russia's political drama heading into 2018...pavel koshkin, editor-in-chief from the editor in...

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by yuri Korgunyuk

Russia's Political DRama HeaDing into

2018

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03. Elections without surprisesby yuri korgunyuk

09. Interview with Andrei Kole-snikov: Hawks vs. doves: Who will dominate in the Kremlin before the 2018 elections?

15. Interview with Mikhail Zygar: Understanding Russian politics, without the conspiracy theories

21. Further reading

Contents eXeCUtIVe sUMMARY

Russian Duma elections recently wrapped up in September, and those results have led to increased speculation about what’s next for Russia’s political future. Next up, are the 2018 presidential elections. As Russia prepares for these elections, it’s worth taking a closer look at the many of the themes and ideas that are likely to persist between now and 2018. For example, it’s clear that the current party of power – United Russia – is looking for a new identity that will resonate with voters. Moreover, the Kremlin is look-ing for the right mix of liberals and conservatives to push forward important domestic and foreign policy initiatives.As part of the new Russia Direct report, we also interviewed Andrei Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Moscow Center, who is among the foremost authorities on Russian domestic politics. As he points out, many of the recent moves in the current political arena – such as the replacement of key Kremlin insiders and the co-opting of slogans and ideas from the opposition – can be viewed as attempts to maintain top-down control over Russian society while providing the semblance of transparency, efficiency and order.Finally, Mikhail Zygar, author of “All the Kremlin’s Men,” explains how policymaking at the highest levels reaches of the Russian government actually works. While Western political observers typically assume that much of Russian foreign policy is the calcu-lated strategy of one man – Vladimir Putin – the reality is often much different. There are many competing clans and many competing ideas, meaning that many moves are simply reactive rather than proactive.Ultimately, that may be the greatest mistake that Western analysts make in analyzing Russian politics. They will mistake the constant tweaks, changes and adjustments made by the Kremlin between now and 2018 as the clear signs of a deliberate, me-thodical plan rather than tactical responses to emerging problems.

REU

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Ph.D. in History, Doctor of Political science, Head of the Politicalscience Department at the Mos-cow-based Information science for Democracy (INDEM) Foun-dation. since 2012, he has been chairman of the scientific Coun-cil for the Comparative study of Party and Electoral systems at the Russian Association of Political science. Korgunyuk is the author of numerous publications on the Russian political system and do-mestic politics.

Yuri Korgunyuk

AUtHoR

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Another man’s mind is a closed book, reads a well-known Russian proverb. Likewise, it can be extended to the field of Russian politics. After all, both Russian and foreign experts have always seen the Russian decision-making process as obscure and full of se-crecy. Because of the lack of information on what is going on behind the Kremlin’s walls, political science has turned into a sort of guesswork. Instead of facts, pundits rely on speculations and assumptions. Oddly enough, it is normal for Russian po-litical analysis — it would be strange if this process worked otherwise. Yet, at any rate, this complicates the work of those who seek to understand the logic of Russian politics.Despite these challenges, Russia Direct has provided new analysis of the ins and outs of the Kremlin’s politics in an attempt to shed light on Russian policymaking. It is crucial to understand the scenarios of Russia’s politi-cal future, especially given the parliamentary election that took place in September, and the upcoming presidential elections, sched-uled for 2018.

Opening a new chapter in the Kremlin’s policy

Pavel Koshkin, Editor-in-Chief

FRoM tHe eDItoR

In this report, Russia Direct gives voice to well-known Russian political expert Yuri Kor-gunyuk from the Moscow-based Information Science for Democracy (INDEM) Foundation. He discusses the Kremlin’s different tactics and schemes in the latest political campaigns as well as the implications of the 2016 par-liamentary elections on the country’s political future. At the same time, in an extended inter-view with Russia Direct, Andrei Kolesnikov from the Carnegie Moscow Center analyzes the links between the parliamentary elections and the upcoming presidential campaign, while giving some hints of what political forces – conserva-tives or liberal technocrats – will dominate in the Kremlin in 2018 and beyond.Finally, the report features an interview with Mikhail Zygar, the former chief editor at inde-pendent TV station Dozhd, who discusses his latest book “All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin.”I hope you enjoy this report. Please, do not hes-itate to reach me directly at [email protected] with your questions. Thank you for being our loyal reader.

Eugene Abov Chairman, Russia Direct, Deputy Director General, Rossiyskaya Gazeta Publishing House, Publisher, Russia Beyond The HeadlinesJulia Golikova Director for Development, Russia Direct, Deputy Publisher, Commercial and Foreign Partnership Director, Russia Beyond The HeadlinesElena Potapova Deputy Publisher, Circulation, Digital Strategy and Operations, Russia Beyond The HeadlinesPavel Koshkin Editor-in-Chief Ksenia Zubacheva Executive Editor Dominic Basulto Executive Editor, U.S. Andrei Zolotov Executive Editor, Europe Alexey Khlebnikov Senior Editor Maria Stambler Social Media Director Olga Fastova Associate Publisher, Sales, Marketing, Events Ekaterina Belan Digital Marketing Manager Anna Sergeeva Representative, New York Olga Guitchounts Representative, Washington, D.C.Andrey Shimarskiy Art Director Nikolay Shiyanov Senior Designer Alexander Kislov Designer Milla Domogatskaya Production DesignerAndrey Zaitsev Head of Photo Department Nikolay Korolev Photo Editor

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© Russia Direct 2016 All rights reserved. ISSN 2412-8171. A product ofNo part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, or by any information storage and retrieval system. The views expressed are those of certain participants in the discussion and do not necessarily reflect the views of all participants or of Russia Direct.


Elections without surprisesThe success of the United Russia ruling party in September 2016 parliamentary elections is unquestionable. But does it mean that the party of power is actually growing in popularity?

Yuri Korgunyuk

Vladimir SmirnoV/TaSS

The main surprise of the Sept. 18 elections to the russian State duma, the lower chamber of the russian parliament, was an al-most total absence of any surprises. The only surprise, in fact, was

how effective the Kremlin’s preventive measures had been in the run-up to the elections. These measures can be divided into three main groups: liberal measures, repressive measures and manipulative measures.

The liberal measures primarily included the “party reform” of 2012, which sharply lowered the entry barriers for the creation of new politi-cal parties and their participation in elections. in 2011, new parties were required to have as many as 40,000 members; with the reform, only 500 members were necessary to register a new political party.

Vladimir SmirnoV / TaSS


in addition, in 2012-2013 it was not necessary to collect signatures for a party to take part in regional and local elections. However, this rule was modified in 2014 — only those parties that were already rep-resented in their respective regional legislature were admitted to the election. Yet, even after that, the conditions for the admission of parties to elections were more liberal than before 2012.

repressive measures included increasing the pen-alties for conducting unauthorized street rallies or violations during authorized street events; adopting laws on “foreign agent” nonprofit organizations and introducing a roster of “undesirable” international nGos in russia; and blocking any internet resources that, according to the Federal Service for Supervi-sion in the Telecom, information Technologies and mass Communications Sector (roskomnadzor), vio-late the “anti-extremist” laws.

in terms of clamping down on liberal themes in the media, the government cleaned up the TV media space. For example, the last independent TV chan-nels, namely dozhd and Tomsk TV-2, were taken off the air. The authorities also prosecuted the partici-pants of the 2011–2012 protests in moscow’s Bolot-naya Square — including popular opposition leaders such as alexei navalny, who was prohibited from participating in the elections as a result.

manipulative techniques primarily included chang-es to the electoral law. For example, a single voting day was scheduled for September, the State duma elections were shifted from december to September, and elections to the lower chamber of parliament were held through a mixed member system, when half of the seats are elected in single-member dis-tricts (plurality system) and the other half are elected from party lists allocated by proportional representa-tion. meanwhile, United russia candidates received the most favorable conditions through the adoption of single-member districts.

another measure that falls into this category was the co-opting of the political agenda of the left con-servative (“patriotic”) opposition by the leaders of the ruling party. it started in 2012 with the adoption of the law on “foreign agent” nGos and “the dima Yakovlev law,” a ban on the adoption of russian or-phans by americans. The culmination of this was the propagandist coverage by the state mass media of the operation in Eastern Ukraine and the incorpora-tion of Crimea.

