rṄog blo ldan śes rab's position on the buddha-nature doctrine and its infl uence on the early...

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist StudiesVolume 32 Number 12 2009 (2010) pp. 249283

rog Blo ldan es rabs position on the Buddha-nature doctrine and its infl uence

on the early gSa phu tradition*1

Kazuo Kano

Introduction

The teaching that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature (tathgata-garbha) was fi rst proclaimed in the Tathgatagarbhastra. Devel-oped in a series of Mahyna stras, such as the rml de v stra and Annatvpratva nirdeastra, it was then sys tem a tized in the Ratna gotra vibhga (abbr. RGV), alias Mahynottara tantra- stra. The core idea of the RGVs teaching is that everyone pos-sesses Buddha-nature. The latter does not change throughout the progression from the level of ordinary beings to that of a Buddha, it is merely purifi ed through the separation from adventitious de-fi lements. Once this purifi cation is complete, awakening is accom-plished.

Both Indian and Tibetan traditions struggled with the question of the ontological status of Buddha-nature. One fi nds indeed in some stras descriptions of Buddha-nature as permanent and per-vading every sentient being, which are also characteristics ascribed by non-Buddhists to the Self (tman). But if Buddha-nature were to be understood as a permanent entity akin to a Self, how could this

1 * I wish to thank Pascale Hugon and Kevin Vose for their very valu-able comments on this paper. Work on this paper has been generously supported by the Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (Start-up) program of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).

250 Kazuo Kano

teaching be compatible with the standard Buddhist doctrine that everything is impermanent and selfl ess?

Some Mahyna stras, such as the Mahyna Mah pari nir-va stra, would off er support for the assimilation of Buddha-nature with a Self. The Mahyna Mah parinirva stra is quite explicit in associating the two notions, characterizing in particular the dharmakya in terms of perfection of Self (tmapramit), but warns about the confusion of the correct tman, which is Buddha-nature, with tman taken in its ordinary sense.1

RGV I.37 and RGVV also speak of the perfection of Self as an epithet of the dharmakya, interpreting however this notion of Self (tman) in the sense of selfl essness (nairtmya) or quies-cence of conceptual proliferations (prapaca), thus distinguish-ing Buddha-nature from the notion of a personal, permanent Self (tman).2

1 The Mahyna Mahparinirvastra equates tman with Buddha-nature (see P 788 tu 105b5 [T vol. 12, 407b; 883b]: bdag ces bya ba ni de bin gegs pa i si po i don to/ /) and characterizes the dharmakya (that is, the resultant aspect of Buddha-nature; see below [i]) in terms of per-fection of permanence (nityapramit), perfection of bliss (sukha-pramit), perfection of Self (tmapramit), and perfection of purity (ubhapramit) (see P 788 tu 33b334a2 [T vol. 12, 377c-378a; 862b]). 2 RGVV 31,1316: tathgatas tua punar yathbhtajnena sarva-dharma nair tmya para prami prptab/ tac csya nairtmyam an tma-laka ena yath daranam avisavditatvtc sarvaklam tmbhipreto nair tmyam evtme tid ktv/ yathokta sthito sthnayogeneti/(a Schmithausen [1971: 143] corrected tathgata to tathgatas tu; b Johnston xvi; c Schmit hau sen [1971: 143] corrected avisavditvt to avi sa vditatvt; d Schmithausen [1971:143] corrected evtmani to evtmeti)RGVV 32,910: prajpramitbhvanaykopamasattva bhjana lo-ka nair tmya nihgamand.See also RGVV 33,810: tm eva cvidyvsabhmi prattya skma-nimitta pra paca samudcra yogd atyantam anabhisaskrm tma-pramit n dhi gacchanti. Schmithausen (1971:143144 and 1973:135) links this sentence to the Ma dhya maka view. For instance, the Madhyamakahdaya (III.284cd) similarly defi nes dharmakya as quiescence of conceptual proliferations

rog Blo ldan es rab on the Buddha-nature doctrine 251

Nevertheless, the RGV does not promote the doctrine of empti-ness in the sense that everything is ultimately empty of intrinsic nature. Quite on the contrary, the RGV stresses the real existence of Buddha-nature, and proclaims the superiority of the Buddha-nature doctrine to the emptiness doctrine of the Prajpramitstras.3

The RGV thus on the one hand distinguishes Buddha-nature from the disapproved view of a Self, while on the other hand it admits Buddha-nature as ultimately existent4 an ambiguous view-point, and a challenging one for its interpreters.

The RGV in Tibet

The RGV was fi rst translated into Tibetan by Atia, working in col-laboration with Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba.5 A new translation was carried out by rog lo ts ba Blo ldan es rab (10591109)6 in collaboration with Sajjana.7

(buddhn dharma kyo ya prapacopaama iva). 3 The alternative title of the RGV, mahynottaratantra supreme doctrine of the Mahyna, hints to the superiority of the Buddha-nature doctrine to the emptiness doctrine. Cf. RGV I.160: prvam eva vyavasthpya tantre punar ihottare / pacadoaprahya dhtv asti-tva prakitam/ / 4 Cf. RGV I.53, I.165; RGVV 2,1113. 5 This translation is not available but is sometimes quoted in gon nu dpals RGV commentary. See Kano 2006, chapter 2 (Six Tibetan Translations of the Ratnagotravibhga). Atia himself quotes the RGV in his own works; for instance, we fi nd RGV I.86 quoted in his Dharmadhtudaranagti (D 2314 = D 4475; P 3153 = P 5388; modern edition in Lobsang Dorjee 1999), a work translated by himself and Nag tsho. Note that the translation of this work slightly diff ers from rogs translation, namely, the third line has the reading brdzun med bslu med tshe med pas, whereas rogs translation reads brdzun med bslu med

chos id da for the Sanskrit ammoadharmitvam. 6 On rogs life, see Kano 2006 and Kramer 2007. 7 This is the translation currently found in D 4024/ P 5525. In total six Tibetan translations of the RGV are accounted for: (1) Atia (9821054) and Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba (10111064); (2) rog Blo ldan es

252 Kazuo Kano

Although there is some evidence of discussions on Buddha-nature in pre-11th-century Tibetan works,8 as well as in 11th-centu-ry works,9 rog was the fi rst to compose an extensive commentary on the RGV, as well as a topical outline (bsdus don) of the same text.10 rogs RGV commentary has been available since 1996 in the form of a facsimile reprint from a xylograph version, and an old manuscript was recently published in the bKa gdams gsu bum.11

rab (10591109) and Sajjana (late 11th century); (3) Pa tshab i ma grags (b.1055); (4)Mar pa Do pa Chos kyi dba phyug (10421136); (5) Jo na Lo ts ba Blo gros dpal (12991353 or 13001355); (6) Yar klus Lo ts ba Grags pa rgyal mtshan (12421346). No. (2) is the only one pres-ently available. Fragments from (1), (3), and (5) are found in quotations in Tibetan RGV commentaries. For the details, see Kano 2006, chapter 2. 8 See Wangchuk 2005: 178180. 9 Sajjanas collaborative translator gZu dGa ba i rdo rje composed a brief note (zin bris) on the RGV. See gon nu dpal, rGyud bla me lo, 4,1718 (paita sadzjana i gsu la lo ts ba gzu dga rdor gyis zin bris byas ba i rgyud bla ma i rnam bad) and A khu Chi es rab rgya mtsho, Tho yig, no. 11338.Sajjanas disciple bTsan Kha bo che composed the Pad ma lcags kyu that discusses his gan sto viewpoints (see Zab khrid yi ge, 205,2206,4). According to u chen Tshul khrims rin chen, bTsan composed a brief note (zin tho) on the text (u chen thob yig, Kha 72a34: khor lo mtha ma i dgos don da mtha phye chos da chos id phye ba i rjes su bra ba byed gis/ rgyud bla rnams dpe tsam ya dka bar byu tshul btsan kha bo che i zin thor gsal ba bin rgya gar dua yod par grags pa i gan sto gi brgyud pa ni ...).The Bras spus dkar chag mentions a Tibetan manuscript of a RGV commentary by Mar pa (see Bras spus dkar chag, p. 1411: rGyud bla i bsdus don, 31 folios; di mar pa lo ts ba i yin nam brtag), who might be the same Mar pa Do pa Chos kyi dba phyug (10421146) to whom a translation of the RGV is also attributed. See above, note 7. 10 An incomplete manuscript of the topical outline found in Kharakhoto, preserved at the British Museum, was edited in Kano 2008. 11 The facsimile comes from an unrevised xylograph version (abbr. A) carved in the twentieth century, which was in possession of Dwags po Rin po che in Paris (see Jackson 1993). A copy of a revised blockprint is preserved in Tohoku University (Thoku Zgai, no. 6798); another copy


