying the domestic threats to both MbS’ rule and ambitious reform agenda, as well

as threats to the political, economic, and social stability of the kingdom.

▪ This section includes:

▪ Focus on Education

▪ Calculated Normative Change

▪ Public Relations for the Political Landscape

❖ Conclusion

▪ Ultimately, the fate of MbS’ reforms is largely uncertain and won’t be felt until the

medium- to long-term. How the Kingdom manages various risks will be indicative of MbS’

rule, Saudi Arabia’s continued role as a regional power, and its influence in the global

stage.

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Risk Environment

Key Takeaways:

➢ Saudi Arabia is at a critical juncture—the power consolidation and reforms promulgated by Crown

Prince Mohammed bin Salman portend a complete transformation of the Saudi economy and

society.

➢ Drivers: MbS’ consolidation of power; allegations of corruption and corruption-related arrests;

economic reforms related to diversification, taxation, fiscal policy, infrastructure, and training

programs; and religious moderation.

➢ Categorization: complex and uncertain, with greatest risks in the short and medium term, and

certain long-term latent effects depending on MbS’ ability to implement successful reforms and

thwart potential opposition.

Problem Framing

In November 2017, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia witnessed a rapid series of corruption-related arrests,

targeting some of its most powerful princes and officials. Among the hundreds of arrested individuals were

eleven royal princes, including the highly influential billionaire Prince Alwaleed bin Talal.1 The instigator

of this sweeping purge was Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), the heir apparent of the Gulf

kingdom. International observers were largely unprepared for the speed and extent of the purges and remain

divided on whether the arrests represent a consolidation of power by the Crown Prince,2 or a genuine

attempt to curb corruption among Saudi Arabia’s elite classes.3

Although MbS’ motivations remain unclear, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Crown Prince is

determined to bring transformative change to the Kingdom he expects to inherit. Since his father, King

Salman, was crowned in early-2015, MbS has assumed responsibility for many of the country’s most

important portfolios using his growing power and influence to reshape the country’s political, economic,

social, and religious landscape. First and foremost, the purge of rival princes has likely ensured that MbS

will face little internal opposition when he takes on the kingship following the death or abdication of his

ailing father. The crown prince’s personal control of key positions in the Saudi military, economic, and

judicial establishment may allow him to maintain stability during the reform’s transitory period.

Apart from his consolidation of power, MbS’ reforms have focused largely on restructuring the Saudi

economy and society. Towards the former, the crown prince has pushed for a transition away from

dependence on oil revenues. Utilizing his powers as Chairman of the Council of Economic and

Development Affairs, MbS has announced the ambitious Vision 2030 program which seeks to invest

hundreds of billions of dollars in projects like the NEOM megacity,4 coupled with structural reforms to

taxation, fiscal policy, decision-making, public ownership of assets, and training programs.5

Another key pillar of MbS’ reform has been a promise to transform the country’s social organization.

Moreover, the crown prince has also pledged to reorient the country towards moderate Islam. MbS has

expressed the opinion that Saudi Arabia’s hardline Wahabist tradition is antithetical to the modern age.6 It

is still unclear how the Crown Prince will renegotiate the government’s long-standing relationship with the

Wahabi religious institution. Nevertheless, it does appear that some steps have been taken in moving the

country away from the conservative religious doctrine such as the recent royal decree lifting the ban on

women drivers. This may signal a broader policy of inclusivity and equality within the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia.

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Risk Categorization

Novelty: There has been no appetite for significant socioeconomic change by the House of Saud since the

rule of King Faisal, between 1964 and 1975.7 Given the rarity of such efforts, the concern is unique in

nature.

Range: The risk in question affects all levels of Saudi Arabian society and economy. There are serious

implications for regional political and economic stability and modest global implications.

Time Horizon: Greatest risks are expected to occur in the short- (1-6 months) and medium-terms (1-3 years).

Successful and failed reforms would likely have sizeable long term (5+ years) benefits/harm timeframe.

Hazard Type: With Saudi Arabia’s vision 2030 plan aimed at drastic changes and a transformation to the

social, economic, religious, and cultural fabric of society, the emergent risk is possibly ubiquitous and

potentially irreversible.

Delay: Between the plan’s initial proposal in 2016 and its realization in 2030, the relatively short period of

14 years allows for multiple risks to emerge, fester, and then manifest over the 14-year period and beyond.

