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Roy Vermaak, 1 Reconnaissance Regiment

Missing Voices Project Interviewed by Mike Cadman 14/09/07

TAPE ONE SIDE A

Interviewer ….. can you give me an indication of how you grew up, where you grew up, the sort of the lifestyle, was it an urban lifestyle, was it on a farm, and so on.

Roy I probably had a very average kid like kind of life. My father was a civil servant, a magistrate, before he became an advocate. So we actually grew up in quite a bit of the country, small villages to two big cities, Durban and Germiston. So the primary things were urban.

Interviewer Do you have brothers and sisters?

Roy Yes, I’m one of 6 children, of which my older brother went to the army in ’75, the Angola thing. And that of course made some form of a…created some form of a spark for the military thing as such, when he came back and told all his stories. That was in ’75.

Interviewer So then you grew up like many other kids, going to school, playing sport, doing all those normal things.

Roy The average South African boy.

Interviewer Alright, then your military call up papers arrive when you’re 16.

Roy Sure.

Interviewer And what happened then? Where were you called up to?

Roy Yes, I was in Germiston at school. I was called up to Heidelberg which was the signals regiment at the time, the army gymnasium. In those years it was still the option of 12, 18 or 24 months I think.

Interviewer What year was that?

Roy ’77.

Interviewer Ok, so you get your call up papers, you finish school, and you’re now ready to go off to the military. Did you go to Heidelberg itself?

Roy Yes.

Interviewer And then what happened?

Roy Well we did the basic training as everybody did, and then at the end of the basic training, all the specialised units would come around and do like what they do on a recruiting drive. ‘n Bemarkingsveldtog. It’s the Parachute Battalion, and the Dog School, and the motor guys, bike guys, and those that (inaudible). And then the Special Forces or the Reconnaissance Commandos came as well. And then I remembered at the December of the year prior they had a very good recruiting movie

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which they screened, and it was called ‘Durf En Daad’. Which was actually and still is, very good recruitment movie they made which was displayed over television. And I remember that, and when these guys came, two and two like on the camp together, and I went and did the selection there at Heidelberg, to start with the Special Forces. Dis hoe dit begin het.

Interviewer In your mind, what did Special Forces mean to you as a young, young man just starting off in an army career?

Roy Daai jare was Spesmagte nie ‘n vreeslike bekende term nie. Dit het maar in 1972 begin met die ouens wat begin het met Jan Breytenbach en Fritz Loots. Wie ookal almal die stigterslede was van die tyd en in daai stadium was die term Recces, nie so bekend gewees nie. Although it was, but it certainly had a nice profile amongst those who knew about them and the little we knew about them.

Interviewer Ok, so now you go to the selection course, and they select you, they invite you to come and do the really difficult stuff. Was that down in KwaZulu-Natal at Dukuduku, or where was that?

Roy How it worked was, they would have a lot of recruitment teams, which I would in later years do myself as well, after being qualified. They would have a lot of recruitment teams going to various national servicemen units, like Heidelberg or Oudtshoorn or Kimberley, or wherever. And out of that they would do like a pre-screening, that was a few physical and question tests. And then they would assemble the people at a place. In our case it was Potchefstroom. At third infantry but at Potch. And about all in all 800 people applied, and I think from Potch we left (inaudible)…in that period of 3 months of the preparation for the selection course, and the training cycle,.I think the stats said there was over 800 people that applied. About 300 or so ended up at Potch and maybe less than 60 or so left Potch to start the actual training cycle. Which was first we went to Durban, and then to Zululand for the selection course. Ek is nie seker of die syfers heeltemal reg is nie.

Interviewer Ok that’s fine. Ok, when you get to the real stuff, now you’re doing the Recce selection course, was it as tough as you imagined or much harder?

Roy I’ll tell you one thing, the Potch phase which was impressive, is that the instructors were rather professional and very confident. The…somehow for me as a young man, yes, in any sense it wasn’t easy, and it was hard and difficult and all that, but it was I think, within the parameters of a physical ability of a young man of 18 or 19 or 20. And although you got screwed up well and big and all that, I think there was a fair equation between the physical and the mental side of it. Ja, dit was moeilik. No arguments, it was difficult.

Interviewer Alright, so you go into this period which is pretty tough, and then finally you qualify. You’ve done the physical stuff and then they

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start teaching you weapons, navigation, and all the stuff that a Special Forces soldier needs to learn. How long did that period take?

Roy More or less a year. Which was like a bench-mark for me, which was an eye opener when I actually realised I just jumped out of an airplane. For being the average schoolboy…and the training was of such nature and so good, the curriculum, the instructors, the equipment. There was so much confidence put in that when you actually landed on the ground you just say, shit I’ve just done this. And everything came pretty natural after that.

Interviewer When you were training I understand there were guys of different nationalities who had service elsewhere. Did they explain to you how they felt compared to their training either in Britain or anywhere else?

Roy I can give you a nice comparison and what happened later, when I was an operational commander at one of the commandoes. We had a lot of senior levels that time still a bit secluded when the people came and visited us, and this country has a tremendous respect, and I say tremendous respect, in the international community for the curriculums, the officers and the people who served in this country. And this comes from people, from senior officers, diplomats, and on lower ranks as well, for the people and the system of the military at the time. Ongelooflike respek.

Interviewer So the Recces were comparable to the rest of the world. Now while you’re doing this training, comparable to the best units in the world, like the SAS and so on and so forth. But now you’re doing this training, did you get the perception that you were different from the rest of the SADF? Were you the blue eyed boys? Were you something special?

Roy Yes, nogal. I’ll tell you why, because everything for us was very well organised. Although we were very new and we were still a rough bunch of diamonds, it certainly was special and I could sense you couldn’t do this amount of training with national servicemen. First of all the time factor wouldn’t allow it, for only doing a national serviceman. I think even at the time, and I’m speaking of the late seventies, early eighties, it cost the state or the government about a million rand for one trooper to be trained over a period of, I think it was 48 weeks or so, to do the operational cycle.

Interviewer So nothing was spared, you were given the best and you were taught to be the best.

Roy Well, certainly the equipment was the best this country had under the embargo era. And I think the people did very well to obtain the equipment from wherever we got that given to us. Yes, certainly. The confidence was created. Wow, you are simply the best and we would like to think that we did compare to the best in the world, and I’ll tell you now we did.

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Interviewer Ok, so now you’re going through this arduous program, you’re extremely fit, you’re learning some very complicated stuff about modern warfare. During that period, what was your perception of why were you doing this? Who were you going to be fighting in your mind as a young soldier?

Roy It’s probably the crux of the questions you’re driving at today, and I’ve often thought about that and doing other interviews and all that. I’ll tell you now, there wasn’t really that motive to go and fight or kill. There wasn’t really that motive for the government for that matter as well. It’s something a young man wanted to do at the time. So it wasn’t really driven politically, it wasn’t driven by aggression, it wasn’t driven by…white or black scenario. It was driven for young men’s eagerness to go and experience the war through the form of the military.

Interviewer So it was a kind of adventure for you?

Roy Well it certainly was, yes.

Interviewer Alright, then it was an adventure, you were young, you were fit, and you thought this is a good way to learn about the world in yourself to a large degree, because I’m sure you examined yourself a lot during those…

Roy Well only later years. Wat ek gevind het wat gebeur het is ek het gesê ek wil net vir ‘n jaar of twee of drie of vier gaan. And we really moved in the fast lane. And it was nice, it was pleasant, we had a very nice salary compared to other people of our time and the other people of the military with quite a bit allowances that just gave us that extra little notch. And I enjoyed it and I carried on.

Interviewer How long did you serve with the Recces?

Roy From ’77 until when I resigned, I think it was in ’93. So that made it about 17 years I would think.

Interviewer Alright, so now you’re trained, you’re qualified, you get your maroon beret, you get your…was the Compass Rose the logo from the start?

Roy No.

Interviewer Not it wasn’t. You got the…

Roy The bokkop. The infantry bokkop with the burgundy beret, the maroon beret, and that was the logo.

Interviewer But later came the Compass Rose.

Roy Yes, the Compass Rose came in later, I think about maybe the early eighties. And Colonel Breytenbach was I think the driving force behind that. It was his project. And the operators insignia. You must remember in the seventies we were quite a bit of a rough bunch. We had a handful of officers and administrators, and I think the whole system didn’t…in the seventies

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certainly…’77, ’78, didn’t consist of more than maybe 50 people all in all. Maybe less, maybe more. And it was only in the late seventies and early eighties that there was a personnel graph in the Special Forces so, we actually came out of a bit of a very unpolished scenario but organised in the same manner as well. Compared to existing structures.

Interviewer So initially, even though you had ranks, you obviously had officers, and non commissioned officers and so on and so forth, you’d have been a lot more informal than most military units. For example a corporal would never have dreamt of walking to the same bar with a Colonel if you were in the infantry.

Roy It certainly was less formal, but make no mistake, rank was respected at all levels. Geen argument nie, dit was meer informeel maar was nie van voornaamterme en goed gewees en goed nie. Daar is geleenthede waar die offisiere, manskappe en onderoffisiere saam gekuier en drink het. En natuurlik in operasionale verband in die bos is dit makliker om informeel te wees, omdat dit kleiner is. Die hele sisteem is meer informeel. Moet geen illusie he nie, dit was glad nie ‘n kwessie van voornaamterme en goed nie. Wrong was wrong. Geen argument nie.

Interviewer So now you’re qualified, you’re a fully fledged Recce. Now it’s time to do operations. How did it work? Did the Recces get a request from whether it was chief of staff army, or whatever, to say, we need X number of people to go and do whatever? Or did the Recces identify their own operations?

