Co p y 1

SUBJECT PE"PL ES

UNDER THE TEUT"NS

BUFFAL O

Published January ,‘April , July and "ctober of Each Year

V" L . VI, No . 3 JULY 19 18

Re-entered a s S econd-class matter Nov. 28 , 19 17 , at the Post " ffice a t

Bu ffalo , New York, under th e Act o f August 24, 19 12

S ingle c op ies of th is bu l letin ( l ikethe others of the series ) , are free to thepubl ic general ly . In quantities a

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shou ld be addressed to the Secretaryof the Faculty of Arts and Sciences ,Townsend Hal l , Niagara Square .

—Commi ttee on Publicati ons

S ect PeoplesUnder the Teu ton s

JULIAN PARK

BUFFAL O , N . Y.

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO

Copyr i gh t , 1918 , b y Juli an Park

F"REW"RD

These essays,designed in popular form to serve

only as introduction to the vast subj ect here presented,

first saw th e l ight in the Buffalo Sunday E xpress,from

which,after revision

,they are reprinted . Many au

th or it ies (mentioned in the bibliography ) have beendrawn upon . The essays provided material for discussion during the spring term in the class in contemporary E uropean history

,and to the friendly com

ments of the members of History 9 their p ublicationin this form is partly due. Their original conception

,

however,owes itself to the conviction

,or hope

,of the

truth of the saying “They also serve who only stand

and teach .

Q CL AS UJ 0 8 0

JUL

SUB J ECT PE" PL ES UNDER THE TEUT"NS

There are at least six races o f considerable numerical importance whichare living against their will under Teutonic domination . He who cananswer the qu estion o f what is to become of them holds in his hand thekey of world peace . Thus it becomes distinctly worth while to examineb riefly into the question of how Germany or Austria succeeded in acquiringthese large alien elements

,how well they have been assimi lated

,and what

problems they will present when the moment comes to make an equitabledisposition of them around the conference table . Without a doubt themost important prac tical business of that conference will be the revisionof the map of E urope along the lines of nationality .

The principle of nationality is one of those vague generalities withwhich the practice of diplomacy so formidably bristles . They are notmere phrases

,however

,these high-sounding mouthfuls like “balance of

power,

” “extra—territoriality,

” and “principle of national ity .

” Our concep tion of their exact meanings may be vague , but that is not their fault ;and the most important of all—because the most human—is this principleof nationality .

‘ We know what nationality is,but do we fully realize all

the factors which compose it " A common country is,of course

,the first

requisite . Others m ost commonly found are a common religion ; a comm onlanguage—e specially if it has given birth to a literature ; and , somethingmost impalpable but none the less compelling

,a common tradition or sense

of memories shared from the past . Nationality is an instinct and cannotbe exactly defined . It is the recognition as kinsmen of those who weredeemed strangers . It is the apotheosis of family feeling and begets aresolve never again to separate . It lead s to the founding of a polity on anatural basis independent of a monarch or a state

,though not in any sense

hostile to them . It is much more than a political contract—i t is a unionof hearts ; once made, never unmade .

Now in the case of every one of these six maj or races it is evident thatif the principle of nationality is to be respected reunion must take placebetween the ravished peoples and their fatherland . But why do we pick onthe Germans as the chief offenders " Surely if this principle is correct

,

Ireland,Corsica and many colonies should be restored to their native peo

ples . There is some abstract j ustice in this viewpoint , but native sentiment,even in Ireland

,is by no means unanimous on the point

,and it happens

,

of course,that feeling among the Germanized states is almo st entirely

3

unanimous. After all , the criterion should be contentment. If Canada andAlgiers and the Philippines are content to live under the three most generous and successful colonizers of the world , who will gainsay their right "But it happens that

,since Germany and Austria-Hungary have governed

their subj ects in j ust such a way as we would expect of nations whose warmethods we know all too well

,

* their al ien populations restlessdiscontented when not openly rebell ious .

* A . J . Toy nbee : The German Terror in B elgium , N . Y. , 1 9 1 7 ; The German Terror inFrance , N . Y. , 1 9 1 7 .

J . H . Morgan : German Atroc it ies,N . Y. , 1 9 1 7 .

N . D . H i ll i s : German Atroci t i es,N . Y . , 1 9 1 8 .

C ommittee on Pub l i c Information , W ash ington : German W a r Practi ces .

THE DANES

We begin,however

,with a race whose lot as German Subj ects for the

last fifty years has been probably more com fortable than that of the others .Numerically

,the Danes in Germany are least important ; economically ,

they no doubt count for less . Wh y then , are they here given the place ofhonor" Because their absorption took place by methods which illustratesuperbly well that kind of internat ional dealing which we have come tocall secret diplomacy

,and not only secret ( for much diplomacy cannot and

should not be divulged ) , but sinister, underhanded , in other words Bismarckian .

Bismarck had come to power in 1862,and only a year was necessary

to prove his peculiar fitness for the office of prime minister . Bismarck ’sroyal master himself had been on the throne for only four of the thirtyyears of his eventful reig n. William I spoke of himself as an old man

,

for he was sixty years of age,but could he have looked into the future he

would have realized that he stood upon the threshold of a new epoch . Atthe outset the soldier king found himself confronted with a situation in thearmy which he believed full of danger for Prussia

,and he promptly sub

m itted to Parliament a plan for army reform s , by which un 1versal mili

tary service would have been rigorously enforced . But th e creation of newregiments would have involved a considerabl e increase in the budget

,to

which the lower house was unalterably "pposed . Many deputies whisperedthat the object of the new regiments was to supply young nobles with posi

tions as officers .A deadlock ensued . William was obdurate

,not only because it was now

a matter of personal pride not to give in,but because he believed that

Prussia ’s destiny depended on her army . He thought of abdicating,but

never of abandoning the reform . Never did ruler have greater need of astrong unscrupulous aid to fight his bat tles for him in Parl iament .

“1 will rather perish with the king ,” Bismarck said

,

“than forsake yourmajesty in the struggle with parliamentary government . Such was theman

,more Tory than the Tories

,who undertook the task of ministerial

government without a maj ority in Parliament,without a budget

,without a

program . Had he been driven by the maj orities against him to resig n, hadthe king abdicated and the army c onsequently been reduced

,German unity

would have been indefinitely postponed . His remedy for the military situation was simplicity itself . Year after year the lower house voted against

the budget , supported by the voters , but the upper house voted for it , andthe king act ed as if this made it legal . Parliamentary government becamea. farce.

Resplendent as an army , especially a Prussian army , may be in appearance, parading and guard-mounting is not the chief end of its existence .This Bismarck was to prove three times during the next eight years

,each

time against a stronger adversary . The evolution of a great unified Germanstate out of the chaos of twenty-five independent kingdoms

,grand duchies

,

duchies , free cities , and what not, could only be achieved , he held , by war .And he would need , of course, to show that they were wars not of ag

g ression .

The origin of the difficulty of which he took advantage in 1863 wassufficiently complicated by itsel f without the added mystery with whichBismarck knew so skilfully how to surround it . Lord Palmerston

,British

prime minister from 1 855 to 1865, once said :“Only three persons ever

understood the Schleswig-Holstein affair ; one was dead , one crazy , and hehimsel f ( the third ) had forgotten what it was all about.

”

Despite this encouragement,it is necessary for us to have the barest

outl ine of the matter in order to understand the pecul iar nature of Bismarck ’s diplomacy . In the Danish peninsula were two duchies

,Schleswig

and Holstein,which

,though 'largely peopled by Germans

,were j oined in a

personal union under the Danish king. Holstein was also a member ofthe Germanic Confederation

,the union which then linked Prussia

,Austria

,

and all the other Teutonic states so loosely that friction was bound ultimately to develop

,even without the guiding hand of Bismarck . But the

duchies ’ only relation to Denmark was that a duke of Schleswig and Holste in had become King of Denmark

,j ust an elector of Hanover had become

King of E ngland . The Danes in the duchies (numbering in Schleswigabout to Germans

,and in Holstein a much smaller minority )

wanted to make the union a real one . But the King of Denmark sat as

Duke of Holstein in the Diet of the Confederation—which erected the question into an issue interesting all Teutons. Would they allow Germans tobe annexed to a foreign country outright" S 0 strong was the feel ing andon such valid grounds did it rest

,that the Diet orderd an army dispatched

to prevent the annexation . Bismarck persuaded Austria , however, that thetwo leading members of the Confederation should handle the matter alone ,to which Austria agreed . With equanimity Denmark saw the question thusnarrowed

,trusting that antagonism and j ealousy would develop between

the two stat es in time to save her . It did not,however, for Bismarck re

6

served that for the future . A characteristically Prussian ultimatum wassent, demanding that the King of Denmark withdraw the act of annexation within forty-eight hours .

“I felt all right about it, he told Count Reust later ;“I had assured

myself that the Danes would not give in . I had led them to think thatE ngland would support them

,though I knew this was not the case . ” He

had,however

,even a surer guarantee than this : the ultimatum was couched

in such a form that even if he would,the king could not comply with it.

The king could not withdraw the act without Parliament ’s consent. ButParliament had just been dissolved

,and a new one could not by any possi

b il ity be elected and convened within two days . The similarity of thissituation to that at Belgrade during the last days of July

,1914

,will be

instantly apparent. Then Lord Wodehouse,playing the role that S ir

E dward Grey and Sir E dward Goschen played so valiantly four years ago ,requested that at least more time be allowed . Bismarck

,of course

,refused

to l isten .

