russell wood. manuel nunes viana..paragon or parasite of empire.pdf

7/29/2019 Russell Wood. Manuel Nunes Viana..Paragon or Parasite of Empire.pdf

1/21

Manuel Nunes Viana: Paragon or Parasite of Empire?Author(s): A. J. R. Russell-WoodReviewed work(s):Source: The Americas, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Apr., 1981), pp. 479-498Published by: Academy of American Franciscan HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/980836 .

Accessed: 28/01/2013 06:53

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Academy of American Franciscan History is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access

to The Americas.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 06:53:08 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aafhhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/980836?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/980836?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aafh


2/21

MANUEL NUNES VIANA:PARAGON OR PARASITE OF EMPIRE?*

" L ETpassManuelNunesViana, manofmediumuild, oundof face, with brown eyes and black hair".Made bythe officialat the registeron the Rio Grande in the interior of BrazilonMay 14, 1717,this is the only physicaldescription of a charismaticfigurewhose word was law in the backlands of Brazil in the first quarterof theeighteenth century.' A native of Viana do Castelo in northern Portugal,Nunes Viana migrated to Brazil around the 1680's. Salvador was hispoint of entry but, after killing an assailant he lay low until pardoned bythe governor; subsequently, he left for the sertao where he was toestablish residence for some 40 years near to the bar of the Rio dasVelhas.2 He sired at least six daughtersand four sons. Duringhis lifetimehe returned to Portugal on two occasions, and was a minor literaryMaecenas although in 1717 his signatureis that of a barelyliterateman.3He was financially successful as a result of ventures in cattle ranching,

* This article is based on materialsconsulted in the following Brazilianarchives:Public Archivesof the State of Bahia, Collection of Royal Orders (hereinafter abbreviated as APBOR); PublicArchives of the State of Minas Gerais, registersof the Delegacia Fiscal (APMDF), and registersofthe Secretaria do Governo (APMSG); Archives of the Casa da Moeda, Lisbon.I"Passa Manoel Nunes Viana homem de medianaestatura, cara redonda, olhos pardos, cabellopretto, comrnua carregaqo q' consta de vinte e trescargasde molhado, Rio grde 14de Mayo de 1717"APMDF, vol. 17, fol. 47v.2"Colesam das noticias dos primeiros descobrimentos das Minas na America, que fez o Dr.Caetano da Costa Matoco, sendo Ouvidor Geral das do ouro preto de que tomou pose em Fevro de1749",fol. 101. Hereafter cited as Costa Matoso, this valuable codex is housed in the BibliotecaMunicipal de Sio Paulo (MS D/ I a/43). In 1727the king referredto a recent petition from NunesViana in which the sertanista claimed residence of 40 years in the valley of the Rio Sgo Francisco,APBOR, vol. 96, doc. 34.3His first return was after the Guerrados Emboabas (Costa Matoso, fol. 101);C. R. Boxer, TheGolden Age of Brazil, 1695-1750(The Universityof California Press, 1969)pp. 364-65 raises a doubt

as to whether he did avail himself of the royal permission to travel to Portugal in 1725, but a laterpetition by one of his daughters refersto hisdeparturefrom Portugal"auzentando-seo seu pay pa osEstados da Bahia",APBOR, vol. 54, fol. 226. On his roleas literary sponsor, see Boxer, GoldenAge,p. 365.

479

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/21

480 MANUEL NUNES VIANA: PARAGON OR PARASITEcommerce in foodstuffs to the developing mining areas, and investmentsin alluvial mining. Alone, and in league with his cousin ManuelRodrigues Soares, he ruled the serthioof the captaincies of Bahia, MinasGerais, and Pernambuco for two decades, before dying in the mid-1730's.4 He cocked a snook at governors and viceroys, although hisloyalty to the crown was never called into question. If one viceroy in 1715could report to the crown that Nunes Viana was not only the "mostcapable" of the inhabitants of the serttioand the best suited to carryoutthe royal will, the following year the Overseas Council in Lisbon was torefer to him as "guiltyof many crimes."5 Not surprisinglythe kingwas ata loss to know whether he had a saint or a sinneron his hands. Governorsran the full gamut from regardinghim as the only possible instrumenttomaintain a royal presence in the Brazilian west to considering him acancer to be eliminated before infecting the loyalty and wellbeing of thecolonial flock. To some settlers, he may have been a Robin Hood of thebacklands, but for others he was a cruel and despotic figure who metedout arbitrary justice with excessive cruelty. Whatever the divergence ofviews, one fact was certain:Manuel Nunes Viana was not a man to whomanybody could remain indifferent.

Nunes Viana possessed that blend of charisma, ruthlessness, andbusinessacumen, which would have assuredsuccess regardlessof time orplace, but the nature of his chosen modus operandi throws into starkrelief certain conditions which were conducive to the emergence andprominence of such personalities. One was that period of transitionbetween exploration and settlement, between the unknown and theknown, between flux and stasis, between anarchy and the imposition ofcentralizedauthority. The second condition lay in what wereperceivedtobe, or actually were in physical terms, geographical frontiers. Suchconditions were present in many theaters of the so-called expansion ofEurope, but what made Portuguese America a case apart was that bothfactors remained present throughout the entire colonial period. UnlikePortuguese Asia where boundaries of empire were largelyundefined, thetreaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Madrid (1750) laid the bases forPortugal's territorialclaims to a region not substantially different fromthe eight and a half million square kilometers of modern Brazil. But forthe three and a quarter centuries of the colonial period, the physical

4lsaias Golgher [Guerra dos Emboabas (Belo Horizonte, 1956),p. 251] places his death as beingon 28 January 1738, but the absence of his name in a 1736 report of the three largest slave ownersbetween Sio Miguel and the bar of the Rio das Velhas and which names his partner ManuelRodrigues Soares may suggest his death in late 1735orearly 1736, APMSG, vol. 55, fols. 100v-10 Iv.5Marquisof Angeja to king, July 1, 1715(APBOR, vol. 8, doc. 90a; Secretaryof State to Angeja,April 1, 1716 referringthe Nunes Viana as "reo de muitos crimes" (APBOR, vol. 10, doc. 32c).



4/21

A. J. R. RUSSELL-WOOD 481frontier in terms of exploration and settlement lay well within theselimits. Indeed, only in our own days has there been the semblance of acoincidence between thedejure and the defacto frontiers of Brazil.Thesetwo factors - the temporal and the geographical - with theconcomitant uncertainties, insecurities,and instability in human, social,economic, and political terms, provided the context for the exploits ofNunes Viana.

