InternationalJusticePaperon

IMPENDINGGENOCIDEINMYANMAR:JUSTICEFORROHINGYAMUSLIMS

RadhikaLalit

InternationalPolicyStudies|StanfordUniversity2016

Table of Contents

Impending Genocide in Myanmar: Justice for Rohingya Muslims....................................3

Executive Summary..............................................................................................................3

Country Profile - Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Burma)...........................................5Economy.........................................................................................................................................5Brief Political History......................................................................................................................6

Brief History of Civil Conflict................................................................................................7Main ethnic groups...........................................................................................................................7

National Ceasefire Agreement......................................................................................................9

Rakhine/Arakan State Conflict – The Plight of the Rohingya Muslims.............................10Nature of Violations.....................................................................................................................11Support from the Buddhist outfits - Mabatha and 969 Movement...........................................15Institutionalized Discrimination...................................................................................................15Blocking Humanitarian Aid..........................................................................................................17Sexual Violence and Forced Labor.............................................................................................17Culture of Impunity......................................................................................................................17Denial of Citizenship....................................................................................................................18

International Justice Tools for Prevention of the Impending Genocide in Myanmar.....19Genocide Convention and Myanmar..........................................................................................19Stages of Genocide.....................................................................................................................21Crimes Against Humanity............................................................................................................23RTP (Responsibility to Protect)....................................................................................................24

Policy Solutions and Recommendations............................................................................26I. Myanmar Government.........................................................................................................26

A. Protect the Rohingya Muslims living in the Settlement Area..........................................26B. Institutionalize Equity through Legislative and Constitutional Reform..........................27C. Punish the Perpetrators of Crimes Against Rohingya Muslims.......................................28D. Promote Peacebuilding Through Transitional Justice......................................................29E. Strengthen Judicial Independence.....................................................................................29

II. International Community.....................................................................................................30A. International Prosecution......................................................................................................31B. Conditional aid and support.................................................................................................32C. Rehabilitate migrated Rohingya Muslims...........................................................................32D. Build Capacity for Institutions and Civil Society................................................................33

Bibliography........................................................................................................................34

Impending Genocide in Myanmar: Justice for Rohingya Muslims

Executive Summary

Myanmar (Burma) since its independence in 1948 has been riveted in rampant ethnic

strife with Burma's ethnic groups involved in world's longest running civil wars (Insight

on Conflict, 2016). Time and again, the United Nations and several other organizations

have reported several instances of severe human rights violations in the country,

especially those against the religious minority of Rohingya Muslims living in the Rakhine

State in Myanmar. The domination of Burman or Bamar people, the largest ethnic group

in the country, over the country's many minorities has been a prominent factor in this

ongoing civil conflict (BBC, 2015).

The exploitation of the Rohingya Muslim minority by national, regional government

authorities as well as other local actors in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State has led to

forceful displacement of the members of this community. Since the sectarian acts of

violence in 2012, around 150,000 Rohingya Muslims have been moved to 80 internal

displacement camps and sites within the State, while more than 100,000 others have fled

by sea to other neighboring countries (ASEAN PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR HUMAN

RIGHTS, 2015). The Rohingya Muslims are known as the world’s most persecuted

minority and are commonly referred to as the “Rohingya Boat People” (The Telegraph,

2015).

The Government of Myanmar does not recognize the Rohingya Muslims as citizens and

have enforced several human right restrictions on this community, including restrictions

on freedom of movement, marriage, reproduction, and other aspects of everyday life.

The community has also been segregated from the rest of the society in Rakhine region

in Myanmar. It is estimated that over 100,000 refugees from the Rohingya community

are now living in Malaysia, Bangladesh, Thailand, and other ASEAN countries (ASEAN

PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 2015). Crimes committed by state and non-

state actors in Myanmar are serious violations of the human rights against Rohingya

Muslims. However, most of these actors have been granted impunity by the State. These

atrocities are crimes against humanity, and are indicative of the impending genocide in

the country.

This paper aims to assess the situation of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and provide

policy and international justice remedies to avert a major humanitarian crisis in the

country. The first part of the paper provides an overall introduction to Myanmar. The

next two sections provide a detailed account of the history of ethnic tensions in Myanmar

and delve deeper into the nature of violations against the Rohingya community. The

fourth section of the paper discusses in brief the various international justice tools that

could be employed to deliver justice to the community and prevent future atrocities and

crimes against this marginalized section of society. The paper concludes with policy

recommendation and response measures to prevent this humanitarian crisis that is a

threat to the stability of the South East Asian region at large.

Country Profile - Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Burma)

Myanmar or Burma, a prominent South-east Asian country, has a population of 51.4

million (2014 census). The country is largely rural with around 70% of the population

living in rural areas, and urbanization increasing at a meagre rate of around 2.9% per

year (Nations Online, 2016). The country is geographically diverse, with fertile coastlines

in the south and a rugged landscape in the Himalayan foothills of the north. Myanmar is

located adjacent to Bangladesh, China, India, Laos and Thailand (UNICEF, 2016).

Officially, the country comprises eight main ethnic groups, which the government has

further categorized into 135 indigenous ethnic groups. According to CIA Factbook, the

majority group Burman or Barmar make up 68% of the country’s population of 55 million,

with the Shan (9%), the Karen (7%), the Arakanese (Rakhine) (4%) and the Mon (2%)

comprising the largest ethnic nationality groups (Burma Link, 2014).

Economy

According to World Bank, Myanmar’s is one of the least developed countries in Asia,

due to the eras of its seclusion during junta rule. Myanmar’s GDP was growing at 8.5%

in 2014-15 owing to the economic reforms undertaken by Former President Thein Sein’s

government (World Bank, 2015). However, this growth is projected to slow down to 6.5%

in 2015-16 due to extreme weather conditions and overall slowing pace of investments

(World Bank, 2015).

In 2010, the agriculture sector in Myanmar accounted for 36% of its GDP, while the

services accounted for 38%, and the industrial and manufacturing sector accounted for

26% (World Bank, 2015) (Rural Poverty Portal, 2014). Like most other developing

economies, 70% of Myanmar’s labor force is dependent on agriculture for its income,

making the agriculture sector the mainstay of the people in Myanmar (World Bank, 2015).

Myanmar suffers from the proverbial resource curse. It’s citizens paradoxically suffer from

food insecurity while it produces a surplus of food in aggregate terms. In addition to the

problems of food insecurity, poverty in rural areas is significantly higher than in urban

areas. “Among ASEAN countries, Myanmar has the lowest life expectancy and the

second-highest rate of infant and child mortality” (World Bank, 2015).

