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Planet Debate2010-11 Russia Coup

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Index

Index ........................................................................................................................................................................ 1

1NC .......................................................................................................................................................................... 22NC Overview ......................................................................................................................................................... 5***Uniqueness .........................................................................................................................................................6Uniqueness – Medvedev OK now ........................................................................................................................... 7At: Medvedev soft now ............................................................................................................................................8Uniqueness – Fight is Brewing! ...............................................................................................................................9***Links ................................................................................................................................................................10Link – Anti-US ......................................................................................................................................................11Link – Anti-US ......................................................................................................................................................12Link – US Action ...................................................................................................................................................13Link – Unilateral Action ........................................................................................................................................ 14

Link – Relations ..................................................................................................................................................... 15At: The plan weakens the US .................................................................................................................................16***ILs .................................................................................................................................................................... 17IL – Balance Key ...................................................................................................................................................18IL – Yes Coup/Backlash ........................................................................................................................................ 19At: Fighting will be moderate ................................................................................................................................22At: No more nationlism ......................................................................................................................................... 23At: Putin and Medvedev are friends now .............................................................................................................. 24IL – Coup will succeed ..........................................................................................................................................25At: Disputes/Factions irrelevant ............................................................................................................................ 27***Impacts ............................................................................................................................................................. 28Impact – Nuclear War ............................................................................................................................................29Impact – Disintegration ..........................................................................................................................................30A2: ‘They’d Never Use Nukes’ ............................................................................................................................. 31A2: They’d Never Use Nukes ............................................................................................................................... 32

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1NC

Uniqueness: the transition to Medvedev has opened up Russia’s foreign policy establishment – the

direction of its policies will be determined by how Medvedev can deal with the different factions of theRussia elites.

Jeffrey Mankoff ‘8 is the Chauncey Postdoctoral Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University and an Adjunct Fellow

for Russia and Eurasian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 55, no. 4, July/August 2008, pp. 42–51. Russian Foreign Policy and the United States After Putin)

With enormous constitutional authority and controlling access to both wealth and power, the Russian president is the central factor indetermining Russia’s foreign policy course. The transition from Vladimir Putin to Dmitry Medvedev thus has serious implications for Russia’s relations with other countries, above all the United States, still the chief reference point for Russian diplomacy. SinceMedvedev was Putin’s hand-picked heir, it would seem logical to expect a fair degree of continuity in terms of the objectives Russiawill pursue in its relationships with other powers—especially since Putin is positioned to continue influencing events as primeminister. This expectation is hardly far-fetched, yet there are enough uncertainties that the problem deserves closer attention. Despitethe increasingly authoritarian, centralized nature of the Russian political system, the president’s preferences are not the only factor

shaping foreign policy. Looking ahead, at least three additional considerations bear close watching: the ideological preferences of thecountry’s elites, the interests of important bureaucratic players who are intertwined with the decision-making authorities, and the ease(or lack thereof) with which Medvedev asserts his authority over these competing factions. Understanding how Medvedev’s elevationto the presidency will affect Russian foreign policy also requires an appreciation of Putin’s impact in this sphere, which was far fromnegligible. Putin has had substantial influence on foreign policy, and especially on relations with the United States (despite the end of the cold war, still Russia’s central foreign policy priority). His consolidation of power in the Kremlin, bypassing institutions like theMinistry of Foreign Affairs, the Security Council, and the legislature, made him a more important source of foreign policy initiativesthan his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Putin’s retirement from the Kremlin opens the field to a range of other influences, with perhapsunpredictable results. Nonetheless, having a better sense of what these other influences are likely to be and how they are likely to

operate can help us get a clearer picture of how Russia after Putin will approach the outside world, especially the United States.

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1NC

Link – if Russia takes a pro-US stance and reciprocates with the plan, the neo-imperialists will backlash

against Medvedev, and take back control of foreign policy. This would return Russia to aggressive anti-

Western policies, dramatically increasing confrontaiton.



One of the greatest uncertainties regarding the future direction of Russian foreign policy has to do with the nature of the transitionfrom Putin to Medvedev. Medvedev, a lawyer by training who worked with Putin in the reformist St. Petersburg mayoral administration of Anatoly Sobchak, is

generally seen as the most liberal and potentially pro-Western figure among those who were considered serious contenders to succeed Putin. But despite beinganointed by Putin, it is unclear whether the non-silovik Medvedev will enjoy Putin’s legitimacy, particularly with the security servicesPutin’s own role is also something of a wildcard. While Putin remains onstage as prime minister, the incumbents of this office have never played a central role informulating or carrying out foreign policy. Then again, modern Russia has never had a Putin as prime minister. As a first deputy prime minister in the Putinadministration, Medvedev focused on domestic affairs, particularly the so-called national projects, and his views on foreign policy were not as clearly articulated. Still,Medvedev asserted his support for an active international role, saying that Russia, as one of a handful of major powers in the world, would “conduct an independentforeign policy.”29 While Medvedev has kept his views on foreign policy somewhat vague, his criticism both of over-reliance on the energy sector as a source of wealthand of the corporatist economic structure promoted by Putin is noteworthy. Foreign investors, who are key to Russia’s future competitiveness, largely welcomed theelevation of Medvedev to the presidency in part because of the presumed similarity between his views and those of known Westernizers like Kudrin and Chubais.30 In

any case, how the succession is conducted will tell observers much about the direction of Russian foreign policy after 2008. The political-

economic apparatchiks did much to control the process from the inside, elevating Medvedev as their preferred candidate at the proper moment, undermining potentialopposition, and (presumably) arranging a division of spoils ensuring that Medvedev’s erstwhile siloviki rivals will be well compensated for accepting his presidency. If they succeed in maintaining their positions, Russian foreign policy will continue largely along the path it has trod for the past few years. The Kremlin will use its energysupplies to squeeze as much money as possible from its customers and pursue other kinds of deals (especially arms sales and nuclear construction) without regard for how they are perceived in the West. Of the ideological groups, the centrists will benefit most, since a profit-maximizing Russia is a Russia that needs good relationswith both East and West. Such a marriage of convenience between apparatchiks and ideological centrists seems the most likely outcome, leaving a Russia whoseforeign policy is simultaneously prickly and schizophrenic, as it was under Putin. If he seeks to dismantle the nexus of wealth and power built up by Putin, Medvedev

will risk reinflaming the ideological debate about Russia’s identity as a civilization and its position in the world, with uncertain results. If he succeeds, Medvedevcould ultimately move Russia in a more pro-Western direction. Should he try and fail to break up Kremlin, Inc., it will be easy for his bureaucratic and ideological rivals to team up in promoting a more serious confrontation with the United States . Muchtherefore depends on how Medvedev, his rivals, and Putin manage the transition process. If for one reason or another the successionturns contentious, the neo-imperialists are likely to come out on top. They are well represented in the military and the security serviceswhich could well play the decisive role if Medvedev fails to rapidly consolidate his control.31 For the United States, the success of the neo-

imperialists would be problematic but probably not catastrophic. Russia might then become more intransigent about, for example, Iran (a state theneo-imperialists see as a potential partner) and more aggressive toward its immediate neighbors. Whatever the ambitions of Dugin and his ilk, Russia’s

lingering military weakness and lack of appeal as an alternative to the West—for even if they could re-create the Soviet Union, the neo-imperialists cannot restore theideological appeal that the Soviet model held for much of the world in the 1950s and 1960s—means that a Eurasianist foreign policy would inevitably fail to create a

bloc of states capable of challenging the West’s dominance, although the price, for Russia and others, might well be tragically high. Conversely, if intra-elite paralysis forces the competing factions to make real appeals to public opinion, it could well be the nationalists who benefit, sincexenophobia has become a proven vote getter that contenders for power would be hard-pressed to ignore. Were that to happen, relationswith the United States would probably worsen even though the nationalists are not necessarily hostile to U.S. interests per se. Rather,

the problem would lie in the fact that the nationalist insistence on defending the Russian diaspora in the near abroad would generateconflicts between Moscow and several of its neighbor s that Washington sees as strategically important, but which have substantial Russian minorities,

particularly NA TO members Latvia and Estonia, as well as Ukraine and, increasingly, Kazakhstan (which is nearly 40 percent ethnic Russian). In any case, the

Westernizers are in no position to benefit, at least in the short run. It is possible Medvedev will turn out to be a committed Westernizer, but even if that is the case, he will need time to consolidate his position, in part by demonstrating to the skeptical siloviki his bona fides as adefender of Russia’s international ambitions. Besides, the general elite consensus about Russia as a Great Power will limit the ability of any leader to pursue

the kind of integration with the West sought by Yeltsin and his advisers in the early 1990s. Only a major external shock, like a collapse of world energy prices, couldinduce a sufficient portion of the elite to abandon its belief in Russia as an independent force in international affairs. Medvedev may turn out to be moreovertly pro-Western than Putin. Yet many of the siloviki and members of Kremlin, Inc. have long questioned his intentions and will bein a position to block any attempt to chart a course that threatens their interests. Besides, Medvedev, like most of the Russian elite, remains

committed to Russia’s Great Power aspirations. He may well favor better relations with Washington, but only on the basis of a partnership of equals. On that point,there is no debate within the Russian elite. Regardless of Medvedev’s ultimate priorities, the United States must get used to dealing with a Russia that sees itself as amajor player on the world stage, and whose interests on issues ranging from U.S. missile defense to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be taken into account, even if Russians themselves remain divided about what, precisely, those interests are.