From the crown perspective the tyranny of distance - be it betweenthe metropolis and the colony, or between the seats of colonialgovernment and the periphery- was an obstacle in itself. Whenallied tothe two further factors of a chronic shortage of trained administratorsand lack of capital, the forces militating against effective crownsurveillance of Brazil were insuperable. Furthermore, there is littleevidence that the Portuguese crown, unlike its Spanish counterpart,seriously pursued a policy of establishing a New Portugal in theAmericas. This was reflectedin the absence of an institutional network tomatch that of Spanish America. Throughout the 322 years of colonialrule, Portuguese America was but one viceroyalty or governor-generalship; it counted one archbishopricand six bishoprics;there wereonly two high courts of appeals. There was no standing army. TheInquisition was neverformally established. Requests by the colonists forthe creation of a university were repeatedly denied. Away from thecoastal cities, settlement was characterisedby sporadic nuclei or, at best,archipelagos of humanity isolated from one another. Communicationswere poor. Commerce was hazardous because of poor roads, anenvironment hostile to man and beast, and threats of attack frombandits, Amerindians, or quilombos. Implementation of the royal willwas an exercise in frustration;at no time did the crown exerciseadminis-trative control over the whole of its richest colony. Neitherthe will of theking, nor of his delegates, nor the imposition of the paraphernaliaofgovernment, were powerful enough to bring about the demise of afrontier tradition in the colony.

It was in such areasof limitedjurisdictionaleffectivenessand (fromtheEuropean perspective) geographical isolation, that an individual couldmake his mark unencumberedby the machineryof the State. Clearlythedata are too incomplete to make a typology of such individuals, but thefollowing components could be present. Holders of Portuguesecitizenship, Catholic in varying degrees of orthodoxy and commitment,such figures were characterized by a love-hate attitude towardsinstitutions of their country of origin and, more particularly, to thoserepresentatives of the crown with whom they maintained relations



5/21

482 MANUEL UNES VIANA:PARAGONOR PARASITErunning the gamut from scorn and derision to grudging respect. Somemight have become acculturated to the customs and values of thosepeoples and regions where they functioned; some were diehard patriots,aggressive in theirloyalty. Others,by theiractions, implicitly rejectedthisheritage. Still others fell into the category designated as trans-frontiersmen.6

From the official perspective,such personages werea boon and a bane.They possessed knowledge and skills, not easily attainablethrough otherchannels, which could contribute decisively to the attainment of officialgoals. They were informational resources on languages, behavior,political alliances, commercial practices, economic opportunities,navigation, and topography in areas in which the crown had, or mightdevelop, an imperial interest. Furthermore, because of their unofficialposition, they might undertake reconnaisances of a diplomatic,commercial, or political nature which, if favourable, could later bepursuedthrough official channels. Not only could they protectthe crownfrom placing the full weight of its authority behind some project whichwas doomed to failure, but, by so doing, they diminished the risk factorimplicit in failure to both the treasury of empire and the reputation ofking and state. Success on their part could have its rewards; n the eventof failure, the crown denied any involvement in their actions. Some fewdid come in from the cold but, for the most part, the relationship wasimpersonal, undefined, and without further commitment otherthan it bemutually beneficial to both parties. The other side of the coin was thatauthorities were intensely aware - to the point of frustrationand anger- that such individuals had identified,and proceededto exploit for theirown ends, the vulnerablepressurepoints of the soft underbellyof empire.Furthermore there was the risk that actions of questionable legality ormorality by such individuals would not only defeat immediate crownobjectives, but that injured parties would view their opponents not asindividuals but as representativesand thus bringthe name of crown andnation into disrepute, therebyjeopardizing future official overtures.Notsurprisingly,the independent stance adopted by many such adventurersrankled with officialdom, causing unsought-for friction which coulderupt into the open. Despite the potential for embarrassment, the factremainedthat in the final analysis it was more expedient for the crown totolerate rather than attempt to eliminate such figures.

6An interesting study of the internaldynamics of social and institutional change in a Portugueseoverseas territoryis Allen F. Isaacman, Mozambique. TheAfricanization ofa EuropeanInstitution.The Zambezi Prazos, 1750-1902 (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1972).



6/21

A. J. R. RUSSELL-WOOD 483Because of the ambiguity and ambivalency surroundingtheir conductand motivations as individuals,and the sporadicand unpublicisednature

of their involvement with the processes of empire, it is inevitable that anaura of fact and fiction, of truths,half-truths and lies should envelop suchpersonages. While not unknown to, nor ignored by, theircontemporariesand later generations, they remain shadowy. But two very differentregions of the Portuguese seaborne empire supply us with two classicexamples of this type: from the outer limits of Portuguese Asia in thesixteenth centurycomes Ferndo Mendes Pinto; distanced in time by twocenturies and several oceans is Manuel Nunes Viana whose theater ofoperations was Portuguese America. Whereas Pinto has been the objectof scholarly scrutiny, Nunes Viana's activities have only beensketchedinthe most general terms.7

A brief survey of the colony will provide a backgroundto his actions.The first decades of the eighteenth century were a period of dramatictransition. The preceding half a century had witnessed an agriculturalcrisis, decline in the sugar industry, stresses in the creaking hulk of thesouth Atlantic economy, and currency devaluation. The eighteenthcentury was heralded in by the accession of an absolutist monarch whowas to reign for 44 years, and the discovery and exploitation of mineraldeposits in Brazil. Two aspects of this new era should be emphasised.First, by its very nature alluvial mining is characterised by physicalmobility; furthermore, reports - founded or unfounded - of newstrikes stimulated successive migrations of free persons and slavesthroughout the interior of Brazil for much of the first half of the century.Secondly, whereas the populace of the littoral had enjoyed an extendedperiod during which institutions, commerce, and society could evolve,instant government and instant society characterised the miningareas. Ifthese differences werenot unsettling enough in themselves,the short- andlong-term repercussionsof miningexacerbated stress lines in the society,economy, and political life of the colony. Traditional patterns of tradewere disrupted; new markets for foodstuffs and slaves were suddenlycreated;the epicenter of the colonial economy wasviolently dislocated tothe interior; agriculturalists on the littoral experienced chronic laborshortages; pricesof basiccommodities and slaves skyrocketed;migratorymovements westwards were followed by success, disillusion, and evenreversemigration;the process was set in motion which would lead Rio deJaneiro to replace Salvador as the capital. In short, the two centuriesold

7Maurice Collis, The Grand Peregrination. Being the Life and Adventures of Ferndo MendesPinto (London, 1949)providesa useful introduction;the only biographicalnote in Englishon NunesViana is in Boxer, The Golden Age, pp. 364-365.



7/21

484 MANUEL NUNES VIANA: PARAGON OR PARASITEBrazil of the coastal enclaves was to become two Brazils:that of thecoast,based on sugar and agriculture, and characterizedby the uncertaintyofstasis;and that of the interior, based on gold and diamond deposits, andcharacterized by the insecurities brought on by perpetual motion.