TacTics used by The Kremlin To mainTain conTrolall these measures proved their effectiveness in the regional elections of 2012–2015, and it’s easy to see how they worked in 2016. The appointment of a single voting day to take place in the second week of Sep-tember resulted in a lower voter turnout: The elec-toral campaign fell during the summer period, when voters’ interest in politics is at a low. in September many city residents are busy with their dachas, which are a higher priority for them than attending a poll-ing station. at the same time, the ability of regional and local administrations to mobilize the controlled electorate (i.e. public sector employees, rural popula-tion, etc.) remained the same, as lowering the voter turnout mainly affected the “uncontrolled” voters.

only once had the reliance on lower voter turnout failed to work, but that was an exceptional case that concerned the election of the mayor of moscow in 2013. at that time, as a result of a low-profile electoral campaign, it was the ruling party electorate that was demobilized while navalny managed to rally all his supporters and gain 27 percent of the votes as op-posed to forecasted 9 percent.

That was an exceptional situation because it was moscow where, after the protests of 2011–2012, it was much more dangerous for the authorities to ma-nipulate the figures without looking at the real voting results, and because the main opposition candidate was none other than navalny. His charismatic appeal had not shrunk, but rather, had grown considerably after he had been convicted in a corruption case.

United russia also benefited from the dozens of new political parties that largely played the role of “spoilers,” drawing away votes from the main par-liamentary opposition — Communist Party (CPrF), liberal democratic Party (ldPr) and a Just russia. as a result, United russia retained a majority in all the representative bodies on the regional and local levels.

UnitEd RUssia bEnEfitEd fRom thE dozEns of nEw political paRtiEs that laRgEly playEd thE RolE of “spoilERs,” dRawing away votEs fRom thE main paRliamEntaRy opposition

public support

of russians trust putin (WcioM, oct. 2016).

56%

of the population supports united russia (WcioM, oct. 2016).

45%


The authorities’ bet on a plurality voting system (in which each voter is allowed to vote for only one can-didate) also proved effective. Before 2014 members to the moscow City duma were elected by a mixed member system. Since 2014 they started to get elected through single-member districts. as a result, the liberal parties, namely Yabloko and ParnaS, which would have been certain to gain a representation in moscow City duma according to a proportional system (in which divisions in an electorate are reflected propor-tionately in the elected body), failed to have any pres-ence there at all. at the same time, United russia kept an absolute majority in the moscow City duma.

The 2016 State duma elections provided even more evidence of the effectiveness of the political tactics chosen by the Kremlin.

changing The sysTem in favor of uniTed russiaThe shift of the elections from december to Septem-ber led to a decline in the voter turnout by almost 10 million — from 60.21 percent in 2011 to 47.88 percent in 2016. This decline primarily affected the regions with low support for United russia and the strong-holds of the liberal opposition — moscow and St. Pe-tersburg. By contrast, the voter turnout and support

for the ruling party exceeded 70-80 percent in the regions — primarily in the ethnic republics — where the level of falsification was massive. as a result, the proportional system helped United russia to surpass its previous result by gaining 54.2 percent as com-pared to 49.3 percent in 2011.

Even more effective was the return to elections ac-cording to single-member electoral districts. They had been abandoned in the mid-2000s, but not because a plurality system was disadvantageous to United russia. on the contrary, although during the 2003 elections the “party of power” gained less than 37 percent of the votes by party lists, it was still able to form a constitutional majority (i.e. over 300 seats) in the 4th State duma (2003–2007), owing it precise-ly to the single mandate candidates.

at that time, however, the Kremlin saw the main threat not in the political opposition but in the gov-ernors of some major regions that were donors of the federal budget. in the opinion of russian President Vladimir Putin and his close circle, those governors be-haved too independently and had to be “put in their place.” The governors fully controlled single mandate candidates elected on their territories, so this instru-ment had to be taken away from them. The switch to a proportional system in the State duma elections in-tended to solve that problem by giving the Presidential

% of Popular VoteVoter turnout in 2016

<10% 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50% 50-60%

60-70% 70-80% >80%

The shift of the elections from December to September led to a decline in the voter turnout by almost 10 million — from 60.21% in 2011 to 47.88% in 2016.

United Russia 54.19%

Communist Party 13.34%

LDPR 13.14%

A Just Russia 6.23%

Communists of Russia 2.27%

Yabloko 1.99%

Russian Party of Pensioners for Justice 1.73%

Rodina 1.51%

Party of Growth 1.29%

Greens 0.76%

PARNAS 0.73%

Patriots of Russia 0.59%

Civic Platform 0.22%

Civilian Power 0.14%

the outcoMes of parliaMentary elections

SoUrCE: rBC / CEnTral ElECTion CommiSSion oF THE rUSSian FEdEraTion alYona rEPKina


administration predominant control over the process of nominating candidates from the ruling party.

However, after the governor elections were can-celed and the practice of appointment of heads of regions by the President was established, there were no longer any threats to the absolute power of the Presidential administration in selecting candidates from United russia for duma elections.

So, the long attachment of the Kremlin to the pro-portional system and its mistrust of elections by single-member districts can only be explained by its inertia in thinking and phobia of changes. Even after United russia received less than half of all votes in the 2011 duma elections, the federal administration was in no hurry to return a mixed system: initially, the plan was to transform the plurality system by break-ing the party lists into a number of regional pieces to match the 225 single member districts. The plan was not implemented for a purely technical reason: The introduction of such requirements would deny all parties except United russia the possibility of partici-pating in elections.

apparently, the Kremlin lost its hypersensitivity to the plurality system only after the 2012 elections to the parliament of Ukraine (Verkhovna rada) in which Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of regions got a mere 30 percent of the votes by party lists but was able to form a solid parliamentary majority thanks to the single-mandate candidates.

due to the return to the mixed system, United rus-sia benefited even more in 2016 than the Party of regions did in 2012. While Yanukovych had to win over independent single-mandate candidates, United russia used the majority system to push through 203 deputies (out of 225). along with the 140 deputies elected by the plurality system, the party received the largest parliamentary majority in the history of post-Soviet russia. moreover, all the ruling party’s single mandate deputies owe their election exclusively to United russia and its administrative resources, so there is no chance of a “riot” on their part.

other parties were not so successful, with few can-didates elected in single-mandate districts: While the

Communist Party and a Just russia got seven depu-ties each, the ldPr got only five deputies. among other elected deputies were the leaders of the rodina and Civic Platform parties (alexei Zhuravlyov and ri-fat Shaykhutdinov), but there is a suspicion that their election was ensured by the local administrations (it is simply impossible to explain victory in their respec-tive districts in any other way).

