russian economy
DESCRIPTION
RUSSIAN ECONOMY. Communist Economic Systems. Russia’s transition to planned economics. state. In a planned economy, the __________ regulates or “plans” p_____________ and p________ Planned economies are also called _____________economies - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
RUSSIAN ECONOMY
Communist Economic Systems
![Page 2: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Russia’s transition to planned economics
In a planned economy, the __________ regulates or “plans” p_____________ and p________Planned economies are also called _____________economiesFrom the late 19___s to 19___, the Soviet Union operated under a planned economy
The ideology of __________________ inspired the use of this systemencourages____________ownership of means of production
state
command20 91
Marxism- Leninism
public
roduction rice
![Page 3: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Conversion to a planned economy began after the end of the ___________________in ______________
The ________________ seized control of Russia after this war__________________ (1870-1924) led the Bolsheviks during the war
The Soviet government ___________________ agriculture in the late 19____s and 19____s Collectivization formed communities in which property is shared Property was owned by the ______________, not individuals
______________(1878-1953) spearheaded collectivizationsucceeded Lenin as leader of the Bolshevik Party
The Bolshevik Party became the _________________ Party of the Soviet Union
Russian Civil War 1920Bolsheviks
Vladimir Lenincollectivized
20 30
community
Joseph Stalin
Communist
![Page 4: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
STALIN’S REFORMS Stalin aimed to transform Russia into a __________ economy
In this economy, ____________ and society belonged collectively to all workers
Stalin eliminated the class of people who ownedproperty without contributing ____________This class is referred to as the “____________”
To achieve this goal, the government attempted to __________________all private property This included all factories and equipment, which were known as “_________”
Socialistproperty
laborcapitalists
nationalize
capital
![Page 5: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Russia’s transition to market-based economics
• Russia now operates under a market-based economy– Transitioning from a planned to market-based economy
took _______ years (19___-20___)– Most of the transformation occurred in the 1990s
• Russia no longer operates under communism• ECONOMIC GROWTH:– Russia experienced rapid growth from 19___ to 20__– Growth ended abruptly with the
________________________in 2008• Russia faces significant challenges– Several problems stall Russia’s development in the global
economy
twenty 91 11
99 08
global economic crisis
![Page 6: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Forms of Property
• Three forms of property comprise the “classical” socialist system– state-owned firms,– budgetary institutions, and – cooperatives
![Page 7: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Three Organization Types
![Page 8: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
State-owned firms
• There were both– NATIONAL FIRMS– REGIONAL FIRMS
![Page 9: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
State-owned Firms• National firms
– under the jurisdiction of national-level ministries• Regional firms
– under the jurisdiction of provincial and local governments• THE “BIG BUT”:
– Economist Janos Kornai: categorizing firms as state-owned = meaningless because…
– subnational governments were controlled by the national government
• All income from production contributed to• STATE COFFERS
• Firms could not be • bought or sold
![Page 10: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
These firms provided employment and housing on a massive scale
• The place of employment included all essential -- social services
• Workers had access to – apartments, daycare, schools, and other social
services• This system gave rise to the communist
___________to________ system of social services
cradle grave
![Page 11: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
These firms provided employment and housing on a massive scale
• State-owned firms encompassed most _____________industry – auto plants and – defense factories
• The Soviet model emphasized economies of scale in every industry
• Economies of scale describes the gains a firm achieves from– Expanding production
• Individual plants commonly employed over – 100,000 workers
heavy
![Page 12: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
• Due to this living and working situation, laborers lacked ____________. In order to move, workers had to acquire a – new job, residence, and housing permit
• A housing permit was called a _____________• The process of moving took years• Low worker mobility _____________the
process of devising production plans– Government planners needed to keep track of
labor at every individual firm• _____________________ of state-owned
firms started in 1992
mobility
PROPISKA
simplified
PRIVATIZATION
![Page 13: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Budgetary institutions• Budgetary institutions included– universities, – research and educational institutions, – Training centers, – trade schools, – hospitals, and – museums
• ____________or_______________________budgets funded budgetary institutions
• Budgetary institutions had no obligation to make ____________cover___________________
National regional government
income expenditures
![Page 14: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Cooperatives
• Cooperatives operate similarly to state- owned firms but were mostly located in _________________
• The cooperative, or collective farm, was called a _______________
• Like state-owned firms, cooperative farms operated on a ___________ scale
• Farms included social services such as ___________• In the 1930s, Stalin collectivized agriculture by
stripping all citizens of _______________• The state assumed ownership of all _________
Comrade, come jointhe KOLKHOZ!