The issue of such a war could not long be doubtful,and the Austro

Prussian invaders made short shrift of their weak opponent. The naturalsequel of a war so conceived was a bitter quarrel between the victors overthe disposition of the spoils

,but that is a matter not immediately concerning

the subj ect. The ultimate issue,of course

,of that war ( as brief as the

Danish struggle ) was to secure for Prussia alone the duchies , with otherrich spoil from the Hapsburg monarchy

,and to settle once and for all the

question of hegemony among German-speaking peoples.

Bismarck ’s purposes in all this were many,beside the obvious one

,

which he trumpeted to the world,of preventing Germans from becoming

Danes . The duchies were wealthy,no t only agriculturally but politi

cally—in the sense that they (with Denmark ) separate one of the twoGerman coast lines from the other ; but with that part of the peninsula inPrussian hands

,a canal at Kiel could be constructed so as to enable the

North Sea and the Baltic fleets to come to each other ’s help . That itemimportant as it was—had no more value

,however

,than the certainty in

Bismarck ’s mind that he could easily provoke Austria into dissatisfact ionat the settlement of the Danish question which would lead to a second war— a war which would be so much more serious than the other affa ir as torally her neighbors to Prussia ’s help .

After the Danish war about Danes migrated to the fatherlandfrom Schleswig

,pending the referendum which was to restore their country

to them . But the plebiscite never came . Prussia had never, of course , the

slightest intention of surrendering an inch of the territory she had conquered. The E uropean countries had troubles of their own of sufficientgravity to turn their eyes conveniently away from a few t h ousand Danes ;and it was easy to excuse themselves by reminding each other that

,after

all,the Danes had brought their retribution upon themselves .

That pledge of a referendum was given to Austria at the Treaty ofPrague, ending the Seven Weeks

’ War in 1866,but Austria waived its eh

forcement -in 1878,j ust before she j oined Germany in the alliance which was

enlarged in 1882 by the admission of Italy and became the Triple Alliance .

Denmark,indeed

,agreed to condone the non-observance of the plebiscite

provision when several years ago she secured a legal status for the Danishinhabitants of the lost duchy

,but it was a condonation wrested from her

by the force of circumstances and does not rectify Prussia ’s action . Here,

as in the case of Alsace, it remains true that there is no such thing as astatute of limitations for honest men and honest states.

Despite a large emigration,in 1905 of the inhabitants of North

Schleswig spoke Danish . In the Reichstag the Danish delegation

is small but aggressive,voting regularly against national measures

,most

frequently with the Catholic Centre,and occas ionally with the Social

Democrats . The question of the rival nationalities in Schleswig,l ike that

in Poland and Alsace,remained a source of weakn ess and trouble within

the frontiers of the German empire.

II

THE FRENCH

Having seen in briefest outline the consequences in terms of human livesand happiness of Bismarck ’s first two wars

,we come now to the conclusion

of that triumphal trilogy . The brief struggles with Denmark ( 1864 ) andwith Austria ( 1866 ) left the work of completing the German structureunfinished . They have given it its character

,however

,and it remained

for the master-builder but to continue the superstructure in the same designas the foundation.

“Th y was it that he found his task relatively so easy " Because of thelack of c ompeti tion in his ovvn particular field . Cavour

,the man whose

work in unifying the Italian people overcame obstacles even greater thanBismarck ’s

,was now dead . In French diplomacy it was a particularly

unfortunate period,since the masters of statecraft—Thiers

,Gambetta

,

Ferry— b eing Republicans,suffered eclipse under Napoleon ’s benevolent des

p otism . E ngland,to be sure

,had such statesmen as Clarendon and Glad

stone,though Palmerston was lately dead ; yet foresight such as is given to

but one or two men in a century was necessary if E ngland was to recognizethe growing danger

‘

to her in the increase of Prussian power . Her fearsenvisaged either Russia—where she anticipated clashes over her possessionsin the Far E ast ; o r France— whose rivalry as a commercial and colonizingpower seemed at the moment most to be feared . On Pruss1a she lookedsympathetically and realized her mistaken policy only when it was too late .

Accordingly Bismarck felt sufficiently free frominterference .It is outside th e scope of this ser ies to detail the way in which he

brought on the reckoning with France . A naive E nglish co rrespondent withthe Prussian army one day said to him :

“You must be very angry withthose Frenchmen who have forced you into this war .” “Angry "” b e re

torted ;“why

,it was I who forced them to fight.

” And i t was by a devicefully in keeping with the Bismarckian tradition —the famous forged telegram of E ms— that he compelled France i f she would retain her self

respect t o accept the gauge .

The war,declared by Paris on July lasted until February 26

,

1871 . France , though no better prepared tlian A ii str ia , had sustained a farmore heroic struggle

,but was doomed from the start. We have no space

for any detailed analysis of the causes and the progress of that war ; butthe treaty which brought it to an end , being the starting point of the Alsa

9

tian question,must now concern us . That Treaty o f Frankfort

,by which

Alsace and nearly a half of Lorraine became German,is a turning point of

modern history . Was this country originally German or French " Theanswer depends to some degree on the nationality

,or sympathy

,of the

questioner,for it may be twisted one way or the other by casuistry . But

the inhabitants themselves asserted that they were French,and that the

document which pretended to transfer them was from the start,and w ould

forever remain,null and void .

When you ask history for the answer you are taken back into the darkages . Caesar found a population not Teutonic

,but Celtic . Naturally with

the Celtic-Roman population some German elements were mi ngled,but in

what proportion it would be impossible to say . Teutonic invasions continned during centuries , after Rome ceased to have strength enough todefend the frontiers of Gaul ; and with the fi fth century the boasted ramparts of her power

,the Rhine and the Danube

,gave way . Tribe after tribe

came,seeking a warmer

,more congenial place in th e sun . During the

middle ages the district emerges as separate parts of the Holy Roman Empire

,that half-phantasmal institution (which one historian has charac

ter ized as neither holy,nor Roman

,nor empire ) existing until Napoleon I

did away with its peculiar life . It was really a German empire with vaguepretensions to the control of Italy . But it was not the father of the German empire of today— though it may satisfy the historic sense of modernGermans ( as Professor Hazen puts it ) to see in the Hohenzollerns inh er i

tors of the secular traditions of the H oh enstaufien and the Hapsburgs .Within the Holy Roman Empire were states of every rank and grade

,of

every degree of weakness and strengt h . Nothing was impressive but itsoutward pomp .

In the final breakup of the dynasty of which Charlemagne was themost illustrious member

,in the last years of the tenth century (when it was

ousted by the Capetian dynasty ) Alsace and Lorraine were lost to the kingdom that came to be known as France and were drawn and held within theorbit of the old Germanic empire . E ach was then lacking in the politicaland geographical unity with which we associate them today . Their historyis a collection of many local histories . The Hapsburg emperors possessedcertain family domains ; petty German princes others ; there were ten freeimper ial cities ; bishoprics , baronies , etc . Alsatians fought ceaseless localwars .By the Treaty of Westphalia

,ending in 1648 the terrible Thirty Years ’

IVar,the emperor ceded to France his rights in Alsace

,and gradually

,by

1 0

methods many of which it is impossible to condone,she incorporated the

whole. Lorraine, more homogeneous , was now a duchy , which had become,through money payments

,practically independent of the empire . In 1786

it was given to Stanislaus L eszcynski , dethroned king of Poland , for theduke ’s son was about to marry the future empress

,and France could not

admit the union of Lorraine with the empire . This compensation for theloss of his kingdom was given to Stanislaus on condition that at his deathit should pass to the crown of France

,the ex-king being father-in -l aw to

Louis XV . W hen Stanislaus died,in 1766

,Lorraine became French in

name as she had been in fact.

When the great revolution came the people of both A lsace and Lorrainehad become so easily and thoroughly Gallicized that they were among th emost eager to salute the new day, without exercising the violence attendingits dawn in the interior of France . The greatest hymn of liberty

,the

Marsai l laise,was composed in Strasbourg

,though it was sung by volunteers

marching up to Paris from Marseilles . Alsatian sons flocked into thevolunteer armies

,and some of them became famous generals

,such as Keller

mann and Kleber ; Marshal Ney was a son of Metz . In 1870 the record ofthe Alsatians and Lorrainers

,their eagerness to give the last full measure

of devotion when their land was invaded,is a suffi cient commentary on the

German assertion that they were Germans,yearning for release .

The conquered people had but one privilege ; they were to have untilOctober 1

,1872

,to decide

,individually

,whether they would preserve their

French citizenship or become German subj ects . Those who chose the formermust have withdraw n by that day and establ ished themselves in France .Pathetic and heartrending were the distress and sorrow that accompaniedthe exodus

,of a people attached by all the ties of affection and interest to

their native and ancestral fields and vi llages .

By the final day allowed about Alsatians and Lorrainersh ad chosen for France . Thousands came to this country . Others repro

duced,with more or less success

,somewhere in France the types of their

old villages,giving them the old names

,preserving the old physiognomy .

