Rumeli Ayanlari: The Eighteenth CenturyDeena R. SadatThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 44, No. 3. (Sep., 1972), pp. 346-363.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28197209%2944%3A3%3C346%3ARATEC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-UThe Journal of Modern History is currently published by The University of Chicago Press.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/ucpress.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgSat Mar 22 13:59:55 2008RumeliAyanlari:TheEighteenthCentury Deena R. Sadat RutgersUniversity-Camden College of Art s andSciences TraditionexcludestheOttomanEmpirefromthedynamicmove-mentsofthe eighteenth century.lThe government wasbankrupt,im- competant, and corrupt; and the governed, confronted with the virtual collapseofcivilauthority,becameincreasinglyisolatedandwith- drawn.The relativelyopenOttomansocialstructureofearliercen- turies seemed to solidify.Rolesbecame increasinglyhereditaryon all levelsandinallprofessions;MuslimsandChristiansbegantobe differentiated into rigidlydefinedandseparated millets. Yet, internaldevelopmentsintheBalkanprovincesoftheEmpire duringthe eighteenth centuryindicatethatthistraditionalviewmust bemodified.The commercialrevolution oftheseventeenth andeigh- teenthcenturiescreatedseveresocioeconomicdisequilibrium,and efforts t o assimilate and adapt to the external worldinduced a crisis in values throughoutOttomanBalkansociety.Bytheendofthecentu- ry,newpatternsofsocialorganizationhadevolved,patternsvery similar to those developing elsewhere in eastern Europe. Amongthe mostsignificantinnovations ofthelateeighteenthcen- turywastheemergenceofaseigneurialregimeintheBalkans,a phenomenonlargelyassociatedwiththerisetopowerofagroupof urban notables knownas hyfin. The origins of the hyhn,or thebydnlik as theinstitutionwascalled,remainobscure.Theworditselfisan Arabic plural(a' ydn) designating eminent personalities andwasused torefertofriendsofMuhammad.InTurkish,itmeantthemost distinguishedinhabitant ofadistrict or quarter, literallya" n~t a bl e . " ~ A'yiinare notedinnumeroustowns andvillagesoftheEmpireduring theseventeenthcentury;however,thefirstindicationthattheterm hadacquiredanymorespecificconnotationscameduringthe Austro-Turkishwarof1683-99.At thattime,thetermdy6nwas usedtorefertocertainwealthyindividuals,electedbythepeople, who acted as intermediariesbetweenthelocalpopulaceandofficials 'Portionso fthisarticlehavebeentakenfromD. Sadat,"UrbanNotablesinthe Ottoman Empire: TheAyan"(Ph.D. diss., RutgersUniversity,1969). 2M.Z. Pakalin,"Ayan,"0.smanliTarihDryiinl~,ri r3c, Teri ml oiSiizliigii(I\tanbul, 1947),pp.120-22;"Ayan."IslamAnsiklopedesi(Istanbul, inprogress);"Ayan," EncyclopediaofIslam,"newed. (inprogress); H .A.R. Gi bb andH . Bowen, Islamic SocietyandtheWest (London,1950,1957),1:198-99,256-57,303;B. Lewis,The Emergence of ModernTurkey (London,1961), pp.32-33. Rumel iAyanlari347 ofthePorte,especiallyinmattersoffinance,taxation,andmilitary r e~r ui t ment . ~theelectorsnot Thenatureoftheelectionsandis known, nor are the precise functions of the h'y8n.Whatisclearisthat the6ydnwasinitiallyanurbanfunctionary,whowasreluctantly accepted but not formally recognizedbythe g~ve r nme nt . ~ Oneimmediateresultofthisnew,semiofficialinstitutionwast o shieldsomeofthepeoplesoftheOttomanprovincesfromthefull consequencesofImperialcorruption.OfficialsofthePortewere forced t o modifytheirdemandsinordertoconformto thelimitsset bythelocalnotables,sincedydnwereoftenabletosecurethe removalofaPashawhoignoredtheiradviceandrefusedtotemper avarice withp r ~ d e n c e . ~ Unfortunately,this effectwastransitory,and by1700 the termdydn hadtaken on an ambiguousmeaning.Thus,a treatisewrittenin1703declaresthatoneofthecausesofdisorder and decline is failure to show proper respectfor men ofworth,"a'yiin veagrafvei h t i ~a r . " ~Yetthesametextrefersto2ydnanddyan-i devlet as oppressors andexploiters ofthe p e ~ p l e . ~ For, infact, what- evertheirorigins,thedydnoftheeighteenthcenturygradually evolvedfromanelementofmunicipalgovernmentintoapowerful landed aristocracy. This transformationwaspartofalocalresponsetomoregeneral 3Evliya Celebi, Seyahatname,10 vols. (Istanbul,1898), 2: 195, 4: 175, 5:429; Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Tarih-i Cevdet, 2ded.,10 vols.(Istanbul, 1884-85),4:199;Osman Nuri (Ergin), Mecelle-iumur-u belediye (Istanbul, 1922), pp.1655-58. 41ntheBalkans, it appears thatmost of the 6yEn evolved from the militarycategories fyrrlikt~llari).For ahypothesisregardingthe originsoftheciy6n,seeSadat, pp.1-50; H. Inalcik,"TheNatureofTraditionalSociety,"inPoliticalModernizationinJapan andTurkey, ed.R.E.WardandD.A.Rustow(Princeton,1964), pp.42-63;idem, "Government,Revenues and Taxation intheAnatolianProvinces"(paper delivered at theColloquiumontheMuslimWorldintheEighteenthCentury.UniversityofPenn- sylvania,June28-July2,1971);AvdoSuCeska,"BedeutungundEntwicklungdes BegriffesA' ylnimOsmanischenReich,"SudostJbrschungen25(1966),pp.3-26; idem,"VilaietskiAjani,"Codi.iniakDr~tTtva lstori?ara- ~ o s n r iHercegovinc~13 (1962). pp.167-98. 51nalcik,"AnatolianProvinces";Archive\nationalesdeFrance(Paris),Affaires ktrangkres,sous-serie B"',Papiers de I'ancienbureaudes consulats:Levantet barbarie (hereaftercitedasAN.B1"),241,"ObservationssurI'echelledeSrnyrne,"n.d.(ca. 1779); Archives nationalesdeFrance,Affaires etrangi.res,Correspondancepolitique: Turquie(hereaftercitedasAN), 213,Vidin,M6iagetoTalleyrand,February22, 1807; Travnik, Davidto Talleyrand,April25,1807; G.Olivier,Voyage dams['Empire ottoman (Paris, AnIX),pp.3 11-12; A.de Juchereaude Saint-Denys,Revolutionsde Con.stantinoplec,n1807et1808,2vols.(Paris,1819),1:235asnotetop.180; F. Beaujour,TableauducommercedelaGri ce (Paris,AnVIII),pp.48-49;andL. Svoronos, Lecommercede Salonique nu ~ ~ I I l e s i h c I e (Paris, 1956),pp.8-9. V. L.Wright,OttomanStatecraft,translationofSariMehmedPasha,"Nasa'ih ul-viizeraveI'umera"(Princeton,1935),p.129189(thesecondfigurereferstothe Ottoman text). 71bid., pp.73/15. 77/22,14611 18. 