The same kind of administrative support was appar-ently enjoyed by the only independent candidate to get to the duma: a member of the United russia’s Supreme Council, Vladislav reznik distanced himself from the party exclusively because he did not want to “cast a shadow on it.” in march this year he was put on the international wanted list by interpol, as in Spain he was charged with being involved in a criminal ring and money laundering.

russia’s “spoiler” parTiesThe consequences of the “party reform” also played into the government’s hands. in particular, each oppo-sition party (not only among the parliamentary par-ties but also non-parliamentary ones) had a spoiler twin, sometimes even a few twins, in these elections.

Thus, for the Communist Party, it was not only the Patriots of russia party that played the role of such a twin (similarly to the elections in 2007 and 2011) but also the recently registered Communists of russia party that tried to appear as even greater apologists of the Soviet past than the Communist Party, which they constantly stigmatized for its opportunism and “conciliatory” tendency.

The rodina party acted as a spoiler for ldPr while the russian Party of Pensioners for Justice was a spoiler for a Just russia. The liberal Yabloko and the People’s Freedom Party (ParnaS) parties had as many as three spoilers: the Party of Growth, Civic Platform and Civilian Power. Thereby, half of the 14 parties that participated in the elections were spoiler

The State Duma e lect ions were du l l and lacked in t r igue . Th is is a worr y ing s ign and not just w i th respect to the theor y o f democracy, but because today the count r y is go ing through ver y ser ious cha l lenges .

Elena Shestopal, professor and head of the Political Sociology and Psychology Department at Lomonosov Moscow State University

Want to know more about russia’s political system? read it here:

also read

www.russia-direct.org/tags/politics.

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parties. The 7.75 percent of the votes that they gained can be considered as “taken away” from the parties for which they acted as spoilers. The Communist Party suffered the greatest: as Communists of russia managed to snatch 2.27 percent of the votes, CPrF nearly lost the second place to ldPr as a result.

The paTrioTic agendaThe outcome of the elections was significantly affect-ed by the fact that Putin and the “party of power” had co-opted the “patriotic agenda” from the Communist Party and ldPr. of course, the “patriotic” wave raised by the events of 2014 in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine had subsided by the time of the duma elections and the state-controlled TV channels did not exploit the “Ukrainian” or international agendas in general dur-ing the last week before the election, fully aware that the audience was tired of them and could react in an unpredictable way.

nevertheless, the imperialist rhetoric that had domi-nated russian television for the past two years appar-ently played into the hands of Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s ldPr: it was the only opposition party that gained a greater share of the votes by the proportional repre-sentation system as compared to the previous elec-tion cycle (13.14 percent vs. 11.67 percent in 2011). all the other parties, with the exception of Yabloko, Par-naS and the Greens, also tried to exploit the “patriot-ic” agenda in their campaigns, but it was Zhirinovsky who was particularly good at it. long before 2014 he had demanded to reintegrate not only Crimea but also the whole of Eastern Ukraine into russia.

defeaT of The liberal opposiTionThe “Crimean-Ukrainian” narrative seemed to have been a decisive factor in the electoral defeat of the

Grigory Yavlinsky, the leader of the Yabloko party.

Yabloko and ParnaS parties. Yabloko got an almost twice smaller share of the vote than it had in 2011 — 1.99 percent against 3.43 percent in 2011 — despite the fact that this time its claim for the role of a unit-ing force for all democrats appeared more convincing than five years ago.

in 2011, the list of Yabloko was rather a friendly get-together, with only the old Yabloko activists included. in 2016, the party’s first ten candidates included such authoritative figures of the liberal opposition move-ment as dmitry Gudkov and Vladimir ryzhkov, not to mention the leader of the Yabloko Pskov division, lev Shlosberg, who had grown into a national-level politi-cian during the past two years.

ParnaS, which had long been a competitor of Yabloko for the role of “gatherer of democrats,” had lost its position by the spring of 2016. after the 2015 murder of opposition figure Boris nemtsov — the main public face of that liberal party — his co-chair mikhail Kasyanov became the sole leader of ParnaS. He is a good bureaucrat but an unsuccessful public politician totally devoid of charisma.

in his struggle for power in the party Kasyanov forced out almost all of his potential competitors. as a result, it was Vyacheslav maltsev — a nationalist blogger from Saratov region and someone who had no relation to ParnaS — who won the primaries held

thE “cRimEan-UkRainian” naRRativE sEEmEd to havE bEEn a dEcisivE factoR in thE ElEctoRal dEfEat of thE yabloko and paRnas paRtiEs. yabloko got an almost twicE smallER shaRE of thE votE than it had in 2011

VYaCHESlaV ProKoFiEV / TaSS


by the party in the spring of 2016. at first, Kasyanov intended to declare the primaries void, but then he decided that maltsev could attract part of the nationalist electorate to Parnas and agreed to include him as a number 2 in the party list.

However, both Yabloko and ParnaS were wrong in their calculations: The former gained under 2 percent of the votes, and the latter — a mere 0.73 per-cent. This failure cannot be attributed solely to the activity of their spoilers: Party of Growth, Civic Platform and Civilian Power together account for only 1.65 percent of the votes. Even the total of these figures does not reach the 5 percent necessary to overcome the entry barrier to the parliament.

implicaTions for 2018most probably, the main factor here lies in the general demoralization and demobilization of the liberal electorate that started under the in-fluence of events in Ukraine. Putin actually managed to split not only the united opposition front, which had been campaigning against him in 2011–2012, but also the liberal electorate as a whole.

apparently, a greater part of it simply ignored the elections. The disap-pointment of the liberal voters was due both to the slowdown of the pro-test wave of 2011–2012 and to the “patriotic” euphoria of 2014–2015, which developed smoothly into a propaganda-fueled hysteria. Part of the vot-ers probably fell for the slogan “Crimea is ours!” while others came to the conclusion that no changes were possible in this country. one way or the other, they expressed their attitude towards the elections by abstaining from using their votes. and thus, they deprived the liberal parties of the last hope to bring about changes through elections.

The success of Putin, his administration and United russia in these elections is unquestionable. However, this begs the question: Could this victory be a Pyrrhic one, a victory inflicting such a devastating toll on the winner that it is tantamount to defeat?

after all, a reduction in the popular support of the opposition is not at all identical to growth in the support of the government. Quite the reverse, in absolute figures, the number of voters that voted for United russia fell by 4 million. Considering that a sizeable proportion of votes was falsely cred-ited to the “party of power” in the zones of mass, sweeping falsification, it can be concluded that in reality the support of the government in russia is not growing, but rather reducing. That means that gradually, the essence of the regime is changing: it is evolving from open (electoral) authoritari-anism to closed authoritarianism. That is a kind of a dead end, which is impossible to overcome through democratic procedures.

apparently, the apathy that has spread over russian society and par-ticularly, its most active, educated part is a fairly good guarantee that Putin will be seamlessly re-elected as President in 2018. one cannot exclude that the administration will try to strengthen these guarantees by taking measures to further tighten the regime, since such measures helped stop the protest wave in 2011–2012 and, later, remove the most dangerous opposition figures from the political arena.