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***Uniqueness

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Uniqueness – Medvedev OK now

Medvedev is fine now – his supports are helping him

Frolov 9-28 (Vladimir, Moscow Times, “Medvedev-Putin 2012 Race Would Be Tight,”http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/384251.html)

It was probably not Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s intention to launch a fierce presidential battle for 2012 more than two years aheadof schedule. But that might be the unintended outcome of his casual comment at the meeting with members of the Valdai Club that heand President Dmitry Medvedev would “figure it out between ourselves who of us would run in 2012.” Putin’s statement was adeliberate put-down of Medvedev on Sept. 11, a day after the president posted his “Go Russia!” appeal in which he criticized the orderof business that had ossified under Putin’s rule. Putin’s remark was an unsubtle hint at Medvedev’s limited capacity to makedecisions on matters as crucial for him as running for a second term. To imply this a week before Medvedev’s visit to the United Nations General Assembly and a Group of 20 meeting in Pittsburgh, was to undercut Medvedev’s international credibility. It was a blow to Russia’s image that no amount of schmoozing with members of the Valdai Club could rectify. Putin left Medvedev no other option but to rush out with a public statement of his own — also made before a foreign audience (clearly, foreigners need to knowfirst) — that he intends to run again in 2012, although this was said tongue-in-cheek. Putin’s remark mobilized Medvedev’s

supporters, like Igor Yurgens, head of the Institute of Contemporary Development, to launch a public campaign to discourage Putinfrom running in 2012. Yurgens said Putin would look like Leonid Brezhnev if he were to run for president in 2012 and again in 2018,when Putin will be 66. Despite assurances of political and personal closeness between Putin and Medvedev, they already haveideologically diverging teams who would hate to see their boss yield the right of way. In 2012 we might see a truly competitive racewith a clear choice in strategy for Russia if both of them ran for the presidency. Putin is already in full campaign mode with publicevents and policy decisions geared to shore up his electoral ratings. Medvedev is busy building his own support base and projectingthe image of the nation’s modernizer and an agent of change. Unlike Putin, he still lacks a political party he can call home. 2012 isshaping up as an electoral battle of the giants and another watershed year for Russia

Medvedev is more than a figurehead—he’s consolidating his influence and bureaucratic support gives

him new momentum

Saunders and Simes 11-9 (Paul J, executive director and Dimitri K. Simes is president of The Nixon Center,

“Who Controls Russia?”NYT, Opinion, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/opinion/10iht-edsimes.html?_r=1)Western conventional wisdom about Russia — especially in Washington — holds that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is in charge and President

Dmitri Medvedev is a figurehead whose statements and actions are scripted in advance to deceive gullible foreigners. This is excessively simplistic.While Putin is and remains a key Russian leader, there is no question that Medvedev thinks he is a real president, and that his subordinates actassertively on that basis, both in bureaucratic struggles within the government and in their public comments. A lot has been made of Medvedev’s failure to make significant changes in his senior Kremlin staff , much of which he inherited from Putin along with the keys to the Kremlin,

though rumors that the Russian president will replace his chief of staff , Sergei Naryshkin, are increasingly widespread. More important,however, is that a number of Medvedev’s inherited aides have begun to reassess their personal interests as their new boss has gainedvisibility and influence. This in turn gives the president further momentum. Russia’s political class well remembers Stalin’s dictum that “cadres

decide everything” and are increasingly discussing who belongs to which team. In fact, a new report from a think tank chaired by Medvedev calls for a“parallel power vertical” (led by Medvedev) alongside the “regular bureaucracy” (led by Putin) to modernize Russia, because — according to the think

tank’s head, Igor Yurgens — modernization is “impossible under the supremacy of the Putin elite.” Others in Medvedev’s camp are openly irritated that 18 months aftethe election, Putin has still not given his successor the opportunity to govern. For their part, Putin’s partisans resent the increasingly aggressive conduct of Medvedev’ssupporters, which many believe is tolerated, if not encouraged, by the Russian president himself. They argue that Medvedev should accept his limited authority for nowin order to avoid creating a destabilizing rift in Russia’s ruling elite. Particularly troubling for the Putin camp is Medvedev’s frequent implicit criticism of Putin’s

performance as president, inherent in Medvedev’s regular condemnations of Russia’s extensive corruption, economic weakness, and political shortcomings — includinghis recent attack on Stalin and his political legacy. This fuels efforts to remind Russians and the outside world alike that the prime minister still matters — efforts suchas his statements on Iran (sanctions are premature) and Russia’s World Trade Organization membership (almost derailed by Putin’s suggestion that Moscow apply

jointly with Kazakhstan and Belarus). Russia’s 2012 election will likely prove decisive in the Putin-Medvedev relationship, though theelection itself will probably be much less significant than the period immediately before it, when the real decision — which of them runs for

president and wins — will be made. Most believe the choice is still Putin’s, but Medvedev’s supporters hope that Putin won’t fight back if they mounta real challenge. The closer the election comes, the greater the pressure on Russia’s elite to choose sides.

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At: Medvedev soft now

Medvedev is avoiding the image of being soft now—military exercises prove

Telegraph 9-28

(“Russia's President Medvedev shows tough side by posing with machine gun,”http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/6240280/Russias-President-Medvedev-shows-tough-side-by-posing-with-machine-gun.html)

Mr Medvedev peered through binoculars to watch exercises in Russia's western exclave of Kaliningrad, which borders theEuropean Union and also examined a machine gun and other military equipment, television pictures showed.He wore a naval forces jacket emblazoned with a badge reading "D.A. Medvedev, commander of the militaryforces of the Russian Federation" as well as a small Russian flag. The exercises, a joint operation withneighbouring Belarus, have been taking place since September 8 and involve more than 12,000 troops. Mr Medvedev in recent months has moved to burnish hardline credentials as Russia fights militants in the northern Caucasus, often

using earthy language reminiscent of his predecessor, Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister. The Russian army presented him with a special knife made of composite materials which Russian news agencies said was effective both underwater and on land. "It can cut, it can chop and it sits very well in the hand," commented the presidentflanked by Nikolai Makarov, Russia's top general. However, Mr Medvedev emphasised that the exercises, whichcontinue on Tuesday in Belarus, did not pose a threat to any country. "I want to emphasise that our exercises have adefensive character. We are not threatening anyone," he said, according to Russian news agencies. "We have not

had this sort of military exercises for a long time. That they are taking place on such a scale now is reassuring."

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***Links

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Link – Anti-US

The siloviki still hate the US – they want to restore Soviet prestige and believe the US threatens that

projectIan Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy; a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute; and a

columnist for the International Herald Tribune. And Samuel Charap ‘7 is a doctoral candidate in political science at St. Antony’s

College, University of Oxford (The Washington Quarterly • 30:1 pp. 83–92.)

Fourth, the siloviki promote the restoration of Russia’s greatness on the international stage. For them, the United States and NATOallies still repre sent an external threat; they actively undermine Russia’s sovereignty and ul timately would like to force the collapseof the Russian state. Siloviki believe that Russia should regain the respect that the Soviet Union once command ed in internationalaffairs by maintaining a strong army and state-of-the-art military capabilities. They also insist that other former Soviet states should bereintegrated with Russia to the greatest extent possible. Finally, siloviki endorse the nationalistic, xenophobic, and sometimes anti-Semitic views of the most conservative elements within the Russian Orthodox Church. The group actively promotes the role of thechurch in public life and would like to impose stringent restrictions on immigration. Both policies could provoke a major backlashfrom some of the more than 20 million Muslims living in Russia because they reflect a racist Slavophilia. Their xenophobia has

practical consequences for state-business relations as well, as one FSB officer recently revealed in comments on the business oli-garchs. He named Aleksei Mordashev of Severstal and Vladimir Bogdanov of Surgutneftegaz as “good” oligarchs—“they’reRussians.” As for the others, he noted that “all Jews are traitors, oriented toward the West. That’s how it’s always been.”11

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Link – Anti-US

Powerful forces in Russia are still against the US – they will make it impossible for Medvedev to

moderate Russia without serious backlashALLEN C. LYNCH ‘7 is the director of the Center for Russian & European Studies at the University of Virginia. 14 Brown J.