348DeenuR.SadatEuropeandevelopments,theintensificationandextensionofworld commerce,which,particularlyaftermidcentury,becameanin-creasinglysignificant economic factor within theOttomanlands.8 The eastern Mediterranean,which hadsufferedeconomicdeclineafterthe close of the sixteenth century, experienced a revivalin the eighteenth. Trade also developedoverlandviaBelgradeintotheGermaniesand theHapsburgEmpire.Despitemonetaryfluctuations,war,plague, anarchy, and official impediment, profitsderiving from thistrade were considerable. For example, ithasbeenestimatedthat aforeign factor residentinSalonicacouldanticipateanannualnetprofitof200 percent on his investment, while indigenous merchants,providedthey weresufficientlycircumspect,hadevengreateroppor t uni t i e~. ~This commercialrenaissancedidnotleadtointernaleconomicdevel- opment as seen inthe West,for it was largelybasedupontheexport ofagriculturalproductsandrawmaterials.Moreover,thetradewas not due t o surplus productionbut to a rather pure form ofexploitation associated with a changeinthesystem ofland tenure-theexpansion of the so called riftlik regime.1 Theprimarymeaningoftheterm~i f t l i kwastheamountofland thatcouldbeploughedbyateamofoxen.llThesizeoftheunits variedaccordingtolocaleandtotheproductivityoftheland,but essentiallya~i f t l i kwasconceivedt obethatareathatcouldbe workedbyanindependantpeasant.Onpaymentofasetfee(t apu bedeli) the peasant acquiredthe right t o the landinperpetuity,losing itonlyifitremaineduncultivatedforthreesuccessiveyears.In addition to the purchase fee,the peasant paidvariousdues andtaxes, which depended on thenature ofthe fiefor endowment on whichthe giftlikwas located. During theseventeenth century, these distinctions ceasedtobemeaningful,forthepeasanthadtodealwiththetax farmer (miiltezim) regardless of the legalstatus of the land.12 Manyof 8The majorstudyo ftheseeconomicchangesisT .Stoianovich,"TheConquering BalkanOrthodox Merchant,"JournalofEconomicHistory20(June1960):234-3 13. Fora more specializedhistory, seeSvoronos, Lecommerce de Salonic/rte. 9Svoronos, p. 114. 'OT.Stoianovich,"LandTenureandRelatedSectorsoftheBalkanEconomy," JournalofEconomicHistory13,no.4(Fall1953):398-41 1:idem,"Merchant,"pp. 253-55;"Ciftlik," Islam Ansiklopedesi (Istanbul, in progress). ''$'iftmeans pair; cf .Polish morgandGerman Spannfahig. 120n landtenure,seeH. Inalcik,"LandProblemsinTurkey,"MuslimWorld45 (1955):221-28;0. L.Barkan,"TiirkToprakHukukuTarihindeTanzimat,"inTan-zimat(Istanbul, 1940),p p . 321-421;S.Shaw, "The Ottoman Vi ew oftheBalkans,"in TheBalkansinTransition,ed.CharlesandBarbaraJelavich(Berkeley,1963),pp. 56-58;B.Cvetkova, "L' tvolution durtgimefiodalturcdelafinduX V I ejusqu'au milieuduXVIIIesiecle,"Etudeshistoriques1(Sofia, 1960):17 1-203;Gibband Bowen,1:46-63. Rumel iAyanlari349 thesetax-farmingleaseswerepurchasedbydyrin,whogradually converted the taxrevenuesintopersonalincome.13 After1750, they took the further stepofturningthe landitselfintoanextralegalform ofprivateproperty.This wasdone throughthe piecemealacquisition of riftlik deeds and titles from the peasants.14 The originalholdingswereoftensmallandisolated, andthemeans used t o develop and consolidate the estates were many, fromthe legal acquisitionofvacantlandstovarioustypesofextortion.Astheir powerincreased, theyresortedtoarmedmercenaries,largelyAlban- ians,whoofferedprotectiontothepeasantforafeeleviedagainst theharvest.The By8nseizedthelandonthefailuretopaythisand other forms offorcedindebtedness.lSThus,the"GreatFear"ofthe French peasant was a realityin Rumeli. The giftliks,as theyexpanded, were converted to commercialagri- culturewiththeintroductionofnewcashcrops,principallycotton, wool, corn, tobacco, and wheat.16 Itwas on thebasisofthis economy thattheexporttradeflourished,muchofitillegal.Withrareex-ceptions,theexportationofgrainwasforbiddenbytheOttoman government,andstringent measuresofcontrolwereattempted;how- ever,thedyiinengagedinaflourishingcontrabandtrade.Ifofficial authorizationtosellthewheatcouldnotbepurchasedatCon-stantinople, the enforcementofficers ofthePorte couldbeinducedto look away as the grain was trans-shipped on the highseas or from the islandsoftheArchipelago.17Thesepracticesweresocommonthat, bythe end of the eighteenth century, the terms Bydnlikand riftlik had losttheiroriginalmeaning.Thelatter,eveninOttomanlaw,meant 13Cevdet (n.3above),4:214-16;7:96;Wright,pp.124,142 ff.,andonay&, 146/!18;Inalcik,"TraditionalSociety,"pp. 47-48. 14Ay6ninvestedinordinarytaxfarms(iltizam);however,theygottheirrealstart withmalikiineholdings,whichwere for life andwhichcame toberegardedas heredi- tary(cf. Cevdet.7:96; Suieska, "Ayin"[n. 4above], p.5. See alsoIbrahimMansour Efendi,Me'moiressurlaGrPceetI'Albnnie.. . [Paris,18271, pp.342 ff.;Stoianovich, "LandTenure,"pp.400-401;Inalcik,"LandProblems,"pp.224-25;Gibband Bowen,1:256-57). l5AN,215,Ruschuk,GalibEfenditoGen.Guilleminot,September16,1807; MansourEfendi, pp.344-46;G.Iakichitch,"NotessurPasvan-oglu.1758-1807, par I'adjudantcommandantMeriage,"LLIrevueslav1, no.1(May1906): 266-67,vol.2, no.2(November/December1906), p.446; vol.3,no.2(MarchiApril1907), pp.283, 286; Cvetkova. pp.198-201. 16Stoianovich, "LandTenure,"pp. 403-5;Svoronos. pp. 273 ff. 17AN B"',236, "Memoireausujet dc latraitedesbledsdanslesestates duGrand Seigneur,"1706, unsigned.This containsdetailedinstructionsontheartofsmuggling grainoutoftheOttomanEmpire,includingcontactsandsuggestedplacesofren-dezvous;idem,237,MemoirebyM.Causinery,May30.181 1;J. Dallaway,Con-stantinople AncientandModern(London,1797), pp.190-92,289; J. C.Hobhouse. A Journeythrough Al bani a.. . (London,18 13). p. 73; W. M.Leake,Travels inNorthern Greece,4vols.(London, 1835), 3:201-3;and Juchereau,1: 1 17. 350DeenaR.Sadatlarge, commercial, private estates, while hydn hadbeengeneralized to mean the rich and powerful. Itshouldbenotedthat theGya"n werenotthesoleprotagonistsof thenewregime,althoughtheyareclearlythedominantelementsin theEuropeanprovincesoftheEmpire.Localreligiousdignitaries (aqraf) alsosucceededinconvertinglandssetasideasreligiousen- dowments ( vakf )into hereditaryestatesfarmedforrevenue;andthe Phanariotesinalliancewiththelocalnobilitywereintroducinga similar system into thePrincipalities.18In Albania and easternMace- donia,the~i f t l i kswereownedbylocalmagnates,presumablynot hydn, whointhelatter partofthecenturywereforcedtosubmitto theauthorityofTepedelenliAliPashaofJanina.19EveninThrace andMacedonia,thedy6nwereinconflictwithvariousotherin-terests, includingderebey20 and government officialswho occasionally claimed provincialestates for themselvesor for one oftheir cl i enh21 To furthercomplicatematters,thetiya"nlik wasneverhomogenous. There was a clear distinction betweenthe more powerfula^ya^n (hane- dan)andamuch largersecondary groupundertheircontrol.22 There isalsoevidencethatsomeby&n maintainedtheiroriginalmunicipal functions. In addition, at certain times after1770,the titlewassoldto variousindividuals without regard to function. Thisconfusioninnomenclaturemakesitdifficulttoestimatethe 180n thePhanariotes,seeM.Zallony,Es wisur1e.yFanari0te.s(Marseilles,1824); andN. forga,"LedespotismeeclairedanslespaysroumainsauXVIIIesiecle," Bulletinof theInternationalComrni t t e~ofHi.