royal commission into the home insulation program commission into the home insulation program royal...

Witness statement

Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program

Royal Commissions Act 1902 {Cth)

Statement of: William Kimber

Address:

Occupation: Public Servant

Date: 9 May 2014

I, WILLIAM KIMBER, public servant make oath and say:

This is a supplementary statement that I have made in response to a request from the

Commission for me to appear before a public hearing on 9 May 2014. This statement also

refers to statements and evidence given by other witnesses to the Commission.

2 I have previously provided statements to the Commission including an interview with

Commission staff on 12 February 2014, a written statement on 4 April 2014, appearing as a

witness in a hearing of the Commission on 9 and 10 April 2014, and a written statement on

17 April 2014.

3 I participated in an interview in 2010 with representatives of the Australian National Audit

Office (ANAO) concerning an inquiry or review that the ANAO was conducting into the Home

Insulation Program (HIP) at that time. I was involved in pulling together aspects of the

Department's submission to a Senate Enquiry into the HIP. I was not involved in the coronia!

investigations related to the program or any other inquiries or investigations.

Role in the Home Insulation Program

4 I commenced employment with the Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts -···

(DEWHA) on 25 March 2008 as Assistant Director in the Greenh se Gas Abatement Team,

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which was responsible for delivering some of the previous Howard Government's policies on

greenhouse gas abatement.

5 On 3 February 2009, I was asked to join the Home Insulation Policy Team (the "HIP Team"). I

started work in this new role on the same day. My official transfer to the Home Insulation

Policy Team occurred on 2 March 2009. My role was 'Executive Level1 -Assistant Director

in the Home Insulation Policy Team.

6 In this role I reported to an Executive Level 2 officer who was Ms Beth Riordan, Director of

the Home Insulation Policy Team. Ms Juliana Marconi was also a member of the HIP Team

at this time. At various times, Ms Sacha Kaminski, Ms Jane Spence, Ms Joe Beath and Dr

Troy Delbridge also served in this team.

7 When I joined the HIP team Mr Kevin Keeffe was the Assistant Secretary responsible for the

HIP team. Later Mr Aaron Hughes occupied the Senior Executive Service Band 1.

8 I was acting Director of the HIP Team for approximately two months starting in April or May of

2009 until Ms Kathy Belka was recruited and commenced work. During that period I was

performing the role of both my substantive job as EL 1 and also that of the EL2, Director of

the HIP team. Having to act in this role without having my position backfilled greatly increased

my workload in the program.

9 I worked on the HIP until I went on leave from the Department on 21 May 2010.

Access to emails and documents from mv time in the HIP

1 0 Prior to making my two earlier written statements and prior to appearing before the

Commission on 9 and 10 April 2014, I had not had an opportunity to view em ails from my

time in the HIP as I lost access to my email profile when I left the department in 2010. In the

three days prior to 9 May I was provided with approximately 43,000 (forty three thousand)

email files, contained in two batches from 2008, 2009 and 2010 by the Australian

Government Solicitor. The files were provided to me on a memory stick and any em ails,

perhaps 80 percent, only contained names of sender and receiver, subject, time and date. No

content in the body or the attachments was available. I understand that this is due to the way

that email archiving has beeri done and it was not possible for me to access the full email

records prior to 9 May 2014 as it takes around one business day per recovery, and each

recovery only covers one month of em ails.

11 In preparing this statement I have had an opportunity to view a small fraction of the em ails

provided to me, as it has not been possible to assess all the email files in the time available.

Policy development for the HIP

12 On the morning of 3 February 2009 I was working in another area of the department and was

reading the media release (Attachment 1) when I was contacted by Mr Carter the first

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assistant secretary who asked me to start work with Ms Riordan on the HIP effective

immediately. I indicated that I knew nothing at that time about insulation or its installation.

13 From my reading of the media release I understood the program was to install free ceiling

insulation up to $1600 per home in around 2.7 million homes within two and a half years. I

considered that the task to implement a program of this size and complexity was very

challenging and would require substantial lead up time for consultations and preparations

prior to implementation. I was further concerned that the press release indicated that the

insulation would be provided simply by making a phone call. Such a program was both novel

and risky with no agency in Australia having previously attempted it, let alone at such a large

scale and in such short timeframes. At the same time the government had also announced

the Low Emissions Plan for Renters (LEPR) which the press release indicated was targeted

at landlords to allow investors who insulate their tenanted rental properties to access a $1000

rebate.

