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Safeguards Performance Assessment (SPA) N E I Pilot Program

Toolbox U C L E A R

N E R G Y

N S T I T U T E

Draft April 4, 2001

SUITE 400 1776 I STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20006-3708 202.739.8000 www.nei.org

INDEX Ai

1. General Information 2. SPA implementation Checklist and lessons

learned 3. Sample three year SPA schedule 4. Drill selection process

A. Key Program elements spreadsheet 5. Defensive Strategy Procedure 6. Adversary Checklist 7. Controllers Checklists 8. Pre-Drill Safety Checklist 9. Drill Participants Critique Form

A. Responders form B. Operations actions checklist from

10.Post Drill Critique A.Drill Coordinator Checklist B.Overall response Evaluation

11. Training Aids 12. Controller Training Information

a -.- . .-

GENERAL INFORMATION

The current version of all checklists are available electronically from the

SWG WebBoard, SPA Implementation Conference.

1. Pilot plant toolbox-Items to be developed by April 16.

* Generic Forms (Tom Mahon) • Documentation Package (Chris Kelley) * Audit trail for key elements for drills * Drill aids (Tom Mahon)

"* Drill weapons, how to do simulation, etc. * Examples of corrective action (Tommy Byers, Paul Serra)

"* Corrective action program, training issues, and minor issue management.

* Matrix-Pilot implementation at first 8 plants(Dave Axt)

• Tactical range exercise, drills, exercises * Matrix-Program element implementation at a site (Chris

Kelley) * Generic defensive strategy procedure (Chris Kelley, Dave Axt)

* Tactical course of fire strawman (Chris Kelley, Dave Axt) • Tactical training lesson plan (Dave Axt, Tom Mahon)

* Pilot plant questionnaire (Curtis Luffman, Dave Axt) * FAQ list-use web page

* Format for questions, and process for review and answer

NMC SPA Implementation Plan

MILESTONE SCHEDULE I. Breakdown all key components & requirements from NEI SPA document Nov. 2000 2. Benchmark NMC best practices (e.g., drill conduct, procedures & forms). Dec. 2000 3. Draft NMC SPA Policy/Procedure. Jan. 2001 4. Circulate among all site security trainers & managers for comment Jan. 2001 5. Monitor OSREs and industry best practices (e.g., confining adversaries to only Jan. 2001+

general public tour routes). 6. Attend NEI SPA Implementation meeting in Dallas. Feb. 2001 7. Revise draft NMC SPA Policy/Procedure accordingly. Feb. 2001 8. Conduct NMC Trainer's SPA Implementation Workshop. March 2001 9. Site implementation planning period. April 2001 10. Formal implementation July2001

POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION PITFALLS WHY? COUNTERMEASURES Security trainers may not be completely familiar with They have not had Ensure NMC procedure SPA terminology, requirements, or how to mesh it with first-hand clearly:. existing programs. experience in SPA e Explains background

development; of program and unfamiliar rationale terminology. for some program 0 Spells-out what is a elements. SPA requirement, and

what is optional. Confusing 0 Shows examples of terminology (e.g., which existing "drill" versus programs can satisfy "exercise," versus SPA requirements. "evaluated drill," * Provides example 3versus "evaluated year SPA schedule. exercise"). I

Also, conduct a NMC Trainer's SPA Implementation Workshop before formal implementation.

Performing an "objective" self-assessment of protective May be difficult to The respective site trainer strategy. NRC will critique exercises' "degree of break away from coordinates the Evaluated challenge and realism." OSRE mindset. Exercise while NMC

Corporate ensure objectivity by overseeing the selection of target sets and scenarios. Use independent evaluators from the NMC Composite Assistance Team (N-CAT).

Confusing and subjective nature of defining level of The OSRE Ensure NMC procedure "insider knowledge" provided to adversary team. "Contractors" clearly:

raised the "insider 9 Defines what insider knowledge bar" in knowledge is to be response to the provided to the NRC/Industry adversaries.

"tying their hands" - a Defines what with the protective strategy

TM F I

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POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION PITFALLS WHY? COUNTERMEASURES ACD/OAC. No information is NOT to clear guidance. be provided to History of ACD adversaries. changing from site • Requires a tactically to site during trained adversary team OSRE program. well versed at scenario

planning and exercise conduct

Scheduling conflicts among the six-(6) NMC sites. Scheduling Ensure NMC SPA conflicts and procedure requires a competing minimum of a six-(6) priorities among month advance planning NMC sites, NMC for Evaluated Exercises. Corporate and Require each site trainer NRC regional coordinate with other inspectors. NMC sites a three-(3) year

drill/exercise/training schedule.

Inconsistent drill documentation and packages between NRC inspectors are Include as attachments in NMC sites may confuse NRC inspectors to lead to "comfortable" with the NMC SPA procedure criticize, consistency and standardized pre and post

uniform drill forms, step-by-step documentation; checklists for planning, deviations raise briefing, drill critiquing, "red flags." and list the contents for all

drill packages. Inconsistent adversary barrier breaching times. Lack of applicable Extrapolate from Sandia

experience. Barrier Technology Inability to perform handbook, precedents objective, valid established during past testing. OSREs, and commission

consultants to render "expert" estimate. Document bases.

