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Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution: An Essay Review

Author(s): Stanley RothmanSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Mar., 1970), pp. 61-82Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1955613 .

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BARRING-TON MOORE AND THE DIALECTICSOF REVOLUTION: AN ESSAY REVIEW

STANLEY ROTHMANSmith College

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, inrather a scomful tone, "it means just what I chooseit to mean-neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you canmake words mean so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "whichis to be the master-that's all."

Through the Looking GlassI. INTRODUCTION1

It is not hard to find reasons why BarringtonMoore's Social Origins of Democracy and Dic-tatorship has had such widespread influence.2 Itsapproach, that of comparative, historical sociol-ogy, seeks clues to the present in the past, andMoore demonstrates mastery of a wide range ofhistorical materials. Yet I feel that the book isultimately unsatisfactory, for it is marred by alack of respect for its own sources of informa-tion and by contradictions and non-sequiturs atcritical points in the argument.In this critique I shall first examine the gen-eral thesis of the book and then turn to the casestudies which Moore uses to support his argu-ments. I shall also attempt to account for thesharp contrasts in the quality of scholarshipwhich characterize the study, and will attributethem to Moore's preconceived ideological as-sumptions about the nature of the good society.

II. THE OVERT ANALYSISThe central argument of the volume seems tobe about as follows:Historically, societies have industrialized inone of three ways. Each of these has involvedviolence and the exploitation or oppression of a

large bulk of the population by a "ruthless" rul-ing class. (24, 28-29, 287, 297, 386, 410, 506.)3The first route taken by England-and withvariations by France and the United States-may be called the bourgeois-capitalist-demo-'Professors R. Jackson Wilson, Daniel Aaron,Cecelia Kenyon, Murray Kitely, Guenter Lewyand Malcolm Smith all read an earlier version ofthis essay and offered criticisms.Professors Wilsonand Aaron were especially helpful. Naturally, theerrorswhich remain are mine.2 (Boston, 1966).'As with many other of his statements, Mooreoccasionally hedges (508, for example), but this isthe overall thrust of his analysis.

cratic road. This route required a violent revo-lution designed to destroy the power of at leasta portion of the traditional elite. It also involvedthe "ruthless" exploitation of both the peasantryand the working class in the early stages of in-dustrial development.The second road was taken by Germany andJapan. Here the bourgeoisie, too weak to assertitself, joined with a quasi-feudal landowningclass in an attempt to modernize society withinits traditional social framework. Industrial-ization was not achieved without exploitation,but revolutionary upheaval was avoided. How-ever, the ultimate outcome was Fascism, and inGermany at least, genocide.The third route, that of Communism, has oc-curred in those societies in which the rulingclasses could not successfully industrialize. Com-munist regimes generally come to power on thebacks of peasant revolutions, and end with theelimination of the peasantry and the develop-ment of a repressive system comparable to al-though different from that in capitalist coun-tries.

One of these three roads, Moore argues, hasbeen more or less inevitable, and together theyexhaust the possibilities of social change. Todaythe bourgeois capitalist route to modernizationseems obsolete, the Fascist road too horrible tocontemplate, and even the traditional Commu-nist road (i.e., the Soviet road) historicallydated, although China may avoid Russia's mis-takes.Indian political leaders have attempted toavoid these choices and to modernize democrati-cally. Moore thinks they have failed, and hehints fairly strongly that an authoritarian re-gime will have to emerge if India is to solve herproblems.4The evidence Moore brings to his argumentis to be found in his case studies. Thus, hischoice of cases becomes crucial. Moore could notdeal with every country in the world, but hisgeneral theory of social change, so far as I candetermine, is not at all applicable to black Af-

'The general argument is summarized on pp. xv-xvi, 413-414. On the obsolescence of bourgeoiscapitalism and Russian Communism, see pp. 507-508, 483. On Moore's hopes for China, see p. 230.I will add additional references in the sections onspecific countries.

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62 THE AMERICAN POLMTICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 64rica or to the Middle East, and, thus, to muchof the "third world." In addition its applicabil-ity to countries like Sweden or Norway seemsproblematical.5 Moore specifically excludes theScandinavian countries from his discussion, ar-guing that, since they are small countries which"depend economically and politically on big andpowerful ones . . . the decisive causes of theirpolitics lie outside their own boundaries." (xiii)Moore offers no support for this argument, yetdeals in great detail with at least one country-India-which was influenced in very decisiveways by an outside power. One suspects, then,that other reasons lay behind his choices.Of more significance at this point are Moore'sneo-Marxist assumptions as to the underlyingpattern of social causation. He argues (1)that the mode of production in a given soci-ety determines ideology of the social classes ofwhich it is composed and its political structure,and (2) that all ruling classes have as their pri-mary goal the fullest possible exploitation ofthose whom they dominate. Ecological factorsare unimportant and cultural variables areepiphenomenal since they either reflect the eco-nomic system or are mechanisms used by theruling classes to further their own interests.Thus, Northern commitment to an anti-slaveryposition in the American Civil War is to be ex-plained by the emergence of an urban capitalistcivilization; and Hinduism and the caste sys-tem, symptoms of India's historical backward-ness, both survived only because they served theinterests of the ruling strata. (123, 136, 335-36.) Nor are Japanese cultural patterns rele-vant to an understanding of the Meiji Res-toration, which was based entirely on the self-interest of a particular segment of the rulingclass, just as the support of social legislation bythe English bourgeoisie in the mid-nineteenthcentury was merely a sop to the lower orders,because everyone knew that the bourgeoisie nowdominated English politics. (240, 245, 441.)The mode of production and class exploita-tion are key to Moore's overall historical analy-sis. Past revolutions have been inevitable, be-cause the ruling classes were unable to transcendtheir own ideologies and unwilling to accept lim-

5For that matter the analysis seems inapplicableto those countries in Southeast Asia, e.g., Thailand,which, for all practical purposes, lack a landowninggentry. On Thailand see: David A. Wilson, Politicsin Thailand (Ithaca, 1962), p. 52; James Mosel,"Thai Administrative Behavior" in W. J. Siffin(ed.) Toward the Comparative Study of PublicAdministration (Bloomington, 1959), pp. 283-288;and D. Insor, Thailand (New York, 1963), pp. 44-45.

itations upon their opportunities for exploita-tion.Moore essentially claims that his frame ofreference enables him to systematize the studyof comparative history more effectively than al-ternate models, and that he was forced to hisconclusions by the facts themselves. (356, 505and the Preface.) However, Moore also levels asharp theoretical attack upon models that givemore weight to cultural variables, specificallythe work of Max Weber, who emphasized theuniqueness of European history, and developedwhat is perhaps the most powerful modern theo-retical alternative to a Marxist or neo-Marxistanalysis.An overall evaluation of the value of Moore'scategories must await an examination of theirutility in dealing with the various countries withwhich he is concerned, but the following reflec-tions are not out of order at this point.First, Moore's two central propositions haveno necessary connection. The values of a givensocial class may be determined by its economicposition, but this does not prove that thesevalues necessarily involve the maximization ofits opportunities for "exploitation."Further, the propositions are not equal in ex-planatory value. The discovery of economiccorrelates for the Weltanschauung of a particu-lar class may be offered as evidence that thesefactors were causal, but to assert that a givenWeltanschauung is supported because it is self-serving explains little or nothing. Even if theruling classes in India were only interested inexploitation, this would not tell us why theychose Hinduism and the caste system as theirinstruments. Moore's volume, as we shall see, isfull of question-begging explanations of thistype.Sometimes, as a last resort, Moore does givean independent role to cultural and ecologicalvariables, even though he would seem to weakenhis thesis in the process. For example, what isone to do with an analysis which continuallydownplays the role of ideas and then lists as onereason for the mild treatment of the Chartistsby the English ruling classes the fact that:Russell was a doctrinaire Whig devoted to theideal of liberty and anxious to avoid encroachingon the free discussion of political issues. (34.)

There are many other instances of the ad hocintroduction of other variables. After emphasiz-ing economic factors in the behavior of the En-glish bourgeoisie, Moore suddenly brings in En-gland's reliance upon a Navy (stemming, oneassumes, from the fact that the country is an is-land) as among those factors which explain the

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1970 BARRINGTON MOORE AND THE DIALECTICS OF REVOLUTION 63lack of repressiveness of English society. (32,444.) It is almost the only time that this vari-able is mentioned with regard to England, andMoore doesn't even consider why Japan's islandposition did not play a similar role. Or, totake another example, he argues that Japan'simperialism was the result of economic contra-dictions which led to Fascism. English imperial-ism, on the other hand, was the result of:... a combination of adventure, reasons of state,commerce, and plunder: motives and causes thatwere really indistinguishable during that burst ofenergy released all over Europe by the decay ofthe traditional Christian medieval civilization andthe rise of a new and much more secular one. (342.)