Brief Political History

Burma was annexed by the British in 1886 which led to several changes to the social,

economic, cultural and administrative structure of the country. During World War II, the

Japanese invaded Myanmar. However, they eventually gave it back to the British empire

until Burma’s independence in 1948 (Nations Online, 2016).

For the next decade, Burma's novice democratic government continued to face

weakening by several communist and ethnic groups within the country who felt

marginalized in the 1948 constitution, until in 1962 the military junta under General Ne

Win took control of the country (CFOB, 2016).

In 1988, due to widespread civil unrest, General Ne Win resigned from the helm of affairs

but within months the military gained momentum, trampled protests and ceased power

in Myanmar once again (CIA World Factbook, 2016).

In late September 2007, there were massive protests within the country over increased

fuel prices led by pro-democracy activists and Buddhist monks (Oxford Burma Alliance).

This movement came to be known as the ‘Saffron Revolution’. The ruling military junta

tried to curtail the mutiny. Over 13 people were killed and thousands arrested in these

demonstrations (Oxford Burma Alliance) (CIA World Factbook, 2016). Following this

uprising, in May 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit the coasts of Burma leaving over 138,000 dead

and “several thousands injured and homeless” (CIA World Factbook, 2016). While the

international community came to Myanmar’s rescue after this tragedy, the situation of

the citizens of Myanmar was exacerbated and the voices for development and

democracy became louder and prominent.

In November 2010, Myanmar’s legislative elections were held which brought the military-

backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) into power with a majority

number of seats. In 2011, the military junta was dissolved and a civilian government was

installed under Former President Thein Sein. Myanmar has ever since seen a gradual

liberalization in its economy (Nations Online, 2016). However, Myanmar is a crucial

juncture at this point in time as it is undergoing a major democratic transition. In

Novemer 2015, the national legislative elections were again held which regarded the

NLD (National League for Democracy) a landslide victory (CIA World Factbook, 2016).

NLD is spearheaded by Nobel Peace Prize Winner – Aung San Suu Kyi. NLD nominated

Htin Kyaw to be Myanmar’s first civilian president in 56 years (CNN, 2016).

Brief History of Civil Conflict

Before British exit from Myanmar, in 1947, several ethnic groups signed the ‘Panglong

Agreement’ to co-operate with the newly formed Burmese government. The agreement

guaranteed rights and privileges to the ethnic minorities and provided them autonomy

and representation in the democratic process (Panglong Agreement, 1947). Leader of

the Burmese freedom movement – Aung San, as well as leaders of the Kachin, Chin and

Shan states sat together to negotiate this agreement (IRIN News, 2012). However, Aung

San was assassinated soon after. The Burmese military leaders saw this as an opportunity

and began advancing into ethnic states to rule them by force.

Several ethnic groups took up arms to protect their states from Burman rule, demanding

autonomy, ethnic rights and an inclusive democracy (IRIN News, 2012). Till date, several

of these ethnic groups continue to fight to protect their individual languages, customs,

culture and natural resources. This ongoing armed conflict is often dubbed as the longest

running civil war in the world (Insight on Conflict, 2016). This ongoing conflict and

communal violence has caused displacement of more than 645,000 people, the highest

number in Southeast Asia (IRIN News, 2012).

Overall, the relationship between the Burman majority and that of other ethnicities has

been characterized by “mutual distrust, power struggles and tension over the hoarding

of natural resources, including gold, gems and timber” (IRIN News, 2012).

Main ethnic groups

To understand the complexity of Myanmar’s ethnic conflict, it is important to note that

these groups comprise one-third of Myanmar’s population. The following table provides

a summary of the main ethnic groups in the country and their respective populations

(CIA World Factbook, 2016) (IRIN News, 2012).

Ethnic group Proportion of

population

Location

Barmar or

Burman

68 percent All throughout Myanmar

Karen 7 percent Kayin State in eastern Myanmar bordering Thailand

Kachin 1.5 percent Kachin State in the north, bordering China

Karenni 0.75 percent Kayah State, on the border with Thailand

Chin 2.5 percent Chin State in western Myanmar, bordering India

Mon 2 percent Mon State in southern Myanmar

Rakhine 4 percent Rakhine State in western Myanmar

Shan 9 percent Shan State, bordering Thailand

Wa 0.16 percent Wa Special Region, on the border with China

Rohingya 0.15 percent Northern townships of Rakhine State, bordering

Bangladesh

Each of the ethnic groups is associated with a prominent armed rebel group which has

been active in protecting their interests. Mentioned below are some of the armed rebel

groups and their origins (Sourced from (IRIN News, 2012)) -

Karen – “The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) took up arms in 1949, and is one

of the oldest rebel armies in the world. The KNLA is the military wing of the Karen

National Union (KNU)”.

Kachin – “In 1961, after the military coup, the Kachin rebels formed the Kachin

Independence Army (KIA), the military wing of the Kachin Independence Organization

(KIO)”.

Karenni – “The Karenni Army (KA) was created after the Burmese government

incorporated Kayah State into the Union of Burma in 1951. Karenni leaders argued they

had not agreed to incorporation. The KA is the military wing for the Karenni National

Progressive Party (KNPP)”.

Chin – “The Chin National Front (CNF) was founded in March 1988 as a coalition of

several Chin opposition groups to push for greater autonomy”.

Mon – “The New State Mon Party (NSMP) established an armed wing that has fought

the government since 1949, when military forces entered Mon territory”.

Rakhine/Arakan – “The Arakan Liberation Army (ALA) was first set up with the help of the

KNU in the 1950s but it became defunct after most of its leaders were arrested. In the

1970s it reassembled, but is still one of the smallest ethnic armies. The Rohingya National

Army (RNA), on the other hand, is dedicated to fighting against the regime for religious

rights and the recognition of the Rohingya people as an ethnic group with special

geographic areas set aside in Arakan State for them to institute Islamic laws and practice

their culture as Muslims” (Source: (Conflict Map)).

Shan – “The Shan State Army (SSA) was formed in 1964 as Burmese military began to

move into Shan State. The SSA later split into two factions, creating the Shan State Army-

North, which signed a ceasefire with the government in 1964, and the Shan State Army-

South, which continued to fight the state until an initial ceasefire in December 2011”.

Wa – “The United Wa State Army (USWA), was created after the fall of the Community

Party Burma in 1989. It is one of the country’s most powerful ethnic armies and receives

military resources, infrastructure and support from neighboring China”.