U

DRAFTNuclear Management Company: Safeguards Performance Assessment (SPA) Program NMC Policy Rev. 0 Effective: March 1, 2001 Page 8 of 35

Table-1 - SPA Components & Factors

COMPNENT

Evaluated Drillstva uatea Exercise

No requirement, but Annually Annually all shift members Triennially (every 3-years). Frequency: suggest monthly

Objective(s): Skill training or evaluation. Team training or to Evaluate at least "one Key Validates overall protective

However, may be used to demonstrate the protective Program element'." strategy and related training

validate some component strategy. Evaluate "other program program(s). of the protective strategy. elements 2 -"

Requirements: None. * Force-on-Force (FOF) * Structured. 0 Structured. with a "shadow force." * Must pre-identify & 0 Force-on-Force (FOF) I Integrated response evaluate at least one with a "shadow force." with plant operations Key Program element1 0 Must evaluate ALL ano/or LLEA (using 0 Must evaluate and pre- "Key Program

NMC Incident identify at least one of elements Command policy), as the "other program * Integrated response required. elements2" with plant operations.

- Formal critiques. 0 Informal critiques. w Formal critiques.

Delivery . On-shift drills. Force-on-force exercise. Three year Cycle - any Force-on-force exercise.

Methods & • Tabletops. of following:

Options: . Firearms simulator On-shift drills.

(e.g. Range 2k). Tabletops.

• Paint-pellet training. Force-on: Stress Fire Course. force drills.

, 1-on-1, on-shift instruction.

Responsibility: Training Instructor or Shift Lead Training Training Instructor or Shift Lead Training

Supervisor. instructor/controller Supervisor. instructor/controller

Security's 1 Individual or Crew. All crews must participant. Individual or Crew. One crew only. Involvement:

Operations' No requirement. Yes. If desired. Yes.

Involvement: OAC Elements: No requirement. Varied components of OAC capabilities (spectrum) Use a "spectrum" of OAC

OAC. spread out over 3-years, or characteristics and included within a few capabilities. scenarios.

No. of No requirement. 1 Multiple force-on-force No requirement. Multiple force-on-force

Scenarios: scenarios, scenarios.

Documentation * Record in Individual * Record in Individual 0 Record in Individual • Record in Individual

Requirements training records. training records. training records. training records. Reflect in training • Reflect in training 0 Reflect in training 0 Reflect in training schedule. schedule. schedule. schedule.

- Drill Report. 0 Drill Report if FOF. * Drill Report.

"I1"Key Program elements" z "Other program elements" "Ky Po S n Nu erlentso" 2 rl pogrdat e men.Planning 2.g. Alarm Assessment & Intrusion Detection Equipment l.a. Sufficient Number of Personnel 2.a. DrilEx. Coordination, Admin. & g 2.h. Individual Response Tactics 1.b. Timely Response 2.b. Controller Participation 2.i. Weapons Handling & Proficiency 1.c. Protected Positions 2.c. Post Drill/Ex. Critiques 2.j. Team Response Tactics 1.d. Appropriate Armament 2.d. Command & Control 2.k. Defensive Positions i.e. Target Set Protection 2.e. Response Communications 2.1. Response Equipment I1f Integrated Response 2.f. Alarm Station Operations 2.m. Use of Deadly Force

g. Overall Protective Strategy 2.n Related Training

Factors Drill Exercise

CAUTION: Any hard copy reproductions of this policy should be verified against the on-line system for current revisions. 01

Table-2, Example SPA 3-Year Schedule

Years 1 & 2 IIrear Ir ear a

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• Nucleaý- Management Company: Safeguards Performance Assessment (SPA) Program - R-'A NMC Policy Rev. 0 Effective: March 1, 2001

' Page 7 of 35

SPA PROGRAM ELEMENTS - Key DISTINCTIONS

EXERCISE

EVALUATED Conducted

SYes

* Triennial. C Structured Scenarios.

* Only One Crew. * Tests All Key Program

Elements. w Formal Critiques and

Related Documentation

DRILL

Any Other Training and/or Drill Related Activity Supporting

the Protective Strategy

No EVALUATED

DRILL?

IF "0 Annual. "* Structured Scenarios. "* Involves All Shift Members. Tests

at Least One of the Key Program Elements and Some or All of the Other Program Elements.

"* Informal or Formal Critiques and Related Documentation

[ • '%•CAUTION: Any hard copy reproductions of this policy should be verified against the on-line [ L system for current revisions.

Drill Selection Process

Drills selected over the three year program must provide a reasonable test of

the defensive strategy. As drills are selected this overall goal must be kept in mind

Note: Rational discussion of this topic can only be conducted at the

safeguards level and is plant specific.