World Aff. 53 2008

A few domestic political facts also impinge upon Russia's post-Putin path in foreign affairs. Russia's elites continue to resist liberal politics or liberal economics. The confluence in the 1990s of economic and social collapse following U.S.-guided "reforms," NATO expansion to

Russia's borders, as well as NATO's war against Russia's client-state Serbia 601 in spring 1999, have worked to discredit and undermine pro-Western

options in Russia. As Nikolai Zlobin recently observed, "Russia does not have an influential... political or economic group ... interested inupgrading [Russo-U.S.] relations."20 Elites, especially in the energy industry, do not require special access to the international market: high energy prices and

the fungibility of oil in the global marketplace mean that even high-cost Russian energy producers can turn a handsome profit on global exchanges. Russia's energyelites thus have little to gain by Russian accession to the WTO and remain little affected by the prospect of Western sticks in the form of trade sanctions, especially asthe bulk of the European Union's trade in Russian natural gas is tied up in long-term delivery contracts. Likewise, the enormous profits to be won from energy exportreceipts at current world prices make both these elites and the Russian state, whose fiscal balance depends on them, much less receptive to domestic social pressuresthan would be the case in a more balanced Russian economy. The logic of the energy industry thus tends to make Russia relatively insensitive to the logic of liberaleconomics abroad and liberal politics at home. The bulk of Russia's non-military industrial base is unlikely be competitive in a liberal international marketplace. Highcosts of production and patterns of economic geography that still reflect Soviet central planning, combined with the absence of true structural reform of the Russianeconomy since the Soviet collapse, continue to render the bulk of Russia's economy non-viable under global market conditions.2' Russia's accession to the WTOthreatens the bulk of the Russian working population with lifetime unemployment. For these reasons, a strict free-market economic regime could only be enforced bydraconian repression. Russias liberal parties were seriously damaged by their association with the "shock therapy' attempted in the 1990s and the subsequenthyperinflation (2,600 percent in the first post-Soviet year of 1992, 900 percent in 1993), depression (a reduction of some 50 percent of GDP), and impoverishment of the vast majority of the population- as well as the disappearance, virtually overnight, of the majority's life savings.22 NATO expansion completed the discrediting of these natural allies of the Western world; indeed, by the mid-i 990s, these parties had to join the anti-NATO camp.23 It is doubtful whether these parties (Yabloko andthe Union of Right-Wing Forces) can survive the new barrier of 7 percent of the vote now needed to enter the Duma in the December 2007 parliamentary elections.24Russia's national security elites harbor enormous resentment against the Western world, and especially the United States, for the betrayal of promises given by GeorgeH.W Bush and German Chancellor Kohl to Gorbachev in 1990 that there would be no further NATO expansion eastward after the rapid unification of Germany in

NATO. Instead, Russia now finds itself contending with NATO for geopolitical influence inside the boundaries of the former Soviet Union, with the three Baltic statesnow in NATO; Ukraine and Georgia still candidates for eventual inclusion; and the United States deploying anti-missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.While the military will not have the possibility of reconstituting anything like the old Soviet machine in the foreseeable future, the sympathy of the early 1990s for a

Russo-Western strategic relationship has long since evaporated. The Russian military and intelligence communities, which are well represented atthe apex of Putin's political machine, are only more anti-Western by degrees than the majority of their civilian counterparts.2 5 Economic

ties also place Russia at odds with U.S. interests: the Russian arms business has seen a small renaissance in recent years, attaining the scale of $5 billion or more per

year, while Russia's civilian nuclear exports are destined to assume greater importance over the next two decades. Arms sales tend to orient Russia to China, whosemilitary modernization has been fueled by Russian arms imports; nuclear exports help frame Russia's relations with Iran, which is scrupulously neutral in Russia's war

in Chechnya. Russia will thus continue to be involved in profitable relationships that complicate U.S. foreign policy purposes. All of these antagonisms seem to be in line with the allegedly anti-U.S. statements made by Putin at a high-level international security conference in

Munich in February 2007, as well as on Victory Day (9 May) 2007, where he made Stalinesque allusions to the Third Reich and those today who display "the same

contempt for human life and the same claims of exceptionality and diktat in the world."26 These statements express Russian frustration with the extentof U.S. power in the contemporary world that, however intense, is hardly unique in a unipolar world dominated by what the French call the U.S.

"hyperpower" and the Germans call the U.S. "OJberpower."27 In practice, Russian foreign policy has been guided under Putin by the clear understanding that none of Russia's main purposes at home and abroad can be met in the face of the active hostility of the United States. A Russia that faced a U.S. government systematicallydetermined, as during the cold war, to contest Russian power wherever it could, would compel Russia to commit resources it can ill afford to maintain its influence incentral Eurasia. For instance, if the Chechen separatists were backed by the United States as fully as it backed the Afghan resistance in the 1980s, Moscow would finditself in an increasingly precarious domestic as well as international position. At the same time, Putin's disciplined pragmatism-reflected in his surprise offer to basecomponents of a U.S. ABM system in Azerbaijan at the G-8 summit in June 2007-is not reflected in the emotional and-U.S. sentiment predominant among Russia's

national security elites. Channeling that unrest and overseeing Russia's economic interest in ways that do not cause serious harm to Russo-U.S. relations or Russia's own interests will be a major challenge for Putin's successor .

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Link – US Action

US attempts to influence Russia policies strengthen the siloviki – it proves that they are right about how

the US perceives RussiaIan Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy; a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute; and a



Can the United States do anything to prevent such developments? Prob ably not . Indeed, active U.S. involvement in Russian politicswould probably backfire, given the current political climate in Moscow. The pre-election factional battles within the Kremlin are verymuch an internal affair. U.S. policymakers should be aware, however, that deterioration in U.S.-Rus sian relations and rhetoricalattacks on Putin and his policies, regardless of whether they are justified, strengthen the siloviki clan’s position. One Kremlin officialrecently cited U.S. unwillingness to approve Russia’s bid for membership in the World Trade Organization as an example of howWashington’s behavior bolsters the siloviki.12 Conflict between Washington and Moscow confirms the siloviki worldview and thus justifies their contin ued influence in Kremlin policy formulation . In short, although the United States has little capacity to effect positive change, its rhetoric could certainly make the situation worse.

Nationalists who are anti-American are gaining power in Russia – they will challenge any softening of

anti-Western rhetoric and policy

Rafael Khachaturian ‘9, New School for Social Research DISSENT / Winter 2009 The Specter of Russian Nationalism

With Russia’s reemergence and Putin’s popularity, there are more than enough factors to worry any democratic observer. Aside fromthe steady accumulation of power—the Kremlin authorities call it “sovereign democracy”— there is a revival of populist nationalismat home that coincides with Russia’s increasingly hard-line foreign policies. The looming presence of nationalism in Russia’s publicdiscourse has gone hand in hand with the Kremlin’s stance toward the former Soviet republics, Western Europe, and the United StatesThe political climate is increasingly anti-American, the world increasingly polarized, in Putin’s representation of it, into anirreconcilable opposition between Russia’s national interests and those of the West. Suspicious popular sentiment is focused onAmerican expansion into Ukraine and Georgia under the guise of NATO. The result is a growing parallelism between nationalism at

home and the renewed effort to build regional and international influence

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Link – Unilateral Action

Unilateral concessions encourage hardliners

Cohen 11-2

(Ariel, PhD, “Russia's Economic Crisis and U.S.-Russia Relations: Troubled Times Ahead,” HeritageFoundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/bg2333.cfm)

When dealing with Russia, the U.S. should staunchly protect its national security and foreign policy interests, including continuingits opposition to the Iranian nuclear weapons, deploying missile defenses, and negotiating the best deal possible on

strategic arms. This is not the time for counterproductive unilateral concessions, which could encourage further Russian recalcitrance.Instead, increasing Russia's stake in the global economic pie could move its rulers over time to emphasize the economic agenda over the 19th century-style expansionism. Congress and the Obama Administration should pursue this option, while still driving a hard

bargain on vital national security priorities.

Unilateral concessions send a signal of desperation to Russian hardliners

CSM ‘9

(Christian Science Monitor, “What price for a nuclear-free world,” EDITORIAL; Pg. 8, 7-7-09, Lexis)

But the more immediate point is that the exact size of the cuts is still to be negotiated. That leaves plenty of diplomatic wiggle room in the months ahead for the Kremlin to take advantage of Mr. Obama's zeal for a nuclear-free world. It can extract concessions that would help Russia become a great power again - especially a power over its neighbors.