National Ceasefire Agreement To impede the civil war in the country, the government of Myanmar brought the major

stakeholders together for a series of negotiations under the Nationwide Ceasefire

Agreement (NCA) (Myanmar Times, 2013). 15 major ethnic armed groups were identified

to participate in these negotiations led by representatives of the Former President -

Thein Sein’s administration along with the Myanmar military and other individual armed

ethnic factions. While the talks began in August 2011 they were stalled by ethnic factions

demanding inclusion of other groups, and contesting military’s constitutional role,

among other such issues (The Diplomat, 2015). “8 of the 15 groups agreed to become

signatories and formally concluded the deal, with the condition that the government

leave the door open for political dialogue and inclusion of other ethnic groups at a later

point in time” (The Diplomat, 2015).

Rakhine/Arakan State Conflict – The Plight of the Rohingya Muslims

“North Rakhine State (NRS) is situated in the far east of the country. The 800,000

occupants of this state share close ethnic and cultural ties with Bangladesh. 80% of this

population is also Muslim” (Human Rights Yearbook, 2005). The state has the highest

population density in Myanmar and is subject to seasonal heavy rainfall and tropical

storms, all of which adversely affects this vulnerable section of society (Human Rights

Yearbook, 2005).

While there are several ideological differences between the two religions and their

preaching, the conflict between Buddhists and Muslims in Rakhine State was historically

exacerbated during the Second World War. Japanese Army invaded Myanmar during

the time with the help of some armed Buddhist Rakhines while the British Army tactfully

used the Rakhine Muslims to fight on their behalf (Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives, 2015).

This fight between the two groups developed into a “religious war”, between Buddhists

and Muslims in Rakhine and suffered irremediable damage as a result of this (Asia

Peacebuilding Initiatives, 2015).

According to a report by Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives, even after Burma’s

independence in 1948, Rakhine State remained beyond the full control of the central

government until the beginning of the 1950s. Bengalese Muslims from Bangladesh (then

East Pakistan) came into Rakhine due to famines in their country. The report further states

that this migration further intensified the conflict between the Muslims and the Buddhists

since along with immigrants also came the Mujahideen, an armed rebel group led by

Pakistanis. Though the Mujahideens were successfully suppressed by the Burmese Army

at the beginning of the 1960s. During this period, Muslims in the state were called

“Rohingya” (Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives, 2015).

For over 50 years now, the Burmese government as well as the Burmese citizens have

upheld the view that Rohingya Muslims are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, and

commonly refer to them as “Bengalis” (Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives, 2015). The

government doesn’t consider the Rohingya Muslims as Myanmar Nationals nor do they

acknowledge them as a Burmese ethnic group (Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives, 2015).

The Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives report further states that Burma’s anti-Rohingya

sentiment stems from the following facts – “Rohingya Muslims have a darker skin color,

they have chiseled features, they do not speak Burmese fluently, and above all, that they

are Muslims. Further, the Rohingya are seen as people who believe in a particularly

conservative form of Islam, and this is regarded as the “evidence” that they are

“Bengalese” and “illegal immigrants”” (Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives, 2015).

The strong negative sentiment against this section of society has incited several incidents

of mass violence and internal displacement in Myanmar. The first such incident took

place in 1978, involving some 200,000 Rohingya (United Nations High Commissioner For

Refugees, 2011). These Rohingya Muslims fled Myanmar and took asylum in Bangladesh.

The incident repeated itself in 1991-92, where more than 260,000 Rohingya escaped the

country over “human rights abuses committed by the Burmese military, including the

confiscation of land, forced labor, rape, torture, and summary executions,” the nonprofit

group Physicians for Human Rights wrote in a 2013 report (Reuters, 2015). According to

villagers still living in Rathidaung, “out of the 53 Muslim villages existing in the district

before 1995, only two remained in 1999” (Human Rights Yearbook, 2005).

“The 1.1 million Rohingya Muslims living in Rakhine, have often been called the most

persecuted minority in the world” (The Economist, 2015). According to Human Rights

Watch, the country's laws discriminate against Rohingyas, infringe on their basic human

rights such as rights to freedom of movement, education, and employment. This

community is also denied land and property rights and ownership. “The land on which

they live can be taken away at any given time” (CNN, 2012). We will delve deeper into

the nature of violations against this community, substantiating facts with evidence, in the

next section of this paper.

Nature of Violations

Over the past many decades, Rohingya Muslims have been victims of vindictive

discrimination and violence by anti-Muslim groups, and the central government (The

Economist, 2015).

The recent incidents of violence have deepened the existing crevasses between the

Rohingya Muslims and the majority Barmar population. “In 2001, Arakanese mobs

attacked Rohingya Muslims in Sittwe, destroying mosques and schools while state

security forces stood by and watched” (Human Rights Watch, 2013). According to a

report by Human Rights Watch, in June 2012, a deadly sectarian violence erupted in

western Burma’s Arakan State between Buddhists and Rohingyas. On 28 May, violence

began after reports spread that an Arakanese woman was raped and killed in Ramri (a

small town in Rakhine) by 3 Muslim men. Details of the crime were disseminated locally

in a provocative pamphlet by inflammatory anti-Muslim media accounts and locals.

Following which on June 3, a large group of Arakan villagers in the town of Toungop

slaughtered 10 Muslims on board a bus. Human Rights Watch report further confirms

that local police and soldiers stood by and watched the killings without intervening. The

report states that, “on June 8, thousands of Rohingya rioted in Maungdaw town after

Friday prayers, destroying Arakan property and killing an unknown number of Arakan

residents”. After this incident, mobs from both communities gathered in the State capital

of Sittwe, and started “killing residents and destroying homes, shops, and houses of

worship”. The eye witnesses in the report claim that “people armed themselves with

swords, spears, sticks, iron rods, knives, and other basic weapons, taking the law into

their own hands”. At the end of this episode of mass violence, land and property

belonging to both the communities ended up being destroyed. “According to the

government, 78 people were killed and over a 100,000 Rohingyas were displaced from

their homes” (Human Rights Watch, 2013). “In the aftermath, local Arakan leaders and

members of the community called for segregating the Muslim community from the city.

On the other hand, local Buddhist monks initiated a campaign of exclusion, calling on

the local Buddhist population to neither befriend nor do business with Muslims” (Human

Rights Watch, 2012).

After this tragedy, there was planned another episode of violence in October 2012.