Risk Measurement

Key Takeaways:

➢ Perception: MbS’ efforts to modernize and liberalize the Saudi economy and society, thereby

attracting foreign investment and approval are tempered by both domestic and international

trepidation regarding the pace and uncertain outcome of the crown prince’s reforms.

➢ Key Stakeholders: Saudi citizens, House of Saud, the religious establishment, the Saudi economy,

Saudi Aramco, and the oil industry, foreign investors, and international workers.

Scope

This report is prescriptive in nature. Given the implementation or move towards implementing reforms, this

report seeks to evaluate possible consequences of these acts.

Stakeholders

Stakeholders Vulnerability Resiliency

Saudi Citizens The rapid expansion of freedoms for individuals in

society, particular for women, is likely to continue as

MbS implements social reforms. However, there is

uncertainty as to whether these changes will continue

and will manifest.

Economic uncertainty during diversification leaves

potential for negative implications on quality of life.

The Saudi government

faces minimal opposition to

liberalization and changes

are expected to continue.

Saudi citizens have

expressed approval of the

changes thus far.8

Bonuses and stipends

provided by the

government will likely ease

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economic burdens that arise

from potential economic

volatility in the short term.

House of Saud Political and social liberalization exposes the House

of Saud to the possibility of political dissent.

Reforms have been opposed by conservative Saudis

and members of the royal family who have had

privileges revoked.

Predicted challenges in maintaining political

structure in the wake of socioeconomic liberalization.

Most Saudi citizens, 70%

of whom are under the age

of 30,9 are receptive to

liberalization reforms. Risk

can be mitigated by

developing a new,

transparent, and progressive

social contract between the

Saudi government and its

citizens.

Ongoing efforts to

consolidate power may

make the government more

effective and reduce

instances of corruption.

Religious

Establishment

Potential for reduced authority of ultra-conservative

clerics in the country as liberalization continues. The

rapid pace of these reforms has upset members of the

religious establishment.

As the home of the two

holiest Islamic sites, Saudi

Arabia will always have

deep roots in the Islamic

religion and culture.

Saudi Economy Increased opportunities for foreign investment are

likely. Economy is open to vulnerability if oil supply

increases.

Potential for economic instability as diversification

occurs.

Resiliency in the context of

Vision 2030 is contingent

upon the success of

socioeconomic efforts

towards liberalization.

Reforms will need to

encourage and support

innovation and

development of the private

sector.

Saudi Aramco Saudi oil company is likely to be accused of price

fixing and wielding too much influence on oil

production following privatization given its

relationship with OPEC.10 Aramco is also vulnerable

to closer scrutiny by entities outside the kingdom

after going public.

Privatization of the

company is likely to raise

its international profile and

attract international offers

during the IPO.

Oil Industry As one of the top influencers of the industry, Saudi

Arabia’s reduced emphasis on oil may cause

volatility for the sector. Rules for production cuts

may change.

Key industry players will

have to figure out a way to

keep increasing the price of

oil without having to cut

production further.

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Risk Perception

The unprecedented nature of MbS’ reforms to open Saudi Arabia’s economy and liberalize Saudi society

is sure to change the perception of Saudi Arabia’s government, both nationally and internationally. A

successful outcome from these reforms is likely to change Saudi Arabia’s socioeconomic narrative from

conservative and protectionist to investor-friendly, globalized, and moderate.

Domestically, Saudi Arabia’s workforce has expressed some trepidation about the economic reforms and

the country’s rulers are already contending with the need to revamp its economy while simultaneously

managing public opinion. This is made clear by the efforts made to date, to offset any immediate economic

impact reforms will have on citizens. While pay raises and allowances will serve to mitigate this in the short

term, perceptions of the overarching reforms in the long term are contingent upon the possibility of

subsequent economic success.11

What may be most concerning for MbS is how he is poised to be perceived personally, and how his

government is to be perceived should his reforms fail or succeed. While successes will provide him with a

positive narrative moving forward, any failures will be directly attributed to the Crown Prince and may

cause Saudi citizens to lose faith in their government and confidence in MbS as a leader.

Risk Evaluation

➢ First Order: Political instability is the foremost concern for the Kingdom. MbS’ purges threaten

both the historical internal cohesion of the House of Saud as well as the longstanding relationship

between the crown and the religious establishment. Furthermore, if reforms fail to achieve their

stated goals, there is the risk of a popular backlash by Saudi citizens.

➢ Second Order: Poorly implemented reforms, socio-cultural strife, and the potential for oil

disruption threaten a serious economic downturn. Overhauling public sector employment systems

may result in reduced consumer spending and potential economic contraction.