In this commentary entitled The Essential Meaning of the Utta-ra tantra (Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma i don bsdus pa, abbr. rGyud bla don bsdus), rog not only glosses on the RGV but presents his own interpretation of Buddha-nature, an interpretation that had a signifi cant infl uence especially in the early bKa gdams pa tradition (more precisely, the tradition of gSa phu Neu thog Monastery) and a long lasting impact in Tibet in general.12

bTsan Kha bo che (b. 1021), was also instrumental in introduc-ing the teaching of the RGV in Tibet.13 A lack of materials prevents us from determining his position on Buddha-nature. However, he does not appear to have been excessively infl uential. According to gon nu dpal, the transmission of bTsans teaching tradition had been broken by the 14th century.14

As pointed out above, the interpretation of the RGV presented obvious diffi culties in view of its ambiguity. In addition, doctrinal divergences between the RGV and Madhyamaka had to be dealt with by interpreters adopting the latter system. These were handled variously. One attitude consisted in accepting the teaching of the RGV literally and regarding it as a profound Madhyamaka posi-tion to be distinguished from the standard Madhyamaka position

of the same revised blockprint was microfi lmed by the Nepal German Manuscripts Preservation Project (Reel no. L 519/4). All these xylograph versions contain a number of serious errors and lacunas. These can now be corrected thanks to the old dbu med manuscript (abbr. B) found at gNas bcu lha kha temple of Bras spus Monastery, which was included in the bKa gdams gsu bum. (Citations from rGyud bla don bsdus in this paper are based on B and retain all of its orthographical particularities.)A unique folio from another old manuscript (the last folio of the work) was found by myself in Lhasa in 2007. A critical edition of the fi rst chapter of the rGyud bla don bsdus on the basis of A, along with an English translation, are to be found in Kano 2006 (an improved version collated with B is currently under preparation for publication). 12 rog is time and again quoted by later masters. See Kano 2006, chapters 5 and 6. 13 See, for instance, Mathes 2008: 3234, 4647. 14 Deb ther son po, 424.

254 Kazuo Kano

of the Mlamadhyamakakrik, etc. Proponents of this position, such as Dol po pa es rab rgyal mtshan (12921361), are called gan sto pas because they admit that Buddha-nature is empty of other, i.e., external defi lements, but not empty of its own pure nature, i.e., Buddha-qualities.15 In this paper we will consider an-other strategy, typical of rog and his followers, which consists in reformulating the teaching of the RGV so as to make it compatible with their Madhyamaka view.

Most previous studies of the Buddha-nature teaching in the Tibetan tradition have focused on post-14th-century works, such as those of Bu ston Rin chen grub (12901364), Dol po pa es rab rgyal mtshan, rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (13641432), etc.,16 while only a few pioneer studies address earlier developments.17 The broader corpus now available puts us in a position to shed more light on the earliest phase of the Tibetan tradition of teach-ings on Buddha-nature, and thereby to clarify the doctrinal basis for later developments.18

The present paper deals with a selection of rogs most signifi -cant views on the doctrine of Buddha-nature and considers some reactions to his interpretations in the works of his followers. Since the RGV commentaries attributed to two of rogs four main [spiritual] sons (sras kyi thu bo bi), a Tshes spo ba Chos kyi bla ma and Gro lu pa Blo gros byu gnas,19 as yet remain to be

15 For the details of the gan sto pa position, see for instance Mathes 2008: 4548. 16 The most relevant studies include Seyfort Ruegg 1969 and 1973, Ogawa 1969, and Hookham 1991. 17 See Kano 2006 (chapter 4) for a discussion of the state of research. Signifi cant contributions include Seyfort Ruegg 1969, Jackson 1993, and Mathes 2008, who made use of rogs RGV commentary. 18 The present paper elaborates on my earlier research on the subject that can be found in Kano 2001, 2003 and 2006. 19 The other two are Khyu rin chen grags and Bre es rab bar. Cf. bKa gdams chos byu gsal ba i sgron me, 151.


found,20 we will concentrate on the next-earliest available work, a commentary by Phywa pa Chos kyi se ge (11091169).21

rogs position

In rogs rGyud bla don bsdus, the most signifi cant work for his position on the Buddha-nature doctrine, the following discussions can be singled out:

(i) The three aspects of Buddha-nature (dharmakya, tathat, gotra),

(ii) Buddha-nature as a cause,

(iii) Buddha-nature and layavijna,

20 Both A khu Chi es rab rgya mtsho and gon nu dpal ascribe RGV commentaries to these two authors. (Cf. respectively Tho yig, nos. 11333 and 11339, and rGyud bla me lo, 4,23, 574,5.) gon nu dpal also lists RGV commentaries by Chos kyi bla mas disciple a bra pa Chos kyi ye es (12th century); Phywa pas disciple gTsa nag pa brTson grus se ge (12th century); and Dan bag sMra ba i se ge (12th century). See gon nu dpal, rGyud bla me lo, 4,2324. A khu Chi es rab rgya mtsho most likely copied gon nu dpals references (see Tho yig nos. 11331, 11334, 11335). 21 Phywa pa authored a RGV commentary and a topical outline of RGV (based on rogs topical outline), both of which were found recently at gNas bcu lha kha of Bras spus Monastery and published in 2006 in the bKa gdams gsu bum. See Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma i bstan bcos kyi tshig da don gyi cha rgya cher bsad pa phra ba i don gsal ba (abbr. rGyud bla don gsal), vol.7, pp. 163345; Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma i bsdus pa i don, vol.7, pp. 145156.The authorship of the rGyud bla don gsal is confi rmed on the basis of (a) the colophon of the manuscript that states composed by the monk Chos kyi se ge (see Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 93a3: theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma i bstan bcos kyi tshig da don gyi cha rgya cher bsad pa phra ba i don gsal ba es bya ba/ / a kya i dge slo chos kyi bla ma i abs kyi rdul phyi bos nod pa dge slo chos kyi se ges e bar sbyar ba rdzogs s.hy/ /) and (b) a citation nominally attributed to Phywa pa in Blo gros mtshus meds RGV commentary (see Kano 2007: 109, n. 75).

256 Kazuo Kano

(iv) the ontological status of the Buddha-qualities (interpretation of RGV I.154155), and

(v) the relation between the emptiness doctrine and the Buddha-nature doctrine (interpretation of RGV I.156167).

(i) The three aspects of Buddha-nature (dharmakya, tathat, go tra)

The three characteristic aspects22 of Buddha-nature, namely the dharmakya, tathat, and gotra, play a central role in the philo-sophical system of the RGV. They are introduced in RGV I.2728 and are explained in more detail in RGV I.130152.23 RGV I.2728 state as follows:

Because Buddhas wisdom [i.e., dharmakya] pervades [all] kinds of sentient beings, because their [i.e., sentient beings] immaculateness [i.e., tathat] is by nature non-dual [i.e., is not diff erent from Buddhas immaculateness], and because one metaphorically designates the Buddha- gotra by [the name of] its eff ect [i.e., Buddhas enlighten-ment], [the Buddha] taught that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature (RGV I.27).Because the body of the Perfect Buddha [i.e., the dharmakya] is all-pervading, because tathat cannot be diff erentiated [i.e., it pervades everything], and because gotra exists [in sentient beings], the Buddha taught that all sentient beings always have Buddha-nature (RGV I.28).24

The three notions of dharmakya, tathat and gotra, enumerated in the RGV as constitutive of the intrinsic nature (svabhva) of

22 The RGVV (69,17) calls them the three-fold intrinsic nature (trividha svabhva). 23 rogs discussion of these notions is found in his commentary on RGV I.130152. See rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 41a242a6; B 25b626b3. 24 RGV I.27: buddhajnntargamt sattvares tannairmalya sy-dvayatvt prakty / bauddhe gotre tatphalasyopacrd ukt sarve dehino buddha garbh / /; RGV I.28: sabuddha kya spharat ta tha-tvyatibhedata/ gotra ta ca sad sarve buddhagarbh arria/ /


