runway incursions

Runway IncursionsRunway Incursions

What Airways are doing to help prevent these serious events.

Presented at the NZ Airports Association Conference, Palmerston North,

15 October 2009

by John Wagtendonk,

Policy and Standards, Airways New Zealand

Runway Incursions

Runway incursions are considered to be one of the most serious safety issues worldwide.

The world’s worst air disaster was a runway incursion. This was the 1977 runway collision between two Boeing 747s at Tenerife in which 583 people died.

Close calls and fatal collisions continue to occur.

Definition: Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.

Runway Incursions

• 68% of the accidents involving Air Traffic Management (ATM) occurred during the ground phase of flight. (Source: Review of ATM-related Accidents worldwide from 1980 to 2001 by the National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) – Netherlands)

• There is a runway incursion every 3 or 4 days in Europe. There is a near collision due to runway incursion every 2 or 3 months in Europe. (Source: European JAA - 2002)

• Runway incursion is a threat that may occur at any airport in the world (i.e. any airport having a significant number of ground movements).

• Runway incursions do occur in daytime as well as at night, in good as well as in low visibility conditions.

Runway Incursions

( Source – US FAA– 2001 )

Runway Incursions

Month/Year

Total

WP AA HN TG RO GS NR PM OH NP WN NS WB CH QN DN NV

01/07 3 1 1 1

02/07 5 1 1 1 1 1

03/07 1 1

04/07 3 1 1 1

05/07 6 1 3 1 1

06/07 1 1

07/07 3 1 1 1

08/07 1 1

09/07 3 1 1 1

10/07 2 1 1

11/07 4 2 1 1

12/07 2 1 1

Total 2007

34 0 6 6 2 2 1 2 1 0 3 2 4 1 0 0 1 3

In NZ - 2007 - Raw incident data reported by Airways

Runway Incursions

Month/Year

Total


01/08 7 1 1 3 1 1

02/08 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

03/08 5 1 1 1 1 1

04/08 4 2 2

05/08 9 3 1 1 1 1 1 1

06/08 4 1 1 1 1

07/08 9 3 4 2

08/08 4 1 2 1

09/08 5 1 1 1 1 1

10/08 10 3 1 1 4 1

11/08 4 3 1

12/08 3 1 1 1

Total 2008

71 0 5 18 7 0 2 3 11 1 3 9 3 2 5 1 0 1


Runway Incursions

Month/Year

Total


01/09 1 1

02/09 11 2 1 4 1 1 1 1

03/09 4 1 2 1

04/09 3 1 1 1

05/09 4 2 1 1

06/09 3 1 2

07/09 0

08/09 3 1 1 1

To date 2009

29 0 2 4 2 0 1 0 7 1 0 2 3 0 4 2 1 0


Runway Incursions

Source:Eurocontrol

Runway Incursions

For some years now, Airways has been aware of the growing world-wide concern regarding runway incursions.

•In 2004, we produced an internal advisory circular highlighting the runway incursion problems and provided recommendations to controllers regarding how to deal with them.

•Amended procedures surrounding the use of conditional line-up clearances.

•Reviewing and amending our Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) with a view to ‘strengthen’ procedures to combat runway incursions.

•Last year we established a working group (PRIP – Prevention of Runway Incursions Project) to implement as much as practicable the recommendations in ICAO Doc 9870 Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions.

Runway Incursions

ICAO Doc 9870 Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions

ICAO Doc 9870 Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions contains ICAO recommendations regarding the prevention of runway incursions.

•Describes factors contributory to runway incursions.•Recommends the establishment of a runway incursion prevention programme at aerodromes.•Provides recommendations directed at;

– Communications– Aircraft operators– Pilots– Air traffic service providers/controllers– Aerodrome operators and vehicle drivers– General

Runway Incursions

Doc 9870 also;•Provides recommendations regarding incident reporting and data collection•Describes a method of classifying severity of runway incursions

Doc 9870 is now a primary tool we use to combat runway incursions and promote safety around the aerodrome.

Airways intention is to fully comply with all Doc 9870 recommendations except where a safety case (or similar documentation) shows that it is not practical to comply in particular situations.