Obama must be careful what he wishes for. He should not give up other vital American interests as he tries to bring about nuclear disarmament . He seemed to have already lost, for example, the battle over whether to link the START II negotiations to Russia's

concern about America's missile defense plans in Europe for fending off Iranian rockets. And he agreed to a preliminary goal in warhead cuts that could allow Russia to reduce the number by only 25. START I limited thenumber of warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200, and the proposed upper limit now is 1,675. Meanwhile, indelivery systems - where the US is much stronger - the proposed cuts are large: from the current range of 1,500to 1,675 units to between 500 and 1,100 units. Such American concessions to Moscow reveal an Obama administration eager

for almost any bilateral nuclear-arms treaty that can create momentum toward global nuclear disarmament. And Obama'sPentagon has not yet completed the Nuclear Posture Review that would help Congress decide what sort of strategic forces the US needs for the next few years. Will China, for instance, decide to greatly expand its smallnuclear arsenal if it can approach the new, lower number of Russian or US warheads achieved with a START IItreaty? Obama is wise to engage the Kremlin fully on a new START treaty. The mutual inspections of eachcountry's arsenals under the current pact cannot be allowed to discontinue and, more important, the US can atleast learn what linkages and concessions are sought by Moscow. But the Russians saw Obama and his antinuke

idealism coming. As with the battle against climate change, he must use persuasion in creating a better world rather than

negotiating with giveaways that may, in the end, not achieve his grand vision.

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Link – Relations

If Medvedev too openly pursues cooperation with the US, he will face backlash. He will be challenged by

the military and security servicesNazrin Mehdiyeva ‘8 is Russia/CIS Editor at Oxford Analytica, Oxford. The International Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 2, June 2008,

21–34

A tangible improvement in Russian-Western relations will be hard to achieve if the basic tenets of a strong state, as envisaged and putin place by Putin, remain intact. The foundation of Putin’s policy rests on increasing state control in the economy, and rebuildingRussia’s military might. Changing either would disturb the balance of interests within the political system and exacerbate factionalrivalry. Medvedev’s task will be further complicated by the need to establish his authority with the more hard-line elements in theRussian political establishment as well as the military and security services. It is worth reiterating that, in this context therefore,Medvedev appears to have little room for manoeuvre, at least in the early stages of his presidency. A softer rhetorical stance withgreater emphasis on cooperation, shared interests in trade and energy, and common values is one area in which Medvedev’s moreconsensual leadership style would bring tangible improvement to bilateral relations. However, his ability significantly to tone downrhetoric and his willingness to re-orient Russian policy back towards the West – and away from China and such institutions as the

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) – will depend to a large extent on Washington’s stance on the issue of missile defence26and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s stance on enlargement to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Boththese issues are of strategic importance to Russia. If pursued without due regard to Moscow’s concerns and interests, such policies wilexacerbate its already acute sense of vulnerability and push it to embrace the strategy of ‘‘aggressive defence’’ with even greater vigour. The intensification in Moscow’s great power rhetoric reflects Russia’s changing perceptions of the world as more hostile thanat any time in the past 17 years. Russia’s desire to reclaim its global stature has led to the deterioration of its relations with the West, but Moscow has accepted this as a price to pay for what it sees as a more independent foreign policy. Russia does not regard itself as being antagonistic towards the West; it is merely determined to protect what it perceives as its national interests. Russia sees itself as agreat power and expects to be dealt with as such.27 These trends will not change under Medvedev, who shares Putin’s views onRussia’s place in the world and his commitment to a strong and sovereign Russia.

US support for Medvedev is a kiss of death—nationalist backlash dooms his political fortunes

Lieven 9-18

(Anatol, senior editor at The National Interest, is a professor in the War Studies Department of King’s CollegeLondon and a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation, “A Stable Kremlin,” National Interest,http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22202)

By the same token, it would be foolish in the extreme for the Obama administration to follow the apparent advice of some of itsofficials and ostentatiously show their preference for Medvedev over Putin. The people who advocate this have obviously learnedabsolutely nothing from the disastrous history of America’s involvement in Russia in the 1990s. Given the attitudes of the Russianmasses to the United States, nothing could be worse for Medvedev or the reformist course he represents than public U.S. support for him. President Obama very wisely recognized this risk of a nationalist backlash in his approach to Iran; he should not forget it again inthe case of Russia.

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At: The plan weakens the US

A weaker looking US actually strengthens the nationalists – they use US weakness in order to justify

aggressive foreign policyTerry W. Simmons ‘8 Dissertation, U Miami, international rels and comparative politics “GORBACHEV, YELTSIN AND

PUTIN: SOVIET-RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES FROM 1990 THROUGH THE FALL OF 2008: ASTRATEGIC ANALYSIS)

Washington’s arrogance in its dealing with the transitional Russian Federation is now being confronted with the emerging reality thatMoscow will no longer be bullied or neo-contained in Cold War terms. As the pseudo-hegemonic clout of the United States continuesto dissipate, Russian aggressiveness will intensify. International support for American foreign policy, already severely damaged by theBush Doctrine since 9/11, will continue to dwindle as vestiges of American Grand Strategy cling to Bush-era unilateralism. Inhistorical terms, the Russian leaders from Gorbachev to Putin have not enjoyed the political advantage of America being on thedefensive despite its superior military capabilities. Putin, in contrast to both Gorbachev and Yeltsin in particular, who conducted their respective foreign policies toward the United States from a defensive disadvantage, is gaining strength daily as America is stretchedand overburdened by logistical and financial problems as well as a swelling reactive electorate disillusioned by the ill-conceived

policies of the Bush administration as embodied in the increasingly defunct Bush Doctrine.

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***ILs

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IL – Balance Key

Medvedev will have to maintain balance among the Russian factions in order to moderate Russia foreign

policyALLEN C. LYNCH ‘7 is the director of the Center for Russian & European Studies at the University of Virginia. 14 Brown J.

World Aff. 53 2008

As THE LONG HISTORY oF military coups-in Latin America, Turkey (four since 1960), Greece (1967), and even Spain (aborted,1981)-suggests, political succession in poorly institutionalized polities often leads to upheaval and even foreign intervention.' Suchsuccession crises touch upon the link between the distribution of economic, social, and political power within a country and acountry's capacity to defend and project its sovereign power internationally. These patterns assume special importance in light of thescheduled "successor" presidential election in Russia in March 2008, when Vladimir V. Putin will likely 53 hand over executiveauthority to an anointed proteg6.2 Considering the predominantly charismatic foundation of Putin's authority and the fact that, to date,executive power has yet to change hands in Russia through electoral means, Putin's succession assumes particular significance for Russia's foreign relations and domestic trajectory. This article will attempt to frame the Putin succession and Russian foreign policy by examining, first, enduring historical patterns of succession and Russian diplomacy; second, the specific pattern of Putin's

diplomacy; third, elite patterns and preferences in the current Russian political system; and finally, the external and internal contextsfor future Russian influence in the wider world. Putin's successor will face a complex balancing act as he walks along political,economic, and diplomatic tightropes. Putin's successor must continue to satisfy multiple domestic factions, balancing the economicinterests of the export-oriented energy sector against the internationally non-competitive bulk of Russia's industrial and agriculturaleconomy, which sustains a large portion of Russian employment and is therefore susceptible to nationalist, protectionist, and evenchauvinist pressures. The next president must be able to exploit high global energy prices to bring revenue into the Russian state andsociety and not just the country's vast criminalized patronage networks (as prevailed in the 1990s). Diplomatically, Putin's successor must reinforce Russia's claim to preeminence in central Eurasia without spoiling Russia's relations with Europe, the United States, andJapan. Finally, and perhaps most challenging, Putin's successor will have to establish his political authority and legitimacy as Putin'shandpicked successor, while Putin himself will try to retain at least a veto power behind the scenes in preparation to run again for president in 2012

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IL – Yes Coup/Backlash

The siloviki are here and powerful – they will do everything they can to intervene in foreign policy,

should they perceive that things aren’t going their wayIan Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy; a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute; and a



The battles between the factions within Russia’s ruling elite have ongo ing destabilizing effects .13 The “bulldog fight under thecarpet,” as Winston Churchill once characterized the politics of the Soviet-era Kremlin, increas es political risk and creates a volatile policymaking environment, which will have a negative impact on the country’s investment climate. Although it is too early to predictwho will emerge as the Kremlin’s choice to succeed Putin, the battles between the various factions will intensify as the 2008 electionapproaches. During the selection process, the conflict between factions could break into the open. How this struggle will manifestitself is an open question. Given the stakes, there is every reason to believe there would be no holds barred. Yet, no matter who ischosen to be Russia’s next president, the siloviki are here to stay. They are so deeply entrenched in the bureaucracy that it would beimpossible to eliminate their presence in Russian politics and po litical economy. Even if they do not succeed in promoting one of their

own as Putin’s successor, they are virtually certain to play a substantial role in the selection process and to help shape the new president’s political and eco nomic agenda for years to come .

AND, Russia is in a precoup situation – if things go badly for the siloviki, they will stage a coup. They’ve

done it before, when Gorbachev dissolved the Soviet Union, and they will do it again.

