White Gold and Troubled Waters in SouthernAfrica: Hydropolitical Policy�s Effect on Peace

in Lesotho and South Africa

SUSANNAH RYANUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Over recent decades, scholars have debated the connection betweenresource scarcity and conflict. Does resource scarcity produce con-flict, or does scarcity demand development and international coop-eration? Can environmental stress be an occasion for peace, or doesinternational cooperation during an environmental crisis indicatelocal or intrastate conflicts? Toward responding to these questions,this analysis examines the effects the Lesotho Highlands WaterProject (LHWP) and shows that while the LHWP helped to put astop to international conflicts between Lesotho and South Africa,the Project�s consequences (ecocide, displacement, and unequal dis-tribution of basic resources) have intensified tensions within thesestates.

Keywords: Natural Resource Management, Peace, Violence, Conflict,Resource Wars, Water Policy, Security Policy, Water Conservation, Leso-tho, South Africa, Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Resource Scarcity,Development, International Cooperation, Environmental Crisis.

Related Articles:Bakenova, Saule. 2008. “Interpreting the Emergence of Water Export Pol-icy in Canada.” Politics & Policy 36 (4): 676-719. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00125.x/abstractMoreno-Jaimes, Carlos. 2011. “Is Local Spending Responsive to thePoor? An Appraisal of Resource Allocation and Electoral Rewards inMexico.” Politics & Policy 39 (6): 1021-1052. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00328.x/abstractElliott-Teague, Ginger. 2011. “�Public� Interests and the Development ofTanzanian Environmental Policy.” Politics & Policy 39 (5): 835-861.

Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank her anonymous reviewers and Editor,Emma Norman, for their feedback and guidance. She would also like to thank Eric KingWatts, Anne-Maria Makhulu, and Erik Doxtader for their direction during this project�s con-ception, and Calum Matheson for his ongoing engagement with the subject.

Politics & Policy, Volume 43, No. 2 (2015): 239-255. 10.1111/polp.12114Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.VC 2015 Policy Studies Organization

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00318.x/abstract

Related Media:AfricaGlobalisation. 2013. “White Gold.” YouTube Video, May 27.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VKj7G5QR0ToGreyl, Lucie. 2015. “Lesotho Highlands Water Project Lesotho.” Ejolt/Environmental Justice Atlas. http://ejatlas.org/conflict/lesotho-highlands-water-project-lesothoLesotho Highlands Development Authority. 2015. “Lesotho HighlandsWater Project.” http://www.lhda.orgThe World Bank. 2011. “Abundant Waters: Harnessing Water forLesotho�s Future.” http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/video/2011/03/15/Abundant-Waters-Harnessing-Water-Lesotho-Future

Durante las �ultimas d�ecadas acad�emicos han debatido la conexi�onentre la escasez de recursos y el conflict. >Puede la escasez de recur-sos producir conflicto, o acaso la escasez requiere del desarrollo y lacooperaci�on internacional? >Puede la presi�on al medio ambiente for-mularse como una oportunidad para establecer la paz, o de lo contra-rio, puede la cooperaci�on internacional indicar conflictos dentro yentre naciones durante tiempos de crisis medioambientales? Pararesponder estas preguntas se analizan los efectos del proyecto Leso-tho Highlands Water Project, LHWP por sus siglas en ingl�es, y semuestra que si bien el proyecto LHWP ayud�o a finalizar los conflic-tos entre Lesoto y Sud�africa, las consecuencias del proyecto (ecoci-dio, desplazamientos y distribuci�on desigual de recursos b�asicos) hanintensificado la tensi�on dentro de estos pa�ıses.

The relationship between dwindling natural resources and civic violence indeveloping countries has been a matter of vibrant debate among political scien-tists, geologists, economists, and sociologists for decades. While scholars acrossdisciplines maintain that there are powerful links between environmental stressand conflict, others argue that the connection is overemphasized, and thatthere are a number of unexplored outcomes of resource scarcity, includinginternational cooperation. One strand of these debates addresses the ways inwhich environmental change has been woven into political discourse as a mat-ter of national security. Several scholars argue that environmental problemscontribute to state failure and international violence. Gleick (1993) asserts thatwater scarcity has led to conflicts among nations and will continue to do so ashuman needs for water grow. Myers (1993) proposes that deterioration of theenvironment leads to global conflict and political instability. Homer-Dixon(1999) uses several case studies to predict ethnic clashes and civil unrest as theresult of renewable resource scarcity. And Kahl (2006) contends that environ-mental stress renders societies and governments in poor countries vulnerable toarmed conflict.