The crown attempted to meet the challenge. In political terms newcaptaincies were created (Sao Paulo and Minas, 1709; Minas Gerais,1720; Goias, 1744; Mato Grosso, 1748) with their respective governors.Ecclesiastically new bishoprics (Sao Paulo and Mariana) and prelacies(Cuiabi and Goias) were established in 1745. Militarily, two troops ofdragoons were dispatched to Minas Gerais in 1719 and they and theirsuccessors were to play an invaluable role as an arm of government. Asecond high court of appeals was established in 1751in Rio de Janeiro.Economically, the crown attempted (and largely failed) in the delicatebalancing act of not dampening enthusiasm for, and exploitation of,mineral deposits while at the same time taking every measure to ensurethat as much as possible of the new riches were syphoned off into theroyal coffers by oppressiveand inequitabletaxation. The riches of Brazil,their protection, and their exploitation and development became theprivateobsession of Dom JoaioV. The regulatorymeasures,for the mostpart, were too little and too late. Response to the challenge createdfurtherturmoil in an alreadyembroiled system:the establishmentof newchains of command, reassessments of priorities, and fiscal and adminis-trative experimentation were unsettling. Those failures which had beenattendant on Portuguese crown rule, became even more acutelyembarrassingto the crown in those decades which paradoxicallyenoughconstituted the golden age of Brazil. Indeed, it was in those very areaswhich were under the closest crown scrutiny and where there was mostintervention and meddling by the king, that Dom Joa-oV was forced todelegate unusual latitudein decision-makingto governors as "menon thespot." The fear that fiscal or social unrest would prejudice productivityand thereby threaten the royal exchequer, to a large degree forced theking's hand in the delegation of authority, and made the sovereignacquiesce in short-term solutions by governors which providedtemporary stability but ran counter to the royal will or metropolitaninterests. A by-blow of this degree of royal helplessnesswasthat both theking and his representatives n the colony grantedlimitedauthority to, orcontemplated actions by, individuals who might be of service to thecrown. As such they became instruments for the furthering of royalpolicies, but this did not prevent them from exploiting such trust forpersonal gain nor, on occasion, flying in the face of national interests.During that limited but critical phase of political, economic, and socialuncertainty and transition, such a personage as Manuel Nunes Viana



8/21

A. J. R. RUSSELL-WOOD 485could not only survive but could reap a handsome profit. At a differenttime and placehe would at the least have beenconvicted of crimesagainstthe State or, at the worst, been unceremoniously hanged.Even his most carping critic would have conceded that his modusoperandi was effective;and hereinlay the secretof Nunes Viana'ssuccess.This may be examined in two facets:first, as regardsthe esteem in whichhe was held in the sertaio;secondly, as regards his stance vis-a-vis thecrown. His prestigein the sertaiowas basedon a shrewdunderstandingofthe mentality of the "gente rtistica",a mixed bunch of whites, blacks,mulattoes, and mamelukes, for the most part illiterate, and eking out aprecarious existence as drovers, boatsmen, small-holders, or ashenchmen for local "powerfulmen of the backlands". Eventoday this is aregion of mystery, of violence, of harsh struggle for survival in the so-called polygon of drought,and with a strongmessianictradition. ManuelNunes Viana exploited the superstitious nature of the populace, usingfear and, it was rumoured, magic to accomplish his dominance. It waswidely believed that shots could not injure him; that he was all-seeing;that he could divine what was passing through the minds, and what washappening in the homes, of his "subjects".His black henchmenwere notmerely the objects of fear, loathing, and awe because of their infamousacts on his behalf but because they were widely reputedto be sorcerers.8Needless to say Manuel Nunes Viana took no steps to disavow suchrumours. Perhaps the greatest tribute to Viana was unconsciously paidby his severest critic, the count of Assumar (governor of Minas Gerais,1717-21) when he noted "any step taken by this man is as intangible as acastle of the winds, and is a great phantasm".9

This shrewdness to examine a situation, be it in human, physical, orpolitical terms, expose the weak points, and then exert pressureon thesestress points directly or on relatedareaswhich would indirectlyproducethe sought after results, characterised his relationship to crown rule.From his command post at the bar of the Rio das Velhas - theundisputed key to Minas Gerais - he was beyond the effective juris-diction of the viceroy in Salvador, or the governors of Pernambuco orMinas Gerais.'o Because of illdefined boundaries and jurisdictions, hecould play off one crown official against another, shifting into anotherjurisdiction should the heat become too intense;from this stronghold he

8APMSG, vol. II, fols. 89v-91r9"q' qualquer passo que da este homem, parece hum castello de vento, a hfia fantasma muigrande", APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 8v-9vloThe bar was 400 leagues upstreamfrom Penedo, 2 months journey from Salvador, and 10daysfrom Sabara (APBOR, vol. 8, doc. 90; APMSG, vol. 44, fol. 112).Appropriatelyenough, Assumarreferred to it as the "balliza racional" of Minas Gerais (APMSG, vol. 11, fol. 136.)



9/21

486 MANUEL NUNES VIANA: PARAGONOR PARASITEexerted pressureon the Achilles tendon of the mining areas, namely, thecollection of taxes, be they tithes, entry fees, or the royal fifths; he couldregulate the degree of stability or instability in the backlands;finally, hecould control the supply of cattle on the hoof to an ever-growingpopulation in Minas Gerais. Crown officials were constantly kept offbalance by his tactics during the formative years of the miningcommunities. We may now turn to an examination of the manner inwhich this man who was a legend in his own lifetime was also to be aninstrumentof the crown. This servicemay becontrasted to the mannerinwhich he sapped the strength from efforts at crown control andchanneled these to his own advantage. By his success, unconsciously hepaved the path for his decline, stimulating the crown and its represen-tatives to act. Finally, we shall examine how changing circumstanceseventually closed in on Nunes Viana,decreasinghis options, and clippinghis wings as a free agent.

He first came to the eyes of the public and of the crown in the Warofthe Emboabas in Minas Geraisin 1708-09." Suffice it to say here that atthis date no township had yet been established, there was no crownpresence of note, anarchy and instability predominated, and there waschronic resentment between the Paulistas, who had made the initialstrikes, and the outsiders who wereupstagingtheirpredecessors.To cut along story short, hostilities erupted and, possibly against his betterjudgement, Nunes Viana permitted himself to be nominated by theEmboabas as their leader. He took the title of Regent, Generalof Minas,or Governor (depending on the source consulted), made civil andmilitary appointments and, within three months, his forces effectivelycontrolled the principal mining nuclei of Minas Gerais. Suchdisturbances invited swift administrative action. The governor of Rio deJaneiro made an excursion inland, tried abortively to conciliate bothparties, and redistributedto Paulistas those posts given by Nunes Vianato Emboabas. At Congonhas do Campo, Manuel Nunes Vianaconfronted the governor, faced him down, and essentially sent him backto Rio with his tail between his legs. The new governor Ant6nio deAlbuquerque Coelho de Carvalho came to the task with trump cards:12

1I Much ink has been expended on his role in the Guerra dos Emboabas; vide C. R. Boxer, TheGolden Age, pp. 64-77; Isaias Golgher, Guerrados Emboabas; Manoel da Silveira Cardozo, "TheGuerra dos Emboabas, Civil War in Minas Gerais, 1708-1709", Hispanic American HistoricalReview, vol. 22, no. 3 (August 1942), pp. 470-492.12Albuquerque carried royal orders to take office as governor in Rio de Janeiro even if hispredecessor had not yet returnedfrom Minas Gerais;should Dom Fernando Martins Mascarenhasde Lencastrefail in Minas, Albuquerque was to proceed directly to the mining areas. He left Rio inJuly 1709 (APBOR, vol. 7, doc. 744).