Buddha-nature,25 are identifi ed by rog as being, respectively, the resultant ( bras bu), intrinsic (ra bin), and causal (rgyu) aspects.26 All three are to be equated with emptiness.

rogs commentary on the fi rst states that:

[Dharmakya pervades all sentient beings] because dharmakya is emptiness, and because emptiness, again, abides in [all] sentient be-ings. Therefore, it was taught [in the RGVV],27 [There are no] sen-tient beings who stand outside the dharmakya of the tathgata.28

Note that RGV I.145 uses the term dharmadhtu to explain dharma-kya29 dharmadhtu being the sphere of reality that is realized by non-conceptual knowledge and Buddhas instruction (dean), and associated with emptiness in works such as the Madhynta-vibhga.30

rogs commentary on the idea that every sentient being pos-sesses tathat, an intrinsic nature shared by ordinary beings and Buddhas, brings out a further equation between tathat and emp-tiness. It spells out also the diff erence between two levels of emptiness; whereas dharmakya denotes emptiness only in the

25 RGV I.144ab: svabhvo dharmakyo sya tathat gotram ity api/ 26 rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 29a34; B 18b5: rdzogs sas sku ni phro phyir da/ es bya ba la sogs pa la/ bras bu da/ ra bin da/ rgyu i si po can yin pa i phyir/ de bin gegs pa i si po can du dgos pao/ / 27 RGVV 70,1819: sa kacit sattva ... yas tathgatadharma kyd ba-hir. 28 rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 41b1; B 26b2: chos sku de ni (B: id) sto pa id yin la/ sto pa id kya sems can thams cad (thams cad om. A) la yod pa i phyir ro/ / des na ga ig de bin gegs pa i chos kyi sku las phyi rol tu gyur pa i sems can de dag (om. A) ni es gsus so// Cf. Kano 2006: 157 and Mathes 2007: 29. 29 RGV I.145: dharmakyo dvidh jeyo dharmadhtu sunirmala/ tan niyan da ca gmbhryavaicitryanayadean/ / 30 See in Madhyntavibhga I.14: tathat bhtakoi cnimitta para-mrthat / dharmadhtu ca paryy nyaty samsata / / The equation of the dharmadhtu with emptiness is not explicit in the RGV.

258 Kazuo Kano

completely pure state (i.e., emptiness realized by Buddhas), tathat brings emptiness into the scope of both pure and impure states:31

As for the previous case [i.e., dharmakya], since the intrinsic na-ture of the pure state itself exists [in Buddhas], the pure state is also present in sentient beings [for Buddhas dharmakya pervades all sentient beings]. Therefore, this very purity [i.e., emptiness]32 was called the essence (si po). As for the present case [i.e., tathat], though [ordinary beings] have no [such fi nal resultant state] which is accomplished by accumulation of purifi cations,33 only the emptiness of intrinsic nature is called essence.34

As for the gotra, rog states:

This cause [i.e., gotra], again, is both emptiness and wholesome seeds.35

31 rogs understanding of tathat as pertaining to both Buddhas and ordinary beings might fi nd its source in the statement in RGVV ad I.148 that tathat is luminous by nature and undiff erentiated throughout both Buddhas and ordinary beings states. 32 See rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 41b1; B 26b2. 33 In his gloss on the dharmakya, rog previously explained that the extremely pure tathat has been accomplished on account of the immeas-urable accumulations consisting in the Dharma of realization of the pre-vious tathgatas (rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 41a6; B 26a2). 34 rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 41b24; B 26a34: sar ni rnam par dag pa i gnas skabs de id kyi ra bin yod pas/ rnam par dag pa i gnas skabs kya sems can la yod pa yin la/ des na rnam par dag pa de id si por brjod pa yin no/ / da lta ni rnam par dag pa i tshogs las ya dag par grub pa de med kya/ ra bin gyis sto pa id kho na si por brjod pa yin no/ / 35 rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 42a1; B 26a7: rgyu ya sto pa id da (om. B)/ dge ba i sa bon te/ See also ibid., A 48a6b2; B 29b830a2: rigs ni (om. A) gis te/ ra bin du gnas pa da/ bsgrubs pa las gyur pao/ / de la ra bin du gnas pa ni sto pa id yin te/ de ni skyes bu i byed pas ma bsgrubs par chos id du grub pa i phyir ro/ / dea (B: de la) sas rgyas kyi chos skyed (B: bskyed) pa i nus pa da ldan pas rigs su gag kya de bin id (A: in) kho na yin no/ / des na bsgrubs pa las gyur pa dge ba i bag chags id sas rgyas pa na yos su gyur nas gnas pa ni/ los spyod rdzogs pa da sprul pa yin pas na gter da ljon i gi dpes bstan te (A:


rog sums up:

[Buddha-nature is called] gotra in view of its causal character, tathat in view of its pervading character, and dharmakya in view of its re-sultant character. Mere emptiness pertains to all three.36

Buddha-nature constituted by the three aspects is, in the end, noth-ing but emptiness a conclusion that concords with rogs defi ni-tion of Buddha-nature in terms of the mental continuum which has emptiness as its nature (sems kyi rgyud sto pa id kyi ra bin).37

to)/ yon tan chos kyis gan gyi dbul pa sel ba da/ rnam par grol pa i bras bu gan la smin par byed pa i phyir ro/ / The gotra is two-fold: the praktistha (inherent spiritual potential) and the samud nta (gener-ated spiritual potential). Among them, the praktistha means emptiness, since it is not brought forth through the eff orts of persons and is estab-lished by nature. Although it is regarded as a spiritual potential (gotra), since it is endowed with the potentiality (nus pa) to generate the Buddhas qualities, it is nothing but the tathat [itself, i.e., emptiness]. Therefore, the samudnta, namely wholesome impressions which abide in the form of a transformed state after one has become awakened, is [called] the sambhogakya and the nirmakya [in verse I.150]. Therefore, the two types [of spiritual potential] are illustrated through the analogies of a treasure and a [seed of a] tree, for the former dispels the poverty of oth-ers by means of its wholesome qualities, namely teaching, and the latter causes the maturation of fruitions, namely the release [from sasra], for others. In another passage (A 40b641a1; B 25b56), rog also refers to the two-fold gotra on the basis of RGV I.149. 36 rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 42a2; B 26a7: des na rgyu i mtshan id nas ni rigs yin la/ khyab byed kyi mtshan id nas ni de bin id/ bras bu i mtshan id nas ni chos kyi sku ste/ sto pa id ba ig rnam pa gsum gar ya gyur ro/ / 37 In the introductory part of his rGyud bla don bsdus, rog explains the soteriological path according to two systems of the seven vajrapadas (see Kano 2006, chapter 4 for the details). In this context, he redefi nes Buddha-nature as the mental continuum that has emptiness as its nature. See rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 4a56; B 2b56: ya dag pa i lta ba son du bta nas thar pa i don du (B: phyir) brtson pa tshogs kyi lam nas brtsams te (A: nas) bya chub sems dpa i sa bdun pa i bar du thob pa i ra bin gi (om. A) dge ba i tshogs kyis legs par bsgrubs pa i sems kyi

260 Kazuo Kano

Another discussion pertaining to these three aspects concerns the question of the nominal (btags pa) versus the actual (dos) status of dharmakya, tathat, and gotra, depending on whether ordinary beings or Buddhas are being considered. The nominal/actual distinction stems from the mention of metaphorical desig-nation (upacra, er btags) in RGV I.27c. The idea behind this is that gotra, insofar as it potentially allows sentient beings to become a Buddha, is a cause of Buddhahood. It can thus be metaphorically designated by the name of its eff ect.

rog adopts this distinction with regard to dharmakya and tathat as well: the term dharmakya directly refers to the re-sultBuddhahoodand indirectly alludes to the causal faculty present in ordinary beings,38 while the term tathat directly refers to both the resultant and causal aspects of Buddhas and ordinary beings.