Moore's habit of blending quasi-economic de-terminism with other whimsically introduced fac-tors, including cultural variables, makes it hardto systematize his position, and raises seriousquestions about his interpretation of the soci-eties which he uses to illustrate his generaltheory. Indeed, since he offers no explicit crite-ria one gets the impression that decisions as towhat weight he should accord cultural factorswere based less on a concern with placing hismaterial in a theoretical perspective, than upona desire to convince his readers of the validityof assumptions brought to his study.Moore's discussion of exploitation suffersfrom similar limitations. He considers the con-cept objective and measurable. In fact, he liststhe criteria which determine whether a givenclass relationship is exploitive. But, although intheory he allows for gradations in exploitation,the English, French, German, Japanese, Indianand Chinese aristocracies all seem to haveshared one aim, that is, to squeeze as much outof their peasants as possible.One wonders whether a concept which isnot used to differentiate among societies, hasany empirical utility. The confusion is increasedby Moore's tendency to hedge. Peasants, heargues, revolt because of objective exploitation.If they revolt even while their objective situa-tion is improving, it is only because they realizethat the "lord's exactions increased and his con-tribution . . . declined." (473.) If they don't,their failure to revolt is explained by inertia. Asfor those peasants who resist the revolution,Moore redefines them as being part of the ex-ploiting classes because of shared ideas. Thusthey present no analytic problem. Moore says ofthe French Revolution that:To be sure, there were members of roughly thesame social strata fighting on opposite sides. Butthey were fighting for opposed social objectives.. . . Victory for one side or the other meant thevictory or defeat of class privileges. On these

grounds alone it seems impossible to deny that theTerror was an instrument of class warfare. ...(518.)

Furthermore the evidence which he offers toprove that a given ruling class has been entirelyexploitive and almost entirely parasitic is not al-ways very compelling. For example, he arguesthat the Chinese gentry fulfilled hardly any use-ful function in Chinese society. (203-05.)6Most contemporary scholars, on the other hand,would contend that China attained relativelyhigh levels of general prosperity, social orderand cultural and commercial development dur-ing the height of the Ch'ing dynasty in the sev-enteenth and early eighteenth centuries. Cer-tainly the political order must have played somerole. But, Moore argues that the increase inpopulation which occurred at that time andwhich most observers might take as a sign of ef-fective social organization and rising living stan-dards, did not stem from these factors. Ratherit was the gentry who increased the birthrate ofthe peasants in order to drive up the price ofland and to impoverish the masses. (168.) Onthe face of it the argument is less than convinc-ing. During the early part of the period, atleast, living standards continued to rise despitethe increase in population, partially because theregime sponsored the opening of new areas forcultivation and introduced new crops.8 Ping-ti-

6 Moore does mention the improvement of irriga-tion, but downplays its importance. Indeed themajor purpose of improving irrigation was to in-crease the possibilities of exploitation. (169.) Healso argues that its role in the maintenance of or-der was unimportant, given the place of the clansin administering local justice. Besides, when largescale banditry did develop it was largely the con-sequence of exploitation by the ruling class. Whatevidence, one wonders, is relevant to the questionof measuring exploitation? Moore, in effect, has itboth ways. If a ruling class does literally nothing,it is clearly parasitic, but whatever functions itperforms are performed for bad reasons and it isstill parasitic.

See Ping-ti Ho, Studies on the Population ofChina, 1368-1953 (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 268-270.Moore cites Ho several times but appears to denythat living standards were rising for the populationas a whole. (Origins, 179.) Interestingly enough,however, he does argue, at least indirectly, thatChina was better off than India in this regard, andJapan was better off than China (Origins, 330-333and passim.).

8Ho, op. cit., 269. Edwin 0. Reischauer and JohnK. Fairbank, East Asia: The Great Tradition (Bos-ton, 1958), I, p. 393.



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64 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 64Ho, whom Moore relies on for population data,argues that the Chinese were hoist by their ownpetard. Having created conditions of generalprosperity, the regime was finally faced byover-population in relation to resources, undercircumstances in which it had reached the limitsof its capacity to raise levels of productivitywithin the framework of the existing system.Whether or not the Chinese gentry did at onetime serve some function in Chinese society haslittle to do with the general conclusions whichMoore reaches about the necessity for a moder-nizing revolution in China. The difference be-tween Moore's view and one which emphasizesthe irony of Chinese development is a differencebetween a view of history as involving genuinetragedy, and one which sees it as a conflict be-tween heroes and villains. Despite Moore's ex-plicit disclaimers, it is quite clear that the latteris his perspective.Finally, Moore's stake in proving that all rul-ing classes are completely exploitive sometimesleads to contradictory appraisals. Thus, he usu-ally describes Feudalism as "gangsterism." But,in talking of modernizing elites, he concedes thatfeudal arrangements had at least protected thepeasants against grosser forms of exploitation.9

* * *

Moore offers several reasons for rejecting ap-proaches to the study of society which give sig-nificant weight to cultural factors. He implies,first, that such explanations tend to emphasizecontinuity and downplay change, and thus havea conservative bias. (485-86.) There seems lit-tle intrinsic reason why this should be so, andMoore offers none. Max Weber, whom Moorespends a good deal of time criticizing, uses cul-tural variables, in part, to explain the great Eu-ropean revolutions which began in the seven-teenth century, and Robert Heilbronner hascome to conclusions about the third world atleast as radical as those of Moore, by emphasiz-ing the role of cultural impediments to peacefulchange.10 But, even if the charge were true, itwould not constitute an adequate scholarly rea-son for rejecting explanations of this type.Nevertheless, his attack on the use of "cul-tural-continuity" explanations is worth examin-ing in detail because it undermines his own ap-proach, although he may not realize this. "Theassumption . . . that cultural and social continu-ity do not require explanation," notes Moore:

'Compare, for example, Origins, 10, 214, 241 withOrigins,12, 194.10In "Counterrevolutionary America," Commen-

tary (April, 1967), pp. 3-10.

obliterates the fact that both have to be recreatedanew in each generation, often with great pain andsuffering. To maintain and transmit a value sys-tem, human beings are punched . . . cajoled,bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read news-papers, stood up against a wall and shot. . . . Tospeak of cultural inertia is to overlook the concreteinterest and privileges that are served by indoc-trination . . . (486.)Earlier he had argued:Such explanations are logically the same as thefamous explanation of the effects of opium asbeing due to its "dormitive" properties. They begthe fundamental question: why did this particularoutlook prevail when and where it did. (240.)

Moore is unfair. Those who argue that thecultural inheritance of a society is a significantpart of any explanation of its dynamics do so onthe basis of some fairly sophisticated proposi-tions concerning the transmission of culturalvalues. And Moore himself, despite his stric-tures, is sometimes forced to recognize the"stickiness" of cultural patterns. In the samechapter from which the above quotation istaken, he explains the revolt of at least some sa-murai against the new Japanese regime as afunction of the difficulties of shedding romantic"feudal notions." (252.)

More importantly, as Moore's own "ques-tion-begging" explanations indicate, economicself-interest does not exist in a vacuum. If wemust take account of the concrete interests thatare served by adherence to certain culturalnorms, the reverse is also true; men define theirinterests in terms of the values which they deemimportant.

Further, Moore himself tends to emphasizecontinuity, albeit in a rather different way fromthose whom he criticizes. For example, in ex-plaining the acceptance by the Chinese peasantof a regime which was fundamentally exploitive,Moore argues:. . .it seems more realistic to assume that largemasses of people, and especially peasants, simplyaccept the social system under which they livewithout concern about any balance of benefits andpains . . . unless and until something happens tothreaten and destroys their daily routine. Hence, itis quite possible for them to accept a society ofwhose working they are no more than victims.(204.)