➢ Third Order: MbS’ economic reforms, particularly, rely on raising substantial amounts of capital

through privatizations (notably through the IPO of Aramco). If these firms are unsuccessful at

meeting fundraising goals, capital-heavy reform efforts will be in great jeopardy.

Impact Assessment

Decreased Investment: Mohammad bin Salman’s economic reform—and to a lesser extent, the political

and social reforms—carry a risk of decreased investments in the country’s economy. Since the entirety of

the economic reform program is dependent upon raising unprecedented amounts of capital through

privatizations, most prominently through the Initial Public Offering (IPO) of Saudi Aramco. The reforms

call for a sovereign wealth fund of $2 trillion, raised through a mix of sell-offs, taxes, and other means.12 If

the IPO of Aramco and other firms fail to meet their fundraising goals, the reforms may be starved of much-

needed capital. However, investors remain confident that the privatizations, particularly that of Aramco,

will result in significant capitalization for the Saudi state.13

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Economic Downturn: Perhaps more significant than decreased investment is the possibility of a general

economic downturn. The austerity measures, including moves to cut state employment, pay, and pensions,

is prudent, considering the spiraling budget deficit. However, there is a danger that the cutbacks may reduce

consumer spending. Non-oil industries have experienced sluggish growth or even contraction in recent

years. If investor confidence and spending does not improve as expected, the reforms, and perhaps the very

foundation of the Saudi state, could be in jeopardy.14

Oil Disruption: Both within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and abroad, the MbS’ reforms are likely to have

some effect on world oil production. Saudi Arabia has long resisted calls from other OPEC members to cut

oil production in order to raise prices. However, Saudi spokesmen have recently called for just such a

production cut, with the intention of raising the price of crude oil to $70/barrel or beyond. There is a

particular motivation to raise oil prices, in the hopes that it might increase Aramco’s value in its forthcoming

IPO. However, higher oil prices could actually hurt the Saudi economy, the prospect of increased revenues

could motivate US shale-oil producers to increase output, undercutting Saudi market shares.15

Internationally, oil importers will be hurt by higher prices.16

Socio-Cultural Strife: Aside from the economic dimension, MbS’ reforms could also usher in cultural strife.

If proposed social reforms are implemented rashly, conservative elements within the broader populace or

the religious and royal establishments may seek to reverse these trends, creating the possibility for political

instability. Religion has long been an ally and tool of the royal family to maintain popular support. A serious

break with the religious Wahhabist establishment could undermine the legitimacy of the government, at a

moment when the economic and political structures are already in dangerous flux.17

Political Instability: Most glaringly, MbS’ reforms and political maneuverings pose a dangerous risk of

causing political instability. Saudi Arabia has long benefitted from a remarkable level of domestic stability

and quiescence, a result partly of the cooption of the religious establishment and partly a result of the

consensus within the royal family. The recent purges and consolidation of power in MbS’ hands, however,

risk destroying that consensus. Past power

struggles, particularly that following the

death of the country’s founder, Abdul-Aziz

al-Saud, hurt the kingdom’s ability to

initiate much needed reforms.18 It is quite

possible either the purges or the death of the

aging king Salman could cause a split within

the House of Saud, resulting in

unprecedented instability. Furthermore, a

poorly-implemented reform program could

create a popular backlash, as stresses on the

economy and rapid social changes push

long-dormant Saudi citizens to demand

change.

RISK GOVERNANCE

Key Takeaways:

➢ Mitigation: MbS and the Kingdom as a whole should focus on a holistic education policy; they

should implement a policy for normative change in order to reform cultural/societal attitudes in

school, at work, and at home; they should engage in a targeted PR campaign for the next 14 years;

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there also must be increased infrastructure spending and dedication to enhancing the services

sector.

➢ Opportunities: Going forward MbS’ outsize role in Saudi Arabia may enable him to uniquely

promulgate change. He can promote education opportunities that are both service-based and

vocational; he can leverage Vision 2030 in order to highlight his achievements and vision for a

better society and can utilize the upcoming Aramco IPO to fund and expedite many of his planned

reforms.

Focus on Education

One of the primary aims of Vision 2030 is to “involve the country’s youth in privatized market economy,”

with the target population consisting of a sizeable 19 million (of 29 million) citizens.19 Alongside the state’s

desire to move away from its petro-state roots towards one that is more progressive and service-based, the

Kingdom must focus on a holistic vision of education policy. In the short span of fourteen years, it will be

very difficult for the Kingdom to build a purely service based private market economy that must both lead

globally while remaining regionally competitive. As a result, the Saudi Kingdom should focus its efforts

on constructing and education policy that values both service-based and vocational skills, the latter of which

presents social obstacles as many consider such training to be beneath them.20 This dual focus will be

essential for the regime’s economic success.