~toricalSciences9(1937):100-115. Asraf(Ulemaandotherreligiousdignitaries)wereactiveintheBalkansbutwere eclipsedbythehykn.Theirrolewasgreaterintheeast,especiallyintheArab provinces (cf. H.Bodrnan, PoliticalFactionsin Aleppo,1760- 1826 [ChapelHill, N.C., 19631; A. Hourani,"TheChangingFace of theFertileCrescentinthe18th Century," StudiuIslamica8[ 19571: 89-122). l9N0tallnotable\wereiTya^n. Othertermsareused(cf.Cevdet.6:291and7:96, whereheusesthetermvucuh).Moreover,someholdersofiltizarnsandgifllikswere Christianmerchantsanddignitaries,esp.kocaba~i(cf.MansourEfendi,p.348;Hob- house,pp.295-96;andB.Cunibert,E.$sai hi.rtoriquesurlesre'volutions. . . dela Serbie . . . (Leipzig,1855), p. 24. =OThedifferencebetweena"y6nandderebeyisunclear.Theywerefunctionally similar, andyetadistinctionisnormallymade.Ithasbeensuggestedthatthosewho heldpowerlegallywereGybn,thosewhogaineditthroughrebellionwerederebey; however, &y$n remained6ydn despiterathercontinualrebellions.Perhapsonewasof urban, the other of ruralorigin, but this is yet to be determined. 21This wasespeciallytrueduringthe1768-74war,whenofficialsofthePortetook advantage of the absence of the iiyc?nandboughtupprovincialtaxfarms andoffices for themselvesor theiragents.Cevdetgivesthisasthemajorreasonfortheseigneurial reactionof the next few decades (Cevdet, 6: 175, 295; 7: 146-49). 22This isreflectedintheextensivealliancesystemsof ayansuchas Tirisnikli-oglu Ismail~ g a ofRuschuk(I. H. Uzun$ar?ili, AlerndarMustufaPasha[Istanbul,19421, pp.8 ff.), andOsman PashaPasvano~luofVidin(Cevdet,6:2 16, 244,29 1-307). Both notonlyledaregionalcoalition,theyalso assumedtherighttoappointintowns subordinate to theircontrol(Cevdet, 7: 147). Rumel iAyanlari35 1 extent ofthe By&-~iftlik regime.However, wecandeterminethatin certainareasoftheBalkansthetownsweredefinitelyunderthe controlofthe dydn attheend ofthe eighteenth century. Theseareas were:Bosnia,theBlackSea coast,andhinterlandfromtheDobruja toEdirne; westwardalong theDanubetoVidin;thenorthernslopes oftheBalkanMountains;thenorthcoastoftheAegeanfrom Giimiilciine(Komatin)toSerez(Serrai);andtheMaritza,Vardar, andStrumaRivervalleys.23Clearly,thedydnlik,likethe~i f t l i k ,tendedt o expandalong theseacoastsandinlandwaterways,further confirmingtheircloseconnectionwiththeexpansionofcommerce. Aswouldbeexpected,thehy6nidentifiedtheirinterestswiththe maintenance of agricultural exports, thus using theirpowerto confirm theincreasingeconomicdependenceoftheEmpireonEurope.(See fig.1.) The governmentcoulddonothingaboutit.Onthecontrary,the outbreakofthewarwithRussiain1768finallyforcedthePorteto recognizetheexistenceoftheiiydn,grantingthemofficialstatusin exchange for otherwise unobtainable men andsupplies.24Long after it hadceasedtobethebasisoftheiractualpower,thegovernment recognizedelectionofhy6nbythe people;the governor(vali) ofthe provinceconfirmingthe electionbytheawardofadocumentknown as hydnlikbuyuruldusuon paymentofafee calleddydniye. The dyhn werecharged withthe administration ofthe township(kaza),making themresponsibleforlocalsecurity,provisioningofthetowns,the collectionoftaxes,andthetraininganddispatchoftroops.Pre-viously, these affairs hadbeen under the jurisdictionofthe Kadi, who wasnowrestrictedt o mattersofMuslim(Seri ) law.Thus, thedy&n received theirdiplomaofinvestiture atalmost thesametimethat the nobles ofRussia were enfranchised byCatherine the Great (1785). 23Stoianovich, "LandTenure,"p.203; AhmedVasifEfendi,"Tarih-iVasif,"voi.4 (IstanbulUniversityLibrary,MSSTY5979),12367b;13272a;Cevdet,6:212-13, 217,293,297,298-305,313;7:96,146.255-56.282-83;8:63;9:2-3;Mansour Efendi, p.xxxii;L.LCger, trans.,"LaBulgariea la finduXVIIIe sikcle:Mtmoires de Sofroni,ev&quedeVratsa,"Me'langrsorientaux,2dser.,9(September1883):393, 408.For theregimeinBosnia,seeMuhammadHadzjahic',"DiePrivilegiertenStadte zur Zeit des Osmanischen Feudalismus,"Suddstforschungen20 (1961):130-58. 24Although alarge regulararmystillexistedonpaper,the governmenthadbecome almosttotallydependantuponlocalmercenaries(Cevdet,6:292-311 : 7:96,146-52, 159,175, 257; Juchereau,1:45-46;AN,204,Pera,RuffintoTalleyrand,Prairial,X;idem,207,Pera.BrunetoTalleyrand,24Nivose,XII; idem,208,Pera,Bruneto Talleyrand,8 Messidor,XII;idem, 209,Pera,ParandiertoTalleyrand,20Nivoseand 29Ventose,XIII). ForthearmyofRumeliin1798,seeCevdet,7:296-97.Forthe entirearmy, seeAN, 2 I1,"Officialnoteonthestate oftheTurkisharmy,"unsigned, n.d.(ca.January1806). Thisprocessbeganduringtheseventeenthcentury(cf.H.Inalcik,"TheHeydayandDeclineoftheOttomanEmpire,"inCambridge HistoryofIslam,ed.P. M.Hol;,A.K.S.Lambton,andB.Lewis,2vols.[Cambridge,19701, 1:342- 50). 352DeenaR.Sadat In most cases, thiswasmerelyarecognitionofthestatus quo, and thegovernmentregulationsactedmainlyas asourceofrevenuefor the vali, who sold the Byrinlikathisconvenience.In1779, an attempt wasmade t o reform the institution.The rightof granting thediploma was removed from thevali, and the methodofcertificationabolished. Instead. the people were to submit the results oftheirelections to the FIG.1.-1, Silivri;2,Corlu; 3, Tekirda'g; 4,UzunKoprii;5 ,Kirklareli; 6, Lulebur- gaz; 7, Gumiilciine; 8,Edirne; 9,Orestias;10, Dimitrovgrad;11,Filibe;12, Pazarcik; 13, Iqtip;14, Yenice;15, Negotin;16,Uskiip; 17, Serez;18, Breznica;19,Kustendil; 20,Dimitrovo;21,Sofia(uncertain);22,Izmail;23,Carmensylva;24,Silistra;25. Kubrat;26,YeniPazar;27.yumnu;28,Herrazgrad;29,Ru s ~ u k ; 30,Zistovi;31, Tirnova; 32,Nigcbolu;33,Gabrovo;34,Lofca;35, Plevne;36,Lom;37. Bcrkofca; 38, Vidin; 39, Bosna Saray. Runzeli Ayanlari353 GrandVizirhimself, who wouldconfirm the %y6ninofficeonlyifan investigation provedhimto beofgoodmoralcharacter worthyofthe confidenceofthe g ~ v e r n me n t . ~ ~ This totallyunrealisticeffort quickly collapsed, and"control"oftheByAnlikwas returnedtothevuli.The nexttenyearsweredominatedbythedialoguebetweenthecentral governmentandtheseautonomous provincialnotables.The concern ofthe government wastoreestablishitssovereigntyover thepeople oftheEmpire,aproblemmorecomplexthantheeliminationofthe hyhnlik.The riseof this parvenufeudalitywasatonce acause anda symptom ofaradicalreorientationintheinterrelationofthegroups, bothMuslimandChristian,whichconstitutedOttomanBalkan society. Themostadverselyaffectedelementwast he.peasantry(rbyu,r e ~ y a ) . ~ ~ Everywhere,excessivetaxationbythefarmers-general was impoverishingthepeasants.On the riftlikestates,theconsequences ofthisfiscalextortionwereparticularlysevere,sincethepayments takeninmoneyorkindwerecompoundedbydemandsforservices. The peasantsnotonlyfurnishedthelaborbutalsothematerialfor any publicrepairsor privateconstructionthebydnwishedto under- take,andtheywerealsorequiredtoquarterandprovideforlocal troops,official and feudal.Moreover, due to thechangeswhichwere takingplaceintheland-tenuresystem,oftenmorethanonelord claimed dues from the same peasants, dues whichwereinmanycases forciblye ~ t r a c t e d . ~ ~ Theseexactions,combinedwiththepolitical disorders attendantupontheusurpationofpowerbythedyiin,had two contradictoryeffects. On the one hand,especiallytowardthe end of the century, peasants begantocommendthemselvestothe protec- tionofapowerfullord,exchangingfreedomforsecurity.Others simplyabandoned theirholdingsandfled,acceleratingthedepopula- tionofpartsofRumeliwhichhadbegunintheseventeenthcentury. The government counteredwithdecreesforbiddingthesettlementof peasantsinIstanbul,andtheshortageofrurallaborincreasedseig- neurialeffortstohindthepeasanttothel a n d . 