According to another human rights watch report, “local Arakanese political party officials

and senior Buddhist monks publicly vilified the Rohingya Muslims, describing them as a

threat to their State”. The report provides a detailed account of the October 23 sectarian

violence. According to the report, “thousands of Arakanese men armed with machetes,

swords, homemade guns, Molotov cocktails, and other weapons stormed Muslim

villages in nine townships throughout the state killing least 70 Rohingya Muslims. Eye-

witnesses account that state security forces in fact assisted the killings by disarming the

Rohingya of their sticks and other rudimentary weapons they carried to defend

themselves”. The massive violence is said to have begun early morning and lasted all

day until the army intervened (Human Rights Watch, 2013). The death toll included 28

children, 13 of whom were under the age of 5 (Human Rights Watch, 2013). “Satellite

images obtained by Human Rights Watch from just 5 of the 13 townships that

experienced violence since June 2012 show 27 unique zones of destruction. It is

estimated that at least 4,862 structures were destroyed in Arakan State since June,

altogether covering 348 acres of mostly residential property” (Human Rights Watch,

2013).

Figure 1: Migration of the Rohingya Muslims (Source: The Economist)

After two massive spells of this brutal ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas in 2012, about

150,000 Rohingya Muslims have begun to live in refugee camps (The Economist, 2015)

(see Figure above). Tall wire fences are erected to isolate these refugee camps from the

rest of the Buddhist community to create a divide between the two races. Due to this,

several thousands of the Rohingya Muslims have tried to escape by sea to Malaysia,

Indonesia and Thailand (see Figure above). Over 300 Rohingyas have even died while

making the attempt between January and March 2015 (The Economist, 2015).

It is unfortunate to note that none of the other countries, that the Rohingya Muslims

migrate to, grant them a legal status. “While by law they are not allowed to work; in

practice many new arrivals are exploited by employers who house them in cramped

apartments or makeshift shelters. The state provides no health care; nor does it educate

Rohingya children, who compete to attend a small number of learning centres funded

by charities. Bangladesh does not allow the Rohingya Muslims citizenship, either” (The

Economist, 2015).

“In the Aung Mingalar area of Sittwe, the government has imposed severe restrictions

on the movement of the remaining Muslim residents” (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Local

authorities claim that this imposed isolation is for the betterment of Rohingya since this

will protect them from further attacks (The Economist, 2015). Rohingyas, on the other

hand, see this as institutionalization of apartheid, which deprives them of their basic

human rights. The human rights watch report claims that “no Rohingya student has been

allowed into the university at Sittwe during the last three years and that Rohingyas are

also not allowed into the township hospitals unless it is a life-and-death situation”

(Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Most politicians also see this anti-Muslim propaganda as good politics. Even Ms Aung

San Suu Kyi, a Nobel peace-prize winner and the de-facto head of state, who campaigns

relentlessly for human rights and rule of law, has not stood up for the human rights of

Rohingya Muslims (The Economist, 2015). The root cause of this is that Rohingyas are

not constitutionally guaranteed citizenship which relieves the government of the

problems and concerns of this community (The Economist, 2015). Clearly, Rohingya

Muslims are a politically disadvantaged group in Myanmar with little or no public support

from the majority Barmar population.

Support from the Buddhist outfits - Mabatha and 969 Movement

Buddhist monks have always played a pivotal role in influencing the behavior of the

Buddhist nationals in the country. “While not politically active, some monks have used

their influence in the past to promulgate hateful rhetoric against Muslims, often referring

to Rohingya and other Muslims as foreigners, invaders, and people who seek to harm

Buddhism” (The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2015). Since 2011, two

most prominent nationalist movements of Mabatha and the 969 have influenced political

ideology in Myanmar aimed to make Myanmar a Buddhist only state (Foreign Policy in

Focus, 2014). Buddhist Monk U Wirathu, has been provoking Buddhist nationals to

defend themselves against the Muslims who he believes are “not loyal to the country

and always secretly plotting to transform Myanmar into a Muslim nation" (BBC, 2015).

According to a report by Professor Penny Green, Wirathu was incarerated by the military

junta for inciting violence against Muslims in Mandalay in 2003, where he served nine

years before being released under an amnesty in 2012 (Penny Green, 2015). Wirathu has

repeatedly refuted his personal involvement or that of 969 in provoking violence against

the Rohingya Muslims but he has repeated called for an embargo on Muslim-run

companies, and has warned his Buddhist counterparts to safeguard their women from

Muslim rapists (Penny Green, 2015). The Mabatha and 969 movements have further

exacerbated the animosity between the Buddhist majority and Rohingya Muslims.

Institutionalized Discrimination

The most recent demonstration of institutionalized discrimination came with the

passing of the four laws known collectively as the ‘Race and Religion Protection Laws’,

which were submitted to the Parliament of Burma (Myanmar) in December 2014 – the

Population Control and Health Care Law (19 May 2015), Buddhist Women’s Special

Marriage Law (7 July 2015), Monogamy Law (22 July 2015), and Religious Conversion

Law (20 August 2015) (Library of Congress, 2015). These laws were passed just before

the 2015 elections most likely to attract the Buddhist majority to vote in favor of the

Thein Sein government. The details of the laws enacted are as follows-

The Population Control and Health Care Bill permitted local authorities to appeal to the

President to introduce “birth-spacing measures” if health or census surveys of the area

indicated that resources were unbalanced because of a high number of migrants in the

area, a high population growth rate and/or a high birth rate (Library of Congress, 2015).

The extremist Buddhist monk – Wirathu - claimed that the law not only protects women’s

health but also “stopped the Bengalis, that call themselves Rohingya, to seize Rakhine

state” (Penny Green, 2015).

The Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law authorizes township registrars to publicly

display a couple’s application for interfaith marriage for 14 days, and permits any

objections to the marriage to be taken to a local court (Library of Congress, 2015). The

law further requires that “existing interfaith couples register their marriages; women

under the age of 20 obtain consent from their parents or legal guardian to marry a non-

Buddhist; and non-Buddhist husbands respect the free practice of his spouse’s Buddhist

religion and refrain from insulting the feelings of Buddhists” (Penny Green, 2015).

The Monogamy Law prohibits married men and/or women entering into a second

marriage or ‘unofficially’ living with another person whilst still married (Library of

Congress, 2015). This law seems to be targeted at Muslim minorities where polygamy is

legitimate. “Rohingya men are frequently accused of having multiple wives who give

birth to large numbers of children as part of the alleged strategy to ‘Islamicise’ Myanmar”

(Penny Green, 2015).

