samkhya system

HERITAGE O F INDIA

The Right Reverend V . S . AZARIAH,

Bishop of Dornakal .

J . N . FAR"UHAR, M .A . , D .L ITT .

Already published .

The Heart of Buddhism . K . I . SAUNDERS, M .A.

Asoka . REV . J . M . MACPHAIL,M .A .

,M .D .

Indian Pa inting . Pr incip a l PERCY BROWN , Ca lcu tta .

Kanarese Literature . REV . E . P . RICE,B .A.

Subjects proposed and volumes under preparation .

SANSKRIT AND PALI LITERATURE .

Hymns from the Vedas . Prof . A. A. MACDONELL , Oxford .

Anthology of Mahayana Litera ture . Pro f . L . DE LA VALLEEPou se , Ghen t .

S e lections from the Up an ish ads . F . J . WESTERN ,M .A D e lh i.

S cenes from the Ramayana . JAMES MORISON . M .A. ,PH .D .

,

Oxford .

S e lections from the Mahabharata .

THE PHILOSOPHIE S .

The Ph ilosop hy of the Upan ishads .

Sankara ’

s Vedanta . A . K . SHARMA,M .A.

, Pa tia la .

Ramanuja'

s Vedanta .

The Buddh is t System .

FINE ART AND MUSIC .

Ind ian Arch itectu re . R . L . E W ING, B .A . ,Madras .

Ind ian Scu lp ture . Princ ipal W , M , ZuMBRo, Madura .

Ind ian Mu s ic . H . A . POPLEY,B .A .

, E rode .

The M inor Arts . Princip a l PERCY BROWN , Ca lcu tta .

Ind ian Co ins .

B IOGRAPHIE S OF EMINENT IND IANS .

Gautama Buddha . K . J . SAUNDERS , M .A.,Rangoon .

Ramanuja .

Akbar . F . V . SLACK ,M .A .

, Ca lcu tta .

Tu lsi Das . S . K . DUTTA , B .A .,M .E .

, CH .B . , Lahore .

VERNACULAR LITERATURE .

The Kurra l . H . A . POPLEY ,B .A .

,E rode .

Hymns of the Adiyars . G . E . PHILLIPS , M .A .

, and FRANCISKINGSBURY, Banga lore .

Hymns of the Alvars .

Tayumanavar . ISAAC TAM BYAH,M .A . , Bar .

-at-Law ,Penang .

Hymns of H indu stan .

Cha itanya Hymns . O . STURSBERG,PH.D . ,

Berhamp ore , Mursh idabad .

Marathi Abhangs . NICOL MACNICOL ,M .A .

,D .L ITT .

,Poona .

Gu jarati Hymns .

HISTORIE S OF VERNACULAR LITERATURE .

Bengali . J . D . ANDERSON , Cambridge .

Gu jarati .H indi . BOW IN GREAVES , Benares .

Marathi . NICOL MACNICOL , M .A .,D .L1r r .

,Poona .

Tam il . FRANCIS KINGSBURY,Bangalore .

Te lugu .

S inhalese . H . S . PERERA , B .A .,Kandy .

EDITORIAL PREF ACE

Fina lly , bre th ren ,wha tsoever th ings are true ,

wha tsoever th ings are honou rab le , wha tsoever th ingsare just, wha tsoever th ings are p ure , wha tsoeverth ings are love ly , wha tsoever th ings are of good

rep ort ; if there b e any virtue , and if th ere b e any

p ra ise , th ink on these things .

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,and regulated li fe there i s much that i s worthless , much

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The utmost care i s being taken by the General Editors

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THE HERITAGE O F INDIA

SAMKHYA SYSTEMA History of the SamkIfya Philosophy

A . BERRIEDALE KEITH,D.L1TT.

O F THE INNER TEM PLE BARRIe R-Ar -LAW , REOIUS PROFES S OR orSAN SKRIT AND COM PARATIVE PHILOLOGY Ar THE

UNIVERS ITY or EDINBURGH .

TRAN SLATOR or THE TAITTIRIYA SAMHITA , E rc.

CALCUTTA : ASSOCIATION PRESS

LONDON : O" FORD UNIVERS ITY PRESS

NEW YORK, TORONTO ,MELBOURNE

,

BOMBAY AND MADRAS

CONTENTS

1. SAMKHYA IN THE UPANISADS

I I . SAMKHYA AND BUDDHISM

III . THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE GREAT E PIC AND THE

ORIGIN OF SAMKHYA

IV SAMKHYA AND YOGA

V . THE SASTITANTRA

V I . GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND THE SAMKHYA

VII . THE SAMKHYA KARIKA

VIII . THE LATER SAMKHYA

INDE"

THE SAMKHYA IN THE UPANISADS

IN all the mani fold character of the content of theUpanisads i t i s undoubtedly poss ible to trace certainleading ideas . The most important of these doctrines is .

beyond question ,that of the identi ty of the self

,Atman

,of

the individual with the Brahman , which i s the mostuniversal expressi on fOr the absolute in which the universefinds i ts unity . It i s probable enough that these twoexpressions are not intrinsically related , and that theyrepresent two di fferent streams of thought . The Brahmani s the devotion of the Brahman priest : i t i s the sacred hymnto propiti ate the gods : i t i s also the magic spell of thewonder-worker : more generally i t i s the holy power in theuniverse at least as much as it i s the magic fluid of primitives avagery. Religion and magic , i f di fferent in essence and inorigin

,nevertheless go often in closest all i ance

,and their

un i son in the case of the concept Brahman may explain theease with which that term came to