Calculated Normative Change

Simply allowing women to work, drive and attend sporting events will not be enough to remove decades

of entrenched conservative cultural perceptions and practices.21 Beyond clamping down on conservative

religious figures and allotting more religious freedoms to women and the general population, the Kingdom

will be required to structure a calculated policy of systematic normative change. This will be particularly

essential when considering that Vision 2030 intends to revolutionize the entire fabric of Saudi society. Such

a policy for normative change will need to focus on reforming cultural values promulgated in the

educational system, workplace environment, domestic households, popular local media and other fora with

which Saudi citizens tend to interact. This will require a combination of calculated messaging from both

the state and its essential arms encouraging moderate strains of Islam, changing society’s perceptions

around the role of women, encouraging notions of equality, and even instilling a sense of patriotism through

collective duty.

Public Relations for the Political Landscape

While liberalizing the economy and society at large, the Kingdom will face challenges in preserving the

political landscape. As Saudi citizens begin paying taxes and living more freely, there is always the danger

of emerging political discontentment with the regime and the power structures it embodies.22 In order to

retain the regime’s long-term prospects while also sustaining or increasing levels of public support the

Saudi Kingdom should embark on a carefully conceived public relations campaign that would be designed

to last the course of the next fourteen years. This campaign could aim for consistent messaging highlighting

MbS’ achievements, goals for the betterment of society, and role as the leader of a revolutionary movement

dedicated to protecting the rights, values, and future of all Saudi citizens. Positive messaging will play a

large role in maintaining public support and ensuring that Saudi citizens feel invested in the larger Vision

2030. Conversely, the Kingdom should avoid making Saudis feel detached from the future of the country.

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Economic Diversification

Vision 2030’s ambitious plan to reduce Saudi Arabia’s economic reliance on oil is contingent upon the

success of Aramco’s upcoming IPO, during which 5% of the oil giant will be made available to private

investors.23 In order to create a solid foundation for economic diversification, revenue generated from the

IPO must be put toward large-scale infrastructure projects and enhancing the services sector. All

investments in this respect will be used to create a more attractive business environment for domestic and

foreign investors.

The Saudi government will also need to embrace dramatic political changes to attract investors, create a

cultural shift within the private sector, and encourage an entrepreneurial spirit among Saudi citizens. Efforts

to make the Saudis more active participants in the economy and an emphasis on a more market driven

economy across sectors can alleviate the transition towards a more robust and diverse economy. At present,

the sector relies heavily on financial support from the government and remains unreceptive to innovation,

a crucial factor for economic growth.24 Success for Vision 2030’s economic plans may also be heavily

contingent on the success of Aramco’s privatization.

CONCLUSION

MbS’ power consolidation is ushering Saudi Arabia into largely uncharted territory. MbS’ proposed

reforms represent a greater risk in the short- to medium-term. Vision 2030 will not be fully realized for over

a decade so many of the economic and social effects may not be felt for years to come. The Kingdom will

need to prioritize education, social change, and public relations to successfully navigate the diverse range

ofthreats and obstacles to MbS’ ambitious agenda.

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Endnotes

1 Nicholas Kulish, “Ritz-Carlton Has Become a Gilded Cage for Saudi Royals,” The New York Times, November 6,

2017, sec. Middle East, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/middleeast/ritz-carlton-riyadh-saudi-

princes.html. 2 Jamal Khashoggi, “Opinion | Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Is Acting like Putin,” Washington Post, November 5,

2017, sec. Global Opinions, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/11/05/saudi-arabias-

crown-prince-is-acting-like-putin/. 3 Martin Chulov, “‘This Is a Revolution’: Saudis Absorb Crown Prince’s Rush to Reform,” the Guardian, November

7, 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/07/this-is-a-revolution-saudis-absorb-crown-princes-rush-to-

reform. 4 Leanna Garfield, “Saudi Arabia Just Announced Plans to Build a $500 Billion Mega-City That’s 33 Times the Size

of New York City,” Business Insider, accessed January 19, 2018, http://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-

mega-city-jordan-egypt-oil-2017-10. 5 “How to Achieve Our Vision | Saudi Vision 2030,” accessed January 19, 2018,

http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/125. 6 Martin Chulov, “I Will Return Saudi Arabia to Moderate Islam, Says Crown Prince,” the Guardian, October 24,

2017, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/i-will-return-saudi-arabia-moderate-islam-crown-prince. 7 Yuri Barmin, “Can Mohammed bin Salman break the Saudi-Wahhabi pact?” Al Jazeera, January 7, 2018.