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The implications of scarcity of such a basic, vital resource like water (aswell as high-value resources like oil) include corrupt governance, poor develop-ment, displacement, and conflict (Collier 2007). However, political scientistDeudney (1999) is critical of these conclusions for being too singularly focusedon the costs of scarcity. He argues that, contrary to what most of the literatureon “resource wars” suggests, the urgent need for a natural resource—especiallywater—discourages conflict and stimulates international cooperation.

Previous case studies have concluded that resource scarcity may not lead toviolence, and that it certainly does not preclude peace.1 For example, an exami-nation of the political context surrounding the Lesotho Highlands Water Pro-ject (LHWP) reveals that during times of resource scarcity, a trade agreementor development policy can function as an international peace treaty. The part-nership formed between Lesotho and South Africa through the LHWP couldtherefore be judged in Deudney�s (1990, 1999) terms as cooperative. That said,while the LHWP may be lauded for its peace-making possibilities and forbringing out mutual economic growth for both countries, I argue that it doesnot simply serve as a model for Deudney�s critique. Although the LHWP madeinternational peace between Lesotho and South Africa possible, it, too, haspromoted latent conflict within the states, or nonviolent conflict that has agreat potential to become violent. In sum, the international cooperation incitedby resource scarcity does not altogether remove the possibility of conflict. Thepresence of international cooperation at times of scarcity may merely indicatethat conflicts over resources have manifested on a different scale.

In this article, I focus on developing two arguments: (1) as Deudney�sscholarship proposes, resource scarcity can work as a facilitator for interna-tional peace; and (2) when stress caused by resource scarcity does not result ininternational conflict, that stress may materialize in more local political ten-sions. Toward establishing these claims, I provide a study of the LHWP, thehydropolitical conditions surrounding its formation, and the latent conflictsthat have emerged since the project began construction. Scholarly work relatedto the LHWP has decreased significantly in the past decade; very little up-to-date material is available. A critical examination of the Lesotho HighlandsWater Treaty and outcomes of Phase I of the LHWP is nevertheless importantand timely given its recent commencement at Maseru, on March 27, 2014. Thisarticle begins with an analysis regarding how interstate conflict over water wasavoided by Lesotho and South Africa through both countries� governmentsenlisting in a mutually advantageous development project. Following this, Iprovide an overview of the project�s policies and the implementation of Phase I(1990-2004). I conclude with a review of the effects the LHWP has had on com-munities in terms of civic relations, and propose how, during the construction

1Environmental cooperation has historically led to a reduction in political tensions and ultimately,brings out peace between nations (see Dinar 2011, 9).

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of Phase II (which began in March 2014), consequences like latent conflict canbe avoided with more governmental accountability toward the Lesotho High-lands Water Treaty.

The purpose of this study is to both affirm and problematize Deudney�s(1990, 1999) conclusions related to resource scarcity and conflict. It is impor-tant, as Deudney encourages, to see environmental crises as an opportunity forinternational cooperation. However, it is equally important to acknowledgethat resource scarcity negatively affects civilians even when there is interstatecollaboration. While development projects such as the LHWP address scarcityat an international level, the impact of the project on the environment andcommunities points to the pervasive risk of violence at an intrastate level. As Ielaborate in the concluding remarks of this article, if governments seek to turnan environmental crisis into an occasion for peace, there should be a carefulconsideration of how development affects peoples; also, in times of develop-ment, there should be assertive compensation and reparation efforts that pre-vent resource scarcity from becoming a source of local tensions.

White Gold and Hydropolitics: Lesotho and South Africa (1955-98)

Resource scarcity has long been credited with generating conflict. Stateswith diminished supply of water are considered especially vulnerable to “waterwars” because water is essential to existence (Turton 2002). Consequently, forstates facing water scarcity, accessing and circulating water becomes a highlypoliticized issue. Water is not treated as a resource with which all peoples andpopulations have a natural right to access; it is contested terrain as civilizationscompete for supply. The set of disputes and negotiations related to the controlof water is referred to as hydropolitics (Turton 2002, 14).