_denote the essence of the

universe or absolute being . The Atman , on the other hand ,in the Brahmana texts which lie before the Upanisads ,has very often the sense of the trunk o f the body

,as opposed

to the hands and feet and other members , and i t i s perhapsfrom that fact at least as much as from the fact that i t has alsothe sense of wind that i t develops into the meaning of theessential sel f of man . The identification of the sel f andthe Brahman results in one form of the doctrine of theUpanisads , that taught under the name of Yajfiavalkya in

S ee H . O ldenberg, Buddha ( 5 th p p . 30-33 ; P . Deu ss en

(Philosophy of the Upanis ads , p . 39 ) p re fers to trea t Brahman as

the cosmica l an d Atman as the p sych ica l p rincip le of un ity . Max

M il ller (S ix Systems of Indian Philosophy , p p . 68-93 ) d istingu ishesBrahman ,

sp eech , and Brahman as tha t wh ich u tters or drives forthor manifests or crea tes .

6 THE SAMKHYA SYSTEM

the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad ( i i , 4 ; iv , in the conclusionthat the Atman as the knowing subject i s unknowable

,and

that the world of empiric reality,which seems to be in

constant change,i s really a mere illusion . This i s the

highest point reached by the thought of the Upanisads , andi t i s not consi stently or regularly maintained . Despiteacceptance of the doctrine of the identity of the individualself and the self of the universe

,there often appears to be

left over as an irreducible element something which is notthe sel f , but which i s essenti ally involved in the constitutionof reality . This is implici t in such statement s as that theAtman completely enters into the body

,up to the nails even :

the all-pervasiveness of the Atman i s not incompatible withthe existence of something to be pervaded . In order toremove the difficulty which i s felt in the existence of thisfurther element

,the conception of creation

,which was , of

course,familiar from the cosmogonic legends of the

Brahmanas,was often resorted to . Thus in the Chandogya

Upanisad (vi , 2 ) we learn in detail how the self desired to

be many and created brill i ance,Tej as

,whence arose water

and food , and then the self ente red into these created thingswith the living self. T his scheme

,by which a being first

produces a cosmic material and then enters into i t as l i fe,i s

a commonp lace in the Speculations of the Brahmanas , andit lends i tself to a very different development than the theoryof illusion . While the latter theory insi sts on the identityof the individual self with the absolute sel f

,both being one

essence surpassing all consciousness,the latter system allows

a certain reality to matter,and a still more definite reality

to the individual soul,which in course of time develops into

the d octrine of qual ified duality,V iSistadvaita , in which

there i s found a p lace for the individual soul and matterbeside the supreme soul

,and which undoubtedly forms the

theme of the B rahma S iltra of Badarayana . But while thissystem can be seen in the Upan i sads , i t would be an errorto suppose that i t is more p roperly the doctrine of theUp anisads than the illusion theory of S amkara :

* neither

For Badarayana’s views see Th ibau t, xxiv ; Sukh tankar,

Vienna Orienta l J ourna l , xii,120 ff

, ; H . Jacob i , xxxiii,

5 1-54 .

THE SAMKHYA IN THE UPANISADS 7

system in i ts completely self- conscious form is to be foundin the Up anis

fads , but the germs of both are present ,and both in a real sense can claim the authori ty of theUpanisads .On the other hand , i t is impossible to find in the

Upani sads any real basi s for the Samkhya system . TheUp anisads

f are essenti al ly devoted to the di scovery of anabsolute

,and , diverse as are the forms which the absolute

may tak e,they do not abandon the search , nor do they allow

that no such absolute exi sts . There are , however , e lementshere and there which mark the growth of ideas which laterwere thrown into systematic form in the Samkhya

,but it i s

impossible to see in these fragmentary hints any indicationthat the Samkhya philosophy was then in process offormation . It is

,of course , poss ible , as a matter of abstract

argument,to insi st that the elements in the Upanisads which

suggest“ the later Samkhya views are really borrowings bythe Upanisads of doctrines already extant in a Samkhyasystem , but , in the ab sense of the slightest evidence for theexistence of such a system in the Vedic l i terature

,i t i s

methodologically un sound to take this hypothesi s as

possessing any value , in face of the natural conclusion thatwe have in the Upani sads scattered hints which were lateramalgamated into one system . Just like the Vedanta ofS amkara , or the Vedanta of Badarayana ,

the Samkhya i s asystem built on the Upanisads : from both of these i t d i ffersin that i t goes radically and essenti ally beyond the teachingof the Upani sads .The cosmogonical form of the doctrine of the sel f sets at

once the absolute into confl ict with the individual sel f,and

i t undoubtedly tends to minimise the importance of theabsolute , since its Operation appears to have been exhaustedby the action of creation . At the same time

,i t i s clear that

the opposi t ion of matter to the individual soul becomesquite a sharp one

,for on the cosmogonic or thei sti c system

the primitive matter is indeed produced from the absolute ,but equally clearly i t exi sts before the individual soul entersinto the sphere of existence . While thus the relation ofsoul and nature becomes one of opposition under the aegisof an absolute which tends to become more faded

,at the


same time reflection is more bent on the actual character ofthe relation of soul and nature

,and finds expression in such

an utterance as that of the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad ( i , 4 ,where i t i s exp ressly stated that food and eater make up

the entire universe . This passage i s interpreted in the lateMaitrayani Upanisad as referring to the distinction betweenSpirit , which i s subject , and all the rest of nature , includingthe Bhutatman ,

the psychic app aratus p roduced fromnature , as the object : i t i s characteri stic of the confusedcharacter of thi s late work that the very next chapters(vi, 11- 13 ) deal with nature as being the product of thesupreme Brahman . It would be wrong

,therefore

,to find in

the B rhadaranyaka Upanisad any conscious realization ofa doctrine which would eliminate the Brahman

,but it i s

clear enough that the path to the elimination of that elementwas Op en .