The Religious Conversion Law and Interfaith Marriage Law establishes a state-governed

procedure to change one’s religion. “The process requires application to ‘Religious

Conversion Scrutinization and Registration Boards’ made up of two local elders and five

local officials appointed by township administrators. The law also bans conversion with

the intent to ‘insult, disrespect, destroy, or abuse a religion’ and prohibits people from

bullying or enticing someone to convert or to deter them from doing so” (Penny Green,

2015).

These 4 laws under the ‘Protection of Race and Religion’ violate the basic human rights

of the Muslim minority and clearly institutionalize and aggravate the prevailing

discrimination against Rohingyas in Myanmar.

Blocking Humanitarian Aid

During the crisis situation and even afterwards, several government and non-government

groups blocked humanitarian aid from reaching Rohingya in need in a number of ways.

The government imposed several administrative barriers that hinder the provision of

humanitarian assistance. Many aid organizations also endured hostility and attacks from

extremist groups during 2014 forcing organizations to temporarily suspend their work

(The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2015).

According to a recent report by the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Médecins Sans

Frontières/Doctors Without Borders, the largest nongovernmental health care provider

in the area, was ousted from Rakhine State in early 2014; though it was called back later

on. The report further states that though some groups are allowed to deliver aid and

medical assistance to Rohingya but no intensive care treatment services are still available

to them (The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2015).

Sexual Violence and Forced Labor

There have been several reports about how the Myanmar Army, Police Force, and locals

in Rakhine region have raped and sexually assaulted Rohingya women and girls. Most

gruesome instances were reported when either the women were taken to isolated

locations for forced labor or when the male relatives of these women were taken for labor

and could not protect them (Yale Law School, 2015).

Culture of Impunity

Myanmar adopted its new constitution in 2008. This marked military junta’s primary effort

to transition to democracy. However, the constitution institutionalized military’s

dominance in the democratic system. 25 percent of parliamentary chambers and

ministerial posts are reserved for the military (Impunity Watch, 2014). The constitution

also gives immunity to members of military junta offshoots - SLOC (State Law and Order

Restoration Council) and SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) for any human

rights violations they committed (Impunity Watch, 2014).

This pervasive culture of impunity exists throughout Burma, especially for government

perpetrators of crimes against ethnic minorities. The human rights violations against

Rohingya Muslims is seldom investigated and none of the perpetrators of these crimes

have been held accountable.” In March 2015, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the

Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee reported that “no independent and

credible investigations” were conducted into the violence in Rakhine State in 2012 that

largely targeted Rohingya people” (The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,

2015). The Burmese government’s reluctance to prosecute perpetrators of crimes

against Rohingya thwarts any efforts to prevent a mass atrocity in the future that largely

targets Rohingya Muslims (The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2015).

Denial of Citizenship

“The 1982 Burma Citizenship Law details the following kinds of citizenships: citizenship,

associate citizenship, and naturalized citizenship” (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

Corresponding to the citizenship status, a color-coded Citizenship Scrutiny Card in pink,

blue, or green is provided to the residents.

The human rights watch report provides a comprehensive overview of the 1982

citizenship law. The report states that the 1982 citizenship law stipulates that Burmese

citizenship is given to those who belong to one of the national races or whose ancestors

settled in Myanmar before 1823. “If a resident is unable to provide evidence of his

ancestry, they are classified as an associate citizen. Those who qualified and applied for

citizenship under the 1948 citizenship law, but who no longer qualify under this new law,

are also considered associate citizens. The third category of citizenship is naturalization.

A resident can apply to be a naturalized citizen if there is "conclusive evidence" that he

or his parents entered and resided in Burma prior to independence in 1948” (Human

Rights Watch, 2000). Section 44 of the act also emphasizes the need for the person to

be an adult (age above 18 years), be of good character and become conversant in one

of the national languages (Human Rights Watch, 2000). It is important to note that the

Rohingya language, a dialect related to Chittagonian, is not one of the national

languages (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

Clearly, the Burma Citizenship Law clearly denies most Rohingyas Burmese citizenship

since most Rohingya families migrated to the Arakan region in Myanmar during the

British colonial period, which is after 1823. Further, while Rohingyas are an ethnic

minority, they have also not been acknowledged as one of the national races in Myanmar

(Human Rights Watch, 2000). “Rohingya are therefore treated like resident foreigners

who are subject to restrictions on their freedom of movement, and access to higher

education. Most importantly, the Rohingya Muslims are restricted from holding public

office due to their citizenship status.” (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

Many Rohingyas were recently given white cards, as temporary identification cards.

Following a severe backlash from Buddhist national majority, the office of Former

President Thein Sein, issued a statement on February 11, 2015 announcing that white

cards were set to expire on March 3, 2015 (The United States Holocaust Memorial

Museum, 2015). Further, it was made obligatory for the white card holds to surrender

their documents to the government by May 31, 2015 automatically revoking their right

to vote in the referendum (The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2015).

“Rohingya advocates say many were full citizens upon independence from Britain in

1948, and they point out that members of their community have voted in each election

since then. But their citizenship status has been gradually eroded over half a century of

military rule” (IRIN News, 2015).

International Justice Tools for Prevention of the Impending Genocide in Myanmar

Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar are facing a life-threatening situation living under onerous

restrictions which exclude them from seeking livelihoods opportunities and basic

services. “The severe oppression and discrimination of this community within Myanmar

creates a situation where even a spark of violence, however small, unplanned or

unintentional, could ignite a genocide” (The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,

2015). The risk to Burma as a country is immense if efforts to mitigate discriminatory laws

and policies are not addressed by the government.

Genocide Convention and Myanmar

The Genocide Convention which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United

Nations in 1948 and entered into force in 1951, declares that genocide is a crime under

international law (United Nations, 1948). Even if states have not consented to the

obligation by endorsing the Convention, the genocide convention imposes “affirmative

legal obligations on states to prevent genocide from occurring and to punish

perpetrators of genocide“ because of it being a jus cogens norm (Yale Law School,

2015).

“The convention defines genocide as any of the following acts committed with intent to

destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” (United

Nations, 1948). The salient features of the convention are as follows:

a) “Killing members of the group”;

b) “Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group”;

c) “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about

its physical destruction in whole or in part;”

d) “Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;”

e) “Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (United Nations,

1948)

Myanmar is a signatory to the ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide’. It signed the international treaty on 30th December 1949 and ratified

it on 14th March 1956 with declarations on the salient features mentioned below:

1) “With reference to article VI, the Union of Burma makes the reservation that

nothing contained in the said Article shall be construed as depriving the Courts

and Tribunals of the Union of jurisdiction or as giving foreign Courts and tribunals

jurisdiction over any cases of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in

article III committed within the Union territory”.