14 I soon learned from Ms Riordan that Ms Riordan and Ms Wiley-Smith had been asked to work

on the program over the previous weekend, that the policy development process had been

very fast and that due to the Government's need for confidentiality they had been given

limited opportunity to consult with industry or other stakeholders. Ms Riordan indicated to me

that the department had suggested the implementation period be five years, however the

Government had selected a two and a half year implementation period to maximise the

economic stimulus objectives. I believe having extra time, and a different business model,

would have reduced the risks in the program.

15 I was concerned that the policy development had been rushed and it did not appear that the

department had been given an opportunity to conduct consultations and consider issues as

would normally have been the case in policy development, especially for such a major

program. It seemed that Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) had been involved in the

program's development and the department had been handed a difficult task to implement it.

A Project Control Group was established for HIP where PM&C were active in steering

directions of the program, in particular job creation was an important issue for them

(Attachment 2). By April 2009 the department provided weekly reporting to PM&C including

on number of homes insulated and money spent.

16 I was concerned that the department had no prior experience with a major insulation rebate

scheme and did not have an existing in house technical expertise in insulation materials and

the installation of ceiling insulation that could be drawn upon. Nor was there time to develop

this given the government's delivery timetable. This meant we were starting from scratch and

needed to rely heavily on external expertise. I was also concerned that the industry was

fragmented with many product types and competitive interests at play, so we needed to know

which consultants and experts may have had conflicts of interest and consider that along with

their advice and representations. (/ 1

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Commencement of the Program on 3 February 2009

17 From 3 February 2009 when the press release was issued I was receiving phone calls from

the public asking how to access the funding. This was problematic as I was unprepared;

having only the press release to go on and it was a scramble to develop the first set of draft

program guidelines which were produced around a week later.

Time when I first became concerned about risks and safety issues

18 I was concerned about compliance and safety issues from the first week in the program, from

3 Feb 2009 onwards. I had no background expertise or specific knowledge of insulation and

by 11 Feb 2009 Ms Marconi and I had started compiling key information that we could gather

through desktop research (Attachment 3). A first draft of the phase 1 guidelines was

produced by 10 Feb 2009 (Attachment 4).

19 I passed information to my supervisor Ms Riordan (Attachment 5) and Ms Riordan passed

information to Mr Keefe. Sometimes I passed information directly to Mr Keeffe and Mr

Hughes. I convened a meeting of external advisors on 3 April 2009 where participants

discussions included the following issues and other safety, quality and compliance issues

which I passed on in an email to Mr Keeffe (Attachment 6):

• "no mitigation strategies will produce zero risk and a risk management approach

must be taken as it is with the BCA (Building Code of Australia).

• high likelihood of catastrophic consequence (death or serious injury)."

20 I was concerned that there was a threat to installer safety following this meeting.

21 Ms Riordan, Mr Keefe and Mr Hughes were also concerned about risks in the program

including safety risks and took action to advise the decision makers of these risks and to also

advise on ways that the department could deliver on the government's objectives for rapid

delivery, large scale and job creation.

22 On 28 March 2009 Mr Keeffe advised the Secretary and the Minister's office that risks in the

program were extreme (Attachment 7). I was involved in drafting a brief for the Minister on 9

April 2009 that indicated the presence of extreme risks (Attachment 8). I was involved in

contributing to the risk register that was updated on a regular basis and was shared with the

Minister's office around the end of April 2009 (Attachment 9).

23 I sent an email on 21 October 2009 regarding electrical safety issues, and an email on 30

October 2009 regarding downlights to Mr Matt Levey in the Minister's office however I do not

have the content of these em ails (Attachment 10, 11 ).

Efforts to manage risks in the program

24 I considered that it was challenging to manage risks in the program. The Government had

decided to adopt the Medicare assisted rapid delivery model(/,iCh was demand driven,

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rather than a five year regional delivery model where the program would be rolled out in

stages around Australia. A regional delivery model would have allowed the potential for a

procurement approach to be taken where the department could deal with fewer installer

companies via a contract with each supplier of the services. The program could have been

piloted then assessed prior to the next stage. I considered these measures would have

provided more control, but would also have slowed down roll-out of the program. I discussed

these issues with Mr Keeffe and within the HIP team and I believe that our thinking would

have been passed on to the decision makers.