The denial in the Samkhya of the supreme sp i ri t ca rrieswith i t curious consequences when added to the extremedevelopment of the doctrine that the spirit i s alone thesubject . The first product of nature i s the intellect , wh ichi s called the great one , and which clearly i s originally acosmic function

,derived from nature but lighted up by

Spiri t . The natural source of thi s concep t ion must be foundin the idea in the Upan isads that the supreme Spirit re

appears as the firstborn oi creation after i t has produced theprimitive matter. The ultimate origin of the idea can betraced beyond the Upanisads to the Rgveda (x , 12 1) wherethe golden germ Hiranyagarbha i s produced from theprimeval waters

,and in the Upanisads we find in the

Kausitaki the seer , composed of the Brahman , the greatone in the Katha ( i i i , 10 , 13 ; vi , the first great sp iritin the Svetasvatara ( i i , 19 ) who is called Hiranyagarbhain i i i

,4 ; iv , 12 ; Brahman in vi

,18 , and the knower , all

pervading,in vi

,17 . Moreover

,i t i s thus that we should , i t

i s clear,understand the seer

,Kap ila , first engendered , in v ,

2 . The idea that in this verse we are to see the first ment ion of the founder of the Samkhya as a real person i s toofantasti c to be seriously upheld

,though it is not at all un

likely that the origin o i the doctrine of Kapila as thefounder of Sarnkhya i s to be traced to thi s passage .


Further materi al for the origin of the series of evolutioni s also to be found in the Upanisads . In the Katha

, whichhas every claim to be regarded as an old work ,

* not indeedof the same antiquity as the great prose Upanisads like theBrhadaranyaka , Chandogya , Aitareya , Taittiriya , orKausitaki, but at the head of the second stage of poeticalUpanisads , representing the period of the full developmentof the philosophy of these texts

,there i s found ( i i i , 10

after an exhortation to control the unruly steeds of thesenses

,a description of Yoga

,or concentration . In this i t

is expressly stated that the objects are higher than thesenses

,mind than the objects

,the intellect than mind

,the

great sel f than intellect,the unevolved than the great self

,

and the spiri t than the unevolved . The spiri t dwells unseenin all beings and is above all . In concentration

,therefore

,

Speech with mind i s to be restrained in the knowledge- self,

that i s intellect , that again in the great sel f, and that in thecalm self

,that is the unevolved . In a later passage (vi ,

7 - 11 ) a S imi lar account i s given : here the mind standsabove the senses

, Sattva above the mind , over that the greatsel f

,over that the unevolved

,over that the Sp i ri t which is

described by terms applicable in the classical Sar’

nkhya , asall-pervading and without any distinctive mark . Thehighest condition of Yoga is reached when the senses withmind and intellect are brought to a standstill . In the nextlines the spiri t is described as only to be expressed by thedeclaration of existence . With this series may be comparedthe fact that according to the Chandogya (vi , 8 , 6 ) at deathspeech enters into mind

,mind into breath

,breath into

brilli ance and brilli ance into the supreme godhead .

Further light i s thrown on the pos i tion by the PrasnaUpanisad , which , though not a work of the same age as theKatha , i s nevertheless probably the earliest of the later proseUpani s ads . In the fourth PraSna i t i s explained that insleep in dreaming the senses enter into mind

,and in deep

sleep mind also passes into the brilli ance,Tej as . Then

follows an account of how all things are resolved into the

See H. Oldenberg, xxxvu , S 7 if ; Buddha , p . 60 ;P . Deussen , Philosophy of the Upanisads, p . 24 .


imperishable,which has no Shadow

,blood or body , the order

being the five elements , each with its corresponding Matra,which appears to denote the corresponding fine element , thefive organs of perception with their functions , the five organs ofaction with their functions

,the mind

,intellect

,individuation ,

Ahamkara,thought

,Citta

,brilli ance

,and breath

,and their

functions . From the highest self there i s here distinguishedthe V ijfianatman , the individual self , which experiences theimpressions of the senses

,and so forth . It i s perfectly clear

that the Prasna i s not an exposition of the Samkhya , but theelements of the Samkhya derivation are present . Theconception of the fine elements seems to owe its origin tothe View expressed in the Chandogya Upanisad (vi,according to which the gross elements

,corresponding to

fire,water and earth

,are not in themselves pure

,but each

i s compounded with some portion of the others : the name ,Tanmatra , which is later normal , i s first given expressly inthe Maitrayani Upanisad ( i i i ,A much more developed account of Samkhya type i s to be

found in the Svetas’

vatara Upanisad , which is no doubtolder than the Prosna

,but later than the Katha . The

Upanisad i s defin itely deisti c , Rudra who bears the ep ithetbut not the name , S iva , being the object of devotion andbelie f

,but at the same time being regarded as the absolute

and sup reme Spirit , rather than as derived from that spirit .On the other hand

,the Upanisad contains a series of numbers

which are best to be explained as referring to enumerationsaccepted by the Samkhya school : thus in i , 4 ,

the individualself is compared to a wheel with three tyres

,sixteen ends

,

fi fty spokes , twenty counter- sp okes and six sets of eight .These are interpreted as the three Gunas