The following slides detail the ICAO Doc 9870 recommendations being addressed by Airways and how Airways are dealing with them.

Runway Incursions

Chapter 3 ESTABLISHING A RUNWAY INCURSION PREVENTION PROGRAMME

3.1 Runway Safety TeamsPara 3.1.1 A runway incursion prevention programme should start with the establishment of runway safety teams at individual aerodromes.

Para 3.1.2 The team should comprise representatives from:•Aerodrome operations;•Air traffic service providers;•Airlines or aircraft operators;•Pilot and air traffic controller associations;•Any other groups with a direct involvement in runway operations

Airways wish to be active members of runway safety teams and promote runway (and aerodrome) safety.

Runway Incursions

3.4 Hot Spots

Doc 9870 discusses aerodrome ‘Hot Spots’

A hot spot is defined by ICAO as:“A location on an aerodrome movement area with a history or potential risk of collision or runway incursion, and where heightened attention by pilots/drivers is necessary.”

Para 3.4.2 Aerodrome charts showing hot spots should be produced locally, checked regularly for accuracy, revised as needed, distributed locally, and published in the AIP.

Airways wish to do what we can regarding hot spots.

Runway Incursions

Runway Incursions Chapter 4 Recommendations – 4.2 Communications

Establish and maintain good communications procedures based on ICAO procedures;

1Full call signs – MATS and AC91-9/AC172-1 Radiotelephony Manual 2Standard ICAO phraseologies and readbacks - MATS and AC91-9/AC172-1 Radiotelephony Manual …except for use of runway designator – NZ is slightly different to ICAO. This is to be resolved in the near future.3Periodically it should be verified that pilots, drivers and air traffic controllers are using standard ICAO phraseologies in all communications associated with runway

operations – MATS Drivers???

4Use English language – MATS and AC91-9/AC172-1 Radiotelephony Manual 5All communications associated with the operation of each runway (vehicles, crossing aircraft, etc.) should be conducted on the same frequency as utilized for the take-off and landing of aircraft - Some aerodromes do, others don’t – some work needed with this.

Runway IncursionsChapter 4 Recommendations – 4.5 ATC

4.5.2 ATC should always use a clear and unambiguous method on the operating console to indicate that a runway is temporarily obstructed –

MATS


4.5.3 ATC should, whenever practical, give ATC en-route clearance prior to taxi.

Currently standard practice at most aerodromes but not a documented requirement - More work to be done on this.


4.5.4 Stop bars should be switched on to indicate that all traffic shall stop and switched off to indicate that traffic may proceed.

4.5.5 Aircraft or vehicles should never be instructed to cross illuminated red stop bars when entering or crossing a runway. In the event of unserviceable stop bars that cannot be deselected, contingency measures, such as follow-me vehicles, should be used.

AA are currently the only ones with Stop Bars. They have local

procedures that comply with this ICAO recommendation.

In the event that other aerodromes one day also introduce Stop Bars, a possibility is to insert into MATS appropriate text.

No further action required until another aerodrome adopts stop bars.


4.5.6 It should be ensured that ATC procedures contain a requirement to issue an explicit clearance including the runway designator when authorizing a runway crossing or to hold short of any runway. This includes runways not in use.

The requirement for an explicit clearance is in MATS but the need to

include the runway designator in all situations is not…. MATS indicates that the phrase “…CROSS TO …” is acceptable in lieu of the explicit clearance to cross. This would not be in accordance with Doc 9870 - More work to be done on this


4.5.7 It should be ensured that ATC procedures contain a requirement to include the runway designator when an instruction to hold short of any runway is issued - MATS and AC91-9/AC172-1 Radiotelephony Manual


4.5.8 Standard taxi routes should be developed and utilized to minimize the potential for pilot confusion.

Current Airways thinking is that many aerodromes do not lend

themselves to publication of standard taxi routes. Often , there is only one possible route to and from the runway.

Some work done by AA limiting the entry points to runways.

More work to be done on this. Possibly, cover this aspect in the MATS Advisory Circular.


