safety assessment method for flight operation system

© DNV Business Assurance. All rights reserved.

DNV GLグループ/ DNV ビジネス・アシュアランス・ジャパン(株）前田直樹 [email protected]

11th WOCS2 Seminar (2014/01/16 ）

Safety Assessment Method for Flight Operation System

- Lesson Learn from “RNP-AR Approach” for Haneda Airport RW22/23 -


本日の目次

1. Intro

2. DNV/DNV Aviation Exp.

3. Safety Assmt, FOSA

4. Haneda RW22/23

5. Conclusion


メキシコ湾の油漏事故調査

The forensic examination of the Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer (BOP) is now concluded, and DNV has submitted its report to the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), who today made the report publically available.

Date: 2011-03-23

3

イントロ - Risk Assessment - 1. Intro 2. DNV/Aviation Exp. 3. Safety Assmt. FOSA 4. Haneda RW22/23

通信インフラの諸トラブルによる収益性RA

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Før tiltak

Etter tiltak

Before actions After actions

車載エアコン新冷媒(HFO-1234yf)の発火危険性RA

//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9d/Deepwater_Horizon_offshore_drilling_unit_on_fire_2010.jpg

© DNV Business Assurance. All rights reserved. 4

イントロ - Haneda Project -

Flight Operational Safety Assessment (FOSA) for RW22/23 in Y2010

1. Intro 2. DNV/Aviation Exp. 3. Safety Assmt. FOSA 4. Haneda RW22/23


設立： 1864年＠ノルウエー、オスロ

組織： 63%DNV財団、37% Mayfair(GL) 出資

資本金： 10 MNOK

売上高： 10,200 MNOK

従業員 : 16,000人

事務所 : 世界100ヶ国、300事務所

サービス：システム規格認証、製品認証、

船級、各種リスクアセスメント

企業理念：生命、財産、環境の保護

( Safeguarding life, property, and the environment )

DNV HQ @ Oslo / Norway


DNV GLグループの概要

© DNV Business Assurance. All rights reserved. Version

Fuelling

3rd Party Risk Holding Points

Transport

Approaches

ATC

Landing

Certification

Runway

Ground Services

Capacity

Environmental

Management

Modelling

Safety culture

Security

DNV Aviation Experience

Construction Work

FAA


Approaches & Landing

Frankfurt Airport (DFS)– Safety

Assessment of the High Approach Landing

System (HALS)

Frankfurt Airport (DFS) Study the safety of

reductions in aircraft separation. Reducing

the Minimum Radar Separation (MRS) on

approach and reducing the Wake

Turbulence Separations.

EUROCONTROL - GBAS (Ground Based

Augmentation System). Functional Hazard

Assessment and Safety Plan for

Implementation (Zurich, Bremen & Malaga)

UK Environment Agency, Bird Strike Risk

Assessment

FOSA studies for RNP AR approaches at

Bastia and Tromso airports – led to

production of FOSA guidance for

EUROCONTROL

EUROCONTROL - wake vortex encounter

risk assessment of the Time Based

Separation (TBS) operational concept.

Represent EUROCONTROL on ICAO

Obstacle Clearance Panel (OCP) Collision

Risk Modelling (CRM) subgroup



European Experience of RNP AR - Tromsø

Tromsø, Norway

Working group members -

Luftfartstilsynet/ Avinor/ SAS/ Boeing/

FAA

Design submitted to ANSP and carrier

at end of November 2008

Simulator trials carried out in Jan 2009

Safety workshop in May 2009

Again generated very useful case study

material for the EUROCONTROL

Guidance Material

Test flights completed in Aug 2009


レーダー空域

非レーダー空域

レーダー空域

Version

RNP-AR 1. Intro 2. DNV/Aviation Exp. 3. Safety Assmt. FOSA 4. Haneda RW22/23

RNP-AR: 航法性能要件 (Required Navigation Performance – Authorized Required)

性能準拠型航法 (PBN)

RNAV

(機上監視警報機能無）

・RNAV10（洋上）・RNAV5（航空路）・RBAV2,RNAV1

（航空路&ターミナル)

RNP

(機上監視警報機能有）

・RNP4（洋上）・Basic RNP1,2 (航空路&ターミナル）・RNP APRC ・RNP AR APRC (進入方式）

航法精度

0.1-0.3 Mile



“Tail” distributions - little data, very uncertain

95% containment

within +/- ? nm

Route

Centrelines

ROUTE SPACING


FOSA and Overall Safety Process

Plan

Design

Approval

Implement

Review

Approved ?

Monitor

OPS Needs Analysis + Justification for

RNP AR

Feedback

Procedure

Major Issues

No

Yes

Safety

Considerations

FOSA

Verification/

Validation/

Action Tracking/

Etc.