Is this explanation of continuity any moresatisfactory than a "cultural" explanation? In-deed it is less so, for it does not suggest anymechanism by which ideas about these institu-



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1970 BARRINGTON MOORE AND THE DIALECTICS OF REVOLUTION 65tions are transmitted. Unlike most sociologistsconcerned with the transmission of culture,Moore puts considerable emphasis on the vio-lence done the individual by the socializationprocess. Somehow, he seems to feel that thisweakens an argument which takes cultural con-tinuity for granted. But why? If the process ofsocialization were as brutalizing as he makes itout to be, it might strengthen the hands of thosewho urge that continuity is natural, and changethat must be explained. Having given up somuch in the process of becoming part of any so-ciety, adult members of that society would resistproposed changes in the value structure withconsiderable ferocity. In short, Moore's argmentproves nothing.In criticizing Max Weber Moore wishes toundermine an interpretation of European devel-opments which stresses the role played byChristianity and more specifically English Cal-vinism. His basic argument is that one can findthe characteristics associated with the Protes-tant ethic in all of the societies under study, andthat therefore the emergence of Calvinism can-not be used as an explanation for English eco-nomic and political developments. But, as Rein-hard Bendix points out, Weber never arguedthat the Protestant ethic was the only reasonthat capitalism emerged first in Europe. Rather,his analysis deals with Protestantism as onevariable among others." Secondly, in provingthe existence of a "Protestant ethic" in India, orChina, or Japan, Moore relies heavily upontravelers' reports. These, of course, are of verylimited value, and Weber never denied that atleast some of the values associated with the"Protestant" ethic might be found to a limiteddegree among segments of any population.Further, Moore has a very limited under-standing of the attitudes which Weber believedcharacterize modern capitalism. In dealing withFrance, for example, he quotes Forster's studyof the nobility of Toulouse to prove that manyof the provincial nobility were characterized by"thrift, discipline, and strict management," aswell as a powerful desire to increase theirwealth. (51.) As Moore sees it, this shows thattheir attitudes were the same as those describedby Weber as constituting the Protestant ethic.The only difference between the French nobilityand the English gentry was that the former, in-stead of rationalizing their estates, "used theprevailing social and political framework to''squeeze more grain out of the peasants and sellit." (53.)

11See Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An In-tellectual Portrait (Garden City, 1962).

Whether or not this description of the Frenchnobility is accurate, it does not support Moore'sargument. Weber never argued that the desireto increase one's wealth or even the organizedeffort to do so was a peculiarly capitalist phe-nomenon. What differentiates the capitalist ori-entation from pre-capitalist orientations is notonly its greater rationality in terms of organiza-tion, but also its emphasis upon mastery of theenvironment. Profit is the unintended conse-quence (and in some ways unwanted conse-quence) of this Calvinist drive toward mastery,toward changing the external world throughlabor. Thus profits based primarily on colonialor fiscal exploitation, on the basis of force guar-anteed by political authority, i.e., continuousearnings through compulsory payments, or var-ious methods of tax-farming, are considered byWeber to be part of pre-capitalist economicstructures.'2Indeed a good many scholars have pointed tojust the characteristics Moore describes, in con-trasting both the French aristocracy and thebourgeoisie with their English counterparts be-fore and after the Revolution. Their point isthat French attitudes remained pre-capitalist inso far as they were not innovative.'3 Forsterhimself is careful to point out that the limitedsample of provincial nobles he studied had madevery few efforts to follow the English example ofexploring new techniques for raising the generallevel of productivity.'4Moore's attack on Weber is less than success-ful. It remains to be seen whether or not the ap-plication of his own frame of reference to thecountries studied is more adequate than one de-rived from a Weberian model.

III. THE WESTERN CASE STUDIESThe assumptions which guide BarringtonMoore's analysis reveal themselves only grad-12 Bendix, op. cit., 53."See, for example: Bert F. Hoselitz, "Entrepre-neurship and Capital Formation in France andBritain Since 1700,"in National Bureau of Eco-nomic Research, Capital Formation and EconomicGrowth, p. 311; David Landes, "French Entre-preneurship and Industrial Growth in the Nine-teenth Century," in Barry E. Supple (ed.), TheExperience of Economic Growth (New York,1963), pp. 340-353; and George V. Taylor, "Non-capitalist Wealth and the Origins of the FrenchRevolution," AmericanHistorical Review, 72 (Jan-uary, 1967), pp. 469-496.14 Robert Forster, "The Provincial Noble: A Re-appraisal,"American Historical Review, 68 (April,1963), p. 687.



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66 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 64ually in his historical case studies, and it is tothese we must now turn. My knowledgeof the material varies widely with the countriesinvolved, and my analysis will not be directedprimarily at "disproving" his argument on thebasis of the evidence, but rather on pointing upsome of the contradictions in his analysis.Moore's Western case studies are confined toEngland, France, and the United States, withbriefer scattered references to both Germanyand Russia. Although I will stress those aspectsof Moore's work with which I disagree, I shouldnote that the differences are only in emphasis,for much of what he says is part of a generalscholarly consensus. However, as in most mat-ters of social analysis, differences of emphasisoften result in radically different conclusions.England, to Moore, is a paradigm case of in-dustrialization, and his chapter is designed pri-marily to prove three propositions. First, he at-tacks the notion that the English have some pe-culiar knack for settling social disputes peace-fully. (4.) The relative peacefulness of Englishsociety in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-ries was preceded necessarily by an outburst ofviolence in the seventeenth century. Withoutthis violent revolution produced by intemperateand violent men, the later development ofpeaceful parliamentarianism would have beeninconceivable. (20, 39.)

Second, the English civil war was essentiallya contest between two societies based on differ-ing economic systems, between the traditionalaristocracy, and the commercially oriented gen-try supported by urban commercial interests.(14-20.)Third, the industrial revolution in Englandwas accompanied by "massive violence exercisedby the upper classes against the lower," (29.)which was not different in kind from that exer-cised by other "ruthless" elites during the pro-cess of industrialization.Competent historians, of course, do not sub-scribe to a non-violent myth of English historyany more than does Moore. The fact remains,however, that even the English Civil War wasrelatively mild by continental standards, some-thing which Moore himself recognizes and at-tempts to explain. The Civil War aside, it is stillthe relative peacefulness of British evolutionsince the eighteenth century which poses themore interesting problem.For his economic interpretation of the CivilWar, Moore relies heavily upon Tawney's "riseof the gentry" thesis, a position which com-mands far less than universal support amongEnglish scholars today, including some of those

he cites.15 Moore relies, too, upon an analysis ofthe geographic distribution of the opposingforces in the Long Parliament, noting, as haveall previous commentators, that the more "com-mercial" sections of the realm generally sup-ported the Parliament, while the more backwardgenerally supported the monarchy. (510-514.)The problem lies in the fact that even in theareas supporting the Parliament, there wasstrong latent support for the king, and, further,these were the same areas in which the dissent-ing sects were strongest.'6 Moore's case for abasically economic interpretation of the revolu-tion, one which de-emphasizes religious andother factors, is not very strong.Indeed Moore seems to be in a quandary, forhe admits in the end that the Civil War did notresult in the displacement of one class by an-other. Its major contribution to bourgeois de-mocracy seems to have been the killing of anEnglish king-a killing which served as a sternreminder to later monarchs. (18, 17.)The killing of the king, of course, was a polit-ical rather than an economic act. It is not clearwhy it should have been so traumatic. As Plumband others have pointed out, this was far fromthe first king the English had killed. Down tothe seventeenth century the English had some-thing of a reputation as regicides.'7 What causedthe trauma? If, as Moore suggests, the CivilWar did not produce a fundamental alterationin the class structure of the society, it is at leastpossible that the changing political culture of

15 He cites Lawrence Stone as more or less sup-porting Tawney's thesis. (Origins, 15). Stone, how-ever, specifically rejects his own previously heldbelief in the key role played by such factors. In-deed, he calls for the replacement of economicinterpretations of the Civil War by broader soci-ological interpretations, and argues that other fac-tors, including religious factors, played a key rolein the conflict. See Lawrence Stone, The Crisis ofthe Aristocracy (New York, 1967; Abridged edi-tion), pp. 4, 7-9, 345-354.

"6See, for example, Ivan Roots, The Great Re-bellion (London, 1966), pp. 62-68; Stuart E. Prall(ed.), The Puritan Revolution (New York, 1968),ix-xxii, and Charles Wilson, England's Apprentice-ship (New York, 1965), pp. 108-140.

17J. H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stabilityin England (London, 1967), p. 19. In the 200 yearsbefore Henry VII established the Tudor dynasty,England had been ruled by twelve monarchs. Onlythree reigned until death overtook them. Of theremaining nine, seven were deposed, five of whomlost their lives by violence, and two went insane.