What was the status,political and human

,o f those who thought it their

duty to remain,either because they were old

,or could not dispose of their

property,or were rooted to it by sentiment even when it ceased to be French

,

or were determined to contest every step in the process of Germanizationuntil the day of deliverance " Alth ough the annexation was regarded bythe Germans not as a conquest but as a recovery of that which was theirs

,

nevertheless the provinces have been treated as conquered territory,based

1

on the principle that they were to be ruled without their consent . Theyhave constituted an imperial territory

,a Reichsland

,which

,though it

should belong in common to the twenty-five states forming the empire,

should not,l ike the others

,be a self-governing state

,but should be governed

in the name of the empire by the King of Prussia . It would be easy withsuch a form of government to avoid granting any political rights to theAlsatians and Lorrainers ; moreover , it would make all the members of theconfederation accomplices in the dismemberment of France

,and couse

quently guardians of the conquest.

Alsace— German in great part by race and almost wholly by language,

although there has grown up a curious patois—remained doggedly Frenchin spirit

,notwithstanding all that German police domination could do

,b e

cause Alsace for two hundred years had been French . The French imprintupon Alsace had been originally

,of course

,a foreign one : once stamped

,it

was never forgotten,and what Germans could with historical logic claim

to be a return to German rule never effaced it. The paradox was seen ofthe people of Mulhausen

,which is a German name that means something

,

persisting in calling themselves the people of Mulhouse,which in French

is a couple of meaningless syllables . The paradox went further : Alsatians

(when German policemen were out of hearing ) prayed in German to beFrench again and in German called themselves French at heart

,not know

ing any other tong ue but German and the dialect . All because they hadonce been French " There is probably no more astonishing example of themoral and intellectual imprint of a people whi ch all the material might ofmilitaristic Germany never succeeded in effacing— whether the method wasforce

,seduction

,bribery

,or what not.

Knowing that their lot was continually subj ect to review , that theirfair land would inevitably be the first to suffer when the age-long struggleshould be renewed

,the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, no matter what

their sympathies,l ived an existence compounded of uncertainty and dread .

The United States is committed to rectifying the wrong done France in1871 ; hence France will be the spokesman in pronouncing the fate of AlsaceLorraine after the war. Of course

,the restoration will evoke across the

Rhine the same passionate protests which France and her friends haveuttered for half a century . Upon no question raised by the war is Germannational sentiment so unanimous . The Socialist deputy Scheidemann hassaid

,

“If on the first of February we signed a treaty giving up those

Napoleon said of his Alsat ian sold iers , L et them speak the ir pato is : they alway sfight in French .

provinces , then on February 2nd we should begin our preparations foranother war in order to reconquer them . Such words are simply anotherargument

,i f any were needed

,for universal disarmament as part of the

peace treaty .

Is sentiment the only reason for G ermanv’s determination thus ex

pressed " By no means,for the vital reasons are economic and military .

Nature has hoarded boundless wealth in the iron-ore fields of German andFrench Lorraine . For Germany

,indeed

,her Lorra i ne i ron-ore fields have

b ecome of vital importance , since , owing to the rapid exhaustion of herstores o f superior ore

,she i s mo re and more dependent on the mines there .*

In 1910 the production of the Lorraine mining district was more than twiceas large as that of al l her other districts put together .

” For this territoryGermany would be willing to fight as for very life . There are many otherforms of wealth in the lost provinces

,but the iron and steel industry

naturally takes easy precedence . Closely coupled and allied with theseeconomic motives are the military reasons . In 1870 the generals had insisted on the necessity of giving New Germany securer frontiers

,of making

any future attack by France more difficult , and of gaining for Germany aco rresponding advantage in the event of her taking the offensive .

Without her desiring it or doing aught to bring it about,France

through themeans of a second war sees the restoration near at hand . After

the reconstitutionof Belgium,must come the restoration to France of her '

l ost provinces,those lost in 1870 l ike those lost in 1914. E ach of them

belongs to her by right . If it was right for Germany to take Alsace in 1871 ,why was France permitted to keep it in 1815 , when she was at the. mercyof the allies " No honest man believes that because Germany has controlleda tenth of France for the last three years she has the sl ightest right to that

terr itory ,'

or ever will have , or ever cou ld have . If she should keep her gripupon them for forty years and more

,as she has kept i t upon Alsace

Lorraine,she would have no greater right than on the very first day of her

unspeakable aggression . As Prof . Hazen remarks , there is no more a“ques

tion” of Alsace-Lorraine today , after forty-seven years of occupation , thanthere is of the departments of the north

,after three years of occupation .

*.T. B . W .

Gard iner calls attent ion in hi s new book , German Plans f or the NextW a r ,

to a memorandum drawn up and addressed in D ecember, 1 9 1 7 , b y the Associat ion ofGerman Manufacturers of Iron and Steel , to the German Government . The documentdemands that Germany annex the French iron areas cen ter ing i n L ongwy and B riey becauseof the ir “ extreme importance f o r German nationa l econom y and fo r the conduct of futurewars

.

” I t ins is ts that the front ier be pushed westward not only to include the pr esentFrench iron depos i ts , but to place them bey ond the range of the French _ a r t i l l ery . " nly i nth is wa y ,

i t s tates,can France be prevented from check ing Germany ’ s future wars .

W . H . D awson , Problems of the Peace ; N . Y. , 1 9 1 8 . P . 1 2 1 .

Ought there to be a referendum " No one would think of demandingthat a popular vote be taken today in the Department of the North

,for

instance,to see if it should become French again . There is no more reason

for consulting the departments of th e Upper Rhine , of the Lower Rhine ,and of the Moselle

,taken forty -seven years ago

,by precisely the same

methods . E ven admitting in the abstract the j ustice of the referendum asthe ideal method of settling such a problem

,we must in this case invalidate

its propriety by asking,Wh o would conduct it " IVh o would be entitled to

vote " Since 1871 the inhabitants of the provinces have increased from amillion and a half to nearly two millions ( the birth-rate is considerablyhigher than the French ) and this increase has been coincident with a radicalchange in the racial composition of the population

,for while there has been

a large emigration of French,both at the time of the transfer and later

,

there has been a still larger influx of German immigrants from other partsof the empire to Alsace

,where they are rewarded by the choicest offices .

The fundamental fact to be allowed for is that two generations have beenborn since 1871

,and that the Alsace of today is very different from that of

forty-seven y ears ago .

The local constitution of 19 11 gave Alsace-Lorraine a larger measureof autonomy than it had hitherto enj oyed

,yet

,although it has now a legis

lature of its own ( endowed with the usual l imited powers of German legisl atures ) it is still in eff ect governed from Berlin and by the emperor

’sirresponsible nominees . Here

,indeed

,the original population and the immi

grants have a grievance in common,for nothing is more galling to people

from states with fairly liberal constitutions,l ike Baden and W ii rtemb urg ,

than to find on crossing the frontier that they have suddenly become citizensof an inferior IVh at i s needed

,in the almost unthinkable but still

barely possible event of any portion of Alsace remaining in German hands ,is that the population should be given political independence as complete ,at least

,as that enj oyed by any other German state .

There have been many other solutions put forward beside the only justand complete one o f restoration— such as neutralization : but the time forneutral states seems to have passed ; or a compromise : but that is only possible in case of an indecisive peace . No ; clearly , emphatically , must thetwentieth century redress the greatest iniquity of the nineteenth .

D awson , op . ci t .1 4

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valiant people whom fate had convinced that no great future was ever instore for them unless they carved out their own destiny in a new countrya pure democracy . The many Polish settlers who have remained in Francealso date from that epoch ; and there , as here , their ability has had fullscope . After Napoleon , what was left of the old Polish kingdom was constituted under the Emperor of Russia as king. Two more abortive revoltsagainst Russia took place, in 1830 and 1863 , and with the latter the national

history of Poland closes .

Any attempt to set forth the present condition and treatment of thePoles as a conquered race necessarily falls into three classes and becomes acomparison of governmental methods requiring more space than is hereavailable . Naturally

,the Poles of the three partitioning countries have

l ocked with the greatest favor upon that power which promised them thelargest measure of j ustice . In promises all three have been prodigal . Therehas been constant interchange of thought between the Polish leaders of allthree countries . Sienkiewicz among others called on his compatriots everywhere to identify themselves with the cause of the Russian people . Others

-the church party and many influential nobles— have placed more faith inAustria . It is significant that no Polish leader has turned to the Hohenzol lerns for support or has accepted German promises except with muchreservation—both expressed and mental . The fortunes of war have renderedthe hope of all Poles for a restoration of their ancient kingdom not entirelyillusory .

* Apparently,Germany is encouraging the plans of Austri a to

place a Hapsburg on the throne ; but whatever faith Galician (Austrian )

" n April 8-1 0 , 1 9 1 8 , there was he ld at R ome a C ongress of " ppressed National i t i esof Austria-H ungary ( to which further reference wi ll be made in the art icle on the SouthS lavs ) , at wh ich the Pol ish delegates read a spec ial memorandum of the ir own , parts ofwhich follow :

This fata l prospe ct ( a Poland dependen t on Germany and degraded to the statusof a German h interland , W i th access to the sea only through E ast Pruss ia) would be in nowa y mod ifi ed if Germany consen ted to an Austrian solut ion of the Pol ish q uest ion , even ifi t were based on the princ iple of Pol ish -Austro -H ungarian trial i sm ; fo r in th is case Polandwould be in a minori ty as against Austria-H ungary , as in Austria i tse lf the C zechs andJugo -Slavs would be in a m inority aga inst the Germans .

