1. S4 Japan 2014 Closing RemarksYokogawa Electric CorporationIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 1 -Tatsuaki TakebeAll brand or product names in this document are trademarks or registered trademarks of theirrespective companies.

2. First Self-destructprogram (RichardSkrenta) First Self-replicateprogram (Skrentas ElkCloner) Brain Virusdeveloped by twoPakistanis Yale, Cascade,Jerusalem,Lehigh, etc. KenThompsondemo firstTrojan Horse Fred CohensVAX VirusesProtocol Weaknesses/Buffer overflowIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 2 - Apple II Computer Commodore Atari TI-99 TRS-80 First Wormdeveloped in XeroxPalo Alto FBI arrest 414sHacker Group FirstConceptMacro Virus Stealth virus (Whale) Variable Encryption (1260) Morris Worm Robert T Morrisfined $10K, 3 yearsprobation Code Red Nimda Philippines ILOVE YOUvirus Melissa virus($80m) Excel MacroVirus (crossplatform) Solar Sunrise -Two California Teensattack on 500 Military,Govt, & PrivateComputer Systems(Vul) Slammer Blaster WeiChia MyDoom Sasser Melissas authorsentenced 20 monthsjail DDoS on 13root serversStandalone Systems Disk/Diskette SharingInformation WarfareComputer CrimesTrusted Operating Systems (Orange Book) Trusted Network (Red Book) ITSEC Phishing attacksproliferatedUK Green Book to BS 7799 to ISO 17799 to ISO 27001Common Criteria (ISO 15408)Insecure Default/Weak Security Techniques/Feature Misuse/Social Engineering Spyware Bots Phishingbegins inAOL Cuckoos Eggin LBLCyber Crimes SPAM MailsDiscovery Experimentation Criminal Exploitation 197719781979198019811982198319841985198619871988198919901991199219931994199519961997199819992000200120022003200420052006 Pharmingattacks (DNSpoisoning) Kevin Mitnickarrested, fiveyearsimprisonment ZoTob WMFInternet World Client-server/PC-LAN Networks Wide Web Web 2.0By Meng Chow Kang 3. " Attack Sophistication & Intruder Knowledge" Everybody can be an attacker." Attack tools can be used for the control systems.Stealth/AdvancedScanning TechniquesNetwork Management DiagnosticsSweepersDisabling AuditsMalicious CodeMorphingWWW AttacksAutomated Probes/ScansHijacking SessionsExploiting Known VulnerabilitiesPassword CrackingSelf-Replicating CodeIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 3 -Password GuessingSniffersBOTSDistributed Attack ToolsDenial of ServiceGUIPacket SpoofingHigh1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010Intruder KnowledgeLowAttackersBack DoorsZombiesAttack SophisticationLipson, H. F., Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Issues, Special Report CMS/SEI-2002-SR-009, November 2002, page 10. 4. Security Incidents From The Repository of Industrial Security IncidentsIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 4 -35302520151050198219831984198519861987198819891990199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011 5. " Industrial Control Systems Security CoverageTCIPIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric CorporationISCIISCII3P SCADA LOGIIC AchillesWurld-Tech- 5 -PCSRFAGAPowerOil &GasChemWaterTransportCommReq R&D Dev Test Eval Demo Deploy OperationSCADA SBIRsCSSPCSSPNSTBISA|99API114FERCNERCSP|99ISACIDXChemITCMuDynamicsICSJWG 6. Critical Infrastructure & StdsIEC ISO/IEC/JTC1ISO/IEC 15408, 18045,19790, 24759, 27001,27002(17799)62351-1762443-13NSTBCSSPCPNI(NISCC Tech Note Series)FERC EPRINERC International Govmtl Industry OutcomeNISTSP800-82, 53, 30, 18, 37FIPS 199, 200, 140-2CMVP, CAVPISCII3P LOGIICAPIChemical CIDXR isk M a pA ccessP o licyT o o lE m era ldD E A D B O L TS ecS SH S M T UWater Sewerage IAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 6 -AGAa ccCIP-002-X -009-XAPI 1164AGA12Guidance for Addressing Cyber Securityin the Chemical IndustryIn tellig en tID SINLCyber SecurityProcurementLanguage for ControlSystemsIEEE IE E E -1 4 0 2 ,1 6 8 6DOE 21 Steps to ImproveCyber SecurityUnite PCSFOrganizations &PeopleISA99 WG1-6ISA99.01.01,02.01,03.01,CCEVS,NVLAP(TestLab)Test