25 The decision by the government to go with the Medicare model combined with the

requirement for large scale meant there was not a lot that I or my colleagues in the

department could do that would be effective in reducing risks. We were told consistently

including by Mr Hoffman of PM&C that the barrier for entry for installers had to be low and

there should be a minimum of red-tape to allow rapid expansion and for existing installers and

new entrants to the industry to register and participate in the program. These decisions meant

that the compliance approach was retrospective rather than up-front. I did try to address

safety and compliance risks through my work including contributing to the minimum standards

for products and installation in the guidelines, the installer competencies and installer register,

development of installer training, production of safety manuals and materials,

communications with the installer workforce, engagement with relevant agencies and the

States and Territories, and through the compliance regime, but these efforts were not

sufficient in my view to reduce risks adequately.

26 I had little confidence in the existing industry players who had not been very closely regulated

prior to the program, furthermore there had been consumer complaints and problems

previously, and their lobbying behaviour indicated to me that they were primarily interested in

accessing funding from the program as quickly as possible, and ensuring that their products

could participate (Attachment 12,13,14). Myself and the rest of the HIP team were short of

time and resources to further investigate and devise options to reduce the various risks as

further outlined below.

27 Once commencement of the main phase of the program had started post 1 July 2009 the size

of the demand from households and the large response to meet that demand became

apparent. This was one factor we could not be sure of before the program started in earnest.

Once this happened it meant that the risks that we had been concerned with started to come

to fruition.

28 I discussed my concerns with Mr Hughes and Mr Keeffe on regular basis during 2009 and I

believe that they shared my concerns. I remember discussing with Mr Keeffe some time post

1 July 2009 that we were going too quickly and should consider a time-out to review the

program. I realised that Mr Keeffe and Mr Hughes were in a difficult position as they said that .,. oJ ...... ~ . ..

they had reported their concerns but the message from the g

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delivery was the primary concern. I did not discuss my concerns any further up the chain of

command but I believe that other more senior people on the Project Control Group may have

also shared these concerns as they could see the same information that I had on how the

program was tracking throughout 2009.

Time when I first considered the States and Territories and their engagement in HIP

29 I was concerned about the need to develop adequate engagement with the States and

Territories, the need for adequate training and the need for compliance mechanisms from the

first week of the program, from 3 February 2009 onwards. I received an email from Ms

Riordan on 9 February 2009 that indicated these and other issues had already been raised

with a selection of industry stakeholders (Attachment 15).

30 I became aware in internal discussions with colleagues early on that the States and

Territories had legislation for occupational health and safety and other regulation of the

building and construction industry. That being the case and even if the Commonwealth

Department of the Environment had no legislation in this area I was still concerned that with

the size and impact of the program on the retro-fit insulation industry, that the HIP guidelines

would become a default industry standard, and the department would become a regulator in

practice.

31 I attempted to establish greater engagement with the States and Territories. This included on

30 April 2009 working to set up working groups for occupational health and safety and fair

trading with the States and Territories and establish memorandums of understanding to share

information on installers in the program. Mr Hughes also took steps to coordinate the

stakeholder engagement activity in the program (Attachment 16). The department set up a

meeting on 29 April 2009 with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and

State and Territory Fair Trading Organisations (Attachment 17). On 9 April 2009 I

encouraged MsKaminski on her liaison with the New South Wales Office of Fair Trading

(Attachment 18). The South Australian Department of Energy provided input to program

guidelines including on safety issues related to insulation installation (Attachment 19).

32 By March 2009 no structured arrangements to work with the States and Territories for

example on guidelines issues and on sharing information about non-compliant installers had

been set up. To the best of my knowledge structured information sharing arrangements did

not eventuate during the first half of 2009. From my perspective it would have been better to

have greater engagement and the reason I could not pursue it personally was due to

constraints on my time and resources and the overwhelming amount of work that needed to

be done. At this time, enquiries from the community on how they could access the program

were already being made and this was also a source of pressure to deliver on the roll-out.

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Knowledge of Foil Insulation Products

33 I first became aware of foil based insulation products during the week of 3 February 2009 as

part of my initial research on insulation products, including an email on 12 February 2009 on

product testing of some foil insulation products (Attachment 20). I do not recall wheri I first

became aware of the New Zealand experience in installing foil products where an installer

had been electrocuted. I do recall becoming aware of it sometime during the first half of

2009. I do not recall Mr Keeffe asking me or my team to investigate the New Zealand

experience. I do not recall when I first became aware of the electrical risk of the practice of

stapling metal foil insulation.