2) “With reference to article VIII, the Union of Burma makes the reservation that the

said article shall not apply to the Union” (United Nations, 2016).

The definition, thus, has three elements: the “intent” element, the “group” element, and

the “act” element (Kate Akkaya, 2015). All must be proved to establish that genocide

has occurred. Below is the analysis detailing all the three elements-

• The “intent” of ethnic cleansing is clear in the evidence gathered in the previous

sections on the plight of Rohingya Muslims in this report. Atrocities committed by

the Government as well as the majority Barmar population to oust and eliminate

the Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar over the last few decades have been well

planned and thought through.

• Further, the Rohingya Muslims are both an ethnic as well as a religious “group”

within Myanmar. However, persistent fears of Islamic encroachment have

essentially legitimized discrimination against them, dismissing their citizenship,

basic human rights as well as identity.

• The “act” of sectarian violence in October 2012 was a deliberate attempt by a

certain section of society to eliminate the existence of the community on Myanmar

soil. These ethnic cleansing events have led to forcible displacement and isolation

of the already disadvantaged Rohingya Muslims. A few hundreds have been killed

in these acts of violence until now, however, it is important for the international

community to take notice of the gradual genocide that perpetrates in the country

before several thousands of these men, women and children are massacred due

to our silence.

Stages of Genocide

Historically, the process of genocide was usually planned and carried out in several

stages. According to Genocide Watch, the eight distinct stages of genocide are

classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation,

extermination, and denial (see Figure below). It is apparent with all the evidence

provided in the sections above that Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar are at Stage 6, only

next to extermination.

It is important to note that despite severe provocations and attempts of dehumanization,

the Rohingya Muslims have so far remained remarkably pacific and non-violent in their

response to the continued oppression and discrimination. However, there are unstated

fears of an Islamist backlash against Myanmar and Buddhism, if there is more

deterioration of this society (The Economist, 2015).

The Feierstein’s periodization of the genocidal process provides another perspective

into the various stages of a genocide. According to ISCI’s findings, Myanmar is

witnessing Feierstein’s fourth stage of genocide only next to which is mass extermination

(Penny Green, 2015). This signals dramatic and unpleasant consequences for the people

of Myanmar, if nothing is done to stop this process.

Crimes Against Humanity

Rome Statute of ‘The International Criminal Court’ exercises jurisdiction over matters

deemed as “Crimes against humanity” (ICC, 2016). “These crimes include any of the

following acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against

any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:

• Murder;

• Extermination;

• Enslavement;

• Deportation or forcible transfer of population;

• Imprisonment;

• Torture;

• Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced

sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;

• Persecution against an identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic,

cultural, religious or gender grounds;

• Enforced disappearance of persons;

• The crime of apartheid;

• Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or

serious bodily or mental injury” (ICC, 2016).

International Law defines crimes against humanity as “crimes that are committed as part

of a systematic attack on a civilian population, which is targeted against a specific

population and part of a state or organizational policy” (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

There is enough evidence to show us that the acts of sectarian violence in 2012 constitute

a widespread or systematic attack against the Rohingya Muslims, as was explained in the

previous sections of this report. This body of evidence is enough to justify the fact that

crimes have been committed against humanity under international law (Irish Centre for

Human Rights, 2010). Myanmar being a non-state party to the Rome statute does not

fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Therefore, in such a case, for the ICC to establish a

court in Myanmar, either Myanmar will have to accept responsibility of allowing crimes

to be committed on its territory against an ethnic population, and request the Prosecutor

to carry out an investigation or the United Nations Security Council could refer this matter

to the ICC (International Criminal Court, 2016).

RTP (Responsibility to Protect)

Resulting from the proceedings of the UN 2005 World Summit, the Responsibility to

Protect (“R2P”) is an international norm which puts the onus of protecting its citizens

from mass atrocities on each individual state and provides a robust framework for

existing international law regulations pertaining to investigations into mass atrocity

crimes. The doctrine points out the following:

“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide,

war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the

prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary

means. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States

to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early

warning capability” (UN General Assembly , 2005).

Only when individual states relinquish their responsibility to protect their own people

from mass atrocity crimes, and peaceful means to pressure these states to accept this

responsibility prove ineffective, can the international community take collective action

through the United Nations. In case of Myanmar, since the Government does not deem

Rohingya Muslims as its citizens, it has at some level abdicated itself of the responsibility

to protect this community.

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine embodies three specific responsibilities,

(International Development Research Centre, 2001):

A. “The responsibility to prevent: highlighting the need to address all causes of

internal conflict that put populations of countries at risk.

B. The responsibility to react: makes the states responsible for responding and

reacting to situations which puts the domestic population at risk of life, by making

use of measures like sanctions or in extreme case military intervention.

C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide assistance in terms of reconstruction and

reconciliation, especially after military intervention.”

R2P insists on peaceful interventions including assistance, peaceful persuasion, and

financial sanctions to solve these complex problems. It points out that all possible

options of “diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means” must be exhausted

before any forceful measure is undertaken (Wagley, 2015).

An independent investigation commissioned by the UN Security Council, UN Human

Rights Council, UN General Assembly, or the UN Secretary General could be set up in

order to determine whether or not a state has abdicated its responsibility to protect.

Such an investigation may recommend that the UN Security Council refer the situation

to the ICC. Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives the Security Council the right and power

to determine measures, whether peaceful or forceful are necessary to bring about global

peace and security (UN Charter). The fact that there is an emphasis on global peace and

security does not imply that threat should be seen to perpetrate beyond the country’s

borders. There have been many cases where the UN Security Council has responded to

crises situations which are important to international community but have been

contained within a country. However, despite the stipulation, the threat in Burma has

definitively has spilled over international borders, with thousands of refugees from the

anti-Muslim conflict pouring into nations including Thailand, Malaysia, Bangladesh and

Indonesia (Wagley, 2015). Clearly, Myanmar is at a juncture where the responsibility of

protecting the Rohingya Muslims from a potential genocide will bring about peace to

the entire sub-continent.

Policy Solutions and Recommendations

Enlisted below are some of the immediate and most important policy solutions that the

Myanmar government, international community and civil society organizations must

undertake to ameliorate the appalling condition of the Rohingya Muslims over the short

and long term, and thereby ensure their protection from a potential genocide.

I. Myanmar Government

Myanmar’s peaceful democratic transition has been plagued by ethnic group rivalries as

well as the worsening anti-Muslim sentiment throughout the country. It is up to the new

government, under the leadership of Htin Kyaw, to put an end to this conflict by

encouraging inclusive growth and ensuring security and jobs to its citizens (ICTJ, 2014).

