rok avbar: some basic thinking and scepticism about...

National question and nationalism in Yugoslavia: a

quick overview (working version)

By Rok Avbar

Rok Avbar: National question and nationalism in Yugoslavia; a quick overview

CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................................3

2. SOME BASIC IDEAS.....................................................................................................................................5

3. NATIONALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA’S ASCPECT.................................................................................................9

3.2. DEFINING NATIONALISM.......................................................................................................................9

3.1. FROM THE SETTLEMENT TO THE FIRST UNIFICATION........................................................................11

3.2. THE UNIFICATION WHICH LED INTO THE CONCLUSION......................................................................16

4. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................................18

5. BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................................................................19

5.1. LITERATURE:......................................................................................................................................19

5.2. E – SOURCES:.....................................................................................................................................20


INTRODUCTION

The 21st century is an era and place when and where human kind should exceed all expectations. The truth is

that we are nothing more than the successors of the centuries before this one. The last decade of the 20th

century confronted us with numerous events which shocked the unsuspicious public, mostly because the ending

of the II. World war has inspired and deluded us not to expect anything similar in the future.

The tragedies all over the world, not only in Yugoslavia during the period 1991 – 1995, but also the events in

Rwanda have shown us that human kind is far from being civil and striving after the respect of human rights.

Nevertheless, to expect that the latter would prevail over the political ambitions is a controversial claim as well.

What is more, the deception we still live in is the comprehension of the modern ages as the ages of possibility to

solve any given conflict, any given situation and at the same time preserve the democracy and human rights.

We tend do forget that regulations dictated by »Universal Declaration of Human Rights« are nothing more than

a consequence of mistrusted human behaviour and is therefore hard to be used as a prevention for the future.

The last decade of the 20th century has once more shown us that no matter how many laws we implement, how

many world-based documents we produce, there is hatred which surpass all the effort. The common expression

in public for this behaviour is, among others, »nationalism«.

The war in Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995 is one of the most notorious events in the history of the 20th

century. Not because it would cause more casualties than World War II but because the situations and political

actions leading into this bloody battle seemed unimaginable for civilized society. It has once more shown the

rebellious nature of the Yugoslav people, deeply rooted hatred and the differentiations which even the political

oppression for almost 50 years was not able to suppress.

Therefore it is quite obvious why so many prominent scholars, academics and studies once again show their

great interest in the question of (ethno-) nationalism, conflict studies and analysis of post-conflict areas. But we

tend not to ask ourselves about the adequacy of the methodology, theories and other necessary instruments of

our intellectual process.


The literature used in research is combined: some of it is the literature found in Slovene language only and

there is an appropriate translation of title provided. Books which are originally written in English or other foreign

languages and are translated in Slovene and were used for the purpose of this essay are cited as they are in

Slovene language, but there is original version information provided as well. The terms used are simplified, for

example: Yugoslavia is always used for describing Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and it consist

territories of today’s states Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, The Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. When referring to nations, I use strict distinctions between

people of today’s states in ex-Yugoslavia territories, adding some important categories and/or adjectives.


2. SOME BASIC IDEAS

It is always pretentious to judge someone’s history over the others but it is needless to say that history of the

Balkans are probably one of the most intriguing histories.1 The reason why is quite obvious: the Balkans were

always understood as a region of contrasts, the region where the brutal South Slavs destroyed the great

achievements of the Roman Empire and where law was not implemented to be respected, but to be put on trial

how it could be broken without any consequences. The truth is that the Balkans are the European “Orient”. The

term Orient is meant in a strict meaning of E. Said's definition of Orient which sygnifies a system of

representations, framed by political forces and is designed for the West as a mirror image of what is inferior and

alien to the West.2 In her book Imagining the Balkans Maria Todorova has shown how ‘as in the case of the

Orient, the Balkans have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-

congratulatory image of the “European” and the “West” has been constructed’. 3 And we cannot blame the

western scholars to understand the situation in the Balkans any different if we realize that mostly aspects with

negative connotation have been stressed in their textbooks. Nevertheless, the number of books about the war in

Yugoslavia and the reasons leading to it can arouse a persuasive doubt about the general comprehension of

the causes which led to this bloody spectacle.4 The first obstacle that is also the main interest of this essay is

the question of the reasons which led to the war. The numerous ideas and variations about the socialistic ideas

of equality and brotherhood was put on test when the general idea of this war became the term “nationalistic

war” or even better, “the war between different nations”. The idea itself can find approval in non-academic

sphere but can arouse a certain doubt about its simplicity, mostly because scholars would agree there is more

to it. But for the purpose of this paper we shall stick to the general presentation about the nationalistic war and

tend no to forget about the complexity of the situation.