,the set of sixteen

consisting of the ten organs,mind and the five elements

,the

fi fty psychic states of the classical Samkhya,the ten senses

and their Objects , and the six sets of the five elements , mind ,individuation and intellect ; the eight elements of the body ,the eight p re fections , the eight psychic states which form inthe Samkhya an alternative to the fi fty

,eight gods and

eight virtues . The worth of such identifications must beregarded as uncertain

,and no conclusive evidence is afford

ed by them , as plays ou numbers are much affected by the


Brahmanical schools . But there is other and much moreconvincing evidence of the existence of Samkhya views .The individual self

,the V ijfianatman or Purusa , is described

as the power of god enveloped in hi s own Gunas , whichshows plainly that while the absolute is still the source ofall

,nevertheless a new element has been introduced in the

conception of the Gunas,through which the absolute becomes

the individual soul . A still more distinct proof of theexi stence of ideas akin to Sar

'

nkhya i s to be seen in iv , 5 , inwhich it is said :

The one she -goa t, red ,wh ite , and b lack ,

Produce th many young ,like - formed un to he r ,

The one he -goa t in love enjoye th her ,The other leave th he r whom he ha th en joyed .

The passage i s discussed by Samkara , who seeks to see

in the three colours a reference to the three colours mentionedin the Chandogya Upanisad (vi , 4 ) as those of the threeelements there mentioned

,fire

,water

,and earth

,which are

produced from the absolute and which are present in allthat exists . This view is so far , i t would seem ,

beyond doubtcorrect : the resemblance in p oint of the colours i s toostriking to be an accident . But the passage must obviouslyalso be admitted to have clear traces of what i s later theSamkhya doctrine : the imagery of the many he-goats andthe relation of enj oyment

,followed by relinquishment

,i s

precisely p arallel to the similes which are often used in theclass ical 8amkhya to illustrate the relation of spiri t andnature . Moreover the she-goat is named Aja which denotesalso the unborn

,a fact which exactly coincides wi th the

Samkhya conception that the first principle nature is not aproduct . The Samkhya conception of the all-pervadingcharacter o f the Gunas

,which in diverse measure are

present in all the products of nature,is as well sui ted to

the description of the progeny of the goat as the view of theChandogya . It is , therefore , only reasonable to assume thatwe have here a clear hint of the origin of the doctrine ofthe Gunas in the threefold material of the ChandogyaUpanigad , and there i s nothing in thi s passage , nor in theothers where the Gunas are mentioned ( i , 3 ; v , 7 ; vi , 3 ,11

, to suggest that the Gunas are anything other than


elements as in the Chandogya . The names Sattva,Raj as

and Tamas do not occur until the Maitrayani Upanisad

( i i , 5 ; v , It i s not imposs ible that the subjective sideof the Gunas

,which i s clearly marked in these names and

which certainly prevails in the classical Samkhya , was adevelopmen t from the conception that the individual self wasthe result of the envelopment of the absolute in the threeGunas : though originally referring to materi al products ,still the tendency would be to see in them psychic states .It i s most probable that in these traces of Samkhya

views we are not to see the result of a con tamination ofSamkhya with a Vedanta philosophy : i t i s p erfectly plainthat in iv, 5 we are not dealing with the conscious expressionof a view which ignores the absolute ; on the c ontrary iniv

,10 we find the deliberate description of nature as an

illusion , and the great lord as an illusion-maker , emphaticden i als of the possibili ty of the sep arate and real existenceof nature as held by the Samkhya school . It i s not naturalthat one who is Opposed so essentially to the view that theSamkhya principles are correct should appropri ate p hraseswhich seem to accept them

,whereas all is natural i f we

assume that the Upanisad represents a definite developmentof the doctrine of the Absolute based on the older Upan isads ,from which in due course the samkhya develop ed .

"e Withsuch a view there i s nothing inconsisten t in iv

, 5 : themetaphor there used app lies perfectly properly to thedifferent condition of two individual souls , the one of whichdoes not real ise its true nature as the absolute enveloped inthe three Gunas

,while the other recogn izes i ts true nature

and throws aside i ts connection with nature .

It has,however

,been argued from the occurrence of the

name,Kapila

,in v ,

2,and of Samkhya in vi , 13 , in connection

with Yoga,that the Samkhya -Yoga system was defini tely

known to the author or redactor of the Up an isad . But thisi s clearly not shown by the facts adduced . Kapila i s , as wehave seen

,not a human personage at all

,and the parallel of i , 3 ,

This is the amount of tru th,in the V iew of A . E . Gough (Philo

sophy of the Upanisads , p p . 2 00 , tha t the Samkhya is or igina llyan enumeration of p r incip les of the Vedanta . N0 such Samkhyasystem is recorded , however ; as a system Sarnkhya is atheistic .

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hammers only the iron not the glow pervading it . Here,too

,

we find the names of the Gunas as p sychic states , and bodilyand men tal ev ils are referred to the action of Rajas , desire ,and Tamas , indifference . In Section V a creation mythi s set out , according to which the highest produces the threeGunas

,Tamas

,Raj as and Sattva , and from Sattva , Sp i ri t ,

consisting of pure intellect , possessing the powers ofrepresentation

,j udgment and individuation as i ts psychic

body . In the hymn of Kutsayana ,an otherwise unknown

sage , which precedes this myth , we find the identi ty of allin the Brahman asserted and the first occurrence in

li terature of the conception that release i s both for the sakeof spiri t and of matter

,an idea which in the Samkhya is

converted in to the view that nature strives as i f for her ownrelease for the release of another

,that is spirit , though else

where the release of Spirit i s denied and the real releaseattributed to nature

,a contradiction arising from the fact

that in reality there i s,and can be

,no pain in nature

,which

i s unconscious,and the pain i s brought into exi stence by

the un ion with Sp irit , whence arises consciousness . In theUpanisad , which recognizes a prius to both nature andSpiri t , the release can be and is for both alike . In vi, 10there i s found expressly stated the doctrine of the distinctionof spiri t and the objective world : the psychic body is

p roduced from the primeval materi al , and consi sts of theelements from the great one

,that i s intellect , app arently up

to the gross elements,unless the reading i s slightly altered ’“

and the s eries brought to a close with the fine elements . Iti s , however , clearly the case in the class ical Samkhya thatthe subtle portions of the gross elements are included in thepsychic apparatus

,and this may be the case here also .