10/21

A. J. R. RUSSELL-WOOD 487knowledge that dissension among Nunes Viana's followers underminedhis position as undisputed leader of the Emboabas; secondly, that hispopular support was also eroding prompted in partby his attemptto gainas his exclusive right slaughtering facilities in Sabara'; thirdly thegovernor carried a blanket amnesty for all those involved in the civil warexcept Nunes Viana and Bento do Amaral Coutinho.'3 Finally,Albuquerque was an old Brazil hand, son of a former governor of theMaranhio, and with experience as manager of family estates in Braziland later as governor of Grao Para'and of the Maranhio. On arrivinginthe mining area Albuquerque ordered Nunes Viana, in the name of theking, to leave the 'General Mines'. Nunes Viana complied with thisrequest and retired to his ranches on the Sdo Francisco River.

Controversy surrounding the true nature, motives, or accom-plishments of his participation in the Warof the Emboabas was to be analbatross which Manuel Nunes Viana could not avoid. The chargesagainst him weregrave: lese Majest6, namely assumption of the positionof governor by popular accord, and without royal sanction; obstructionof a royal delegate in the fulfillment of his duty; thirdly - althoughuntrue - seizure of his position by force.14Not all the evidence wasnegative. There was some basis for his own assertion that he hadperformed a valuable service to the crown:15he had indeed encouragedorderly collection of the royal fifths in a chaotic situation and hadappointed a superintendentto accomplish this. Indicative of his successin preventing disruption in the collection of the fifths was the fact that for1709 these were duly delivered on time (not always to be the case insubsequent, more orderly years).16Secondly, in order to preventa massexodus, Manuel Nunes Viana had dispatched one Raphael da Silva eSousa to farms and small holdings of Paulistas assuringthem of ManuelNunes Viana'sprotection of their possessions and lives in the name of the

13There was serious disagreement between Nunes Viana and the Bahian Sebastiio Pereira deAguilar (Boxer, The Golden Age, pp. 76-77);the revoltagainst Nunes Viana'spretensionswas led bya Padre Campos (Costa Matoso, fol. 37); the pardon was described in a letter from the king to thegovernor-general Luis Cesar de Menezes, August 22, 1709 (APBOR, vol. 7, doc. 744).14Summaries of the charges against Nunes Viana are in APMSG, vol. 4, fols. 215r-218r;vol. 11,fols. 94-99v. The charge of seizure of power by force was made bythe count of Assumarto the crownjudge of the comarca of Rio das Velhas (APMSG, vol. 11,fols. 58v-61) in a letterdated October 10,1718. The argument for the legitimacy of his popular election is in Costa Matoso, fol. 48.151nhis Suplica of June 28, 1725,Nuno Marques Pereirawas at pains to emphasize the valuablecontribution of his literarysponsor in subduing the Paulistas, referringto Nunes Viana as a "loyalsubject of the king" whose courage and prudence made him most worthy of royal favours;Compendio Narrativo do Peregrino da America (Lisbon, 1728). In 1719 Nunes Viana still believedthat he had performeda valuable serviceto the king (Assumarto the king, January 8, 1719,APMSG,vol. 4, fol. 215.

16Boxer, The Golden Age, p. 80; Cardoso, "The Guerra dos Emboabas", p. 481.



11/21

488 MANUEL NUNES VIANA: PARAGON OR PARASITEking.'7 It could also be claimed that, but for his intervention and strongleadership, there would have beengreaterfactionalism resultingin loss oflife, especially among the hopelessly outnumbered Emboabas."8Thisstabilizing role played by Nunes Viana was recognized by the viceroyhimself who, in 1715, recommended him as being worthy of the royalfavour in the granting of some benefice or pension. The viceroy alsogranted Nunes Viana blanket authority to "govern the sertdioof Bahiaand Pernambuco."'9 Although Nunes Viana's case was to become apolitical football between the warring councillors of the ConselhoUltramarino and viceroy Angeja, on Good Friday 1716 the sertanistareceived a pardon for alleged usurpation of authority.20

Ironically enough Nunes Viana's greatest service to the crown by hisforceful participation in the Guerra dos Emboabas escaped theimmediate notice of both himself and the crown. It was to have focussedthe royal attention on the potentially inflammatory position in themining areas, and as a result the incorporation officially of the miningareas within the captaincy of Sdo Paulo. This lead to a visible crownpresence in the establishment of townships, and the appointment oftreasury, judicial, and administrative officers. As we shall have cause toexamine later, this crown presenceencroached on, andfinally stifled, thefreedom of action of Nunes Viana and other poderosos do sertilo.

But the immediate impact was that Nunes Viana emerged as primusinterpares and was even courted for his knowledge as an eminence griseon matters of the sertdo. In this advisory role he was to give valuableservices to the crown's appointed representatives. In 1714 the crownjudge of thejudicial district of Rio das Velhas informed the king that theregion of the Sdo Francisco rivervalley was nothing but a "receptacle orcriminals from the whole of America" and noted that this situation couldbe remedied by a single action: namely, by enlisting the assistance ofNunes Viana. Evidently Nunes Viana was contacted and used his muscleon behalf of the crown, because the following year the viceroy praised

'7APMSG,vol. 65, fols. 119v-120v.18CostaMatoso,fol. 4819AlthoughoncedinghatNunesViana's ctionshadnot secured hepriorapproval f theking,Angeja ecognized isstabilizingoleand recommendedoyal avoursAngejaoking,July1,1715,APBOR,vol. 8, doc. 90a). Recommendedn partfor hiscalmingof hostilities,n 1718ManuelRodrigues oareswasgrantedetterspatentbythe countof Assumarplacinghim inchargeof thegovernanca f VilaNova da RainhadeCaethe APMSG,vol. 12,fol. 28).Assumarwasto chargethatNunesVianaabused heauthority ested n him(APMSG,vol. 11, ols.55-56; ol.4, fols. 215-218)andrecommendedo the ncoming overnor-generalhecountof Vimeirohathebestripped fhispowers Assumaro Vimeiro,October16, 1718,APMSG,vol. 11,fols. 61v-62r.20Thiswasapparently nlya gubernatorialardon,APBOR,vol. 10,doc. 32a.



12/21

A. J. R. RUSSELL-WOOD 489him as the "most capable"inhabitant of the region. Not only was he theonly poderoso do sertaioto enact the royal orders, but he had kept thepeace and curbed Amerindian hostilities. This was but the mostmeasurable outcome from what the viceroy was to relateas having beenlengthy and valuable discussions with Nunes Viana on the enforcementof law and order in the River Sao Francisco valley and Minas Gerais.21Some fifteen years later we find Nunes Viana still being sought afteras aconsultant on matters of the hinterland. In his relationship to viceroySabugosa, who in 1721 had described him as a common criminal andmurdererand who but 9 years later was to praise him as a "praicticodosertio", Nunes Viana exemplified his extraordinary ability in inter-personal relations.22If he could not actually swing around to his causethose whom he had wronged, insulted, or offended by his high handedactions, at least he could gain their respect and even grudgingadmiration.