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1970 BARRINGTON MOORE AND THE DIALECTICS OF REVOLUTION 67English society played some role, and that reli-gious factors played at least as important a rolein these changes as did economic.No one seriously doubts the importance ofeconomic factors in explaining changes in politi-cal and other values in England and elsewhere,but the evidence indicates that religious andconstitutional issues were at least as significant,and were not merely dependent variables. Wideagreement had been reached in the Long Parlia-ment on purely economic issues; it was the po-litical and religious question, as well as Charles'personality, which ultimately produced theconflict.18It is hard to believe that the EnglishCivil War could have occurred without the po-litical aggressiveness of the dissenting sects, andthere is every reason to believe that anotherMonarch might have been able to escape withhis head.19There is little evidence that enclosures or thecommercialization of agriculture were greatlyaccelerated by the Civil War itself, and, in anyevent, the dissenting sects were rather more fa-vorably inclined to enclosure than other reli-gious groups.20 I should note that while Mooresometimes sees the Civil War as opening thefloodgates to enclosure, he offers no evidence forthis assertion, and at other times is quite willingto admit that the process was a gradual oneuntil the late eighteenth century, to which wemay now turn. (19, 25.)Moore's analysis of English industrializationrepresents what must be called a "post-revision-ist" position, in that he sharply criticizes thosescholars who have tried to alter the traditionalpicture of the consequences both of enclosureand of industrialization. Before we analyze hisattack in somewhat more detail, let us considerbriefly the revisionist account of the changeswhich took place in late eighteenth and earlynineteenth century England.First of all, such scholars as Mingay, Jonesand Thompson deny that the wave of enclosureswhich swept over England in the late eighteenthcentury served to break the back of the smallpeasant proprietor and to convert him into arural or urban proletariat. They argue that

'Root, op. cit., pp. 32-42, and passim.1' Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints

(Cambridge, 1965), p. 114. H. R. Trevor Roper,"The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,"in Trevor Aston (ed.). Crisis in Europe (NewYork, 1967), pp. 99-100.' W. E. Tate, The Enclosure Movement (Lon-don, 1967), pp. 143-153, and Wilson, op. cit., pp.141-142.

while the concentration of landownership byabout 1830 was greater than in the seventeenthcentury, it was not much greater, and that theincrease had been a very gradual one.21In fact,while the enclosures of the late eighteenth cen-tury took land from some peasants, others re-ceived land. The evidence seems to indicate thatthe number of small owner occupiers actuallyincreased for a short time.22 The proportion ofagricultural workers to owners was about 13/4to1 at the end of the seventeenth century; 140years later it had risen to only about 23/4 to 1.23The real source of the gradual decline in smallholders was not enclosure, but the relative dis-advantages of small-scale agriculture in an eraof commercial farming.24Revisionist scholars argue further that enclo-sures did not depopulate the countryside. In-stead the rural population actually increasedduring the period. In many cases the largest mi-grations took place from unenclosed areas, orareas which had been enclosed much earlier. Thecreation of an urban and even a rural proletar-iat was far more the result of the increase inpopulation than it was the result of enclosures.25

2"Some of the important works on the subjectinclude: E. L. Jones and G. E. Mingay (ed.),Land, Labour and Population in the IndustrialRevolution (London, 1967); E. L. Jones, Agricul-ture and Economic Growth in England 1650-1815(London, 1967); J. D. Chambers and G. E. Mingay,The Agricultural Revolution, 1750-1850 (London,1966), F. M. L. Thompson, "The Social Distribu-tion of Landed Property in England Since theSixteenth Century," Economic History Review,XIX, 3 (1966), pp. 505-517. A classic and muchearlier "revisionist" analysis is J. H. Clapham, AnEconomic History of Modern Britain (Cambridge,1926), I, pp. 98-142. See also B. H. Slicher VanBath, The Agrarian History of Western Europe(London, 1963), pp. 318-321. The edited volumescontain some of the classic earlier studies whichare the basis for much of the revisionists' case.' Chambers and Mingay, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

3Clapham, op. cit., p. 114.2' Chambers and Mingay, op. cit., pp. 92-93.5The classic essay is J. D. Chambers, "Enclosure

and Labor Supply in the Industrial Revolution,"reprinted in Jones, op. cit., pp. 94-127. A recentdetailed study by Lawrence White, concludes thatthere is absolutely no significant relationship be-tween enclosure and migration to the city, or be-tween enclosure and increases in poor rates. Thestudy was done on the basis of an analysis of allEnglish counties, using regression analysis. SeeLawrence White, "Enclosures and Population



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68 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIEN CE REVIEW VOL. 64Further, they argue, all the evidence we haveindicates that living standards for workers, bothrural and urban, did not fall during the periodof industrialization. Rather the picture is one ofgradual amelioration interrupted by such things

as the effects of the Napoleonic wars, bad har-vests, et cetera. On the whole, real wages in-creased at about the same rate as the relativelyslow growth of per capita national product. Theevidence indicates that income may have beenbecoming rather more equally distributed amongsocial classes during the whole period of indus-trialization. Certainly income inequality doesnot seem to have increased.26To be sure there was a good deal of sufferingamong certain groups as old skills became out-moded, or, especially in the south, because of alack of labor mobility. Certainly the transitionmight have been made more easily and more hu-manely in a perfect world. But, the fact of thematter is that the great growth of urban centersand industrialization took place first in England,and in the early nineteenth century. It must bejudged by these standards. The alternativeswere mass starvation and migration as in Ire-land or land hunger and migration to cities inwhich no jobs were available as in France. Inboth of these countries population increasedduring the eighteenth century, but industrial-ization did not absorb excess labor.27 Mooreconveniently forgets to point out that in Francemigration to the cities occurred without thebenefit of massive enclosures.Moore agrees with the revisionists that thedismal picture painted of the results of enclo-sures and early industrialization by radical his-torians was somewhat overdrawn, but insists,without offering any new evidence, that the rad-ical case still stands in its broadest outline. Hiscritique of the revisionists rests on three kindsof arguments which may, for want of betterterms, be called "adjectival," "rhetorical" and"psychological." The "adjectival" argumentturns on the tendentious use of key words. ThusMovements in England, 1701-1831." It will be pub-lished in a forthcoming issue of Explorations inEntrepreneurial History.

26The best summary of the data is to be foundin Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, British EconomicGrowth, 1688-1559 (Cambridge, 1967, 2nd ed.),pp. 25, 27-28, 283, 301, and Lee Soltow, "LongRange Changes in British Income Inequality," TheEconomic History Review, XXI (April, 1968),p. 1729. Needless to say the issue is still fairly con-troversial.

C. E. Labrousse, La Crise de l'6conomie fran-Qaise a la fin d'Ancien Regime et au debut de laRevolution (Paris, 1943), xxii-xxiii.

when revisionists cite the lack of peasant resis-tance to enclosure in the nineteenth century asevidence for the fact that peasant hostility toenclosure was not that great. Moore, citingthem, states that ". . . the old peasant commu-nity finally gave way and disintegrated." (28.)Or where some commentators might see thepoor laws and other measures as a sign of therelative responsiveness of the English rulingclasses to changes which were but imperfectlyunderstood, Moore emphasizes the horrors ofbeing forced to receive public assistance. Heneglects to point out, of course, that howevermany people were on poor relief in the late eigh-teenth and early nineteenth centuries, evidencefor the late seventeenth and early eighteenthcenturies indicates thatAt a conservative estimate, a quarterof the popu-lation could be regardedas permanently in a stateof poverty and underemployment if not of totalunemployment. This was their chronic condition.But when bouts of economic depressiondescended,the proportion might rise to something nearer ahalf of the population.'

The rhetorical argument is simply that nomatter how it occurred, the fact is that thepeasantry was destroyed. An entire social classwas eliminated. The psychological argument istied in very closely with the rhetorical argumentand is best summarized in Moore's own words:... it still seems plain enough that, together withthe rise of industry, the enclosuresgreatly strength-ened the larger landlordsand broke the back of theEnglish peasantry, eliminating them as a factorfrom British political life. From the standpoint ofthe issues discussed here, that is, after all, the de-cisive point. Furthermore, or the "surplus"peasantit made little differencewhether the pull from thetowns or factories was more important than thepush out of his rural world. In either case he wascaught . . . between alternatives that meant de-gradation and suffering, compared with the tradi-tional life of the village community. That theviolence and coercion which produced these resultstook place over a long space of time . . . must notblind us to the fact that it was massive violenceexercised by the upper classes against the lower.(28-29.)

This passage is based on a mis-statement ofthe facts, in so far as it ignores populationgrowth and other causal factors. However, let usdisregard that and analyze the other compo-nents of the argument.First, to assert that the elimination of a classand its occupation is by itself evidence of "mas-

' Wilson, op. cit., p. 231.