Roy Nee, hoe dit gewerk dit van die tyd is dat die Spesiale Magte, het direk onder HSAW, hoof van die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag se bevel geval. Wat anderste was as die vegtende eenhede wat onder die hoof van die leer geresorteer het. So the Special Forces would always be complementary to certain projects or their own for that matter. And we would get our tasking from a higher level than the normal unit would get. So then, and it was always very structured and very professional, and we would have like a system where we would have the officer commanding go up to the headquarters, or through the telexes and the communication systems and the filing system, that the command would come down the channel until it comes down to unit level to do the operations. And we would, not like for normal units, say for instance 7th infantry battalion would go and serve in Ondangwa for a period of 3 or 6 months. Then the whole company, or the whole battalion, would mobilize and go and serve out the block period. (Then/there?) we would operate differently. We had three or four operational bases from Katima right down to Ondangwa. And those were manned permanently by admin and logistics staff and all that. And there were always operational members coming through there and going deployed in the various sectors and operations, as time and the situation would require.

Interviewer In other words, the military were using their operators as a scarce

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resource, so they wouldn’t have you just sitting in a place waiting. They’d send you off to…

Roy Nee, ons het nie bloktye gedoen nie. Ons het opgegaan om te gaan voorberei of operasies doen, en natuurlik het dit geroteer vir opleiding in operasies en die en daai. Maar dit was seker nie ‘n blokperiode wat ons ‘n sectoral moes gaan patrolleer het om dit so uit te druk nie. Nee. It was specialised jobs and we fitted in where offensive and clandestine and other tasks were required, and we would cover the whole spectrum of the operational sector.

Interviewer Now as a Recce, you’re trained to do a wide range of things, but I’m sure some people were better at some aspects of it than others. Did you specialise in any particular aspects? Were you an explosives expert for example, a demolitions expert?

Roy The way my thing went was I became an airborne specialist. So in later years I became the…of the training commander or the training wing at the time, I became the air wing commander. So my speciality became aircraft and choppers and everything that had to do with air.

Interviewer And then you would have utilised all the modern techniques like HALO (high altitude low opening –parachuting technique) and so on and so forth.

Roy Jy moet onthou dat valskermspring was maar net ‘n tegniek soos enige ander lugwaartse tegniek is. Dit was maar ‘n vervoermedium soos om met helikopters luglandingsoperasies te doen. Of valskerminfiltrasie-operasies, en stormoperasies met helikopters of ander vorms van lugverwante operasies. Natuurlik uit die aard van die saak in elkeen van daai fasette wat ek nou vir jou verduidelik het. As was the rest of the curriculum, it was very defined and very polished, and also bearing in mind that we’ve been a very young organisation. We had to do extremely a lot to put all this stuff in curriculums and make a contribution to training, and write manuals and doctrines and stuff, and then proven advance. In the early eighties to the middle eighties a huge focus was placed on the training of their own syllabus and the training of people and the training of instructors and the people started getting career orientated. So the wild bunch became a bit polished now. We became more of a system. It was more polish on the diamonds now. So it became like a bigger asset and people went overseas and overseas people came here and we trained ourselves and we had the best training school, which was an operational war at the time in the country so we had to be good. So die opleiding kon nie swak gewees het nie, want die meeste van dit was gebruik in operasionele omstandighede. En ons het ‘n uitstekende naam gebou daarvoor.

Interviewer Now the guys who went and did most of the operations themselves, whether it be intelligence gathering or indirect combat and so on and so forth. Was the average age sort of late

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twenties, early thirties?

Roy Yeah, miskien.

Interviewer So you’re slightly older than the average infantryman who tends to be 19 years old, 20 years old.

Roy Well certainly if you compare it to a national serviceman, yes. For a start you had to do national service or some part of it before you would come. Then you would do at least a year’s training, and then after that you would get deployed. And then a lot of people came to us from other units as being Permanent Force with relative or experienced soldiers as well. Die ouderdom was hoer as die gemiddelde dienspligtige…

Interviewer So you’ve got slightly more mature men out there.

Roy Absoluut.

Interviewer I know it’s difficult to generalise, but…what makes a Special Forces soldier? I mean, is there any common trait that you’ve noticed amongst your colleagues?

Roy In my opinie, en baie mense het my daaroor gevra, ek het die Carte Blanche interview gedoen en klomp goed en met baie ouens en baie mense as hulle met jou praat en goed. Ek dink die grootste enkele karaktereienskap is die feit dat ‘n ou gebalanseerd moet wees. Balance is probably the key word.

Interviewer And that’s all aspects of his character. Rational thinking, physically strong… you’ve got to have the certain physical prowess to survive the physical rigours of the job…

Roy Ek dink as jy die deursnit-eienskap wil vat is heel waarskynlik balans. En jy kan dit seker in ander maniere uitdruk en goed. You must understand, the fact that you’re working with, first of all a selected amount of people, and secondly the selection process after that will cut out 80 or 90%, I think the average passing rate was about 10% or 12 or 15%. So you’ve cut out 85% of people so you’re automatically dealing with a selected bunch of people. And not anyone of us there was probably the fastest, strongest, or the most intelligent as an individual. Because you always find stronger, bigger and faster than you. But you won’t find that in a combination. En ek dink dit is die… dis waar ek uitkom by balans. So there will be a minimum criteria of physical, mental, social, and whatever skills. But it’s the combination to give you a controlled aggression, a controlled approach to work, a controlled approach to life, and a controlled image you portray which makes you a good soldier.

Interviewer It’s interesting that you mention controlled aggression. I mean, the very nature of soldiering is that there has to be a certain amount of aggression at times. But it’s not good to be aggressive all the time, because you’re going to get yourself into trouble.

Roy Ek sit en dink nou-nou toe jy nou hiernatoe ry, toe dink ek julle

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gaan seker die goed vra. Ek weet nie van iemand met wie ek te doen gehad het in my Spesmagte milieu, wat ek kan se, daai ou is ‘n aggressiewe persoon, ek bedoel buite verband. Of nature, he’s an aggressive person by nature. I do not remember a guy that would go out and just wanted to kill and shoot and fight and… daar was nie een ou in ons organisasie sekerlik wat ek kan onthou wat ek sal koppel as ‘n ongebalaseerd aggressiewe moordenaar of wil gaan baklei teen swart ouens of wou gaan doodskiet het nie. Nie een van ons was so, wat ek geken het nie.

Interviewer Now the nature of working as a Recce is generally relatively small groups, and sometimes very small groups of 2 or 3 men. When you were selecting a team to go on an operation, would you say…would you try and balance the two individuals, looking at the individuals you’re going to send out and say well, we know so and so is like that, we know so and so has those characteristics and so and so has those characteristics, let’s send them out as a team because they’re going to complement each other?

Roy Versekerlik in die kleinspan milieu was dit so gewees. The small team operators or the spies, so to speak, were of a better calibre. And they had certain qualities which came out and through, yes. (For) those guy,s certainly the environment was very close. Yes, we certainly had to select them.

Interviewer Just to get my mind around it, the small team operators, that would have been 2 or 3 guys operating behind enemy lines, gathering information. And then on a different kind of operation you have a larger group of guys usually working deep in enemy territory. But how big would their unit be sometimes?

Roy Dit hang af van die job wat gedoen moet word, is offensive teams could range anything from 7…how much you can do with 7 people…as to what was available, having a whole commando unit mobilising, to the semi conventional warfare or the bigger attacks on bases and bigger displays or having mechanised and mobilised forces going. So, an offensive team would be compiled for what is required…anything from 7, 15, 20, or a full scaled attack kind of thing.

Interviewer Can you give me an example, in whatever detail you feel comfortable with, of a typical offensive operation?

Roy Alright, ek gaan dit vir jou so verduidelik as jy die sisteem mooi wil verstaan is. As jy nou gepraat het van die kleinspanoperateurs sal byvoorbeeld gegaan doen het en ‘n verkenning op ‘n basis gedoen het. Wat in baie gevalle baie ver 100, 200, 300 km in was, met helikopters ingeneem was in Angola en waar ook al die ouens die werk gedoen het. Die inligting sal teruggebring word, verwerk word baie professioneel foto’s geneem word, lugfoto’s en goed, en van daar af, sal daar dan die plan gemaak word, en dis ‘n hele ontplooiingsproses. Ek vergeet nou die korrekte term, die ontplooiingsiklus was 14 of 15 stappe waardeur gegaan word, voor die ouens fisies ontplooi. En

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dan kom ons gestel dit was ‘n basisaanval soos wat by meeste ouens al betrokke was en goed. En dan sal die ouens met, watse ook al medium helikopters of voortuie of instap. Die basisaanval doen en dan natuurlik weer onttrek word. Daar was etlike tientalle sulke operasies gedoen met meeste van ouens van deel was. So dit was ‘n normal tipe scenario. En natuurlik dan was ‘n klomp defensiewe operasies vir al saam met die UNITA-magte en goete waar ouens glad nie kontak gemaak het nie bloot vir inligting of lokvalle en (hinderlae?) en goed, en vliegtuie en wat daarmee gepaardgaan en goed. So daar’s tientalle sulke operasies wat die organisasie uitgevoer het. En ek moet darem se die meeste van dit baie suksesvol.

Interviewer Somebody said to me that in many instances you wouldn’t have been wearing South African Defence Force uniforms or using standard SADF equipment. You would be using the weapons best suited to the job, and those could be weapons from almost any theatre of war in the world.