The basic and mostly correct idea of Yugoslavia is that during the period 1945 – June 25 1991 (or January 15

1992 when Slovenia and Croatia have been internationally fully recognized as sovereign states for the first time)

there were six main nations within Yugoslavia5: Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, Albanians and

1 The term »history« can also be used in plural as »histories« if we accept the principles of »The Annales School« which stresses the difference between history of certain entities and realizes there are many histories, not only one, what nowadays most of the modern historians would take for granted.

2 Edward W. Said, Orientalizem: zahodnjaški pogledi na Orient, Ljubljana, 1996; first edition: Orientalism, New York, 1978.

3 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, New York, 1997, p.188.

4 The usage of word »spectacle« is justified by the media covering the war and the general idea how media was brought into a happening what can also be read in the Marjan Jerman's, Iz pekla, Ljubljana, 2001. [Marjan Jerman,From Hell, Ljubljana, 2001].

5 The number of nations could be also seen from the national flag of Yugoslavia; the number of torches indicates the number of republics: before 1963, there were five torches, after 1963 six. Bosnian Muslims were not recognized on a federal level as a divided


Bosniaks.6 If we take a look at the various publications about the history of the Balkans we can hardly find an

author who will deny the unbelievable ethno genesis taking place in this region. Therefore it is unreasonable to

claim that substantial identities which are more or less present in everyday discourse are pure manifestation of

a nation. Eric J. Hobsbawm in his book Nations and nationalism since 1780 shows that national formation was a

process and we can only discuss nations in the modern way after the 1780.7 Defining the nation which obviously

became an obstacle in the process of sustaining order in the region with the agreement in Paris, also known as

Dayton Agreement, and the criteria used in the latter, is a common problem of the superficial observation. What

Hobsbawm suggests is that we can hardly find satisfactory criteria for such an action.8 Even shallow

observation would convince us there are many cases in which the most objective or subjective criteria would not

be sufficient. National formation is commonly regarded as a formation where the language, territory or religion

plays an important part in. What we can observe in Hobsbawm’s writing is the doubt he arouses when it comes

to defining the (sub-) objective criteria for a definition of nation.9 Language, for instance, has a long tradition in a

common comprehension of it as objective criteria which in case of Yugoslavia is proven to be wrong. The small

differences between Croatian and Serbian language can be generally ignored 10 what could also be seen in the

formation of Serbo – Croatian language.11 But nevertheless, battles in last Yugoslav war convinced us, what is

also claimed by M. Ignatieff, that the smaller the differences between two groups are, inside of the imagination

the differences could become bigger and more threatening.12 Although the nationalism experts would mostly

disagree on defining language as the objective and crucial criteria/condition for national formation, the general

understanding is quite different which can be seen in stressing language differences as in the latest case of

Montenegro which would like to introduce two new letters in their Montenegrin language.13 To show the

importance and the delusion of Yugoslav presentation on language issue, I cite the anecdote from Misha

nation until the constitutional revision in 1974, what also meant they were no longer referred as “muslims” with a small “m”, but as “Muslims”. More about this in Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, Penguin Books, London, 1992, p.141.

6 The difference between terms Bosnian and Bosniak was left aside by many researchers. The term Bosnian indicates Slavic people who reside or come from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The term Bosniak indicates a member of one of the constituent ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina and is generally, but not necessarily related to their religion.

7 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nacije in nacionalizem po letu 1780, Ljubljana, 2007, p.10.

8 Ibid, p.12.

9 Ibid, p. 14 – 15

10 URL: http://www.search.eb.com.nukweb.nuk.uni-lj.si/eb/article-42665, page retrieved on January 16, 2009.

11 We can see the late proving attempts of language differentiation mostly between Croats and Serbs and Bosnians, for example: http://www.hercegbosna.org/engleski/dummies.html, page retrieved January 15 2008.