The other Upan i sads of thi s period give us little for theSamkhya doctrine . In the Mundaka , however , we find ( i ,1,8,9 ; i i , 1 , 2 , 3 ) a development of principles from the all

knower to food,thence to breath

,thence to the mind , thence

to truth , the worlds , and actions , or from the spirit to theimperishable

,thence to breath

,thence to mind and the

organs of sense,and thence to the elements . This exposi tion

Deussen,S echzig Upanisads , p . 33 7

,n . 2 .


clearly accepts the absolute , and follows the normal tri adof absolute

,nature and souls

,but i t di ffers from the Katha

,

which it otherwise somewhat closely resembles , by theaddition of one principle

,breath

,in place o f the great sel f

and the in tellect of that Upanisad . I t i s clear that Prana ,breath

,plays a cosmic function .

As the Upanisads do not recognize the exi stence ofSpiri t as individual only

,but always admit the exi stence of

a supreme Spirit,the essence of the knowledge which i s to

save men from constant rebirth i s the knowledge of the realidentity of the supreme and the individual Self . Thederivative character of the Samkhya comes in to very clearprominence in i ts retention of the doctrine of knowledge asthe means of saving grace . In the Samkhya , as therei s no real connection between sp i ri t and nature , i t seemswholly impossible to understand how the false conceptionof such a connection can ari se : the Spiri t i s in reali ty purelysubjective

,nature i s purely objective

,and there i s no

interaction which can explain the exi stence of ignorance orindeed of knowledge . On the other hand , in the case of theUpanisads , whatever degree of reali ty be allowed to theindividual souls of the world

,i t i s essenti ally the case that

there i s a source of ignorance : the absolute , ei ther by selfillusion or in fact

,develops from itself a world of spirits

and matter,and the knowledge which brings salvation i s the

knowledge that,despite the seeming multiplici ty

,there is no

real di fference between the absolute and the self,at any rate

in ultimate essence . Ignorance i s admitted in the Samkhyaas a fact , but i t i s a fact which has no explanation whatever ,and therefore i ts position in the system must be traced to aform of philosophy in which i t had a more just claim toexistence .

Another clear proof of derivative nature i s the acceptance ,without comment

,of the doctrine of transmigration and the

accompanying doctrine of pessimism . The Upanisads donot show the doctrine of transmigration as fully developed :rather , as might be inferred from the fact that transmigrat ion proper is not clearly known to any Brahmana text ,they show only the origin of the system . The credit of firstenunciating the doctrine as a great moral truth , that o f


retribution according to action by rebi rth,i s ass igned to

Yajfiavalkya , who lays down the principle in the B t hadaranyaka Upanigad ( i i i , 2 , 13 ; iv , 4 , 2 though eventhis view has been questionedfi

" The idea,however

,worked

up into an elaborate and confused whole,in which the ideas

of retribution by rebirth and the older view of punishmentin hell and reward in heaven are thrown together

,i s found

definitely in a late portion of that Upanisad (vi , 2 ) and inthe Chandogya (v , 3 The doctrine is by no meansnecessarily accepted in all the Upani sads of the older type ;thus it i s doubt ful i f it appears at all in the older portionof the Aitareya Zranyaka ; on the other hand , i t i s clearlyaccepted by the Kausitahi and by the Katha

,and is later

a commonplace assump tion . Its full development andspread must antedate the rise of Buddhism

,and it may

fairly be argued that the doctrine prevailed among widecircles in India in the north by 550 B C ,

and probably halfa century earlier . Efforts have even been made to find thedoctrine in the Rgveda , but so far without real success .The origin of the belief has been attributed to borrowing

from aboriginal tribes ,’

r i t being a common V iew in primitivepeoples that the spirits of their dead pass into other formsof li fe . Traces of similar V l eW S have also been seen inoccasional hints in the Rgveda of the dep arture of theelements of the dead to their prop er abodes . The realimportance of the Indian doctrine

,however

,i s the moral tinge

given to i t by Yajiiavalkya , while its immediate precursorin the Brahmanas is the dread of repeated death , which i sexp ressed in the view that even after death death may awaitthe man who i s not proficient in some ritual p erformance . l;This conception of Punarmrtyu ,

repeated death,for a time

evidently played a considerable place in the ideas of theBrahmanas , as i s seen by the quite frequent occurrence of theconception in the Satapatha B rahmana and by its mentionin the Kausitaki B rahmana

, and the turning of a ritual

S ee F . O . S chrader , lxiv,333-335 .

1‘

A . E . Gough ,Philosophy of the Upanisads , p p . 20-25 .