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1970 BARRINGTON MOORE AND THE DIALECTICS OF REVOLUTION 69sive violence" is to blur key distinctions. Isn't itimportant whether the change took place sud-denly or over a longer time? And doesn't itmake a difference for peasants whether theywere driven to the city or attracted to it? Com-mon sense, I think, would urge that these con-siderations are of significance if we are con-cerned with the human costs of social change.According to Moore, after all, industrializationwas both necessary and inevitable, and as withall major social changes it involved a good dealof pain. We can evaluate the relative costs in amoral sense (if at all) only in terms of the al-ternatives which were available at the time, andby comparison with other societies.Migration to the cities undoubtedly involveddegradation for some. That it took place grad-ually, and that peasants often went to cities notfar from their homes probably made the transi-tion less severe. Moreover it was younger peoplewho most often left and they may well havegone to the city because of the wider opportuni-ties it offered.It is true that, in some cities at least, deathrates probably rose with the initial spurt in pop-ulation, but as Englishmen learned to cope withproblems of sanitation, urban mortality beganto fall rapidly, and continued to do so duringmost of the nineteenth century.29 I suspect thatthis was a net psychological gain for all citydwellers. Further, there is at least some evidencethat by the early nineteenth century, city dwell-ers were taller and healthier than their ruralcounterparts, as even a Marxist like Hobsbawmmust admit.30 The disorganization and despairsupposedly characteristic of the new workingclass is based on unproved suppositions, andthere is at least some evidence on the other side.Crimes of violence declined in England duringthe nineteenth century and sporadic riots wereincreasingly replaced by organized political andtrade union activity.31 Isn't this perhaps a signthat leaving a condition which Marx describedas "idiocy," the ability of these peasants turnedworkers to shape their own destiny wasincreasing 32 Isn't it also possible that the rela-

29See Deane and Cole, op. cit., p. 131 and passim.sE. J. Hobsbawn, The Age of Revolution, 1789-18.48 (New York, 1962), p. 28. His data is fromBelgium, but one suspects that it applied equallywell to England.

31J. J. Tobias, Crime and Industrial Society inthe 19th Century (London, 1967), pp. 22-50.'3This is certainly the impression left by E. P.Thompson's The Making of the English WorkingClass (New York, 1966), despite his attempt to

prove rather a different kind of case. See, for ex-ample, pp. 830-831. We have some hard data on

tive peacefulness of political activity on the partof the working class was related to graduallyimproving conditions, and to the general senseof responsibility which, as Moore sometimes ad-mits, characterized both the English aristocracyand the English middle classes?One more issue deserves consideration indealing with England, both for its intrinsic im-portance and for later discussion. Moore isforced to ask himself why English capitalists didnot have to engage in the kind of repressionduring the nineteenth century which he will de-scribe as characteristic of other nations, andthus did not have to turn to the aristocracy forassistance:Other capitalist tasks, such as the further disci-plining of the labor force, English industrial leaderscould carry on their own with a minimum of helpfrom the state or the landed aristocracy. They hadto do so because the repressive apparatus of theEnglish state was relatively weak, a consequenceof the civil war, the previous evolution of themonarchy, and of reliance on the navy rather thanon the army (32.)

One detects here a conservative streak inMoore. It is almost as if institutional and cul-tural patterns once established have a life oftheir own. Indeed, to use Moore's own argu-ments, there is no reason that British industri-alists should not have created a repressive appa-ratus if they felt the need for it. Actually Mooresometimes is forced to admit that conditions inEngland were improving during the nineteenthcentury, an improvement he ascribes to Englishindustrial pre-eminence and imperialism, andalso to "a strong current of opinion in favor ofdoing something to alleviate mass distress . . .which is traceable to England's historical experi-ence .". ." (34.)33

Despite Moore's rhetoric we have come fullthis from contemporary developments. Alex In-keles, in an intensive study of urban migrants inChile, and other countries, argues that the adjust-ment from rural to urban life and to the factoryis not nearly so difficult as is sometimes imagined.Indeed urban factory workers from rural back-grounds not only regard their situation as an im-provement over rural conditions, but, on most in-dices which have been used, are more able to copewith the world. The results of Professor Inkeles'work will be published in book form in the nearfuture.

3 The emphasis in the quote is mine. At onepoint much later Moore literally brings in thekitchen sink and relates British attitudes to En-gland's whole historical tradition including the useof unpaid justices of the peace. See Origins, 444.



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70 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 64circle. In fact, English developments were rela-tively peaceful, going back even as far as theCivil War, and English industrialization, giventhe era and the options, was relatively humane.

* * *To Moore the French Revolution destroyed afeudal regime which was slowly changing andcreated the basic institutions of a bourgeois capi-talist society. (105-06.) The Revolution tookthe form it did because, for reasons whichMoore does not really explain, the French gen-try while becoming capitalist, directed their en-ergies to milking the peasants rather than driv-ing them from the land. (52.) 34 Whatever thecosts of the Revolution it was necessary, even inits radical phases, for it produced a society su-perior by far to the old regime and preventedFrance from eventually going through a Fascistphase. (78, 104-5, 413.)As with his English case study Moore's anal-ysis is essentially "pre-revisionist." It is quiteclear for example that by the latter part of theeighteenth century, only remnants of whatmight be loosely called feudalism remained inFrance.5 It is also quite clear that the sup-posedly sharp line between bourgeois and aristo-crat was actually far more permeable than has

been thought. More important, there is little ev-idence of a sharp differentiation between the ar-istocracy and the bourgeosie in their use of capi-tal, their relation to the land, or their participa-tion in commerce. Both groups, if we use theterm loosely, were participating in "bourgeois"economic activities in much the same way, and,with exceptions, the economic activity of bothgroups combined some elements identified with a"capitalist" mentality as defined by Weber, anda pre-capitalist mentality.6 Finally, it is quiteclear that, at least in its early stages, the so-called bourgeois revolution was not initiated bythe bourgeoisie, if we define the bourgeoisie in anarrowly economic sense. The leaders of the firstmoves consisted not of men of commerce but ofprofessionals such as lawyers and bureaucrats ofboth a "bourgeois" and an aristocratic back-

'His supposed explanation actually consists ofa description of the differences between En-glish and French gentry.' Alfred Cobban, The Social Interpretation ofthe French Revolution (Cambridge, 1964), pp. 25-53.

36 Taylor, op. cit., and Albert Goodwin, "TheSocial Structure and Economic and Political Atti-tudes of the French Nobility in the EighteenthCentury," in Comite International de Sciences His-toriques, XII, Congres International..., Rapports,I, (Vienna, 1965), pp. 356-367.

ground. True, the bulk of the initiators werebourgeois,but only in the legal sense that theywere not members of the aristocracy,i.e., thesense in which the term was used in the eigh-teenth century.37Moore admits some of this, and sometimesargues that the French Revolutionwas a bour-geois revolutionnot because it was caused bythe bourgeoisie,but rather because t establisheda "capitalist"system of private property,andequality before the law. (105-06.) 38 This argu-ment begs the basic question, i.e., the roleplayed by changes n the system of production.Indeed,if the role of economicclasses s not de-cisive, Moore's whole analysis falls apart, forthen landed, non-commercial entry can makeabourgeoisrevolution,and Fascismis not the in-evitable outcome of the failure of the bourgeoi-sie to do so. Indeed Moore recognizes this.Throughoutthe chapter, as in other chapters,the emphasis is upon economic classes as thesourceof social change,except whereit is incon-venient. (68-9 passim.)It is impossible to know whether the terrorwas necessary for the partial victory of the"bourgeois evolution."Pace Moore,the radicalphase of the Revolution contributedlittle tothose basic changesin France'slegal structureinitiated from 1789-1791 and brought to frui-tion under Napoleon.39On the other hand theterror was one of a series of mechanismsbywhich the Revolutionarieswere able to defeattheir enemiesat home and abroad.It is also impossible to know whether amilder revolution or non-revolutionaryreformwould have resulted n a more pronounced"Fas-cist" phase in French life than she experienced.Moore'sargumenthere dependsupon his cate-gories rather than any evidencehe adduces.Itmight be well to point out, however,that whilethe Revolution did modernizethe French legalsystem and uproot the old class system, pavingthe way for a more modernsociety,some of its

" Cobban, op. cit., pp. 54-67. See also ElizabethL. Eisenstein, "Who Intervened in 1788? A Com-mentary on the Coming of the French Revolu-tion," American Historical Review, LXXI (Oc-tober, 1965), pp. 77-103, and the debate which fol-lowed in Volume LXXII of the same journal, pp.497-522.' If establishing equality before the law and amodern system of private property are the essen-tial features of bourgeois democracy, then the re-storation in Japan established a bourgeois demo-cratic regime, something which Moore denies." The definitive study is Jacques Godechot, Lesinstitutions de la France sous la Revolution etl'empire (Paris, 1951).



