role hierarchies and constraints for lattice- based access controls ravi sandhu george mason...
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE-BASED ACCESS CONTROLS
Ravi Sandhu
George Mason University
and
SETA Corporation
![Page 2: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
2© Ravi Sandhu
OUTLINE
RBAC96 model: policy neutral LBAC models: policy full and varied LBAC can be reduced to RBAC96
LBAC < RBAC96 ? why bother to do this?
![Page 3: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
3© Ravi Sandhu
RBAC96
ROLES
USER-ROLEASSIGNMENT
PERMISSION-ROLEASSIGNMENT
USERS PERMISSIONS
... SESSIONS
ROLE HIERARCHIES
![Page 4: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
4© Ravi Sandhu
HIERARCHICAL ROLES
Engineer
HardwareEngineer
SoftwareEngineer
SupervisingEngineer
![Page 5: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
5© Ravi Sandhu
RBAC96
ROLES
USER-ROLEASSIGNMENT
PERMISSIONS-ROLEASSIGNMENT
USERS PERMISSIONS
... SESSIONS
ROLE HIERARCHIES
CONSTRAINTS
![Page 6: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
6© Ravi Sandhu
WHAT IS THE POLICY IN RBAC?
RBAC is policy neutral Role hierarchies facilitate security
management Constraints facilitate non-discretionary
policies
![Page 7: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
7© Ravi Sandhu
LBAC: LIBERAL *-PROPERTY
H
L
M1 M2
Read Write- +
+ -
![Page 8: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
8© Ravi Sandhu
RBAC96: LIBERAL *-PROPERTY
HR
LR
M1R M2R
LW
HW
M1W M2W
Read Write-
+
![Page 9: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
9© Ravi Sandhu
RBAC96: LIBERAL *-PROPERTY
user xR, user has clearance x
user LW, independent of clearance Need constraints
session xR iff session xW read can be assigned only to xR roles write can be assigned only to xW roles (O,read) assigned to xR iff
(O,write) assigned to xW
![Page 10: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
10© Ravi Sandhu
LBAC: STRICT *-PROPERTY
H
L
M1 M2
Read Write-
+
![Page 11: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
11© Ravi Sandhu
RBAC96: STRICT *-PROPERTY
HR
LR
M1R M2R LW HWM1W M2W
![Page 12: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
12© Ravi Sandhu
LBAC: WRITE RANGE
subjects have 2 labels read labelwrite label
H
L
M1 M2
![Page 13: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
13© Ravi Sandhu
RBAC96: WRITE RANGE LIBERAL *-PROPERTY
HR
LR
M1R M2R
LW
HW
M1W M2W
read role ° write role
![Page 14: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
14© Ravi Sandhu
RBAC96: WRITE RANGE STRICT *-PROPERTY
HR
LR
M1R M2R LW HWM1W M2W
read role ° write role
![Page 15: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
15© Ravi Sandhu
LBAC: CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY
HS
LS
LI
HI
HS-LI
LS-HI
HS-HI LS-LI
two independentlattices
one compositelattice
![Page 16: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
16© Ravi Sandhu
RBAC96: CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY READ ROLES
HSR-LIR
LSR-HIR
HSR-HIR LSR-LIR
Same for all cases
![Page 17: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
17© Ravi Sandhu
RBAC96: CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY WRITE ROLES
LSW-HIW
HSW-LIW
HSW-HIW LSW-LIW
Liberal confidentialityLiberal integrity
![Page 18: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
18© Ravi Sandhu
RBAC96: CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY WRITE ROLES
Strict confidentialityLiberal integrity
LSW-LIW
LSW-HIW
HSW-LIW
HSW-HIW
![Page 19: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
19© Ravi Sandhu
RBAC96: CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY WRITE ROLES
Strict confidentialityStrict integrity
LSW-LIWLSW-HIW HSW-LIWHSW-HIW
![Page 20: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
20© Ravi Sandhu
SUMMARY
policy-neutral RBAC96 can accommodate policy-full LBAC in all its variations
LBAC variations are modeled by adjusting role hierarchy adjusting constraints
![Page 21: ROLE HIERARCHIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR LATTICE- BASED ACCESS CONTROLS Ravi Sandhu George Mason University and SETA Corporation](https://reader034.vdocuments.net/reader034/viewer/2022051400/551463c9550346284e8b5a37/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
21© Ravi Sandhu
COVERT CHANNELS
are a problem for LBAC remain a problem for RBAC but
they don’t get any worse same techniques can be adapted who cares about them anyway