Anders Aslund ‘8, Peterson Institute for International Economics “Purge or Coup?”

http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=865

All these KGB people have come to the fore only because they were friends of Putin. He is their only claim to fame. In all likelihood, nobody else would appoint them

to such high posts. Putin has maintained his power by dividing these groups and arbitrating between them, so that they all hate oneanother. But by appointing Medvedev as his heir apparent, Putin has carried out a coup against his KGB friends, betraying them all.Ironically, the prime beneficiaries are the surviving family oligarchs led by Roman Abramovich, who have been losing out politically since the Yukos confiscation in2003. Today, all of Putin’s Chekists undoubtedly loathe Medvedev, who has outwitted them. But most of all, they must hate their former friend Vladimir

Vladimirovich. They all hoped to remain in power, but what will happen to them in the future under the Medvedev-Putin dream team?

They are privately wealthy, but their fortunes hinge on government positions that President Medvedev could fire them from, and any student of management or history

knows that it would be imprudent of him not to do so instantly. The situation is quite simple. Either the Chekists gang up against Medvedev andPutin while they still have power, or they face being discarded into the dustbin of history. The oligarchs may be ready to defendMedvedev with their money, but the Chekists have the arms and troops. In short, we are seeing a classical precoup situation: Will thearmed old regime give up without violence or try to reassert its power? The most obvious parallel is the end of Mikhail Gorbachev’sreign. From October 1990 to April 1991, Gorbachev made common cause with Communist Party hardliners, who started considering him oneof their own because of his many appointments of reactionary Communists. In April 1991, however, Gorbachev started his Novo-Ogaryovo process on

the elaboration of a new union treaty, which amounted to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its replacement with a loose, voluntary confederation.

Gorbachev’s hard-line appointees wanted nothing of the kind. On August 18, 1991, two days before the planned signing of the new union treaty,

they joined hands and staged a coup —admittedly one of the most pathetic operetta coups the world has ever seen. The Sechin group appears to have started

to attack Putin himself. The very precise—and plausible—information about Putin’s personal wealth seems to originate from the Sechin clan. The same interlocutorsare now leaking the roles of Putin’s reputed bagmen, Gennady Timchenko and Yury Kovalchuk. Nobody but the Sechin operatives are likely to have had access toMarina Salye’s report from 1992 on Putin’s alleged corrupt foreign trade deals in St. Petersburg at that time, which was released on the Russian Internet for the first

time on November 30, 2007, two days before the State Duma elections. Suddenly, the censorship on criticism of Putin has eased, and it is controlled by the Sechincrowd. On November 30, 2007, Kommersant published the extraordinary Oleg Shvartsman interview that blackened Sechin and, interestingly, General ValentinVarennikov, one of the foremost August 1991 and October 1993 putchists. It outed KGB business in general. Alisher Usmanov, the owner of Kommersant, is connectedto Gazprom, which Medvedev chairs. This internecine war among the KGB men is reminiscent of the bankers’ war in 1997, which preceded the demise of the oligarchs.Are we seeing the prelude to the fall of the KGB kleptocrats? If Medvedev is to become president, Putin had better fire all these Chekists before the planned coronationin May. Indeed, he has already spoken about a complete change of the top leadership of the state, but after having warned the incumbents, he needs to act. Meanwhile,

time is running out for his former KGB friends, who need to mend fences among themselves if they intend to organize a coup whilethey still command Russia’s many special forces. They will, however, have to prove more skill than some of them did in August 1991 and October 1993.

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IL – Yes Coup/BacklashThe structure of the Russia regime is highly unstable because of constant fighting among the factions of

elites. But the stable theme is anti-US rhetoric and policy. If that theme changes, there is a high risk of

violent competitions over control of Russia.

Stephen Blank ‘8 Institute for Security and Development Policy – Policy Paper Series “The Putin Succession and its Implicationsfor Russian Politics” )

Succession, for which there is no established legal procedure, duly remains a source of this model’s weakness. Every post-Sovietsuccession has been accompanied by force, electoral fraud on a grand scale, and a steady narrowing of democratic and public political participation. The most recent succession struggle is no different, featuring gross electoral manipulation, arrests and murders of high-ranking officials, etc. These coups, arrests, and murders are also accompanied by large-scale transfers of property to one or another faction, indicating again that the basis of Russian political affiliation remains the faction or “clan,” not one of kinship but of political patronage and clientilism which is based, like medieval feudalism, on the principle of nul homme sans seigneur. Such manifestationsof infighting are to be expected in the Muscovite model based on the concept of the Tsar’s patrimonial power over the economy, andthe institution of the boyar service state where all must serve to acquire the rents that they seek from the state that grants them. Of course, in such a state there is no pretense about civil and human rights, nor are there even enforceable property rights. Hence theelites’ struggle for access, power, and property is constant and never-ending, and Tsars and presidents deliberately encourage thedivision of the elite into rival and competing factions. And each of these intra-elite struggles is a total struggle for the losers lose

everything, a fact that explains their intensity. Moreover, an endless struggle for rent-seeking imperial expansion, though notnecessarily territorial, is an indispensable function of the system because it is the only way new rents to accommodate new servitorscan be found. Likewise, the inculcation of nativism and hostility to foreign powers is another constant of such a system. Indeed, thegreatest threat to it is not American power but American ideals, i.e. democracy. Thus the anti-Western drift of Russian foreign policyis not merely a sign of campaigns to arouse public opinion on behalf of the government; rather it is the inherent logic of the system.Putin is manipulating the “power vertical” to ensure that he and his appointments hold on to power into the Medvedev period byupholding the threat of investigation and prosecution over all officials and politically interested personages. Similarly, newinstitutional checks on democratic and even elite competition have been instituted. Among them are groups like the youth group Nashi, which mobilizes public opinion, especially among the youth, on behalf of the regime and against its domestic and foreigncritics; similarly media controls have been extended far beyond what they were. Moreover, the Investigations Committee (SK) has been set up to concentrate the investigative and prosecutorial power in the Presidential Administration, not the regular state, making ita formidable weapon for a purge of the elite, not unlike Ivan the Terrible’s Oprichnina, which could take lives and property withimpunity. We may envision the SK as an institution that simultaneously abets and restrains this kind of politics, by creating a

pervasive possibility of investigation and conviction among all elites. As these institutions were being set up, secret police controlsand penetration of key institutions were also extended and legislation allowing for the takeover of the country by the power structures – if necessary – was also enacted into law. Thanks to such moves, the mafia-like tendencies of the regime have become entrenched,and corruption and criminality have mushroomed with the growing fusion between organized crime and the government in manycenters. As the Politkovskaya and Litvinenko murders suggest, opponents of the regime are at risk of ever greater violence. Thus,while this regime appears stable, its foundations are decidedly shaky and its propensity towards domestic violence and externalaggrandizement remains inherent in the logic of its construction. This is not, economic trends notwithstanding, an enduring basis uponwhich to build a politically sound and stable Russia that can cooperate with its partners in safeguarding international security.

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IL – Yes Coup/Backlash

And, the siloviki are skeptical of the current power-sharing regime. They are aiming to regain control

and make Russia confrontational again – and they will use violence and assassinations to do it.

Stephen Blank ‘8 Institute for Security and Development Policy – Policy Paper Series “The Putin Succession and its Implications

for Russian Politics” )

Bulbov’s arrest led Viktor Cherkesov, his boss and head of Gosnarkokontrol and a long-standing friend and colleague of Putin (albeit bitter rival of the FSB’s head Nikolai Patrushev) to go public in the media, warning that the security serrvices were in danger of becoming embroiled in “an all against all” war for power and influence that could destroy the state. In turn, Cherkesov’s going public provoked Putin’s ire because the article exposed the inner workings of the regime and was interpreted as a direct strike against the patron of the FSB in Putin’s inner circle, his long-time aide Igor Sechin, the reputed head of the Siloviki faction. Indeed, Bulbov wasreportedly bugging the offices of the FSB and Ministry of Interior (MVD) leadership.12 So when this scandal went public, the resultswere highly embarassing to all parties. Putin’s announcement that he would head the United Russia party, create his own personalmovement “for Putin” (za Putina), and retain the office of prime minister to head the future government may well be traceable, at leastin part, to this scandal that showed that the Siloviki could not restrain their struggle for power and could tear the regime apart.13 Thelast act in this grisly drama occurred in late October 2007, when an officer and former officer of FSKN were found dead (from poisoning) in St. Petersburg. This too was widely interpreted as being connected to the arrests of Bulbov, and the infighting betweenSechin, Patrushev, and investigations Committee chief Alexander Bastrykin and Cherkesov and his protectors.14 In all these cases,there was a trend toward ever more violence, arrests, and also an ever greater contraction of the space available for democratic politics. Likewise, each succession is then followed by a new redivision of assets under state control as well as the enhancement of state controls over the economy. This redivision is already occurring as Gazprom, tied to the probable new president-to-be, DmitryMedvedev, is already angling to take over Tomskneft, the prize subsidiary of Rosneft, the fief of his rival Igor Sechin.15 Such movesunderscore the fragility of the status quo and explain why, despite many Russian and foreign analysts’ statements that Russia is back as a great power, Russia remains a risk factor in world affairs on account of its internal realities.16 Similarly many observers questionthe durability of the Putin-Medvedev arrangement. Either they fear Medvedev is too weak to assume the real powers of the presidencyand discipline the rival factions or that Putin will not let go of the powers he has accrued, especially as there are signs, discussed below, that he is already angling to increase the prime minister’s powers at the expense of the president.17 Thus the state’s foundation becomes ever narrower as rival factions, “clans,” and bureaucratic patronage networks fight for power. Moreover, absent anyauthoritative legal mechanism or accountability, ultimately the only way a Tsar can rule,—and this applies to Yeltsin, Putin, and their Tsarist and Soviet predecessors as well—is by constant “checks and balances” among the elite, i.e. a constant balancing act amongrival factions. The Tsar checks and balances each group by the other while remaining in some sense above the fray, not least through

the mystique of Tsardom and the popular cult of personality as Putin, pace Stalin, has done. Policy thus often emerges out of the strife

of these bureaucratic and “courtly” factions.