Roy Ja, dis geen geheim nie vir die klandestiene tipe werk en die verkennings en goed moes jy soos die vyand lyk. Ons het AK47’s en kamoefleerdrag en ‘’black is beautiful’’ aangesit. Ja, ons moet uiteraard ongesiens daar kom, en die job doen en natuurlik terugkom ook. En wat in ons geval dit baie sterker soldate gemaak word want die…in baie gevalle was dit die moeilikste om daar te kom en nie gesien te word nie en om terug te kom voor jy gevang word. Maar ja, ons het honderde van daai klandestiene operasies gedoen inteendeel meeste van dit was met vyandige klere om te lyk soos die vyand en AK’s en goed. Honderde van dit.

Interviewer If for example you were, I think the term is ‘’inserted’’ by parachute, you’d be a long way behind enemy lines, would there be pick ups by chopper afterwards or would you be expected to walk out of there, or did it just depend on the circumstances?

Roy Nee, ek moet darem se die goed waarvan ons betrokke was is, dit is deel van die beplanning dat om die troepe te kry na die tyd was deel van die plan. Jy’t altyd ‘n noodmatreel gehad indien dit nie sou werk nie. Maar ja daar was altyd sekerlik in die operasies wat ek betrokke was, was daar ondersteuning in die verband.

Interviewer When you were working with choppers and then the airforce and so on, did you have pilots assigned to you or would you just be in a roster and you’d get whichever pilot was available?

Roy Dit het maar op ‘n roster gewerk met die aard van die saak is daar’s sekere ouens wat jy baie mee saamgewerk het en baie ouens wat net soos wat in die grondmagte seker meer geskik was as ander ouens, maar dit was maar soos wat die eskaders ouens toegeken het aan ons. Uit die aard van die saak het ons ‘n noue verbintenis gehad.

Interviewer Now you’re starting to do this work and you’re doing a lot of it, you’re doing it on a full time basis, how did your family and

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friends react to this? Did they want to know what you were doing or did you not talk about it. What was it like when you were home on a break, in terms of the social atmosphere around the dinner table, for example?

Roy Ja, die mense wil maar geweet het wat aangegaan het. Ek moet se die ouens het ‘n baie goeie kondisionering rondom ons geplaas deur om nie onnodig te praat nie. En die meeste van die ouens as hy sou praat sal hy eerder net ‘n storie vertel eerder as om homself te posisioneer. En natuurlik is ‘n ou geleer om nie datums, name, tye en plekke te se nie, en baie van die klandestiene of koverte of sensitiewe operasies het ‘n vooraf uitgewerkte cover story gehad. And that is your story and you stick to it.

Interviewer But the general perception when you were home for a weekend or a bit of leave, or whatever, and you went to watch rugby with a friend or whatever the case was, would there be a perception of people saying, oh, be careful he’s a Recce, don’t pinch his beer, because he’s going to eat you alive.

Roy Yes, there was a perception like that, it was a bit funny in a sense because most of the okes could moer you as well as you could moer them. So there was a bit of a perception. So we savoured the moment as well, but yes there was. But in general or at the time, there was a lot of war stories. Pasop vir die Recce, hy’t sy ma se keel met ‘n garrotte afgesny, en hy moet sy hond eet voor hy ‘n Recce kan word…en al daai goed. Yes, there were millions of those stupid ludicrous rumours at the time. And the guys did mock you. Hey Recce kom hierso, en so aan. But in general it was a respected thing. And it was a bit complimentary in the sense…yes there was.

Interviewer Did you…there you are, you’re going off on some fairly dangerous work quite often, and I know all soldiers have a period of hurry up and wait and these long periods where nothing much happened. But you’re doing some fairly serious work, and then you’re going back into almost a civilian society from time to time. Did you have difficulty in equating the two and balancing the two?

Roy Ek moet jou eerlik se selfs tot nou toe weet ek nie eintlik waarvan die ouens praat om sukkel om aan te pas nie. Want niemand het nog vir my gesê ek is abnormaal nie. En ek wil ook nie glo dat ek abnormaal is nie. Die vraag waarna jy verwys is om te se ons sukkel om aan te pas by siviele omgewing. Ek weet nie of dit ‘n kompliment is of nie. Alhoewel ek verstaan omdat ons uit ‘n milieu kom wat militer was en in hierdie milieu spesifiek. Al wat ek gedoen het is, ons was baie bevoorreg om in periode van tyd en baie bevoorregte posisies in die lewe te kom en te ervaar wat ander mense nie ervaar nie. Maar verder moet jy onthou, as ‘n ou by die huis was, by jou eenheid, dan was dit ‘n normale werk. Jy het werk toe gegaan, opleiding gedoen, mense opgelei, geadministreer, beplan, gekommunikeer, bemark, alles was dit ‘n normale werk. So vir my om te vra of ek aangepas het, ja sekerlik

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die roetine as ‘n siviele persoon was klein bietjie anderste. Maar ek sukkel oor die aanpassingsteorie, dit was nooit vir my ‘n probleem nie.

END OF SIDE A (counter at 358)

SIDE B (counter at 12)

Interviewer …talk about the issues of post traumatic stress. Do you believe that post traumatic stress is a factor in the lives of a Special Forces soldier? Are you equipped to deal with the fact that you’ve been through some fairly tough conflict situations, and then you go off and you can be a father, you can be an uncle, you can just be yet another person in civil society?

Roy Yes, absoluut! Orraait, jy vra nou binne die Spesmagte-konteks ons het nou-nou gepraat oor dienspligtes en burgermag ouens en so. For those guys I can understand probably it wasn’t their primary thing, they weren’t mindset for it, and you must actually salute those chaps. You know the national servicemen, some of them wanted to do it,some didn’t want to, some not at all, but we’re not all made from the same material. But certainly in the Special Forces context, as I’ve explained to you just now, the selection process has thrown out 85% already. So the guy you’re dealing with in which the psychology test and the whole selection process was set up for, the profile of the person, doing the cycle and getting his operator’s badge probably makes them absorb those things better than the other 85% would have absorbed. So yeah, daar is aanpassings daar is as ouens wat bad scenarios gehad het, almal het met lewe en dood te doen gehad. But then on the same argument I can ask you, a guy that works in the police cells or a mortuary or in the times when we still hang people in this country, what does that guy feel when he goes back to his house? What does the policeman feel, he goes into a township and he sees all those bodies and people as opposed to our guys that did a job…as part of it. So, sekerlik vir my was dit tot nou toe enigsins iets ervaar en goed nie. Daar is uiteraard goed waaroor ‘n ou dink en ‘n ou dink meer oor die sisteem eerder as die fisiese voorvalle waarby jy betrokke was.

Interviewer So now you’re trained to do this stuff, you’ve worked as a soldier for a long, long time in neighbouring countries, but in operational areas. Towards the end of the eighties and early nineties there were some internal operations as well. Did that impact on the way that the operators were thinking? Did they get annoyed and say well we trained for war, but not necessarily inside our own country.

Roy Once again I’m saying, if you look at those three groupings: national servicemen, commando forces, or the citizen forces, and the permanent force soldiers. For the permanent force soldiers if he gets deployed on the South West border or Namibian border, or he gets deployed in a township, it’s not quite the same, but you are being a soldier. So your commander or officer commanding or what level of command you are, gives you a job to do you go

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and do it. So yes it was not quite which we were prepared for, and a lot of people (were thinking?) it was police work, but remember at one stage if I remember it correctly, marshal law was announced by the minister, so we were actually legally commissioned by the ministers to go and do what we had to do.

Interviewer And your commands would it still come from the military not from the police?

Roy At that time I think the commands, they were called JOCs I think, Joint Operational Centres and it would be a joint effort. Although it was under the police command, the military troops operated usually under military structures.

Interviewer Now during the late eighties and early nineties, clearly society was changing. South Africa was heading in a different direction. Were some of the guys starting to question why they were still fighting or were they simply saying, well I’m a soldier and I’m not going to question the politics of it all.

Roy Can you rephrase please.

Interviewer My question is that, in the seventies and eighties Special Forces soldiers would have said, I’m a soldier and I’m going off to do soldiering, but by the time the end of 1980 arrived it was clear that South Africa was working towards the ’94 elections and that the scenario was changing dramatically. Were there a number of guys who said that they felt that their needs as a soldier were no longer required, or their skills as a soldier were no longer required?

Roy I think there was an angle change. I think there was. But in essence we were still doing soldiering related tasks. And it became evident that the system was coming to an end so…out of that perspective we knowing that the system that was coming to an end, the people would have thought well it might be time to move.

Interviewer And then in ’94 a new government came in. Many of the people in the government might have had links to either Umkhonto we Sizwe or the Communist Party. Did any of the guys that you know of - or yourself - was there a sort of sense of resentment, well goodness, 15 years ago these guys represented the enemy and now they’re the government?

Roy Yes it was inevitable. En ek dink enige ou wat dit ontken of wat nee se will not be honest. Yes, there was some form of resentment. And then also on the other hand there was a sense of reality that prevailed as well. En ek moet se die oorgansfase, die transitofase van wat jy nou net verduidelik van ouens om te aanvaar wat gebeur het, is eintlik oor die algemeen baie goed geakkommodeer, want ek herroep nie dat daar enige enige enige fisiese voorvalle was van waar die regering deur die militer of uit militere geledere opstande of rebellies of goed gekom het te midde van persoonlike gevoelens soos wat ouens van toe af en

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tot selfs vandag mag he nie. Die enigste insidente wat werklik gebeur het van die tyd met die onderhandelinge was die AWB-insidente by die Trade Centre en die Mmabatho-insidente en so aan. Maar die militer, ja almal het natuurlik nie gevoel soos die politici wat die volgende era sou lei gevoel het nie, maar die balans tussen daai twee faktore is goed geabsorbeer. So, ja dit het gebeur.