I: S ee S . Levi, La Doctrine du S a crifice , p p . 93ff P . O ltramare ,

L’histoire des Ide

’

es Théosophiques , i, 96 ff .


conception into a moral one was as natural as the transferof the repetition of birth in the world beyond to the birth inthis world

,which was the one thing wanting to make the

concep tion really a doctrine of transmigration . This step i snot certainly taken in any passage of the SatapathaBrahmana , though a few passages are open to thi s inter

p retation . In making the deci sive change i t i s,of course ,

perfectly possible that the popular ideas o f the sp iri t of theancestor taking up i ts abode in some beast or bird or otherform

,such as that of a snake , may have helped the conception

to take root and become easily appreciated . I t i s indeeddoubt ful whether without some such backgrond we couldexplain the extraordinary success of the doctrine in winningthe real and lasting adherence of the great mass o f thepeople of India . None the less , i t must remain extraordinarythat none of the philosophical systems Should haveattempted to examine the validi ty of the bel ief

,a fact which

stands in striking contrast with the procedure of Plato , who ,in the Phaedo

,provides a philosophic background for the

conception,which he probably took direct from the pop ular

Pythagorean or Orphic conception of the fate of the soul .The pess imism which i s assumed by the Samkhya must

l ikewise be derivative . In the Upanisads there i s nogeneral pessimi sm visible in the earl ier exposi t ions ofdoctrine ; the marked pessimism of the Ma itrayani i s aclear indication of i ts posteriori ty to the influence ofBuddhism , which had evidently a very considerable partin spreading the doctrine . The underlying view ofthe Upanisads i s , indeed , that the Atman in itsel f i sperfect , and that , accordingly , all else i s filled withtrouble , as the Brhadaranyaka ( i i i , 4 , 2 ; 5 , 1 ; 7 , 23 )expressly says ; and with thi s expression of opinion may beset such remarks as that the knower of the self overcomessorrow ; nor is there any lack of references to old age andtrouble . But i t i s one thing to admit thi s

,and quite another

to hold that the general tone of the Upanisads i s pessimisti c ; rather the joy of the discovery of the new knowledgeis the characteri stic of the teachers

,while they regard the self

as in i tself bliss . S ince the knowledge of the self i s op ento all , and since by that knowledge bliss is to be obtained ,


the older Upanisads could not be and are not pessimistic .While , however , the Samkhya shares with them the belief inthe possibility of freedom being obtained in the course ofman ’s li fetime , and thus has a less pessimistic side , i t den iesthat there i s bliss in the state of the released Spiri t , and likeBuddhism dwells on the reality of human misery .

Efforts have been made to find references to distinctivelySamkhya doctrines in older Upan isads , such as theChandogya and the Brhadaranyaka . In the latter text

( iv , 4 , 8 ) the term Linga appears beside mind , and thesuggestion to treat i t as mean ing p sychic apparatus*

presents itsel f,but i t i s much more l ikely that the sense is

simply “bearing a characteri stic mark . In iv,4,13 , a

verse found also in Ti a“

Upanisad 12, S amkara sees a

reference to the Samkhya doctrine in the term Asambhuti

which he renders as Prak t ti, but this View has in i tsel f no

probabili ty,and the commentator

, Uvata ,declares that the

polemic against the believers in Asambhuti, destruction , isdirected against the materialists . The statement in i , 4 ,

15 ,of the Upanisad , that in the beginning the universe wasundiscriminated

, and was later discriminated by name andform ,

is a repeti tion of a very old concept , which ha s hadi ts share in moulding the Samkhya concept of Prak t ti, butit is not specifically Samkhya . The Cha

’

ndogya Upanisad

in vii, has the word Ahamkara , but uses i t merely as asynonym for the self

,A tman

,and in vii

,26 , 2 , the term

S attva has not yet the technical sense of one of the threeconstituents of nature which belongs to i t in the Sar

'

nkhya .

Nor in i i i, 19 i s there anything specifically Samkhya : that

paragraph is a legend of the origin of being from non- being ,the coming into existence of an egg , the two halves of whichare sky and earth , and from which the sun ari ses . Thisform of creation myth i s of importance for the creationlegends seen in Manu and the Puranas

,but i ts relation to

Sar‘

nkhya is merely the vague one that i t contemplates aprocess of production

,though the idea of not being as prior

to being is completely contrary to the developed samkhya

Th is doctrine is not c learly known to any Up an isadbe fore the Maitrayani (v i, Katha (vi , 8 ) and Svetasvatara( vi, 9 ) may re fer to it.


view,which does not regard Prak t ti, when unevolved , as not

being,because i t i s nothing definite . The conception of the

Up anisad version with that of the cosmogon i c hymn , Rgveda .

x,129 , i s obvious , but here also we have only an idea which

later i s in part adopted by the Samkhya , that of anunformed primitive matter . More importance attaches to apassage in the Atharvaveda (x , 8 , 43 )

The lotus flowe r of n ine doors ,Cove red w ith three strands ,Wha t p rodigy th ere is w ith in it ,Tha t th e Brahman-knowers know .

The human body with its nine orifices i s clearly meantby the flower with nine doors

,but the three strands present

difficulties . The meaning“quali ty i s not proved for earlyVedic literature

,occurring first in the Sutras

,and the sense

must therefore be assumed to be constituent or somethingsimilar , the reference being probably to the hair , skin and

nails . I f the reference i s to be taken as to the constituentsin the sense of the Gunas of the Samkhya philosophy ,* i t i sclear that the expression i s inaccurate

,since the three

consti tuents make up nature,and the passage would say that

the body was covered with nature,instead of consi sting of

nature . An attemp t ]L to find in the same hymn (x , 8 , 39 , 40 )

a reference to the doc trine of the ages of the world , therebeing periodic destruction and reproduction

,cannot be

regarded as proved , though in any case i t would not be ofany value as proof of the existence of the Samkhya , sincethe idea is common to all the systems .In the later Upani sads , such as the Nrsimhatapaniya ,

Garbha , Galika’

, and others,clear references to Samkhya

doctrines occur , but the dates of these Upanisads are fartoo uncertain , and probably late , to throw any light on thequestion of the origin or of the doctrines of the Samkhya .