The siloviki will backlash – they want to maintain control over the presidency; their interference in the

2008 election proves

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy; a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute; and a



The siloviki clearly want to maintain their influence after the presidential elections in 2008. Group members will use their leveragewithin the Kremlin and the state bureaucracy to promote the candidacy of someone who will protect their interests and extend their influence. The siloviki have only the most primitive public relations apparatus and little experience in electoral politics generally. As a

result, efforts to support their preferred candidate will take place almost entirely behind the scenes. They will use their considerable in fluence within the state-dominated Russian media and with Putin to secure power for a new president they believe they can trust.

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At: Fighting will be moderate

Stephen Blank ‘8 Institute for Security and Development Policy – Policy Paper Series “The Putin Succession and its Implications

for Russian Politics” )

Given the nature of inter-elite rivalries, their struggles are almost invariably zero-sum games. Those who lose, lose everything, andvice versa. Thus every succession struggle, even if they become progressively narrower in scope, remains as equally intense for its players. All these struggles, like those in 1999 and those in the 1950s after Stalin, feature violence and/or arrests among the players, if not broader violence as in 1993 and 1999. Other prominent features include the leaking of what is now called Kompromat, and

attempts to impede any policy of reconciliation with the outside world.25 Thus Putin’s government has long since emancipateditself from any control by or accountability to any kind of social, economic, or political “veto groups” or interest groups. Notsurprisingly, every conceivable form of criminality and corruption also permeates the regime.26 Under these circumstances, it ishardly surprising that as the political system narrows, the sanctioned participation of the various army and police organizations in it,and recent successes in rent-seeking, i.e. higher budget and other appropriations, is growing.27 As these “veto groups” have a vested pecuniary interest in hyping the so-called foreign threat to get more appropriations and rents, and as their support, along with publicsupport, is vital to any contender, the need to appeal to their interests obliges the regime to intensify hostile propaganda against allenemies and give them more money. Meanwhile, as succession approaches, political infighting becomes ever more intense, just like

what happened with the arrests of members of Russia’s Federal anti-narcotics agency and the aforementioned shootouts of 2007. Butthose incidents were part of a recurrent pattern. The Yukos takeover, the imprisonment of its owner Mikhail Khodorkovskii in 2003-04, the ousting of the remnants of the Yeltsin family at the same time as part of the same process, the scandals, bombings, and war of 1999, Yeltsin’s threatened coup, and arrests of rival factions in the Kremlin in 1996, etc., all fall in the same category.28

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At: No more nationlism

Nationalism is growing in Russia – they will challenge Medvedev and force him to be confrontational

with the West and will winRafael Khachaturian ‘9, New School for Social Research DISSENT / Winter 2009 The Specter of Russian Nationalism

More than ever before, nationalism is a political tool that makes for an increasingly volatile Russian society. Under mounting pressurethe government has stepped up its efforts to prosecute hate crimes and prevent any further activity by far right groups. But thesemeasures by themselves will not be enough to suppress xenophobia and chauvinism in which the government is itself complicit. Evenmore troubling is the chance that the line between the more “benign” nationalism of the Kremlin and the violent ultranationalism of the fascist groups will begin to blur. There is certainly some overlap between the ideology of the far right and the general feelings of some members of the government elite about the meaning of Russian patriotism. And if Dugin’s gradual ascension from the radicalfringes to the center stage of national politics is any indication, a further shift toward a radical nationalism by the government is notout of the question. Nationalist ideology in Russia has a constantly shifting purpose, determined by the political ends toward which itis applied. There is no single, large-scale nationalist movement uniting the Kremlin elites and the far right neo-Nazi parties;ideologically they are too disparate ever to be completely reconciled. Even a populist demagogue like Zhirinovsky, known for his

xenophobic attitude toward minorities, was an eager supporter of Russia’s policy of handing out passports to Abkhazians, because hesaw this as an opportunity to expand Russia’s influence. Russian fascists are unlikely to accept such a policy: for them a true Russiameans one purified of all foreign elements. Despite this divergence, both groups have actively perpetuated an aura of hostility andmistrust, which has only been intensified by the government’s rhetoric. Nationalism is a dangerous political tool, and the Kremlin’sresentment over its loss of empire and the encroachments of the West into its traditional sphere of influence makes for a dangerouslyvirulent politics. Although Medvedev was not counted as a member of the silovik group prior to his election and was thought by someto be a more moderate and “liberal” figure, his allegiance clearly lies with the Putinist Kremlin. He may be a more pragmatic face tothe West, but the political machine behind him is firmly in place, with Putin as prime minister, pushing for a more aggressive Russianforeign policy and beating the nationalist drum.

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At: Putin and Medvedev are friends now

Not friends, enemies. Putin will use the siloviki to control Medvedev

Whitmore – 8 (Brian, senior correspondent and writer for Radio Free Europe, “The Two-Headed Tsar: Who Will Really Be In Charge In Russia?”,

http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/03/F208B6EF-844F-438B-8251-E2E105C97CFE.html)

Edward Keenan, a professor of Russian history at Harvard University in the United States, says it is a pattern that has repeated itself whenever the elite splitirreconcilably -- from the turmoil of the Time of Troubles in the early 17th century, to the chaos that followed the fall of the Romanov dynasty in 1917, to the free-for-all that ensued after the Soviet breakup in

the 1990s. "When the elite begins fighting among itself, it's over. They have got to at least pretend that they are asolid phalanx," Keenan says. Bureaucratic Schisms Russia's new diarchy is coming into being at a time when bitter rivalries have begun to emerge among the security service veterans that make up Putin's inner circle. Theso-called "siloviki war" erupted late last year, and pits one bureaucratic clique, led by Federal Antinarcotics Service head Viktor Cherkesov, against another, led by Putin's

powerful deputy chief of staff, Igor Sechin, and Federal Security Service head Nikolai Patrushev. Sechin in particular was staunchly opposed to Medvedev

becoming Putin's successor and wanted the president to circumvent the constitution and seek a third consecutiveterm in office. Some analysts have speculated that Putin may use anti-Medvedev "siloviki" like Sechin, Patrushev, and Aleksandr Bastrykin, who heads the powerful

Investigative Committee, to keep Medvedev in check. "There are different forces who can control [Medvedev]: Unified Russia with its

constitutional majority; Sechin, who doesn't like Medvedev, who can be named head of the presidential administration or something else; Bastrykin with the Investigative Committee," says Vladimir Pribylovsky, a Moscow-

based political analyst. Additionally, analysts say some of the relatively liberal technocrats in the ruling elite, like Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin and Unified

Energy Systems CEO Anatoly Chubais, are expected to coalesce around Medvedev. According to Ryabov, sooner or later one faction of the bureaucracy will emerge victorious.

"What we have is not just a conflict of interests, but a conflict between visions of Russia's future and the futureof Russian politics," Ryabov says. "Under the conditions of this institutional diarchy, as it has been called, it isnot possible to combine these different views and policies. Somebody from the center, probably in a short period of time, must take a leading role and impose their views on the future of Russian politics."