12 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging. Journeys into the New Nationalism, Vintage, London, 1994, p.14.

13 URL: http://www.siol.net/svet/zanimivosti/2008/08/crnogorski_jezik.aspx, page retrieved January 15, 2008.

http://www.siol.net/svet/zanimivosti/2008/08/crnogorski_jezik.aspx

http://www.hercegbosna.org/engleski/dummies.html

http://www.search.eb.com.nukweb.nuk.uni-lj.si/eb/article-42665


Glenny’s book The Fall of Yugoslavia where he also describes a conference of parliamentary parties from all

the republics in Yugoslavia:

Dragoljub Micunovic, the leader of the Democratic Party from Serbia, was the conference host. He and his party had expended

considerable effort bringing together so much mutual loathing around a single oval table in such a civilized manner. The intention of

the participants was to achieve what the leaders of the six republics had failed to do so abysmally: to unearth the road to peace.

Micunovic made this plain in a tactful and encouraging opening speech. He finished by saying that simultaneous translation of the

proceeding into Slovene and Macedonian would be provided. This harmless remark was the signal for the remaining guests to inject a

lethal dose of Balkan absurdity into the proceedings which would demolish any marginal hopes that the conference might have

produced anything of value.

Neven Jurica, the leader of the Croatian Democratic Union delegation and an uncompromising Croat nationalist, raised his hand on a

point of order. “I was pleased to hear that Slovene and Macedonian translations will be provided but there are other languages as well

to be translated. What about our Hungarian and Albanian colleagues?” A fair enough question to which Micunovic fairly replied, “I wish

we could provide them with translations but you must understand that this entire event is financed by Democratic Party and our

financial resources are limited. Those interpreters happen to be Democratic Party members who speak Slovene and Macedonian.

Unfortunately we do not have any members who speak Albanian or Hungarian. If we did, we would provide them.” Brushing aside this

reasonable explanation Jurica continued with his precise, icy logic, “While we are on the subject of language, I would also like to

request a simultaneous translation of the proceedings into Croatian.” Jurica’s request, which would be akin to somebody from

Glasgow requesting that a Londoner’s speech, is translated into Scottish English, provoked uproar and laughter.14

National formation in Yugoslavia is also quite often linked to the question of territory which was also the case in

Yugoslav wars during the period 1991 – 1995. Territory settled and covered by South Slavs in the early 6

century AC under the Avar rule or independently was actually the entire peninsula, starting at Alps and ending

at the Peloponnesus. Ethno genesis, mentioned earlier, took place while the old inhabitants of the peninsula of

different origins were slowly assimilated into the new community. It is not responsible to discuss national names

at this early stage, nevertheless the first sovereign principalities such as Croat and Serb states emerged in the

late ninth or twelfth centuries.15 The relation of territory to mythological or real sovereign entity is sometimes

crucial in transforming ethnic/language group into a nation. In the heart of nationalistic myth which was so often

used in political discourse in Yugoslavia in 1980s, there has to be at least a bit of truth so the mythological

structure would seem convincing.16 Therefore we could understand some tendencies in the territorial claims in

Yugoslavia but we are obliged not to forget about the meaning of land’s transforming identity or as Banac

suggest: “The history of the Balkans is the history of migrations – not just of people, but of lands.” 17 So it is not

14? Glenny, The fall of Yugoslavia, p. 145 – 46

15 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: origins, history, politics, Cornell University Press, New York, 1984.

16 Eric J. Hobsbawm, On History, Abacus, London, 1998, p. 8.

17 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 33.


hard to understand that there are mythical representations included in known political discourse of Yugoslavia,

nevertheless the national question was almost never officially brought into public in order to be discussed.