This distinction also applies in the context of identifying the essence (si po), a term already met with in the above passage on tathat.39 Buddhas essence (that is, the result itself) directly refers to the dharmakya (the resultant aspect of Buddha-nature), and indirectly alludes to gotra (the causal aspect).40 On the other hand, sentient beings essence (sems can gyi si po, that is, the cause itself) directly refers to gotra.41

rgyud sto pa nyid kyi ra bin ni/ e bar len pa yin te/ khams so/ / 38 rog previously restricted the presence of dharmakya to Buddhas; however, so as not to contradict the teaching of RGV I.2728, according to which Buddhas dharmakya pervades every sentient being, rog ad-mits the nominal existence of dharmakya in ordinary beings. 39 Although Sanskrit dictionaries do not defi ne garbha as essence (si po), some Indian sources refer to such a meaning (Zimmermann 2002: 41). For instance, Ratnkaranti equates vajragarbha with hdaya and Jayaratha interprets garbha as sra (see Zimmermann 2002: 41, n. 58). Furthermore, gon nu dpal refers to Sanskrit equivalents of si po as sra, hdaya, garbha, and maa (see his rGyud bla me lo, 262,2425). 40 rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 29a45; B 18b56. 41 rog, ibid., A 29b1; B 18b719a1.


(ii) Emptiness as a cause

Among the three aspects of Buddha-nature dealt with above, the causal aspect (i.e., gotra), that is, the spiritual potential to become a Buddha, plays the most signifi cant role.

rogs predicament in this regard is a Madhyamaka one: every-thing is empty by nature and there is no real entity on the ultimate level; how then can Buddha-nature be called a cause and how can it produce a result? Indeed, if we understand Buddha-nature as a real, causally effi cient entity, then it could not be emptiness.

rogs solution is to accept it as an effi cient cause, which is how-ever a conventional object (tha sad kyi yul) devoid of real exist-ence:

Therefore, the dhtu [i.e., Buddha-nature], which is a conventional object pertaining to a non-affi rming negation (prasajyapratiedha), is called the effi cient cause (updna) of dharmakya, which is the con-ventional object pertaining to the non-affi rming negation. It is, how-ever, not the case that objects which must be produced and which pro-duce [something] really exist. The term conventional object means something that is established as having a nature of a non-affi rming negation, [namely,] something that does not exist in reality.42

42 rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 4a23; B 2b34: des na med par dgag pa i tha sad kyi yul du gyur pa i khams ni med par dgag pa i tha sad kyi yul du gyur pa i chos kyi sku i (chos kyi sku i om. A) er len du brjod kyi bskyed par bya ba da skyed par byed pa i* don id ni dos su yod pa ma yin no/ / tha sad kyi yul es bya ba ni/ med par dgag pa ra bin du grub pa de kho nar med pa i don to (B: te)/ / * bskyed par bya ba da skyed par byed pa i is my conjecture. B reads: bskyed par bya ba da bskyed par byed pa i; A reads: skyes bu byed pa i. The reading of B, it is not that objects which must be produced and which produce [something] really exist, is more likely than that of A, it is not that the object of human activity really exists, since rog as-serts here that Buddha-nature or dhtu (that is, emptiness) does not have an ontologically grounded causation but a merely nominal causation. Furthermore, this reading is supported by a similar expression found in Phywa pas rGyud bla don gsal, 3b2: dos myed da dkon mchog gsum la rjes su gro ba i ra bin skyed byed da skyed bya myed kya ldog pa tsam las rgyur tha sad gdags pa ste/ /

262 Kazuo Kano

rog thereby accepts neither that dhtu and dharmakya should be entities in order to be causes or that the causation in question is a causation of the type that occurs between a seed and a sprout. Even though all phenomena are empty by nature, everything is able to exist and function conventionally. In this sense Buddha-nature can fulfi ll a causal function.43 rog probably premises his position here on Mlamadhyamakakrik XXIV.14:

Only when emptiness is applicable [to all phenomena], everything be-comes applicable; if, on the other hand, emptiness were not applicable [to all phenomena], nothing would be applicable.44

From another point of view, emptiness is a cause because one grad-ually attains enlightenment by meditating on emptiness:

Emptiness is the cause for the origination of the [resultant] pure state [i.e., enlightenment] if one takes it as an objective support [in a medi-tative state].45

(iii) Buddha-nature and layavijna

When explaining gotra, the causal aspect of Buddha-nature, the RGVV quotes a verse from the Abhidharmastra:

The beginningless dhtu is the universal basis of all phenomena. Due to its presence, there arise all forms of existence as well as the attain-ment of nirva.46

43 The RGV teaches Buddha-nature not only as a cause to become a Buddha but also as the universal foundation of sasra and nirva (see below [iii]), and this latter aspect is relevant to emptinesss function that enables all phenomena (which include sasra and nirva) to exist on the conventional level. 44 Mlamadhyamakakrik XXIV.14: sarva ca yujyate tasya nyat yasya yu jyate/ sarva na yujyate tasya nya na yasya yujyate/ /Ro ston associates rogs position with Mlamadhyamakakrik XXIV.14 when explaining rGyud bla don bsdus A 4a1; B 2b23. See Ro ston, rGyud bla legs bad, 79,1320 (he also refers to Vigrahavyvartan). 45 rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 42a12; B 26a7: sto pa id kya de la dmigs nas (B: pas) rnam par dag pa i gnas skabs skye ba i rgyu yin no/ / 46 RGVV 72,1213: andikliko dhtu sarvadharmasamraya /


After quoting this verse that teaches that dhtu is the universal basis of sasra and nirva, the RGVV identifi es this dhtu with Buddha-nature.47 One will remain in sasra as long as Buddha-nature is covered with defi lements, and will reach nirva when Buddha-nature is purifi ed.

This same verse is quoted in Yogcra works, such as Asagas Mahynasagraha and Sthiramatis Triikbhya. Those works identify dhtu as layavijna:48 seeds stored in layavijna cause further existences in sasra, and the transformation of laya vijna (i.e., rayaparivtti) causes nirva.

rog endorses the RGVVs identifi cation of dhtu with Buddha-nature, as well as the Yogcra identifi cation with layavijna as he states:

Such [dhtu], which is endowed with various faculties [to gener-ate everything that belongs to sasra and nirva], is also called layavijna.49

The identifi cation of Buddha-nature with layavijna also echoes what we fi nd in the Lakvatrastra and Ghanavyhastra, two stras that were most probably composed after the RGVV.50

tasmin sati gati sarv nirvdhigamo pi ca/ / 47 RGVV 72,1673,1: dhtur iti/ yad ha/ yo ya bhagavas tath-gata garbho lokottaragarbha praktipariuddhagarbha iti/ 48 Mahynasagraha (ed. Nagao), I.1, and Triikbhya (ed. Buescher), p. 116,12. 49 rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 42a6; B 26b23: de dra ba nus pa sna tshogs pa can de la ni kun gi i rnam par es pa es kya brjod do. In the gloss on RGV I.1, too (rGyud bla don bsdus, A 7b14; B 4b57), rog presupposes that dhtu is a foundation of sasra and nirva and explains why the conventions/expressions of sasra and nirva are applicable to dhtu which belongs to the ultimate level. This idea can be linked to rogs understanding of Buddha-nature as a foundation that includes all the seven vajrapadas. See rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 7a6; B 4b45: rdo rje i gnas bdun po di mtha (om. A) dag khams kyi ra bin du bsdu ba ni sar bad zin pa id do/ / 50 For the source of this equation of Buddha-nature with layavijna found in the Lakvatrastra, see Kano 2006, introduction. E.g.,

264 Kazuo Kano

rog leaves unsolved the problem of how this identifi cation is to be reconciled with his defi nition of Buddha-nature as emptiness. The notion of layavijna indeed involves a level of reality which is hardly compatible with complete emptiness. This diffi culty is probably the reason why rogs successors, for instance, as will be discussed below, Phywa pa Chos kyi se ge, rejected the identifi ca-tion with layavijna.