SpecsTest LabsPCSRFSPP-ICS PPPowerOilGasTransportRailroadTelecommunicationAny 7. " Industrial Control Systems Security CoverageIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric CorporationISCIISCI- 7 -PowerOil &GasChemWaterTransportCommReq R&D Dev Test Eval Demo Deploy OperationISA99 ISA99 8. IAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 8 -8" IEC/ISA 62443 Series structure 9. " ISA 99 organizational structureIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 9 -9 10. IAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 10 -" IEC TC 65 11. Cards & PI BioMetricsIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 11 -" ISOIECSecurityFinancialServicesVocabulary 12. IAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 12 -" ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27SC 27WG 1WG 2WG 3WG 4WG 5ISMSCryptoSecurityEvaluationSecurityControl &ServicesIDMgmnt &Privacy2700X1540819790247602910029101ISA 99IEC TC 65/WG10SC 22/WG 23ISA 99IEC TC 65/WG10 13. IAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 13 -" ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 22SC 22WG4COBOLWG5FortranWG9ADAWG14CWG17PrologWG19Formalprogramming languagesWG21C++WG23Prog Lang VulTR24772SC 27/WG 3 14. Secure IACS and maintain operational security IAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 14 -System Security Compliance MetricsEstablishing an Industrial Automationand Control Systems Security ProgramOperating an industrial automationand control system security programIEC 62443-2-4 practicesIACSsuppliersecuritypoliciesandTargetSecurityAssuranceLevelsforISA 99.01.03ISA 99.02.01ISA 99.02.02ISA 99.02.03ISA 99.03.02 ZonesandConduitsSystem security requirements and securityassurance levelsISA 99.03.03ISA 99.02.01ISA 99.03.02ISA 99.03.02ISA 99.01.03ISA 99.03.03ISA 99.01.03ISA 99.02.02ISA 99.02.03ISA 99.02.01 ISA 99.04.01ISA 99.04.02IEC 62443-2-4IEC 62443-2-4How to fit the entire pieces together? 15. " Compliance" IEC 62443-2-1 ISMS compliance for Asset Owners (62443-2-1 isIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 15 -aligned with ISO/IEC 27001)" IEC 62443-2-4 Vendor/System Integrator Security Maturity 16. Product security IEC 62443-4-1Assurance Sec Rea IEC 62443-4-2Functional Sec ReqIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 16 - 17. ISASecure LevelsCommunication Robustness TestingIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 17 -Software Development SecurityAssessmentFunctional Security AssessmentSoftware DevelopmentSecurity AssessmentFunctional SecurityAssessmentSoftware DevelopmentSecurity AssessmentFunctional SecurityAssessmentLEVEL 1LEVEL 2LEVEL 3Requirements Necessary to AchieveCertification LevelsLevel 1 Level 2 Level 3Total Count inSpecificationSDSA 130 149 170 170FSA 20 49 82 82CRT All All AllCRT Common Specificationplus all 6 Protocol CRTSpecifications 18. ISASecure EDSA Certification ProgramIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric CorporationDetects and Avoids systematic design faults The vendors software development and maintenanceprocesses are audited for artifacts for DUT Ensures the organization follows a robust, secure softwaredevelopment process- 18 -Embedded DeviceSecurity AssuranceSoftware DevelopmentSecurity Assurance (SDSA)Functional SecurityAssessment (FSA)CommunicationsRobustness Testing (CRT)Detects Implementation Errors/Omissions A components security functionality is audited against itsderived requirements for its specified security level Ensures the product has properly implemented the securityfunctional requirementsIdentifies vulnerabilities in device networking capabilities A components communication robustness is tested againstcommunication robustness requirements Tests for vulnerabilities in the 4 layers of OSI Reference Model 19. ISA Security Compliance Institute Document Structure for ProductEvaluation" Similar structure for system evaluation is being discussed