agriculture
KOLKHOZmassive
housing
propertyoutput
![Page 15: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
COLLECTIVIZATION
• ECONOMIC MOTIVES:• steady supply of grain
for________• The state believed
larger farms would produce more ________________ than smaller farms
• POLITICAL MOTIVES: bureaucratic control of farmers prevented them from fighting back– Farmers could not become a
social, political, or economic force
– They fit seamlessly into the body of the Soviet system
– They could not • leave the farm or • outsource labor
– Essentially, farmers always remained members of • the “collective”
cities
efficiently
![Page 16: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Summary of socialism
• Socialism replaces __________ownership with __________ ownership– The state owns all property
• Capitalists could no longer __________workers– All members of society collectively worked and owned
property• Public ownership of production transferred the
responsibility of allocating resources from __________mechanisms to ________________ economic planning
PRIVATEPUBLIC
EXPLOIT
MARKET BUREAUCRATIC
![Page 17: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
CENTRAL PLANNING SYSTEM
![Page 18: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
The Planning System: The role of bureaucracy
• The bureaucracy planned all economic activity – top-down fashion– Fulfilling plans was compulsory
• planned economy sought to eliminate the anarchy of the market– state would organize the economy on a national scale– bureaucracy, not the market forces, controlled the vitality of a
firm• Bureaucratic planning sought – to distribute goods more equitably– goal followed the ideals of Marxism
![Page 19: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Five-year plans dictated the Soviet economy
• Each five year plan was split into annual plans– Five-year plans functioned as
statements of policy intent rather than specific plans
• The first plan: 1928• The last plan: deteriorated in
the late 1980s
![Page 20: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
CENTRAL PLANNING
• Planning involved – determining inputs and – estimating outputs for each individual factory
• This task was enormous, especially since the Soviet Union spanned 13 time zones– Flawed estimations often resulted in shortages– A lack of inputs caused a lack of outputs
![Page 21: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
CENTRAL PLANNING
• Plans determined each firm’s level of – technical development, – capital investment, and – trade
![Page 22: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
CENTRAL PLANNING
• A system of bureaucracy-controlled price lists designated prices of all goods
• Gosplan manually calculated every aspect of the entire Soviet economy
• For most of this period, planners lacked access to computers
![Page 23: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
BUREAUCRATIC RESPPONSIBILITIES
![Page 24: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
The role of managers and labor• Plans required
coordination of – the Communist
Party, – State ministries,
and – individual firms
![Page 25: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
The role of managers and labor• Gosplan strategies to break these systems
down into manageable parts– Planners disaggregated the plan in a downward
flow of information– Higher levels sent directions to lower levels• State plans did not recommend or suggest actions• The term “command” economy derives from this process
– Planners received an upward flow of information• While drafting a plan, planners received information from
lower levels• Lower levels contributed nonbinding recommendations
about target output levels
![Page 26: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
The role of managers and labor• The bureaucracy chose managers at every
level of the economy– Each manager held a specific and mandatory role
in each plan– Plans specified the amount of labor allocated to
each sector and factory
![Page 27: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
Incentives and attitudes
• Plans required firms to produce exactly the amount stated in the plan– managers lacked motivation to innovate– No reward for producing a surplus
• But the state punished managers for failing to meet plan targets– Managers could be
• removed from office, • sent to a labor camp, or • accused of sabotage
• An accusation of sabotage could lead to a death sentence
![Page 28: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Central Planning and Central Management
• Motivation: intrinsic– ideological sense of duty to the Communist Party
• Motivation: extrinsic - bonuses for good work– awards and – privileges
• In addition, – political power and prestige provided sources of
motivation– For some, material benefit and fear were
motivators
![Page 29: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Central Planning and Central Management
• BIG “BUT”: the penalties of taking risks outweighed the potential rewards– Without ownership,
managers lacked incentive to exceed the bare minimum
– Janos Kornai states…
Among managers, “SERVILITY and a
HEADS DOWN MENTALITY prevailed.
![Page 30: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Economic distortions
• A chronic “shortage” economy emerged in almost every sector– The planning system misestimated the supply and demand
for goods• In a free market economy, changes in price eliminate excess
demand and supply– This shortage condition affected consumer goods
![Page 31: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Managers had built-in incentives to underreport production:
• Ensured that plan targets for the next year would not exceed the firm’s capabilities– A firm that could produce 150% of the target plan
might produce only 101%– This signaled improvement but not enough to
cause expectations of it to increase– Managers • hid extra output and • sold it on the black market
![Page 32: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Outputs differed in proportion to inputs
• Target plans – only specified that firms meet a goal, – not fully utilize the allocated inputs
• As a result, – excess inputs existed in some sectors – while shortage existed in others• This caused
– poor allocation of resources and – waste
![Page 33: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
STATE PRIORITIES:
• Socialism overemphasized rapid growth– Quantity of production took precedence over
quality– Inferior quality of goods still impedes Russia’s
ability to compete in world markets• The state prioritized industrial production over
consumer production
![Page 34: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
SUMMARY of PROBLEMS:
![Page 35: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
SHADOW ECONOMY / BLACK MARKET
• RESPONSE to the chronic “shortage” state– A black market is called a shadow economy– economic activity that lacks official state approval
• In the socialist system, private property and private means of production do not exist
• Black market participants circumvented price lists and other restrictions of the system
• Some analysts believed the black market kept the system alive– The black market remedied some of the failures of the planning
system– It also fueled corruption at every level of the economy
• Russia still feels the effects of the black market today
![Page 36: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV: VITAL STATS• Born: –1931
• Became General Secretary of the Communist Party: –March 1985
• Ousted from office: –1991
![Page 37: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
Problems facing Gorbachev upon entering office
• Soviet Russia’s stagnating economy was the greatest challenge– planning system lacked flexibility– complexity of calculating economic
needs exceeded the capabilities• Tim COLTON believed planners could
not anticipate the need for computerization
• As the economy’s size and complexity increased, so did planning failures
• Values and motivation suffered under the overbearing state
Morris and Anna Feldberg Professor of Government and Russian Studies and the Chair
of the Department of Government at Harvard
University
TIM COLTON
![Page 38: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
Reform and reconstruction
• Gorbachev immediately recognized a need for an overhaul of the economy– This goal = perestroika,
literally translating to “reconstruction”• did not intend to establish a
market-based liberal system• sought to reform the existing
communist system
![Page 39: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
Criticism
• Many critics argued that Gorbachev ignored the Soviet economy– They compared his actions to Chinese leader Deng
Xiaoping’s actions in the 1980s• They accused him of “sequencing” reform– This practice involves favoring “easier” political reforms
• In contrast, Gorbachev began his reforms with the economic challenge
• Gorbachev’s economic policies – between 1985 and 1991 – Followed 4 phases
![Page 40: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
Phase 1: 1985-86
• Recovering Worker Productivity and Infrastructure
![Page 41: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/41.jpg)
Anti-alcohol campaign
• First, Gorbachev tackled worker absenteeism and low labor productivity
• He initiated an anti-alcohol campaign to reduce chronic alcoholism among workers– The campaign closed down some alcohol factories– Some Russians resorted to producing bootleg
liquor• This created the unintended sugar shortage• The consumption of bootleg liquor also meant that
productivity remained low
![Page 42: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
Uskorenie
• Gorbachev attempted to invest in old infrastructure
• launched an uskorenie, – literally meaning “acceleration”– acceleration of investment in old plants and
factories• The Soviet Union lagged behind the West’s
technological progress• Poor infrastructure impeded labor productivity
![Page 43: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
• The two programs were fundamentally incompatible, because– one reduced government revenue and – the other demanded more government spending.