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1970 BARRINGTON MOORE AND THE DIALECTICS OF REVOLUTION 71consequences inhibited later "capitalist" devel-opment. The very fact of Revolution and Napo-leon's continental system were such that Francehad fallen much further behind England interms of economic development by 1815 thanshe had been in 1789; some promising moves inthe direction of free trade taken by the monar-chy were dropped by the revolutionaries andNapoleon, and, more importantly, the creationof a large vested group of small peasant ownersinhibited rather than aided the growth of com-mercial agriculture. Nor is there much evidencethat the Revolution changed the attitudes of thecommercial strata in the society. In fact, themutual antagonism which characterized varioussocial groups in the aftermath of the Revolutionand the instability of French regimes, may haveinhibited the development of a more dynamicentrepreneurial attitudes. In any event, Frencheconomic growth after 1815 was not any fasterthan under the old regime, and France did notbegin to modernize until the late nineteenth cen-tury. In fact her economic structure remainedhighly traditional until the mid-twentiethcentury.40 Nor did the Revolution really solveone of the major problems that had served tobring it about, i.e., the pressure of population onland. This problem was really solved (if thiswas a solution) by the peasants themselves, asthey increasingly turned to birth control and thelimitation of family size, a trend which had al-ready manifested itself in the 1770's.41Finally, in addition to the terror, French mil-itary casualties during the Revolution and theEmpire are estimated at about 1,300,000 men, towhich must be added those who died duringfamines which resulted from general disorderand military action.42 To all of this we mustadd the schism in French life produced by theRevolution-a schism which was at least partiallyresponsible for the violence which characterizedFrench life through most of the 19th and early20th century, as well as the rapidity with whichFrance collapsed during World War II. WhenMoore asks us whether we would have preferred

4 For references on this point, see the sourcescited in footnote 37. See also Cobban, op. cit., pp.68-80, Alexander Gerschenkron, "Reflections onEconomic Aspects of Revolutions," in Harry Eck-stein (ed.), Internal War (New York, 1964), pp.180-204, and Arthur L. Lunham, The IndustrialRevolution in France (New York, 1955), pp. 3-13.

4 Wesley D. Camp, Marriage and the Family inFrance Since the Revolution (New York, 1961),p. 101.

42 Marcel Reinhard, "Bilan demographique deL'Europe, 1789-1815," Comite International, Rap-ports, op. cit., pp. 451-455.

"moderate reform" to the Revolution, he neg-lects these results although he is quite willing toplace in the balance all of the injustices of theold regime from time immemorial. (104.)Even those who reject his neo-Marxismwould agree that a Revolution like that whichdeveloped in France could not have occurredmuch before 1789. The real question, then, is,given a choice, which alternatives would havebeen the least costly? In abstract terms, itseems to me that gradual reform on the Englishmodel has much to be said for it.Moore's analysis of the Revolution is uncon-vincing in its major dimensions. I certainlywould not deny the role of the economic changeswhich were taking place in France in creating

pressures for a restructuring of the society. Per-haps my major disagreement with him lies inmy willingness to consider as key factors theideas of the Enlightenment, and the example ofEngland, as these undermined the legitimacy oftraditional French society. It was this conjunc-tion of ideological and cultural variables, to-gether with economic changes, which was re-sponsible for the unique development of modernEurope.43* * *

Moore's scattered references to Germany aredesigned to demonstrate that the failure of abourgeois revolution and resulting moderniza-tion from above led to National Socialism. Henever tells us why this should have been so,aside from a few remarks on the irrationality ofthe German economy. (442.) nor does he satis-factorily explain why the German bourgeoisiefailed to create the kind of modern capitaliststate which would not have succumbed to totali-tarianism.According to Moore, the bourgeoisie neededthe aristocracy if Germany were to be unifiedand the German working class kept in its place.Not only did they support the aristocracy; theyalso adopted their life style and values. (36-7,34, 437.) But why couldn't the German middleclasses have supported the aristocracy and re-tained the "bourgeois" values which their eco-nomic position should, theoretically, have im-pelled them to adopt? By what mechanism isthe rational acceptance of the leadership of oneclass by another transmuted into the accep-tance of their values? Why could not the Ger-man bourgeoisie merely have accepted the lead-ership of the aristocracy, until the state hadbeen unified and they were no longer needed,

4 The classic study of these influences on therevolution is Daniel Mornet, Les Origines intellee-tuelles de la Reolution franXtaiseParis, 1933).



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72 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 64and then dispensed with their services?44 It is atpoints like this that Moore's neo-Marxism be-comes vulgar Marxism and begins to lose alltheoretical coherence.Moore's discussion of Germany flows into hisAmerican chapter. In summary his argument isthat in 1861, the United States made a choicebetween an essentially English pattern and aGerman (or perhaps Russian or Chinese) one.The alternatives were revolution (the Civil Warwas the "last capitalist revolution"), or an alli-ance of Northern businessmen and Southern"Junkers." (115, 131, 153, 421.) Moore's expla-nation of why the alliance did not take place isout of step with much of the best recent schol-arship on United States history. But it may bemore important to ask whether the materials foran alliance even existed. If they did not, Moorehas created an interpretation of the Civil Warby posing a false pair of alternatives.No evidence exists pointing to a possibleNorthern business and Southern Junker allianceat any time before the Civil War. Neither be-fore nor immediately after the Civil War wasthere a cohesive business community drawn intosupporting common policies by a need to controlor a fear of a "radical" working class. Business-men split widely on every major issue that aroseduring the whole period, from banking to cheapmoney, to the tariff, the last of which is centralto Moore's argument.45The dual program of cheap land and high

4 We may also ask why the German workingclass was so much more of a threat to the Germanbourgeoisie than the English working class was tothe English middle class? Despite the rhetoric,they were not notoriously more violent. And ifthe relatively mild rhetoric of British working classleaders is to be explained by rising living stan-dards, as Moore suggests, why didn't this havethe same effect on German workers whose realwages almost doubled between 1870 and 1914? SeeAshok V. Desai, Real Wages in Germany, 1871-1913 (Oxford, 1968), p. 36.

4 Robert Sharkey, Money, Class and Party, Bal-timore, 1967), discusses the Reconstruction periodin some detail and reviews the general literature.The book is but one of a series which have suc-ceeded in demolishing Charles Beard's portrait ofReconstruction beyond repair. On the Tariff ques-tion see Richard Hofstadter, "The Tariff Issue onthe Eve of the Civil War," in Gerald D. Nash,Issues in Economic History (Boston, 1964), pp.50-55, and David Montgomery, Beyond Equality(New York, 1967), pp. 64-65. On the bank issuesee Bray Hammond, Banking and Politics inAmerica from the Revolution to the Civil War(Princeton, 1954).

tariffs which, according to Moore, forged theeconomic alliance between the North and theWest owed a good deal to the attempt by theRepublican party to develop a majority by ap-pealing to a wide variety of groups on the issueswhich were most salient to them. Moore finds itstrange that Northern business never thought tomarry the issues which they were supposed tobe concerting to marry, and that it was left to"politicians and journalists" to do so. (125-28,130.) It is only curious if one assumes that po-litical parties are merely epiphenomenal, andthat all social policies must be explained inpurely economic terms.The one constituency which supported bothfree land and higher tariffs was not Northernbusiness, but rather the same elements who pro-vided the "radical" core of the Republican party-small businessmen and farmers. Both groupswere wedded to the idea of building a powerfulAmerica composed primarily of small propertyowners, and also saw both the tariff and cheapland as contributing to these goals.46Moore's attempt to differentiate between theNorth and the South on the basis of their eco-nomic systems (contrasting Capitalist systems)is no more successful. It is true that slavery waspartly an economic institution, and that the ori-gins of slavery must be sought in economic vari-ables. But unless one assumes that slaves werenotably more efficient than free labor, or thatonly Negroes could effectively work plantations,the fact that Negro slavery came to characterizeSouthern agriculture, and that the South foughtso hard to retain it, cannot be explained by eco-nomics alone. On purely economic grounds,there was little reason for southern Americansto refuse to accept the kind of sharecropping ar-rangements which Brazilians found relativelyeasy to consider and which, in fact, they ulti-mately came to themselves in the aftermath ofemancipation. In short, racism was a keyvariable.47We may ask, too, how closely the southernplantation owner resembled the Junker. Whilesocial mobility in the South was probably lowerthan in the North, class lines in the white com-munity were considerably less sharp than in Eu-rope. Indeed the South had accepted universalwhite suffrage, and Southern politicians had to

48 This is the general thrust of W. R. Brock'sanalysis in An American Crisis: Congress andReconstruction, 1865-67 (New York, 1966).

4 Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black (Cha-pel Hill, 1968). Jordan proves fairly conclusivelythat negative attitudes toward Africans precededthe establishment of slavery, and were a key factorjustifying it in the minds of English settlers.