Sa

fety

Asse

ssm

en

t/ C

ase



FOSA Scope

FOSA

Aircraft

Performance Navigation

Services

Flight Crew

Operations Infrastructure

ATC

Operations Operating

Conditions

Aircraft

Failures



FOSA and Overall Safety Process

Plan

Design

Approval

Implement

Review

Approved ?

Monitor

OPS Needs Analysis + Justification for

RNP AR

Feedback

Procedure

Major Issues

No

Yes

Safety

Considerations

FOSA

Verification/

Validation/

Action Tracking/

Etc.

Sa

fety

Asse

ssm

en

t/ C

ase



8-Step FOSA Method

3. ハザード特定

5. 要因分析と尤度推定 4. 結果分析

6. 潜在的緩和策決定

7.リスク許容性

9. FOSAの文書化

1. システム定義

2. 安全基準設定

基準に適合


８.リスク軽減措置基準に不適合


FOSA for Haneda RW22/23 1. Intro 2. DNV/Aviation Exp. 3. Safety Assmt. FOSA 4. Haneda RW22/23



FOSA for Haneda RW22/23




WorkShop with specialists for - Procedure design - ATC - ATC engineering - Flight crew - Flight operations - Regulation - Safety assessment and research




= 安全基準 = - Qualitative (定性分析） Risk Reduced As Far As Reasonably Practicable (AFRP) : ESARR, ANSP Risk Reduction As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP): ICAO SMM ->… risk [reduction] must be balanced against the time, cost and difficulty of taking measures to reduce or eliminate the risk.” - Quantitative（定量分析） has only been applied to determine the effectiveness of extending the NTZ to the RF legs by analysing the risk at the RF turns with and without an NTZ.

Hazard 3

-Causes

-Conseqs

-Mitigations

Hazard 2

-Causes

-Conseqs

-Mitigations

Hazard 1

-Causes

-Conseqs.

-Mitigations


Event Tree of Detection and Recovery

OUTCOME

Pilot detects

and resolves

ATC detects

and resolves

ACAS detects

and resolves

See and

Avoid

Providence/

Luck Resolution

Deviation Yes

Resolution

No Yes

Resolution

No Yes

Resolution

No Yes

Miss

No Yes

Accident

No



1. Intro 2. DNV/Aviation Exp. 3. Safety Assmt. FOSA 4. Haneda RW22/23 FOSA for Haneda RW22/23

Can’t be disclosed


Step 6 – 潜在的緩和策の検討

Contr

ol E

ffectiveness

Replacing an activity or task with a less

hazardous or more reliable one.

Designing the activity based on the

resource & capability constraints.

Substitute

Eliminate Controlling the hazard at source.

Obviously the most effective control if

the hazard can be totally eliminated.

Alarm Warning Devices & Alarms which tell you

that an unsafe situation has or is about to

occur are an important part of risk

mitigation, but they do not act to prevent

the hazard occurring in the first place.

Engineer Engineered controls include the

incorporation of fail safe devices into

designs, good ergonomics, increased

reliability etc.

Training Reducing human error through better

skills – limited again by achievable

human reliability.

Procedural Procedural controls include policies and

procedures for safe work practices.

Their effectiveness is limited by human

performance & reliability .

Contr

ol E

ffectiveness

Replacing an activity or task with a less

hazardous or more reliable one.

Designing the activity based on the

resource & capability constraints.

Substitute

Eliminate Controlling the hazard at source.

Obviously the most effective control if

the hazard can be totally eliminated.

Alarm Warning Devices & Alarms which tell you

that an unsafe situation has or is about to

occur are an important part of risk

mitigation, but they do not act to prevent

the hazard occurring in the first place.

Engineer Engineered controls include the

incorporation of fail safe devices into

designs, good ergonomics, increased

reliability etc.

Training Reducing human error through better

skills – limited again by achievable

human reliability.

Procedural Procedural controls include policies and

procedures for safe work practices.

Their effectiveness is limited by human

performance & reliability .

6 Cost / T

ime


羽田FOSA まとめ

Can’t be disclosed


終わりに

2013年現在、羽田を含めて9空港に、RNP AR進入方式が導入されている。

今後、78空港への導入方針が伝えられており、日本の空路の安全性、効率性の向上に寄与するものと期待できる。


終わりに


RJ CD Japan Office Location

Yokohama

Kobe (HQ)

Kitakyusyu

Hiroshima

DNVビジネス・アシュアランス・ジャパン（株）

設立 1964年

従業員 61名 (+ 契約監査員75名)

資本金 3.5 億円

売上(2012年） 19億円

神戸事務所（日本本社）神戸市中央区御幸通4-2-20 三宮中央ビル9F

電話: 078-291-1321

横浜事務所

横浜市中区桜木町1-1-8 日石横浜ビル14F

電話: 045-683-1406


www.dnvba.com

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safety assessment method for flight operation system

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