Interviewer Now many years later, effectively there were no more operations in Angola after 1989. We’re nearly 20 years on now. Do some of the guys look back and say, was it all worth it? Why did I do all that stuff?

Roy Baie ouens dink daaraan terug. Baie menses al die prentjie gesien het, baie nie, vir hulle eie redes en goed. Ek dink die vraag wat ‘n ou moet vra op die lang termyn is kan ‘n ou teruggaan na die ou sisteem of nie. But there’s a lot of questions was it worthwhile? Jy moet onthou die era of die kultuur wat die 70’s en 80’s en die vroee 90’s verteenwoordig het, sal hierdie tipe van vrae vorm en baie mense het familie en kennisse verloor en goed, maar ek dink die groter meerderheid van nuwe Suid-Afrika, en ek praat van blanke Suid-Afrika so te spreek, vir ouens wat die uniform van voor 1994 gevra het, het gevra ja waarvoor. Maar ek dink van daai ouens aanvaar 80 of 90% die sisteem waarin hy nou veg, en sal dit dalk nie nou weer wil he nie ofskoon hy dalk nie so nasionalisties voel teenoor die nuwe vlag of die nuwe regering nie. Maar ek dink dit gaan met ‘n balans gepaard.

Interviewer I mean that for example, many of the guys who might feel some kind of distance between themselves and the new government will nevertheless sit down this evening and watch South Africa playing England rugby and support South Africa one hundred percent. So they’re still patriots in that sense.

Roy Well they’re patriotic in that sense is that you’re patriotic to your own beliefs which you grew up in. And you will obviously feel…and I can tell you now, if you would go to Loftus Versveld or Ellis Park or Kings Park for that matter, and the old anthem as we knew it at the time would be played, you would hear a huge roar from the people joining and singing the old anthem rather than the new version because that’s the anthem the people grew up with, that is the flag they grew up with, and that is the perception you grew up with. And that does not mean that you approve of everything of the era, but it certainly…well for people of my age and of that generation certainly…it does have a sentiment still.

Interviewer Back in the eighties if you had walked into a public place wearing your full Recce uniform with your beret, people would have looked at it, not being sure who it was but when people explained what that beret meant, many people, certainly in white society, would have looked at that with respect. What is your perception now when people learn about your past, when people hear that you served as a Recce, what is the general sort of reaction to that now?

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Roy Respect has grown bigger. It has created a legacy which is a good thing. And it has created a legacy of respect. Dit het inderdaad groter geword, I think.

Interviewer You work in the hospitality industry. When you meet black people and they learn about the past and they see some of the pictures on the wall and you discuss it, what is the reaction to…?

Roy Respect.

Interviewer As well.

Roy Yes.

Interviewer You mentioned earlier on that some people even feel that some kind of military service and the discipline that it instils in people is necessary. Could you explain a bit more about that thought.

Roy I think the people that’s running the country now at the levels, know what the value is to deal with a homogene approach to a country’s economy and society. And that is what the old system gave to this country. There was a like a nice departure point to a large extent of people who served in the military in terms of a common denominator of understanding whether you liked it or not. You can even speak to chaps now who liked it or not. And in my family I have people who didn’t like the military because they were totally different. But at least he could say there was some common conversation that would come from there. And with all the crime and the looseness of the youth so to speak, not there’s anything wrong with them, but it seems that they could do with a bit of anchorage. And that comes out of the black and the white community as well, and I’ve had that from all walks of life, people come in here and mentioning that kind of comment. ‘’Only if we carried on with national service.’’ ‘’Only if we did. Only if I’’. And if you take of it, you know, any country has a military system. And any country is entitled to ask of a young man at one stage of his life to give something for the country, not necessarily war, but to make a contribution to the country.

Interviewer Thinking about that now…ok, you served in an elite unit, so your experiences are a bit different to many other sort of conscripts and soldiers like that…but reading about the Recces, I’ve read quite a few books about it and I get the sense that they were these highly trained guys doing at times highly dangerous work, operating behind enemy lines, and so on and so forth. But the stories don’t give me any indication really of the individuals, the people, doing this. Is there any aspect of the Recces when we discuss it in general terms now, that you feel is ignored by these books, that is ignored by modern society? Is there some aspect that you think we should pay more attention to?

Roy Well I think this very project you’re doing is probably very valuable in a sense if you can make a comparison of the then and now scenarios and to make a contribution as to teach a generation what was right and what was not right, or not so right

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to speak. Most of the books that came out told the story and any author will position himself in a book, although he doesn’t necessarily speak of (inaudible?) but he talks about his involvement and his perspective. And if you take the books of 32 Battalion, the few that’s been written on our organisation and all that, it’s a story line as such. If you’re asking about the personal attention to the individuals it probably give you a bit of a different angle.

Interviewer What I’m thinking of particularly…in some quarters if you mention 32 Battalion particularly, people say, ‘oh, ruthless killers’. Recces are a bit more of a mystery but nevertheless you might be grouped with 32 Battalion. People say oh, ruthless killers who supported apartheid. In your mind that doesn’t apply?

Roy What in terms of the Recces or the Special Forces?

Interviewer Well I’m speaking Recces in particular but many people will group Recces with 32 Battalion, they won’t see a difference.

Roy No, well there’s a huge difference. You must remember 32’s Battalion’s origin is much different to what ours was, although the founding members came out of a communal pool. But those guys were more an offensive fighting force with all the expats from the neighbouring countries and the Angolans and the Portuguese people. Whereas we were compiled for different things. But we also did a lot of offensive operations. We also had ruthless times and very aggressive operations and all that, and we did do operations with them and joined on bigger operations. Being dubbed a ruthless killer might have an origin, if you remember the Boipatong incidents that came here in the later parts in the townships operations and this that and all that. Yes, there were violent operations. War is war in the end. There were aggressiveness, there were kills and blood and all that, and sometimes individuals that overstepped the line. But then you must also remember, specifically towards the end of it and in the Angolan era, there was always propaganda that was the marketing tool for the opposing politicians to create an image in the press. So yes, some of it might have been right, but not forgetting that we were soldiers and you had to be aggressive and you had to fight properly and dirty sometimes to do an operation. Geen argument.

Interviewer …you mentioned that in all wars there’s a propaganda element and that’s what politicians do, that’s their job. Much of the war in South Africa was regularly denied by Pik Botha, by the government. We often had troops a long way inside Angola doing various things and they were constantly saying, ‘’we’re not there, it’s not us’’, and so on and so forth. Was there a sense of resentment that the Recces weren’t given recognition for the tough work they were doing at the time? Because they were fighting a war that was being denied.

Roy Well certainly from my perspective no, because we knew it was our profile not to get like kind of acknowledgement, and I’ve been

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involved in a few operations, driving back from the spot and when Pik Botha would say…you know those statements those guys made…I emphatically deny. And then we would listen to the radio on the way back from, for example, the Matola raid. You would come back and we would listen to that. But you know, it was part of the politician’s strategy at the time, and only afterwards the guys would say, yes, we were there and they gave the reasons. So you must remember this country and the government didn’t operate anything different from what the Americans or the CIA or the French or the British or Germans or the Russians for that matter did. Everybody had their…foreign policies, may it be political, intelligence, economical, or military, and they had a strategy to execute. If you look in the history of the Americans for example, the first spy plane being shot down, Gary Powers who was the pilot. So the Americans also denied that until the guy appears on TV. Oh yes, ok. So ja, julle kan nou nie vir Pik Botha en al daai ouens kan se julle het so gelieg nie. Dan moet julle al die regerings van die wereld noem, because that’s how the system works and operates if you’ve got to execute the strategy. Yes, we did that.

Interviewer So you as soldiers accepted the fact that the politicians had to do what they did and if they had to say you weren’t there when you knew full well you were, well tough.

Roy We accept. You mustn’t declare me brain dead here. We accepted the fact that there was a strategy. I mean it would be stupid if we got to do a clandestine job and you would like play your hand before it was necessary. But I would concede to the fact that the military was part of the political instrument. But then in the same hand, if you worked for the department of justice you can’t declare the judge brain dead because he’s working for the railways or the justice department or any over government department for that matter. So when you tell me if Pik Botha or anybody ran the country, then you just did what the politicians said. So having a military force at the time was an instrument as any other government department. And it was accepting orders blindly and all that. Sure, certainly the government of the time had their policy regarding the apartheid thing and this, that and all that. And you had to see for yourself where you fit in. So if you are driving to asking me how I’m experiencing it, I will tell you.

Interviewer What I’m thinking of really, in many aspects there was a war fought in secret…ok, which is the nature of Special Forces operators. But it was a war fought in secret. Then 1994 comes along and the government changes, and now to a degree it’s a war that’s only known about by certain tiny group of people, and in many instances some of the work done has been completely forgotten. So you’ve got people who have been highly decorated in some instances, many people who have risked life and limb for their job in what was then a secret war, and now it’s…once again, it’s a secret war. So, I just wonder about the experiences of the individual thinking, well we get no recognition anywhere in any

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way. And I’m not suggesting that people should say you’re good guys or bad guys, I’m just suggesting that perhaps there should be greater recognition of the role or the sacrifices these guys made.