Scholars hold differing opinions over whether hydropolitics actually leadto violent conflict. As Deudney (1990) points out, other factors such as a weakstate and crime may be the proximate cause of conflict whereas scarcity oftenincreases cooperation between countries, particularly in cases of water shortage(see also Sullivan 2010, 120-1). Environmental pressures like water scarcity typ-ically produce a weighty demand for development projects such as the LHWP(Kahl 2006, 10); by extension, they produce a demand for interstate coopera-tion. In this section, I explain how the political climate in Southern Africa waschanged by South Africa�s water shortage in the mid-twentieth century andhow, much in line with Deudney�s claims, the Lesotho Highlands Water Treatyalleviated the looming threat of violence on the border of Lesotho and SouthAfrica.

As will be made clear in the following historical overview, the LHWP func-tions as an alternative to military aggression, signifying the cooperation thatcomes on in light of resource scarcity as Deudney argues. A “water war” wasunlikely. Lesotho lacked the “industrial products and surplus wealth” to wagewar against a potential aggressor who intends to tap into their water supply

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(Deudney 1990, 462). Additionally, South Africa—still under apartheid ruleand facing both intrastate and interstate pressure to deracialize their gover-nance—did not have the political prowess or stable footing to pour their mate-rial and institutional resources into a military conflict. Ultimately, Lesotho andSouth Africa opted for mobilizing a water trade agreement to address scarcity,which produced far less social and political disruption and was more cost-efficient than military aggression (Deudney 1999, 207-8).

The LHWP was originally proposed by the British High Commissioner ofLesotho in the 1950s while the country was still under British rule. Economistsat this time perceived the heavy rainfall in Basotholand as an opportunity toharness water as a natural resource that can be exchanged for currency. In1966, a newly independent Lesotho entered into negotiations over a projectcalled “Oxbow-Malibamatso,” which would transfer water to industrializedregions in South Africa. Negotiations at this time never settled into agreementdue to disputes over Lesotho�s purchase price of water (Mwangi 2007, 7).

After the country�s first attempts to bargain with Lesotho, South Africaexplored the cheaper Tugela Transfer to improve water supply; but by the late1970s, an acute need for water in the Vaal river basin put a development projectwith Lesotho back into play (Thabane 2000, 633). At the time, the politicalrelationship between the two nations was disagreeable; the legitimacy of theSouth African apartheid state was under international scrutiny and Chief Lea-bua Jonathan, then-leader of the Lesotho government, participated in censur-ing White South African rule. Along with political instability, South Africa wasat this time also suffering a severe drought that posed a threat to the region�seconomy, particularly with regard to mining in the country�s urban center,Johannesburg. The LHWP was the only viable solution to South Africa�s watercrisis. Therefore, although the LHWP was originally part of the agenda of anApartheid State, the water crisis necessitated incorporation into the country�spostapartheid policies.

In 1994, both countries formally acknowledged that the economic well-being of the region is interdependent (Laurence 1987, 61-3). In 1998, His Maj-esty King Letsie III of Lesotho, President Nelson Mandela, and Sir KetumileMasire of Botswana officiated the inauguration of Phase I of the LHWP. Sincethe project was rooted in South Africa�s apartheid government, Mandela�s(1998) championing of the cooperation embodied in the Lesotho HighlandsWater Treaty was important for rewriting the dam development project as ademocratic South African undertaking:

The resounding success of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project testifiesto the powerful split of co-operation that is growing as Africa lifts itselfthrough its own efforts, with the strong support of an internationalcommunity. The flow of fresh water is the concrete result of the weldingtogether of our efforts and nation building and regional develop-ment. . .Here in Southern Africa we have worked for our mutual benefit.

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Although framed as a positive political and economic development, theLHWP was not commenced without some duress. Soon after Mandela�s state-ment, a political crisis in Lesotho required Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisilito appeal to the South African Development Community (SADC) for assis-tance. The SADC subsequently organized a military intervention in Lesothoalong with the Botswana Defense Force; Mandela authorized 700 SouthAfrican troops to partake in the mission (Mwangi 2007, 10). As MangosuthuButhelezi, who acted as president of South Africa numerous times, explained,the primary purpose of the intervention in Lesotho was to safeguard theLHWP (Likoti 2007, 257).