![Page 44: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/44.jpg)
Failure of both reforms
• Both initiatives failed – socially– economically
• The anti-alcohol campaign worked against the investment project– Closed alcohol factories reduced state revenue
• Decreased revenue hindered increases in investment
• Neither initiative improved – worker discipline,– economic productivity, or – infrastructure
• Workers still consumed bootleg liquor
• The budget deficit increased
![Page 45: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
Phase II: 1987-88: Glasnost and Demokratizatsiia
![Page 46: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
Glasnost• A policy that allowed greater public discussion
– Gorbachev initiated it at the• in 1987 • Central Committee of the Communist Party PLENUM
– A plenum is a planning meeting
• allowed citizens to openly discuss the merits of the communist and market systems– The Soviet Union had never allowed this level of free speech– Glasnost enabled
• the Soviet media and • politicians to discuss issues freely
– Politicians of this time comprised a new super parliament in 1989
• jumpstarted discussion on private property– The subject had always remained taboo
![Page 47: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
Demokratizatsiia• introduced limited accountability into Soviet
politics• The term demokratizatsiia translates to
“democratization”• It enabled greater participation of
interest groups in the political process
![Page 48: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/48.jpg)
Introduction of private property rights
• “Cooperative” enterprises introduced quasi-property rights– These firms operated in the
• commercial and service sectors– “Cooperative” enterprises
• lacked clear governance or ownership structure• They offered business initiative among a small group of entrepreneurs
• Gorbachev granted managers more autonomy on what to produce– Managers still had limited opportunities to explore new markets
• Gorbachev maintained the collective farming system– He refused to reinstate private farming– Intermittent food shortages persisted
![Page 49: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/49.jpg)
MANAGERS JUST WANT TO HAVE FUN
• Gorbachev gave managers more freedom from bureaucratic control. As a result, managers…– privatized firms behind planners’ backs– increased activity on the black market– acquired money that they later used to participate in
privatization• HALF-MEASURES
– These partial reforms worsened the economic situation.– Gorbachev passed up his chance to implement sweeping
reforms before the onset of stagflation in 1989.
![Page 50: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/50.jpg)
No sweeping economic reform• Gorbachev tended to compromise with conservative members
of his Politburo– The Politburo consisted of a cabinet of elite communist party officials
• Compromising stalled implementing far-reaching economic reforms– He missed the chance to initiate reforms before the onset of
stagflation• Stagflation describes inflation with zero or negative economic growth
– This presents the worst possible situation for an economy– Normally high growth accompanies inflation
» This concern still plagues China’s economy
• Gorbachev may have lacked the means to initiate widespread economic reform– may have lacked enough control within the Communist Party– may have lacked desire for change
• He believed in the communist system, not liberal capitalism
![Page 51: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/51.jpg)
Phase III: 1989: Stagflation and the Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe
• Stagflation• the Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe
![Page 52: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/52.jpg)
Phase III: 1989Collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
• Gorbachev’s reforms met a receptive audience in Eastern Europe
• The Berlin Wall fell in November 1989
![Page 53: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/53.jpg)
ECE Satellite Governments Fell
• Several satellite communist governments in Eastern Europe followed suit– The collapse destroyed guaranteed markets for
inferior Soviet goods– This loss further damaged the Soviet economy
![Page 54: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/54.jpg)
Gorbachev’s indecision• Gorbachev attempted to please both radical
reformers and conservatives– As a result, his inconsistent policies deepened the
economic crisis• Reform efforts created larger budget deficits– Sustained subsidies to industry drained the state’s funds
• Inflation plagued the economy even as growth declined– The economy experienced stagflation– Too much currency was circulating– High wages also caused inflation
![Page 55: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/55.jpg)
PROBLEMS• The state lacked a mechanism to collect taxes• Restrictions on the development of cooperative movements
prevailed• The practice of barter grew
– Barter involves trade without currency• Agriculture experienced limited reform• The Soviet Union faced widespread food shortages
– This problem had not plagued Russia since World War II• The economy experienced negative growth rates
– Production fell by about 10% per year until 1991• The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991
![Page 56: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
SUMMARY
![Page 57: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/57.jpg)
Phase IV: 1990-91: Boris Yeltsin and Reform Alternatives
![Page 58: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/58.jpg)
The Five Hundred Day Plan
• summer of 1990• a group of young Russian economists devised
a plan• dubbed it the Five Hundred Day Plan
![Page 59: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/59.jpg)
The Five Hundred Day Plan
• Gorbachev adviser and economist Stanislav Shatalin led the project
• Economist Grigori Yavlinsky also helped produce the plan