Target Sets:

Entry points:

Paths:

Adversary:

P nr-

NEI SPA KEY PROGRAM ELEMENTS SPREADSHEET

I

SPA DRILL AND E, ,CISE SCHEDULE

PLANT NAME PLANT ONE PLANT TWO PLANT THREE P5LANT FOUR PLANT FIVE PLANT SIX

PLANT SEVEN PLANT EIGHT PLANT INE

PLANT NAME PLANT 0 iNE PLANT TWO PLANT THREE PLANT FOUR PLANT FIVEPLANT SIX PLANT SEVEN PLANT EIGHT PLANT NINE

PLANT NAME PLANT ONE PLANT TWO __

PLANT THREE PLANT FOUR PLANT FIVE PLANT SIX PLANT SEVEN PLANT EIGHT

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a A. -

Protection Strategy Implementing Procedure

5.0 REQUIREMENTS

5.1 Target Set Analysis

Security's protective strategy is the result of and is based on a vital target set analysis. The target set analysis identifies groupings of targets which the design basis threat (DBT) could destroy/breach in order to induce radiological sabotage. See Figure XX for the current Target Set Matrix. Plant Security, Operations, and Engineering staff shall perform and document a target set analysis at least bi-annually. The purpose of subsequent target set analyses is determine if any plant or operational changes may impact existing target sets and, therefore, necessitate a change to Security's protective strategy.

5.2 Protective Strategy

5.2.1 Overview

In response to a DBT attack, the protective strategy involves a self-triggered and immediate deployment of the Response Force Team (RFT). The RFT deploys to pre-determined defensive positions that cover choke points. Choke points are pre-identified areas where adversaries must pass through in order to reach key targets. From the defensive positions, RFT members shall use appropriate force and tactics in order to interdict and, if necessary, neutralize the threat. During the contingency response, the CAS/SAS and lstLt, function in a command & control and communications (C3) role.

5.2.2 Defense-in-Depth Concept

A combination of responders (who deploy to pre-determined defensive positions) and adversary delay barriers provide a defense-in-depth response. Defense-indepth places -- between the adversary and key targets -- concentric layers of responders and/or physical security measures. A defense-in-depth strategy serves to delay/interdict or neutralize the adversaries as they attempt to proceed to key targets. If the adversaries are not completely neutralized upon initial engagement, an inner ring of defense is automatically in place (or re-directed) to interdict and neutralize the adversary's advance to key targets. This defense-in-depth strategy is designed to ultimately deny the adversaries from achieving radiological sabotage.

5.2.3 Development and Validation

Security's defense-in-depth protective strategy was designed through analysis of target sets and time lines (RFT versus adversaries), defensive positions, chokepoints, and engagement analysis. The protective strategy is periodically validated through table tops and contingency response drills/exercises. The

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protective strategy and the RFT's immediate response to a DBT attack are implemented via the Response Procedure Matrix (RPM).

5.2.4 Response Procedure Matrix (RPM)

The Response Procedure Matrix (RPM) (see Figure-XX) identifies specific deployment choke points for each Response Force Team (RFT) member. All

Security Force Members shall be trained on RPM usage and have a RPM in their

immediate possession while on duty. See section 6.3, Contingency Response Training and Drills, for more information. The XXX column of the RPM identifies

Protected Area quadrants (groupings of XXX). The XXX column identifies Security

Force duty positions. See section 6.2, Post Locations and Staffing Utilization for more information.

Upon assessment of an intrusion, the CAS/SAS announces XXXX. Each RFT

member then quickly refers to their RPM and deploys to the appropriate, pre

determined choke point (and associated defensive position). Each choke point

identified in the RPM may involve multiple defensive positions of which the responder can select to cover the respective choke point. Defensive positions are

pre-identified based on: (a) cover, (b) concealment, (c) field-of-view/fire, (d) withdrawal route, and (d) radio communications. The RFT's deployment to a particular choke point is based on:

Zone of Attack. RFT members deploy according to the adversaries' initial XXX penetration, and the adversary's direction of travel within the Protected Area. For

example, if the adversaries attack the Protected Area in the XXX quadrant (zones

X-XX), the RFT deploys to defense-in-depth positions in relation to the XXX and

key targets. If, once inside the Protected Area, the adversary relocates to the XXX or XXX quadrants, the CAS/SAS quickly communicates the appropriate RPM "re

direct."

Target Set Relationships. If, once inside the Protected Area, the DBT penetrates

doors leading to the emergency or stand-XX XXX, the CAS/SAS immediately communicates and appropriate "re-direct." Following the re-direct announcement, the RFT automatically re-deploys in order to pre-empt (interdict and neutralize) the DBT from completing their target set. Additionally, the lstLt (who responds to CAS/SAS) may re-deploy some responders in order to pre-empt the adversaries from achieving a target set.

Mutual Support/Flanking Fire. Many of the initial choke points and defensive positions reflected in the RPM attempt to place two responders in positions of mutual support. Should the adversaries attempt to overwhelm or circumvent one responder, a second responder is in a position to deny such maneuvers.