“ Thus the Pol ish q uest ion adm its of no cut-and -dried solu t ion and of no compromise .

Poland W i l l e i ther be saved with the All ies o r she wil l become dependent upon Germany ,e ither with or withou t Austria ; above all , upon all-powerfu l Pruss ia .

“ There i s only one w a y of avoid i ng th is latter alternat ive , and that i s b y counteringthe plans of the C entral Powers wi th regard to Poland b y the proclamat ion of the Pol ishprogramme , wh ich is that of the Al l ies . This programme is the reun ion into one independentstate of all the Poli sh lands , in clud ing those which the C entral E mpires a r e refus ing torestore to Poland and those wh ich they a re bestowing as largess on the ir vassals . Thisprogramme is the rest i tu t ion to Poland of the mouth of the V istula , of D anz ig , and of thePol ish port ion of the B alt ic coastl ine . This programme is the preventi on of L i thuan ia andthe U kra ine from becoming instruments of P ru s s o-German oppress ion and Austr ian intrigue .

“ It i s only such a Poland , reconst i tuted under th es e'

con d i t ion s , of suffi ci ently largeextent , stretch ing to the sea ,furn ished W i th all th e resources for i nd ependent ex i s tence .

separated from Germany and Austria b y a l ine drawn almost due north and south—i t i sonly such a Poland as thi s wh ich will be able to fulfi l i ts h i storic m iss ion as a rampartagains t the German fl ood which i s alway s ready to overfl ow i ts boundaries

1 6

Poles may put in Austri an promises,they will look long before they leap

into a Hohenzollern trap . Their position in the Hapsburg dominions during the last fifty years has been by no means intolerable .

On the whole,the Austrian government has shown unexpected skill in

its dealings with the Poles,granting concessions to the national spirit which

were at times galling to their allies in Berlin . Instructive is the contrastbetween the treatment of their Poles by the two central allies . In AustrianPoland the native language is not forbidden ; in the universities of Cracowand Lemberg it is even the vehicle of instruction . Germany on the otherhand

,in order to convert her of Poles into German s , has forbidden

the use of the language in public and private education,and even in rel i

g ious instruction . Letters addressed in Polish are not forwarded by theGerman p ostoffice ; Polish theaters , clubs , societies are not allowed to exist.

Besides,the Pruss i an government has tried to Germanize the districts where

Poles prevail by i ts traditional policy ( another example of which , in Alsace ,we saw in the last article ) of settl ing German peasants among them . Withgovernment grants

,which in 1908 amounted to as much as

land was bought belonging mostly to Polish peasants,who have thereupon

largely emigrated ; l i fe ceased to be very pleasant for the Pole who soldhis land to a German ; for thus being bribed to desert the cause he must beprepared to face the boycott of his Polish neighb ors and the anathema ofthe V illage priest . Church and national cause are completely identified,and the Polish clergy enj oy a respect from their par ishioners which givesthem vast powers of control .

Despit e all government measures the Poles have not only held theirground in the east of Germany

,but even seem to have gained ground

,partly

because their national instinct is str ongly developed and because they clingto their language

,partly because the Poles are more prolific than the Ger

mans . Thus ih the province of Posen , where Poles andGermans lived side by side

,the Germans increased by only 4 per cent . be

tween 1890 and 1900 , while th e Poles increased by about 1 1 per cent . duringthe same period .

“I would rather sacrifice the Rhineland,

” said Bismarck,

“than thePolish provinces . ” Wh y " Where is the danger to Germany

’sfrom her Poles " But these Prussian Poles are only a part of agreater host or more— seven to eight millions in Russia

,four

in Austria,and three in Ameri ca . The growth of a Polish national feel ing

is for the Germans dangerously allied with the Pan -Slavic movement.The

growth of a “greater Slavic” feeling among Poles,Russians and Bohemians

1 7

i s fraught with great danger to Germany ’s future— to say nothing of themillions of the South Slavs .One can easily see

,then , why Germany should be so anxious to G er

man ize her subj ects by any mean s , while Austria should be willing to grantconcessions . Germany i s a really Teutonic state , with the exception of thisimp otent minority of Poles and of a few thousand Danes practically all hersubj ects speak the German language . In Austria

,on the other hand , the

Germans being decidedly in a numerical minority,cannot well imp ose their

culture on one of the elements—the Slavic—which form the maj ority ofthe population of the entire empire

,and are wise enough to abstain from

trying.Consequently the German Poles have always allied themselves with

the Catholic Center or the Socialists,or any other party which at any given

time threatened to embarrass th e government . In Austr ia , however, Polishpatriots have risen to leadership in Parliament ; and Poles have even beenmembers of cabinets .As to the treatment of the Poles in the present war

,there is but l ittle

definite information that can be relied on . The land we kn ow h as beenfought over by both sides until i t must resemble the battlefields of theThirty Years War. We have heard tales of eyewitnesses—apparentlycredible—according to which the legendary cruelty of the ignorant Russiansoldiery pales before the planned

,organized rapine of the defenders o f

western culture . Nor is this treatment confined to military “exigencies .

For instance,the cable brings the following advertisement in the Deutsche

Tageszeitung“For E xchange—Fifty Polish work-people

,20 men

,30 girls

,for ex

change for an equal number of other work-people .”

What German Socialists thought about it appears from this commentin the V orwaerts :

“Here are 50 people offered for exchange as if they werecattle . It is evident that these human beings have as little to say concerningtheir disposition as would a herd of oxen .

”

And this happened almost on the same day that the kaiser received adelegation of the Po l ish regency council

,and assured it that he always was

the defender of humanity in general and of the Poles in particular. Wherefore

,he urged it to believe : “You will be best serving your fatherland if

,

in common with the German empire and Austro-Hungarian monarchy,you

pursue the aims which guarantee the weal of humanity and peaceful ccoperation of peoples as against the calumnies of the enemy .

”

The Polish delegation may have perceived that it had little option aboutthe proposal . But the rest of the world can have no excuse for ignoranceabout what would be the fate of any peoples or provinces left to Germanyby the peace settlement. At all events there is no place in a future Polandfor Hohenzollern influence

,no matter what the role of the Hapsburgs may

be in the nation that is to arise from the ashes of the present war .

1 8

IV

AUSTRIA AND THE BOHEMIAN S

There seems to be no question but that after the war there will still bea Germany— empire or republic— a Germany shorn of h er ill -gotten gains ,of Alsace-Lorraine

,of at least parts of Prussian Poland— but still Germany

,

whether repentant or not . The ethical bases of depriving her of these territories have been demonstrated in previous articles . But with Austria thecase is different . If she is deprived of the territory which all the variouscla imants demand

,there will be hardly any Austria left . Not that that

would be any great misfortune to the world ; but it indicates that anyterr itorial changes must necessarily be effected in a spir it of compromise .

Can the Hapsburg empire survive the present crisis " The question hasbeen asked many times already during the last century and each timeanswered in the negative

,yet the empire still exists and is playing a leading

part in international politics at this moment . Of course,it is in spite of her

lack of homogeneity,not because of it

,that she has thus existed . It i s the

only great state of E urope which has no natural basis,and that is why its

condition has long been held to be precarious . It is a bundle of nations andfragments of nations , originally brought together by the lucky marriagesand conquests of members of the Hapsburg family

,and in more recent days

held together mainly by fear of what would happen if they broke asunder .The empire is divided into two distinct halves

,with distinct governments

,

and each of these halves is dominated by a ruling race—the Germans ofAustria proper in the Austrian half

,and the Magyars in the Hungarian

half . Austrians and Hungarians have fought bitterly in the past and donot love one another now . Both theGerman Aus trians and the Hungariansoccupy clearly defined areas

,but all the outlying parts of the empire are

peopled by other races,quite distinct from the Austrians and Hungarians

and in most cases closely related to other free races over the border—whencecomes much of the complexity of the problem .

First among these subj ect races may be named the Bohemians or Czechs,

who occupy a large area in the north,a sort of island among the German

speaking peoples,walled in by mountains . As a matter of fact

,they are

not only surrounded by Germans,but number among their population a

considerable proportion of Germans , who would have reasonable ground forobj ection i f they were to be ultimately included in a new independent state

.

This German minori ty ( in Bohemia proper , 35 per cannot j ustly be

B u t see p . 3 4 .

1 9

abandoned to Czech nationalism,enj oying power for the first time and

schooled as a victim,in Austrian methods of employing it.

But for the moment let us speak only of the Czechs in Bohemia . They ,l ike the Poles

,look back to a proud national history

,the greatest days of

which were in the fifteenth century,when the enthusiasm raised by the

doctrines of John Hus,a forerunner of the Reformation

,and the military

genius of a group of great Bohemian soldiers,enabled them triumphantly

to defy the might o f Germany and indeed of all E urope. The kingdom o f

Bohemia passed by marriage to the German dukes of Austria,but the

Bohemians proudly maintained their separate nati onal existence,unti l it

was crushed out by a fierce Austrian persecution in the seventeenth century .