Lack of resourcing and time to conduct adequate policy development and analysis of risks

34 In February 2009 Minister Garrett was keen for us to prioritise development of the Low

Income Plan for Renters (Attachment 21 ). There was also focus on Question Time Briefs

(QTBs), Possible Parliamentary Questions (PPQs), senate estimates, media enquiries and

responding to community members and installers who were calling and emailing the

department asking how to get access to the program. The number of staff we had was

around five or six in the early stages (Attachment 22) was not adequate to address the

expectation for responsiveness by the Minister's office as communicated to us through the

senior executive. There were a range of requests such as reporting to the coordinator

general, responses and advice to other parliamentarians on the program on eligibility and

· coverage, and updating the question time briefs. This workload contributed to the resource

constraints that I and my colleagues were facing (Attachments 23, 24, 25, 26).

35 Much of this tasking was urgent and meant that I and my colleagues needed to be reactive

and ready to drop work at a moment's notice to focus on more urgent things. I and many of

my colleagues were working long hours often 10 hour days, and my colleagues in the HIP

team were also racking up many hours of flex time which concerned me as I did not feel the

work load was sustainable from a work life balance point of view. The work environment was

chaotic, and forced us to be reactive. This made it challenging to analyse and develop

approaches to the HIP program as we did not have adequate resources or time to look at all

the issues in detail and conduct adequate consultations or focus on development of technical

knowledge of insulation products and safety issues. Efforts to recruit staff in key positions,

such as compliance, were made however I feel there was not a sufficient urgency to build the

type of capability the department needed. I raised this with Mr Keeffe and I believe that he

agreed with me (Attachment 27). This situation persisted throughout 2009.

36 A media campaign was being planned designed to stimulate interest and demand in the

program and I was concerned that this was distracting our resources from key tasks in

building the integrity of the program which I felt was lacking (Attachment 28). Numerous

technical issues were popping up that there was an expectation we would devote time and

resources to investigate, even though I considered them to b a distraction from key risks in

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the program. For example the issue of whether reflective paint could be eligible in the

program (Attachment 29).

37 I adjusted my work priorities to meet the needs of my bosses and the Minister and passed

these priorities on to people in the HIP team. This is what we are required to do as public

servants, to serve the government of the day and implement their priorities. The affect of my

adjusting priorities for example to complete QTBs, PPQs, consultations with NGOs and

design of the LEAPR meant that other issues needed to slip such as training and compliance

including liaison with the States and Territories.

38 In the face of these challenges, myself and other staff in the HIP team and our senior

executives displayed resilience, flexibility and commitment to serve the government.

Product Neutral Policy

39 All products were allowed into the program so long as they met the Australian standard for

insulation materials (Attachment 30). The Minister's office and the Prime Minister's office

were keen to ensure that small players were not disadvantaged in participating in the

program (Attachment 31 ). A range of industry players were lobbying to have their products

included, such as expanded polystyrene (Attachment 32).

Role of Mr Trov Delbridge

40 I was Dr Delbridge's supervisor. He was engaged on 20 March 2009 on a twelve month

contract. His contract was terminated on 29 July 2009. I was not involved in Dr Delbridge's

recruitment.

41 Dr Delbridge was employed on contract as an ASO 6 policy and program officer in the Home

Energy Branch. Dr Delbridge was not employed as a technical expert. He did not have

specific qualifications or experience in the insulation industry or in the testing of insulation or

in safety issues related to insulation products or their installation.

42 Dr Delbridge's role was to identify and gather information and analysis from experts who did

have the required expertise, knowledge and experience. A key part of his job was to pass

information on to the HIP team so that it could be provided to more senior people and

decision makers.

Alleged threats against Dr Delbridge

43 At no stage did I ever threaten Dr Delbridge. I did not tell Dr Delbridge to shut up. I did not

threaten him with termination if he did not shut up. I always treated Dr Delbridge with respect

and courtesy. I always sought to promote the passage of information and discussion of ,

important issues. My practice and the practice in the HIP team was to share information and

ideas, and treat others with respect and courtesy.

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STA.001.024.0017

Allegations that Dr Delbridge was prevented from speaking out

44 At no stage did I prevent Dr Delbridge from speaking with anyone else including senior

people. This was not something I could have done or would have done. Our practice in the

HIP team which I promoted was to share information and analysis. I did not seek to constrain

the passage of information.