(iv) The ontological status of the Buddha-qualities (interpreta-tion of RGV I.154155)

Verses I.154155 of the RGV introduce the notion of emptiness within the system of the Buddha-nature doctrine as follows:

There is nothing to be removed from it [i.e., from Buddha-nature] and nothing to be added. The real should be seen as real, and seeing the real, one becomes liberated. (RGV I.154)51

The dhtu is empty of adventitious [stains], which have the defi ning characteristic of being separable; but it is not empty (anya) of un-surpassable qualities, which have the defi ning characteristic of not being separable. (RGV I.155)52

La k va tra stra VI (Takasaki ed. p. 6,12; Nanjio ed. p. 221,1213): aparvtte ca tath gatagarbhaabdasaabdita layavijne nsti sa-pt n pravtti vij n nirodha / The same notion is found in the Ghanavyhastra: P 778 cu 62b12: sa rnams sna tshogs kun gi ste / / bde gegs si po dge baa/ / si po de la kun gi i sgras/ / de bin gegs pa ston pa mdzad/ / si po kun gir bsgrags par ya/ / blo gan rnams kyis mi es so/ /; T vol. 16, 747a; 775a. For the doctrinal background and development of the equation of Buddha-nature with layavijna, see Takasaki 1982. Mathes (2007: 416417) summarizes gon nu dpals and others positions with regard to the equation of Buddha-nature and layavijna. 51 RGV I.154 parallels Abhisamaylakra V.21. rog, in his Abhi sa-ma y lakra commentary, explains that verses V.1821 teach the fruit of the daranamrga-stage and that V.21 teaches the view of emptiness as a reasonable way for liberation. See rog, mon rtogs sgron me, A 86b35; B 34a89. 52 RGV I.154155: npaneyam ata kicid upaneya na kicana /


The RGVV explains:

There is no defi ling factor (sakleanimitta) to be removed from it, i.e., dhtu, which is naturally pure, because it is naturally devoid of adventitious stains. Nor does anything need to be added to it as a puri-fying factor (vyavadnanimitta), because it is naturally endowed with pure qualities which are inseparable [from it].53

In sum, Buddha-nature is primordially void of adventitious stains but not void of Buddha-qualities. The RGV hence teaches that Buddha-nature is not empty (anya), insofar as it is not emp-ty of Buddha-qualities. The question that is likely to arise for a Mdhyamika interpreter and is actually already prefi gured in RGV I.156 (see below)is how this affi rmation of Buddha-qualities in the RGV can be reconciled with the Prajpramitstras stance that everything is empty by nature? Let us consider rogs interpretation of these two verses:

Neither superimposing the [unreal] ultimate existence of the objective support (dmigs pa) for defi lements, nor denying the conventional ex-istence of the objective support of mind and mental factors for purifi -cation, [the reality] remains in accordance with the two truths as they are. ... In the way of neither superimposing [unreal] ultimate existence (paramrthasat) nor denying conventional existence (savtisat), the correct reality, namely the nature of the integration of the two truths, is thus presented [in verse 154].54

dra a vya bhtato bhta bhtadar vimucyate / / nya gantukair dhtu savinir bhgalakaai / anyo nuttarair dharmair avinir bh-galakaai/ / 53 RGVV 76,57: na kicid apaneyam asty ata praktipariuddht ta th gatadhto saklea nimittam gantukamalanyat prakti tvd asya/ npy atra kicid upaneyam asti vyavadna nimittam avinir bh ga-uddha dharma pra ktitvt/ 54 rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 42b36; B 24b57: kun nas on mos pa i dmigs pa don dam par yod par sgro mi dogs pa da/ rnam par bya ba i (B: bar) sems da sems las byu ba i dmigs pa kun rdzob tu yod pa la skur ba mi debs pas/ bden pa gis ji lta ba bin gnas pa ni/ ... de ltar don dam par yod par sgro mi dogs pa da/ kun rdzob tu yod pa la skur ba mi debs pa i tshul gyis ya dag pa id phyin ci ma log pa bden pa gis zu du brel ba i ra bin bstan to/ / Cf. Kano 2006: 160 and Mathes 2007: 31.

266 Kazuo Kano

rogs strategy is here to appeal to the distinction between the two truths. Insofar as perception of reality involves avoiding the denial of conventional existence (kun rdzob tu yod pa), the possibility re-mains for something to be not empty. Where the RGVV explains that after removing wrong assertion and denial,55 there remains Buddha-nature which is empty of defi lements and there is thus something remaining (avaia), rog interprets this passage as saying that on the conventional level there remains the objective support for purifi cation which is empty of the objective support for defi lement on the ultimate level.56 rog is thus resorting to a strat-egy often met with in Madhyamaka, namely, taking the view that everything is empty by nature to refer to the ultimate level, while admitting that existence on the conventional level is not empty.

rogs interpretation along this line thus succeeds in recon-ciling the view of Buddha-nature being not empty of Buddha-qualities with the everything is empty-standpoint, but leaves the problem of the status of the Buddha-qualities unresolved: in rogs framework, the Buddha-qualities would have to be conventionally existent. However, the RGV rather teaches the Buddha-qualities as really existent (bhta),57 and admits Buddha-nature endowed with the Buddha-qualities as unconditioned or as the ultimate.58

55 RGVV 76,11: samroppavdntaparivarjand avipartaa nyat-la ka am anena lokadvayena paridpitam/ (a Schmithausen[1971: 159] corrected aparyanta to aviparta) 56 See rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 43b56; B 27a8b1. 57 As pointed out by Schmithausen (1973: 134), the RGV restricts this emptiness to mundane factors which are accidental and unreal (RGV I.158), while claiming the true existence of the reality (bhta) which is void of faults (RGV I.164cd). See also Schmithausen 1971: 160161. Furthermore, RGV III.13 teach the Buddha-qualities, such as the Ten Powers, as belonging to Buddhas ultimate body (paramrthakya), and the characteristics of the Great One (mahpurualakaa) as belonging to Buddhas conventional body (savtikya). However, Phywa pa ex-plicitly understands the Ten Powers, etc., as belonging to conventional truth. See Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 76a7. 58 RGV I.53 admits Buddha-nature as unconditioned (asaskta), and the RGVV (2,1113) teaches that the expressions, Buddha-nature, the


rog appears not to subscribe completely to the existence of the Buddha-qualities in Buddha-nature, for he says that all Buddha- qualities are summoned as if called when one realizes the dharma dhtu.59 What rog implies here is that dharmadhtu (i.e., Buddha-nature) is the cause for the attainment of the Buddha-qualities; the Buddha-qualities are thus not strictly speaking pre-sent in the Buddha-nature, but generated by it. In this way, rog strives to avoid the non-buddhistic view of satkryavda (the posi-tion that admits the result existing in the cause).

(v) Relation between the emptiness doctrine and the Buddha-nature doctrine (interpretation of RGV I.156167)

RGV I.156167, the last twelve verses of the fi rst chapter, discuss the purpose of teaching Buddha-nature. RGV I.156 fi rst introduces an objection:

Why did Buddhas teach here [i.e., in the Tathgatagarbhastra, etc.] that the dhtu of Buddha exists in every sentient being, after teaching here and there (tatra tatra) [i.e., in most stras such as the Pra j p-ra mitstras]60 that everything should be known to be empty in every respect, like clouds, [visions in a] dream and illusions?61

Replying to this objection, RGV I.157 teaches that the purpose in teaching Buddha-nature is for the sake of abandoning fi ve faults:

ultimate (paramrtha), and the sphere of sentient beings (sattvadhtu) are synonyms. 59 See rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 33b23; B 21b1: don dam pa rtogs pa ni yon tan kun gyi rgyu yin te/ chos kyi dbyis rtogs na sas rgyas kyi yon tan thams cad bos pa bin du du ba i phyir ro/ /. Cf. Mathes 2007: 31. 60 As for the understanding of tatra tatra, I follow Vairocanarakitas gloss, tatra tatreti stre (see Vairocanarakita, Mahynottaratantraippa, 14r1) and also a suggestion by Schmithausen (1971: 169): Allenfalls wre es denk bar, da tatra tatra zu ity uktvaiva zu ziehen ist und bedeu-tet: in manchen [Mahynastren]. 61 RGV I.156: nya sarva sarvath tatra tatra jeya megha-svapna myktbham / ity uktvaiva buddhadhtu puna ki sattve sattve stti buddhair ihoktam/ /

268 Kazuo Kano

the depressed mind, contempt against those who are inferior, cling-ing to things unreal, speaking ill of truth, and aff ection for ones self.62 Further, RGV I.158159 teach that the claim everything is empty in every respect implies the absence of the defi lements, etc., with regard to the real existence of Buddha-nature. Moreover, RGV I.160 hints to the superiority of the Buddha-nature doctrine to the emptiness doctrine.63

rog comments on RGV I.157 as follows:

[The reality which has] the characteristic [of emptiness] expressed there [in the Prajpramitstras] is regarded here [in the RGV] as a cause; by focusing on the characteristic [i.e., emptiness] taught there, it [i.e., emptiness] is the cause for the arising of the Buddha-qualities. The intention [of teaching Buddha-nature] is in order to eliminate fi ve faults.64 In this way, the contradiction [between the teaching of Buddha-nature and that of the Prajpramitstras] is eliminated.65

In order to bridge the gap between the emptiness teaching of the Prajpramitstras and the pragmatic function ascribed to Buddha-nature in the RGV, rog utilizes his understanding of emptiness as a cause (see [ii]). Accordingly, rog does not agree with the superiority of the Buddha-nature doctrine to the emptiness doctrine, as taught in RGV I.157ff . Rather, he is seeking to adapt the Buddha-nature doctrine of the RGV to fi t with the emptiness doctrine of the Madhyamaka system.