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IL – Coup will succeed

If there is a fight, the neo-imperialists will win – it will make Russia mean again

Jeffrey Mankoff ‘8 is the Chauncey Postdoctoral Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University and an Adjunct Fellowfor Russia and Eurasian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 55, no. 4, July/August 2008, pp. 42–51. Russian Foreign Policy and the United States After Putin)

Compared to the 1990s, ideology played less of a role in shaping Russian foreign policy during the Putin years. Putin implemented anessentially corporatist model of governance in which the immense profits derived from the oil and gas sectors were used to co-optdifferent factions within the elite—both ideological movements and bureaucratic “clans.” In this way, the ideological clashes of the1990s were subsumed. Yet the deep polarization within the Russian elite continues to exist, and under the new political circumstances post-Putin, ideological differences about Russia’s fundamental identity may again play a prominent role in setting the foreign policyagenda. Roughly speaking, Russia’s elites fall into four main ideological camps that one may term ethnic nationalists, neo-imperialists(or Eurasianists), centrists, and Westernizers. 8 Putin managed to effectively balance among these camps, promoting Russia’s re-emergence as a major international player in a way that was supported across the political spectrum while giving each camp some, butnot all, of what it desired. If Medvedev lacks Putin’s ability to balance the factions, he risks having this debate spill into the open, adevelopment that would most probably favor the neo-imperialist hardliners thanks to their close ties to the military leadership and thenotorious siloviki, the former spies who were a pillar of Putin’s administration but may prove less accommodating to a PresidentMedvedev.

Who controls Medvedev determines foreign policy – if the old elites backlash, he won’t be able to

moderate Russia



Washington has made the U.S.-Russian relationship increasingly challenging. Medvedev’s inauguration thus represents something of a fresh start. He will no doubt have his own priorities for Russian foreign policy that will not entirely coincide with Putin’s. Theoverall objectives of Russian foreign policy may be shared broadly across the elite, but there remains a great deal of debate over

specific priorities and over the best means for obtaining objectives. Besides elite preferences, the corporate interests of important bureaucratic actors will also continue to exert substantial influence on foreign policy. The energy sector and the defense industry, in particular, will seek to protect their shares of the pie; their access to top Kremlin decision-makers ensures that they will be heard, evenif their narrow mercantilism is at odds with the competing ideas about Russia’s national interests advanced by many intellectuals.Finally, the nature of the transition will itself matter a great deal. It remains to be seen how these bureaucratic factions will respond tothe Medvedev presidency, and their actions will to a great extent determine how much autonomy he will have to implement his owndesigns.

AND, Medvedev’s relation to the Putin faction will be critical to his success – if he antagonizes them, they

will crush him and take back over Russia

ALLEN C. LYNCH ‘7 is the director of the Center for Russian & European Studies at the University of Virginia. 14 Brown J.

World Aff. 53 2008

The default response in Russian politics is thus now reflexively anti-U.S., a novel accomplishment in a country whose people duringthe cold war were hopelessly pro- U.S. 29 A Russia whose political system displayed true democratic accountability to the public,governmental institutions, and elites would be much more actively anti-U.S. than Russia has in fact been under both Yeltsin and Putin,given the depth of current anti-U.S. sentiment. It has only been the tight centralization of executive power in the office of the presidentthat has allowed Putin to impose a disciplined realism upon a political system predisposed to lash back at the West, NATO, and theUnited States in particular. Whether Putin's successor can maintain that measure of internal control will be a major determinant of Russia's future relations with the outside world and with the United States in particular. While the conditions for a radical reversal of Russia's foreign policy course do not appear to be present, the decomposition of Putin's foreign policy course cannot be ruled out inthe event of an unruly succession. In that case, the costs of integrating a still fragile post-Soviet Russia into the international systemwill be much higher, for Russia as well as for the outside world, than they ever needed to have been.

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Wake

At: Disputes/Factions irrelevant

Disputes between factions in the Kremlin determine the direction of Russia foreign policy – they balance

is lost, the winner will determine how Russia actsIan Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy; a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute; and a



With so much authority concentrated in the Kremlin, however, factionalism, personality clashes, and bureaucratic scuffles within itswalls are now exponentially more significant in determining policy . The executive’s inter ventions in the economy exacerbated thisinternal friction by greatly increasing the possibilities for financial gain available to officials. In other words, Putin’s consolidation of political power partially backfired. The executive branch may have all the authority, but divisions within it have limited the president’s direct control. Although other institutions and the private sector are now largely irrelevant, disputes between Kremlinfactions, rather than directives from the president, often determine major policy outcomes.

AND, the siloviki will control Medvedev is he is too pro-West. They can take over Russia foreign policy

Nazrin Mehdiyeva ‘8 is Russia/CIS Editor at Oxford Analytica, Oxford. The International Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 2, June 2008,

21–34

The policy-making environment in which Medvedev will operate, and the bitter factional rivalry within which he will have tomanoeuvre, will set significant constraints on his policy flexibility. In the short term at least, Putin will continue to wield influence inthe foreign policy arena. The political weight that he enjoys in the Kremlin – and that Medvedev still lacks – will translate into policy-making power at home and influence abroad. Attempts to revise substantively Russia’s policy towards the West would clash with theinterests of some silovik21 groups who have benefited considerably from the allocation of resources to state holdings. An atmosphereof tension and suspicion towards foreign interests has been crucial to the economic and administrative expansion of the siloviki, andthey will resist attempts to dispel it.22 The battle for influence and control has unravelled within the siloviki camp: for instance, between First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov and Russian Technologies Corporation Chairman Sergei Chemezov over controlof the government’s defence industrial assets in some 250 companies.23 Such strife sheds light on the scale of the challenges that

Medvedev would have to face if he attempted to break down the stranglehold of the existing power structures on the economy.

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***Impacts

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Impact – Nuclear War

Russian nationalism leads to nuclear war – it would cause internal conflicts to go violent and then

escalateBlank ‘00

(Stephen J., Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, Threats to Russian Security: The View from Moscow, p. 41)

These documents and the security consensus that lies behind them represent only the latest manifestation of Russia’s

continuing failure to become a true democracy at peace with itself and the world . As long as this unrealism and pre-modern structureof politics govern the discourse and practice of Russian security policy, continuous internal unrest is the best scenario we can predict

for Russia. But experience shows that this unrest does not remain bottled up in Russia. The war in Chechnya is now

accompanied by threats against Tbilisi and Baku as well as attempts at military-political union in the CIS. Thus Russia’s refusal

or inability to adapt to reality presages a continuing struggle in the CIS and other unsettled areas like the Balkans . Every preceding

time when state power in Russia fragmented, the whole region within which it acted was engulfed in instability, if not conflict, andforeign armies were either tempted to invade or dragged into the quagmire . Thus these documents are ultimately a confession of political, economic, social and moral

bankruptcy and an admission of despair. If Russia perceives everything around it as a threat whose origins lay beyond its borders, then the temptation to avert domestic reform will continue to strengthen and breed still moreinternal unrest and instability. Nor will any outside attempts to help be appreciated or accepted. Absent a reliable defense policy and defense forces and following an elite that seems determined on racing to the brink o f a precipice, Russia’s elites remain fixated on military threats that exist mainly in their fantasies. Thus they show themselves utterly unable to come to grips with the new but very real threats to Russia’s security and stability.119

If this situation continues , then the Russian people, if not their neighbors and partners, will be thrown over the edge as Russia fallsinto an economic, ecological, demographic, and possibly even nuclear abyss.

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Impact – Disintegration

Conflict in russia would cause nuclear war!

David, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins, 99 (Steven, “Saving America From the Coming CivilWars,” Foreign Affairs, January / February, Volume 78, Number 1)

Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in

decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemiessuch as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a

second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia couldlead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but evenwithout a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weaponsand the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the countr y. So far, the government has

managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much materiel. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites willslacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Suchdispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would

increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war

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A2: ‘They’d Never Use Nukes’

Russian military doctrine considers global nuclear war, including a first-strike, a real possibility and

prepares accordingly

Blank ‘6

(Stephen, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, “A NEW RUSSIAN DEFENSE DOCTRINE,”October, UNISCI Discussion Papers)

Indeed, if one looks carefully at Russian procurement policies and exercises, both of which have increased in quantity and

intensified in quality under Putin due to economic recovery, we still find that large-scale operations, including first-strike

nuclear operations using either ICBM’s o r tactical (or so called non-strategic) nuclear weapons (TNW) predominate,even when counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist exercises are included. In other words, the military-political

establishment, rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, still believes that large-scale war, even with NATO or China is a

real possibility. Ivanov’s speech to the Academy of Military Sciences on January 24, 2004 excoriated the GeneralStaff for insufficient study of contemporary wars and for fixating on Chechnya. Blaming it for this fixation, hesaid that, We must admit that as of the present time military science has not defined a clear generalized type of modern war and armed conflict. Therefore the RF Armed Forces and supreme command and control entitiesmust be prepared to participate in any kind of military conflict. Based on this, we have to answer the question ofhow to make the military command and control system most flexible and most capable of reacting to any threatsto Russia’s military security that may arise in the modern world.10 Ivanov had earlier observed that, Military preparedness, operational planning, and maintenance need to be as flexible as possible because in recent yearsno single type of armed conflict has dominated. The Russian armed forces will be prepared for regular and anti-guerrilla warfare, the struggle against different types of terrorism, and peacekeeping operations.11 Baluevsky has

also since argued that any war, even a localized armed conflict, could lead the world to the brink of global nuclear war, therefore

Russian forces must train and be ready for everything.12 These remarks reflect the continuing preference for major theater and

even intercontinental nuclear wars against America and NATO over anti-terrorist missions . Note: At the time this was written, Yuri Baluevsky was the First Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces GeneralStaff

The Russians are willing to escalate—Medvedev’s threats prove he doesn’t fear a hot war

Lucas ‘9

(Edward, Lucas works for The Economist, the London-based global newsweekly. He has been covering EasternEurope since 1986, and was the Moscow bureau chief from 1998-2002. He is now the central and east Europeancorrespondent, The New Cold War, page 148-9)

The effect of the war inside Russia, wildly popular, has been to end any talk of a "Medvedev thaw." The diminutive lawyer fromSt. Petersburg slipped effortlessly into his new role as leader of a martial nation, denouncing Georgia and the West in almost equal

measure. Russia, he said, was not frightened of a "New Cold War." Indeed, it does not seem frightened of a hot one, issuing stern

threats to NATO not to build up a naval presence in the Black Sea.