Allegation that I micro-managed Dr Delbridge or other staff members

45 I did not micro-manage Dr Delbridge or people in the HIP Team. I found that aspects of Dr

Delbridge's work and conduct were below the standards required for an APS 6 level officer.

After consultation with Paul Monagle of the Human Resources Division and Mr Aaron Hughes

who was my supervisor at the time, I conducted performance management with Dr Delbridge.

This involved me I asking Dr Delbridge to complete work that was assigned to him, set out

expectations, and then followed up with him regarding completion and evaluation of his work.

Dr Delbridge resisted my efforts to work with him to prioritize his workload and set realistic

expectations for his work. He failed to work with me to develop a performance and

development plan which would set out expectations of his work and conduct. I provided Mr

Monagle and Mr Hughes with updates on progress and took further advice on what the next

steps would be in the performance management process. Mr Monagle and Mr Hughes were

supportive of my efforts to conduct performance management with Dr Delbridge.

Allegation that I prevented Dr Delbridge from speaking with other agencies

46 I did not direct Dr Delbridge to not worry about safety issues. I was concerned that the level

of engagement in the program from relevant work health and safety agencies in the States

and Territories was below what we had hoped for. I had asked Dr Delbridge to establish

relevant contacts and a memorandum of understanding with relevant agencies as a way to

increase their engagement and assist the passage of information between the

Commonwealth and relevant agencies and vice-versa.

47 I am not aware that a memorandum of understanding with work safety agencies in the States

and Territories was concluded following Dr Delbridge's departure. I remained concerned

about the need for greater engagement with the States and Territories, and that the

program's compliance capacity may not be sufficient.

48 Mr Keefe and Mr Hughes said to me words to the effect that they also felt the program was

risky and that it was challenging to control these risks while still implementing the program in

a way that would achieve the Government's requirements for rapid delivery at a large scale.

Allegation Dr Delbridge was terminated due to his contact with State and Territory Agencies

49 It is my recollection that Dr Delbridge's contact with State agencies was not a reason for his

termination. It is my understanding that Dr Delbridge was terminated for under performance

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STA.001.024.0018

of his duties as an APS6 officer. Mr Hughes advised Dr Delbridge of the termination of his

contract and I was not present at that meeting.

Allegation that I prevented Dr Delbridge from reporting a safety breach by an installer in Griffith

50 I did not tell Dr Delbridge he was not to report information to the Queensland authorities.

When I became aware of possible installer breaches of the program guidelines I passed this

information on to the compliance team in the Department. Dr Delbridge and I were working in

the policy section and it was not our role to deal with compliance matters.

Allegation that I told Dr Delbridge that non-compliance by installers was not our concern

51 I did not indicate to Dr Delbridge that non-compliance was not our concern. If the HIP team

received information about installer non-compliance it was to be documented so it could be

considered by the compliance function of the program (Attachment 33). In April 2009 prior to

the compliance capability being set up I asked members of the HIP team to ensure that the

HIP team was recording information about installers behaving badly (Attachment 34).

Email exchange between myself and Dr Delbridge on 17 July 2009

52 I was concerned about safety and compliance issues in the program and concerned that our

ability to share information on installers with relevant work health and safety agencies in the

States and Territories was below what was required for the program. I had asked Dr

Delbridge to establish relevant contacts and a memorandum of understanding with relevant

agencies as a way to increase their engagement and assist the passage of information

between the Commonwealth and relevant agencies and vice-versa.

53 In an email at 1.08pm on 17 July 2009 (Attachment 35) I indicated to Dr Delbridge that he

needed to avoid expressing sensitivities to external stakeholders regarding the potential for

installers to have accidents in the program. The reason for my indicating this was to ensure

that the passage of information regarding non-compliance was done in a structured, timely

and coordinated way, not in an ad-hoc fashion. I felt that establishing a memorandum of

understanding would assist in setting up this appropriate structure, establishing "buy-in" to the

program by the relevant agencies which was lacking, and assist with any possible privacy

concerns in the exchange of information. This comment was not a direction to Dr Delbridge

to not share important information with the relevant agencies.

54 In addition, Dr Delbridge was an APS 6 officer and I considered that he should not be

representing views to external agencies or the public which had not been considered by more

senior people in the department.