But such measures will only cement the problems accumulated in the economy and society, while erasing the traditional ways of solving them within the existing system. That means that in the future, solving those problems will only be possible under extraordinary conditions.

expert coMMent

James Sherrassociate fellow and former head of the russia and eurasia programme (2008-2011) at chatham house

My prognosis before the elections was that there would be no repeat of 2011-2012, there would be no ma-jor protest and that people who were dissatisfied would demonstrate their dissatisfaction by sitting at home. And this is exactly what happened. So, I read the low turnout as an indi-cator of how many people in Russia are dissatisfied or at least under-stand that their vote is not going to change anything. It is not because the elections are rigged. The main factor is that the Russian elector-ate knows whomever they elect to the Duma, these people are either puppets or they are representatives of local power structures and they do not govern for the people, they govern for themselves. And therefore having a stable elec-tion does not mean that Russia is stable because the real issues in Russia involve the relationship between people and power at vari-ous different levels. In some places that might look like a good, firm and predictable relationship, but in other places of Russia, where there are over 80 regional subjects and localities, things are not that good. There is still a real possibility of dis-cord rising locally at different levels in ways that people had difficulties predicting before. So, I think the Kremlin can draw some confidence from these elections, but not a great deal.


Hawks vs. doves: Who will dominate in the Kremlin before the 2018 elections? Carnegie Moscow Center’s Andrei Kolesnikov discusses the links between the 2016 parliamentary and 2018 presidential elections, focusing on Russia’s political future and the ongoing rivalry between the “hawks” and “doves” within the Kremlin’s inner circle.

INTERVIEW

Senior associate and the chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. His research focuses on the major trends shaping Russian domestic politics, with particular focus on the fallout from the Ukraine crisis and ideological shifts inside Russian society. Kolesnikov also works with the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, sits on the board of the Yegor Gaidar Foundation and is a member of the Committee of Civil Initiatives.

ANDREI KolESNIKoV Pavel Koshkin

Russia’s recent parliamentary elections were, by and large, a dress rehearsal for the more important presidential elections coming up in 2018. Between now and then, members of the political estab-

lishment will be able to try on new roles, experiment with new campaign slogans, and determine who will play a starring role within the Kremlin’s inner circle. The central consideration is how to consolidate power in a way that balances the interests of the government and the population.

To get an inside look at Russia’s current political landscape, Russia Direct sat down with Andrei Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Moscow Center. According to him, the 2016 parliamentary elections provide a preview of what to expect in 2018 and beyond.

Russia Direct: To what extent were the 2016 parliamentary elec-tions fair and legitimate, in your view?

Andrei Kolesnikov: In fact, they were juridically legitimate because they were conducted in accordance with Russian law. However, the de-gree of the political, not juridical legitimacy is a debatable question be-

fRoM peRsonAl ARCHIves


take into account all positions and sig-nals that were coming from the regions during the electoral campaign and could not ignore them. There were so many of these signals that she objectively and physically could not control the elections throughout the country, espe-cially, in the distant regions.

RD: What kinds of violations took place during the 2016 elections, if any?

A.K.: violations took place, even though they were not large-scale, like previously during the 2011 elections. These violations included the use of administrative resources for influence, rigged and fabricated voting, stuffing the ballot box, and dirty political tech-niques against the liberal and commu-nist parties during the political cam-paign and before election Day.

There was also orchestrated voting, when cadets, students and governmen-tal employees were ordered to vote. This also should be taken into account. All these violations took place not only in distant regions, but also in those under the steady control of the Central election Commission.

RD: Why did the United Russia party win despite its declining popularity throughout Russia?

A.K.: The fact the United Russia won the majority in the state Duma and the party’s popularity are basically different things. Its popularity has been decreas-ing indeed. It is one reality. But it doesn’t prevent the party from winning most of the seats. That is the other reality.

Russian citizens don’t see the party as a body that deals with the problems of the population. The credibility and approval rankings of almost all govern-mental bodies, except law enforcement agencies and the president himself, are dropping. And United Russia is not the exception, because people perceive it not as a party, but as a kind of a govern-mental body. Its rating will keep going down, but slowly, step by step.

Usually, if you vote for United Russia, it

lesser extent — no wonder that people were compelled to vote in accordance with the orders of local authorities. The violations in these regions were likely to be common.

RD: Does Russia’s Central Election Commission have any tools to influ-ence voting in the distant regions?

A.K.: There are some instruments, but local authorities limit and restrict them. I don’t think the administration of the Russian president hampered the work of the Central election Commission Head, ella pamfilova. she tried to balance the interests of Russian president vladimir putin and the interests of the country’s civil society.

This is the middle-of-the-road position and it is very difficult. she just tried to

To a lesser extent, these elections were fair and transparent in the distant Russian regions or — in the words of political expert Dmitry Oreshkin — “zones of peculiar electoral culture.”

Tactically, Duma elections were aimed at preparing the groundwork for the 2018 presidential elections.

cause of the low turnout: It means that the representation of Russian citizens in the parliament became even less than previously. About one-third of the Rus-sian population voted at the elections.

even though the United Russia rul-ing party garnered four million fewer votes than during the 2011 elections, it received more seats in the parliament. In addition, liberal politicians are not in-cluded in the parliament at all. Thus, po-litically, the legitimacy of the elections is a matter of question.

Regarding honesty, these elections were fair in the polling stations with observers, to a large extent. They were honest in the regions, in which the Central election Commission controlled the electoral pro-cess in cooperation with observers.

To a lesser extent, these elections were fair and transparent in the distant Rus-sian regions or — in the words of promi-nent political expert Dmitry oreshkin — “zones of peculiar electoral culture,” which saw an abnormally high electoral turnout. I mean, for instance, the repub-lic of Tuva in southern siberia, the north Caucasus, Kemerovo region etc.

These regions were controlled by the Central election Commission to a much

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means a mechanical, symbolic process, a sort of political law-abiding ritual. If you are law-abiding and go to the polling station, you are likely to vote for United Russia, because it is necessary. This is the very logic and motivation that drive average voters to elect United Russia.

even though some people preferred not to vote for the ruling party, they voted for the current authorities, because there were no real alternatives: They voted ei-ther for one of the three systemic par-liamentary parties or the spoiler parties, which aimed at distracting the attention of voters and preventing the opposition from gaining parliamentary seats.

RD: Why did the Russian opposition fail and what is its key problem?

A.K.: The reason why they failed can be traced back to the personal ambitions of the opposition leaders. They couldn’t team up and compete with each other. In addition, they have different values, in fact. I mean right-leaning liberals and left-leaning liberals don’t always agree. This does matter, after all. Moreover, these leaders don’t have enough political heft. Most of them cannot be considered pow-erful and influential political figures.

Another problem is that the authori-tarian regime in Russia will prevent the emergence of new powerful liberal forc-es in Russia. If such a party emerges and poses a serious challenge to the authori-ties like opposition leader Alexei na-valny did, it will be either destroyed or discredited and marginalized. so, in such a situation, it is very difficult to come up with a pragmatic solution. However, this year’s parliamentary elections proved that the only political democratic force noticeable on a scale of a whole coun-try is the Yabloko party and its leader Grigory Yavlinsky, no matter how you view them.