now.IAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 19 -19Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp. 20. In order to decrease the chances to be hacked, You need investments Attackers need skill, resources to crack the secure system Lets make an agreement and grade the levelLvl 4IAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 20 -Attackers Skill,Resources,Tools,TimeHow much security?Investment,Efforts,Tech Level,AssuranceLevelChances to getcompromised.Lvl 3Lvl 2Lvl 1 21. " 62443-3-3 System security requirements and security assurance levelsFrom Draft 3 ISA 62443-3-3(99.03.03) Sep 20114. FR 1 Identification and authentication controlTo prevent unauthorized access to device and/or inquiry of its infoTo prevent unauthorized operation of deviceTo prevent tampering dataTo prevent data leakageTo prevent unauthorized information leakageTo notify security violation to authority and to report forensic evidenceTo protect the entire NW resources from DoS attacksIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 21 -5. FR 2 Use control6. FR 3 Data integrity7. FR 4 Data confidentiality8. FR 5 Restricted data flow9. FR 6 Timely response to events10. FR 7 Resource availability21Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp. 22. " 62443-3-3 System security requirements and security assurance levelsFrom Draft 3 ISA 62443-3-3(99.03.03) Sep 20114. Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes anddevices), and allow them access to the system or assets. SL 1 Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes anddevices) by mechanisms which protect against casual orcoincidental access by unauthorized entities. SL 2 Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes anddevices) by mechanisms which protect against intentionalunauthorized access by entities using simple means. SL 3 Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes anddevices) by mechanisms which protect against intentionalunauthorized access by entities using sophisticated means. SL 4 Identify and authenticate all users (humans, processes anddevices) by mechanisms which protect against intentionalunauthorized access by entities using sophisticated means withextended resources.IAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 22 -22Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp. 23. " 62443-4-1 Product Development RequirementsFrom Draft 1 Edit 1 ISA-99.04.01 Jun 20115. Phase 1 Security Management Plan (SMP) SDSA-SMP-1 - Security Management Plan SDSA-SMP-2 - Action Item Resolution SDSA-SMP-3 - Documentation of softwarereleases SDSA-SMP-4 - Development Environment SecurityDocumentation SDSA-SMP-5 - CM System SDSA-SMP-6 - Configuration Management Plan SDSA-SMP-7 - Configuration ListIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 23 -23Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp. 24. " 62443-4-1 Product Development RequirementsFrom Draft 1 Edit 1 ISA-99.04.01 Jun 20116. Phase 2 - Security Requirements Specification (SRS)7. Phase 3 Software Architecture Design (SAD)8. Phase 4 - Security Risk Assessment and Threat ModelingIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 24 -(SRA)9. Phase 5 - Detailed Software Design (DSD)10. Phase 6 - Document Security Guidelines (DSG)11. Phase 7 - Module Implementation & Verification (MIV)12. Phase 8 - Security Integration Testing (SIT)13. Phase 9 - Security Process Verification (SPV)14. Phase 10 - Security Response Planning (SPR)15. Phase 11 - Security Validation Testing (SVT)16. Phase 12 - Security Response Execution (SRE)24Tatsuaki Takebe Yokogawa Electric Corp. 25. ConclusionsIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 25 - Why standards? No security is perfect. Standards are the golden mean agreedupon by the stakeholders. Compliance/Certification givesassurance if something happens. 26. Thank you very muchfor your attentionIAMK014-0411Copyright Yokogawa Electric Corporation- 26 -