Years following South Africa�s intervention, support for the project hasremained adamant. In 2004, Thabo Mbeki described the LHWP as a demon-stration of collaboration over harsh competition and King Letsie III of Leso-tho said, “we often hear predictions that water will be a source of internationalconflict. We certainly do not wish to see the LHWP being a source of such con-flicts with our neighbors” (Letsie 2004). Most recently, in his State of theNation Address delivered in the winter of 2014, President Jacob Zuma praisedthe collaborative success of Phase I. Because LHWP is upheld as a legitimateand mutually beneficial development project for both states, it is fair to arguethat the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty functioned as a peace treaty. Ratherthan the countries waging war over water, political leaders have consistentlysupported the project as a diplomatic alternative to conflict. To this extent, theLHWP corroborates with Deudney�s claims: in instances of resource scarcity,nations will elect to engage in peaceful development and trade instead ofcombat.

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

The LHWP is Africa�s largest design for transferring water. It is comprisedof several large dams and tunnels that move from the water-wealthy mountainsin Lesotho to the dry terrains in South Africa. In this section, I outline theobjectives of the LHWP and its policies, which were shaped by the terms of theLesotho Highlands Water Treaty. Reviewing of the project and its policies iscrucial to verifying that the environmental and civic consequences of theLHWP are violations of the Treaty, and thus, not the result of scarcity itself,but the parties� failure to fulfill the compensations and reparations promised tocivilians.

Ranked as one of the driest countries with annual rainfall at about half ofthe world average, water availability is a severe constraint on development inSouth Africa (South Africa Department of Energy 2010, 60-1). Even if anation were sufficient in other natural resources, the scarcity of water for low-and middle-income countries is damaging to their economy; in South Africa�scase, water transfer is needed for sustaining operations in the nation�s indus-trial heartland, the Gauteng Province (Barbier 2005, 242). While the LHWP is

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essential to South Africa�s environmental and economic stability, it is also astaple for Lesotho�s development, with water being the country�s most lucra-tive natural resource. Lesotho�s economy is mostly based on livestock and agri-culture, but only one-eighth of the land is arable (a product of erosion,overgrazing, and overcropping). Whatever Lesotho lacks in fertile soil andmodern industrialization, it makes up with an abundance of glittering water-falls and a store of rivers that give the country a unique advantage in an aridregion. The water harvested for export is so referred to by Lesothians as “whitegold” (Maro 2011, 35-6).

In view of both Lesotho and South Africa�s needs regarding development,the LHWP is designed to transfer water to the Gauteng region in South Africaand provide Lesotho with statewide hydroelectric power by improving infra-structure (e.g., dams, weirs, and delivery tunnels). Additionally, the LHWP isset to alleviate poverty in Lesotho and stabilize the nation�s economy by utiliz-ing its most copious natural resource (Food and Agriculture Organization ofthe United Nations 1986, Article 4). Toward accomplishing these ends, the pro-ject is separated into two phases: “Phase I,” which was altogether completed in2004, and “Phase II.” Phase I was divided into two subphases: Phase IA (com-pleted in 1998) and Phase IB (completed in 2004). Phase IA included: (1) theconstruction of the 185 meter-high Katse Dam on the Malibamatso River; (2)82 kilometers of delivery tunnels to South Africa�s Gauteng Province; (3) con-struction of the Muela Dam on the Liqoe River; and (4) development of theMuela Hydropower Station. Phase IB included the construction of the MohaleDam on the Senqunyane River and several delivery tunnels to Katse (see Haas,Mazzei, and O�Leary 2010, ix).

Along with detailing the material aspects of the LHWP, The Lesotho High-lands Water Treaty delegates responsibilities regarding the project�s execution.The treaty establishes that Lesotho is responsible for consistently transferringclean, usable water to South Africa and providing security for all infrastructurerelated to the project that is situated within its borders (Food and AgricultureOrganization of the United Nations 1986, Article 6). Meanwhile, the treatyestablishes that South Africa is responsible for purchasing the water transferredfrom Lesotho, underwriting much of the construction of Phase I and Phase II,and providing security for all infrastructure related to the project that is situatedwithin its borders (Article 7). The treaty also outlines specific means to preservethe quality of life of those impacted by the project: The Lesotho HighlandsDevelopment Authority (LHDA) is responsible for ensuring that the citizens ofthe Kingdom of Lesotho affected by the project are able to “maintain a standardof living not inferior to that obtaining at the time of first disturbance” (Article15). Both Lesotho and South Africa are cited in the treaty as responsible for pre-serving the quality of the environment and protecting the “welfare of personsand communities affected by the Project” (Article 15).