![Page 60: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/60.jpg)
SHOCK THERAPY
• sought to imitate successful example of economic “shock therapy”
• Borrowed idea from Poland
![Page 61: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/61.jpg)
The 500 Day Plan
![Page 62: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/62.jpg)
GORBY’S RESPONSE
• He rejected the 500 Day Plan by the fall of 1990– favored a slower and more conservative approach
to change– wanted to retain price controls for another two to
three years• Gorbachev appointed a likeminded
conservative prime minister
![Page 63: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/63.jpg)
Elections across the Soviet Union
• The Soviet Union began to lose legitimacy as an economic and political union
• Its 15 constituent republics, including Russia, started electing new leaders
• Gorbachev authorized these elections
![Page 64: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/64.jpg)
Boris Yeltsin• (1931-2007) • June 1991: became Russia’s first popularly elected
president– Gave Yeltsin greater political legitimacy than Gorbachev– Gorbachev
• remained the unelected President of the Soviet Union• the unelected General Secretary of the Communist Party
![Page 65: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/65.jpg)
YELTSIN
• held various positions before becoming president– Member of the Politburo– Provincial Communist Party boss– Elected speaker of a new Russian parliament in
1990• Yeltsin disagreed with Gorbachev’s lagging rate
of reform– He initiated much more rapid reform, leaving
Gorbachev behind
![Page 66: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/66.jpg)
Gorby’s Last Days• Yeltsin’s popularity and power
rivaled Gorbachev’s• challenge pressured Gorbachev
to pursue radical market solutions—but it was too late
• Gorbachev’s Politburo attempted a coup in August 1991– effectively removed Gorbachev
from office
![Page 67: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/67.jpg)
Gorby’s Last Days• By December 1991, the Soviet Union
completely collapsed– The union dissolved into 15 new and separate
countries– Russia was the largest of these new countries– It adopted the title of the Russian Federation
![Page 68: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/68.jpg)
Gorbachev’s Legacy
• Gorbachev’s half-measures and indecisive reforms deepened the Soviet Union’s economic crisis
• By the end of 1990, political motives diverted reform efforts from economic needs
• By the end of 1991, shortage and inflation persisted– The inflation rate loomed at over 100%
![Page 69: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/69.jpg)
The Economy Before the Collapse
• Pre-existing problems– Although Gorbachev may have fallen short, the
Soviet Union’s system deteriorated on its own– Production levels declined throughout the late
1970s– They hit a free fall in the late 1980s under
Gorbachev
![Page 70: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/70.jpg)
Growing State Sector Presented Problems
• The state controlled almost every economic activity– By 1991, most people were on the state payroll• Although the economy appeared fully employed, many
people did nothing– “We pretend to work and you pretend to pay us” became a
popular saying• Post-Soviet policymakers feared increasing
unemployment• Minimal pensions and wages necessitated that people
work after retirement
![Page 71: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/71.jpg)
Problems with STATE SECTOR• Chronic shortages caused by sub-optimal planning was an
enduring problem• Industrial production far outstripped consumer production
– This imbalance contributed to the low standard of living• Economic growth under the planning system carried high
costs– The system created inefficiency
• Because of the system’s emphasis on economies of scale, MONOPOLIES dominated the economy– Massive firms operated efficiently as monopolies
![Page 72: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/72.jpg)
LACK OF INCENTIVES• The Soviet economic system discouraged technological
innovation– the West developed computer hardware and telecommunications– Even with a strong post-secondary education system, Soviet
Russia fell far behind• The lack of incentive to improve production yielded poor-
quality goods– Soviet Russia’s manufacturing sector could not compete globally– Instead, the Soviet economy relied on natural resource exports,
especially oil and gas• But global oil and gas prices were falling• The Soviet economy could no longer protect itself from world
competition– Before 1989, the Soviet Union rarely traded with non-communist countries
• These conditions exposed the Soviet Union to the “resource curse”
![Page 73: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/73.jpg)
Flaws of the Soviet system
• Money had no real value since prices did not reflect supply and demand– Price lists determined prices for everything sold in the Soviet Union
• Additionally, the ruble could not be converted in international markets– About 3,000 different exchange rates existed for almost every item in foreign
trade– The state controlled conversion rates
• Two types of rubles with different values existed in the economy– Enterprise accounts used one type– Consumers used the other
• The Soviet economy lacked important financial institutions and markets– These missing essentials included
• a private banking system, • a real estate market, • a stock market, and • private companies
![Page 74: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/74.jpg)
Negative growth rates• Exacerbated by Gorbachev’s reforms, these
conditions stunted growth• By the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 25,
1991, growth rates hit -17%– Growth rates had declined from +3% in 1989
![Page 75: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/75.jpg)
*Millions died in industrialization and collectivization .*People’s demands outpaced system’s capabilities.