62 See RGV I.157: lna citta hnasattvev avajbhtagrho bhta dharm pavda / tmasneha cdhika pacado ye te tatprahrtham uktam/ / 63 See note 3. 64 RGV I.160cd (commentarial verse on I.157): pacadoaprahya dhtv asti tva prakitam/ / 65 rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 45a56; B 28a6: dir ni der bstan pa i mtshan id de la dmigs nas [B: pas] sas rgyas kyi chos grub pa i rgyu yin no es der brjod pa i mtshan id de id rgyur gag [B: bag] pa yin no/ / de i dgos pa ya es pa la spa ba i [B: spa bar bya ba i] phyir ro es de ltar gal ba spo bao/ /


The equation of Buddha-nature with emptiness stands at the core of rogs interpretation of the RGV. One can wonder what the background could be for this idea; could it have its origin in Indian sources?

Two among the three aspects of Buddha-nature, dharmakya and tathat, are identifi ed with emptiness already in early works, such as the Madhyntavibhga. However, these works do not dis-cuss Buddha-nature, and do not seem to have had an impact on rog on this account.

The writings of Indian Mdhyamikas turn out more likely to provide a source of infl uence. The fi rst Madhyamaka master who discussed Buddha-nature was Bhviveka (assuming he was indeed the author of the Tarkajvl), who combined Buddha-nature with the Three Deliverance-doors (trimokamukha). He asserts that the teaching that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature implies that emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness, etc., abide in the mind of all sentient beings; this teaching does not refer to the inherent (antakaraa), eternal purua (i.e., tman) pervading everything.66

Kamalala further develops Bhvivekas idea in his Madhya-mak loka:

[The teaching that] all sentient beings have Buddha-nature refers to the fact that all [sentient beings] are able to attain the state of perfect awakening; this is because it is held that the expression tathgata [being the fi rst member of the compound tath gatagarbha] refers to the sphere of reality (dharmadhtu) which is characterized by the

66 Tarkajvl VI, D 69a13: de bin gegs pa i si po can es bya ba ya sto pa id da/ mtshan ma med pa da/ smon pa med pa la sogs pa rnams sems can thams cad kyi rgyud la yod pa i phyir yin gyi/ na gi byed pa i skyes bu rtag pa thams cad du khyab pa lta bu ni ma yin te/ ji skad du/ chos thams cad ni sto pa id da/ mtshan ma med pa da/ smon pa med pa i o bo/ ga sto pa id da/ mtshan ma da/ smon pa med pa de ni de bin gegs pao es bya ba la sogs pa byu bas so/ / Bhviveka probably premises his interpretation on a passage in the Lakvatrastra (Nanjio ed., pp. 77,1379,9). Cf. Takasaki 1980: 232236 and Eckel 2008: 154155.

270 Kazuo Kano

selfl essness of person and phenomena, namely natural luminosity (prakti prabh svara).67

In this statement, Kamalala proposes to take the word tathgata-garbha in the sense of *dharmadhtugarbha68 and interprets the teaching that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature in the sense that all sentient beings are pervaded by dharmadhtu, which is characterized by selfl essness. In other words, he understands Buddha-nature as selfl essness. Even though rog does not ex-plicitly acknowledge Kamalalas pioneer integration, it is likely that such an integration of the Buddha-nature teaching into the Madhyamaka position had an impact on rogs interpretation.69

Precise statements of the equation of Buddha-nature with emp-tiness are found in works by Jaynanda and Abhaykaragupta; whether, being younger contemporaries of rog, they could have had an impact on the latters position is diffi cult to ascertain.70

67 Kamalala, Madhyamakloka, D 242b47: sems can thams cad ni de bin gegs pa i si po can no es bya ba dis kya/ thams cad bla na med pa ya dag par rdzogs pa i bya chub kyi go pha thob par ru ba id du yos su bstan te/ de bin gegs pa i sgra ni chos kyi dbyis ga zag da chos la bdag med pa i mtshan id ra bin gyis od gsal ba yin par brjod par bed pa i phyir ro/ / 68 This term is found in the rmldevstra, and quoted in the RGVV. See RGVV 76,1618: sa khalv ea tathgatagarbho yath dhar-ma dhtugarbhas tath satkyadipatitnm agocara ity ukta di-pra ti pakatvd dharma dhto/ As regards the historical and doctrinal background of Kamalalas position on Buddha-nature, see Kano 2006, introduction. 69 According to Seyfort Ruegg (1981: 95, n. 308), Kamalala was perhaps the fi rst of the leading Madhyamaka masters to incorporate the theory of the tathgatagarbha into the Yogcra-Madhyamaka school. 70 As regards Abhaykaraguptas position, Seyfort Ruegg (1977: 302) noted that: In Abhaykaraguptas comments it is especially interesting to fi nd the assimilation of the tathgatagarbha with the praktisthagotra whose nature is dharma dhtu, in other words non-substantiality (nair-tmya) of both pudgala and dharmas, absence of own being (ni sva-bhvat) and Emptiness. For the details of Abhaykaraguptas discus-sion, see Kano 2006.


rogs followers in the early bKa gdams pa tradition

We do not know much about the views of the two of rogs four main [spiritual] sons (sras kyi thu bo bi), a tshes spo ba and Gro lu pa, who authored lost commentaries on RGV. We can get a glimpse of Gro lu pas position on Buddha-nature from some dis-cussions occurring in his voluminous bsTan rim71 where, in addition to an extensive general discussion on gotra in the second chapter,72

Jaynanda equates Buddha-nature with emptiness in Madhya ma kva-trak, D 211b5: sems can thams cad kyi lus kyi na na mchis par brjod de es bya ba ni sto pa id kyis thams cad la khyab pa i phyir ro / /; ibid., D 212b23; ibid., D 213a45. Whether Jaynanda had direct contact with rog is unclear (Jaynanda fl ourished slightly later, for he is said to have debated with Phywa pa, who was born the year of rogs death, 1109), but it is most likely that rog received a Kashmirian tradition of Madhyamaka during his stay there (sometime between 10761092) and integrated that system with his RGV commentary. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that we cannot trace rogs interpretation of emptiness in the Mahynottaratantrastropadea of Sajjana, who directly transmit-ted the teaching of the RGV to rog. In the marginal note on verse 28 by an anonymous hand found in the manuscript of the Mahynottara-tantrastropadea, it is said that the conditioned (saskta) is empty, but the luminous mind is not empty. This is incompatible with rogs interpretation. See Kano 2006, chapter 4. Note also that Jnarmitra al-ludes to the identity of Buddha-nature and emptiness in the Skrasiddhi (ed. Thakur, p. 487,2223). 71 The current paper does not take into consideration other works by Gro lu pa which became available recently in the bKa gdams gsu bum: Phags pa yon tan rin po che sdud pa tshigs su bcad pa rnam par bad pa (vol. 3, pp.339574); brGyad sto grel chen gyi bad pa (vol. 3, pp. 579746); Rin po che i phre ba la bcu pa (vol. 4, pp. 36; I am cur-rently preparing a critical edition and annotated translation of this work); Sas rgyas kyi bstan pa la rim gyis jug pa i tshul (vol. 3, pp. 243321); rGyal ba i yum bar ma leu brgyad pa i khri la sto pa mdo grel rnam par bad pa (vol. 4, pp. 331602). For a preliminary study of the bsTan rim, see Jackson 1996. 72 This chapter is entitled How to cultivate an awareness of the value of a human life that is free from the conditions that obscure the prac-tice of religion (37a47a). Gro lu pa does not focus on the gotra of the

272 Kazuo Kano

a small section of the eighth chapter is devoted to Buddha-nature.73 In this context, Gro lu pa follows faithfully rogs interpretation as found in the latters gloss on RGV I.2728 the two verses that teach dharmakya, tathat and gotra as being three reasons why all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature.74 Gro lu pa appears elsewhere in the same text to endorse rogs idea of tathat as emptiness,75 and follows rogs position with regard to the inef-fability of the ultimate.76 Although Gro lu pa would thus appear to stand as a faithful heir of his teacher, a conclusive determination will have to await further studies and the hopeful surfacing of his RGV commentary.