Indeed, it is losing popularity year after year, but this party remains firmly within the country’s political landscape and if the opposition is able to persuade vot-ers that Yabloko brings together differ-ent representatives of liberal and dem-

ocratic forces as well as well-educated intelligentsia, they might succeed in the future. But in reality it’s hardly probable.

RD: You said that the Kremlin would prevent the emergence of a new pow-erful liberal political force in Russia, because the existence of such a force contradicts the nature of the authori-tarian regime. Yet why are the Russian authorities afraid of everything that is associated with liberals, if those within the Kremlin are pretty confi-dent, if their approval rankings are high among the majority of Russians, if people don’t trust liberals and the idea of liberalism is totally discredited in the country?

A.K.: Well, first, it is a matter of the logic of development of any authorita-tive regime. It adds up to total political control. second, in fact, the authorities are not so confident that they are so popular among the people, as implied by the words of Russian president vladi-mir putin, who came to the United Rus-sia headquarters after the elections and said that, despite economic challenges and the difficult situation, people voted for United Russia. If you read between the lines, you can detect the feeling of the lack of confidence.

It means that the social contract — economic well-being in exchange for political freedoms (“we restrict your po-

litical freedoms, but feed you instead”) — doesn’t work anymore and might be not so relevant. That’s why the authori-ties find it necessary to feed people with imperial pride, wars, Crimea and increase political control and establish a political monopoly, which also means creating fake liberal parties such as the party of Growth. After all, it is a good ex-ample of the spoiler artificial party cre-ated within the Kremlin’s test tube. And this control is likely to persist as long as this regime exists.

RD: What will the 2016 parliamentary elections change in Russian politics?

A.K.: Basically, there won’t be big changes. Tactically, these elections aimed at preparing the groundwork for the 2018 presidential elections and test-ing Russia’s current political system. And in this regard, this task was fulfilled. By 2018 putin is going to look for new faces and figures to renew his team, but this is going to be a different political process, even though it is partly related to the parliamentary elections.

RD: You said the 2016 parliamentary elections were a proving ground for the 2018 presidential elections and tested Russia’s current political sys-tem. Could you be more specific?

A.K.: These elections confirmed the le-gitimacy of the current Russian authori-ties. once again, the Kremlin sees that it does have the mandate to rule the coun-try. putin himself does have this man-date, because the ruling party is asso-ciated with his name, and the country’s political unity is based on the Crimea narrative and the parliament itself.

The system passed the test success-fully. so, it can work for a certain period of time as long as everybody is satis-fied with this model. Thus, the system is ready to live for another 18 months until the 2018 presidential elections, with the parliament organically embedded in this system and ready to fulfill blindly all or-ders from the president.

The other question is how will these

RElATIoNS bETWEEN THE GoVERNMENT AND THE PEoPlE

66% 7%

of Russians rely only on themselves and avoid any contact with the authorities (levada, Aug. 2016).

of respondents think that communicating with the authorities helps to achieve their goals.


elections be conducted in terms of ob-vious predictability and the absolute absence of interest toward them given the fact that nobody can compete with putin. In fact, he is the only candidate who will win. so, there is the lack of mo-tivation for voters to come to the polling stations in 2018.

RD: Do you mean that the turnout at the presidential election will be low?

A.K.: The turnout is going to be the key question. In fact, the 2018 election is a ref-erendum that will test the credibility and approval of one person [putin]. In this situation, the authorities have to create an artificial rivalry to putin, but it is hardly likely to work. The real rival won’t be al-lowed to compete with putin openly, if we are talking about navalny. Thus, if putin is once again elected president, there is no motivation to vote.

on the other hand, as indicated by this year’s parliamentary election, those who came to the polling stations observed a sort of political ritual. It is a matter of car-rying out a law-abiding commitment. And this might drive people to vote in many Russian regions and have an impact on the electoral turnout. However, I expect it to be lower than during the parliamentary elections, especially in Moscow and st. petersburg. Importantly, the turnout will be low not because people do not trust putin — it will be low because of the ab-solute predictability of the elections, be-cause of the absence of competition.

RD: To what extent were this year’s parliamentary elections different from the ones in 2011 — and why didn’t they lead to protests?

A.K.: Well, the situations are totally dif-ferent. In 2011, people were waiting for changes and the continuation of mod-ernization, with urbanites frustrated by the rigged voting and obvious violations during the parliamentary elections. They were also disappointed with the presi-dential swap, when then president Dmi-try Medvedev decided not to stand for the 2012 presidency and let putin come

to power once again, depriving them of the opportunity of a choice. eventually, they took to the streets.

Yet their protests failed to bring chang-es among the authorities. Moreover, these protests brought about a series of arrests, which had a chilling effect on the protesters. Afterwards, the authori-ties took very repressive legal measures — including “the Dima Yakovlev law” that bans foreign families from adopting Russian orphans, the laws that restrict the right to organize rallies, laws on for-eign agents and undesirable organiza-tions, and other restrictive measures.

Thus, by the beginning of this year’s elections, people had been very discour-aged. They didn’t believe that they could change something. They were not ready to take to the streets. They were totally apathetic and disappointed politically. on top of that, there was the incorpora-tion of Crimea. This narrative played its role in bringing people together around the authorities.

RD: Remarkably, those who took to the streets in 2011 supported Crimea’s incorporation.

A.K.: statistically, it is difficult to make any conclusions, yet the correlation does exist. Indeed, Crimea helped to mobilize people, even part of the liberal-minded citizens. It became the key narrative that mobilized the nation. Those who didn’t support the incorporation of Crimea are seen as outcasts. They are considered to be outsiders.

RD: How long will the Crimea effect be able to unite people around the au-thorities?

A.K.: It is difficult to say for sure. prob-ably, the abrupt worsening of living stan-dards and drop in income might influ-ence the behavior of the population. Yet this is just a hypothesis, because people are still very satisfied with Crimea’s re-turn to Russia: They see themselves as being part of a great power.

According to the polls of the levada Center, people are still supporting the Kremlin’s foreign policy, they don’t want the sanctions to be canceled, and they believe they are above these sanctions. They think that Russia should keep the counter-sanctions policy instead of try-ing to persuade the West to lift these

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sanctions. This mobilization — being in the state of quasi-war — helps them to deal with the economic crisis and ad-just to it. Honestly, there are no signs of political indignation, which means that people won’t orchestrate large-scale political protests.

RD: Shortly after the parliamentary elections, Russian media reported about the Kremlin’s plans to create the Ministry of State Security (or MGB in the Russian abbreviation), which is expected to bring together all Russian law security agencies. So, it seems to be a reanimated version of the old KGB. What does it mean for Russia’s political future?

A.K.: Russian law enforcement offi-cers play today a significant role [in the country’s decision-making process]. so, if these plans come true, it means that the authorities are trying to hedge po-litical risks: It is a matter of the system defending itself in advance. one of the goals [of the MGB] is to provide security for the president and this problem will be more relevant by the end of the state Duma’s tenure, by 2021, because it will be the time when the future of putin will be determined.

After 2021, there will be the questions from people and political elites if putin will remain at the helm after 2024 or not, if he will nominate his successor or not, if he will be a lame duck or not. All these questions need to be clarified. And to feel more confident and secure, he needs absolute control. And the cre-ation of such a monstrosity like the MGB is quite logical in such a situation. But this leak about MGB was no more than proving public and elite’s opinions. pre-sumably, right now this body will not be created.