Roy Well I think in the aftermath it probably would be nice if some form of a…well anybody enjoys some form of reward at any time or so. But at the time, this is the way we were conditioned and that is one of the biggest qualities of Special Forces operators is this thing about secrecy and confidentiality and what the secret code of conduct to execute your job without telling people about (the do?). So yes, afterwards it might be nice if somebody would give, as the organisation as a whole, a compliment which comes all the time from the private sector and I think the existing system as well. But I don’t think there are real people who’ve got a global grudge. If there are grudges it would be like individuals within the system who might feel that they got oppressed by an individual in the system or a superior or inferior relationship and that thing, but I don’t think as a global or a bigger picture, the system would feel that they didn’t get that much recognition. Because the people who were there knew what they did. They knew what the organisation did, and all of us on our own system got medals and certificates and compliments, and you still got your camaraderie with the people you shared a common special part. So, I certainly don’t have an inferior complex about that or anything, but maybe it could be nice…I think the biggest compliment could be, if you want to compare it, then a nice scenario is, if anybody who can want to give a compliment, they must enhance the existing Special Forces and the existing people based on a good legacy from the past, so that the legacy that the past has brought from the seventies, eighties, and nineties, and the first part of this decade, so that the system continues on a standard which they got renowned for and world renowned for. That’s probably the biggest recognition that could come the way of the Compass Rose.

Interviewer I saw a small display by some Special Forces guys down at Hoedspruit the other day…they took vehicles out of the back of a Hercules and so on. To your knowledge do those guys follow some of the training principles established by yourselves?

Roy Ek het nog kontak met van die mense en goed, en die ouens wat nou in bevel was is my rang en ouderdomsgroep en dit kom uit dieselfde era uit waarvan ek deel was en dit klink vir my sekerlik of dit nog baie op dieselfde standaard is en goed, en die leerplan en die curriculums waarvan ek goed gepraat het en die standaard en die kultuur en die sisteem klink inderdaad of dit nog ‘n standaard hantaaf om op trots te wees. So that will be good. And you will believe me if I say that knowing the people and the system, it will have improved.

Interviewer So they would have learned new ideas and new techniques…

Roy Yes, I’m sure. And make no mistake, I’m sure. I’m not involved in

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any way anymore, but I’m sure these guys still do clandestine operations, the government still use them to get information, and even if it’s clandestine stuff as we did in the early nineties, looking at criminal elements, this, that and the…make sure they will still be operationally deployed. Make sure they will.

Interviewer You mentioned guys of your age, many guys had left the force, they’re in all walks of life. You’ve got guys in cities, you’ve got game rangers, you’ve got the works these days, haven’t you? Are many people still in South Africa, or have guys left?

Roy Ek kan dit vir jou moeilik antwoord, daar is a ‘n groot klomp ouens wat militere verwante werk in die buiteland doen. As jy dit as ‘n presentasie moet uitdruk van die era wat ek geken het, sal ek skat dat miskien 30% of so persent van ouens wat ooit operasionele Recces was so to spreek miskien werk in die buiteland het. But the important thing is about all these guys having worn the Compass Rose or the operator’s badges, most of them are doing very well, as a private entity working in a company or their own businesses or doing security stuff in Iraq or where else, yes, they seem to be doing very well. And there’s very few of them wat nie kan aanpas nie. Die Recces pas aan. Dit is een van die goed. Daar is baie min van daai ouens…in fact I do not recall any incident of any guys who’s been an operational member of the system that went so called bossies or al daai terme wat hulle aan hierdie goed wou toegedig het en goed, en dit kom terug na die term, of die beginsel wat ek gesê het van balans en ‘n goeie keuringsproses.

Interviewer In looking at the past and and what people did in the past , and what former Recces are now, is there something you feel that I’m missing that I need to understand about these guys? Or do you think we’ve covered it pretty well?

Roy Ek dink wat julle ouens moet verstaan is, die vraag is, daar is eintlik twee vraae oor die Recces is wat jy my nou-nou gevra het oor hoekom het jy dit gaan doen? Wat het jy gedryf om dit te word? En ek is seker as jy die vraag vir 80% of 100% van al die ander Recces vra van ‘n jongman van my ouderdom wat uit die skool uit weermag toe was, wel ek het verseker na matriek nie werklik geweet wat ek wil doen nie. And along came the compass rose, and the rest is history 18 years later. Ek was nie gedryf om ‘n Apartheid-instrument wees nie. Ek was nie gedryf om ‘n swart man te haat nie. Niemand het dit ooit vir my gesê nie. Ek het gedoen wat ek wou gedoen het en ek het dit geniet. En ek dink 90% ouens sal dit so ervaar het. Andre Diederichs het gesê, dit was lekker. Ek gaan sommer op jou tape vloek. Hy’t gesê dit was fokken lekker. That’s what he said. En ons het dit geniet. Ons het alles geniet daarvan. As jy kyk daar en spring uit vliegtuie, gaan in duikbote, doen opleiding, gaan na die buiteland toe, doen operasies in helikopters en tegnologie. En al hierdie interaksie. En die sosiale gedeelte daarvan. Kom terug, lekker geld in die sak, motorbike, kry die girls, die hele sisteem. Vir die jongman was dit ‘n goeie ding op die tyd, dit het in die milieu gepas. Om

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die vraag te antwoord oor waarna ek nou-nou so gesinspeel het, baie mense het al die term gebruik, veral ouens wat teen die sisteem was, om te se is die Apartheidsisteem het jou gebrainwash daarin. Ja, natuurlik het enige regering sy beleid en goed, maar ek kan jou nou se geen ou wat ek nou kan noem, no-one I can remember has gone there to kill black people, or to kill, as a motive rather than enjoy being a soldier which killing was part of the thing. And in the same breath I must say the people weren’t angels either. They were very well trained and good and balanced and when required, aggressive soldiers. And amongst them you get good, bad and uglies. But the most of them turned out to be the above average soldier and…well, being a good citizen for the country.

Interviewer You mentioned Diederich’s book…he enjoyed at the time, it was lekker. And you spoke abut the adventure…

Roy Job satisfaction.

Interviewer You spoke about the sheer adventure of it and it was fun for a fit young man. But there was an aspect of it that was maybe not so lekker and that at times somebody could kill you, and the Recces did lose people in the operations. At times I almost get the sense that there was a feeling that you were almost, not immortal, but the chances of being killed were remote. Yet at other times you buried your colleagues.

Roy You know…yes, it’s true. But you must remember if you express that as a percentage, the exposure in terms of a year of actually coming in a situation where you could be killed is minute. Certainly in operations when you get in contact scenarios or where you could be picked up by surveillance or by any form of being picked up, yes. But somehow I don’t think…it’s like jumping out of an airplane, with your parachute, you are prepared to do or execute an emergency procedure or deploy a reserve parachute, but you rather think of doing the procedure than thinking of dying. But if the thought or the subconsciousness is not thereof that you could die, you wouldn’t deploy properly. But certainly in my case…yes, it wasn’t lekker to think about it and certainly when the hard stuff came from the front it wasn’t lekker. I remember, always said, your mother said, don’t go there. And then afterwards somehow things worked well. Nee, dit was sekerlik nie ‘n oorwegende gevoel nie.

Interviewer And you saw sort of a lot of action starting in the seventies and going into the eighties. What was the level of training the guys that you were encountering…and I know it will depend on what area you were in, because it would have changed…you mentioned Matola, that was Mozambique. But in Angola you would have met different people. What was the standard of training? Were some of these soldiers just no different to our national servicemen, a youngster thrown in the deep end and told off you go and fight.

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Roy I think if you had to compare one on one we certainly were more advanced military set up than anywhere you would have in Africa. There’s no question.

Interviewer Is there any aspect of this you want to add to, or do you think we’ve covered most of the bases? I’m quite happy with the way we’ve discussed things because I think it gives me a bigger picture, but are there any specifics that you want to go into?

Roy Yes, I think a lot of people, and it’s a question that you’ve put in your email to me, is…and what we discussed…everybody…the standing that you have in life now, and I’ll tell you now, all the people that’s been part of the system, the standing of life stems from the compass rose. And this Compass Rose has been what sports has been to a sportsman or what anything, or a good training or a good houding has been to a kid or so. And everybody who’s been here will always remember this as being a solid professional and a good system which has created a way of life in terms…

END OF SIDE B TAPE ONE

TAPE TWO SIDE A

Roy Dit was ‘n groot voorreg, ongeag die politiese konnotasie wat daaraan gekoppel word, as jy iets van die mense wil weet, dan moet jy weet, eerstens het die ou gegaan vir sy eie redes. Maar die ouens wat daar was vir ‘n periode en goed, sal dit nooit vergeet nie. En die denkwyse en die manier sal jy by baie mense ook vind. Jis, daai ou was in die Spesmagte, kyk hoe doen hy dit of wat ‘n nice ou of wat ‘n gebalanseerde ou of dit of dat. So dit is ‘n groot kompliment vir die sisteem in hoe die sisteem aan die generasies oorgedra is en goed…As jy wil uitvra oor die politiese koppeling daarvan is jy welkom. You’re welcome and I’d like to speak on that because it’s a big issue as to if it was right or wrong or not. And you’re welcome to ask me on that, because I think it needs to be addressed as well.

Interviewer Well that’s why I asked earlier on about when you were a really young man and you wanted to get in to the Special Forces, your perception of who you were fighting, why were you fighting? You said initially that, as a young guy you thought, hell, it would be a good thing to be a Special Forces soldier. It’s going to be fun, it’s going to be exciting. But then during your training you’re taught to use all these weapons and you know that at some stage further you’re going to kill somebody. And that’s a seminal moment in anybody’s existence I think when you’re prepared to actually kill another human being. And you were nevertheless part of a military that was part of…

Roy The political.