The earliest post-rog RGV commentary currently available is that by Phywa pa Chos kyi se ge, better known to most mod-ern scholars for his contribution to the Tibetan tshad ma tradi-tion. According to the colophon of this text, Phywa pa received the teaching of the RGV from Chos kyi bla ma, who is probably to be

RGVs system, but deals with gotra in general. After presenting some general remarks on gotra, Gro lu pa explains the two-fold gotra of the Mahyna. He takes the gotra of the ultimate level as a synonym for dharmat and that of the conventional (vyavahra) level as being consti-tuted of both the praktisthagotra (as in the one-vehicle [ekayna] theory) and the samudntagotra. The latter is the basis for practices and is acti-vated by the wholesome roots at the mokabhgya-stage. See Gro lu pa, bsTan rim, 39b14. 73 This section is entitled: The teaching of the [nature of the mind] as being Buddha-nature (de id de bin gegs pa i si por bstan pa) (Gro lu pa, bsTan rim, 345a447a). It is contained in the eighth chapter, How to cultivate meditatively a realization of ultimate reality. 74 Gro lu pa does not refer to rog by name, but the source of his explanations can be identifi ed as rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 29a3b2; B 18b519a1 and A 41a342a2; B 25b726a7. Gro lu pa adopts rogs understanding of dharmakya, tathat, and gotra as nominal (btags pa) or actual (dos) with regard to ordinary beings and Buddhas, respectively (see above [i]). See Gro lu pa, bsTan rim, 371a35. 75 Gro lu pa, bsTan rim, 68b3: chos thams cad kyi de bin id ni ra bin med pas cia mi dmigs pao/ / 76 See Cabezn (forthcoming).


identifi ed as rogs spiritual son a tshes spo ba Chos kyi bla ma.

Phywa pas debt to rogs (and/or maybe to Chos kyi bla mas) RGV commentary is clearly visible, as Phywa pas text mostly fol-lows the outline found in rogs commentary and adopts rogs interpretation of the major issues that were dealt with above, such as the equation of Buddha-nature with emptiness (cf. [i]),77 the causal function of emptiness (cf. [ii]),78 the three aspects of Buddha-nature (cf. [i])79 and the reconciliation of the teachings in the Prajpramitstras and the Tathgatagarbhastra (cf. [v]).80

77 Phywa pa defi nes Buddha-nature as the reality of the mind, that is, emptiness (rGyud bla don gsal, 3b8: gis pa ni tshogs kyi lam nas brtsams te sa bdun pa i bar gyi dge ba i chos kyis rigs kyi dri ma bsal ba i sems kyi chos id sto pa id ni khams te e bar len pao/ /). See also Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 62a12: des na bras bu i si po e bar btags nas yod paam thams cad kyi khyab byed sto pa id kyi si po dos su yod paam rgyu i si po ma btags par yod pa la dgos nas rnam pa gsum du bsad pa yin no/ / Therefore, [sentient beings] metaphori-cally possess the resultant essence [i.e., dharmakya]; they really possess the essence of emptiness [i.e., tathat] that pervades everything; or they possess the causal essence [i.e., gotra], not metaphorically. Having these in mind, [the RGV] explained that [Buddha-nature] has three aspects. 78 See Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 3b5, 61b4, and 61b862a1. Phywa pa also discusses the question of how emptiness can be a cause. His ini-tial answer is that emptiness is conventionally called cause from the viewpoint of mere exclusion (ldog pa tsam), although it does not have a real effi ciency: just as the absence of food is a cause for hunger, so the absence of impurities that have ultimate nature (don dam pa i ra bin gyi dri ma) is the cause for Buddhahood, and this very absence is called cause. (rGyud bla don gsal, 3b23).In another context (Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 61b45), Phywa pa describes emptiness as a metaphorical cause to attain Buddhas wisdom (or the nirvikalpajna) insofar as it is the object of the meditation lead-ing to the attainment of that wisdom; it is, however, the meditating mind of the practitioner that is the real cause. 79 Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 34a7 and 61a3 (on dharmakya), 34a78 and 61a78 (on tathat), 34b1 and 62a1 (on gotra). 80 Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 67a78. There, Phywa pa explicitly

274 Kazuo Kano

Phywa pas agreement with rogs views is, however, not com-plete. A noticable point of divergence occurs, for instance, with re-gard to the relationship between Buddha-nature and layavijna. When commenting on the notion of dhtu occurring in the sense of Buddha-nature in the verse from the Abhidharmastra quoted in the RGVV on RGV I.149152, rog identifi ed this dhtu with layavijna (see above [iii]). Phywa pa, on the other hand, claims that it consists of both (a) emptiness and (b) wholesome seeds, which respectively correspond to praktisthagotra and samudntagotra. Buddha-nature is thus the foundation of nirva, for nirva is caused (a) by correct understanding of emptiness and (b) by whole-some seeds. On the other hand, Buddha-nature is also the founda-tion of sasra, for sasra is caused (a) by incorrect understand-ing of emptiness and (b) by defi lements. The latter do not arise from the wholesome seeds themselves but from seeds of defi le-ments stored in the layavijna.81 By avoiding the exclusive iden-tifi cation of Buddha-nature with layavijna, Phywa pa seems to be aiming at avoiding both the confl ation of layavijna with emptiness and the attribution of an ultimate status to layavijna.

Phywa pas originality as a thinker is also notable in his discus-sion of issues not adressed in detail by rog. A noteworthy dis-cussion in this regard concerns the Bodhisattvas understanding of emptiness. The RGVV divides Bodhisattvas who newly departed on the Mahyna into two categories: (a) those who misunderstand emptiness as mere cessation and (b) those who misunderstand emptiness as something existing (as a real entity).82 While rog

states that the Buddha-nature doctrine taught in the Tathgatagarbhastra is provisional (dgos pa can) and is not to be taken literally (sgra ji bin ma yin). Phywa pa thus considers the doctrine of emptiness as primary, leaving a secondary role to the Buddha-nature doctrine. 81 See Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 62a8b4, and in particular 62a8b1: bsgrubs pa las byu pa i rigs thar pa i cha thun gyi dge ba i sa bon dos las kun nas on mos mi byu ya de i rten kun gi la on mos pa i sa bon bsgoms las kun nas on mos byu bas de i rten du brjod de kun gi ni nus pa sna tshogs pa i phyir ro/ / 82 The RGVV presents the former (a) as: [Bodhisattvas] who as-sume that the deliverance-door consisting in emptiness leads to the de-


merely off ers a summary of this passage,83 Phywa pa extensively discusses both positions. He identifi es the fi rst as the attitude of Mind-only adherents, Yogcra-oriented Bodhisattvas, for whom cessation is the cessation of paratantra, a process that is also identifi ed with nirva, conceived of as immaculate purity, i.e., parinipanna.84 As for the second wrong position (b), he considers it

struction of something existing, saying that parinirva is a cessation or destruction throughout future time of a dharma that exists. (RGVV 75,1415: ye bhvavinya nya t vimoka mukham icchanti sata eva dharmasyottaraklam ucchedo vina parinirvam iti /) The RGVV presents the latter (b) as: [Bodhisattvas] who hang on to emptiness by tak-ing emptiness as an object saying, we shall attain and realize a certain en-tity called emptiness existing separately from visible matter (rpa), etc. (RGVV 75,1517: ye v puna nyatopalambhena nya t pratisaranti nyat nma rpdivyatirekea kacid bhvo sti yam adhi gamiymo bhvayiyma iti /) According to RGVV 74,56, they are those whose minds have deviated from emptiness (nyatvikiptacittnm) and can-not perceive Buddha-nature. 83 See rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 42b12; B 26b4. 84 Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 63b57: sto pa id kyi tshul de bin gegs pa i si po ni dgag bya rnam par gcad pa tsam gyis sto pao/ / de las ams pa yos gcod du lta bao/ / ga dag es pa ni sems tsam pa ga dag go/ / yod pa i chos id dus phyis rgyun chad pa ni ma dag pa i gan dba don dam (don dam: in the bottom margin) du yod pa phyis ste gsal bas (em.; MS: ba i) ig nas myed pa i sto id do/ / de mya an las das par dod pa ni dri ma myed pa i rnam dag du khas len pao/ / de rnam par thar pa i sgor dod pa don dam par khas len pao/ / Buddha-nature which has emptiness as its mode means being empty in the sense of mere elim-ination, which eliminates objects which are to be negated. Those who have fallen from this [correct view] are [called] those who [incorrectly] see [emptiness] as elimination [which eliminates anything whatsoever]. [Bodhisattvas] who ... means [Bodhisattvas] who belong to the Mind-only school (sems tsam pa). [The words] destruction throughout future time of a dharma that exists mean emptiness, i.e., the impure paratantra that exists on the ultimate level ceases by means of rejection and becomes a non-entity. [The words] they admit this as nirva mean: [the Mind-only school] accepts [this] as immaculate purity [i.e., parinipanna]. [The words] to assume this as the deliverance-door mean: to accept [this] as ultimate. Note that rGyal tshab (rGyud bla ka, 160a13) identifi es in-

276 Kazuo Kano

to be the position of those who identify emptiness as self-awareness (ra rig) and who accept emptiness from the viewpoint of affi rm-ing negation.85 The identifi cation of the fi rst category of mistaken Bodhisattvas as Yogcra is signifi cant, as it implies that the RGVV is a work that rejects the Yogcra position. As in the previous discussion, here again Phywa pas preference for the Madhyamaka view appears to direct his choice of interpretation.