These last provisions listed in Articles 7 and 15 of the Lesotho HighlandsWater Treaty are of particular importance with regard to the consequences of

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the project and the conflict that followed construction of Phase IA and PhaseIB. Lesothians suffered from ecocide and displacement, which compromisedtheir quality of life and created tensions between communities that oftenresulted in bloodshed (see Bildhaeuser 2010, 52; Sibanda 2003, 34-5). Concur-rently, many South Africans living in rural, impoverished regions impacted themost by water scarcity were met with discrepancies regarding water distribu-tion that are analogous to apartheid politics.

After the formation of the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty and comple-tion of Phase I, the LHWP was credited with “demonstrating the benefits ofbilateral government cooperation” (Haas, Mazzei, and O�Leary 2010, 26).Yet although the LHWP is a development project that promoted peace overinternational conflict, the consequences of Phase I (mentioned earlier anddetailed shortly) demonstrate that Deudney�s (1990, 1999) conclusions relatedto water scarcity and cooperation are complicated by the presence of intrastateconflict, which can compromise the success of the project and completion ofPhase II.

Consequences of Phase I: LesothoThroughout the implementation of the LHWP, alleviation of poverty and

economic stability has been of primary importance to Lesotho. Revenues fromPhase IA of the project-supported infrastructure projects—roads, dams,bridges, and forestry and soil conservation—all of which were delegated tolocal labor markets. Once construction of Phase IB began, however, theLHWP�s virtuous results were compromised due to a lack of transparency,weak technical designs, and poor (even criminal) management.2 More specifi-cally, at the end of Phase I, the LHWP�s destruction of the environment andthe LHDA�s flippant regard for displaced communities ultimately createdstrained relations between Lesothians that reportedly resulted in violence. Inthis section, I discuss how the LHWP impacted the environment and how thoseeffects ultimately agitated conflicts between peoples.

The World Bank is correct to acknowledge a great deal of economic growthin Lesotho since the completion of Phase I, as demonstrated by the country�sgross domestic product (GDP), increase in jobs, and development of infra-structure. However, the construction of the LHWP�s dams has taken a toll onLesotho�s environment. Even though the Lesotho Highlands Water Treatydeclares dedication to ensuring social and environmental stability, the projectconstruction continues to cause “unwarranted environmental destruction” inLesotho, which led to the loss of arable land and soil erosion; this “ecocide”that has had a profound effect on agriculture in Lesotho has threatened humansecurity in the country (Mwangi 2007, 12). With these environmental costs, the

2This “poor (even criminal) management” refers to cases of project level fraud and “the lack ofguidelines in assessing funds.” See Haas, Mazzei, and O�Leary (2010, 13-14).

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displaced Lesotho communities also received little to none of the compensationthey were promised in exchange for evacuating their land so that the project�sconstruction could take place (Thamae 2006, 9). As a result of competition fordiminishing resources like animal stock and crops, and in response to the realdanger of starvation among affected families, there have been eruptions of vio-lence between communities struggling to survive (Mwangi 2007, 15).

The environmental destruction caused by the construction of the LHWPdams was devastating for Lesotho, a landlocked country with only a small por-tion of its soil being suitable for farming. Phase I ravaged approximately 3,700acres of cropland and over 12,000 acres of grazing land. The Mohale Valley,which was overtaken by the Mohale Dam, was the region in the country withthe most fertile land and the only region that produced agricultural surpluses.With two-thirds of the population living in the areas affected by the dam con-struction depending on local produce, the loss of farmland has diminishedfood security (Hoover 2001, 7).

The extreme effect the project has had on Lesotho�s environment hasaffected peoples� lives in other ways as well. For example, fuel sources (treesand woody shrubs) were lost to inundation, which posed a problem for manyhouseholds that sold firewood as part of their family income. Prior to theimplementation of Phase I, over half of all households would gather under-growth from the riparian areas; since those areas are now submerged, abouthalf of the population are forced to find $200 worth of brushwood elsewhereand many cannot afford the expense (Boehm and Hall 1999, ii). Other resour-ces swallowed by the dam construction include: over 175 species of medicinalplants that grew in flooded areas; leloi grass, which was used for traditionalcrafts; and river sand, used for making bricks (Hoover 2001, 8-9).