“Wh oever is master of Bohemia ,” Bismar ck once said

,

“ i s master ofE urope .” He had in mind not the nominal rulership

,but the mastery of

problems which have never ceased to trouble E urope . Throughout herperturbations Bohemi a has within the last century grown economically toa commanding position in Austri a and E urope . Agriculturally and industrial ly highly productive, with enormously rich coal deposits and the mostfamous mineral springs in the world

,Bohemia enj oys indeed a proud pre

eminence .

For centuries,too

,Bohemia has been prominent in the arts of peace .

The Czech nation gave to the world Comenius,the pioneer in many fields

of education,and in more recent times Bohemia has been one of the artistic

centers of E urope . In music Dvorak and Smetana ; in painting, Max ,Orl ick

,Schwaiger and many others

,prove that Bohemian culture has not

been crushed by persecution .

It is probably in Bohemia that of all the various racial elements inAustria

,the war between nationalism and Germanism has been waged with

the greatest bitterness . All such struggles turn chiefly on the question ofeither language or religion . In the three preceding articles we have seenwhat a large part of the anti-German bitterness has been caused by theTeutonic persecution of the native language . It has been hardly less trueof Bohemia . To be sure, the Austrians, as also in the case o f their Poles,have not been quite so unreasonable as their allies

,but the Czechs have

never been treated so considerately as the Poles in Galicia . In a wo rd , itmay be said that in Bohemia the policy o f Germanization has once moreproved a complete failure.

Naturally enough,certain Czech patriots and agitators have sought by

every means at their command to undermine the hold of the Hapsburgs ontheir North Slavic dominions. No settlement of Austria is worth consider

2 0

ing which does not satisfy the Czechs’ legitimat e aspirations ; but Mr . Toyn

bee , ih h is invaluable book,“Nationality and the War

,

” points out some ofthe obj ections. We have already mentioned the considerable German minori ty in the population of Bohemia ; but that is no t an insuperable d ifliculty . It would not be impossible- by the exercise of j ust such methods asthe Germans themselves have used in Alsace and Prussian Poland—to getrid of this Teutonic element . But another wrong would not make a right

,

and in spite of the element o f poetic j ustice that there would be in such ameasure, those who will win the war, not being barbarians , will have re

course to j uster methods . There are,however

,economic and geographic

factors which legislation cannot change .

Bohemia , as a great manufacturing and mining district , depends forits prosperity upon good communication with markets . If Bohemia achievesseparation , Germany and Austria can easily build a tariff wall whi ch willcut her off from the outside world . Bohemian trade flows down the riverE lbe to Hamburg or else

,in th e other direction

,must focus at Vienna. The

map may have decreed that the Czechs should be a nation,but political

economy is a later growth than physical geography and has brigaded theminexorably with the German group .

Not all the Bohemians demand independence . Wh at they claim is only

j ustice—which in such cases means,of course

,an impartial reopening of

their case . If most of them have demanded the restoration of their ancientkingdom

,the demand does not necessarily include a native king on the

throne . “The coronation of Francis Joseph at Prague” was their cry . Inthis their programm e went far in its ambition . We must remember thatthree-fifth s of the Austrian p opulation are Slavs . In 1900 the populationof Austria was thus composed : Germans 35 per cent .

,Slavs 59 per cent . ,

Italians 4 per cent .,others 2 per cent . With the advance of democracy the

Czech leaders bel ieve that numbers must prevai l , and they conceived ofAustria in the future as a Slavonic state . Instead of detaching themselvesfrom the Austrian unit

,its Slav citizens were to conquer it for Slavdom and

convert it into the chief focus o f Slavonic culture in E urope .

If Bohemia became independent her possible leadership in Austria for

achieving this aim would be lost . Independent, she would be beset by theperils of the small

,surrounded state ; as eventual leader , she would become

the mainspring of Slav culture in the world. E ven if no such aim isachieved—i f international j ealousy and bickering continually block thePan-Slavic aspirations—an autonomous B ohemia within the empire may

satisfy all but the most extreme.

2 1

There is prevalent an undesirable tendency to discriminate too generously between Germany and Austria , and to cast. upon the former powerthe sole responsibility for the war . But it is not easy to see how Germany ’sally can be exonerated . All the evidence goes to show that this is Austria ’s

,

hardly less than Germany ’s war . Nevertheless,it is possible to discriminate

between the Allies . Germany is animated by ofl ensive,Austria primarily

by defensive motives . Government and people of Austria are alike convinced that they have no alternative save to subdue Pan-Slavism ,

or sooneror lat er submit to mutilation at its hands . Bernhardi ’s rallying cry of“world dominion or downfall” i s singularly appropriate to the position inwhich Germany and Austri a stand today . Germany drew the sword ihspired by a hope ; Austr ia , haunted by a fear . Germany deemed . that thehour had struck to translate her vision of world -dominion into substance ;Austria trembles lest the war wh ich she has pro voked with the obj ect ofaverting

,may merely accelerate , her inevitable downfall .

Austri a in her strength and her weakness—n her diversified German andnon -German material and intellectual interests

,as well her hopeless in

ternal dissensions— is today a considerable stumbling block in the path ofGermany ’s single-minded ruthlessness . P an-Germanism

,always confined

to lower Austria ( the old Teutonic duchy proper ) has made few convertssince the war . Vienna is not y et ready to sink to the level of a lesserBerlin . This alliance has taught Austria what to expect in a future parth ership in “Central E urope .

” It will be the task of wise statesmanshipamong the Allies to reconcile the claims of the Czechs w ith the position ofAustria as an important factor in eventual combinations that shall bringabout peace and save the world from future aggression on the part ofGermany .

“Thile it would be an exaggeration to maintain that the race antagonism

of Slavs and Teutoi i s was the chief cause which led to the present cataclysm,

it may be safely said that it was one of the main contributory causes . Hencewhen the terms of peace come to be discussed it will be distinctly wrongif we allow the importance of the West E uropean questions at issue to ob

scure that of the Near E ast ern p olitical problems— which for our purposemay include the Czechs as members of the great Slavic family . The pointis one which may readily receive less attention than it deserves in thiscountry . The average American thinks he has no particular quarrel withAustria . W hat he wants is “to crush the hateful spirit of Prussian mil itar ism .

” If genuine const itutional government were introduced into Germany

,th e danger to other nations produced b y the existing form o f mili

2 2

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V

AUSTRIA AND THE SOUTH SLAVS

The Bohemians are,roughly speaking

,the northern branch of the great

Slavic family,which in its entirety includes more offshoots of the same

people than any other racial division of E urope. Thus Austria ’s Slavicproblem is divided into two distinct parts—the Nort h and the South Slavs

,

of which the latter present much the greater difficulty. As we saw in thelast article

,the North Slavs ( Czechs Ruthenians and Poles ) demand not

so much independence as autonomy . Their cousins in the South , on theother hand

,divide into those inside the Austrian border and those in inde

pendent states,chiefly Serbia

,whose ambition

,naturally

,i s to merge both

into one powerful Slavic state . That is wha t Pan-Slavi sm means ;that is i ts danger to Austria ;

* and it has a distinct danger to Germany,

too,for if achieved

,Slavic unity would constitute an effectual stumbling

block to Teutonic dreams of hegemony from Berlin to Bagdad ; it wouldblock German control of Turkey ; it would , in conjunction with an Italianvictory

,shatter almost completely Teutonic outlet to the Mediterranean

,

and would mark Germany ’s defeat in the war j ust as surely as the finalsuccess of a western offensive.

This be ing the case,it b ehooves us

,as closely as space will permit,

to exami ne into the causes of the Slav separation and the likelihood ofeventual unity .

In the first place,it was absolutely vital to the integrity of the Austro

Hungarian monarchy that no strong and self-suflicing Slav state shouldbe allowed to grow to maturity upon its southern frontier and to act as amagnet to the mill ions of discontented Slavs within its borders. Slavaspirations must not only be suppressed at home ; they must be preventedfrom assuming alarming proportions anywhere within dangerous proximityof the Hapsburg boundaries . In other words

,the Balkan peninsula must

constitute an Austrian,not a Russian sphere of influence . Such a policy

must obviously be directed in the first instance against Serbia,whose fron

tiers marched with tho se of Bosnia and Herzegovina—Slavic provinceswhich had been nominally the property of Turkey but which the latter hadso misgoverned that the Congress of Berlin gave them to Austrian control ;

So consc ious was Austria of th is danger that i t i s generally be lieved that the victimof Saraj evo , the he ir to the throne , was ready to mak e the bold experiment of sh ift ing themonarchy to a Slav ic base , or at leas t of cons t i tu t ing the monarchy on a tr ia l i s t ic (GermanMag y ar-S lav ) instead of a dual basis .

24

in 1908, however, Austria felt that she could annex them outright , and didso despite Russian and Serbian protest. Hence the immediate obj ective ofAustrian statesmen was to maintain Serbia in a position of weakness , and atall costs to prevent that inland state from uniting with her sister Sla v kingdom of Montenegro , o r from acquiring any part of Albania ( south of Montenegro ) and thereby obtaining access to the sea . If Serbia were once toopen a window on the Adriatic , her economic dependence on Austria wouldvanish , and her political emancipation from Hap sburg pressure must speedily follow .

Austria was achieving considerable success with her Balkan policy untilshe made the egregious blunder in 1908 .