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1970 BARRINGTON MOORE AND THE DIALECTICS OF REVOLUTION 73take into account this constituency. The pres-ence of the blacks also served to reduce socialclass distinctions between whites.48 Further, asMoore points out, the Junker used the Germanpeasant as an ally in order to maintain his posi-tion. (38.) If the Negro was, as Moore alsoargues, the only group in the United States re-sembling a conventional European peasantry, itis extremely difficult to conceive of an allianceof this kind ever developing. (111.)Finally, if it was the North's economic sys-tem which produced anti-slavery feeling, onewould expect to discover some correlation be-tween type of economic activity and abolitionistsentiment. Moore tries to find this in the familyfarm in the North (although he is not sure whythe same feelings are not produced by familyfarming in the South). (129.) The evidence be-lies this. Opposition to the extension of slaveryamong yeomen farmers in the North was oftenbased on anti-black feeling.49 On the otherhand, if we look for the sources of abolitionistsentiment, the key factor seems to be religious.Abolitionists come in substantial numbers fromradical Protestant backgrounds.50The assumption that Northern businessmenwould have deferred to the leadership of South-ern "Junkers" to produce a "German" solutionto industrialization if the Civil War had not oc-curred is absurd. It does not tie in with our pic-ture of the South or of the country in general.Did the North need the Southern Junker inorder to create a national state? Did Northernbusinessmen emulate the life style or culture ofthe Southern gentry? On the contrary it wasthey who felt self-confident and the Southernerswho felt on the defensive. One of the reasonsthat the Civil War came when it did was thatSouthern militants correctly believed that thebalance of power was tipping rapidly in favor ofan increasingly powerful industrialized North,and that, given ten or twenty years more, theSouth would be overwhelmed with ease. To talkof a German solution to industrialization inAmerica is a little like assuming that it is thetail which wags the dog.51

I See the discussion in W. J. Cash, The Mindof the South (New York, 1941), pp. 31-43.'Eugene H. Berwanter, The Frontier Against

Slavery (Urbana, 1967).' David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (NewYork, 1961), pp. 19-36."1On the relative position of the North andSouth see Peter d'A. Jones, The Consumer Society(Baltimore, 1965), pp. 127-128. That the Southfaced a crisis of which this factor was part, ispointed out by Eugene D. Genovese, The PoliticalEconomy of Slavery (New York, 1967). Nevins

Nor is Moore on firmer ground in arguingthat Reconstruction was liquidated by the cre-ation of an alliance between Southern ex-Junk-ers, and northern businessmen, so fearful of nas-cent radicalism in the North that they werewilling to leave the Negro to his fate. Wood-ward, whom Moore cites for this, offers little orno proof of the assertion in his book, whichdeals with the compromise of 1877. Rather, areading of the volume indicates that the com-promise, aside from particular political-economicgains for both sides, was forged largely becausedof a fear of renewed sectional violence.52In fact, the evidence points the other way.The Republicans abandoned the Negro becausethey had become self-confident enough to be-lieve that they no longer needed his votes, andbecause the passions aroused by the Civil Warhad died away.53 The failures of Reconstructionare to be layed to the continuing racism whichcharacterized American society, and to the limi-tations of the very liberal ideology which was soinstrumental in producing the crusade againstslavery.54

IV. THE ASIAN CASE STUDIESWhile 1\oore recognizes some of the difficul-ties of comparing European and Asian countries,

he is convinced that the categories he has devel-oped are universally applicable and his discus-sions of China, Japan, and India are intended toround out both his theoretical and his moral case.China's failure to break through to a modernsociety, Moore argues, stemmed not from cul-tural limitations or institutional structure butfrom concrete class interests. The Chinese gen-try, rather than turning their efforts to raisingproductivity, preferred to increase theircertainly implies that this was one of the reasonsfor the militancy of at least some Southerners.See the selection from his Ordeal of the Union,Vol. I, in Edwin C. Rolywine, The Causes of theAmerican Civil War (Boston, 1961), pp. 200-216.

"2Indeed Woodward himself lists this as the keyfactor in the compromise. See C. Vann Woodward,Reunion and Reaction (Boston, 1951), pp. 13-14."Sharkey, op. cit., points out the difficulty ofuncovering a unified capitalist versus agrarian orworker position during the period. He is supportedin this by Montgomery, op. cit., and Irwin Unger,The Greenback Era (Princeton, 1964). Both of thelatter stress the importance of ideological as wellas economic variables.

'See Brock, op. cit., especially pp. 274-304. Seealso Stanley P. Hirshon, Farewell to the BloodyShirt (Bloomington, 1962), and Kenneth M.Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction (New York,1966), especially pp. 186-215.



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74 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 64wellbeing by squeezing still more out of thepeasantry. (179-80.) In the last analysis theonly alternative to a Communist revolution wasa quasi-Fascist road to modernization, although,because China was at a relatively early stage ofdevelopment, this did not take quite the sameform as it did in Europe. (196-7, 178.)55Moore's strictures against arguments whichexplain some of the differences between theWest and China on cultural grounds are quitesimilar to those which he has used before. Thereis evidence that by the nineteenth century theChinese were willing to turn to Western technol-ogy; the gentry were willing to engage in com-merce, and all the right attitudes were available,though perhaps latent. (179.) Ultimately, how-ever, the landed gentry controlled the state, andit was easier to increase the population and ex-ploit peasants than to turn to methods designedto expand production. Why it should have beeneasier to operate in this fashion, Moore does nottell us, except to assert that ". . . there was norapidly growing urban population with at leastmoderately diffused and increasing prosperitythat could act as a stimulus to rationalized pro-duction for the market." (Ibid.)The argument is unconvincing. Urbanizationand moderately diffused prosperity may be arequisite for economic growth (the English gen-try, then, were not that exploitive), but Chinahad had both at various periods, including what,in some ways, was a highly developed system ofcommerce.56It is hard to escape the feeling that

5 Moore is a little more cautious. He points outthat the Kuomintang resembled European Fascismin a number of interesting ways. However, thegeneral thrust of his argument is clear.

5 According to Rhoads Murphey, large citieswere proportionately more numerous in Chinathan in Europe until the nineteenth century, anduntil the eighteenth century urbanism may havebeen higher. He argues that as much as a quarteror more of the population lived in towns andcities of more than 2500 population and perhaps10 or 15 per cent in cities over 10,000. Most citiesor towns of more than 5,000 had well definedcommercial or manufacturing districts, and specialareas for each important enterprise. These onlyrepresent educated guesses, but I gather that theorder of magnitude is accepted as correct by mostscholars in the field. See, "The City as a Centerof Change; Western Europe and China," Annalsof the Association of Geographers, LIV (1954),p. 354. Incidentally, in dealing with Japan, Mooredrops the requirement of "moderately diffused andincreasing prosperity." The key factors in Japanwere peace and luxurious display on the part ofthe nobility (Origins, 234-235.)

cultural as well as institutional factors played asignificant role in inhibiting Chinese develop-ment. Mary Wright, whom Moore cites to sup-port his view that the restoration monarchycould not raise adequate revenues lest it alienatethe gentry class, actually argues a quite differ-ent case. The regime's failure lay basically in itsinability to conceive of efficient ways of usingavailable resources because its institutionalstructure was based on Confucian precepts. TheJapanese monarchy could restructure the econ-omy because the loyalty of the gentry was to agiven monarchy and a given nation. In Chinathis was impossible because loyalty was to aninstitutionalized culture of a universalized type.(182-83.) 57 Moore denies that the Chinesegentry differed in kind from other aristocracies.He bases his case on the argument that sinceland was a key source of wealth, and wealth wasa key source of acquiring bureaucratic position,the differences between the Chinese and othergentry were unimportant. (160-65.) But toparaphrase him, this is to confuse morphologywith dynamics. In China potential entrepreneu-rial talent was diverted to the gentry scholarclass through the examination system. In Japan,on the other hand, the fact that aristocratic sta-tus was hereditary and closely tied to the landmay have been an important factor in theearlier development of an entrepreneurialclass.58Chiang Kai-shek is both authoritarian andunattractive. It is less clear that he is a proto-Fascist. This is a key point, for Moore clearlyuses Fascist as a scare word, evoking images ofgenocide. (304-05.) Let us try to deal with theissue. First, within the framework of Moore'sown scheme, Chiang Kai-shek could not haveestablished a Fascist regime. Fascism, after all,emerges only after conservative modernizationhas produced a series of fundamental economic

"Wright points out first that there were goodeconomic arguments against increasing the tax onland, and, second, that there were other mechan-isms available to the government which wouldnot have alienated any maj or economic groups,but which it did not use. See Mary C. Wright,The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (Stan-ford, 1957), pp. 169, 186, 193. Moore and I musthave derived a different meaning from the text,for he cites almost the same pages. Wright doesnot deny that the regime was limited in its powerby various interests. The real question, however,is the relation between interest and ideology.5 Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Contrasting Factors inthe Modernization of China and Japan," in SimonKuznets (ed.), Economic Growth: Brazil, India,Japan (Durham, 1955), p. 523.