2 Vselsewherein 25Text inPakalin, p.121. 2"'hechange in thestatus ofthepeasantryisreflectedintheusageofthe termrciya ("flock").Initiallyr 6ya referredto allOttomansubjects outsidethegovernment(thus, uskerver i i yu) . Intheeighteenthcentury, it cametomeanpeasantandwas often used withthead,jective"oppressed."Theuseof4 y atodesignateChristiansubjectsisa nineteenth-century innovation. 27Leake, 3:203;Hohhouse,pp.121,140,410;Beau,jour,1: 130-32;lakichitch, "NotessurPasvan-oglu"(n.15 above),I, no.2(June1906): 420;2.no.2(Novem-berIDecember1906): 446;Lkger,pp.414-16; GibbandBowen,1:253 ff.;Svoronos, pp. 363 ff. 28Cevdet, 7:148:Wright,pp.89,93/45,119174, 76/20 -21;Juchereau,2:302 -3;MansourEfendi,pp.350 - 5 1 ; Iakichitch,3,no.2 (MarchiApril1907): 283,286,288; 354DeenaR.Sadatea\ternEurope,thepeasantslostnotonlytheirlandbutalsotheir mobility; and the resultsin theOttomanEmpireresemble the agricul- turalcolonizationwhich was occurring simultaneouslyin the Austrian andRussian domains. Attempts to immobilize the peasantrywerenotalwayssuccessful. Manyescapedtothe mountainsandrevertedtoasemipastoralform ofsubsistance.Others,bothMuslimandChristian,joinedrobber bands.CalledKlephtsinGreeceandHaiduksinSerbia,theywere prevalentthroughouttheBalkans,andtheproletarianizedvillage leaders ofadispossessedpeasantrymadebrigandageacharacteristic of the times.29 Whenalliedwiththe authorities, these armed peasants could be asignificantelement oforder. The Pasha ofBelgradearmed SerbianpeasantstocounteracttheMuslimfeudality;andArmatoli, disarmed anddisbanded duringthe eighteenthcentury,seemtohave beenreestablishedintheirofficialfunctionsinAtticaaslateas 18Basically, however,most peasants wereafraidandalienated, susceptibletorevolutionaryuprising,butessentiallyinarticulate.31 Thebrigands,byaddingtotheconfusion,abettedthecauseofthe f e ~ d a l i t y . ~ ~ To the iiydn, astate ofcontrolled andmodulated anarchy was essential bothtomaintaintheirintimidationofthe peasantryand sustain their independence of action against the central government. Ifthepeasantswerethevictims,themerchantswerethenatural allies ofthe iiy6n. The historicalroleoftheGreekmerchants as the disseminatorsoftheEnlightenmentineasternEuropeshouldnot obscuretheirfundamentallyconservativeorientation.Evenat the timeoftheGreekWarofIndependence,merchantsexchangedone feudality for another, aligningthemselves withthePhanariotes.Their alliance with the Bydnwas builtuponamutualinterestinthe colonial Leger,pp.409-15; Stoianovich,"Merchant,"pp.254ff;F. D.H. L.Pouqueville, Voyageen Morbe . . . (Paris,1805), p.121; ANB"1,239."Reporton the Commerce of theBlackSea,"unsigned,1771.ForrhetextofadecreebySelim111bindingboth peasants andtownsmen,see Vasif,4: 109, 54a and54b. 29Cevdet,6:214,216,244,295;7:95-96,146,282;AN, 204.Pera,Ruffinto Talleyrand,16Floreal,X;idem.,207,Pera,Bruneto Talleyrand,18Brumaireand24 Nivose,XIII;Hobhouse,pp.149-52,whichincludesavividdescriptionoftheman- nersandcustomsofthebrigands.SeealsoT. Stoianovich,AStudyinBulkanCiv- ilizariotz(New York,1967), pp.141-44. 30Hobhouse, p. 479; LCger,p.419;AN204,Pera,Kuffinto Talleyrand,14 Thermi- dor, XIII.31The economicexploitationandincreasingserfdomprovokedatleastonearmed peasantrebellion.ItoccurredintheKraina,anareanorthwestofVidin,in1806 and wassavagelyputdownbytheholderoftheestates,OsmanPashaPasvano~l u(Ia- kichitch,2, no.2 [NovemberiDecember19061: 446). 32A~~6n oftenencouragedandaidedthebrigands(Cevdet, 6:298,304-5;7:95.148, 282;Vasif,4:12367b;AN210,Pera,ParandiertoTalleyrand,2and14Thermidor, XI I I ;idem, 2 lI, Rodosto,Salvatore toRuffin, April16 and22,1806). R~rrnel i Ayanl ari 355 trade. As longas theBydnwereable to fulfill theirfunctionofsupply andprotection,theyandthemerchantssharedacommunalityof vested interests. While one prosperedthe other thrived.33 Justasthecommercialrevivaldidnotleadtogeneraleconomic expansion in the Empire,so, too,this protobourgeoismerchantgroup didnotreallyassume the characterofaWestEuropeanthirdestate. When it came, self-awareness assumedaparticularist,nationalistcol- oration. This was largely due to the ethnic, linguistic,andculturalgap betweenthetownsandtheircountryside,complicatedinOttoman societybythereligiousdiversityofthepopulations.Politicalcondi- tionsaugmentedthisalienation,forthedisordersencouragedbythe notables madelocalcapitalinvestmentprecarious,whileconspicuous consumption and/or investmentwas discouraged bythe Turkish habit ofconfiscation.Thus,theenterpreneurialfunctionwasassumedby the state itself, or bythe aristocracyon the basisofservile labor, and intheeighteenthcenturyremainedofmarginalsignificance.Com- mercialcapitalwaseitherreinvestedintradeorsentabroad.The merchants,particularlytheGreeks,maintainedcoloniesinmostof the majorEuropean commercial centers.34 As far as the peopleofthe Empirewere concerned, thelackoflocalidentification on the partof themercantileclass confirmedtheexploitativerelationshipbetween townandcountry, accenting thepolarizationofsocietyintothepos- sessing and the dispossessed. This divisionofsocietywasnotonlybetweentheruralandurban elementsbutalsowithinthecityitself,wheretherewasanabsolute conflict of interest between the Bybn and the artisans. Of allthe urban groups,theartisanswerethemostimmediatelyaffectedbythein- trusionofthe modernon the medievaleconomy. The basicproblems ofinflationandfiscalmismanagmentwerenotpeculiartotheOtto- manEmpire.However,thesituationtherewascompoundedbya combination ofsevere urbanunemploymentandacontinuousrisein commodityprices,inducedbycurrencymanipulationandachronic shortageofgrain.35 Sincegrainshortageswereoftenduetoillegal 33Leake, 3:203;Hobhouse,pp.620-21;Dallaway,pp.199 ff.;Iakichitch,3,no.1 (January/February1907):138; 3,no.2(MarchIApril1907): 282-83;BarondeTott,Me'moires,4vols.(Maestricht,1785), 2:145-46;ANBjlJ,241,"Observationssur I'echelledeSmyrne,"1779, unsigned;idem,242,"CommercedeLevant,"n.d.(ca. 1788), unsigned. 34Stoianovich, "Merchant."pp.294-96,306 ff.; Svoronos,pp.273 ff.,351 ff.The predominance of Christian merchantsisitselfan innovationoftheeighteenthcentury. See the commentsbyH.Inalcik, "CapitalFormationinthe OttomanEmpire,"Journal of Economic Hi.rtory 29, no.1(March1969): 97-140. 