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/mohammed-bin-salman-break-saudi-wahhabi-pact-

180107091158729.html 8 Bethan McKernan, “Saudi Arabia’s youth embrace crown prince’s desire for liberalization”. The Independent,

October 25, 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-change-youth-crown-prince-

modernise-wahhabism-mohammed-bin-salman-a8019876.html 9 Martin Chulov, “I Will Return Saudi Arabia to Moderate Islam, Says Crown Prince.” 10 Rania El Gamar and Alex Lawler, “These days Saudi Arabia is considering the unthinkable – quitting OPEC”.

Financial Times, September 28, 2017. http://business.financialpost.com/commodities/energy/insight-aramco-listing-

reshapes-saudi-arabias-opec-oil-policy 11 Alaa Shahine and Vivian Nereim, “Royal Handouts Cheer Saudis But Show Struggle To Revamp Economy”.

Bloomberg Politics, January 5, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-06/saudis-get-extra-pay-

after-price-surge-sparked-public-complaints 12 Adel Abdel Ghafar, “Will Vision 2030 Usher the New Kingdom of Saud? - Part 1 | Inter Press Service,” Inter

Press Service News Agency, February 19, 2018, http://www.ipsnews.net/2018/02/vision-2030-usher-new-kingdom-

saud-part-1/. 13 Matthew Winkler, Filipe Pacheco, and Shin Pei, “How a $1.5 Trillion Aramco IPO Could Transform Global

Stocks,” Bloomberg.Com, January 25, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-25/aramco-seen-

transforming-global-stocks-with-1-5-trillion-value. 14 Alla Shahine, Vivian Nereim, and Donna Abu-Nasr, “Saudi Arabia’s Great Makeover Can’t Afford to Fail This

Time,” Bloomberg.Com, October 16, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-10-16/saudi-arabia-s-

great-makeover-can-t-afford-to-fail-this-time. 15 Grant Smith, “Saudi Arabia Is Taking a Harder Line on Oil Prices,” Bloomberg.Com, February 19, 2018,

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-19/once-opec-s-oil-price-dove-saudi-arabia-takes-a-harder-line. 16 Rumki Majumdar, “The Oil Mighty: The Economic Impact of Oil Price Fluctuations,” Deloitte Insights, July 22,

2016, https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/global-economic-outlook/2016/q3-understanding-

economic-impact-of-fluctuations-in-oil-prices.html. 17 Yury Barmin, “Can Mohammed Bin Salman Break the Saudi-Wahhabi Pact? | Middle East | Al Jazeera,” accessed

February 24, 2018, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/mohammed-bin-salman-break-saudi-wahhabi-pact-

180107091158729.html. 18 Thomas W. Lippman, “Opinion | The End of Saudi-Style Stability,” The New York Times, November 8, 2017, sec.

Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/opinion/saudi-arabia.html. 19 Khashan, Hilal. “Saudi Arabia's Flawed ‘Vision 2030.’” Middle East Forum, Middle East Forum, 2017,

www.meforum.org/6397/saudi-arabia-flawed-vision-2030. 20 Ibid.

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21 Team, Gulf. “Shifting Sands: What Is Changing in Saudi Arabia?” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 8 Nov. 2017,

www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-arrests-milestones/shifting-sands-what-is-changing-in-saudi-arabia-

idUSKBN1D8181. 22 Zhai, Keith, and David Tweed. “In Saudi Crown Prince's Crackdown, Echoes of Xi's China.” Bloomberg.com,

Bloomberg, 8 Nov. 2017, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-08/in-saudi-crown-prince-s-graft-crackdown-

echoes-of-xi-s-china. 23 Zainab Calcuttawala, “The Fate of Vision 2030 Rests on Saudi Aramco IPO”. Oil Price.com, August 22, 2017.

https://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/The-Fate-Of-Vision-2030-Rests-On-Saudi-Aramco-IPO.html 24 Naser Al Wasmi, “Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030: Economic reform likely to bring political changes too”. The

National, July 20, 2017. https://www.thenational.ae/world/saudi-arabia-s-vision-2030-economic-reform-likely-to-

bring-political-changes-too-1.610506