55 I was concerned about Dr Delbridge's reliability, as he had not copied me on this email and

was not sharing relevant information with me and other colleagues regarding his interactions

with these agencies. I felt he was not delivering on assisting the department to establish the

information sharing relationships with the States and Territon_i~e- 'tnfhcat. the program needed. I

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STA.001.024.0019

was concerned that Dr Delbridge's failure to do this was hampering the HIP team's ability to

engage with the relevant agencies and having a negative impact on our ability to better

understand and address safety and compliance issues in the program.

Email from Dr Delbridge to me and senior executives on 28 Julv 2009

56 On 28 July Dr Delbridge sent an email addressed to me and copied in Mr Forbes, Mr Carter,

Mr Hughes and other Departmental staff, where he accused me of bullying and harassment

by placing an unreasonable workload on him, and accusing him of fraud (Attachment 36). I

was very surprised to receive this email.

57 I did not bully or harass Dr Delbridge. Dr Delbridge resisted my efforts to establish clear and

agreed expectations for his work and performance via a performance development plan

(PDS) and resisted my efforts to work with him to prioritise his workload. Dr Delbridge failed

to pass information to me as was required. My attempts to work with him on these matters

are referenced in my email to him dated 23 July 2009 (Attachment 37).

58 I was concerned about resources in the HIP team and the need to recruit more people who

were capable of harnessing expert advice and building effective relationships with key

regulatory agencies. Dr Delbridge was failing at these tasks.

Allegation by Dr Delbridge that I was willing to accept serious injuries as a result of the program

59 I was not willing to accept serious injuries or deaths as a result of the program. I was

concerned about a range of risks in the program including installer safety. I was concerned

that the pace and large scale of the program and the delivery model selected by the

government would raise the likelihood of these risks further. As I have stated above, I passed

information about safety concerns on to more senior people in the department who shared

my concerns.

Suggestion Dr Delbridge was a whistle blower

60 Dr Delbridge was not alone in being concerned about safety and risk in the program, and

speaking about those concerns. The HIP team, including myself, my other colleagues and

senior people were also concerned that there were risks in the program and that the scale

and speed of its implementation would intensify those risks. Dr Delbridge was aware that I

was concerned about safety and risks in the program as we discussed my concerns both one

on one and in team meetings on a regular basis. The HIP team collected and passed

information on a range of issues and risks with the program, including regarding safety to

senior people and decision makers.

Allegations that I harassed or bullied Dr Delbridge

61 I did not harass or bully Dr Delbridge. I always treated Dr Delbridge with respect and

courtesy. I did provide him with directions as his supervisor any;:~was responsible for his

performance management.

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Allegation Dr Delbridge was terminated for raising concerns

62 Dr Delbridge was not terminated for raising concerns in the program, or for speaking out

about safety issues, or for making contact with external agencies.

Under-Performance of Or Delbridge

63 The Department followed under-performance procedures and Dr Delbridge's contract was

terminated. Dr Delbridge was being performance managed as a result of his failure to

complete the work that was assigned to him on time and to a satisfactory standard, his failure

to adequately participate in team activities and meetings, and failure to attend work during

normal business hours. I documented Dr Delbridge's under-performance and raised this with

my supervisor Mr Hughes as well as with Mr Paul Monagle who was an EL2 officer in the

corporate area of the Department responsible for advising supervisors on performance

management of staff. I received support from both Mr Hughes and Mr Monagle in the form

of advice and assurance that they felt Dr Delbridge's performance was below the standards

required and we needed to follow under-performance procedures. Mr Monagle also indicated

to me at the time that Dr Delbridge had had similar performance problems during his

employment with the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service. Mr Monagle showed me

an ABC media item from 19 April 2000 that suggested this may have been the case.

Dr Delbridge's failure to complete work on time and to a satisfactory standard

64 It was part of Dr Delbridge's job to gather information from experts and relevant agencies that

related to the program and share it with the HIP team so that we could provide analysis and

advice to more senior people and decision makers. I was concerned that Dr Delbridge was

not passing relevant information to myself and the HIP team. I was also concerned that Dr

Delbridge was not performing his duties by failing to complete the work assigned to him.

65 Dr Delbridge indicated to me that he had too much work. I asked him to provide me with

information about what he was doing so that we could make a plan to prioritise his work, and

reallocate some of his work to others if needed. Dr Delbridge resisted my efforts to help him

plan and prioritise his work.