35Stoianovich, "Merchant,"pp.255-56:idem,"LandTenure."pp.399-400;Svo-ronos, chap. 4;M.Shaw, The Ottoman Empire from1720- 1734 (Urbana,Ill.,1944). 356DeenaR.Sadat exportation, this exacerbatedconflicts between artisans and both mer- chants and a^ya^nthroughoutthe century. In fact, many"revolutions" werebreadriots and/or guildrevolts, for the free-trade aspirationsof thedydnandthebasicweaknessofthecentralgovernmentleftthe artisans u n ~ r o t e c t e d . ~ ~Anotherproblemwhichdevelopedduringthisperiodandfurther dividedurbanallegianceswasgrowingtensionbetweentheMuslim andChristianelementsofsociety.Thiswasparticularlynoticeable withintheguilds, whichhadremainedinterconfessionalatleastuntil the end of the seventeenthcentury. Relations graduallyworsened,the twogroupstooktomeetingseparately,andeventuallynon-Muslims beganto elect their ownguildofficers.Finally,lateintheeighteenth century, Christians insome of the guilds requestedpermission tohold their festivals~ e p a r a t e l y . ~ ~ The causesofthis phenomenonare yetto bedetermined.PartoftheproblemmayhavebeentheMuslims' growingsenseofthreatfromRussiaandAustria,combinedwitha tendencyforsomeoftheOttomanChristiansubjectstocooperate withtheenemy.Equallyifnotmoreimportantwastheeconomic crisis,leadingtheMuslimmajoritytotrytolimitcompetitionby forcing the minorities out ofthe urban economy. Partlyas a result ofthis divisioninsociety, the conflict ofinterests amongtheurbanelementsdidnotleadtothedevelopmentofa class-orientedbourgeoisieorofanurbanproletariat.Ontheone hand, the wealthierChristians, forcedout ofthe traditionaleconomic relationshipsandexcludedfrom the landgrab ofthe late seventeenth andearly eighteenth centuries, increasinglyentered trade, whichrein- forcedtheirextraterritorialaffiliations.This,combinedwiththecor- ruption ofthe church andthe hellenizingpoliciesoftheGreekPatri- archate,ledtoanincreasinglysecularorientationwhicheventually combined with massdiscontentamongthe peasantry and ledtorevo- lution. The Muslims responded differently, first, because they couldidenti- fyethnicallyandculturallywiththedominantgroupsand,second, becauseofthe nature ofTurkish Islam. The decayandcorruptionof the"religiousinstitution"didnotleadtoasecularizationofMuslim societybuttoamoreovertexpressionofreligiousheterodoxy,the traditionalIslamicformofsocialpr0test.3~Thisreactionwasnot uniform.OnthemarchesofEurope,thereligiousrevivalwasBek-36Cevdet, 6:214- 15; 7 5 2 ;Svoronos, pp. 9,31; AN204,Pera,RuffintoTalleyrand, Prairial,X;idem,209,Pera,ParandiertoTalleyrand.18Germinal,XIII; idem,2.14, Constantinople, Sebastiani to Talleyrand, June 9 and28,1807. 37Gibb andBowen, 2:289. 38ThistendencywasevidentthroughouttheMuslinWorldfromtheJihadsof sub-Sahara AfricatoWahabbipuritanisminArabia.Forthehistoricalbackgroundof Rumel iAyanlari357 tashiandinterconfessional.Elsewhere,itassumedamoremilitantly Muslim character.But everywhereMuslims sought salvationinprivi- lege. TheenrollmentofMuslimartisansintheJanissarycorpsgave themstatus, includingtherighttobeararms.39 Thus,theeconomic dislocations didnotresultinadivisionof theguildsinto journeymen and masters evolving into classes. Rather, it strengthened the need for corporate integration, allowingthe Muslimartisans notonlyto identi- fy with the guildmasters butalso withthe a^ya^n.What evolved wasa strangetriangleofJanissary-guild-hyan.InfusedwiththeBektashi mystique, these groupssetouttopreservethestatusquoinalliance withthetraditionalreligiousauthorities,whosememberswerealso agriculturalentrepreneurs.Howtheserelationshipsoperatedisnot clear, nor weretheyconsistent.OftentheJanissarylartisansrevolted againsttheirown Agusandthebyin,whiletheByilnwereincom- petitionwiththe Agasandappearedat timeswillingtosacrificethe corpstotheirowninterests.40 Moreover,whiletheBektashiand Janissarieswereconsolidatingtheirreactionarycoalitionwithor-thodoxy,thesameDervishorderwasexperiencingarevolutionary, interconfessionalrevivalin Albania and northernB~ l g a r i a . ~ ~Thesecontradictionarenoteasilyresolved,andconditionsinthe OttomanEmpireinthe1780sareoftendescribedaschaoticor anarchic. Yet, ifwe abstract the essence of change from the confusion indetail,itisan anarchywithapatternthatbearsastrikingresem- blancetochangeswhichwereoccurringsimultaneouslyinPoland, Russia,andinpartsoftheHapsburgt e r r i t o r i e ~. ~~The qiftlikregime suchmovements,seeC1.Cahen,"Mouvementspopulairesdanslesvillesde1'Asie musulmaneaumoyenage:milice,etassociationsdeFoutouwwa,"Recueilsdela Soclete'JeurtBodin,vol.7, Laville(Brussels,19551, pp. 273 -88; F.Taeschner and CI. Cahen,"Futuwwa,"lslamAnsiklopedesi(Istanbul,inprogress);G.Arnakis,"Fu- tuwwa Traditions in theOttomanEmpire; Akhis,Bektashi DervishesandCraftsmen," JournalofNearEasternStudies12(October1953): 232-47;B.Lewis,"TheIslamic Guilds,"EconomicHistory Review 8, no.1 (November1937): 20-37. 39The processbywhichJanissaryandartisanfusedinto one categoryremainstobe studied.Foradescriptionoftheresults,seeGibb andBowen,1:276-95;andI.M. D'Ohsson,Tableau ge'nhrale de ['empire othoman, 7 vols.(Paris,1788-1824), vol. 7. 40Sadat, pp.188-89.This ambivalenceis demonstrated duringtherevoltofMustafa Pasha Bayraktar, describedbelow. 41Sadat, pp.146-51.TheconnectionbetweenJanissary,Bektashi,andguildwas perhapsasoldastheEmpire.See,Arnakis,"Futuwwa,"andGibbandBowen, 158-59, 64-65,283,and285.For theBektashiin general andtheirexpansionduring thisperiod,see J. K.Birge,The BektushiOrder ofDervi.shes,2ded.(London,1965); andF.Hasluck, Christianityandlslam underthe Sultans,2 vols.(Oxford,1929), esp. 2586-96.42Fordevelopmentsin these states see the excellentbibliographyin L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since1453 (New York,1958), pp.887-93;andW.H.McNeill,Europe's SteppeFrontier,1500- 1800 (Chicago,1964), an interpretivestudywhichalsoincludes abibliographic essay. 