His relationship over two decades as consultant to the crown'srepresentativesunderlines two other aspects of his personality. First, hiswillingness to take a calculated risk. His dealings with officialdom didnot meet with the unanimous approval of his erstwhilecompanions andfellow-travellers. The governor of Minas Gerais may well have beenunderstatingthe case when he remarkedin 1718that only the office andprestige of the governor stood between Nunes Viana and 40 potentialassassins.23 There is evidence that Nunes Viana was not unaware thatthere had been an erosion in his formerly unquestioned control in thesertao, that his henchmen were not obeyed as readilyas earlier,and thathe had decided to gain a measure of crown protection. Secondly, hisenhanced relations with the viceroys may have been born of a shrewdassessment of changing political, social, and economic realities in thehinterland. Earlier than most, and even earlierthan the crown's officialrepresentatives, Nunes Viana realized that the ambience which hadpermitted his free-wheeling ways was being eroded by insidious butprogressive crown influence. Rather than waiting for this to be

21"ehe certo, q' o d' Manuel Nunes Viana nio so he o homem maiscapaz q'tem aquellesdistritos,tanto pa fazer o cabal informe q' selhe manda, e executar as ordens de VMagde fazendoas observarerespeitarcomo devem ser;mas he o unico q' actualm" da comprim" s q' selhe mandio, e faz ter emsocergo e respto o districto, q'selhe tem asignado como sua capitania mor, socegandoa, e alimpandoados ladroens todas as vezes, q' aparessem algis por aquelles districtos, por cujos servigos se fazmerecedor de q' VMagdeo attenda ...", Angeja to king, July 1, 1715 in response to the king's ofNovember 17, 1714(APBOR, vol. 8, docs. 90, 90a). Cf his of June 26, 1716to the secretaryof state inan equally laudatory vein (APBOR, vol. 10, doc. 32a).22"ManuelNunes Viana esti na minha opiniao confirmado regullo",Sabugosa to king, March6,1721 (APBOR, vol. 13, doc. 188a; Cf his letter of May 12, 1730 (APBOR, vol. 26, doc. 87.)23APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 223v-224r.



13/21

490 MANUEL NUNES VIANA: PARAGONOR PARASITEconsolidated, which would have resulted in the closing to him of allavenues for manoeuvering, Nunes Viana acted; by so doing he kept opena range of options which would otherwise have been closed. To under-stand this calculated shift, we must briefly look at his actions before theGuerra dos Emboabas and, more critically, in the following decade.

Nunes Viana'sbase of operations was at the confluence of the Rio dasVelhas and Rio Sdo Francisco, at the boundaries of Bahia and MinasGerais, and a linchpin in the critical Bahia-Sabara axis of supply to themining areas. The vertiginous speed of successive mining strikes hadrepercussionsunrelatedto the industryitself:an instant demand for meatin the form of cattle on the hoof, other foodstuffs, and utensils; theimposition of exorbitant taxes by the crown not only on gold productionbut on imports into the mining areas, construction of barracks, tithes,and even donations to the expenses of royal marriages;finally, a feelingof individualism engendered in part by a lively awareness that theinhabitants were beyond the pale of effective crown control, and blendedwith dislike which could explode into actual hostility for representativesof the crown. Nunes Viana'ssuccess lay in exploiting for personal profitthis highly vulnerable and soft underbelly of Portugal's golden calf.

Customarily cattle destined for Minas Geraisleft Piaui and Pernaguain May, arrivingin somewhat desperate straits at the bar of the Rio dasVelhas after a journey of 400 leagues. Here they were fattened up untilDecember when they would be driven to the townships of MinasGerais.24By his domination of the areaof the bar, Nunes Vianaincreasedor decreased the availability of meat to the mining areasvirtuallyat will,raised prices artificially, and engendered unrest in the already unrulymining encampments.25 His actions also had an impact on the city ofSalvador whose city councillors complained in 1716that the meat supplyhad decreased by two thirds, and that those supplies there were fetchedexorbitant prices. Nunes Viana enhanced his unofficial control over meatsupplies by bidding successfully for the highly lucrative contract on theimportation of cargoes, slaves, and cattle into Minas Gerais.26Thesecond vulnerable point in the mining areas concerned collection of theroyal revenues, especially the fifths (quintos) on all gold produced.Crown policy to impose the least ineffectual method of collecting these

24APMSG, vol. 11, fol. 71.25During Albuquerque's governorship Nunes Viana had already been placing restraintson thefree flow of cattle to Minas Gerais (APMSG, vol. 1l, fols. 55-56).26Camarato king, July 28, 1716(APBOR, vol. 11,doc. 21);Nunes Vianaheld the contract for thetriennium 1715-1718.



14/21

A. J. R. RUSSELL-WOOD 491dues varied;the result was misunderstanding,confrontation, and unrest.In 1715 the king orderedthat a fixed quota system be replacedbya tax onthe number of pans (bateias) in operation. Apparently accepted at first,violence erupted in the judicial district of Rio das Velhas and there wasmore than a hint that, if not directly a protagonist, Nunes Vianawelcomed this unrest to enhance his own position.27 Allied to theproduction of gold was the always delicate issue of the grantingof miningconcessions and their registration:in 1718 Nunes Viana moved from thearea of the curraes into the central mining region of CatasAltas whereheshared mining concessions with his cousin. Nunes Viana's presence initself was unsettling enough but it became apparent that his primepurpose was not to mine, but to disrupt mining operations. Backinguphis demands by armed slaves, he forced neighbors to cede to him theirwater rights and mining concessions. Later, in direct contravention ofgubernatorial edicts, Nunes Viana armed those slaves working on hismining concessions.28It would not be too much to say that for a decadefollowing the termination of the War of the Emboabas Nunes Vianawasthe indisputable ruler of the sertilo.

It was this very immunity which Nunes Vianaexploited in his personaland financial relationships with his neighbours. Here it is difficult toseparate fact from fiction, but if only half of the stories of excesses weretrue, they would be sufficient to underscore the ruthlessness andambition of Nunes Viana. It was alleged that he had stolen his Fazendade Tabua from its former owners, whom he had reduced to begging foralms in the central mining area. He was capable of extreme cruelty,evicting tenants at will, throwing disobedient slaves and others into apool stocked with piranhas, and murderingthose who thwarted him. Itwas rumoured that he herdedsick people on to his Fazendade Tabuiaandwaited for them to die so that he could inherit their estates.29Even his

27This isturbanceocussedon VilaRealand VilaNovadaRainha, ndwasofsuchseverityhatthegovernorwasforced o retain hequotasystem APMSG,vol.4,fols.34v,194;APMSG,vol.5,fols. 41v-42r.Thatunrestwas ntheair,andthatManuelNunesViana ndhiscohortswerenvolved,wasexpressedntwolettersof 27December 715 romDomBrasBalthazareSilveiragovernorfMinasGerais,1713-1717)o theviceroy nd o theking APMSG,vol.4,fols.194v-197r). valuablesurveyof theproblems ttendantuponthecollectionof thefifths s Manuelda SilveiraCardoso,"TheCollection f theFifth nBrazil,1695-1709", ispanicAmericanHistoricalReview, ol.20,no.3 (August,1940),pp. 359-379.28NunesVianathreatenedhosewhodallied oo long,or wererecalcitrant,hattheirseveredheadswouldbe sent to theregionof the SdoFrancisco iver.Assumar ispatchedhenegotiatingteamof the formersecretary f the governmentManuelda Fonsecaand the Mestredo CampoJosephRebelloPerdigdoo coolpassions nddemarcateands APMSG,vol. 4, fols.215-218; ol.11,fols. 43v,61v-62.).290n theTabuaallegations,eeAPMSG,vol.4, fols.215-218; ol. 11, ol. 128.Other busesarechronicled n Boxer,TheGoldenAge, p. 365;APMSG,vol. 11,fols. 55-56,89v-91.