The new government can also help avert a potential genocide of Rohingya Muslims in

the country by undertaking the measures detailed below-

Immediate Short Term Measures

A. Protect the Rohingya Muslims living in the Settlement Area

In order to improve the deplorable conditions of this persecuted minority living in

segregated camps and other restricted areas in Rakhine State, it is important that the

government ensures access to the following facilities on humanitarian grounds:

a) Right to livelihood opportunities, food, health care, and education for Rohingya

Muslims

b) Ensure protection of and unrestrained access to humanitarian aid/international

development organizations delivering assistance in settlement areas within

Rakhine State

c) Bring back the internally displaced Rohingya Muslims living in isolated settlements

and camps into the main townships within the Rakhine state and integrate them

back to the society

d) Counter hate speech through effective peacebuilding mechanisms which can help

promote inclusive development and a peacefully co-existing society

Medium Term Measures

B. Institutionalize Equity through Legislative and Constitutional Reform

It is important for Myanmar to undertake constitutional and legislative reforms in order

to end all discriminatory laws and policies targeting the Rohingya, and ensure inclusive

development:

a) Amend the 1982 Citizenship Law: Myanmar’s government must amend the

citizenship law in order to provide the Rohingya Muslims their right to citizenship

and work. It is equally important for the government to clearly outline and simplify

the process for any migrant to apply for citizenship under a new law so that these

individuals can be integrated into a labor force and have employment

opportunities.

b) Amend and reform discriminatory and offensive laws: Laws of the land in Myanmar

have been restricting the freedom of movement and infringing marriage rights

and family choice especially for the Rohingyas Muslims. It is important to amend

these laws to build a secular state.

c) Representation to Rohingya: Myanmar will be a true and inclusive democracy only

when Rohingya Muslims will be integrated fully into the society and be given

representation in the government. This Rohingya Muslims have been oppressed

for decades. In order for them to voice their concerns, it is crucial that they be

provided mandatory representation in the parliament.

C. Punish the Perpetrators of Crimes Against Rohingya Muslims

a) Punish the Perpetrators of Crimes: There must be a thorough investigation on the

attacks on Rohingya and other minority groups during the 2012 atrocities. It is

important to hold perpetrators accountable in accordance with internationally

recognized legal standards and partner with other governments and international

agencies to monitor potential violence against the community in the future to

detect early warning signs of genocide (The United States Holocaust Memorial

Museum, 2015).

b) Revoke Amnesty:

o “Under Section 204(b) of the 2008 constitution, the President has the

power to grant amnesty, but only in accord with the recommendation of

the NDSC (National Defense and Security Council)” (Oxford Burma

Allliance, 2012). This section allows the NDSC to have substantial control

over amnesties for military personnel or other suspected criminals it wishes

to protect. Therefore, this law in the constitution must be appropriately

amended so that the NDSC does not get away with providing amnesty to

individuals who are committing crimes against the Rohingyas at will.

o Further, Article 445 of the 2008 Constitution states that, “No proceeding

shall be instituted against the said [previously-ruling] Councils or any

member thereof or any member of the Government, in respect of any act

done in the execution of their respective duties” (Oxford Burma Allliance,

2012). The Article 445 is also known as the Immunity Clause, which grants

impunity to any previous (military) officials who may have committed any

crime on their official duties. This statute clearly breaches customary

international law, under which there is no amnesty provided for core

international crimes. “The Immunity Clause also violates Burma’s

obligations as a signatory to the Geneva Conventions to prosecute persons

who have committed war crimes” (Oxford Burma Allliance, 2012).

Thus, this laws must also be amended by the new incumbent government to ensure that

the perpetrators of crimes against Rohingya Muslims are not let free and that justice to

the grieving families of Rohingya Muslims is delivered.

D. Promote Peacebuilding Through Transitional Justice

Ensuring justice for all is an imperative for promoting peacebuilding and reconciliation

in the country. “The UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council have recognized

that impunity for serious human rights violations can threaten international peace and

security, and that transitional justice processes and institutional capacity-building are

mutually reinforcing” (ICTJ, 2014). Therefore, transitional justice could be an important

tool to assist Rohingya Muslims to break out of these cycles of violence.

While there has been some talk by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human

Rights in Myanmar for parliamentary consideration, it is unsurprising to see that this

suggestion was not taken seriously by the Buddhist majority (ICTJ, 2014). Therefore, an

While there has been some talk by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human

Rights in Myanmar for parliamentary consideration, it is unsurprising to see that this

suggestion was not taken seriously by the Buddhist majority could be a constructive step

for the government to showcase its commitment to the Rohingya Muslims who have

been victims of wanton discrimination and human rights violations. This will send a strong

message to the perpetrators of these crimes and might help prevent the recurrence of

future crisis.

Long Term Measures

E. Strengthen Judicial Independence

Several UN agencies and international development organizations are taking measures

to improve the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary as well as independent

prosecution, enforcement, and legislative oversight. Amending the Judicial

Appointment Process -- Section 299 (c)(i)-(ii) of the 2008 constitution would be an

important step in the same direction. Presently, the Chief Justice and other Supreme

Court Judges are nominated by the President, who then submit the nominations to the

Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Assembly of the Union) for approval. The law stipulates that the

Pyidaungsu Hluttaw “shall have no right to refuse the person nominated by the President

[…] unless it can clearly be proved that the persons do not meet the qualifications for

the post prescribed in Section 301” (Oxford Burma Allliance, 2012). The unrestricted

power of the President must be complemented with the legislature’s ability to participate

in the appointment of judges to ensure the checks and balances in the system. It is

important to come up with a process that maintains the integrity and independence of

this critical institution.

II. International Community

It is important to understand that conflict prevention is not merely a national affair. The

failure to prevent conflict can have wide international consequences and costs.

Moreover, for prevention of this genocide-in-process, strong support from the

international community will be needed. The international community as a whole must

lead mediation, peacebuilding and other efforts to promote dialogue or reconciliation

towards stabilizing the South East Asian region, especially at a pivotal time when

Myanmar’s new democratic government is transitioning into power.

Despite all the negative international attention about the Anti-Muslim violence in Burma,

following the 2012 violence, the Burmese government has failed to provide a system to

impart justice to the Rohingya Muslims who were attacked. On the contrary, government

officials segregated the already stateless Rohingya Muslims from the rest of the

population. Though the UN has publically acknowledged and held the government of

Myanmar responsible for widespread atrocities against Muslims (Wagley, 2015), the

international community has failed to address this issue and take necessary action to

protect the marginalized Muslim community in Myanmar.