ý , "'',Page 2

DRAFT 5.2.5 Post Locations and Staffing Utilization

5.2.5.1 Post Locations

In the XXX row, the RPM identifies XXX (X) armed security officers and XXX (X) 2 nd Lieutenant (response team leader). Each of these members (posts) is immediately available to deploy as members of the RFT. The CAS, SAS, Security- XX, and lstLt are not included in the RPM. During a contingency response, the 1 stLt responds to the CAS or SAS and provides overall strategic command and control. The CAS/SAS provides the RFT with alarm notification and relays, via radio and public address, pertinent threat information. The Security- XX post may not be present during certain shifts. If the Security - XX post is present during a contingency response, Security XX deploys either "as directed," or to the engagement location.

To ensure effective implementation of the RPM, certain RFT members listed on the RPM must remain within their assigned post locations during normal operations (pre-contingency response). Other RFT members are not confined to post locations and may deploy to pre-assigned choke points from anywhere within the Protected Area. The below list shows the normal, minimum shift compliment that would comprise the RFT, as well as RFT members' pre-contingency event locations. Positions with an asterisk (*) indicate that the respective post is reflected on the RPM.

RFT Member Pre-Contingency Event Location

*Security 1 Unit X - 695' Level XXX Building *Security 2 Unit X - 695' Level XXX Building *Security 3 Security XXX *Security 4 Patrol XXX, within Protected Area *Security 6 XXX

Security 8 XXX

5.2.5.2 Staffing Utilization

The above minimum shift staffing level for normal operations calls for XXX armed Security Officers and XXX 2ndLt (Response Team Leader). The number of armed security officers reflected in the RPM may decrease by no more then XXX armed Security Officers, however, the frequency of such occurrences shall not be pre-planned and shall not exceed 2% of total annual shift coverage. Regardless, should the number of available armed Security Officers drop to XXX and XXX 2ndLt, the security contractor shall immediately attempt to fill the vacant position. Should the number of armed Security Officers drop to XXX and XXX 2ndLt, the security contractor shall immediately notify NSP and shall take action to bring the number of armed

Page3

E3RNFISecurity Officers to XXX. At no time, and under no circumstances, shall the number of available armed Security Officers decrease below XXX Security Officers and XXX 2ndLt.

5.3 Contingency Response Training and Drills

5.3.1 Initial & Reinforcement Training

Each Security Force Member shall receive initial and reinforcement tactical response training. This training shall involve situations or scenarios that simulate design basis threat characteristics and tactics. Initial tactical response training shall include subjects in Weapons Handling, Individual Tactical Movement, Tactical Communications, Team Tactics, Defensive Positions, and Close Quarters Tactics. Additionally, all Security Force Members shall receive training on Security's protective strategy and use of the RPM prior to shift assignment. Reinforcement tactical training may involve force-on-force engagements where participants use paint projectiles in their weapons, on-shift RPM and tactics review, the NSP-approved tactical stress fire course, or use of the Range 2000 laser engagement training device.

5.3.2 Contingency Response Drills

Each Security Shift shall participate in at least one contingency drill annually. These drills/exercises may consist of table tops, force-on-force drills, and/or On-Post-Training (OPT) drills.

Page 44 ;;ml:l

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION (When Completed)

NEI SPA ADVERSARY CHECKLIST ( TO BE COMPLETED BY DRILL COORDINATOR

DATE OF DRILL: SCENARIO ID NUMBER

DRILL COORDINATOR:

DRILL IDENTIFICATION NUMBEPR

NUMBER OF ADVERSARIES:

DESCRIPTION OF ADVERSARIES:

ADVERSARY GOAL(S):

METHOD OF ATTACK:

ADVERSARY ARMAMENT:

ADVERSARY EQUIPMENT:

ADVERSARY ORDINANCE

TOTAL ADVERSARY ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT AND ORDINANCE WEIGHT PER PERSON: LBS.

INSIDER ASSISTANCE:

OTHER INFORMATION:

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION

I

ADVERSARY SELF-CRITIQUE FORM

Drill Number Adversary Position Date

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Did you encounter responders?

Did you fire your weapon?

At what range did you fire?

Were the responders stationary or moving?

Were the responders utilizing cover?

What were the results of your shots?

Did a responder eliminate you?

If you were eliminated, why?

9. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the response team?

10. If the use of grenades and or satchels was effective, where were they used?

11. Recommendations for improving security's defensive positions and or response strategy:

12. Additional Comments:

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M27

NEI SPA DRILL CONTROLLER CHECKLIST

TO BE COMPLETED BY DRILL COORDINATOR Initial each item as it is complete

DRILL COORDINATOR DRILL ID NUMBER

1) Ensure drill participants are equipped with simulated drill weapons (no actual weapons).

2) Ensure drill participants have equipment to simulate gunfire.

3) Be aware at all times of any issues that could become a safety hazard or drill artificiality and be prepared to stop actions immediately and notify lead controller.