15/21

492 MANUEL NUNES VIANA: PARAGONOR PARASITEcattle ranchingactivities were tainted with criminality.Largenumbersofcattle and horses in the serhto left their naturalpastureseach year at thefirst rains for remote areas. Nunes Viana, it was charged, possessed thelabor force needed to catch such animals, burnout their brands,and sellthem for a tidy profit.30He also derivedpersonal profitand prestigefromthe fortuitous circumstancethat he was appointed agent for D. IzabelMaria Guedes de Brito, an inhabitantof Bahia and heiressto enormoustractsof landgrantedbythekingto herfather n the late seventeenth enturyas a rewardfor "pacification"of the Amerindiansand settlement of theinterior. Nunes Viana looked on his duties as transcending those of amere rent collector: not only did he interpret the terms of the grant asapplying to a vaster region than originally conceived but, by threateningeviction of the tenants who refused to buckle under to his strong-armextortion, he gained firm control over the terrifiedpopulace.31 It is clearthat Nunes Viana escaped the wrath of justice not merely because of hisgeographical isolation but because of an extensive networkof influentialcontacts, reaching to the very court. Not for nothing did the viceroycomplain that through his Lisbon agent Nunes Viana knew of royaldecisions before the viceroy himself.32Nunes Viana also exploited thecombination of human avarice and inadequate salaries paid tomagistrates. His friendshipwith the crownjudge of thejudicial districtofthe Rio das Velhas and the curious circumstances which led tomagistrates on the High Court of Appeals in Salvador changing theirvotes, aroused comment.33

But changing circumstances were whittling away at his power base,altering the context which had been so conducive to his operations.30Theproceeds of sales of all such "bens do vento", viz possessions without an owner and whichwere primarilycattle and slaves, were ordered by the king to be applied to redemption of captives.The absence of such a mamposteiro dos cativos had led the Provedordos defuntos e auzentes in 1715to gain Bras de Silveira's approval to make such sales and place the proceeds in his custody, butAssumar rejected this proposal (APMSG, vol. 59, fols. 145v-149v).31On Maria Guedesde Brito, see A.J. R. Russell-Wood, "Female and Family in the Economy andSociety of Colonial Brazil", in Asunci6n Lavrin, editor, Latin American Women. HistoricalPerspectives(Greenwood Press; Westport, 1978),pp. 88-89. Nunes Viana's abuses are chronicled inAPMSG, vol. 4, fols. 37, 52v-53;vol. 5, fols. 69, 84v-85;vol. 11,fols. 55-56. Nunes Viana'sclaim wasbased on the phrase"Pais do S. Francisco ate as vertentes do Rio das Velhas",which he interpretedto mean that her territoryextended to the headwaters of the Rio das Velhas in the heart of MinasGerais,whereasthe original intention (to be upheld later)was up to the confluence (APMSG, vol. 11,fols. 61v-62, 277-278.)32APBOR, vol. 20, doc. la.33Manuel Carvalho Maya, a miner of Rio das Contas, had charged Nunes Viana with stealing aslave and gold. The case went to the RelaCio of Salvador: the decision was split, 3 to 2 in favor ofCarvalho; Nunes Viana'spresence in Salvador, and possibly other favours, led one Desembargadorto switch hisvote whenthe decision was appealed, therebyacquitting Nunes Viana(APBOR, vol. 18,doc. 7). On Nunes Viana'scosy relationship with Luis Botelho de Queiroz, crownjudge of Rio dasVelhas, see APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 130-133.Queiroz died on November 4, 1716(Costa Matoso, fol.42).



16/21

A. J. R. RUSSELL-WOOD 493Discovery was giving way to settlement. A degree of demographicstability was replacing rampant mobility. Blacks, mulattoes, and whites- both slaves and free - were forming their own religiousbrotherhoods. Townships were being established, the economy wasbecoming diversified with agricultureand cottage industries. There wasencroachment on the formerly deserted expanses of the sertilo.Communications were improving. Above all, the seeds of royal govern-ment sowed by Albuquerque had taken root: boundaries were fixedbetween Bahia, Minas Gerais, and Pernambuco; in 1720 Serro do Friowas made a separatejudicial district(comarca)with its own crownjudge;fiscal inspectors were making visits to the remote areas; militiacompanies werecoming into being and, to give a little muscle to the royalwill, traineddragoons were dispatched to the miningareas;a move to thecollection of the royal fifths (quintos) in foundryhouses demandedmoreeffective registersto regulatethe export of gold dust;parisheswerebeingdelineated and jurisdictional confusion over ecclesiasticalappointmentswas being resolved. In 1721 Minas Geraisbecame a captaincy in its ownright, but for the preceding four years the governor of the combinedcaptaincy of Sio Paulo and Minas Geraishad residedin the heart of themining area.The years 1717-21 were characterized by confrontation between thegovernor and Nunes Viana. It was a sign of the changingtimesthat, withfew exceptions, the governor emergedthe winner. On the decisive issue ofcattle, Nunes Viana suffered a double loss. First, despite intimidation,coercion and threats of disrupting future revenues, Nunes Viana wasunable to maintain his hold on the cattle contract when it came up forrenewal in 1718. The governor preempted action by Nunes Viana, bytransferringthe bidding to Vila do Carmo where Nunes Viana had noinfluence, with the result that he was outbid.34Resorting to what heacknowledged to be a "mentiraoficiosa", by which Nunes Viana was ledto believe that Assumar was acting on the direct command of the king,the governor met alone with Nunes Vianaand exacted two promises:thatNunes Viana would desist from impeding the entry of cattle to MinasGerais;that until a crown ruling resolved the issue, Nunes Viana wouldmake no furtherefforts on behalf of D. Izabel Maria Guedesde Brito.35

34Prior to bidding, Nunes Viana had forbidden all fishing on the Rio Sdo Francisco, ortransportation of fish to Minas Gerais(APMSG, vol. 1 , fols. 61v-62), with the purposeof loweringrevenues and therebydiscreditingthe contract. His reaction to losing was to ordernobody at the barof the Rio das Velhas to receive cattle on their lands for fattening up prior to sale in Minas Gerais(APMSG, vol. 4, fols. 215-218; vol. 11, fol. 71).35LaterAssumar confessed in a letter to the king (January 8, 1719)that he had been forced to thissubterfuge by threeconsiderations: the "muitaarrogancia"of Nunes Viana;lack of means to represshim; popular revolt if there were to be a shortage of meat. (APMSG, vol. 4, fols. 215-218).