![Page 76: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/76.jpg)
REFORM UNDER BORIS YELTSIN
• The fifteen newly independent states of the former Soviet Union diverged in their methods of economic reform.
• This section will focus on Russia’s reform process as implemented by President Boris Yeltsin. Between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of Yeltsin’s presidency in 2000, Russia made great strides in – breaking down the planning system and – opening the door to privatization.
![Page 77: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/77.jpg)
Shock Therapy in Theory• The return of shock therapy– Fall of 1991, Boris Yeltsin
surveyed reform options– He settled on the plan put forth
by a group of young economists led by Yegor Gaidar
– Yeltsin appointed Gaidar prime minister
– Gaidar advocated rapid transition to a market economy through “shock therapy”
![Page 78: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/78.jpg)
SHOCK THERAPY demanded three immediate and simultaneous reforms
![Page 79: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/79.jpg)
SHOCK THERAPY in THEORY
• These three key policies inflicted a short-term “shock” on the population– Prices increased suddenly– Inflation quickly reached high levels– Unemployment rose as the state allowed
unprofitable industries to fail• Market mechanisms would eventually kick in– Gaidar expected the economy to grow within three
years• The economy would stabilize well before Yeltsin was up
for re-election
![Page 80: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/80.jpg)
Shock Therapy in Practice
• Elimination of price controls– Shock therapy began with the sudden freeing of prices on
January 2, 1992• Average prices increased by 245% overnight• Production dropped as expected
– With relaxed import controls, foreign goods filled the market– Larger cities imported the most foreign goods
• Freed price controls and relaxed import controls solved the chronic shortage state– But prices mostly surpassed the average Russian’s budget– Gaidar assured Yeltsin that market mechanisms would push prices down– He believed Russian manufacturers would try to match the quality of
foreign goods» He also believed they would offer lower prices to Russian
consumers
![Page 81: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/81.jpg)
BACKLASH!
• By April 1992, industrial enterprise managers opposed shock therapy– They were referred to as “red managers”– They opposed the end of subsidies to their firms– Some refused to restructure to accommodate
market mechanisms– Others lacked the means to restructure even if they
wanted to• Debt accumulated as managers traded for industrial
inputs without money– In the early 1990s, barter economies existed in both
agriculture and industry
![Page 82: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/82.jpg)
The end of shock therapy• To assuage opposition, the state issued Central Bank credits to
firms in the spring of 1992– They also increased printing of the ruble
• This compromise caused spikes in the budget deficit and inflation– These effects especially hurt consumers
• This violation of fiscal austerity and deficit control signaled the end of shock therapy– All other areas of the reform plan receded as well
• Russia opted for more gradual reforms after 1992– This path necessitated abandoning several aspects of liberal
market reform
![Page 83: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/83.jpg)
Privatization in Theory: 3 Main goals of privatization
• 1st: creation of a middle class
• 2nd: creation of a market economy
• 3rd: separation of ownership from management
![Page 84: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/84.jpg)
Privatization in Theory: 1st goal of privatization
• First, creation of socioeconomic stratification, particularly a middle class– Private property rights and ownership would allow
classes to form– Economically, middle classes provide a reliable
source of taxation– Politically, they represent varied interests that
support political pluralism• Political pluralism contributes to the creation of a
democracy
![Page 85: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/85.jpg)
Privatization in Theory: 2nd goal of privatization
• Second, creation of a market economy– Yeltsin’s main political legacy is destroying
the communist economic system– The introduction of private property
prevented an easy return to the old system– Economist Anders Aslund believes
two thirds of an efficient market economy must be private• No more than one third of national
employment can exist in the public sector
![Page 86: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/86.jpg)
Privatization in Theory: 3rd goal of privatization
• Third, separation of ownership from management– In the planned economy, managers did not legally
own their firms– They only controlled them because of their access
to information about the firm– Newly empowered managers lacked oversight from
a board of directors• They pocketed extra money from selling excess products
on the black market
![Page 87: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/87.jpg)
Yeltsin hoped to introduce managerial accountability to a board of directors
• This principle was referred to as corporatization– He intended to incentivize managers with the
principles of supply and demand– Directors would assess managers on profit and loss,
instead of political criteria– Competitive managers would replace poor-quality,
command-era managers
![Page 88: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/88.jpg)
Privatization in Practice• Gaidar and Yeltsin passed
the privatization legislation in June 1992
• They initiated the program a month later, in July 1992– The program attempted to satisfy conflicting
ownership claims between managers, local governments, and workers
![Page 89: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/89.jpg)
State Committee on Property:• created the State Committee on Property to oversee the
process– This committee was also called the Goskomimushchestvo
• They classified firms eligible for privatization– Small firms employed less than 200 employees– Medium firms employed 200-1,000 employees– Large firms employed over 1,000 employees
• The committee divided firms into – federal, provincial, and municipal property
• They forced specific firms to privatize– Wholesale trade– Retail trade– Food services– Construction– Consumer services