4) Do not coach or advise drill participants on any response action they may chose to take. Remember you are only there to observe the actions taken.

5) When a shot is taken by either responder or adversary it is the responsibility of the controller to call the shot. Do not let the situation become a " I shot you first " encounter.

6) Ensure that when a drill participant is neutralized, that the red ball cap or other identification method is worn to make all players aware that they have been neutralized.

7) Do not make any communications to CAS as to the location of any drill players or their status

8) Be prepared to critique officer's actions at the post-drill critique.

9) Ensure all controllers names are listed on page (2) of the checklist

Drill Coordinator Signature Date

Comments

I�

NO 6" twl 2

NEI SPA

DRILL CONTROLLERS

DRILL COORDINATOR DRILL ID NUMBER________

DATE _________SCENARIO #______

NAME POST

i! •,•,•.•.

NEI SPA

DRILL

CONTROLLERS

DRILL

cOORDINATOR

DRILL ID NUMBER

DATE

SCENARIO #

NAME

POST

DRAFT~~ NEI SPA

CONTROLLER CHECKLIST FOR UNARMED EVENT

-PURPOSE To assess the performance of Armed Responders involved in a Security Drill. The

results of this drill will be factored into future exercises as "lessons learned". The controller is responsible for filling out this form.

DRILL COORDINATOR DRILL ID NUMBER

CONTROLLER: POST:

RESPONDER: DATE

1) While responding to an unarmed event scenario, did the response team member?

a) Interdict between the intruder and buildings? YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A ( )

b) Take control of the situation by issuing strong verbal commands? YES( ) NO( ) N/A( )

c) Keep proper distance between themselves and the intruder? YES( ) NO( ) N/A( )

d) Properly cover the intruder while other response team members used other means of force (pepper spray)? YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A ( )

e) Utilize proper use of handcuffs (if necessary)? YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A ( )

f) Communicate with the CAS? YES( ) NO( ) N/A( )

COMMENTS:

NEI SPA CONTROLLERS INSTRUCTIONS

GENERAL These guidelines outline actions of drill controllers during Tactical Response Security Drills. The purpose of these guidelines is to productively evaluate the developed strategies against Design Basis Threat in a safe and realistic environment and identify areas for increased training to the Security Force.

The effectiveness of drills is directly related to those personnel assigned controller duties. Controllers should be knowledgeable of the specific tasks of the duty position that they are evaluating. Additionally, basic concepts of tactics, use of force, and weapons safety must be known. The Drill Coordinator is responsible for drill requirements and the overall safety of all participants in the drill.

PROCEDURE Security Drills, controllers and adversaries will meet to select scenarios. Once scenarios have been selected, they are not to be deviated from without the Drill Coordinator being aware of such alteration.

All applicable areas of the Controller Checklist are to be completed prior to drill initiation.

CONTROLLER POSITIONS Each player should have a controller with him or her. If, due to a shortage of controllers, it is not possible for a controller to be with each player, the controllers will be with the officers that will normally interdict with the adversaries.

The adversaries are equipped with simulated: grenades; smoke canisters; simulated drill weapons; and explosives. Their effectiveness on the Response Team Members depends on the cover that the officers use. It is up to the controller to decide whether an adversary or an officer is neutralized.

When a player is neutralized, it is important that the controller ensure that the "out" player signifies their termination with a red cap or other method used to identify neutralized player.

Controllers should be aware of drill artificiality that could affect the outcome of the drill. Controllers should stop the drill and report these artificialities to the lead controller who will determine how the drill should proceed.

SAFETY It is the responsibility of all personnel to prevent an unsafe act or procedure violation from occurring. Controllers will request an immediate termination of a drill should they determine a situation may result in personnel injury or equipment damage.

CRITIQUE Upon completion of the Security Drills, the controller, adversaries, and the Response Team Members will normally meet to discuss their observations in a formal critique. Each controfler will then complete their check sheets and give them to the- Drill Coordinator.

NEI SPA D PRE-DRILL SAFETY/CHECKLIST

TO BE COMPLETED BY DRILL COORDINATOR Initial each item as it is completed

DRILL ID # SCENARIO ID #

1) _ Shift Manager and RP Supervisor have been notified of drill A. Shift Manager briefed on scenario and safety vs. safeguards review of drill conducted. B. RP briefed on scenario and any RP issues resolved.

2) CAS/SAS personnel are briefed on drill and make a plant announcement of drill.

3) Advise working shift, if on duty shift is being utilized, that a drill is going to be conducted.

4) Ensure all officers are carrying drill weapons (handguns and rifles) or if drill weapons are not utilized, ensure that controllers are with players where the action is going to be to ensure safety. DO NOT TOUCH YOUR ACTUAL WEAPON

5) Ensure all officers are carrying equipment to simulate gunfire.