4.5.9 Where applicable, progressive taxi instructions should be used to reduce pilot workload and the potential for confusion. Progressive taxi

instructions must not infer a clearance to cross a runway - MATS


4.5.10 Existing visibility restrictions from the control tower which have a potential impact on the ability to see the runway should be assessed and any such areas should be clearly identified on a hot spot map - Airways does all it can to ensure that all the manoeuvring area is within view of the tower either by direct sight or CCTV

4.5.17 Controllers should be “head-up” for a continuous watch on aerodrome

operations - MATS


4.5.11 Environmental constraints should not compromise safety, e.g. regular, multiple changes to the runway configuration.

We intend to cover these sorts of issues in the MATS Advisory Circular

(cautions controllers against chopping and changing runways as this could lead to aircraft using an incorrect runway and general confusion). More work to be done on this.


4.5.12 It should be ensured that runway safety issues are included in the training and briefings for ATC staff.

4.5.15 When conditional clearances are used, specific training should be

provided to ensure that such clearances are used strictly according to ICAO provisions.

Review all our education material and courses to ensure that our

controllers are aware of the runway incursion issues and how to deal with them. More work to be done on this.


4.5.13 Any hazards should be identified and any risks associated with runway capacity enhancing procedures (intersection departures, multiple line-ups, conditional clearances, etc.), when used individually or in combination, should be evaluated. If necessary, appropriate mitigation strategies should be developed.

Consultation with operators and airports.

Risks associated with runway capacity enhancing procedures highlighted to controllers in MATS Advisory Circular

Consultation required and more work to be done.


4.5.14 Line-up clearance should not be issued to an aircraft if that aircraft will be required to hold on the runway for more than 90 seconds beyond the time it would normally be expected to depart.

Risks associated with holding aircraft on the runway for longer than 90

seconds (or longer than necessary) highlighted to controllers in MATS Advisory Circular. More work to be done.


4.5.16 When using multiple or intersection departures, oblique or angled taxiways that limit the ability of the flight crew to see the landing runway threshold or final approach area should not be used.



The recommendation seems to be applicable only when using multiple departures or intersection departures.

Airways view is that angled taxiways remove the last safety layer of the pilot looking along the runway and on final to check for traffic.

Use of RET has been withdrawn from AA and CH. CH have amended the taxiway holding point on A4. WN do not have RETs

There are some oblique or angled taxiways at Regional units particularly if grass runways are also considered.



With light aircraft which can turn on an angled taxiway so as to be able to see the approach end of the runway, the problems with angled taxiways

are mitigated to a large extent.

Consultation is needed to establish if and how some aerodromes could comply with this recommendation. Depending on that, amendments to MATS may be needed to document requirements.

Runway IncursionsChapter 4 Recommendations – 4.8 Incident Reporting

4.8.1 It should be ensured that all runway incursions are reported and investigated in sufficient detail to identify specific causal and contributory factors (see the reporting forms in Appendix F and G).

4.8.2 To enhance lesson learning, related runway safety data should be shared

with other aviation safety organisations both nationally and internationally.

Airways already has a reporting system capturing runway incursions. The incident reporting form includes a runway incursion tick box to further

highlighting the event as a runway incursion.

More work is being done between Airways and CAA regarding incident reporting.

Runway IncursionsChapter 5 Recommendations – Incident Reporting and Data Collection

Chapter 5 talks more about incident reporting and data collection.

The importance of “just culture” in the process is highlighted. “Just culture” is an atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged to provide essential safety-related information but in which they are also clear about where the line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.

Airways are already involved with reporting of runway incursions and “just culture” is an important part of our business.

More work is being done between Airways and CAA regarding incident reporting.

Runway Incursions

Whilst world-wide attention to runway incursions seems to focus more on large international airports, I suggest to you that smaller regional airports also need to do what they can to address these events because;

1.We should all be doing whatever we can to prevent collisions and enhance safety for all aircraft be they international jets, smaller regional turbo-props or local aero club light aircraft.

2.Preventing runway incursions needs good safety habits on the part of pilots, air traffic controllers and drivers. These habits need to be learnt and ingrained from day one of their training which, for pilots and controllers, generally starts at smaller regional airports.

Runway Incursions

A clear runway…

Thank you

runway incursions

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