17/21

494 MANUEL NUNES VIANA: PARAGONOR PARASITESecondly, the development of ranching was such that although thecurraes remained important, alternative sources of meat wereemerging.36 Furthermore by improved communications and firmness,Assumar was able to undermine the effectiveness of Nunes Viana'spotentially most destructive weapon: uncertainty. Rumours spread byNunes Viana of proposed tax increases or of the governor exceeding hisauthority, were effectively scotched by Assumar himself in personalcorrespondence with leading citizens.37 Right on Nunes Viana's owndoorstep, authority scored a double victory: despite every effort byNunes Viana, a town was finally established in 1720 in Papagaio;secondly, by ordering that all bids on the contract of riverpassages bemade in Lisbon, the crown undercut the effectiveness of Nunes Viana'sbrand of personal persuasion over the inhabitants of one of the mosttravelled crossings of the Rio das Velhas.38Finally, Assumar brought tohis task the powerful instrument of the devassa, or legal enquiry. Byselective application, Assumar arrested,or inspiredfear enough to resultin the flight of Nunes Viana's accomplices, and even reached into theinnercircle of his coterie. Another expedient adopted by Assumarwastosubvertthe blind loyalty of those close to Nunes Viana by chargingthemwith the undertaking of official missions in return for promises ofimmunity against criminal action: "fazerdo ladrdo fiel" as he so aptlydescribed this policy.39 In general, and in such particularmatters as histhwartingNunes Viana'sefforts to place one of his own on the municipalcouncil of Caeth6 by a riggedelection, the count of Assumar slowly was

36APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 223v-224; vol. 4, fol. 211.37Even before his arrival in Minas Gerais (November 15, 1717) Assumar faced the widespreadrumour, openly denied by Nunes Viana, that the sertanista had advised the governor that it was notconvenient for him to enter Minas Gerais (APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 8v-9v; Assumar to Angeja,December 30, 1717). More serious was the 1718 rumourthat the newlydrawnup list for paymentsofthe fifths, would include a further tax of 10percent on each slave (APMSG, vol. 11,fols. 70v-71r).When the crown judge arrived at Papagaio in 1718 to establish a town on Assumar's orders, thepopulace - fanned by rumours of a 10 per cent tax on all imported commodities if they acknow-ledged their being part of Minas Gerais ratherthan Bahia - refusedto permitthe creation of a townand threatened revolt. Nunes Viana had canvassed support from all the neighboringranches(vol. 11,fols. 89v-91r) and himself dispatched 40 men from his ranchat Jaquitahi (2 days from Papagaio) toswell the opposition.38King to Dom LourenCode Almeida, July 12, 1723(APMSG, vol. 5, fols. 88v-90r;see also fols.65, 68.39The mining crisis in Catas Altas was defused by the threatened arrest of Manuel RodriguesSoares' nephew (APMSG, vol. 11, fol. 66-67) in 1718;Rodrigues Soares was ordered not to subvertthe course of justice by intimidating witnesses for the devassa, and both he and Nunes Viana werethreatened with arrest if they failed to keep the peace. In 1719 Assumar chose Faustino RebelloBarbosa and Jodo Ferreirados Santos, close supporters of Nunes Viana, to soften up opposition tothe establishment of a town, the auctioning off of the river passage, and inclusion of that region inMinas Gerais (APMSG, vol. 11, fol. 135).



18/21

A. J. R. RUSSELL-WOOD 495gaining the upper hand over the wily old fox that was Manuel NunesViana.40

Nunes Viana was being isolated not only by the inexorableprogressofsocial, political, and economic development. This isolation also found itsexpression in geographical and human terms. As regardsthe former, thestrengthof thepoderosos do sertro was graduallybeing eroded as settle-ment occurredin the hinterlands,pushingthe truefrontierever furthertothe west. As to the latter, fellow ranchers failed to comply with NunesViana's grandiose schemes for self aggrandisement and personal profitby manipulating the supply and market for cattle. Few possessed hisfinancial reserves to maintain a protractedsiege byfreezingsupplies,andpreferredto throw in their lot with crown policies and preservea more orless regular income.41 Finally, that urgency engendered by the strugglebetween the Paulistas and the Emboabas, and which Nunes Viana hadridden to fame and fortune, had diminished over the next decadealthough it was never to die entirely. His deeds had dimmed in thememories of those who had participated; ever increasing influxes ofpeople relegated the hostilities and their protagonists to oblivion. All ofthese factors contributed to facilitating the task of the incoming viceroy,the count of Sabugosa (1720-35). He called the old sertanista to hispresence and gave him the city of Salvador as his prison. Nunes Vianaposted bond of 20,000 cruzados not to leave the city without the expressorder of the king. Ajudicial enquiryinto his actions was inconclusiveandin 1725 Nunes Viana travelled to Lisbon ostensibly for the purpose ofplacing his six daughters in a convent, but also to plead his case beforeDom Jodo V. In this he was successful. A royal decree of 3 November

40APMSG, vol. 11, fol. 120v-121r. Two close friends of Rodrigues Soares, Frutuoso Nunes andJoio Barreiros, sold up their possessions and intended to return to Portugal on the fleet of 1719.411n a letter of September 27, 1718 Assumar noted this change, increasing hatred for NunesViana, refusal to abide by his policies, and that Nunes Viana would also lose from any siege(APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 55-56.)



19/21

496 MANUEL NUNES VIANA: PARAGONOR PARASITE1727 granted Nunes Viana permission to live out his last years on hisranches in the valley of the Rio Sao Francisco.42

It was a measure of the success of his balancingact that Nunes Vianareceived both official recognition and personal financial success. Theking granted him a knighthood in the Order of Christ, letters patent asmaster of the field of the Rio Sdo Francisco, and the office of alcaide mdrof the township of Maragogipe in the Rec6ncavo of Bahia. He alsoreceived royal recognition in the concession of the proprietary post ofscribe to the ouvidoria of the judicial district of Rio das Velhas.43Hisfinancial dealings were shrouded in secrecy, but there can be no doubtthat he was a wealthy man. In 1717 the incoming governor of MinasGerais noted that such were his riches that he had aroused manyjealousies and enemies.44He was the owner of at least two cattlefazendas,was a partnerin mining interests,and in 1721 was reportedbythe viceroyto be able to muster 250 slaves.45An unusual measure of his financialindependence was that he could pay the entry fees and sustain his 6