RD: There is some speculation that Putin might be concerned with a plot prepared by some members of Rus-sia’s political elite. Is it really the case?

A.K.: In fact, today there are not any signs of a conspiracy against putin. The

stakeholders within the Russian politi-cal elites are not interested in it, given a great deal of solidarity and unity around the Crimea narrative. even though pu-tin is autocratic in his nature, neverthe-less he is very popular among the elites. He builds such a political machine that guarantees him security and prevents any possibility of a coup d’état.

provide putin with security when he ei-ther retires or hands over power to his successor.

RD: There is also speculation that Pu-tin is trying to fuel an artificial rivalry between different law enforcement agencies to strengthen his positions in the Kremlin. Do you agree?

A.K.: partly, it is the case. The logic of the MGB is to control this rivalry, watch over it closely and make it more trans-parent within one big entity. After all, putin is an observer. He is like a weigh-ing-machine that takes into account all views and tries to balance them. He gives them room to compete with each other up to a point and makes certain conclusions. It is a matter of effective political management.

look at Alexander Bastrykin, the chair-man of the Russian Investigative Com-mittee. He has been very influential until recently, but he started expressing po-litical claims and got in trouble [In July 2016 the federal security service (fsB) conducted a series of inspections in the Investigative Committee’s offices and arrested high-profile officials suspected of corruption and embezzlement — Edi-tor’s note].

Today, putin doesn’t need independent and very corrupt figures. He is ready to put up with the riches of his govern-mental oligarchs, but as long as they can hide it and fulfill their commitments within their governmental corporations.

summing up, putin is creating the envi-ronment that can provide him with secu-rity and insurance and control the wars

Crimea helped to mobilize people, even part of the liberal-minded citizens. It became the key narrative that mobilized the nation. Those who didn’t support the incorporation of Crimea are seen as outcasts.

RD: Yet recently Putin reshuffled his political deck and asked his chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, a former KGB of-ficer, to resign. Anton Vaino, who was seen by some experts as a political unknown and a neutral technocratic political figure, replaced Ivanov. Does this resignation mean that Putin hedg-es the risks and just wants to get rid of those who might compete with him?

A.K.: Actually, this is the trend, which means the 2018 new team of the presi-dent will consist of docile, absolutely loy-al bureaucrats, who will be distant from the leader and won’t have any claims for power. This is in contrast to putin’s cro-nies — governmental oligarchs and his close friends.

This team will also comprise the bu-reaucrats and average men from law enforcement agencies, including secu-rity guards and representatives of the special services. This is how putin sees effective governance; this is how he is going to reform the governance system. This is part of his strategy to save his personal security during his next presi-dential term. These people will have to

How do Russians see themselves in the changing world order?Find out in Russia Direct report ‘National Identity: The 25-year search for a new Russia’ available at

AlSo READ

www.russia-direct.org/archive


with the Kremlin’s inner circle. Russia’s political elites have already received a lot of signals from him: If somebody be-haves in a wrong way, he will be either dismissed or accused of corruption.

RD: How do you see the role of Med-vedev, given that he has acquired the reputation of a very weak and docile politician? To what extent does he fit into the system?

A.K.: His weakness is his power. His purposefully technocratic nature is his competitive capability. He is convenient, docile. He is between the loyal systemic liberals and law enforcement officials. In addition, his informal agreement with putin is still intact and relevant. political-ly, it is not in putin’s interest to replace Medvedev with a more powerful and in-dependent politician.

In this case putin should choose between liberals and “hawks” — between [former finance Minister] Alexei Kudrin and Igor sechin [the head of Russia’s largest oil company Rosneft]. Yet putin cannot do it right now. He has to choose a middle-of-the-road, technocratic and docile figure like Medvedev, who will become a very convenient way to shift responsibility for the economic crisis after 2018.

In this regard, the ideal candidate to replace Medvedev is Anton vaino, pu-tin’s current chief of staff, or his deputy sergei Kiriyenko, who in the eyes of Rus-sians was responsible for the 1998 eco-nomic default. However, Medvedev is a much more experienced politician.

RD: You mentioned the “hawks” and liberals within the Kremlin’s inner cir-cle. Who is more influential today?

A.K.: You can look at this hierarchy both simplistically and from a more so-phisticated point of view. If we tend to simplify, there are the “hawks” or con-servatives and “doves” or liberals: While the former are responsible for politics and foreign policy, the latter deal with the economy, business, the budget and fiscal policy.

on the other hand, all these players,

monalities. After all, all of them support the Crimean consensus. They support putin’s domestic and foreign policy, even though some of them [liberals] don’t approve it. They are just adjusting to the current political situation without openly expressing their disagreement.

RD: Sooner or later Putin will have to step down. To what extent will the transition of power be difficult in Rus-sia?

A.K.: This transition will be very dif-ficult at any rate. After all, there hasn’t been a rotation of power for years. The nuance is putin can accelerate the tran-sition to democracy only if it brings ben-efits to him to save his personal security. If technocrats and liberals are able to persuade him that his security depends on democracy, he might chose this path, yet, again, not because he likes democ-racy. Today he is not ready for liberaliza-tion.

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THE DYNAMIC oF PUblIC TRUST IN STATE, lAW ENFoRCEMENT AND SoCIAl INSTITUTIoNS (2012-2016)

The nuance is Putin can accelerate the transition to democracy only if it brings benefits to him to save his personal security.

especially, law enforcement officials [“hawks”] are involved in clan wars to a larger extent than the liberals, who, basically, have nothing to compete for (if we don’t take into account the de-bates between the economy Ministry, finance Ministry and the Central Banks about the nuances of Russia’s economic policy).

The closer we look at the political groups within the Kremlin, the more obvious it becomes that all these play-ers are included in putin’s team: In fact, they have less differences than com-

AlSo READ

What is behind the changing of the political guard in Russia? How will it influence the society in Russia? Find out on our website: www.russia-direct.org/tags/society.

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Understanding Russian politics, without the conspiracy theoriesMikhail Zygar, the former chief editor at independent TV station Dozhd, discusses his latest book, “All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin.”

INTERVIEW

Russian journalist, writer and filmmaker, and the founding editor-in-chief of the Russian independent news TV channel, Dozhd (2010-2015). In 2014 he received the CPJ International Press Freedom Award.

MIkhaIl ZygaR

Pavel Koshkin

The recent shakeup in the Kremlin’s inner circle, including the appoint-ment of a new head of the presi-

dential administration to replace Russian President Vladimir Putin’s close team-mate Sergei Ivanov, has reinvigorated interest in Russia’s political elites and how the decision-making process works in the country.

All of this makes the new book by Mikhail Zygar, a well-known Russian journalist and former chief editor at in-dependent TV station Dozhd, relevant for both Russian and foreign audiences.

Published in 2015 in Russian, his “All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladi-mir Putin” is available in English since September. The book provides insights into how Russia’s political system has evolved under Putin.

Russia Direct recently sat down with Zygar to discuss his book and hear his thoughts on how the Russian political system really works.

Russia Direct: Why and when did you decide to write such a book?

Mikhail Zygar: In fact, I was writing

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this book for approximately seven years. That is, I was collecting information for this book for seven years: I had to meet with numerous newsmakers and conduct off-the-record interviews with them.