With the exception of water, there has been a sharp decline in access toresources for communities affected by the construction of the Mohale Dam;communities have lost access to wild vegetables, medicinal grounds, and wood-lands that previously sustained their quality of life. With respect to wateraccess, since resettlement, there has been a shift from using natural watersources to using piped water services; this could almost be considered anachievement by the LHWP, were it not for the fact that the water sources pro-vided by the state often do not function properly, leaving displaced com-munities to resort to communal water resources (Sets�abi and Mashinini 2006,135-6).

Because resettlement leads to an increased demand on utilities and commu-nal resources, the project�s relocation of peoples has led to conflicts betweenhost communities and resettlers. One-quarter of the households displaced atthe time of dam construction report not feeling accepted by their host com-munities (see Sets�abi and Mashinini 2006, 132). One relocatee in Ha Tsiu citedconflict within the community as a major challenge faced after the LHWP dis-placed villages: “they insult each other and this is the challenge. I had to gobetween and to settle peace . . . I don�t know why people fight” (quoted in

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Bildhaeuser 2010, 52). He adds that bloodshed often results from insults (52).Violent conflict is common when large populations are shuffled across territo-ries and, because Lesothoians are cagey on local disputes, it is hard to gaugeexactly how prevalent violent conflicts are among displaced communities(Mwangi 2007, 4). Even if violence were not a particularly distinguishing factorfor displaced peoples, there is no doubt that their displacement has spurredhostilities that have brought the country into latent conflict. Put differently,through a combination of ecocide and deficient or missing reparations, theLHWP created an atmosphere in which violent conflict between communitiescould feasibly occur within the state. Because newly integrated villages shouldcompete for grazing land and other natural resources, with starvation at stake,tensions between families and villages are high. It was not uncommon for theLHDA to fail to inform a host village of the arrival of displaced people untilafter contractors began preparing the resettlement site. Such a disregard forthe people in the area led to severe hostility toward those resettling. Forinstance, an older person from the displaced village, Molikaliko, passed awayshortly after arriving at Makhoakhoeng, but when friends and family gatheredfor a funeral, armed members of the host society guarded the local graveyardand threatened aggression if they attempted to bury their loved one there(Transformation Resource Center 1999, 8). These testimonies by those affectedby the dam construction reveal that resettlements and relocations have culti-vated an environment vulnerable to civic violence.

If there happened to be some monetary compensation delivered to dis-placed peoples, which was an infrequent occurrence, there would be internalconflicts over access to that money and its distribution. In Hai Tsui, threemembers of the Compensation Committee embezzled payments and, as aresult, LHDA stopped issuing compensation. Makoali Mokhachane, anothermember of this committee, explains, “those people that took the money are stillhere but the moment that the auditor comes back to us, it should reveal mis-management. This is when we can take the people to the court . . . We do notlook at them well. We kind of despise them” (quoted in Bildhaeuser 2010, 52).As reported by Nkopane Khama, Ramotse (leader appointed by the villagechief) in Hai Tsu, theft by members of the Compensation Committee have ledthose who have been relocated to feel underrepresented and not well-integratedinto processes affecting them: “The arrangement that the communal compen-sation is shared with them is no problem,” Khama clarifies, “[i]n principle, weagree that we are one people. But the modalities how that money is nowdecided on is an issue. So it looks like we do not have any power, we are justfollowing the host community” (quoted in Bildhaeuser 2010, 57).

The manner in which the LHWP was executed has left Lesothoians in a farmore precarious situation than before the project, despite their country�s eco-nomic growth. In sum, the state�s failure to meet the terms outlined in theLesotho Highlands Water Treaty has led to further environmental stress, whiledisplaced communities compete with host communities for natural resources.

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While major donors of the project such as the World Bank have producedguidelines on restoration for affected populations, compensation is inadequate(Bildhaeuser 2010, 15). Consequentially, villages are in a state of latent conflictor unstable peace that can—and often does—result in atrocity. It is importantto note that the civic conflicts that circulate throughout a recently noted peace-ful democracy (Jordan 2012) did not result from some natural phenomenon,but in the aftermath of a Treaty that would seemingly ensure peace in the faceof resource scarcity.