«of reopening the whole question byannexing Bosnia . Russia , exhausted by the Japanese war, was too weak toprotest effectively

,as her interests clearly dictated if she was to retain her

hegemony among all the Slavs,but it threw her into the arms of E ngland

,

cemented more firmly her French alliance,and altogether al igned t h e two

groupings of the powers on the basis largely of their Balkan p olicies .

Why have not, under Russian tutelage , these Slavic states merged "

Russia,through her kinship with them on the ground of common religion ,

customs,and especially her traditional anti -Austrian

,anti-Turkish

‘

p ol icy ,

is their natural protector. If she did not demonstrate this in 1908, she madeit a cause of war six years later

,rather than lose her influence in Serbia .

Greece,Montenegro

,Serbia and even Bulgaria—had she so chosen

would,then

,at

'

any time up to the second,inter-Balkan war have

been as sured of Russian support in any effort for a great Pan -Slavic state .

The Roumanians,of course

,cannot be included in such a group because they

are not S lavic , ,but are reputed descendants of early Roman colonists, speaking a language of La tin origin .

If ever such a state is possible after the war, Serbia would expect itsleadership ; and as a matter of fact she has always taken the leading part inPan -Slavic agitation . There are many more Slavs outside the borders ofthe little kingdom than there are inside

,and the former occupy a position

capable of greater poten ti al inj ury to Austria . It is a question of geography

rath er than of census .The sole port for the thirty millions of Aus tria is Trieste . To reach

Trieste one passes through a large belt of Slavic territory—and Trieste i t

self is more Ital ian than German . The sole port of Hungary is Fiume,to

reach which one also passes through much Slavic territory,and in Fiume

there are comparatively few Hungarians . The Slavs who cut off Fiumefrom Hungary

,and the Slavs of the Dalmatian coast and of all Bosnia and

2 5

Herzegovina belong to the same family— the Serbo-Croats,sometimes called

Jugo-Slavs,and they are first cousins to the Slovenes

,wh o cut off Trieste

from German Austria ; they all Speak practically the same language as theSerbians and Montenegrins ; they are all actuated by the same ideals .

If those ideals ever find their fullest expression,a glance at the map

will show us the predicament in which Austria will be placed ; she will belandlocked

,whether by P an -Slavs or by Italians does not much matter to

her . The most probable and j ust o utcome will be that each will have a share .

We see now the explanation of Austria ’s desperate attempts to stiflenational aspiration in her South Slavs . She has needed no German prompting to arrive at her point of view regarding the Balkan nationalities .What

,then

,has prevented these peoples from uniting to seize the favorable

moment " For one thing,they are divided in rel igion . The Serbians are

Greek Orthodox,while the Croatians and Dalmatians ( tho se along the

Adriatic coast and in Bosnia ) are Catholics ; the Albanians are mostly Moh amm edans . Secondly

,the Adriatic Slavs have never been willing to play

understudy to the Serbians ; they feel that their culture is not inferio r toSerbian

,and certainly Agram

,the capital of the South Slavs out-side Serbia

,

i s in some ways superior to Belgrade . Finally , there are physical difficulties .The different families o f South Slavs are separated from each other byparallel mountain ranges

,which make communication not only difficult

,

but an actual hardship . The closest degree of relationship exists betweenthe Serbians and the Bosnians ; and it was in S araievo , the capital o f theannexed province

,that a Serbian symp

-ath izer thought to start the confla

grat ion which would result, through Russian help , in a return to the Serbianfold of two million lost brothers .

The abuses in Bosnia and Herzegovina which led to this outbreak areof the same essential nature as those which have failed dismally to breakthe spirit of Alsatians

,Danes

,Poles

,Bohemians

,and Ital ians who have

been caught in the meshes of the Teutonic web . Practically all the p op ulation of Bosnia speaks Serbian . Yet German is the language of the administration and the only l anguage of the railways

,posts

,and telegraphs

,which

have never ceased to be under military cont rol . Most of the functionaries ,after thirty years of service in Bosnia

,do not know the language of the

country . In German schools,pupils are taught the history of Germany

,

but in Slavi c schools the history o f the South Slavs is excluded from thecurriculum . Before the war there were fourteen schools for Germans

( a poor enough showing ) but only one school for every Slavs.

2 6

Always Austria ’s policy has been to humiliate Serbia,to keep her in

economic bondage,to demonstrate to her own millions of Slavs that the

Serbians were helpless . But centuries of foreign oppression have failedto stamp out the Serbian nati-onal consci ousness ; in spite of all persecutionsthe love of freedom survived

,and when in 1903

,by methods which we

cannot condone but whose end went far to j usti fy their means,a servi le ,

pusillanimous king was done away with,a ruler acceded whose l ife had been

spent in exile . The old love of independence grew with the accession ofPeter into a grandiose

,imperialistic dream of a greater Serbia as the pro

tector and mistress of all SouthernSlavs . How can this claim be reconciledwith what the all ies will be willing to grant at the peace negotiations " Acountry which has endured uncomplainingly such sufferings as Serbia isentitled to every consideration

,and she has been assured—and properly so

—that her legitimate national aspirations will be realized . However, thereis some difference of opinion as to whether all her national aspirations arelegitimate . The Serb race , l ike the Polish , has vague outlines . On all sidesit melts int o and mingles with other races—Bulgarian

,Greek

,Albanian

,

Italian,Hungarian . Italian and Serbian aspirations on the Adriatic will

be,it must be feared

,a source of future trouble.* But the expression “

re

al izat ion o f Serbian nationa l aspirations” can hardly mean less than thatAustri a will have to aban don to her Bosnia and Herzegovina—perhaps ,indeed

,all her Southern Slavs—e -even

,in an extreme cas e

,those in the

hinterland o f Trieste . The rumblings of Austrian discontent with Germany ’s conduct of the Russian war which came to the surface from time totime during the last winter may provide the necessary opening

,apart from

th e discontent more or less openly expressed with her economic condition .

We ourselves are not fighting for Serbia,nor should we ever have

fought for her,since we were never under any obligations to fight for

“ R esolu tions adopted at the C ongress of the " ppressed National i t ie s of AustriaH ungary , held in R ome Apri l 8 las t , as fa r as concerns the Italo-Jugo-S lav agre ement :

1 . In the relat ions be tween the I tal ian nation and the nat ion of the Serbs , Croats ,and Slovenes—k nown also under the name of the Jugo-S lav nation—the representat ives ofthe two peoples recogn iz e that the uni ty and independence of the Jugo-Slav nat ion is a v i talin terest of I taly , j us t as the comple tion of I tal ian national un i ty i s a v i tal in terest of theJugo-Slav nat ion . And therefore the representat ives of the two people s pledge themselvesto employ every effort in order that during the wa r and at the moment of peace these decis ions of the two nations m ay be complete ly attained .

2 . They declare that the l iberation of the Adriat ic Sea and i ts defence again st everypresen t and future "enemy i s a v i tal in terest of the two people s .

3 . They pledge themselves also in the interest of good and s incere relat ions be tweenthe two peoples in the fu ture , to solve amicably the various terri torial con trovers ies on thebas is of the principles of national i ty and of the righ t of peoples to decide the ir own fate ,and in such a wa y as not ‘ to in j ure the vi tal in terests of the two nat ions , such as shal l bed efined at the moment of peace .

4. To such racial groups of one people as i t may be found necessary to include with inthe fron t i ers of the other, there shall be recogn iz ed and guaranteed the right to the irlanguage , cul ture , and moral and economic in terests .Such an agreement at su ch a congress mark s a new era i n the pol icy of the E n ten te .

2 7

interests so far removed from our own . B ut the South Slavs,j ust as honest

ly as any other of all the peoples partly or wholly governed from Viennaor Berlin

,represent an ideal

,in the fight fer which there can be no distino"

tion of language,race

,or religion . Serbian history may not

,indeed

,be

unblotted ; but th e splendid pluck with which her sons have faced theAustrian Goliath and smitten him hip and thigh before they were overwhelmed by numbers and a dire vengeance taken

,would have wiped out

many worse blots . Serbia deserves,many times

,all that the victors can

do for her,and if the expense could be borne by Bulgaria—which has twice

in three years stabbed her treacherously in the back—as wel l as by Austria,

it would divide the cost of the cr ime more fairly among the conspirators .

VI

UNREDEEMED ITALY

Itali a irredenta is what it is called over there fi —in other words,unre

deemed Italy,those districts inhabited for generations by Italians

,but in

the destiny of which she has no voice . We have seen in the last two articlesthat there is also a Serbia irredenta and a Roumania irredenta ; let us nowexamine into th e j ustice o f those wh o cla im that the Austro-HungarianItalians have been fully a s ill-treated as the Slavs and Roumanians of thedual monarchy . We must recognize at the outset that there may legitimately be two opinions about Italian war-aims in their entirety ; and we havealready seen something of the way in which in one direction ( the eastern

A driatic coast ) they clash with Slavic aspirations . That i s one o f the bestexamples of the need of compromise when the many victorious allies not

only sit in j udgment on the instigators of the war,but reconcile their

own conflicting claims on the basis of nationality—i f it can be done.