Interviewer Yes, that was part of a political South Africa at the time. Did you ever think well, my goodness this isn’t right, we’re actually fighting for the wrong side.

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Roy No, not on the wrong side. You must remember, and certainly it’s the way I perceived it as a young man, and this is important for anybody who listens to this, we never were taught to fight black people. En dit is my belangerik dat mense dit moet weet. Daar was nooit gesê gaan baklei teen swart ouens nie. Of die k-woord wat van die tyd gebruik was. En ek wil he die mense moet dit onthou. Dit was nie ‘n Spesmagte-beleid nie, dit was nie ‘n weermagbeleid nie. Dit het eerder gegaan soos die geykte beleid van die PW Botha’s en die Pik’s en goed wat gepraat het van die Kommunisme van die tyd. Dan moet jou onthou, en dis seker in retrospek, 30 jaar later, het dinge verander in die land vir ouens wat toe alles gehad het is daar beswaarlik iets vir die ouens oor in terme van swart ekonomiese bemagtiging, en ‘n wit oukie wat minder werksgeleenthede het en en en en. So jy moet daai perspektief ook aanvaar maar in dieselfde asem, sal niemand eers van daai ouens wat so dink, kan dink vandag in ‘n tydmasjien te klim van 2007 en terug te gaan na 1977 vir die ekonomiese, politiese en swart ding, ek kan nie dink dat iemand nog so dink nie. Maar ongelukkig is daar sekere persoonlike emosionele, politiese en ekomiese opofferings wat gemaak word in die proses, ongelukkig is dit nie ‘n kliniese proses nie. Die politiese motivering vir die tyd en as jy mooi daaroor dink is, jy weet, van die wit Rhodesiers van die tyd, die Mosambiek van die tyd, die Suidwes-Afrika van die tyd, en alles die vraag wat jy nou-nou gevra het, was dit die moeite werd. Jy kan seker 100 dae en nagte daaroor praat en wonder of nie. Maar vir ouens van die tyd wat daar deel was kan ek verstaan dat hy ‘n sentiment het en ek kan verstaan dat ouens voel dat hy uit die nommer een se plek geskuif is en nou dalk nie meer so in die limelight in die sitplekke is nie, aan die hand van die voorbeelde wat ek nou vir jou gegee het. Ek wil net verder daarby se, en in dieselfde asem het ons oor die goed gepraat en dink toe en meer as nou, en in die periode het ‘n ou gewonder oor die politiese korrektheid daarvan en op my onderhoud met Carte Blanche Derek Watts ook op die perseel ‘n jaar of vier of wat terug, het Derek Watts vir my gevra, se vir my is ek jammer oor iets? Nee, ek is nie jammer oor niks nie. Al waaroor ek is, ek is jammer dat ‘n land met sy eie mense moet oorlog maak. It is sad that there was a war amongst the own people. But I’m not sad and I’m not sorry for who I represented, for what I’ve done in any way as such. En ek wil graag he mense wat hierna luister moet weet dat ‘n ou hoef nie skaam te wees oor goed wat jy gedoen het as jy binne die reels gebly het nie. En ek kan verstaan hoe ‘n swart man in die land voel van ‘n honderd jaar terug af, ek sal versekerlik ook so teenoor ‘n wit man gevoel het, maar dan ken e kook die geskiedenis van die land. En ek kan weet hoe kom ‘n wit man so opgetree het. Dan die grootste kompliment is en wat in ‘n sekere sin die geskiedenis vir hom herhaal het, the best thing the Anglo Boer war did, it created a government here. The best thing that happened in ’94, it’s the first time in ten years this country hasn’t had war in the history of this country…this country hasn’t had war in ten years since 1994. So erens moet ‘n ou groot genoeg wees

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om die spectrum te aanvaar. En niemand gaan vir my se ek moet slag voel oor die sentimente van die tyd nie. So yes, dit is waar my emosionele verbintenis le en as ek van rugby en biltong en sonskyn nou, en ‘n ander ou lyk van sokker en mieliepap, dan is dit reg. Maar die common interest, of die gemeenskaplike belange is die welvaart van die land. En geen ou in sy regdenkende wyse kan se dat die oorlog of die sisteem moes aaangegaan het soos dit aangaan nie.

Interviewer You mentioned an interesting term there, you said, you’ve got nothing to be ashamed of if you played by the rules, if you behaved within the perimeters of what the rules of the military were. But you just mentioned the raid on Matola. Now wasn’t that an attempt to assassinate ANC leaders? And those people were living in civilian quarters, they weren’t living in military barracks, they were in with the general population. Was that within the rules?

Roy Well in my mind it certainly…it’s like a tactic of war. It was governed and authorised properly, and it was a professionally executed operation of people who were doing trans border operations into the country at the time. There were a few of those done. A lot of them came into public eyes and newspapers and a lot then. That would certainly regard as a military operation. What I mean with not playing the rules is people who made decisions on levels and executing them which had life result…taking decisions in their own hands. I mean those guys did the same. They came in here, Kerkstraat bom en die dit en die Koeberg en Magoos, en McBride en company en goed so.

Interviewer So…you…

Roy But I must tell you this government, or the government of the time, has never made any operation as near as cruel as the Church Street bomb or Magoos…all the stuff were military directed operations, and as a sad result the odd civilian might have died in between. But there was never, not one operation, certainly which I was involved or even know of that there was any civilian like kind of angle of it.

Interviewer Ok, so there were no civilians targeted specifically as civilians. It was as a result of an operation that was aimed at what you considered a military target.

Roy And if there were it never came up. But daar sal nie wees nie, ek weet. But imagine a government of this standing, of this country, planting a bomb in…the capital of Maputo at the time and killing whoever passes there. Nee. Yes, they lived in civilian quarters but they were military personnel. And you must remember that was the phase of the war at the time as things developed it was a well executed military operation as was the others in Lesotho and wherever.

Interviewer Another thing you mentioned about serving in the military at the time was that you were there primarily as a soldier doing soldierly

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things, but the Recces were one of the first integrated units as far as I’m aware of in terms of race. You’d get guys coming across from Mozambique, guys from Angola, so you had white guys and black guys working in the same military unit. That would have started happening in the early eighties, is that right?

Roy Well even in the seventies when we did operations in the then Rhodesia…it wasn’t Zimbabwe it was Rhodesia at the time…and I remember in my first operations we deployed with five reconnaissance troops which were black guys, and I joined a sleeping bag with a black guy. Made the same food. The guys had the first equal ranking and pay opportunities. And funnily enough when the whole CCB thing came to light and the whole thing came to an end, the military took the punch for the white on black violence and that rather than the police but the military was the first actually to create an equal kind of thing for opportunities and jobs and all that. But having said that, it doesn’t tell the whole picture as well, and I’ll be frank about this. There was always a bit of a psychological separation as well but it was rather a cultural thing than a colour thing. Soos ek nou-nou gesê van die rugby en die sokker. Dit het eintlik eerder met kultuur as kleur te doen.

Interviewer That I can understand. What about that aspect of it, there you are, you’re fighting alongside a man, you’re going through the same conditions on operations you’re eating the same food, you’re living exactly the same. But when you come back to base he can’t vote in an election, he can’t go eat in the same restaurant as you and your family…let’s presume that you wanted to and that there was an attraction to that, did that not create a perception in your mind of a bit of…a inconsistency, saying well, he’s the same as me, he can fight alongside me, yet he can’t share the same privileges as me. He can’t sit on Addington Beach for example next to me.

Roy Ja dit is so. Dit is goed daie goed wat ek nou-nou gesê, as jy ‘n toe en nou perspektief wil daaroor (inaudible) dit is so, jy kan dit nie ontken nie. Maar om in ‘n militere konteks dit toe te pas was dit seker die naaste aan wat gelykige integrasie op enige vlak gebeur het. Die nasionale invloed waarvan jy nou prat, ja dit is so gewees. Dan natuurlik ek wil vir jou eerlik se, jy kan vandag ook nog gaan kyk na swart en wit kulturele voorkeure. Ek sien dit baie met mense wat hier kom konferensies hou. Sodra die mense geleentheid het om te kies met wie hy wil assosieer, preference of association, soort soek soort. Dan sal ‘n ou gaan staan by wie hy wil praat. En soos ek se dis kultureel gekoppel, maar in die land ook ongelukkig kleur gekoppe. Ja, ek kan dit nie ontken nie, en dan die ander kant natuurlik dit was soos dit was, the hindsight is the perfect sight.

Interviewer But despite that it never affected the relationships while you were fighting. If you were on an operation you were all in that together and nobody sat down and had a debate over, well…one group of people isn’t allowed to go with the others. Was there no division

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along those lines?

Roy No, not really. I would imagine it would be similar like to now. Here we’re sitting here today. Tonight you may go to a pub but I’ll tell you now, not you or me, together or alone, would go to Mamelodi to a pub tonight.

Interviewer It’s true.

Roy So you’re being denied access there not by law, but by an invisible law. It’s a cultural divide. And it’s a preference of culture and a preference of association. Well, as you know, what made apartheid very attackable was the fact that it became legislation. Prior to that it was like an emotional feeling, but as soon as legislation was passed it became a visible instrument. Or an instrument to be attacked. And as I said, I understand both sides of the spectrum, the argument.