Consequences of Phase I: South AfricaSince the construction of Phase I, the LHWP has supplied South Africa

with approximately 780 million cubic meters of water per year. Phase II, whichwas inaugurated during March 2014, would further increase South Africa�swater supply by 50 percent (South African Government Press Release 2014).As touched on earlier, the LHWP was—and remains—necessary for SouthAfrican industry and, with 84 percent of Lesotho�s external trade in SouthAfrica, the project is highly important for economic development in SouthernAfrica (South African Government Press Release 2014). But, similar to theeffects of the LHWP in Lesotho, the execution of the project has producedunintended consequences. In this section, I review how the water transferredfrom Lesotho to South Africa was distributed, and how that distribution isdemonstrably reminiscent of apartheid politics. The LHWP has exacerbatedsocioeconomic gaps between race groups; many South Africans have, thus,detached the LHWP from Mandela�s vision and consider it, instead, a policythat fits an apartheid rather than a postapartheid era.

The average real GDP growth rate from the beginning of Phase I throughtwo years after its completion in 2004 was approximately 2.4 percent, and in percapita terms, approximately 0.4 percent. This is an improvement from the lastdecade of apartheid rule (i.e., 1985-94), and such improvement is in part indebtedto the LHWP, which sustained business operations in the mining industry (IMFCountry Report 2004, 4). However, these improvements have not materialized forresidents living in provinces surrounding Lesotho and the water sources that fuelthe state�s economic growth. South Africans residing in places like the KwaZulu-Natal Province and the Eastern Cape have objected to the work of the LHDAdue to the harrowing conditions it imposes on poor Black African communities(AfricaGlobalisation 2013). Jonny Mpho, an activist stationed in Alexandria, reit-erates sentiments of Black African civilians living in rural areas of the country.“How can a big project like this happen in Lesotho whereas people around thisProject, they don�t have access to water?” (AfricaGlobalisation 2013).

Water supply and sanitation has been a central cause for postapartheid. In1994, 15 million people did not have access to a safe water supply, but by 2010the government provided widespread improvements in water sources in urbanareas of the country (WHO/UNICEF n.d.). However, water access and

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sanitation improvements in rural areas in the KwaZulu-Natal Province andEastern Cape have been emerging at a much slower pace. According to a 2012governmental census, approximately 39 percent of the households in theKwaZulu-Natal Province and 30 percent in the Eastern Cape reported thattheir main source of water was from a tap in their dwelling; for families residingin Limpopo, only 15 percent use water from their taps. These numbers stand instark contrast to over 60 percent of the households surveyed in the GautengProvince relying on piped water in their dwelling (Statistics South Africa 2013,116). Such disparities are specific not only to provinces, but to racial groups aswell. Ninety-seven percent of White and Indian/Asian households are able touse tap water from their homes; 82 percent of Coloured households do thesame. By comparison, a mere 32 percent of Black African households are ableto rely on tap water in their homes (Statistics South Africa 2013, 117).

These two sets of statistics correlate in significant ways. Because there aremore Black Africans in South Africa than any other racial group, there doesnot seem to be a distinguishing difference in the proportion of Black Africansliving in any Province: approximately 88 percent of the total population inEastern Cape; 86 percent in the KwaZulu-Natal Province; 97 percent in Lim-popo; and 77 percent in the Gauteng Province. But the differences betweenprovinces regarding how White populations are dispersed are far more dra-matic: approximately 4 percent of the total population in Eastern Cape isWhite; 3 percent in the KwaZulu-Natal Province; 2 percent in Limpopo; but,Whites make up over 17 percent of the total population in the Gauteng Prov-ince. Furthermore, almost half of all of South Africa�s White populationresides in the Pretoria area, where most of the water is transferred (StatisticsSouth Africa 2013, 54). It is hardly happenstance that the Eastern Cape, theKwaZulu-Natal Province, and Limpopo were formerly regions occupied byBlack Africans during the apartheid regime. Additionally, these regions werepreviously segregated for Bantustans, or territories where the apartheid govern-ment proposed to relocate Black South Africans. The Gauteng Province, how-ever, was a region marked for White residents even during the apartheid era.

With this taken into account, it is fair to say that President Mandela wasfar too optimistic about the LHWP. It began as an apartheid project and hasimposed apartheid-era infrastructure on Black populations who do not reapthe benefits of the trade agreement. In turn, the project has succeeded inimproving water scarcity in a specific region, one that decades ago was inhab-ited only by White South Africans and one in which, today, over half of theWhite South African population resides.