![Page 90: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/90.jpg)
SUMMARY: Firms classified by the State Committee on Property
![Page 91: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/91.jpg)
Privatization options• Firms could choose between three different paths of
privatization– These options differed in the percentage of shares owned by
insiders• Insiders include managers and workers of the firm
– The firm • auctioned off their remaining shares or • traded them for vouchers
– All three options granted insiders favored access to shares• They allowed for over 25% insider ownership• Gaidar made this sacrifice to incentivize managers to participate in
privatization– This decision was political, not economic
• Critics called this a “giveaway”– They believed this concession prevented separation of ownership and management
![Page 92: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/92.jpg)
Privatization in Theory: VOUCHERS
![Page 93: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/93.jpg)
First stage of privatization: voucher program
• firms had the option of auctioning off shares– Share auctions began in December 1992
• Thousands of auctions occurred every month between December 1993 and June 1994
• Firms traded shares for vouchers through the voucher program
• The voucher program began in August 1992– This phase of privatization was brief– Vouchers had to be claimed by the end of January 1993
and invested by July 1, 1994
![Page 94: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/94.jpg)
VOUCHERS• The state distributed privatization vouchers to every
man, woman, and child– The effort hoped to involve public sector workers in the
process of privatization• Doctors and teachers did not privatize their firms but could still
participate
• Citizens could trade their vouchers for shares of privatizing firms– This feature aimed to create a vibrant stock market
• Initially, each voucher held a value of 10,000 rubles in shares– When the first privatization legislation passed in June 1992,
vouchers were worth $84• Russians received an average of $50 a month in wage
– Vouchers held considerable value
![Page 95: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/95.jpg)
Russians could use their vouchers in various ways
• Buy shares of the firm they worked for (as long as it underwent privatization)
• Buy shares of other privatizing firms• Buy shares through mutual funds– This diversified their portfolio and spread risk across
different firms• Buy shares in a voucher fund• Sell them• Give them away
![Page 96: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/96.jpg)
VOUCHER PROGRAM
• Firms resisted the voucher program because they did not receive money from it– In May 1993, Yeltsin stated that firms must sell
29% of all shares for vouchers– This proved moderately successful as the average
came closer to 20%• Citizens invested most vouchers by 1994– The first stage of privatization finished that year
![Page 97: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/97.jpg)
Second stage of privatization: auctions of state holdings
• July 1994• auctioning off remaining state holdings for cash
– Firms received part of the proceeds as capital for restructuring– The government received the rest of the proceeds
• The government aimed to finance its budget deficit without increasing inflation– They anticipated billions of dollars of revenues
• The government also intended to create larger blocks of shares for foreign investors– Foreign investors could then increase their role in corporate
governance• During the second stage of privatization, the benefits to insiders
decreased
![Page 98: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/98.jpg)
The second stage of privatization failed in many ways
• Vladimir Polevanov, the more conservative Minister of Privatization, froze privatization– Nationalists and communists in
parliament influenced this decision– Polevanov advocated the
re-nationalization of many firms– This prospect scared off
foreign investors
![Page 99: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/99.jpg)
“Loans for shares” scheme
• failure of the second stage of privatization made the government desperate for revenue
• In 1995, the Russian government settled on the “loans for shares” scheme
• They auctioned off – 12 blue-chip companies – to a group of commercial
banks
![Page 100: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/100.jpg)
“Loans for shares” scheme:
• All interested bidders, foreign and domestic, could participate
• The bank offering the largest loan to the government won a block of shares
• Banks could not sell the shares until September 1, 1996
• They could only keep a third of the capital gains after they sold the shares
• The government made 1 billion dollars
![Page 101: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/101.jpg)
Corruption in the “loans for shares” scheme
• On the surface, bidders appeared to support the government– However, banks mainly
wanted to control Russia’s largest companies
• Ultimately, the Russian government could not repay the loans– The banks assumed ownership
of the companies
![Page 102: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/102.jpg)
The “loans for shares” scheme spawned a backlash
• Few banks had the strength to participate• Participating banks organized auctions themselves– This system presented a conflict of interest between
auction participants– By the end of the process, banks openly quarreled
• The process tainted the reputation of privatization• It transferred a large portion of the economy to a
small group of wealthy business people– This group became known as “the oligarchs”
![Page 103: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/103.jpg)
SUMMARY: Loans for Shares
![Page 104: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/104.jpg)
THE OLIGARCHS
![Page 105: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/105.jpg)
• 1n 1991 Baturina founded INTECO (Интеко), – Construction, though it began
as a plastics business. • husband Yuri Luzhkov, became
the mayor of Moscow in 1992, – corruption – he awarded municipal
contracts to his wife's company. – For instance, the contract to
produce 85,000 seats for Luzhniki Stadium, Moscow's largest stadium, in 1995
• controlled 20% of construction in Moscow
• Baturina then bought shares – in Gazprom and – Sberbank.