What is more, political discourse and public mobilization was not based only on mythological representations

but it was also based on religion bases, which is also one of the key elements in national formation. When it

comes to question of religion on the soil of Yugoslavia, there are three major religion groups: Catholics,

Orthodox and Muslims. The meaning of religion in establishing entities as nations is commonly stressed in

Yugoslav case, with special attention on so-called “national pockets”.18 These entities which arouse all over the

Balkans are the result of the historical progress, migrations which were caused by the expansion of Ottoman

Empire. Today’s land of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, was divided or was held by different

communities or sovereign principalities with their specific religion.19 In the latest history, there are two key

religion related elements which were the generators of nationalistic tensions in Yugoslavia: the thesis about

Serbs as a “chosen people” and thesis about religion clash between Orthodox Serbs, Catholics Croats and

Muslims (Bosnian and Albanian Muslims).20

By mentioning, and on Yugoslav case explained, three most recognized components in nation-building, we can

slowly move towards the question posed in the introduction. By moving on, we do not comprehend these three

criteria as the only ones but we focus on them because of the simplicity of the discussion. For the purpose of

the following discussion, we have to highlight the basics of nationalism as a field of study by adding some more

dimensions.

18 In general, the term »national pocket« would be an appropriate term for national minority with some differences.

19 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 35 – 42.

20 Ana Kralj, Skriti šarm nacionalizma, in foreword of Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nacije in nacionalizem po letu 1780, p. 258.


3. NATIONALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA’S ASCPECT

3.2. DEFINING NATIONALISM

Defining nationalism is at the same time defining nation. If we accept Hobsbawm’s definition of nation as “any

sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a nation” 21 and Gellner’s

definition of nationalism as “primarily a principle which holds that the political and national should be

congruent”,22 we only describe two phenomena which are summed up in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,

i.e. the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity and; the actions

that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination. 23 While the concept

of nationalism and its meaning in general discourse changed over the years, there is a fair amount of

agreement about what is historically the most typical, paradigmatic form of nationalism. It is the one which

features the supremacy of the nation’s claims over other claims to individual allegiance and which features full

sovereignty as the persistent aim of its political program.24 The idea of “belonging” is not disputable, the most

prominent authors of nationalism studies tend to question the way of the latter. Authors such as Renan and

Weber acknowledge this on strictly voluntary basics, when more typically authors stress this process as a

process of non-voluntary essence of common origin, language, tradition and culture. The origin and other

components of the latter definition are disputable as we could realize in the text above. Nevertheless, more

modern views, according to the Stanford’s Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, define nation as somewhat mixed,

both ethno-cultural and civic category, but still closer to the purely ethno-cultural as to the purely civic extreme. 25

When describing “belonging”, we often take it for granted and do not think about the process of nation-building

as a task of fulfilment. The question:”Who is nation?” was more than appropriate. As Peter Wagner claims this

question has been answered by political intellectuals which were sure about the existence of historical groups

with common language and cultural experience.26 By creating a nation which never thought of itself as such, at

least not in modern terms, national foundations and legitimacies were yet to be found. Wagner suggested two

different models; French model which understood nationality and nation as a construct and as a result of 21 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nacije in nacionalizem po letu 1780, str. 16.

22 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p.1

23 URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nationalism/, page retrieved January 16, 2009. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Peter Wagner, A sociology of Modernity. Liberty and Discipline, Routhledge, London, 1996, p. 48.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nationalism/


historical progress, while the German model understood that the cultural and language unity gain advantage

over an individual.27

This explanation has a valid point if we take into a consideration the result that follows. When we pointed out the

ethnic and civic aspect, we strived to point at the direction of distinction of two forms of nationalism: while we

are all familiar with the general presentation of nationalism as an ideology with negative connotation, there are

few who know there is more to it. Civic nationalism is based on the community of equal, sovereign citizens who

are in favour of common series of political principles and institutions.28 Ethnic nationalism is, in contrary, more in

favour of common origin and culture, the national principle is often exclusive in its essence. 29 What is more,

ethnic nationalism is often a basis of exclusion, intolerance and authoritativeness

27 Ibid, p. 49.

28 Ana Kralj, Skriti šarm nacionalizma, p. 254

29 Ibid.


3.1. FROM THE SETTLEMENT TO THE FIRST UNIFICATION

By paying special attention to Yugoslavia, we can observe almost all of the dimensions of nation building

processes mentioned above. The territory where one of the bloodiest incidents in the late 20 th century took

place was a witness of human degeneration named war before. The kingdoms of Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, the

Ottoman rule over almost entire Balkan region, Habsburg Monarchy and more sovereignty took control over

people and their land. Incredible ethno genesis mentioned above was also the key factor in mixing all the key

elements of population. So therefore it is irresponsible to claim right over someone’s territory by putting this right

in the historical context and operate with terms they are not appropriate. As Peter Stih, a prominent Slovene

historian puts it in his book Slovenska zgodovina:” History of the specific territory and its inhabitants is not

possible […] to reduce only on a history of one nation […]”.30 Nevertheless, the political discourse and the

events in the late 20th century have convinced us there is this ethnic nationalism in its horrifying form which

was/is present in the Balkans.