6) _ Advise all drill participants of safety requirements (examples) a. Moving quickly is permitted, but be careful b. Hard-hats, eye and ear protection is required where posted c. Do not key radios in posted areas

7) _ Ensure that all radio transmissions begin and end with "THIS IS A DRILL"

8) _ Ensure that everyone involved has required dosimetry and understand RP requirements.

9) _ Ensure adversaries are identified (special clothing)

10) _ Adversaries are briefed on drill scenarios with target sets in mind. a) Special Controller responsibilities identified. b) Drill Artificialities identified c) Special RP requirements identified.

11) - Ensure adversary controller has ability to simulate explosives and label breached doors.

12) - Ensure on duty force drill participants are in place prior to initiation of the drill.

13) _ If an adversary or responder is taken out, identify out of action with red cap or other means.

14) - Do not allow drill activities to interrupt Control Room activities.

15) Remind Players to ensure fields of fire are clear of obstructions (If not notify Supervisor)

")MMENTS:

,7 A s. _ ý I

NEI SPA CONTROLLER CHECKLIST FOR

INITIAL AND SECONDARY RESPONSE

PURPOSE To assess the performance of Armed Responders involved in a Security Drill. The results of this drill will be factored into future exercises as "lessons learned". The controller is responsible for filling out this form.

DRILL COORDINATOR DRILL ID NUMBER

CONTROLLER: POST:

RESPONDER: DATE:.

1. Did the response team member?

a) Respond to initial position quickly and tactically? YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A (

b) Respond to secondary position quickly and tactically? YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A ( )

c) Notify CAS of engagement or sighting? YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A ( )

d) Communicate with other response team members? YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A (

e) React properly to a grenade (seek cover)? YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A ( )

f) Take cover when fired upon? YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A ( )

g) Aggressively defend their position? YES( ) NO( ) N/A( )

h) Shoot properly through smoke? YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A ( )

i) Reload after engagement? YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A( )

j) Simulate firing the weapon? YES( ) NO( ) N/A( )

k) Relay necessary information to CAS (adversary down, adversary heading to another area, other officers down, etc.) YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A ( )

1) Looks to you the controller for advice? YES ( ) NO ( ) N/A (

COMMENTS

NEI SPA ALARM STATION CONTROLLER CHECKLIST

PURPOSE To assess the performance of alarm station personnel involved in a Security Drill. The

results of this drill will be factored into future exercises as "lessons learned". The

controller is responsible for filling out this form.

DRILL COORDINATOR DRILL ID NUMBER

CONTROLLER : POST

OPERATOR: •DATE:

1. Initial Assessment/Detection of alarm, or Intruder in CAS/SAS:

a) Assessed number of Intruders YES ( ) NO( ) NA( )

b) Identified zone YES (NO() NA()

c) Identified armament or equipment (if any) YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

d) Notifications YES ( ) NO( ) NA( )

e) Tracked intruders using PTZ cameras YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

f) Relayed information gathered from cameras YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

g) Relayed information from Responders YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

h) Communications discipline YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

COMMENTS:

NEI SPA O-,FF DRILL PARTICIPANT CRITIQUE FORM

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION (When Completed)

TO BE COMPLETED BY SECURITY DRILL PLAYER

NAME: POST

UPON HEARING THE ALERT TONE AND ANNOUNCEMENT FROM CAS/SAS OF

ADVERSARIES ENTERING THROUGH ZONE NUMBER

I IMMEDIATELYRETRIVED AND CHARGED MY WEAPON AND ASSUMED MY PRIMARY

RESPONSE POSITION AT

I DID NOT OBSERVE ANY DRILL ACITIVITY

-- ---------- OR------O --

I OBSERVED ADVERSARIES AT A DISTANCE OF YARDS.

I ENGAGED ADVERSARIES FIRING APPROXIMATELY ROUNDS

FROM MY RESPONSE WEAPON FOR APPROXIMATELY SECONDS WITH A

(High/Moderate/Low) PROBABILITY OF NEUTRALIZING

ADVERSARIES.

ADDITIONAL DRILL DETAILS:

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION (When Completed)

MITH

DRILL COORDINATOR:

DATE OF DRILL:

OPERATIONS PARTICIPANT (S):

ACTIONS IN SEQUENCE:

TIME 0

TIME I

TIME 2

TIME 3

TIME 4

TIME 5

TIME 6

TIME 7

TIME 8

TIME 9

TIME 10

TIME 11

TIME 12

DRILL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER:

ACTION: DRILL INITIATED, CONTROL ROOM NOTIFIED.

ACTION:

ACTION:

ACTION:

ACTION:

ACTION:

ACTION:

ACTION:

ACTION:

ACTION:

ACTION:

ACTION:

ACTION:

COMMENTS:

DRAFT

NEI SPA

OPERATIONS ACTIONS CHECKLIST FORM TO BE COMPLETED BY OPERATIONS DRILL PLAYER

(-or,� *�

NEI SPA ,,lr POST-DRILL CRITIQUE / CHECKLIST

TO BE COMPLETED BY DRILL COORDINATOR ( Initial each item as it is completed

DRILL COORDINATOR: DRILL ID NUMBER

SCENARIO ID NUMBER

1) _ Shift Manager and RP Supervisor notified of the completion of the drill. Notify RP of any Radiological boundaries that were crossed and their location.