![Page 106: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/106.jpg)
![Page 107: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/107.jpg)
![Page 108: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/108.jpg)
![Page 109: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/109.jpg)
![Page 110: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/110.jpg)
![Page 111: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/111.jpg)
![Page 112: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/112.jpg)
![Page 113: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/113.jpg)
![Page 114: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/114.jpg)
![Page 115: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/115.jpg)
![Page 116: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/116.jpg)
Other corruption• Organized crime groups often purchased
shares from failing firms at little cost– This practice stripped the firm of value• Purchasing shares this way did nothing for capital
stock or the economy in general
![Page 117: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/117.jpg)
The effects of the privatization program
• By 1996, 75% of large and mid-sized firms successfully underwent privatization– Almost 90% of industrial output also privatized
• Conservatives called privatization a “crime against the nation”
• Privatization succeeded in redistributing assets– They did not reach the middle class as originally intended
• The efforts did not provoke major social revolt– However, many people took issue with the speed of its implementation
• Privatization also occurred at the same time as other pervasive negative changes– As a result, the public linked privatization and negative changes
![Page 118: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/118.jpg)
PRIVATIZATION by the Numbers
![Page 119: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/119.jpg)
Causes of the 1998 Economic Crisis
• Non-inflationary measures• Growing DEBT
![Page 120: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/120.jpg)
Non-inflationary measures
• By 1996, inflation and the ruble exchange rate stabilized– The years 1996 and 1997 were characterized by
stabilization and low inflation– The ruble reached a semi-convertible state– Russia achieved stabilization by stopping the
Central Bank from printing money• Reducing the money supply decreased inflation
![Page 121: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/121.jpg)
Non-inflationary measures• The government borrowed money to handle the growing
deficit– issued short-term treasury bills and some longer-term treasury
bills– received loans from the International Monetary Fund
• Federal revenues decreased and the state reduced spending– Federal and regional governments failed to collect taxes
• This setback benefited large oil and electrical firms– They provided energy to firms who could not afford it– In return, the state allowed them to export without paying taxes and tariffs– Over time, these firms accrued tax debts to the government
![Page 122: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/122.jpg)
Non-inflationary measures
• The state also withheld wages from state-sector employees– In 1996 and 1997, the state fell behind on
payment of wages and pensions– Russians worked for no pay
![Page 123: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/123.jpg)
Growing debt• By late spring and summer of 1998, the state started
borrowing foreign currency– These loans financed their troubling domestic short-term debt– In the first eight months of 1998, Russia’s foreign debt
increased by 18.5 million dollars• This reduced the foreign currency reserves required to support the
ruble
• On July 20, 1998, the International Monetary Fund offered Russia aid– The package they offered aimed to finance wages and
domestic short-term debt– Instead, Russia used the package to attempt to save the ruble
and failed
![Page 124: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/124.jpg)
![Page 125: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/125.jpg)
Effects of the 1998 Financial Crisis• The financial crisis occurred on August 17, 1998
– Russia devalued the ruble– defaulted on its domestic and international debts
• The crisis eliminated all savings in Russia• Devaluation of the ruble made imported goods too expensive
– Russians returned to purchasing domestic products• This increase in consumption boosted the recovery of domestic industry
• By 1999, Russia’s economy started to grow for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union– The recovery of domestic manufacturing played a part– Increases in prices for raw material exports also contributed greatly– Growth continued until the global financial crisis in 2008
OIL
![Page 126: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/126.jpg)
VLADIMIR PUTIN & DMITRI MEDVEDEV
• Economic Growth from 2000 to 2008– President Vladimir Putin (elected in 2000)– In his first term (2000-2004), he enacted a series
of reforms drafted by Yeltsin• Flat income tax of 13%• New legal code• Systems to prevent money laundering• Regime for liberalizing currency• Reduction of taxes on profits from 35% to 24%• New land code allowing Russians to own commercial
and residential land
![Page 127: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/127.jpg)
Putin’s Reforms
![Page 128: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/128.jpg)
GDP reaches 8.5% in 2000!
• GDP reached an all-time high of 8.5% in 2000 and sustained high levels growth
![Page 129: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/129.jpg)
Economic growth
• Between 1999 and the summer of 2008, Russia’s economy grew rapidly– The result:• budget surpluses,• no foreign debt, and • sizeable hard-currency reserves
• Inflation remained modest• GDP growth reached an all-time high in 2000
![Page 130: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/130.jpg)
RUSSIAN GDP
![Page 131: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/131.jpg)
Rising oil prices
• Russia’s growth coincided with a rise in prices for Urals crude oil– This crude oil blend was Russia’s chief export• Price of barrel increased
– from $12 USD in 1998 – to $70 in 2007
• increased government and personal income– Higher incomes increased demand for
manufactured goods and commercial services
![Page 132: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/132.jpg)
Professor Philip Hanson
Professor of the Political Economy of Russia and Eastern Europe, Retired Emeritus
Centre for Russian and East European StudiesUniversity of Birmingham
“It is by their indirect effects … that oil and gas price rises fuelled Russian growth.”
![Page 133: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/133.jpg)
RUSSIAN OIL
![Page 134: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/134.jpg)
THE RESOURCE CURSE
• The resource curse describes negative effects associated with abundant natural resources– Some economies experience • increasing debt, • nationalization of resources, • government corruption, and • negative growth
– Russia experienced many negative consequences due to its supply of natural gas and oil
![Page 135: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/135.jpg)
SUMMARY: Resource Curse
![Page 136: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/136.jpg)
Dutch disease
• Russia’s heavy volume of mineral exports invoked a sharp inflow of foreign currency– This influx created a high exchange rate– As a result, domestic manufactured goods became
too expensive• Russians purchased imported goods instead
• This phenomenon is called Dutch disease
![Page 137: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/137.jpg)
SUMMARY: Dutch Disease
![Page 138: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/138.jpg)
Decay of other industries
• Russia was excessively dependent on oil exports
• While Russia grew with the record growth of oil prices, Putin loosened fiscal policy– He began permitting oil companies to take on
debt– Imports increased with the onset of Dutch disease
![Page 139: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/139.jpg)
STABILIZATION FUND
• In 2003, the state established a Stabilization Fund to store resource extraction tax revenues– This store of money was intended to serve
as an emergency fund if oil prices fell• The state could use the money to –fight inflation or –defend the ruble
![Page 140: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/140.jpg)
STABILIZATION FUND
• In 2008, the government divided the Stabilization Fund into two separate parts– The Reserve Fund and – the National Prosperity Fund
• government did not use the money to improve the poor manufacturing sector– Russia’s manufacturing received little attention even
after the collapse– The economy lacked alternative industries when oil
prices plummeted in 2008
![Page 141: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/141.jpg)
Critique by Analyst Evgeny Gontmakher
• The state did not invest in improving oil extraction technology and infrastructure– This problem greatly hindered Russia’s ability to
recover from the 2008 financial crisis– When oil prices crashed in 2008, so did the
Russian economy• Russia’s economy mirrored the conditions of the period
following the 1998 crisis
![Page 142: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/142.jpg)
Analyst Evgeny Gontmakher
“This is all a result of --incorrect economic policy, --oil dependence, --and rampant corruption. Until the system changes, these problems will persist.”