Early commentaries such as those of rog and Phywa pa were certainly infl uential on later compositions of the gSa phu tradi-tion, although the few available sources display abundant disagree-ment on the key issues dealt with above. For instance, in the RGV commentary of gSa phu pa Blo gros mtshus med,86 written in the 14th century, Phywa pa (referred to as some great teacher87) is repeatedly criticized.88

stead the second wrong view as that of the Yogcra. 85 Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 63b78: gcig la gcig myed pa khas len pa ni ya ga dag es pa ste/ rtogs par bya ba ni bras bu i dus nao/ / bsgom par bya ba ni lam gyi dus nao/ / gzugs la sogs pa ni gzu dzin gis so/ / de las tha dad pa i dos po ni des dben pa i sems ra rig ma yin (ma yin in the bottom margin) dgag gan dba don dam pa i sto pao/ / sto pa id la rten es pa ni i tshe ba i sto par khas len pao/ / 86 gSa phu pa Blo gros mtshus med (ca. 14th century) was an assist-ant teacher (zur chos pa) of gSa phu Gli smad bGros ri monastic college (grwa tshang). His teacher was Jam dbyas kya gon nu and his disciples included Karma pa Ra byu rdo rje (12841338), Grags pa se ge (12831364) and g.Yag sde Pa chen (12991378). He composed extensive commentaries on the RGV and Bodhisattvacaryvatra, and independent works, such as the bso ba yon bad kyi sto thun and Theg pa rin po che gsal byed rin po che i rgyan sna (all included in the bKa gdams gsus bum, vols. 1517). See also Kano 2006, chapter 5 and ap-pendix E; Mathes 2008: 9198. 87 Blo gros mtshus med calls Phywa pa by name (rigs pa i dba phyug phywa pa i al nas) on a single occasion: rGyud bla sgron me, A 201,5; B 342. See Kano 2003. 88 Blo gros mtshugs meds criticism of Phywa pas position is found for instance with regard to the understanding of RGV I.154 (Blo gros mtshus med, rGyud bla sgron me, A 369,16; B 421422), the causal


Conclusion

The RGV itself neither equates Buddha-nature (or dharmakya, the resultant aspect of Buddha-nature) with tman nor with emptiness. It thereby implies neither that Buddha-nature is an entity nor a non-entity.

rog for his part considers the RGV as a Madhyamaka work, and its teaching as defi nitive. This position is made clear also in the introductory passage of the rGyud bla don bsdus, where the RGV is given as a treatise that explains stras of defi nitive mean-ing (ntrtha), whereas the other four treatises of Maitre ya (i.e., Abhi samaylakra, Mahynastrlakra, Ma dhynta vi bh-ga, and Dharmadharmatvibhga) are listed as treatises that ex-plain stras of provisional meaning (neyrtha).89 Such a reading, however, creates a tension with regard to the RGVs teaching found in verses I.154155 that stresses the real existence of the Buddha-qualities which abide in Buddha-nature: Buddha-nature is only empty of defi lements, but is not empty of the Buddha-qualities.

As we have seen, rogs strategy to solve the contradiction be-tween the existence of Buddha-qualities taught in the RGV and the emptiness of the Prajpramitstras by appealing to the Two Truths (satyadvaya) fails to account for the status of real exist-ence that the RGV ascribes to Buddha-qualities. Thus, albeit taking the RGV as a teaching of defi nitive meaning, rog fails to take such statements of the RGV literally, in order to remain faithful to Madhyamaka. One can see here a local illustration of his generalized policy, which aims at systematizing the whole of

nature of the praktisthagotra (ibid., A 358,6360,2; B 416417), and the provisional meaning of the Tathgatagarbhastra teaching (ibid., A 378,6382,2; B 426428. Cf. Phywa pa, rGyud bla don gsal, 67a7b1). 89 See rog, rGyud bla don bsdus, A 1b24; B 1b13. It is surprising that he classifi es the Abhisamaylakra within the latter group, thus implying that the Prajpramitstras that it comments on are provi-sional. This point is criticized by Blo gros mtshus med (rGyud bla sgron me, A 13,14, B 246247).

278 Kazuo Kano

Indian Buddhist doctrines as constituting elements of a global Madhyamaka philosophy.90

rog has to face another tension as he, on the one hand, identi-fi es Buddha-nature with emptiness and, on the other hand, presents Buddha-nature as the cause for becoming a Buddha. His rationale for emptiness functioning as a cause is repeatedly quoted in the later literature, although it is variously evalutated.91

Although Phywa pa mostly follows rogs position, he judges the Buddha-nature doctrine to be a non-literal teaching (ayathruta), and his judgement might have had an infl uence on Sakya Paita who, referring to RGV I.156157, judges the teaching of the RGV to be provisional (neyrtha).92 Sa skya Paitas position was criti-cized by Blo gros mtshus med, who, like Dol po pa, took the teach-ing of the RGV to be defi nitive.93 Thus, the Buddha-nature doctrine

90 On the question of what kind of Madhyamaka rog subscribed to, the later Tibetan tradition and modern scholars usually classify him as a Svtantrika Madhyamaka. The division between Svtantrika and Prsagika itself is however not attested in such terms in rogs own works. rog prescribes a reading of Ngrjuna that integrates the agenda of the epistemological school of Dharmakrti. In his sPris yig bdud rtsi i thig le verse 10, rog says that one should understand the emptiness doc-trine taught in Ngarjunas works on the basis of Dharmakrtis beauti-ful philosophy (chos rnams ra bin sto pa i tshul la jug pa i sgo/ / ya dag rigs tshogs klu sgrub al nas gsus pa de/ / rigs pa i dba phyug rnam grel mdzad pa i gu mdzes las/ / gsal bar rtogs nas lugs an gan kun rtswa bin dor/ /). See Kano 2007 and 2009. 91 See Kano 2006, chapters 5 and 6. 92 See Sa skya Paita, sDom gsum rab dbye, I.139140: sems can rnam la sas rgyas kyi / / si po yod par gsus pa ni / / dgos pa yin par es par bya/ / de yi dgos gi sto id yin/ / Sa skya Paita thinks that if a teaching involves an intention (dgos pa) which is not literally expressed, then this teaching is a provisional one (dras don, neyrtha) since it needs to be interpreted non-literally. 93 Blo gros mtshus med took both the Prajpramit and the Buddha-nature doctrine as defi nitive teaching (ntrtha), and considered that the statement of a purpose (prayojana) does not make a teaching non-literal (see rGyud bla sgron me, A 379,6380,1, B 426427: dgos pa


was accepted diff erently from the viewpoint of each school, and interpreted in ways that fi tted their respective doctrinal systems.

The interpretation of the RGV is symptomatic of the kind of issues Tibetan Buddhists had to confront as they imported, almost simultaneously, Indian doctrines that, due to their gradual devel-opment in various periods and areas in India, sometimes contra-dict each other. Tibetan scholars such as rog strove to construct a consistent philosophical system out of this disparate material. In this regard, rog played a pioneering role in the introduction of Indian Buddhist philosophical traditions to Tibet in the Later Dissemination (phyi dar) period, as he aimed at a systematization of Indian Buddhist philosophy centered on Madhyamaka.

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rṄog blo ldan śes rab's position on the buddha-nature doctrine and its infl uence on the early...

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