During all these years, I was working as a political journalist for different media outlets. I started this book when I worked for Kommersant. Then, I became deputy editor-in-chief of Russian Newsweek and, afterwards, I moved to the Dozhd TV channel as editor-in-chief.

Dealing with Russian political jour-nalism means that newsmakers can be relatively outspoken only during off-the-record interviews. It is impossible to have honest and sincere conversations on the record. That’s why, in order to be political journalist in Russia and fulfill the com-mitments of an editor, I had to conduct off-the-record interviews to learn all the ins and outs of Russian politics and un-derstand what is important and what is not, what is really going on under the surface of Russia’s political agenda.

This is one of the most important parts in the editorial routine of working either

the book would not end that way and it was too early to come up with conclu-sions. only in 2014, I understood that a certain political epoch ended and it was high time to release the book to remind readers about the events that had been taking place during Putin’s three presi-dential terms and what was the origin of this political epoch. So, I had to finish the book.

RD: You mentioned that most inter-views were off-the-record. Is this the reason why your book is primarily based on assumptions without refer-ring to primary sources, as some skep-tics claim?

M. Z.: Those people who think in such a way might not be well aware about the nuances of Russia’s political journalism. In fact, since the beginning of the 2000s, there hasn’t been [reliable] information based on primary and open sources in Russia’s political press. If you open high-quality newspapers in Russia such as Ve-domosti or Kommersant, all journalistic investigations are based on anonymous sources. This is the reality that has exist-ed in Russia for more than 10 years. And there is no other reality.

In such a situation, I had several alter-natives: either I could give up writing the book or I could write an official and boring account about Russian politics or Putin, which would be released but would fail to attract an audience, be-cause it would not reflect the reality — it would be something like ZhZL [a Russian abbreviation for “the life of remarkable people,” a series of Russian books de-scribing the biographies of outstanding people — Editor’s note].

Another option was to come up with the book that I wrote, one based on off-the-record conversations. At the same time, the book contains references to pri-mary sources; in fact, I clearly identified them in my book and mentioned many interviewees.

nevertheless, although almost the en-tire book is based on anonymous sourc-es and on their narratives, I don’t see it as

for a publication or television. At any rate, I had to meet with different newsmakers and understand what was behind that pseudo-news in Russia’s news feed.

So, at the earliest stage, in 2007, I came to an idea that I had to come up with a book that would include these off-the-record interviews. At that moment, it seemed to me that it would be easy and fast enough to fulfill this task: I planned to sum up the results of Putin’s two pres-idential tenures.

However, afterwards, [with the third presidential tenure of Putin and the start of the Ukraine crisis] it became clear that

Any claims that Russians are not ready for democracy are very dubious, according to Zygar.

Although almost the entire book is based on anonymous sources and on their narratives, I don’t see it as a flaw; instead, I see it as an advantage.

AP


a flaw; instead, I see it as an advantage, because this is the only opportunity [in Russia] to find out true information about what is happening behind the-scenes of Russia’s politics.

RD: The name of your book — “All the Kremlin’s Men” — is intriguing. It seems to refer to the famous movie “All the President’s Men,” about the Watergate scandal and corrupt politicians in the high ranks of power, or to “All the King’s Men,” a novel by Robert Penn Warren, which portrays the rise of cynical politi-cians and demagogues. Is it an attempt to describe Russian politics through symbols, allusions, and memories?

M.Z.: The name of the book conveys a lot of references. In fact, it is a hint at the quote from the famous English writer Lewis Carroll’s “Through the Look-ing Glass” — “Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall: Humpty Dumpty had a great fall. All the King’s horses and all the King’s men couldn’t put Humpty Dumpty back to-gether again.”

So, it could be anything. on the one hand, it might mean that a big group of people with a great deal of power cannot resolve a trivial task. At the same time, there are multiple layers of meaning. Yes, it refers to Penn Warren’s novel, which deals with the ways of how power func-tions; what effect it has on human psy-chology; how human behavior changes, when one gets access to power; what is primary — the impact of the human psyche on political decision-making or the impact of political calculations [on human behavior].

In addition, it’s possible to mention the famous movie about the Watergate scandal, even though it is related to the book to a lesser extent. So, there could be a great number of allusions embed-ded within the name of the book.

RD: The structure of your book is based on the comparison of each of Putin’s tenures with different histori-cal monarchs — from Richard the Lion-heart to Ivan the Terrible and, finally,

to Vladimir the Saint. How can you ac-count for this?

M.Z.: It is rather an irony: it is about the [psychological and behavioral] chang-es inside of one person; it is about the changes in his mindset, his outlook, his self-assessment; it is about the changes in how others — his environment — treat him. And all these changes can be so drastic, I mean, beyond recognition.

RD: The Kremlin’s inner circle is one of the most popular topics among ex-perts and academics. For example, University College London professor Alena Ledeneva with her book about “Sistema” as well as well-known Rus-sian expert Evgeny Minchenko with his “Politburo 2.0,” shed light on how the system of power in Russia works. They seem to provide a very detailed analy-sis of the problem. What new aspects of the topic does your book reveal?

M.Z.: In fact, there hasn’t been any popular book, which tries to explain how the system of Russian power works, how and why Russia’s political decision-making has been evolving for the last 15 years. Even though the previous works —like the ones from Minchenko — contain nuggets of information, but they don’t reveal the whole story. The problem is that both journalists and pundits in Rus-sia can be very knowledgeable, but they

are affiliated with the country’s key po-litical movers and shakers.

on the other hand, there are those who are more independent, but less informed. Most importantly, despite the fact that there are many high-quality books and reports on this topic, written by journal-ists and political experts, none of them has targeted a broader audience until re-cently; none of them has written some-thing complete, solid from the point of view of plot and narrative.

Meanwhile, my book firmly follows the plot and the [chronological] narrative — and it targets not those who keep up with Russia’s political agenda on a daily basis, but rather ordinary, politically un-motivated and rather unbiased people, who might be interested in politics — who seek to know what happened in re-ality and why.

I wrote this book for those who will read it in a hundred years and under-stand it; who have just started express-ing interest toward politics and see it as a tabula rasa, a blank sheet of paper, to be interpreted in new ways. So, my book is a sort of executive summary of the previ-ous episodes in a long-running television series, which they just started watching.

RD: Some compare your book with the one by New York Times reporter Steven Lee Myers (“The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin”), despite the fact that your book offers totally different explanations of Rus-sia’s politics and alternative narratives. You argue that there is no intention in what happens in Russia, that Russia’s politics are situational in nature and respond to domestic and foreign chal-lenges depending on circumstances. In contrast, Myers seems to search for an explanation in the intentional schemes in Putin’s behavior and Russia’s poli-tics: Everything is predetermined and has a certain design. Why do you avoid such an approach?

M.Z.: If you compare my book with the one by Steven Lee Myers, it is important to keep in mind that they are written in

The RussIAn PolITICAl elITe oPInIon Poll (hAmIlTon College)

of respondents regard the inability to solve domestic problems as one of the top threats to the security of Russia.

of representatives of Russian elite find the current political system most suitable for the country.

42%32%


different genres. While he wrote a book about Putin, I came up with a book not about Putin per se. The main character of my book is the collective environment around Putin; it is rather about the Rus-sian system of power.

It is not the biography of a person. And if you write the biography of this per-son, everything should be related to this person. Involuntarily or purposely, you might either idealize or demonize him; you put him in the center of the world. I see such an approach as a key mistake, committed by about 99 percent of both Russian and foreign journalists who write about Putin.