358DeenaR.Sadat intheOttomanEmpirereflectsacharacteristicfeatureofeastern Europeintheeighteenthcentury,thedevelopmentofagricultural capitalismbasedon the introduction ofnewcrops andtheexpansion ofserfdom. The growingexportmarketforagriculturalcommodities reinforcedthis trendandencouragedthe growthofamerchantclass whichinmostcountries oftheEastwasofforeignorigin.Thisnew economysustainedtheprivilegedpositionoftheeasternEuropean aristocracy,apositiontheywerepreparedtodefendforcibly.Atthe sametime,the gapbetweentheurbanandruralelementsofsociety widened, as the peasantry,alienatedand enserfed,increasinglyturned to flight, rebellion, or millenarian visions. TheRussiancolonizationoftheUkraineofferstheclearestex-ampleofthesetransformations;however,theevolutionoflandlord, serfandmerchantwasrepeatedinmostpartsofeasternEurope, includingthe OttomanBalkans.Detailsvaryevenbetweenprovinces withinthesamepolity,andthedifferencesbetweentheOttoman, Hapsburg,andRussianexperiencesweresignificant.However,the es4entialdifference was in therelativestrength ofthevarious govern- ments.Thus, theexpansion ofcommercialagriculture, whichinRus- sia andAustria wasencouragedbythestateandprotectedbyImpe- rialgarrisons,waseffectedintheOttomanlandsbyprivateinitiative supportedbyprivatemercenarytroops,althougheveninthisthe dy6nresembledthePolishmagnateswhoalsoactedontheirown initiative.Moreover,intheOttomanEmpire,aselsewhere,theat- tempt to readjusttothese newconditionsprovokedapoliticalcrisis, whichinthe West destroyedandintheEastconfirmedthemedieval world. Thecrisisoriginatedintheactivitiesofthecentralgovernment. ThereformeffortsoftheOttomansintheeighteenthcenturyare normallythought ofas entirelymilitary;however,themilitaryweak- ness of the Empire was recognizedas being only part of a much larger problem. Like all the monarchies of Europe, the Ottomans were faced withafiscalcrisisofincreasingmagnitude;andthemeasurespre-viouslyadoptedtorestoresolvency -confiscation,increasedinternal tariffs,anddeliberateinflation-merelyaggravatedtheproblem.To operate,evenwithoutreform,thecentralgovernmenthadtoregain controlofthefinancialresourcesofthestate,whichmeantbreaking thepoweroftheprovincialnotablesandotherprivilegedgroups within the Empire. ThiswastranslatedintopoliticalactionbyGrandVizirHalil Hamid(1782-85). Apartfromtheintroductionofnewmilitarytech- niques and educational institutions, he attempted to deal directlywith thebasicproblemofthefeudality.In1785, byImperialdecree,the Rumel iAyanlari359 ayznlik was abolished. Instead, the people of the townsweretoselect one of their elders to represent them, who would thenreceivethe title yehirkethudasi.Inattemptingthisreform,theGrandVizirbadly miscalculatedhisstrength.Thepowerofthenotablesremainedun- diminished,andthe~ e h i r kethudasilackedtheprestigetofunction without the assistance andsupport ofthe iiyhn.Localaffairsbecame confused, and government business (presumably tax remittances) was neglected.Withtheoutbreakofwarin1787, theresurrectionofthe iiyiinlikbecameunavoidable,becausemercenariesofthe6y6nwere themainmilitarysupportavailabletotheregime.Byadecreeof November1790 the dy6nlik was officially restored.43 The result of the governmenteffortwastomakethedyhnmoreconsciousoftheir independence and power, andtheyassumed and exercisedan author- ity more absolute than before. Two years later, the challenge was renewed, thistime ina far more serious effort. In1792-93,Sultan Selim I11 issuedaseries ofdecrees knowncollectivelyastheNi zam-i cedid(NewOrder).44 Generally associatedwith the militaryregimentthat borethatname,thedecrees prescribed a far-reaching programoffiscal and administrativereform. One ofthe initial concerns oftheSultan wastorationalizethefinan- cialbasisofthestate,ifonlytofundthisnewmilitaryregiment. Currencyreformswereinstituted, andanewtreasury(Irad-i cedid) wascreatedtoreclaimtax-farmingleaseholdsandreceivecustoms duties directly. In addition, certain military fiefs were confiscated, and trade,especiallythegraintrade,wastobecontrolled.Therewasa tentativeessayatstate-sponsoredindustrializationwhichconcen-tratedonthefoundingofpowderandpapermills;and,toregain control of trade from the Greeks,Selim I11 triedto limitthe capitula- tions andeventodevelopaTurkishmerchantmarine.These efforts werelogicallyextendedtoincludeadministrativereform,sincethe anachronisticandswollenOttomanbureaucracywasincapableof adjustingtocontemporaryrealities.Withoutgoingintodetail,the 43Text inPakalin(n. 2 above), p.121. 4 4 0 ~ r purposeis todiscusstheNizam-icedidas acounterpointtotheactivitiesof the8ydn.Therefore,wehaveavoidedadetaileddescriptionofthereforms.The regulationscan befoundinCevdet,vol.6;Vasif,vol.4; Juchereau,vol.1; Mahmud Rayf,Tableaudestzouveauxr6glement.rde/'Empireottoman(Istanbul,1798); E.2. Karal,SelimIIIiinHat-tiHumayunlnri:Nizam-i Cedid(Ankara,1942).ForSelim 111'sdecreeregulatingtheZly$n,seeOsmanNuri(n.3above),pp.1660-61.The firmans seekingtolimitthecapitulations are giveninAN21 1, anddatedJanuary1I ,February12, andMay 3,1806. On the reign ofSelim111, see S. J. Shaw. Between Old andNew: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim 111 1789-1807(Cambridge, Mass., 1971); idem,"TheOriginsofOttomanMilitaryReform:TheNizam-icedidArmyof SultanSelim111,"JournalofModernHistory37,no.3(September1965):291-302; idem, "TheEstablishedOttomanArmyCorps underSelim111,"DerIslam40(1965): 142-84. 360DeenaR.Sadat importofthenewregulationswastolimittenureofofficeandre-establishresponsiblegovernmentintheprovincesaswellasinthe capital. Obviously,the\eregulationswerewelldesignedtooffendevery vestedinterestintherealm,andtheresultswerepredictable.The Sultan hadnorealbase ofpower.There werereformersandbureau- crats intheOttomanEmpirewhocouldidentifytheireffortswiththe activitiesofthestate.Therewereevenindividualsamongthearis- tocracywhosupportedSelim111.IsmailBey,AYdnofSerez,and especiallySiileymanBeyCapanoglu,DerebeyofCentralAnatolia, vigorouslyassistedintheapplicationoftheNewOrderwithintheir domains; however, the domains remained theirs. Without either popu- lar or militarysupport, the Nizam-i cedid was unenforceable. Theresultsweretoencouragethefeudalitytogreaterexcesses. Thea"y$n, althoughneverformallyorganized,begantoactasa corporateentity,takingcollectiveactionagainstanyattemptofthe governmenttoviolatethestatusquo.TheJanissariesofRumeli openlyrevoltedanddefeatedaregimentofthenewtroopssent againstthem;andbothiiya"nandJanissaryAgashiredgangsof brigandsandmercenarysoldiers toterrorizeanddominatethecoun- t r y ~ i d e . ~ ~ It was this seigneurialreactionwhichled to the rearmingof theSerbs andoftheGreek armatoli, anditwasthisreactionwhich provokedthe Serbs into r e v o l ~t i o n . ~~Finally, on May29,1807, using the Serb revoltand French influence and intrigues as their excuse, the coalitionofiiya^n,Janissary, andufema deposedSelimI11 andraised MustafaIV to the S ~ l t a n a t e . ~ ~The triumphofthe ancien rdgime wasnotquite complete.In June 1808,MustafaPasha,calledBayraktar,bybnofRusquk(Ruse), marchedtoEdirne.ThereheassembledtheentirearmyofRumeli, estimatedat40,000menand,raisingthebanneroftheProphet, marchedon Constantinople(July23).On July26,heappointedhim- 45The tendencytotakecollectiveactionwasespeciallyevidentbetween1800 and 1808 (Cevdet, 7:146-54,174, 255-56;8:63-65;Juchereau,2:27-34;lakichitch,1, no. 2[June19061:425;AN204,Adrianople,n.d.[ca.18021,"LapositiondelaRou- melie.. ."; idem,206,Sebastiani,"Etatactuelde 1'Ernpireottoman,"n.d.[ca.18021; idem,212,Pera,Ruffin to Tallevrand, July25 and30,1807; Sebastiani toTalleyrand, August25,30,andSeptember21,1807; 1.H. Uzun~argili,AlemdarMustafaPasha [Istanbul, 19421, p.12). 