S ee Wh itney’

s note w ith Lanman’

s correction . The Guna

theory is accep ted by P . O ltrama re , L’

histoire des Idées Théosophi

qu es , i , 240 , 241. Cf. below, p . 48 .

I“S ee H . Jacobi, Go

'

ttingische G e lehrte Anzeigen , 1895 , p . 2 10F or the a lleged mention in the Aitareya Brahmana

,see Macdone ll and

Ke ith,Vedic Index,

ii,193 .

SAMKHYA AND BUDDHISM

THE essential fact of the atheism of the Samkhya systemin its classical form and the atheism of Buddhism naturallyraises the problem whether the view is borrowed by the onesystem from the other . There is , of course , no a priori

reason to deny the p ossibility of such borrowing ; indefini tely historical times there was clearly a lively interchange of views between Buddhism and the Brahmanicalschools : the growth of logic was furthered by discoveriesor developments now by the one side , now by the other , andthere is striking similarity between the doctrine of void

,

which was brought into special prominence by the BuddhistNagarjuna , in the first or second century A.D . , and itsdevelopment into the V ijfianavada of Asafiga , probably in thefourth century A.D . ,

which has suggested the view* that theillusion theory of the Vedantaywhich has attained its classicalshape in the doctrine of S amkara , was derived from Buddhism as regards a very imp ortant part of its content . Butthat Buddhism i s the source of the Samkhya is most improbable , since the divergence of the two systems suggeststhat Buddhism repre sents a further advance in the disinte

gration of the earlier p hilosophy of the Upani sads . It istrue that the Samkhya abandons the idea of the existence ofthe absolute , but i t i s , on the other hand , careful to retainthe idea of Spiri t and of nature ; the doctrine ofBuddhism

,on the other hand , has in effect abandoned these

two conceptions,and has left i tself with only the fleeting

series of mental states as a quasi reality , from which thedevelopment of the doctrine of the void is a natural enoughstep . It i s impossible to prove

,and certainly not plausible

to believe,that from so developed a doctrine as that of

See H . Jacobi,

xxxiii,5 1-54 .

2 2 THE SAMKHYA SYSTEM

school , are nevertheless treated by it in a special manner.The attemp t to bring this really conclusive form of argument to bear has been made by Jacobi

,

* who has sought tofind in the series of twelve p rincip les , which are used in theBuddhist View to explain the causation of misery

,clear

traces of their derivation from the evolution series of the5amkhya . The elements of the evolution series of theSarnkhya are not by any means p eculiar to that system ,

butthe order of evolution and the stress laid on the evolutionare matters of great importance . J acobi further strengthenshi s position by the argument that the reference in theepic to the two systems of Samkhya and Yoga as two and

eternal i s a clear indication that at the time of the epic,

which he sets not later than the beginning of the Christi anera

,the systems were of great antiqui ty

,that the atmosphere

of thought in the time of the Buddha was filled withSamkhya ideas , and that the Buddha was influenced bythese ideas

,and strove in his own system to produce some

formula of causation which would b e suitable to serve as anexp l anation of the origin of the misery which the Samkhyaand his own system so strongly affirmed . He also pointsout that in ASvaghosa

’s B uddhacarita we have an

account of a meeting between the Buddha and hi s formerteacher

,Arada

,in which are ascribed to the latter views

which resemble those of the Samkhya , as modified by thebelief in the personal supreme divin ity of the V iSiStadvaitaVedan ta . The importance of this ep i sode , i f we are tocredit the account in ASvaghosa , would be thati t would remove the most serious difficulty in theattempt to connect with the Samkhya the system of Buddhism . The latter has no trace of the doctrine of the threeGunas , or constituents , which are present in nature and alli ts products according to the Samkhya , and therefore i f i t i sto be derived from the Samkhya it must be tr aced to a8amkhya which did not accep t the doctrine of the Gunas .Now the account given of Arada ’s teachings does not ment ion the Gunas

, and in it might perhaps be seen evidence

Z .D .M G 111,1-15 ; Nachrichten van den Konigl . G esellschaft

der Wissenschaften eu Gottingen ,1896 , p p . 43ff . F or critic isms see

O ldenberg, Buddha ( 3rd p p . 443ff ; Iii, 681-694 .

SAMKHYA AND BUDDHISM 23

of the existence of a Samkhya which did not knowthe Gunas . * It is clear

,however

,that thi s argument

cannot sa fely be pressed : the histori cal accuracy of theviews of ASvaghosa i s not confirmed by the information wehave . Arada i s known to the sacred books of Buddhism ,

but his doctrines are never set out in any way correspondingto the picture of him in ASvaghosa ,

and we cannottherefore say that the account in ASvaghoSa has any valueat all

,not merely for the actual teaching of Arada , but for

the existence at any time of a school o f 5amkhya , whichdenies the existence of the Gunas . I t may be doubted i f anysuch school of Samkhya ever was known .