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1970 BARRINGTON MOORE AND THE DIALECTICS OF REVOLUTION 75crises. China had not yet passed through such aphase. The point may seem a quibble, but it isextremely important, for if the Kuomintang re-gime was incipiently Fascist, then Fascism is notmerely a later result of conservative moderniza-tion, and the whole dialectic of Moore's analysisis open to question.What evidence does Moore offer? Chiang wasan incipient Fascist, Moore argues, because heled a single party, which relied, in part, on a se-cret police apparatus; he used force to solve so-cial problems; he was a nationalist; he urgedmoral regeneration rather than developing "real-istic analyses" of Chinese problems, and hefailed to discourage industrialization.What do these arguments add up to ? Theleaders of many third world nations could becharacterized in much the same way, includingsuch diverse types as Bourguiba, Nasser, SekouToure, Nkbrumah and Ayub Khan. To describethem all as latently Fascist or Communist wouldnot seem to further political analysis.Chiang's writings certainly lack detail on eco-nomic questions, but so have the writings of agood many modernizing oligarchs before theyconsolidated power. In fact, the regime did insti-tute a good many legal and economic reformsbetween 1928 and 1937, and, it did encourageindustrialization. Industrial growth in China be-tween 1928 and 1937 is estimated at perhaps sixto eight per cent per year.59 If his regime madea fatal mistake in ignoring the problems of thepeasantry, it demonstrated that it was capableof learning. Once on Formosa it initiated andcarried through reforms based on the originalKuomintang program.60Chiang Kai-shek had not yet consolidated hispower when the Japanese invaded in force, andhis emphasis on building a modern military ma-chine was based on a reasonable assessment ofboth Japanese and Communist intentions. Hisfailure to press land reform was partly relatedto a feeling that the consolidation of power andnational defense had first priority.61 Of course,

59For industrial growth during the period seeJ. K. Chang, "Industrial Development of Main-land China 1912-1949," Journal of Economic His-tory, 27 (March, 1967), 56-81. Professor Changdevelops his argument more fully in a new book,Industrial Development in Pre- Communist China(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969). Fora discussion of the efforts of the Kuomintang andthe difficulties they faced see Fairbank, Reschauerand Craig, op. cit., II, pp. 691-704. Not all of thelatter were of their own making.

'Neil H. Jacoby, US. Aid to Taiwan (NewYork, 1966), pp. 81-82.

t Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, op. cit., Franz

his control over local leaders actually decreasedduring the war itself.62His policy was clearly wrong. However, we donot know what he would have done had he con-solidated his power. After all the Communistsalso subordinated agricultural reforms to the re-quirements of victory by downplaying collectivi-zation, just as, at an earlier period, they hadworked with the Kuomintang despite the "bour-geois" character of that party.The creation by Chiang of a police state onthe mainland and on Formosa can be explainedpartially by the fact of very real opposition tohis policies. On Formosa these policies includethe fanatic desire to reconquer the mainland, adesire as pathetic as it is unreal. However, thata man nearing death should cling to the dreamwhich has given his life meaning, says littleabout what his actions might have been underother circumstances.63Moore's critique of Chiang's emphasis uponthe "excessive" individualism of the Chinese andhis calls for moral regeneration is rather pecu-liar, in that he admits that the theme was notmerely rhetorical, and is to be found in thewritings of Sun Yat-sen. (208.) The same themeof moral regneration finds its echoes, too, amongthe Chinese Communists, who are also relyingupon moral rhetoric and compulsion to eliminatevestiges of "reactionary individualism."Finally, as Moore points out in citing the evi-dence for the regime's incipient Fascism, Chiangargued against precipitant action and urged theimportant of thinking correctly before acting.(198.) However, nothing could be further fromFascist doctrine, which urges the primacy of ac-tion over thought.Whether Chiang Kai-shek could have suc-ceeded in modernizing China at less cost thanthat exacted by the Communists or even at all,we do not know. However, the description of hisregime as incipiently Fascist does not really con-tribute to our understanding of either him orChina.64

H. Michael and George E. Taylor, The Far Eastin the Modern World (New York, 1956), p. 409.'Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China (Chi-cago, 1963), p. 77 and passim.' It is very difficult to get a clear picture ofChiang Kai-shek. Almost all of the writing abouthim is heavily rhetorical whether hostile or lauda-tory.

4Revisionist analysts of the Communist revolu-tion in China argue, contrary to Moore, that percapita food production was actually rising duringthe period 1900-1950; that tenancy had not in-



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76 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 64Moore's chapter on Japan is a paradigmstudy of the relationship between "conservativemodernization" and the emergence of Fascism.Given a Japanese bourgeoisie which was tooweak to assert itself, conservative oligarchs tookcharge of the modernization process. The indus-trialization which followed was characterized byrepression, with the masses being kept at a sub-sistence level. After 1925 the evils of the systembecame apparent to everyone, and Japanesebusinessmen, unable to create a vigorous inter-nal market, because it would have threatenedtheir exploitive paternalism and their profits,joined with the military to create a Fascist re-gime. (290-91, 299-300, 3043-5.) The ulti-mate result was Pearl Harbor. Japan had es-

caped the horrors of radical revolution only tocreate greater horrors for herself. As Mooreputs it, comparing Japan to China:A hundred years from now, or perhaps in muchless time, the partial nature of Japan's social andindustrial revolution, especially the very limited"revolution"of the Imperial Restoration in 1868,may seem to be the essence of Japan'stragedy....On the other hand, contemporaryChinese society,despite severe difficultiesand setbacks, shows signsof moving ahead. By learning from Soviet mis-takes, China could conceivably surpass Russia.(229-230.)

Moore's analysis of the sources of Japaneseeconomic growth in the pre-Restoration periodis unconvincing. If, as he argues, Chinese andJapanese landlords were equally exploitive in in-tention, and neither contributed in any way tosuch growth, wherein lies the difference betweenthe two societies? Certainly late seventeenthand eighteenth century China, as Japan, wascharacterized by both peace and luxury; whydid nothing comparable to Japanese develop-ment occur? Moore's discussion offers us noclues, unless the Japanese landlord was not asclever as his Chinese counterpart.65How repressive was post-Restoration Japan?creased substantially, except around a few largecities, and that the Communists established theirstrongest and most important bases in areas ofrelatively low tenancy. See Roy Hofheinz, "TheEcology of Chinese Communist Success: RuralInfluence Patterns, 1923-1945," in A. Doak Barnett(ed.), Chinese Communist Politics in Action(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969),pp. 3-77. His analysis is confirmed in an exhaus-tive study by Dwight H. Perkins. See his Agricul-tural Development in China 136S-1968 (Chicago:Aldine Publishing Company, 1969).' Compare footnote 56.

If Moore wants to make a case for the "repres-siveness" of the Japanese process of industrial-ization, he must demonstrate that the new re-gime was more repressive than the old, or thatit was more repressive than comparable Asiansocieties of the period.It is difficult to support either proposition.While Japan's progress until 1930 was uneven, itwas moving in the direction of greater openness.That large numbers of people remained weddedto a traditional outlook is beside the point. Alegal system had been created which establishedrelative equality before the law by eliminatingfeudal privileges; both education and social mo-bility were rising sharply; the masses wereslowly being drawn into the political process,and new ideas were reaching ever larger num-bers of people through the press and in theuniversities.66Moore's contention that the great mass of thepopulation benefited little if at all from industri-alization is not supported by the evidence. In-deed the only data he offers are references to anarticle by Ohkawa and Rosovsky, and to Al-len's A Short Economic History of Japan, to theeffect that Japan was forced to import increas-ing amounts of rice. He also cites Allen to provethat per capita consumption of rice fell after1925. (289.) Actually, he misreads Allen'sfigures, for the table cited shows per capita con-sumption of rice rising between 1925 and 1929and only falling after that year.67It is true, as Allen points out, that Japan didimport increasing amounts of rice beginningafter World War I, in part, because Japaneseagriculture could no longer advance as rapidlyas previously within the existing agriculturalframework. However, Allen adds, (and Moorefails to mention), that (1) Japanese populationwas increasing rapidly during this period. (2)-Itseemed wiser to grow rice more cheaply inKorea and Taiwan and diversify agriculture onthe mainland.68 Allen's figures show that riceconsumption had been rising steadily since 1880.Since the transition to military rule and Fascismcame in 1932, according to Moore, it seems arash judgment to assert that three years of de-clining consumption are proof that 50 years ofsteady progress was a "short range successwhich had already begun to display its "dubiousside," and that now "the evils of the system hadbecome apparent to everyone," especially when

"Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, op. cit., II,pp. 513-578."7The table (X) appears on page 201 of Allen'svolume.1' G. C. Allen, A Short Economic Histor7 a!Japan (London, 1962, 2nd edition), p. 116.



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1970 BARRINGTON MOORE AND THE DIALECTICS O

rothman - essay on barringtom moore

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