The international community has not tried to coerce the Burmese government to take

concrete steps to address the plight of the Rohingya Muslims through any conditional

sanctions or agreements. While the state has the default responsibility to protect its

citizens from such atrocities, a residual responsibility also lies with the international

community to address the situation (Responsibility to Protect Doctrine). “This fallback

responsibility is activated when a particular state is clearly either unwilling or unable to

fulfill its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities;

or where people living outside a particular state are directly threatened by actions taking

place there. In such extreme situations, action must be taken by the broader community

of states to support communities that are under serious threat” (International

Development Research Centre, 2001). Therefore, enlisted are some measures that the

international community can collectively undertake to address the situation of the

Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar –

A. International Prosecution

For justice to be delivered, it is important to prosecute individuals for the crimes of

genocide and crimes against humanity either in the national courts or international

courts. The ICC (International Criminal Court) is a judicial body that complements the

existing national judicial systems. However, it may only exercise its jurisdiction when

certain conditions are met, such as when national courts are unwilling or unable to

prosecute criminals. In the case of Myanmar, it might be the case that the national courts

may not be able to prosecute the criminals of the atrocities in 2012 due to the sensitivity

of the issue. However, there are three methods by which international prosecutions of

Burmese officials who were involved could be carried out (Source: (Levin, 2011)):

1. “Establishment of an ad-hoc tribunal under the authority of the UN Security

Council: UN Security Council could exercise its Chapter VII power to establish an

independent tribunal for Burma. Examples of ad hoc tribunals created under

Chapter VII include the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia

and Rwanda (ICTY/R). However, the ad hoc tribunal model is not well suited for

Burma as they are very costly. Additionally, the formation of an ad hoc tribunal

under Chapter VII necessitates tremendous political will within the Security

Council.” (Levin, 2011)

2. “Establishment of a hybrid tribunal: Hybrid tribunals combine elements of

domestic and international criminal justice systems. They are often implemented

where domestic political will to prosecute prior abuses exists, but there is

insufficient judicial capacity or other obstacles to domestic prosecutions.” (Levin,

2011)

3. “Referral of select high-level cases to the International Criminal Court (ICC): The

Security Council could refer the situation in Burma to the ICC. Although there are

four ways in which the ICC can hear a case—State Party referral, non-State Party

referral on an ad hoc basis for crimes committed in that state’s territory, Security

Council referral, and through the prosecutor’s own initiative—Security Council

referral would be necessary for Burma. Since Burma is not a party to the Rome

Statute, another state could not refer the matter, and the ICC prosecutor could

not independently exercise his propio motu powers to investigate the situation.

Further, while Burma could theoretically self-refer particular matters to the ICC,

the SPDC is not going to seek accountability for alleged crimes committed by

junta leaders. Security Council referral to the ICC is thus the only plausible

scenario at the present time. This is problematic, however, because China, a

permanent member of the Security Council, would most likely veto such a

proposal due to its strong economic ties with Burma.” (Levin, 2011)

B. Conditional aid and support

The United Nations, USA, and Europe, among other prominent international community

stakeholders “must condition any agreements—including on preferential trade status,

military training and provision of military equipment, concessionary lending by

international financial institutions, or new large-scale development packages— on clear

benchmarks that must be met by the government regarding increasing humanitarian

assistance to Rohingya, protecting Rohingya voting rights, and ensuring that those

responsible for anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim violence are held accountable”. (The

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2015)

C. Rehabilitate migrated Rohingya Muslims

While neighboring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Bangladesh,

must rehabilitate the migrated Rohingya Muslims in refugee camps. All of them have a

strong stance against giving these migrants a refuge or an ability to work in their

respective countries. Indonesia and Malaysia have recently offered to offer temporary

shelter to 7000 migrants on the condition that they be resettled elsewhere with a year1.

Several hundred thousand Rohingya Muslims are living in despair in need of a country

they can call their own. These governments need to recognize the extent of this

humanitarian crisis and help these migrants regain their lives by giving them work

opportunities. This will not only help their economies in the long run but also benefit this

ailing community.

D. Build Capacity for Institutions and Civil Society

It is important for the international community as a whole to provide funding and

technical assistance to strengthen rule of law and build capacity of the weak government

institutions and civil society organizations in Myanmar. A special emphasis must be laid

to encourage international development organizations, civil society organizations, media

representatives and non-government organizations to work on the following issues:

a) Promote peace and counter the anti-Rohingya sentiment among Buddhist

majority

b) Provide employment skills and opportunities to Rohingya Muslims living in the

separate settlements in Rakhine State

c) Ensure that even the smaller instances of crimes against Rohingya Muslims are

scrutinized, condemned and reported in the mainstream press to ensure that no

perpetrator of the crime believes that they escape the law.

1HowMyanmarandItsNeighborsAreRespondingtotheRohingyaCrisis(NewYorkTimes;May14,2015):Thailand’sresponsetohelpingtheRohingyashasbeenweak.WhiletheThaigovernmenthassaiditsnavywillgivehumanitarianaidtomigrantboatsinitswaters,andithasdiscussedcreatingrefugeecampsashore,itdoesnotwantpermanentsettlers,andhasnotagreetotakeinmorerefugees.MalaysiaispredominantlyMuslimandrelativelyshortofunskilledlabor,soitisattractivetomigrants.However,RohingyawhoreachMalaysiathroughtraffickingroutesaretreatedasstatelessillegalimmigrants,oftenlivinginslumsandfacingdiscriminationandexploitation.Theymay findworkonly inpoorlypaidordangerousmenial jobs.Malaysia recentlyagreed toassist7,000migrantsstrandedatseaandtoofferthemtemporaryshelter,providedthattheyareresettledelsewherewithinayear.Indonesia,ontheotherhand,hasmadeclearthatillegalimmigrantsarenotwelcome.ThecountryhasamajorproblemwithrefugeesfromtheMiddleEastusingitasawaystationtotrytoreachAustralia.However,theyhaverecentlyagreedtoassist7,000migrantsjustlikeMalaysia,providedthattheyareresettledelsewhereinayear.RohingyaliveonbothsidesoftheborderbetweenMyanmarandBangladesh.About200,000RohingyaliveinrefugeecampsinBangladesh,manyinsqualidconditions.ThegovernmentofBangladeshdeniesthatRohingyafromMyanmarareactuallyethnicBengalisandhavebeentryingtocloseitsborderstothemigrants.

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