E very nation ’s claims to territory as procl aimed to the world are bound

to be more grandiose than she can ever really expect to real ize . Just howtrue that is of Italian claims depends on the sympathies of those who askthe question . The range from those who claim that greater Italy is entitledto Nice

,Corsica

,part of Asia Minor ( Smyrn a district ) and parts of Abys

sin i a,to those who remain content with Trentino and Trieste

,includes a

vast variety o f opinion,and yet logical proof is at hand to support each

contention .

From a glance at the map it would seem that Italy already holds moreof the Adriatic coastline than Austria-Hungary . But the Ital ian littoralafl ords few harbors

,none of which is of strategic value

,whereas the oppo

s ite shore,a rocky

,picturesque coast land

,contains some of the finest natural

harbors in the world,affording a preponderant strategic advantage to the

country possessing them . Italians have from the earl iest days r ecognizedthis Under the Roman dominion and later, with her rise to first rank

,

un der the Venetian republic,both coasts were Italian for over years .

The whole extent of its shores were lined with thriving wealthy cities,whose

culture was entirely Italian . Satisfied with a thin strip of coastland,they

made no attempt to penetrate into the interior . Long after Venetian powerhad crumbled and Austria had succeeded to its domain

,they remained

,with

little concern for the Slavs of the interior. Wh en in 1866 Venice was unitedwith the kingdom of Italy

,Austria retained the an cient possessi ons of the

doge on the eastern Adriatic . Thus are to be accounted for nearly half amillion Italians living opposite their independent brothers

,with whom they

maintain close relations and with whom they seek some day to be united asa part of greater Italy .

Austria and Hungary,from the very beginning of their existence as a

dual monarchy,have been caught in the vise between Ital ian i rrendentism

and Serbian irredentism— between Greater Italy and Pan-Slavism . Fromthe economic point of V iew ,

one cannot but sympathize with the determination of the Austrians and Hungarians to prevent the disaster which wouldcertainly come to them if the aspirations of Italian and of Serbian irre

denti sm were realized . The severity of Hungary against Croatia and theoppression of the Serbians in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Dalmatia byAustria have been prompted by the same reasons which led E ngland andScotland to try to destroy the national spirit of Ireland for so many cen

tur ies after her independence was gone . They could not afford to have theircommunications by sea threatened by the growth of an independent nation

,

especially since this nation was believed to be susceptible to the influence ofhereditary enemies . If there is any salvation for Austria in this directionit will lie in what it is to be feared will be the inevitable clash betweenSlavic and Ital ian interests .

The race hatred of the Slavs for the Ital ians,who had always treated

the Slavs rather indifi’

erently , had long b een latent . Prompted in partby Vienna

,the Slovenes really needed small urging to combat the growing

irredentism of the Italians of the littoral . It was a congenial role fo r theSlovenes

,whose expansion was now tolerated for the first time in their

history. It seems curious that Austria would give them such a chance,

knowing that later it might well lead to increased demands ; but the Slavicproblem was in Austria -Hungary to stay

,and she could at least play them

off against another racial element , so numerically inferior that it mightgive up the struggle .

Trieste became the goal of Slavic ambitions , and the city was seeminglydelivered up to them as their prey by the Austrians . Developing rapidly

,

the movement soon embraced all the It alian cities‘

of the east coast . UnderAustrian subvention Slavs emigrated to cities which had been largelypeopled by Italians . Clashes between the Slavs and the Italians in Triestebecame everyday occurrences

,instigated by Slavic agi tators who felt secure

in the knowledge that they would not be prosecuted . It was a device worthyof Prussia—worthy a country which wanted to provoke a war which couldthen be proclaimed to the world as having been forced upon her. The

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teeming with youthful energy,so proud of her newly acquired dignity and

standing,that it all demanded an overflow . She entered the race fo r Afri

can colonies and has,a fter considerable trouble , acquired three . That gave

her confidence . It was then time to give heed to her unredeemed brotherswho were call ing to her much more closely than from Africa . Gradually ,she was breaking away from Germany and Austria—it was an unnaturalalliance at best—and was veering around to her logical friends , France and

E ngland . In no way was she consulted when Austria and Germany pro

voked war. Her very neutrality proves that to Ital ian minds the war wa san aggressive one on Germany ’s part

,for the terms of the alliance bound

Italy to help her Teutonic friends only in case it was a war of defense .

S o Italy remained neutral for many months . But permanently neutral ,she would have been recreant to her opp ortunity . Her writers —Carducci

,

D ’Annunzio,two of the greatest poets of the century—her far sighted states

men,Sonnino

,Salandra

,were educating the masses by writing everywhere

the inscription “Per la piu grande Itali a .

” The fact that the Central empires recognized the j ustice of that cry is shown by their willingness tocede much of Ital ia irredenta Wh y , then , did not Italy accept the offerand

,while remaining at peace

,attain most o f her obj ects " Because both

Austria and Germany had a curious obj ection to the immediate transfer ofthe territory . Italy surely woul d not mind if the arrangement would nottake effect till aft er the war

,when the transfer could be attended with more

dignity " To which Sonnino replied in effect,

“But suppose you don ’t win "”

A promi ssory note on Germany was not worth taking seriously,especially

with Belgium a recent example .No

,it was not land greed so much as a spirit like that of the Christian

crusader setting out to redeem the shrines of the Holy Land,which inspired

the Italian people to work for the liberation of their brothers still underthe Austrian yoke . Despite the disaster on the Isonzo

,Italy has already

won a great victory . The future has for her untold possibilities in store .Her best fr iends will advise her to be magnanimous to the sorely tried Slavs ,but if she can be moderate in her vict ory she will show a greatness of soulworthy of the country that has produced a Cavour. And such a leadershipas that no country has surpassed

,not Germany

,with Bismarck

,France

with Gambetta,nor E ngland with Gladstone .

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VII

CONCLUS ION

In the six articles which h ave appeared under th is heading , the greatestlesson which the war can teach us is writ in letters so large that h e whoruns can read— or el se they have utterly failed in th eir purpose . Hencelittle in the way of epilogue or “ summary sh ou ld be necessary, except toemphasize certain po ints common to a l l th e articles

,upon which space

fo rbade teaching with deta il .

After all,

" each case must be j udged on its merits , and no argumentshould hold good except the honestly ascertained wish of the populationactually concerned . Th e most difficult point , of course

,

"i f plebiscites are

to be taken,is to obta in freedom o f voting

,secure against coercion of any

kind ; This,it may be repeated

,would be so difficult in the case of'Alsace

on account o f the hundreds of thousands o f nat ive sons who have emigratedand

‘

of the even greater number of Germ-ans who have imm i grated— as to'

make it impo ssible to conduct a j ust referendum . It is no‘ less“

true in the

case of the Poles who are even more scattered .

If each case must be j udged on its own merits,above all must we

i

beon our guard against

“historical sentiment”—against arguments taken fromconditions which onceexisted or were supposed to exist

,but which are no

longer real at the pre sent moment . Some extreme exam ples of this wehave seen

,and the truism has a lready been p ointed out th at each country

will claim more than it can really expect to receive .

The national problems of E urope are numerous— by no means confinedto the Central Powers— and each one is b eset by arguments good

,bad and

indifferent,some so elaborately staged that it requires the greatest discern

ment to unmask them . Vast bodies of people,with brains and money at

their disposal,have been interested in obscuring the truth

,and to do so

have used every instrument in their p ower . To discriminate between thisuse and abuse of intellect and money we need pro found knowledge not onlyof history but of ethnology

,geography

,religion

,comparat ive literature and

national psychology . It is,then

,a case for experts with ample scope for

their elucidations, and it is evident that articles so necessarily l imited inspace can but skim the surface .

In our surveys we must be scrupulously fair,or they lose what value

they might have . Wh ere the Allies may have been at fault we must recogn i ze

,

"

it, i n a. friendly way

,and where we may have exaggerated Teuton i c

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inj ustice we,as students of history rather than propagandists

,owe it to our

Anglo -Saxon love of fair play to remedy it. On the other hand,some

readers have found the tone of these articles not mild enough to fit thecrimes with which they deal . The Bohemian National Alliance

,for instance

,

has pointed out some supposed errors of fact,or j udgment

,in the article

entitled “Austria and the Bohemians .

” Their statistics show that the numberof Germans in Bohemia is not as here stated

,35 per cent.

,but less than

25 per cent. More important, however, is their obj ection to the statementthat “Autonomous Bohemia within the empire may satisfy all but the mostextreme.” “The fact is

,

” comments the Alliance,

“that the whole nation,

irrespective of party and creed,is,to use your wo rd

,extreme

,and will not

be satisfied with anything but complete independence.” And certainly thefacts seem to support the contention that the great mass of the Czechs arenot to be persuaded into remaining content with autonomy

,despite the

specious pleading of their conservative,reactionary leaders

,who happen

to have greater facilities for bringing their case before the world. "ne

does not die for autonomy,and it is not for autonomy but for ab so lute

freedom that Bohemians are fighting on all fronts,particularly in France ,

where their revolutionary army is fighting side by side with the oth er

allies .

How do we find the peoples whom the reverse of the picture mightpresent as oppressed by E ngland and France" We have seen Bohemians ,Al satians

,Poles

,Cro atians and many others fighting against their rulers .