2) _ All required participants are present before critique begins

3) _ Drill scenario and expectations explained

4) _ CAS/SAS member brief on their participation

5) _ All participants state name, post number, where they responded and what part they played in the drill

Location Location 1 8 2 9 3 10 4 11 5 12 6 13 7 14

6) _ All controllers explain what part they played in the drill

7) _ Note any drill enhancements or required corrective actions in comments.

8) _ All officers leave drill weapons (handguns, rifles and other response equipment) before exiting the room.

COMMENTS:

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TYPE DRILL: DRILL ID NUMBER

DRILL COORDINATOR:

SCENARIO ID #

ALARM STATION OPERATIONS:

CAS

SAS

OTHER

PAS:

SSS :

1

ARMED RESPONSE OFFICERS:

7

8

3

4

5

6

-9

10

11

12

ALARM STATION ACTIONS

Was alarm correctly acknowledged and response team effectively dispatched (By using the security radio and Plant PA system)? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

Were appropriate notifications made? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

Were CCTV's utilized effectively? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

Was communications maintained between alarm station and response team? YES() NO() NA()

0� 7

DATE:

SHIFT:

NEI SPA RESPONSE DRILL CHECKLIST/EVALUATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY DRILL COORDINATOR

NEI SPA RESPONSE DRILL CHECKLIST/EVALUATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY DRILL COORDINATOR SECURITY SUPERVISOR

Was information gathered and dispersed to appropriate personnel? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

Was the adversary target properly identified, plant vulnerability properly assessed and appropriate defensive positions established? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

Was effective communications maintained with Operations and SAS? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

Did the Security Shift Supervisor maintain proper command and control of the event to include developing a tactical plan to ensure protection of the critical plant systems?

YES( )NO( ) NA(

ARMED RESPONSE OFFICERS

Was there command and control of the Response Team? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

Were effective tactical deployment techniques utilized, i.e., cover, concealment, and approach? YES( )NO( ) NA( )

Were proper decisions made concerning the use of force? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

Were correct response positions achieved in a timely manner based upon the adversary target and plant vulnerability? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

Were appropriate actions implemented to protect target sets? YES() NO( ) NA(

EXERCISE COMMENTS AND CRITIQUE: (Did the Security Force accomplish their mission?) YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

KEY PROGRAM ELEMENTS EVALUATED:

Sufficient number of security personnel responding? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

Response was within appropriate timelines? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

Responded to protected positions? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA

With appropriate armament? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

Provided target set protection? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ( )

An integrated response was documented? YES ( ) NO ( ) NA ((Operations players used in drill)

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DRAFT NEI SPA RESPONSE DRILL CHECKLIST/EVALUATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY DRILL COORDINATOR

OTHER PROGRAM ELEMENTS EVALUATED:

Coordination and Planning Command and Control Communications Alarm Station Operations Individual Responder tactics Team Responder Tactics Use of deadly force Alarm assessment and intrusion detection equipment Weapons handling and proficiency Controller participation Post drill/exercise briefing/critiques Defensive Positions Deployment of Responders and equipment Training

COMMENTS/CRITIQUE:

YES YES YES YES YES YES ( YES ( YES ( YES YES YES YES ( YES ( YES (

)NO )NO )NO )NO )NO )NO )NO )NO )NO )NO )NO )NO )NO )NO

NA( NA( NA( NA( NA( NA( NA( NA( NA( NA( NA( NA( NA( NA(

SECURITY

PERFORMANCE

ASSESSMENT

TRAINING AIDS

DRAHF

Revolver and Auto Pistol by ASP® used by Adversary Team and Armed Response Team.

Plr~

DRAFT

Colt AR-15 Rifle by ASP® that is used by Response Team Members. Momentary

push-button switch installed on trigger, which is wired to buzzer alarm on magazine

well. A Dual Lens Laser Sight by LaserLyte® is mounted on the front sight.

DEWy�

Tactical Support Vest used to carry magazines, chemical munitions Bean bag rounds and ammunition.

fm r I

LIUMI

Adversary Backpack used to carry items such as Satchel Charges and Grenades.

pr'ý ̀ 771

oRAFT

Gas Mask with additional AR-15 magazine pouch available to Response Team

OFTR

6AF-T -

Adversary Simulated Satchel Charge.

r " M*

Adversary Grenades. Black Rubber ball type which is expended smoke grenade, Grey Dummy Grenades made of Duct Tape and Plastic Fragmentation grenades.

E~lm

FTI

Air Horn used as a warning device to simulate an explosion or breach

rrr

CONTROLLER TRAINING NOTES

CONTROLLERS DUTIES

> Ensure all drill participants, players and controllers, are in position and ready prior to the start of drills.