![Page 143: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/143.jpg)
Increased government ownership• Government ownership of the economy increased
between 2003 and 2007• The state pressured firms to invest instead of allowing
market forces to provide incentives• State ownership of oil expanded considerably– The state-controlled natural gas company Gazprom
purchased Sibneft– The government also took over gas company Yukos and oil
company Rosneft– Government control of oil rose from
• 19% in 2004 to over 50% by 2008– The Russian gas industry has not undergone privatization yet
![Page 144: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/144.jpg)
GAZPROM swallowed Sibneft
![Page 145: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/145.jpg)
Yukos swallowed
Rosneft
![Page 146: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/146.jpg)
The growth rate of oil production fell between 2004 and 2007
• Exports fell proportionally
![Page 147: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/147.jpg)
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis:Calm before the storm
• Dmitri Medvedev: presidency, spring 2008– Russia was in an unprecedented period of prosperity
• The stock market thrived– Foreign direct investment grew rapidly
• But investment remained low compared to other emerging markets
• Real disposable income increased by over 10% a year– Consumer spending increased remarkably
• Unemployment fell from 12% in 1999 to 6% in 2008– Poverty fell from 41% at subsistence minimum to 12%
![Page 148: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/148.jpg)
The BRIC
• Russia became a part of four notable emerging markets, collectively known as BRIC– Brazil– Russia – India – China
![Page 149: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/149.jpg)
The Global Financial Crisis• began in September 2008• Between June 2008 and January 2009, Russia’s stock
market lost 70% of its value– The ruble lost 1/3 of its value against the dollar
• The Central Bank increased spending to save the ruble but failed
• Russia’s foreign reserves fell from rising corporate debt, bank trouble, and credit issues
• Inflation hit a 14-month high of 13.9 by February 2009• According to Bank of America Securities-Merrill Lynch,
industrial output fell by 16% between October 2008 and February 2009
![Page 150: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/150.jpg)
REVENUE & GROWTH
• Government revenue fell by 28% in the first quarter of 2009– A decrease in commodity prices, including Urals
crude oil, caused this reduction• Urals crude oil was Russia’s primary mineral export
• GDP growth declined to -0.2% in 2009– Russia experienced budget deficits for the first
time since the 1998 economic crisis
![Page 151: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/151.jpg)
Global Financial Crisis: Russia by the Numbers
![Page 152: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/152.jpg)
Stunted recovery
• By the first quarter of 2009, Russia exhibited• the same ailments as it did in the 1990s– Negative growth– High unemployment– High inflation– Low oil export prices– Weak manufacturing
![Page 153: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/153.jpg)
![Page 154: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/154.jpg)
1998 Recovery
• Prudent fiscal policy • rising oil prices– aided Russia’s transition out of the 1998 crisis
• Boris Yeltsin’s administration established these policies before Putin entered office
![Page 155: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/155.jpg)
Putin’s Authoritarianism
• Putin introduced a more authoritarian developmental model– He implemented more • autocratic• state-led economic policies
– Russia’s growth did not result from these policies– In fact, Putin’s approach stunted Russia’s ability to
transition out of the 2008 crisis
![Page 156: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/156.jpg)
RECOVERY
• Recovery depended on several factors that would prove difficult to achieve– Domestic consumer demand would have to
increase• High unemployment and inflation strongly worked
against this goal– World oil prices would have to rise• The global recession suppressed demand for oil
– The state would have to implement prudent fiscal policy
![Page 157: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/157.jpg)
Russia Today
• Enduring problems–Russia’s manufacturing sector fails to
compete in the global marketplace• Russia can only compete in raw materials
exports• Russia’s GDP over-relies on oil and gas• The economy is at the mercy of world
markets
![Page 158: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/158.jpg)
MODERNIZATION & MEDVEDEV
• Dmitri Medvedev initiated a new “modernization”– The effects of the global
economic crisis necessitated that Russia diversify its economy
– Dependence on oil exports made Russia’s economy fragile
![Page 159: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/159.jpg)
Skol’kovo Innovation District
• Medvedev launched the construction of a Russian Silicon Valley called Skol’kovo– This project intended to use Russia’s educated labor force
to innovate new products– Medvedev located the site in a new economic zone
outside Moscow– Skol’kovo will probably not
contribute significantly to GDP for years or decades
![Page 160: RUSSIAN ECONOMY](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022062310/5681688e550346895ddf14a1/html5/thumbnails/160.jpg)
MEDVEDEV’S PROMISED REFORMS
• Medvedev promised to stabilize Russia’s – legal regime– approach to property
This change would encourage and protect foreign investors