4 Th ecausesoftheSerbrevoltaregenerallyrecognized,althoughnotallwould agree that the JanissaryAgas were infact ciyhn.Butsee L.vonRanke,The Historyof Servia andthe Servian Revolution. . . (London,1853), p.74, wherehe callstheDahis of Belgrade "Tschitluksahibis,"a corruption of giftliksahibi, and notes this as theirreal tyranny. 47Cevdet, 8:143-88;Hobhouse,2:1027-34;Juchereau,2:103-43;AN214,Con- stantinople,Sebastiani to Talleyrand, May27,28, and June 9,1807. Rumeli Ayanlari36 1 self CommanderinChief(Serasker) oftheImperialArmedForces andonJuly28investedthePalace,forciblytooktheSultan'sseal from the GrandVizir, and,since Selim I11 hadbeenmurderedinthe interval,elevatedMahmudI1tothethrone.48 Thisactionofthe Bayraktar wasnotan outgrowthofthe Janissary-artisan clique ofthe capital:itwasanaristocratic movement,undertakeninalliance with theGrandVizirandvariousAnatolianaycin.49 Further,thecoup d'CtatwasmadeinthenameofSultanSelimI11andtheNizam-i cedid. It issurprisingtofindsuchresidualstrengthinthereformmove-mentandperhapsmoresurprisingtofinditpersonifiedbyMustafa PashaBayraktar.He wasan aydn, a JanissaryAka,andlatelyCom- manderinChiefoftheImperialforcesontheDanube.Hehadnot beenan active member oftheoppositiontoSelim111, and,afterthe uprisingatEdirneandagain afterthe depositionofSelim111,hehad receivedreformistrefugeesatOntheRus~uk. ~Ootherhand,the Pashawasnotedforhistendencytowardindependantaction,and, untilhisappearancebeforethewallsofConstantinople, hehadnot beenidentifiedwiththereformparty.Moreover,onceinpossession ofpower,theBayraktardidnotsimplyrevivetheNizam-icedidbut demonstrated his own concept of the needs and nature of the State. Given the absolute necessity for reform, MustafaPasha wasaware thatanyfundamentalrevisionwasimpossiblebyadministrativefiat, sincealleffectivepowerhadpassedtoprovincialnotableslikehim- self. His solutionwas tosummon a council of his peers.In September 1808,lettersweresenttoallthemajorhy&nandPashasofthe Empire, announcing the convocation ofa general consultativeassem- bly(Meclis-i megveret) tobeheldatthebeginningofOctober.The dyhn and derebey weretoappearinpersonor sendan agentwith full powerstodiscussandagree uponaprogramfor the resolutionofthe major problems of the state.51 MustafaPasha'smajorproposalwasmilitary,asanecessaryfirst stepforanyotheractivity.He laidbeforetheassemblednotablesa 48Cevdet, 8:298-3 1 1; Juchereau,2: 164- 80;A. Miller,MusrafaPashaBayraktar (Moscow, 1947). 49This wasrecognizedat thetime(Juchereau,2:188-89;Cevdet,9:3;H. Inalcik, "Sened-iIttifak veGiilhane Hatt-i Hiirnayunu,"Belleten28,no.112 [October19641: 604). SCevdet, 8:298-99;Juchereau,2: 164- 67. SICevdet,9:2-3;Juchereau,2:197-201.ThereissomeindicationthatMustafa Pashaconceivedoftheideaofafeudalconfederationbeforethecoupof1808. In December1806, he wassaidto have proposeda"ConfederationoftheDanube"to include all the rlyrln. This was even before thePorte declaredwaron Russia(AN 213, Warsaw, Talleyrandto Napoleon,January 9,1807). 362DeenaR.Sadat planforareformoftheJanissarieswhichwouldhaveeffectively destroyed the corps from withinbyisolatingthe hardcore ofregulars andremovingartisansfromtherolls.Theconfirmationofthe rights and privileges of the provincialaristocracy wentalong withthis de facto eliminationofthe Janissaries. As aresultofthismeeting,an alliance(sened-i ittifak) wasdrawnup,signedbyallthosepresent, and proclaimedas law bythe Chief ThisalliancewasanattempttoreestablishtheImperiumonthe basisof acontractual agreementbetweenthe provincialnotablesand the crown, a concept totally alien to Ottoman experience, but reminis- centoftheconservativeaccommodationattemptedinPolandand achieved byRussia andAustria. The Sultan wasnot adirect partyto the agreement, since he ruledbydivine right; however, theseparation ofthe Sultan-Caliph fromthepoliticaladministrationwouldineffect facilitatesecularinstitutionalreforms.Theirrifakrepresentsacom- pletelynewconcept inOttomanpoliticaltheory, aformalrecognition ofthe rightsandobligationsofthe governmentand ofthesubjects of therealm,definedintermsofawrittencontractapartfromthe MuslimHolyLaw(Ser'i). Itwasaninnovationthatwouldhave implicitly altered the very essence of the State. Infact, thesened-iittifakwasneverputintoeffect.Mostofthe ilyilnandderebeywithdrewbeforethesigning,unwillingtoaccept limitationsuponwhattheyregardedas theirabsolute rights.Mustafa Pasha, foolishly takingthe agreementat face value,allowedthe army ofRumelitobreakcampafterthesigning.OnlyhisownAlbanian regulars remainedinthe city, while AbdurrahmanKadiPasha,Selim Ill' sserasker,held~s ki i dar . OnNovember14,1808,thedaythe armywithdrew,the6ydnofBulgariamovedagainstRus ~ukand Edirne, and the Janissaries andmobsofConstantinople rose inrebel- lion. The Bayraktardied inthe first momentsofthe revolt,and, inby farthebloodiestofthethreesuccessivecoups,theNewOrderwas annihilated.53 Two generations later, after the Janissaries and the dy6n hadfinally beendispossessed,theYoungOttomansweretolookbackwith regretatthepassingofthebydn.Theyfeltthatthe6y6nwerean essentialfactorinthebalanceofpowerofthestate,andthattheir destructionmeant the isolationof the governmentand its bureaucracy fromitsownprovincialresources,humanandotherwise. Thisisthe same fundamental miscalculationthat destroyedMustafaPashaBay- 52The textis in Cevdet, 9:278-82,with aFrenchversion in Juchereau,2:201-7.For adiscussionofthe Sened-iItrifak,seeH. Inalcik,"Sened-iIttifak,"pp.604-9;idem, "TraditionalSociety,"pp.52-53;andN.Berkes,The DevelopmentofSecularismin Turkey (Montreal,1964), pp. 90-91. 53Cevdet, 9:27-30;Juchereau, 2:217-37;Hobhouse;2:1034-45. Rumeli Ayanlari363 raktar.Theseurbannotableswerenotaconstitutivefactorinthe state butexisted apart from it and incontradictiontoit. The ittifak of theBydnofRus ~ukofferedtheopportunityforthemtoassumea functionparalleltothatoftheRussianorAustrianorHungarian nobility.However,thenotablesrejectedtheentireconceptoftheir powerasderivativefromorpertainingtothestate.Thea*ya^n of RumeliassembledatTekfurdagresembledthePolishhighnobility meetingat TargowicatoperservethelibertiesofthePolishnation. Not surprisingly, Catherine the Great wasable to regardbothPoland and Turkey as objects for partition. One commentremains.Anexaminationofthesocialandpolitical realitiesoftheBalkansintheeighteenthcenturyunderlinesthefact thattheOitomanEmpirewasamajorEuropeanpower,sharingthe dynamics, the tensions,the rhythmofthe MediterraneanWorld.The confrontationbetweenSelim111 andthedydn andtheeffortsofthe Bayraktarto gaincorporate recognitionfor hisown"estate"wasnot auniqueandisolatedperformancepeculiartotheTurksbutoneof many"relatedproductsofacommonimpulse."54 The OttomanSul- tansharedtheadministrativeandfiscalproblemsofhiscolleagues, and the dyan echoed the ambitions of their European