42Thus ended a long campaign, involving viceroys, governors-general, the king, the OverseasCouncil, and the count of Assumar. In 1717 viceroy Angeja was reprimandedfor having failed tosend requested information on Nunes Viana; he was informed that the Overseas Council thoughtNunes Viana should besent to Lisbon(Secretaryof State to Angeja, April 14, 1717,APBOR, vol. I1,doc. 57). Assumar recommended the same treatment (letterto count of Vimeiro, November 8, 1718,APMSG, vol. 11, fol. 71), and orderedthe judge of Rio das Velhasto drawup a reportsummarizingtestimony to send to Lisbon (January 21, 1719 idem, fols. 103v-105v). In January 1719 Assumar'sdevassas were taking effect but Nunes Vianaand Rodigues Soares werespreadingdissent promptingthe governor to make the cryptic comment "ndo he novo haver mtos paos de dois bicos q' levdo etrazem de ambas as pte pa pescarem melhor nas aguas turbas"(APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 100v-101).Assumar receivedofficial recognition for his efforts, although abortive, to arrestthe pair(APMSG,vol. 16, fol. 80). Sabugosa reported his action to the king by a letter on the fleet leaving Salvador inDecember 1723 (APBOR, vol. 18, doc. 6); should he leave within 5 months he would forfeit 6,000cruzados to the Ribeira das Naus (APBOR, vol. 19, doc. 109). On the legal maneuvering, seeAPBOR, vol. 18, doc. 6; 96, doc. 34. The king granted Nunes Viana permissionto come to Portugal(Secretary of State to Sabugosa, February 10, 1725) and Sabugosa granted this (Sabugosa toSecretaryof State, July 11, 1725;APBOR, vol. 19,docs. 159, 159a).The royal letterof November 14,1727took the side of Nunes Viana, orderingSabugosa to suspendthe devassa (A PBOR, vol. 96, doc.34).

43Boxer, The Golden Age, p. 365; Golgher, Guerrados Emboabas, p. 247, and, for the scribalpost the following references:Costa Matoso, fol. 101; APMSG, vol. 30, fol. 39v.44APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 8v-9v.45APBOR, vol. 13,doc. 188a. Manifests housed in the mint of Lisbon and recordingremittancesof bullion, coin, or precious stones from Brazilto Portugalcontain but 6 referencesto Manuel NunesViana, and these are for modest sums, namely: 948$800 in 1731and 1200$000in 1735(Archives ofthe Casa da Moeda, Lisbon, vol. 1999, nos. 69, 70, 71, 72, and vol. 2051, no. 230;vol. 2062,no. 121.).All such remittanceswere made to Francisco Fernandes Amorim and/or Jodo Rodrigues Bandeira.



20/21

A. J. R. RUSSELL-WOOD 497daughters in a convent in Santar6m, as well as paying for one son'seducation at Coimbra university.46

Nunes Viana was one of those lucky few who realizedthe hopes andaspirations of thousands who left Portugal and the Atlantic Islands insearch of fame and fortune in the New World. He found both. Imbuedwith limitless energy,entrepreneurial nitiative, and what is referred o inmodern management circlesas "accessvision", it would be all too easy todismiss Nunes Vianaas yet another gold rushsuccess story. This is to dohim an injustice. Possessor of keen intelligence, the ability to identify ageneral area with a potential for personal gain, and then pinpoint thespecific and act quickly, perhaps the most interesting aspect of NunesViana's career was his only minor involvement with mining. Before hiscontemporaries he realized that the risk factor in mining wasunreasonably high, that competition was severe, and that the industrywould become the object of intense administrative and fiscal scrutiny.When all around him were succumbing to gold rushfever,his decision toinsulate himself and maintain his independence was brilliant. Byisolating himself geographically, he preservedhis physicalindependence;by feeding off, rather than committing himself to, mining he was thebetterable to cope with the vicissitudesof the industryand profit not onlyfrom its advances and its reverses in general terms, but also in specificregions at different times. It was in this ability to rideabove the storm, topreserve options, and to move swiftly and simultaneously on differentfronts that there lay not only Nunes Viana'ssecret for survival, but alsothe key to his relationshipto royalgovernment. Whilecontributingto theimperial effort, or acting as consultant to viceroys or governors, NunesViana preserveda certain distance; in all his dealings he ensured therewas still room for withdrawal rather than face commitment. In anoblique manner he contributed to the crown's efforts, but only in thoseareaswhich coincided with his own personal interests. At no time was hea true collaborator. This eternal search for compromise rather thancommitment should not be interpreted to mean that Nunes Viana wasincapable of takinga stand. Wehave seen his strengthin this regard n theGuerra dos Emboabas. Similarly, in dealing with his fellow colonists, hedid not flinch from forming alliances or resorting to physical force,excessively if needs be, to maintain his position.

46The admission fees alone were 16,000 cruzados. Placed in the convent of Sio Domingos dasDonas of Santar6m, the six daughters were later to take legal action against their brotherfor failingto maintain them (APBOR, vol. 54, fols. 225-232; vol. 19,doc. 159;vol. 75, f. 188). The son Miguelgraduated from Coimbra in 1737 (Francisco Morais, Estudantes da Universidade de Coimbranascidos no Brasil) [Brasilia, suplemento ao volume IV; (Coimbra, 1949), no. 858.]



21/21

498 MANUEL NUNES VIANA: PARAGON OR PARASITEFinally, it is appropriate to mention what Nunes Viana was not. Hewas no peasant bandit fighting on behalf of the people against an

oppressive imperial establishment. While sharing some of the charac-teristics of the later cangaceiros, who were to provide E. J. Hobsbawmwith the basis for a typology of "social banditry", t would be difficult toplace Nunes Viana into the perhaps too neatly delineated categories of"avenger"or "noble robber".47Nor can he be regardedas a prototype forlater protagonists in the struggle for freedom and independence. Hisopportunism and his healthilydeveloped talent for gain, coupled with hiswillingness to place accommodation above commitment effectivelyremoved Nunes Viana from consideration as a "good" bandit eitherduring his lifetime, or later as a popularhero to beeulogized as a nationalfigure of protest. Nunes Viana was too deeply immersed in thatexploitation and inequality which prevailedin colonial Brazil,and whichwere the pillarsfor a crown policy essentially basedon the credo that endsjustify means. Unlike a Manuel Beckman or a Joaquim Jose da SilvaXavier (known as Tiradentes), Nunes Viana knew no greatercause thanhis own interest. This inability to transcend the personal, the material-istic, and the local conspired against a niche being found for thisfascinating personality in oral narrativesor in scholarlystudies. The traitof opportunism effectively denied Nunes Viana the position in historywhich he deserved; his penchant for accommodation and ambivalenceled even his contemporaries to vacillate between regarding him as aparagon or a parasite of empire.The Johns Hopkins University A. J. R. RUSSELL-WOODBaltimore, Maryland

47E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (New York, 1959), chaps. 1-2;Bandits (New York, 1969).See also Linda Lewin, "TheOligarchical Limitations of Social Banditry n Brazil",Pastand Presentno. 82 (February 1979), pp. 116-46.

russell wood. manuel nunes viana..paragon or parasite of empire.pdf

Documents