Nation building in Yugoslavia, as it has been shown, has a long lasting mythical perspective in people’s

comprehension of their nation’s history. The idea of Great Serbia, Herceg – Bosna project, ideas of long lasting

continuity of Slovene sovereignty dating at the end of the eight century AC are clear evidence of the

mythological perspective. Nonetheless, this is not a specialty of the Balkans regions; it is even more obvious

that the attempt in establishing a certain continuity between present and past regardless to historical accuracy,

is probably most known for Italy (if we take into a consideration only the nations of Austro – Hungarian

Monarchy).31 But to understand it in more serious way, we have to get to know the history of the national

question in the Balkans where the essential guide is probably Banac’s book The National Question in Yugoslavia. As he points out: “To this day, its political and social life is dominated by a particularly complex,

long-standing, and troublesome nationality problem.”32 The specific historical development in the region

contributed to establishment of the national borders which by no means were the borders of the nation-state.

What he stresses is that only Spanish-Portuguese state frontiers are the only genuine national frontiers in

30 Peter Štih, Pregled slovenske srednjeveške zgodovine, Ljubljana, 1998, p. 10. ; also available online: URL:http://www.sistory.si/publikacije/pdf/zgodovina/Stih-Slovenska_zgodovina_od_prazgodovinskih_kultur_do_konca_srednjega _veka.pdf; page retrieved on January 17, 2009.

31 Ibid, p. 11.

32 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 12.

http://www.sistory.si/publikacije/pdf/zgodovina/Stih-Slovenska_zgodovina_od_prazgodovinskih_kultur_do_konca_srednjega%20_veka.pdf



Europe.33 He is also clear on defining the nation where he does not approve the term to be fixed by political

criteria what was definitely not the case in Yugoslavia.34

In specific historical development of nations in Yugoslavia, he points out the fact that “the national identity of the

Bulgars, Croats, and Serbs was acquired, though not firmly fixed, long before the development of modern

nationalism.”35 What is more, these three nations in his opinion have not lost their collective memory of their

medieval statehood, where Serbs have related on their autocephalous Serbian church and the Croats on the

continuity of Croatian parliamentary life.36 The present state territories are quite different as they were before but

nonetheless, the modern representations and collective memory denies the difference. For instance, Serbia was

not on the banks of Danube, the political centre of Croatia was not in Zagreb, but on the Adriatic, Bosnia was a

small place at the source of the Bosna River and we cannot discuss Slovenia until the nineteenth century. 37 The

medieval kingdoms of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia were shaped under several influences and the borders

changed constantly. Although even today some people tend to believe in the greatness of their state in non-

patriotic sense, the matter of fact is there can hardly be said that a certain territory where migrations, mixture

and ethno genesis took part could be claimed as a property of a member of modern nation. Misha Glenny

describes the demonstrations in Belgrade where he witnessed the absurdness and, for our purposes important,

manifestation of territorial “concerns”:

Ice-cream stands had been swept aside by virtually toothless young men with long hair, beards and denim jackets all selling the bile of

Chetnikdom: T-shirts with the words “Freedom or Death” curled around a skull and crossbones or proclaiming, “Ravna Gora (the

Chetnik training camp) – camp of Serbia’s heroes?, not to mention the endless stream of Chetnik and nationalist songs on tape. The

tune which had been on all the nationalits’ lips since Kosovo Polje was “Ko to kaže? Ko to laže? Srbija je mala” (“Who dares say it?