peers. There are differencesintheOttomanexperience: thecomplexconfigurationof urbanloyaltieswhichisstillnotfullyunderstood;themystiqueof Islam, notas astatic tradition,butas avigorousexpressionofsocial protest;the$ydnthemselvesasnewcomers,relying,notonlawor precedent,butalmostexclusivelyonforce; and,theextremeweak- nessofthecentralgovernmentwhichwastheessentialqualitative difference. The service nobility had longsince emancipateditself, and themilitarywasasource ofweaknessratherthanofstrengthtothe central authorities. Yet even these differences werenotso extreme as theybecameinthenineteenthcentury,whenthedialoguebetween East and West assumed a very different texture. It wasnotafailuretoreacttothegeneralcrisisbutafailureto respondfully thathelpedcreatethatdifference.For,intheOttoman Empire as elsewhere, the premature efforts ofSelimI11 consolidated the opposition, and the lack of any effective agency of coercion onthe part of the state forced retreatrather thancompromise. Yeteventhat retreat was temporary. Within twentyyearsofthedeath ofSelim 111, Sultan MahmudI1 wasabletodestroytheJanissaries,theBektashi, the Aydn, andthe Derebeyandredefinethenatureandthestructure of the state. 54R. R.Palmer,TheAgeoftheDemocraticRevolution:APoliticalHistoryof EuropeandAmerica,1760- 1800,2vols.(Princeton,N.J.,1959,1964),1 :9.Fora bibliographyon the"western"or"Atlantic"revolutionoftheeighteenth century,see Palmer,"TheImpactoftheFrenchRevolution:RecentInterpretations,"TheNine- teenth Century World, ed. S. Metraux andF. Crouzet (New York,1963), pp. 44-85. You have printed the following article:Rumeli Ayanlari: The Eighteenth CenturyDeena R. SadatThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 44, No. 3. (Sep., 1972), pp. 346-363.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28197209%2944%3A3%3C346%3ARATEC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-UThis article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from anoff-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Pleasevisit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.[Footnotes]8The Conquering Balkan Orthodox MerchantTraian StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 20, No. 2. (Jun., 1960), pp. 234-313.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28196006%2920%3A2%3C234%3ATCBOM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R10Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800Traian StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Autumn, 1953), pp. 398-411.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28195323%2913%3A4%3C398%3ALTARSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G14Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800Traian StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Autumn, 1953), pp. 398-411.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28195323%2913%3A4%3C398%3ALTARSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G16Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800Traian StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Autumn, 1953), pp. 398-411.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28195323%2913%3A4%3C398%3ALTARSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Ghttp://www.jstor.orgLINKED CITATIONS- Page 1 of 3 -NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.18The Changing Face of the Fertile Crescent in the XVIIIth CenturyA. HouraniStudia Islamica, No. 8. (1957), pp. 89-122.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0585-5292%281957%290%3A8%3C89%3ATCFOTF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B23Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800Traian StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Autumn, 1953), pp. 398-411.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28195323%2913%3A4%3C398%3ALTARSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G28The Conquering Balkan Orthodox MerchantTraian StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 20, No. 2. (Jun., 1960), pp. 234-313.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28196006%2920%3A2%3C234%3ATCBOM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R34The Conquering Balkan Orthodox MerchantTraian StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 20, No. 2. (Jun., 1960), pp. 234-313.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28196006%2920%3A2%3C234%3ATCBOM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R34Capital Formation in the Ottoman EmpireHalil InalcikThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 29, No. 1, The Tasks of Economic History. (Mar., 1969), pp.97-140.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28196903%2929%3A1%3C97%3ACFITOE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H35The Conquering Balkan Orthodox MerchantTraian StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 20, No. 2. (Jun., 1960), pp. 234-313.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28196006%2920%3A2%3C234%3ATCBOM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Rhttp://www.jstor.orgLINKED CITATIONS- Page 2 of 3 -NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.35Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800Traian StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Autumn, 1953), pp. 398-411.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28195323%2913%3A4%3C398%3ALTARSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G37Futuwwa Traditions in the Ottoman Empire Akhis, Bektashi Dervishes, and CraftsmenG. G. ArnakisJournal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Oct., 1953), pp. 232-247.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2968%28195310%2912%3A4%3C232%3AFTITOE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C37The Islamic GuildsBernard LewisThe Economic History Review, Vol. 8, No. 1. (Nov., 1937), pp. 20-37.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0117%28193711%291%3A8%3A1%3C20%3ATIG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q41Futuwwa Traditions in the Ottoman Empire Akhis, Bektashi Dervishes, and CraftsmenG. G. ArnakisJournal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Oct., 1953), pp. 232-247.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2968%28195310%2912%3A4%3C232%3AFTITOE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C44The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-I Cedid Army of Sultan Selim IIIStanford J. ShawThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 37, No. 3. (Sep., 1965), pp. 291-306.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28196509%2937%3A3%3C291%3ATOOOMR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Phttp://www.jstor.orgLINKED CITATIONS- Page 3 of 3 -NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.