* Out of place or unprepared controllers is the single most prominent cause for drill confusion.

* Poor controller communications is the second most prominent cause for drill confusion.

> Observe and record all player activities. * Action not observed cannot be critiqued. * Without a good critique of the players actions, the training value significantly decreases.

* Without a good critique of the players actions, it is impossible to make a sound determination of

the overall drill results.

> Make and announce engagement outcome decisions. * Only the controller can make judgements of engagement outcomes; the controllers decision is

final. * Controller decisions must be timely and accurate; timeliness is most important.

* If an engagement decision is not announces, it may as well never have occurred; decisions to

neutralize a player must be clearly and rapidly announced over the controller net. * If you cannot contact the opposing players controller by radio, yell or shout to get their

attention; if necessary, chase them down or have another controller assist you in the communication.

- Critique player activities. * The controller should conduct the first critique of a players action on-site, where the action

happened. This way, the information is fresh and the necessary visual references are available.

+ Without a good critique, there is little value to the training experience.

* For post drill critique purposes, it is very important to know the number of shots fired at which or

how many adversaries and at what range. If necessary, pace of the distance of the engagements after the drill.

CONTROLLER POSITIONI NG

; Controllers should position themselves such that they can observe all player activities.

* If the controller cannot observe the players activities, then they cannot critique those actions

> Controllers position should allow the controller to observe the players field of view (fire) from as near the same prospective as the player as possible.

* The controller cannot make a sound decision on the ability of the player to effectively engage if

they cannot see the engagement conditions. * As the controller, you should require the player to verbally indicate to you the actions they are

taking. For example "1 am reloading my weapon" or "I am engaging the yellow adversary".

> Controller should make every effort not to interfere with the players movement or give the players

position away. * The players main advantages are remaining concealed in good defensive position.

* Movement is the primary visual attractant in a tactical situation. * Remain and concealed where you can observe the players actions.

ENGAGEMENTS

Rifle - Stationary target in open Probability of Neutralization vs. Number of Shots Range to Target

Low Moderate High

0 to 25 yards 1 25 to 50 yards 1

50 to 75 yards 1 2

75 to 100 yards 1 2

100 to 125 yards 1 2 125 to 150 yards 1 2 3

150 yards or more 1 2 3

Rifle - Moving target in open Probability of Neutralization vs. Number of Shots Range to Target

Low Moderate High

0 to 25 yards 1

25 to 50 yards 1 2

50 to 75 yards 1 2

75 to 100 yards 1 2 3

100 to 125 yards 1 2 3

125 to 150 yards 2 3 4

150 yards or more 3 4 5

Rifle - Stationary target w/cover Probability of Neutralization vs. Number of Shots Range to Target

Low Moderate High

0 to 25 yards 1 2

25 to 50 yards 2 3

50 to 75 yards 2 3 4

75 to 100 yards 2 4 5

100 to 125 yards 2 4 6

125 to 150 yards 3 5 7

150 yards or more 4 6 8

Pistol - Stationary target in open Probability of Neutralization vs. Number of Shots

Range to Target Low Moderate High

0 to 25 yards 1 2 3

25 to 50 yards 3 4 5

Pistol - Moving target in open Probability of Neutralization vs. Number of Shots

Range to Target Low Moderate High

0 to 25 yards 1 4 5 25 to 50 yards 3 5 -- - 7

I; Ii IRRAF,

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> Grenades: * 0-5 yards * 0-5 yards * 0-5 yards

0

0

0

5-10 yards 5-10 yards 5-10 yards

* >10 yards * >10 yards

in open = Kill minimal cover = minor incapacitation good cover = temporary, very minor incapacitation

in open serious incapacitation in cover = minor incapacitation good cover = no significant effect

in open = minor incapacitation in cover = no significant effect

SMOKE

;, Takes approximately 15 seconds to start developing significant cloud > Burns for approximately 90 seconds > Cloud duration: inside approximately 2½ - 3 minutes outside > Vision obstruction: confined area - total open ar

EXPLOSIVES

> Doors (most) 0 1¼ lb. Charge * 10 seconds 0 10 yard danger area inside door

> 1-2 lb. Charge "* Used to destroy equipment "* Effects (with no cover):

* <20 feet = serious incapacitation/death * 20-40 feet = incapacitation/serious incapacitation * >40 feet = minor incapacitation/no effect

> 5-7 lb. Satchel Charge "* Used to defeat defensive positions/bunkers "* Effects:

* <8 feet = serious incapacitation/death * 8-20 feet = incapacitation/death * >20 feet = incapacitation to serious incapacitation

approximately 1½ - 2 minutes "ea - near total to total

> 20 lb. Satchel Charge * Used to destroy buildings

3

•EEffects: * <40 feet = death * 40-80 feet = serious incapacitation/death • >80 feet = incapacitation to serious incapacitation

Remember: As controllers you are responsible to the Lead Controller, The lead controller is responsible to the Management Team, the management team is responsible to the NRC.