Who dares lie about it? Serbia is a small country”).38

The expansion of medieval kingdoms and the parallel expansion of the Ottoman Empire brought crucial

consequences. While we can observe the medieval changes of frontiers everywhere in the Europe, we have to

take into the consideration the fact there were much more severe consequences in this region. Migrations

meant not only the following mixture of culture it meant also the religion expansion. The Vlachs, the Roman

remnants also exposed to the Slavicization, are as well an important factor in South Slavs expansion in the

early sixth century. Although they had a special status in medieval Croatia and were Catholics, the Vlachs in

33 Ibid, p. 22.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid, p.23.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid, p. 33.

38 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, p. 43.


spreading Ottoman Empire which deported or resettled Catholics, especially those on the frontiers, were

Orthodox. Serb pockets in Croatia where a lot of conflicts broke up, were a consequence of the migration of

Orthodox Sclavicized Vlachs who in time acquired Serb national consciousness through their church

organisation.39 To demonstrate the obscurity of mythological land-owning perspective, we can take a quick look

over the language composition. In the Middle Ages, Croats spoke three dialects, čakavian, kajkavian and old

western štokavian, all three as the part of western South Slavic group. Medieval Serbs spoke old eastern

štokavian and Torlak, what could be considered as a part of the eastern South Slavic group. From the twelfth

century we can observe the coalescence of two štokavian dialects and separating themselves from the other

dialects of their groups. To simplify, the map of dialects under clearly shows us the mixing in the Balkans

although I stress this map only suggests the diversion of dialects and it does not links it by any nation-state

aspirations.

If we put aside some of the other elements which also contributed to nation-building and we focus on religion as

one of the essential factors, we would be able to more clearly understand the mythological perspective in the

collective memory in the region. We can operate in terms of general perception there was three most important

religious manners established in the region: the Catholics, the Orthodox and the Muslims. Linkage between

state organisation or sovereignties and the religion in the Middle Ages is nothing new, but it is important for us

to understand what role the religion had in the Balkans. While what today we call Slovenes were evangelized in

the eight century by the Latin rite missionaries from Salzburg, the Croats were Christianized mostly by Aquileian

missionary.40 The Serbs, on the other hand, were more exposed to the Eastern Orthodox Church because of

the situation in the Balkans in the thirteenth century.41 The linkage between Orthodox Serbian church and

politically based sovereignty can be explained by religiously denoted expansion of the Serbian medieval empire

in connection with migrations taken place under the influence of the Ottoman Empire. As Banac put it:” In short,

the Ottoman overlordship had the paradoxical effect of investing the Serbs with a great instrument of national

expansion.”42

39 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 42 – 3.

40 Ibid, p. 60 – 2.

41 Ibid, p. 63.

42 Ibid, p. 65.


Map 1: Serbian and Croatian dialects around 1700 A.C.43

43 Ibid, p. 48.


The Ottoman Empire also influenced on the religion structure of present territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The religion structure of BiH has varied from the Church of Bosnia to Catholic Church organisation and further

to Muslim religion after the Ottoman’s conquest of BiH.44 Although by the end of the seventeenth century around

three-quarters of Bosnia’s population were Muslims, the distinction between Bosinan Muslims and Ottoman

Turkish was obvious.45 Although it is attractive to grasp the religious element as a crucial in national

consciousness of the Balkans’ nations, we tend not to forget that only Serbs were related to their religion as a

basic element of their nation, Croats quite well resisted the equation of Catholicism and Croatdom. 46 The

Ottoman Empire did not mean the extinction of other religions besides Islam but as mentioned before it meant

the possible resettlement. Therefore the region’s religious structure was colourful. The Ottoman Empire and the

sovereignties such as Habsburg Empire, Hungarian Kingdom took control over the territory we today refer as

ex–Yugoslavia. What they have in common is that under the foreign rule, the similarities between different

“nations” rose over the differences which we can see in idea of Illyrianist movement. Although there were some

difficulties, the idea of linkage between “nations” was established but never carried out on the Illyrianist basics. 47

As shallow as this brief description goes, we can still be sure that as well as the language similarities were

important, so was the common destiny under the foreign rule. There were differences and every nation had its

own perspective, but the historical progress has forced these entities to reach out in order to collaborate.

Simplified as it is, the result was the first politically based sovereignty of South Slavs which we can by some

means call a predecessor of Yugoslavia.