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A2: They’d Never Use Nukes

Putin’s xenophobic, fascist ideology is nostalgic for the Soviet days and glorifies the defeat of the West in

a nuclear confrontationLucas ‘9

(Edward, Lucas works for The Economist, the London-based global newsweekly. He has been covering Eastern Europe since 1986,and was the Moscow bureau chief from 1998-2002. He is now the central and east European correspondent, The New Cold War, page123-127)

The Kremlin's response to that was not to loosen up, but to tighten still further. Russia was "at war" with its terrorist foes, Putin said. That justified almost any

restriction on political liberty. The urgent need was to make Russia stronger, and therefore safer. Michael Yuryev, a businessman close to the Kremlin, in

2004 gave an illuminating list of what he regarded as truly essential freedoms on which the "national idea" should never infringe.55 They boiled down to

private enterprise and the right to travel around Russia. He explicitly excluded from the list the requirement to obey constitutional provisions on electoralterms, the right to form political parties , and the freedom of privately owned mass media. Yuryev used to be seen as an extremist eccentric who believed in

an irreconcilable clash of Russian and Western values, who wanted Russia to be both isolated and explicitly imperial in outlook. His recently published book ,

The Third Empire: Russia as It Must Be56 describes a world in 2053 when Russia has defeated America in a nuclear exchange. That may just be unpleasant fantasy, but Putin has repeatedly adopted both his phrases and his ideas. The new ideology that has taken shape since 2004 hasa name, the anodyne-sounding "sovereign democracy?' This phrase elides two key concepts enshrined in the preamble to the Russian constitution. But

"sovereign" clearly counts for more than "democracy" As Masha Lipman of the Carnegie Centre notes, the phrase conveys two messages: First, that Russia's regime isdemocratic and, second, that this claim must be accepted, period. Any attempt at verification will be regarded as unfriendly and as meddling in Russia's domesticaffairs. And sovereignty also implies that outside (i.e., western) norms do not apply.57 The new ideology includes a surprising dose of what in Western countries would

be called "new age" thinking. That might seem surprising at first sight: The tough greedy world of the Kremlin could hardly be more different from the herbs, healing

crystals, and hog-wash beloved by the devotees of the "Age of Aquarius" and similar types. But according to Surkov, "Russian cultural consciousness isclearly holistic [and] intuitive and opposed to [the] mechanistic [and] reductionist." He continues: Synthesis prevails over analysis,idealism over pragmatism, images over logic, intuition over reasoning, general over particular . This naturally does not mean that theRussians lack analytical thinking and people in the western countries [lack] intuition. The issue here is the ratio. Let's put it like that: the Russian

person is more interested in the time than in the blueprint of an alarm clock. So what stems from this "intuition" about how a society should best beorganized? Surkov continues: First, it is the aspiration for the political wholeness through the centralisation of power functions. Second,

idealisation of the goals, pursued by the political struggle. Third, personification of political institutions. All these phenomena exist in other political

cultures, however, their presence in our political culture exceeds the average leve1.58 That may sound vague to an outsider, butit has clear practical effects,which nudge Russia in the direction of what might easily be called fascism. The first and third ideas combined mean that no institutions matter outside the presidency. Power

flows from the very top. That means that parliament, the judiciary, the police, and the civil service, the institutions whose complex interrelations guarantee individual freedoms, all are subordinate to the will of the man at thetop. Whether or not this should even be called an ideology is contested. Surkov is widely described as the Kremlin's head of ideology, a designation he does not reject. His colleague Dmitri Medvedev however, said hedislikes the term "sovereign democracy" and called it an "ideological cliche."" .At any rate it is not the ideology of Suslov's day. Surkov is a lively minded figure with an easy, populist touch. Suslov was regarded as dull even by the narcolepsy-inducing standards of the Soviet politburo. Surkov uses little jargon; Suslov used nothing else. Surkov was a successful businessman in television, advertising, and public relations before he moved to theKremlin in 2004 (his biography suggests he may have worked for the GRU in the 1980s); his career, spanning the worlds of high state office, media, espionage, and private business, is the embodiment of Russia under Putin.Suslov embodied the Brezhnev-era Kremlin; it is hard to imagine him in any role other than as a communist functionary. But the similarity is still striking. In both cases, the aim was to ex-plain the difference between theideal and the reality. Suslov had to explain why the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) deserved to stay in power even though the utopia it promised showed no sign of arriving. Surkov has to give a justificationfor Russia's new political system, of authoritarian state capitalism. Like Suslov, he also has to explain why questioning the system is not just mistaken, but treacherous. The big question for the West is how to deal with it.Some argue that this is all better than nothing. Vlad Sobell, a Russia expert at the London offices of Daiwa, a Japanese investment bank, says that Surkov is developing a "fresh, post-totalitarian application of liber¬alism."59

Russia has its own political culture, so it needs its own political philosophy, the argument goes. Better to have something homegrown than import misunderstood ideas from outside, such as Marxism. In addition,

Russia is also right in rejecting the idea that global stability depends on the United States playing the' role of "global teacher-cum- policeman:' Multipolarity will be more stable than a unipolar, U.S.-dominated world. Others simply want to rebut "sovereign democracy" in both

its premises and its arguments. Certainly much of this is based on exaggerations and misapprehensions. The outside world was not trying to weaken Russia in the 1990s(indeed, one of the big fears of that era was that Russia might disintegrate, or prove too weak to control its nuclear weapons). The current U.S. administration has

overstretched America's military power and shredded its reputation. But the idea that America is threatening the world is a bogeyman. Bogged down in Iraq

and Afghanistan and scrambling to cope with the rise of China, the supposed global hegemon is too weak to fulfill the tasks it faces, not too strong. America's "democracy promotion" efforts may be ill-judged or hypocriticalon occasion, but the isolationism that America-bashers seem to want would have a high price: It would mean, in effect, agreeing to leave the world in the hands of dictators. Russia certainly has the right to its own political

culture; every country does. And the aftermath of totalitarianism may mean tolerating some unpleasant and features, at least for a time (Germany in the 1950s was very different from the way Germany is now). Surkov is righon that. But he has not made a persuasive case for reinventing the wheel. The basic means by which a free country works are universal: the rule of law, separation of powers, independent media, and fair elections. And theclear sign from the Kremlin is that these elements of political life are not just optional, but outright undesirable. The most telling point, though, is not to rebut the Kremlin's criticisms of the West, which may in some cases beaccurate and merited. It is to point out that other countries' shortcomings do not justify Russia creating new ones of its own. Violent abuse of power by the state is bad, regardless of what other countries are doing. Whether itis snatching assets from well-run private companies, locking up opponents, stifling criticism, or hollowing out supposedly independent public institutions of state, the Kremlin is doing a disservice to the people of Russia, inwhose name it supposedly governs. The novels of Fyodor Dostoyevsky include powerful criticisms of the West in the nineteenth century. But that did not mean that the rigid brutalities of Tsarist autocracy such as the knout,

serfdom, censorship, and deportation to Siberia were a better way of governing the country. So why does the Kremlin promote this ragbag ideology, which alienatesoutsiders and promotes misgovernment of the country? The crudest reason is that it is an easy way of staying in control. PortrayingRussia as a fortress besieged by malevolent hypocrites is a handy way of explaining to the population why its sacrifice of freedom isnecessary. Second, intimidating the outside world is a good starting point for fending off their interference. Talking toughly was astandard approach of Soviet negotiators during the old Cold War . Terrifying rages and frosty silences would melt without explanationwith the prospect (usually illusory) that the thaw would continue if only the other side would see reason and back down. But the most

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Wakeworrying explanation of all is the simplest: The Kremlin adopts an ideology based on Soviet nostalgia and xenophobic rhetoric becauseit partly or even wholly believes in it. If this explanation is true, it makes it all the more worrying that the outside world still seems so unbothered.

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