Interviewer I think I’ve covered most of the bases I want to go through. There were many operations in Angola but I think they’re fairly well recorded. Peter Stiff has done a lot of them. Jackie Greeff writes about some of them. Is Peter Stiff’s book an accurate representation of pretty much what went on and…

Roy What I didn’t like of his book (Peter Stiff – Silent War) was his preamble or his initial thing wasn’t all that bad or it was I think fairly representative. But he became hasty in the end. In the end things seemed to have tapered and petered off and all that. And I think he probably could have covered more people, the personal thing, and he could have done a bit more operations, if I think, if I remember correctly. But yes, all of those stuff did happen. Clandestine, covert, offensive, defensive. Ja ons het al daai goed gedoen. En soos ek nou hier sit, ek voel jammer of skuldig oor niks. Waaraan ek geassosieer is of was nie. Soos ek se al waaroor ek jammer was is dat ‘n land teen sy eie mense baklei het. Ek meen ‘n ou kan dit in geen terme goedpraat nie, want dis ‘n ongewenste scenario.

Interviewer When you run into a bunch of your former colleagues, do you talk about those days or do you actually talk about other things altogether? Whether it’s…

Roy I’m glad you asked it. When the people would come together, you would rather link to an era of time and the biggest thing that comes out is humour. Everybody would remember the humour. You might recite an operation or so or talk about an individual or so, but firstly due to the calibre of the people, they hardly position themselves, they rather tell a story. And there’s nobody that actually just talks about the war or the blood or the killings. The people weren’t that way inclined. And the people who listen to this must see this as a compliment to the system and the individuals who served within it, coming back to the thing of being balanced.

Interviewer It’s quite something to take humour out of a situation which at

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times can be frightening, but is there any sort of humorous story that you think can sort of give a good example of the kind of humour that comes out of those situations? Some of it might be in-house humour I’m sure. Like all professions we all have our own in-house jokes.

Roy Ja-nee dis, daar is etlike stories. Maar net om vir jou ‘n voorbeeld te noem, een van die outjies wat saam met my keuring gedoen het was op ‘n operasie doodgeskiet in Rhodesië of hy’s dood maar in ‘n skietkontak scenario in Rhodesië. Toe hy agter sy rugsak uitklim en al die skietery en goeters is klaar en almal tel en die ouens lewe en goed, die eerste ding wat hy toe oopmaak is sy rugsak. Toe sien hy sy blikkie hoender is stukkend geskiet. Nou wat moet ek nou vanaand eet as hierdie bliksems my hoender stukkend geskiet het. I mean, there’s still enough food to eat, the man has just come out of a scenario of almost being killed and he worries about his chicken.

Interviewer Clearly that’s the most important aspect of his life, he survives so he’s happy with that, now it’s his supper.

Roy So which makes the man a survivor. And coming back to the question you asked me about this adapting in civilian life…first of all I am a civilian of this country, I’ve got a job doing a military work or at the time it was. The only thing I…well one thing I must tell you which I really missed was the humour involved. Because there’s always some bugger who would come up with a joke, like I just said, or a comment, and the military had its own humour like you will not believe. And the people were rather task orientated than money orientated. So very few people saw another one as a rivalry except when the odd promotion and position came through and then the upper ranks and all that. So that made the people very sociable, very likable, and a very neat bunch because they were task orientated rather than economically orientated. So humour is a huge factor and that’s the thing I talked about, the common denominator. That had a big binding influence.

Interviewer Earlier on we spoke about how many of your operations were clandestine and the sort of the mindset that you didn’t speak about it because that’s what you did, that was your job and that was the way you’d been…you’d learned to deal with the nature of your work. You mentioned Rhodesia…now that’s been written about quite a few times, people working…one Recce who served with D squadron SAS, is that right?

Roy Yes. Do you know the history of D squadron?

Interviewer Well this is what I want to…it’s been written about, it’s not well documented but can you tell me what it’s like because it seems strange to me that we thought we could send South Africans to Rhodesia and nobody would know that they were South Africans.

Roy Ja kyk, as ons op sulke campaigns gegaan het, was daar altyd cover stories. Soos almal weet, die SAS het net A, B, and C squadron, so for a start D squadron was odd. But that wasn’t the

26

compromising factor. D squadron was the squadron that couldn’t speak English. And D squadron was the squadron who drank coffee and not tea. And talking about humour…we had this one guy. So we travelled from Salisbury, or nowadays Harare, down to the Russian front on the south eastern side at Mabaluata and (inaudible) and those places where we deployed into Mozambique. And on the way there they had these troopie canteens and there was this little village, Enkeldoring, soos jy in Afrikaans sal sê, Enkeldoring. So here comes D squadron, ouens wat nie kan Engels praat nie, and this one guy was coming from Namibia, and he only knew yes and no in English and he sometimes confused that as well. So hy kon niks Engels praat nie. And he asked the auntie behind the counter there, he says, auntie, can I have 3 hamburgers? She says, no, you must pay for your hamburgers. He says, no, 3 hamburgers, showing 3 signs. So hy kan glad nie Engels praat nie. Sy se, nee, julle ouens is boere, julle is nie van die SAS nie. So D squadron was deployed at the time to help the real SAS, or the Rhodesian SAS. We worked with the Selous Scouts all that. And I think the easiest way for the superiors at the time was to dub us D squadron. And that’s how it started, I think in ’78, we did the first few operations then the south east. The operations I think was called Canesta and Acrobat. It was a series of operations which we did mostly under (inaudible?) and also sometimes with the SAS and the Selous Scouts at the time. And then at the elections, D squadron, D-eskadron het toe ophou bestaan. I think it stopped there. So that was more or less in a nutshell what D squadron was. And we did excellent operations there. It was a good sweef for us. And then of course there was a bit of rivalry amongst us and the Rhodesian SS and the Scouts because everybody were showing their muscles and claiming how big and good and that they are. So D squadron by and large operated from the south east in Rhodesia at the time.

Interviewer If you…and it might have happened I don’t know…if you took casualties there it would have been…the military here would have referred to it as a death and operational area.

Roy Yes, that was still very much closed at the time. It’s not a secret anymore now but certainly at the time.

Interviewer How many guys served in D squadron?

Roy Well, there’s a new book being written I believe. I would estimate that there would have been…well there was quite a bit. At the time in the late seventies, ’77, ’78, ’79, until the elections it was for a large period of the time the Special Forces in this country’s major operational zone. And the guys did a lot of operations there to assist the Rhodesians at the time, and it was a good operational experience. There was a lot of people that went there. But that served under the D squadron framework must have been about 50 or so people, maybe a bit more.

Interviewer Once again that must have stretched your thoughts about who

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you were fighting because suddenly you were in a neighbouring country fighting secretly and could they all have been linked directly to South Africa? I suppose it could have in the sense of the Communist pressure?

Roy It certainly was perceived under the same frame and we all knew that once the hondo, which is a Shona word for war, ends there, then it’s coming this way. And it certainly did happen that way. So yes, we saw it as the same kind of same tasking doing there, and you must know it’s a bit exciting for a young guy getting this cover story, D squadron, klim in ‘n airplane, gaan daar, bly in die hotel en dit, en gaan operasies… Ja al wat ek wil sê oor hierdie spectrum dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering toe en nou is geen anderste as enige ander regering nie. Almal het maar hulle storietjies en plannetjies en strategieë en taktiek op politiese en militêre vlak en goed so die boodskap wat ek oordra is die regering van die tyd was niks anderste as nou behalwe dat dit ongelukkig net ‘n gedeelte van die land verteenwoordig het nie. En daarby gaan ‘n ou nie verbykom nie.

Interviewer Just rewinding a little bit, you mentioned this competition between yourselves, and the Scouts, and the Rhodesian SAS. Within the SADF, was there much competition or jealousy between the parachute…1 Parabat and the Recces?

Roy The control staff, the permanent force members of the parachute battalion would have liked to compare with us. But the troopies, the para troopies could never be compared with the Special Forces troops. Because first of all those national service was only there for a year, their training wasn’t as good. Physically they probably were as good as not, but the total balance, the total toughness, no, it wasn’t. This one guy that was serving with us, he was from the Parachute Battalion, he became the training wing commander. And he once physically confronted me with it. Wat maak julle Recces nou eintlik so beter? I said, nee, ons is nie beter nie, ons is net anderste. And for a long period, especially in the late seventies and early eighties, the guys joined, I think for the reason I said because they wanted to, they enjoyed it. None of them were really career soldiers. They enjoyed it for the time and the moment and the era and all the connotations they might have made for themselves, but then in the early middle eighties things became as I said, the diamonds became polished, the curriculums, the systems, the slightly more conventional approach to the units and…like the normal units and the bit more regimental stuff which we were not, therefore a lot of guys left. The retention figure became noticeable less. And a lot of them were not really career soldiers for other therefore enjoying the moment of what it offered at the time, parachuting and diving and the social and the war, and overseas trip and the humour and all the stuff we’ve covered now. (counter at 293)

SIDE B (counter at 77)

Interviewer …sort of history. I know that all regiments develop their own

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flavour and their own characteristics, but would the Recces have been more British army orientated, British tradition then a straight South African? Was there anything that made the Recces different to the SADF is what I’m asking, in terms of tradition and so on?

Roy I think you phrased it correctly. Every crowd has their own tradition. We certainly had a culture of our own as the rest of the regiments. Remember most of them were much older than we were. And we were certainly more informal than the rest of the bigger battalions and units were. But everybody created their own (inaudible). Even amongst ourselves. The guys in Langebaan, the sea (inaudible) the guys in Durban and the Phalaborwa guys had their own cultures and traditions.