Do we find any Irish , South Africans , E gyptians , Indians , Moroccans orFrench Canadians on the Teutonic side " Not only does a careful inquiryreveal none ; not only do we find them volunteering by the thousand in aquarrel which might rightly be deemed none o f their concern ( if they didnot look beyond its immediate causes and see civilization at stake ) , but wefind neutrals from every nation rushing to aid—which si de" That whichhas consist ently oppressed every nationality within its borders "

All are fighting to make permanently impossible such an iniquity as theTeutonic persecutions of Danes

,Alsatians

,Poles

,Boh emians, Serbians ,

Roumanians and Ital ians ; none will be content with less . It has been saidthat a peace disrupting Austria on the line of nationality and redeemingfrom Germany her foreign subj ects would leave a sense of inj ury andwounded pride which would force a high spirited nation to resolve onrevenge and to strain every nerve in order to renew the struggle. Butthere is no wish to impose on Ge rmany such conditions as Napoleon imposedon Prussia in 1807. Germany would remain a great and p otent nation ,

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possibly even stronger than before,i f the German parts of Austr ia should

gravitate , as they might well do , towards the German empire .

What is the verdict of history " In theory,a peace without victory

sounds well,but

,as a matter of historical fact

,permanent peac e has never

resulted from such a conclusion to a great war . Take the wars fought inopposition to Louis XIV ’

s attempt to dominate E urope . One after anotherthose wars recurred for 50 years

,and

,none of them having been really

decisive, it was not till 1713 that the peace of Utrecht finally settled thequestion by the defeat of France . The War of the Austrian Succession

,

beginning in 1740, ended in a draw ; the peace o f 1748 was merely a truce .It led to the Seven Years ’ War

,which ended in 1763 with the defeat of

France and Austria,and with the final triumph of Frederick the Great in

E urope and of E ngland in Canada and India . Finally,in the case of the

Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars,coal ition after coalition was formed

and broke up without reaching a definite settlement. The peace of Amiensin 1803 was merely a truce b etween the two chief opponents—E ngland andFrance . It was not till the complete defeat o f France that a settlement wasreached

,which gave E urope repose for forty years. The questions supposed

to be settled by the Crimean War again became acute within a few years .

In fact,the only war which ended in a satisfactory peace without victory

was that of 1812,which aro se out of a comparatively trivial dispute and

ended when,with the cessation o f the war in E urope

,the dispute i tself

came to an end . The great wars which the United States have known , theRevolution and the Civil War

,both ended in decisive victories . Nothing

else would have satisfied either the revolted colonies or the northern states .

E veryone knows how Lincoln repudiated the idea of an inconclusive peacein the darkest days of the Civil War . There never was a more crushingvictory than tha t of 1865—yet peace , permanent and unbreakable , was theoutcome. Peace was maintained because in each case the questions at i ssue

were settled once for all .

When Marshal J offre first set foot on Alsatian soil , he said , in the

simple phrases the very directness of which has won him his election to

the French Academy : “We have come back for good and all ; henceforward

you are and ever will be French . Together with those l iberties for which

her name has stood throughout the ages , France brings you the assu rance

that your own liberties will be respected—your Alsatian liberties , tradi

tions and ways of living . As her representative I bring you France ’s ma

ternal embrace .”

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Can anything be more different than that from the Prussian spirit "

E ven where,as in the case of Russia ’s Baltic -provinces

,she claims them to

be “unredeemed Germany,

” she prefers to be feared rather than loved,and

brings not a maternal embrace , but the mailed fist .

That is why,if peace should be signed without providing fo r the full

restoration of the Teutons ’ oppressed races , it will be temporary ; that iswhy their quarrel and interests are

,in the las t analysis

,ours as much as

anyone ’s .

On March 6th the ka iser telegraphed to Hindenburg : Our Balticbrethren are liberated from the Russian yoke and may again feel themselvesGermans . ” Who are these Baltic brethren who are to have full liberty todetermi ne that they are Germans " In Courland the Germans are less thannine per cent . of the population . In Livonia they are eight per cent . InE sthonia they are less than that . In Lithuania they are less than two percent. But the maj orities

,ranging from 91 per cent . to 9 8 per cent . , will

learn to feel themselves German,or the kaiser will know the reason why .

All pretence has b een cast aside . It is rej ected in the terms of the treatywith Roumania

,which calls for free transport of the Teuton troops through

Roumania and Bes sarab i a to Odessa,the great seaport of our good and

extremelv new friend,the Ukrainian republic .

The Roumanians i n turn,are to receive compensation at Russia ’

s expense for the loss of the D ob rudja and the rectification of their frontiertowards Austria—Hungary . The promise of Bessarabia is contained in th e

stipulation that “as soon as pea ce is restored between Russia and Roumania ,the remaining parts of the Roumanian armv will also be demobilized inso far as they are not required for security service on the Russo-Roumanianfrontier. ” Thus the Junker amuses himself with the new picture puzzlegame of rearranging Russia .

What will have happened to the area and population of the Russianstate when the Junker play boys get through with their little game of selfdetermination . is apparent from the following figures

Areasquare m i les

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P opulation

GrodnoUkraine

Volhyn ia

KholmPod-oliaKievKhersonE katerinoslavKharkovP ol tova

ChernigovMoh i lev

To RoumaniaBessarabia

To TurkeyB atoumE rivanKars

Total .

The b oundaries_

o f the Ukraine and Lithuania towards Russia have notbeen fixed

,and it is not certain in what proportion the provinces o f Minsk

and V olhyn ia will be divided b etween Lithuan i a and the Ukraine , but forRussia and Germany it comes to the s ame thing.

The area. o f the former Russian empire,exclusive of Siberia and

Turkestan,is square miles

,with a population of The

German sword,with the aid of Will iam I l ’

s great ally,has thus determined

to self-determine to its own uses one-fourth the area of E uropean Russ iaand two -fifth s of the population . So if Germany loses th e war in the “Test

,

she is mo re than making up for it in the E ast . Here , then , is a seventh

maj or race to be added to those under Teutonic dom in ation . It is hardthat we should have to fight for a people who are not more worthy of beinghelped

,but the modern crusade must go on until the deluded Russ ian s , too ,

have an adequate chance to work out fo r th emselves whatever dest in y thevcan achieve .

BIBLIOGRAPHIE S

There are several excellent general historie s of E urope in the nineteenthcentury which should be mentioned first

,as material therein applies to all

the preceding articles . Some were published befo re the war, but severalgood ones have appeared since 19 14 , with the new viewpoint added by that

fact.

Davis,W . S . Roots of the War . N . Y.

,19 18 .

Bullard,A . Diplomacy of the War . N . Y.

,1916 .

Seymour,C . Diplomatic Background of the War. New Haven , 191 5 .

Ferrero,G . E urope ’s Fateful Hour . N . Y.

,19 18 .

Rose,J . H . Development o f the E uropean Nations 1870-1914. N . Y.

,

Hazen,C . D . E urope since 181 5 . N . Y.

,19 10 . (The best of all nine

teenth century hi stories . )S eignob os , Charles . Political Hist ory of E urope since 1814. N . Y.

,

Andrews,C . M . Historical Development of. Modern E urope

,1815

1 897. 2 vols . in one . N . Y.

,1898 .

Hayes,C . J . H . Political and Social History of Modern E urope . Vol .

2,1815 -1914. N . Y.

,1916 .

Holt,L . W .

,and A . IV . Chilton . E uropean History

,1862 -1914. N . Y.

,

Apart from E uropean histories,there are some works which apply also

to the general subj ect treated in these essays,works which have appeared

recently enough to be thoroughly up-to-date .

T-oy nbee, A . J . Nationality and the War . N . Y.

,19 15 .

Rose,J . H . Nationality in Modern History . N . Y.

,1916 .

Fisher,H . A . L . The Republican Tradition in E urope . N. Y.

,191 1 .

Ogg,F . A . The Governments of E urope . N . Y.

,1916 ; Social Progress

in Contemporary E urope . N . Y.

,19 16 ; E conomic Development "f Modern

E urope . N . Y.

,1917.

CHAPTE R I

Bismarck , Otto von . Reflections and Reminiscences . 2 vols . London ,

1908 . (Also for Chaps . II and III . )Headlam

,J . W. Bismarck . N . Y.

,1899 . (Also for Chap . II

White , A . D . Chapter on Bismarck in Seven Great Statesmen.N

. Y

Henderson,E . F . History of Germany . N . Y.

,1916 .

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UN IVERSITY OF BUFFA L " BULLETIN (Col lege of Arts and Sciences) quarterlyDEPARTMENT OF MED ICINE , Catalogue and Alumn i D irectory .

COLLEGE OF PHARMACY, Bulletin (quarterly) .DEPARTMENT OF L AW, Annual Announcement and Register.

COLLEGE OF DENTISTRY, Bulletin (quarterly) .BOOKLET OF ILLUSTRATIONS .

A HISTORY OF THE UN IVERSITY, 1846-1917.

Undergraduate Pub l ication—“The Un iversity B ison . Sub script ion

Recent issues of The Un iversity of Buffalo Bulletin have includedApril , 1917 FOOD PREPAREDNESS .

Octob er, 19 l 7—FOOD PREPAREDNESS Bulletin No . 2 : FOOD VALUES( I llustrated ) .

January , 1918—Catalogue Numb er, 1917-1918 .

Apri l , 1918 DRINKING WATER ( I l lustrated) .