44 Ibid, p. 39 – 40.

45 Ibid, p. 41.

46 Ibid, p. 107 – 8.

47 Ibid, p. 73 – 8.


3.2. THE UNIFICATION WHICH LED INTO THE CONCLUSION

The expiring Ottoman ruler ship over the Balkans, the weakened Austro – Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of

Serbia have all contributed to a slow unification process in the region. What has followed after the ending of the Great War

was the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Although we could understand this action as

logical, the fact of the matter is that the reasons which led these entities into the Kingdom were more or less those of

practical manner. The Serbs had tendency to incorporate all Serbian speakers, Croats and Slovenes were facing with

Italian territorial concessions because of the Treaty of London.48 Even at the beginning of this unified state there were

disputes between two strongest parties; the National Radical Party led by Pasic, a Serb with a long and well-established

reputation in the politics, and the Croatian Peasant Party. Serbian political and military elites thought of themselves as

liberators because they fought on the winning side in the Great War. Croats, on the other hand found themselves trapped

in this entity and were not willing to admit the dominance of Serb elements as well as Slovenes. Macedonians and Muslim

speakers of Serbo – Croatian were recognized as Serbs or Croats what was the result of the “single, three-named people

Yugoslav nation” logic after renaming the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.49 As

Wachtel puts it, in each of the Balkans’ states before the World War II, “parliamentary democracy was abrogated and

replaced by a right-wing, though not specifically fascist, dictatorship under a leader who pledged to preserve the nation

from internal chaos and external danger.”50 The establishment of the Ban’s Croatia on the eve of the World War II followed

by the Independent State of Croatia which was directly linked to Hitler’s Germany was more than clear evidence there

were tendencies for independence. World War II meant the first real combat between nations of the Kingdom Yugoslavia

where the oppression under the Serbian hegemony, long lasting deprivation of national independence etc. have

awakened hatred.

After World War II and the conquest of Yugoslavia under the communist leadership, the nations of Yugoslavia once again

entered into the second stage. The communist leadership was well aware of national question in its full controversy,

therefore the idea of Yugoslavia was based not only on building a unity, but also on denial of national question contrary to

condicio sine qua non. National question was nevertheless never put in front and Tito always “publicly identified unitarism

(for many non-Serbs a code war for Serbian nationalism) as the greatest threat to Yugoslavia’s harmonious development

[…]”.51 Ignored by communist leadership and burst among the people, the national question was becoming more and

more relevant for the politicians who gained public support by stressing the meaning of their republics’ rights.52 It was no

longer the case of territory that was important, it was the mythical dimension and never resolved questions after World

48 Andrew B. Wachtel, The Balkans in World History, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, p. 91 – 4.

49 Ibid, p. 94 – 103.

50 Ibid, p. 98.

51 Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804 – 1999, Penguin Books, New York, p. 589.

52 Ibid, p. 587.


War II which contributed to an end of unity. As Glenny notices in the writing of Serb communist, Dobrivoj Radosavljevic:

“Tito committed a historical error by encouraging Albanian-Serb and Croatian-Serb conflict. Yugoslavia will pay a heavy

price for it.”53

An account had been made up in 1991 and more in 1992 when the struggle for independence began in Slovenia, Croatia

and Bosnia and Herzegovina. While Slovene war took only ten days and the attack of Yugoslavian People’s Army was not

as severe as it was elsewhere, Croatia and BiH faced the cruelty of war. These territories were nationally mixed and

therefore the citizens were keener in joining their “mother-state” as it was case in Croatia (Kninska krajina) and Bosnia

and Herzegovina (Herzegovina as mainly populated by Croats and north part of Bosnia as mainly populated by Serbs).

The mythical perspective of these territories as once belonging to other sovereignties was put in front what was most

obviously seen in BiH. Territorial claims of the Tudjman (Croatian president) and Milosevic (Serbian president) as well as

Izetbegovic (president of BiH) were a stumbling block in peace negotiations during the war. While the general opinion is

mostly discussing the Croatian and Serbian nationalism, it is often forgotten there was also a Bosnian nationalism

involved as well. When negotiation process in a form of Vance Owen Peace Plan (the VOPP) emerged, Tudjman and

Milosevic supported the plan while “the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government was aggrieved because the VOPP denied

its central war aim – a fully unified state”.54 Izetbegovic as a key element of BiH’s struggle for the independence was also

sentenced in jail in early 1970s for writing so called The Islamic Declaration.55 Therefore we can by no hesitation

whatsoever admit there were nationalism tendencies present all along.