Unfortunately, they purposely distort the reality just because they put them-selves in the framework of the genre that they choose. Instead of trying to describe the real political processes, they draw the same artificial and improbable schemes.

After all, never ever does life add up to a simple black-and-white picture; I firmly believe that it is more nuanced.

To illustrate this, I always give an ex-ample: During numerous sessions in the beginning of Putin’s first tenure, the Rus-sian president frequently reiterated that Russia needed to care about Ukraine oth-erwise Moscow would lose it. It is a clear indication that reveals his initial plan. It was to control Ukraine not to alienate it

by incorporating Crimea.Unfortunately, by demonizing or ideal-

izing Putin, many journalists have come to wrong conclusions in an attempt to follow the rules of the genre they choose. For example, if you make a movie, let’s say about Alexander the Great, you will have to focus primarily on him and — to a lesser extent — on his environment, which is less interesting than the major character. Thus, you create an image of a celestial half-god, which is put in the center of the world. It is a logical and ar-chaic artistic approach, which has been used by many writers throughout history.

RD: Ok, how do you describe the gen-re of your book?

M.Z.: Let’s describe it as a historical chron-icle. It is a sort of “medieval chronicle” that reveals the details of how the king’s court is working and functioning. That’s why in my

According to Zygar, “Putin” is the collective judgement of the dozens of politicians, bureaucrats, civil servants, intelligence chiefs, and military and business leaders, who surround him.

Unfortunately, by demonizing and idealizing Putin, many journalists have come to wrong conclusions in an attempt to follow the rules of the genre they choose.

© DMITRY ASTAKHoV / RIA noVoSTI


book I use hints and reminiscence to me-dieval historical characters like Richard the Lionheart and other monarchs. My goal is to convey its “medieval” nature.

RD: Your book looks like a counter-balance to numerous conspiracy theo-ries, which abound today in Russia and abroad. Why do you think they are popular among the Russian political elite? Do they really believe in conspir-acy theories or don’t they — maybe, they just use them to manipulate and impose their own agenda?

M.Z.: Based on my numerous conver-sations with key Russian politicians and officials, I would argue that many of them do believe in conspiracy theories just because it is such an easy answer to difficult questions. They just see it as a simple and logical explanation: that we are right, while others are wrong; or even though we are wrong, it is not our fault — it is the fault and plot of our enemies. Yet such behavior is common not only for Russian politicians, but also for their foreign counterparts.

It seems to me that the explanation, which presents Putin as a politician with an artful and skillful plan to conquer the world, is another example of a con-spiracy theory, which is very popular in the West. For example, some Western journalists frequently ask me why I don’t pay attention [in my book] to a special operation of the Federal Security Ser-vice (FSB), which allegedly sought to integrate then agent Putin into the struc-tures of Russian government and, after-wards, conquer all its institutions. This is a good example of a fantastic conspiracy that is unfortunately in vogue among for-eign journalists. Alas, it usually hampers a well-balanced and reasonable analysis.

RD: The recent reshuffles in the Krem-lin’s political elite and the increasing influence of law enforcement repre-sentatives seem to be a gift for the fans of conspiracy theories who argue that Putin has a certain plan.

M.Z.: In fact, everything that takes

place is a gift for conspiracy theorists, because it is always convenient to find necessary facts to come up with expla-nations, which fit one’s theory. That’s why I would prefer to avoid giving any political analysis on the recent political appointments and resignations within the Kremlin’s inner circle.

In this regard, I would rather say that the American version of my book ends up with a chapter about Syria and Tur-key. It highlights that the whole Russian conflict with Turkey is not the result of an industrious, overarching plan.

And today’s events [the reconciliation between Moscow and Ankara] is another proof that it is the case, because if one has a certain plan of how to behave in the Middle East and what kind of policy it is necessary to choose toward Turkey, the recent fluctuations in Moscow-An-kara relations, which we have been wit-nessing for the last half a year, would be just impossible. However, initially, a cold war started between Russia and Turkey, but afterwards they suddenly reconciled and fraternized.

RD: Some argue that there is demand for paternalism in Russia, which means that Russians are not ready for true de-mocracy. However, it is not clear what comes first — the demand for a pater-nalistic leader from the population or the Kremlin’s information campaign that imposes this agenda. It is like the chicken-or-the-egg problem. What is your take on it?

M.Z.: This is the very question that pre-occupied people in the early 20th cen-tury, during the events, which preceded the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution (now I am writing a book on this historical period in Russia). Likewise, they were debating the question whether the Russian people were ready for democracy or not. Inter-estingly, in 100 years these doubts — whether Russians are ready or not — still persist. In my view any claims that Rus-sians are not ready for democracy are very dubious: It is an attempt to ascribe anthropomorphous, human characteris-

tics to inanimate objects like entire na-tions.

But there is no reason to do it. It is too naïve, it is an oversimplification, some-thing like looking over clouds and trying to find the shapes of animals in the sky while sprawling on the lawn: This cloud looks like an elephant, this one resembles a crocodile. Yet the cloud neither turns into an elephant nor into a crocodile no matter what you think about it. It doesn’t reflect the reality. So, again, there is no need to oversimplify and claim that a na-tion has certain and predetermined char-acteristics and fate.

In my view, Russian society is much more sophisticated and it brings to-gether different groups of peoples with different values. While some stick to democratic values, others prefer to af-filiate themselves with a great power and share imperialistic values, they feel pride for their country. These people are very different in their mindset.

At the same time, there is a group of people who are politically apathetic, who try to shy away from politics and power; they are preoccupied with routine, mun-dane burdens and they don’t think about democracy; they just don’t want to be bothered. And such people represent the majority of the population. They are ready to agree automatically with any initiatives and calls, because it requires less effort. In this situation, a lot depends on the current political situation. So, it would be wrong to oversimplify and put nations into boxes.

Want to know more about mikhail Zygar’s book? Read our review of his book at

Also ReAD

www.russia-direct.org/reviews.


1. Alena V. Ledeneva. Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

2. Steven Lee Myers. The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin. New York: Knopf, 2015.

3. Karen Dawisha. Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2014.

4. Tatyana Stanovaya. “Kremlin-Duma Reshuffle Offers False Hope to Russian Reformers,” Carnegie Moscow Center, October 12, 2016. http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=64834.

5. Ivan Timofeev. “From Authoritarianism to Democracy? The Future of Political Regimes,” Russian International Affairs Council, October 25, 2016. http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=8273.

6. Ekaterina Grobman. “Inside the Power Struggle Within the Russian Elite,” Russia Direct, August 5, 2016. http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/inside-power-struggle-within-russian-elite.

7. The Russian Elite 2016: Perspectives on Foreign and Domestic Policy. Hamilton College Poll, May 11, 2016. https://www.hamilton.edu/documents/russianelite2016final.pdf.

8. Vladislav L. Inozemtsev. “The Russian Opposition Should Do Its Homework,” Kennan Institute, September 22, 2016. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-russian-opposition-should-do-its-homework.

9. Vladimir Gel’man. Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015.

10. Ivan Kurilla. “The Return of Stalin: Understanding the Surge of Historical Politics in Russia,” PONARS Eurasia, Policy Memo 429, May 2016. http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/return-stalin-understanding-surge-historical-politics-russia.

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