Interviewer When in 1980 some of the SAS guys and some of the Scouts guys came down, somewhere…where did I read it? It could have been in Peter Stiff’s book, he suggested that there was an element of culture shock for the Rhodesian guys trying to slot into the mindset of…

Roy Yes, it didn’t work at all. It didn’t work.

Interviewer And was that purely because of the culture, or was that because they were still in their own kind of shock about what had happened in Rhodesia. They never expected that Mugabe would come to power.

Roy I think a lot of them didn’t want to continue but it was definitely a different culture altogether. And you can experience today with Rhodesians in this country as well, a lot of them, which I find quite strange with, they resent the Afrikaans culture in totality. They refuse to speak it, ninety percent of them. They still have this like kind of British approach to the South Africans and Afrikaans speaking people. And I find that strange because they came to a country when they were in trouble, for their own reasons they came here, and this country looked after them and then they resented the culture, which built the country, which was actually fighting the same common cause as they did. And it was noticeable and it still is. It was totally a non compatible kind of scenario.

Interviewer That’s interesting because I presume the South African government at the time when they decided to assimilate these units into the SADF saw a strategic value to it. I mean, I don’t think they were just being nice guys and saying well, we’ll take you to Phalaborwa just because we think you’re nice guys. I mean, they saw a strategic into it, but that effectively most of those guys were gone within two years of getting here.

Roy Well I think it was part of the transition, I suppose they had to look after the people to come and all that. And you must remember for them, they also had their own pride and national thing, their own flag and the Ian Smith era, this that and the other. For them an era was over as well. For them to be motivated as

29

well, and they come in a different environment and it is totally a different culture. As much as you would have thought black and white is…it was a bit of an uncompatible scenario, I remember that time. And the odd few guys stayed on…and they made it and they were good soldiers in general as well in their own rights…they were good soldiers.

Interviewer I know that with 32 Battalion there were accusations that some of the guys were said to be no more than mercenaries. Did you encounter mercenaries and were there mercenaries who were working within Special Forces?

Roy Yes, there were guys that came through.

Interviewer So guys who did it purely for the money…

Roy Yes.

Interviewer But they were paid no different to you?

Roy No, no. There were guys who were just there to make money and they were soldiers, there were the odd few of them.

Interviewer Is there anything you want to add? … discussing the issues of how you’d be fighting alongside a black guy, yet you might go back and he wouldn’t be allowed to go to the same restaurant as you. And the difficulties of assimilating the Rhodesian Special Forces into the cultural and traditional background of the SADF. How difficult was it to align those different cultures in a unit like the Recces? I mean it did happen to a degree, but how difficult was it?

Roy I think I’m going to answer that by starting at the current scenario. And you can make it vice versa and as from the time as well, and it does not necessarily pertain to the Recces, it’s a national thing, which white people and black people must know about the composition of the cultures of this country. I’ve no doubt in my mind that people of different races and cultures can work together when it needs to be, but there will always be, due to our background, our culture, our heritage, some form of preference of society in terms when it comes to your social and private and free will to enter into social structures where you come to. And it certainly wasn’t more difficult at the time which is much easier now, for example the restaurant thing. And then of course the biggest thing is now that legislation equates everybody that it’s a one man one vote system, that makes it easier. But I think a lot of the people of the Recces at the time will as I have and sentiment with the scenario at the time but we accept the change as well. And I think it applies from black to white, white to black. And for the other examples you mentioned from the Rhodesian time as well. And it’s probably everybody’s right to feel that way, as long as the national wealth of the country is important. And I think what is happening now with the reconnaissance regiment that probably carries that well. But there will always be the individual’s choice to do what he wants to do.

30

Interviewer So essentially you’re saying that your example of back in the late seventies when you were fighting alongside black guys, you were doing the same job under the same circumstances and therefore you were equals. But if the black guy you were fighting alongside wanted to go home and eat different meals to you or follow different religious practises that was absolutely fine. So while you’re equal in terms of your employment, you should be allowed to follow your own cultural preferences and your own right to association.

Roy Being an operational commander in Phalaborwa at 53 Commando, I remember one black trooper, Kelvin Ndlovu, I think was the name. The guy is dead now. At one event I’d asked him, come and stand here with us which was the leader element and the white guys, and the answer I just gave you actually came from him. He says, sir, it’s also nice for us, to do our own thing and all that, we fight together, but we are happy to talk about what we talk and you guys are happy. And that made me realise that it is a diverse society and people have the choice to associate who with they want to associate with on different levels. And that does not mean you cannot share the same country or the same opportunities.

Interviewer We were talking about the Recces in an era when only white people could vote in South Africa. Now within a South Africa where everybody can vote, is there still a need for a Special Forces unit? Is there a need in the military or society for Special Forces fighters?

Roy One can never guarantee the future and any government who has the ability to get rid of it would be a stupid mistake. It would be stupid.

Interviewer Do you ever run into former black operators and chat with them about how their lives have panned out?

Roy Most of them seem to have been coping well and when you see them it’s like seeing anyone of your old friends, and there’s…and it’s a good moment as any. Most of them seem to have been coping well as well.

Interviewer Do you ever talk politics if you run into them?

Roy No not really in the sense of the now politics. But I’ll tell you one thing is that a lot of them has come out for the old system as opposed to the new system…

Interviewer Why is that?

Roy …as they feel that the new system is not competent enough in any terms. First of all you must remember out of their perspective they’ll have a military past perspective and they know the military is not nearby in the same league it is now than it was in general. And a lot of them respected the positive ways of the pre-apartheid military and as a lot of people in the world and others

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just know the current government is just not as competent in many assets as the previous government was. And that’s not too difficult to see.

Interviewer Then in essence they, like you, accept that times have changed and so you deal with society as it is now and you have to make the most of it.

Roy Yes, in essence, I think a lot of us probably have been led into it due to the circumstances. Probably a lot of us wouldn’t have resigned or left if the dispensation was still the same. But yes I don’t think there’s people sitting and sulking every day and say, I wish, I wish, I wish.

Interviewer And nobody is sitting plotting violent overthrow at this stage to go back to the old days.

Roy Well it might happen as a far out dream for an individual and so on but no, I can guarantee you no. And I’m not involved in anything, but I guarantee you no, there’s nothing of that nature, because if you know anything for a start like this, the conditions are so difficult to try and do that that there probably…I can guarantee you there’s nothing going on. The odd Barend Strydom and the odd this and that oke might bitch and all that but there’s no organised resistance organisation I can tell you now.

Interviewer Alright, and then this evening you’re going to be going to watch rugby?

Roy Absoluut. … I must just set the record straight here about those goody goody Recces, the balanced and good okes, that they were. But make no mistake, when there needed to be done, hard work and fighting and aggressiveness, and if it meant killing, that was part of the legal thing, yes, make no mistake then these guys could become lions and growling and fighting bears when is required. But it stems from a balance and it stems from a good breeding and it stems from a good nationality. Then these guys could develop or become these people being a good hard fighting force with no argument.

Interviewer So while killing might have been part of the job, it wasn’t a way of life?

Roy It certainly wasn’t brush your teeth in the morning and go and shave in the morning and say, who can I kill today? Or I want blood on my hands, or anything like that. Not nearly. But make no mistake, you wouldn’t want to be on the wrong side of these guys, either on the battlefield or even at a pub when it had to be, and there were many brawls, the odd brawls in pubs and stuff as well. And we came the better of it as well. But it certainly wasn’t the lifestyle, it wasn’t something that you would roam on or anything but when the need arises the guys could do the job, no argument.

Interviewer Were many Recces or Special Forces soldiers religious?

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Roy Yes. A fair percentage of them did the church thing and you must remember in the military at the time there was always the morning prayers thing at the parades, and the odd church parade which was compulsory. But a lot of them due to the culture of the country at the time, the national culture, especially amongst the Afrikaans communities where the family goes to church on the Sunday morning, that like kind of did on. And then a lot of us were slightly indifferent and a lot of the people weren’t.

Interviewer And many of the guys are family men? They’ve got kids…

Roy The majority of them, although as…I don’t think the percentage is any different than the rest of the country statistic. A lot of people got divorced and all that. But even those guys who got divorced they were always loyal to the children. If there were divorces handled it professionally and gentlemanly so to speak if I may use the phrase. But by and large the people were family men those who got married.

Interviewer So yet again, the myth of these all conquering soldiers, soldiering was a job, but after soldiering they also had lives as humans.

Roy As I said, if you were not on some course or deployed, which was a large percentage of the time at the time, you had a normal life. You went to work and you came home and you had a house and children and watched rugby and go to the beach and have a drink, or a restaurant. So we were normal men.

Interviewer Actually sitting here talking to you now I just thought of something else, I know that some Recces, quite a high percentage, have gone off into nature conservation as either as rangers or anti poaching or in some form of an attempt to go and live in the bush. Is that because many associate it with the past? The past, much time was spent in the bush and the guys feel comfortable there. Do you think that there’s an association that they like the bush because it reminds them of the young days when they were rough…you said initially rough…but tough soldiers?

Roy Rough and tough on the Bluff (1 Recce were based on the Bluff, a suburb of Durban) - era, no. I just think the guys who went that way it just a part of their making. I don’t think it’s a link to reminisce. I don’t think it’s a link to the military as such. It’s what the man would like doing another job as well.

END OF INTERVIEW (counter at 257)

Collection Number: A3079 Collection Name: “Missing Voices” Oral History Project, 2004-2012

PUBLISHER: Publisher: Historical Papers Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand Location: Johannesburg ©2016

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