Conclusions and Implications:Lessons Learned and to be Applied for Phase II

This article began by rearticulating questions on the connection betweenresource scarcity and conflict. Although there is a tendency to associate

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environmental crises such as water scarcity with interstate violence, scarcitydoes not only produce conflict. Daniel Deudney�s (1990, 1999) important cri-tique of “water wars” provides an alternative way of viewing scarcity: environ-mental stress will likely provoke countries to cooperate toward a solution sincemilitary aggression is more costly socially and economically. An overview ofthe LHWP and the political climate surrounding its initiation substantiatesDeudney�s claims. Lesotho and South Africa chose to engage in a collabora-tive, mutually beneficial development project in response to severe water short-age. While this article expresses some ambivalence toward the project�ssuccesses and failures, it is fair to acknowledge that the LHWP created peace-ful relations between Lesotho and Sound Africa under conditions presumed toproduce interstate conflict.

However, this case study also problematizes Deudney�s critiques of scarcity�srelationship to violence. Although water shortage produced international coop-eration, the LHWP�s detrimental affects of the environment and communities inLesotho and South Africa have contributed to latent conflict on a local scale,some of which has already resulted in violence. Therefore, large civil engineeringprojects like the LHWP do indicate that international cooperation is preferableto military violence; however, because such development projects inevitablytransform and often compromise the living conditions of peoples, peace at aninternational level does not necessarily mean that peace is being experienced at amicrolevel. Although Lesothian and South African officials praise the LHWP�soutcomes, civilians from both countries express discontent with the project�simplementation. In Lesotho, displaced families lost valuable fertile land, medici-nal plants, precious burial grounds, and ultimately, their independence. Passedon to another community, most often without compensation or the vocationaltraining promised in the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty, the members of dis-placed villages found themselves at the mercy of a host village. Because peace ishighly lauded for religious and cultural reasons, some of the integrated commun-ities share hospitable relations, but often the new arrivals initiated competitionover resources and farmland that, since the dam construction of Phase I, hadbecome even more rare. This has resulted in local conflict and violence acrossthe state. Along those same lines, the project intensified economic and racial dif-ference in South Africa; it has succeeded in providing water resources to thenation�s mining industry, but the consumers who have benefited from theimprovement in water supplies have been non-Black African populations. BlackSouth Africans who reside in rural areas rely on using public taps, gatheringwater remnants dripping to the ground from leaky pipes, or scooping river waterinto a pail as their primary water source. The disparity of water supply betweenimpoverished Black South Africans and largely White populations living northof Lesotho is reminiscent of apartheid South Africa�s segregationist policies.

Altogether, this case study demonstrates that even though resource scarcitybrings out international cooperation, this macrolevel peace does not ensurepeace between communities who experience environmental and economical

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stress on a daily basis. However, as this article points out, the Lesotho High-lands Treaty was conscious of this fact and required Lesothian and South Afri-can governmental organizations to preserve the quality of life of peoplesaffected by the LHWP. It has been a failure of compensation and reparationinitiatives that ultimately compromised intrastate peace. For this reason, thePhase II feasibility study states that improved communication with impactedcommunities and more suitable programs for distributing compensation toaffected civilians is required for securing public support for the Project andultimately, essential to the Project�s overall success.3

Collectively, the LHWP demonstrates that international peace in the faceof resource scarcity is possible on both macrolevels and microlevels. Interstatepeace can be ensured so long as development is mutually beneficial and effec-tively resolves issues of scarcity; intrastate peace is possible if those collabora-tive development plans contain assertive and adequate plans forcommunication with affected communities, and compensation for those mate-rially affected by development. The violence associated with resource scarcityis neither inevitable nor impossible; conflict stemming from environmentalstress is contingent on development policies, those policies� attention to inter-state and intrastate outcomes, and their thorough and thoughtful execution.

About the Author

Susannah Ryan is a doctoral student at the Department of Communica-tion at UNC-Chapel Hill and the Graduate Program in African and African-American Studies at Duke University. With particular interest in Central andSouthern African politics, her research revolves around human rights, transi-tional justice, and theories of reconciliation. Her further work on these topicsis forthcoming in JAC: A Journal of Rhetoric, Culture, and Politics.

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