53 Ibid, p. 593.

54 Ibid, p. 640.

55 URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3133038.stm, page retrieved on January 18, 2009.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3133038.stm


4. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this discussion was not to (re)solve the national question in Yugoslavia which existed since the

beginning of the latter. It has a more specific aim, i.e. to recall the meaning of collective memory, how it

influences on present actions and how the Balkans region is complex and hard to understand. The international

attempt witnessed in establishing post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to restore peace and security in

the region has once more shown the complexity of situation. While there are individuals and parties in the entire

successor states stressing more the meaning of collaboration, their rule over the years in Yugoslavia is not

disputable. It is clear more or less all the political interests were left aside and the national consciousness

prevailed over.

It is hard if not even impossible to explain the full scale of factors which led masses to these actions. Why

neighbours happily living side by side in peace and harmony did become the most fanatic enemies over the

night? This discussion has a purpose to point out some key elements which could contribute to this bloody

spectacle and lighten some of the specialties in the process of nation-building in Yugoslavia.

However, the lack of correct information and the complexity of the Balkans led to the fact this paper have its

imperfections. For more thoughtful and more hollowed discussion or interest in the question of nationality in

Yugoslavia, a list of books is almost endless, each giving a specific dimension.


5. BIBLIOGRAPHY

5.1. LITERATURE:

Banac, Ivo: The National Question in Yugoslavia: origins, history, politics, Cornell University Press, New York,

1984.

Gellner, Ernest: Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1983.

Glenny, Misha: The Fall of Yugoslavia, Penguin Books, London, 1992.

Glenny, Misha: The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804 – 1999, Penguin Books, New York.

Hobsbawm, Eric J.: Nacije in nacionalizem po letu 1780, Studia Humanitatis, Ljubljana, 2007; translated from:

Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Hobsbawm, Eric J.: On History, Abacus, London, 1998.

Ignatieff, Michael: Blood and Belonging. Journeys into the New Nationalism, Vintage, London, 1994.

Jerman, Marjan: Iz pekla, Ljubljana, 2001. [Jerman, Marjan: From Hell, Ljubljana, 2001.]

Kralj, Ana: Skriti šarm nacionalizma, in foreword of Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nacije in nacionalizem po letu 1780,

Studia Humanitatis, Ljubljana, 2007.

Said, Edward W.: Orientalizem: zahodnjaški pogledi na Orient, Studia Humanitatis, Ljubljana, 1996; first edition:

Orientalism, New York, 1978.

Stih, Peter: Pregled slovenske srednjeveške zgodovine, Ljubljana, 1998. [Stih, Peter: An Overview of Slovene Medieval History, Ljubljana, 1998.]

Todorova, Maria: Imagining the Balkans, New York, 1997.

Wachtel, Andrew B.: The Balkans in World History, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008.

Wagner, Peter: A sociology of Modernity. Liberty and Discipline, Routhledge, London, 1996.

5.2. E – SOURCES:


URL: http://www.search.eb.com.nukweb.nuk.uni-lj.si/eb/article-42665, page retrieved on January 16, 2009.

URL: http://www.hercegbosna.org/engleski/dummies.html, page retrieved January 15, 2008.

URL: http://www.siol.net/svet/zanimivosti/2008/08/crnogorski_jezik.aspx, page retrieved January 15, 2008.

URL:http://www.sistory.si/publikacije/pdf/zgodovina/Stih-

Slovenska_zgodovina_od_prazgodovinskih_kultur_do_konca_srednjega _veka.pdf; page retrieved on January

17, 2009.

URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3133038.stm, page retrieved on January 18, 2009.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3133038.stm



http://www.siol.net/svet/zanimivosti/2008/08/crnogorski_jezik.aspx

http://www.hercegbosna.org/engleski/dummies.html

http://www.search.eb.com.nukweb.nuk.uni-lj.si/eb/article-42665

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