Dr Delbridge's failure to attend during normal business hours

66 I raised my concerns with Dr Delbridge regarding his regular failure to attend work during

normal business hours, which were around 9am to 5pm and were set out in the Department's

policy. Dr Delbridge would frequently not arrive in the office until after 1 Oam or 11 am, and

sometimes he would not leave until 1 Opm or 11 pm. I told Dr Delbridge that he was unreliable

as he sometimes failed to arrive in time, or was absent without explanation for scheduled

meetings with our team or with other officials and stakeholders. I told Dr Delbridge that some

flexibility is ok but his unexplained absences were so frequent as to be a problem as he was

not contributing to the work of the team, and was missing out on important information, and

not sharing information as he should be. When I raised these i ues with Dr Delbridge he

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STA.001.024.0021

refused to accept that he needed to be in the office during normal business hours and his

erratic attendance continued. I also raised with Dr Delbridge his inappropriate attire in that he

would often remain in his lycra bike gear after riding his bike to work.

Dr Delbridge's failure to adequately participate in team activities and meetings

67 I told Dr Delbridge that he was not adequately sharing information with me and other

members of the HIP team as he should have been, such as keeping records of discussions

with relevant stakeholders and agencies and passing them on. Dr Delbridge resisted my

request for this and continued to operate without adequately sharing information.

68 Dr Delbridge indicated to me that he was suffering from stress. I became concerned about his

health and suggested he should take time off and also notified him of the Department's

Employee Assistance Program (EAP) which provides counselling support. He did not take

any time off. I do not know if he utilised the EAP or not.

Impact of Dr Delbridge's Conduct on the HIP Team

69 The HIP Team was suffering time and resources constraints. I was concerned that Dr

Delbridge's failure to perform his duties to an adequate standard by failing to complete the

work assigned to him, failing to share information adequately, failing to attend during

business hours and failing to work effectively as part of the team, was further hampering the

HIP Team's ability to conduct consultations and more fully investigate serious issues.

Role in Minister Combet's office

70 I was seconded as a departmental officer to the office of the Hon Greg Com bet MP for a

period of approximately two weeks in late March and early April 2010. Minister Com bet had

recently taken on a role as Minister assisting, responsible for the HIP.

71 Initially Mr Hughes asked if I would agree to perform this role for a limited period as I had

specific knowledge of the program, and the Minister's office wanted someone from the

department to start as soon as possible, ie by the next day. I agreed to do this.

72 Prior to starting I met with Secretary Parkinson who indicated that my role was to assist the

Minister's office as the Minister and his staff were new to the program having just taken on

responsibility for it from Minister Garrett. This would include assisting the Minister and his

staff to obtain information from relevant work areas in the department. The Secretary also

indicated that I should be careful not to provide political advice, and he offered me his

business card and invited me to call him if there was ever a need for me to do so.

73 While in Minister Com bet's office I spoke with the Minister one-on-one on one occasion when

I first arrived. I did not make a record or summary of the discussion as I did not think to do it

at the time. The Minister asked me to come into his office and he closed the door behind us.

He said to me words to the effect: you look like an honest person I want you to tell me the

truth. I said yes I would tell him the truth. Then he asked me to ~him about the program.

Signed:~ , Taken by: ~-

./::?" / ~ of 14

STA.001.024.0022

7 4 I told him words to the effect that: from my perspective as a relatively junior officer in the

department, the program has been a very difficult and challenging task both personally and

for the department due to the requirement for such large scale and speed and the business

model selected by the government. I indicated that information had been passed to the

Ministers office regarding risks in the program including the risk to installers. I indicated that

the department did what it could to manage risks such as through installer training, production

of safety materials and the compliance regime, and that individual officers had worked as

diligently and skilfully as they could on these issues but the efforts we not adequate to

manage the risks in the program.

75 The Minister said to me words to the effect: Thank you for the information and for being frank

and honest. I left his office and that was the last time I spoke with him one-one one.

76 For the next approximately two weeks I assisted the Minister's office by liaising with the

department for information on issues like constituent enquiries, Ministerial correspondence

and coordination of briefing material. At the end of this period I asked to be returned to the

department and another departmental officer took over my role in the Minister's office.

SWORN by the deponent

at Brisbane, QLD

on .. 3 ... ~ .. ?.::;. .. 29 I Lf

Before me:

Signature of witness

LEX HOLCOMBE LAWYER HWL Ebsworth 6 National Circuit Barton ACT 2600

Signedk

Signature of deponent

Taken by:

of 14

STA.001.024.0023

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