The causal series of Buddhism,in which the idea o f

cause is only an inaccurate or popular expression,

applicable in its strictness to some alone of the members ,traces the miseries o f ex i stence from ignorance

,through the

Samskaras,V ijfiana ,

name and form,the six organ s of

sense,contact

,feeling

,desire

,clinging

,becoming

,bi rth , to

old age and death . The series is of very curious appearance ;i t has variously been declared to be one of the first o f theBuddha ’s discoveries

,and to be a late conglomerate

,nor in

any case is i t a masterwork of expression or thought . Inthe View of J acobi the whole refers but to one birth andli fe . The last element takes us into the midst of thesorrow of existence

,which is exp la ined by birth . The first

ten members serve to expl ain the origin of bi rth , and arederived in part from the Samkhya and in part from theYoga , which Buddha well knew and which had the 8amkhyaas the basi s of its philosophic system . Avidya, ignorance ,is in the Samkhya and the Yoga alike the cause of thebinding of the spirit . It cons i sts in the failure to realize theexternal distinction of spi ri t and nature . In Buddhi sm itmeans the failure to realize the four great truths concerningmisery . The Samskaras are terms of Samkhya and Yoga ,expressing the imp ressions made upon the intellect by such

P . O ltramare (L ’

historie des Ide’

es The’

osophiqu es i,243-5 )

holds that the Guna doctr ine is a la ter a ccretion to the Samkhya ,

bu t w ithou t adequ a te grounds . S ee a lso O . S trauss , Vienna Orienta lJ ourna l , xxvii , 25 7 ff , who p oints ou t the a ffin ity of Arada

’

s views tothose of the ep ic.


activities as thinking , feeling , willing and action , fromwhich in due course other phenomena of the li fe of thesoul spring forth . The Buddhist conception of theSamskaras i s a varying one , but i t i s sometimes clearlyanalogous in character . Name and form are to beconsidered as really equivalent to the p rinciple of individuation

,and they naturally grow out of V ijfiana , which i s

nothing else than the intellect of the Samkhya , which hasV ijr

'

iana as one of its functions . Moreover,the derivate

character of the Buddhist system shows itself very clearly inthe fact that both for ignorance and for the Samskaras anintellect must be assumed

,which i t merely admits after the

Sar‘

nskaras in the form of V ijfiana . From individuationthe 8amkhya allows

,on the one hand

,the organs of sense

and the fine elements,from which are developed the gross

elements,to arise . This i s rendered plausible by the

cosmic principle of individuation for each world period,but

in the Buddhist series from individuation,as name and

form,the senses and their objects are derived simply and

without any justification as regards the derivation of thegross world from the individual . The next element in theBuddhist series

,contact

,is the contact of the senses and

the ir objects which i s recognized in the Samkhya-Yoga :from it results the feeling of p leasure or the reverse , which i sthe same as the feeling of the Buddhist series . Fromfeeling ari ses desire according to both theories : from desirethe motive to rebirth or becoming

,which in the Samkhya

Yoga is termed Adrsta , or Dharmadharmau,and in the

Buddhist Upadana , clinging .

The evidence of dependence i s clearly somewhat lackingin cogency

,even on the theory of the causal series adopted

by Jacobi,as regards certain of the p oints . Moreover

,the

ser ies i s interpreted,on the basi s of the oldest Buddhist

texts very differently by O ldenbergfi" He lays stress on the

fact that V ijfiana i s conceived as coming into existence atthe time of conception as a result of the Samskaras , orimpressions

,which have been formed in the mind through

ignorance in a former bi rth . With V ijfiana come into being

Buddha ( 5 th p p . 25 7 -295 .


name and form,the latter being defin itely the corporeal side

of the future being,while name hints at the personali ty .

From name and form we are led from experience of the worldthrough the senses to the desire

,which leads to clinging to

li fe,and thence to a further rebirth

,the series thus

illogically including a second rebirth,which i s traced to

different causes,but the main idea being merely to Show the

connection of misery with li fe . An attempt to save thetheory from the grave error of bringing birth twice in i smade by O ltramarefi

‘ who argues that the matter i sconfined to an explanation of the existence of

‘

misery , basedon the arguments that man i s miserable because he exi ststhrough being born : he i s born because he belongs to theworld of becoming : he belongs to that world because henourishes ex i stence in himself : thi s he does because he hasdesires : he has desires because he has sensations : he hassensations because he comes into contact with the externalworld : thi s he does because he has senses , which act :the senses act because he opposes himsel f as individual tothe nonself ; thi s again he does because his consciousness i simbued with the idea of individuality : thi s again comesfrom former experiences

,which in their turn are derived

from the lack of the correct knowledge . Thi s i s a temptingsuggestion , but i t is open to the serious objection that i tgoe s a good deal beyond what i s recorded , and introducesin all probabil i ty too refined a psychology . Deussen i

l goesso far as to hold that the system is the conglomeration o ftwo quite di fferent elements : the last group of membe rsfrom desire onwards i s a formulation of the ground of theorigin of misery : the group from the second to the seventhexplains psychologically the growth of the eighth

,des ire ,

while the conception of ignorance i s borrowed from theVedan ta and placed at the head of the series .The only conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence

i s that some of the conceptions of Buddhism are very closely

La formu le bouddhique des Dou ze Causes (G eneva ,

TAllgemin e Ges chichte der Philosophie , I , iii, 164- 168 . Hisview is that V ijfiana is cosm ic and p roduces a ll rea lity . Cf. M .

Wa lleser , D ie philosophische Grundlage des alterenIIBuddhismus , p p .

49ff.

, bu t see O ldenberg , Buddha , p . 2 63 n . 1.


allied to those of the 8amkhya . The most importantcorrespondence i s that in the conception of the relation ofignorance and the Samskaras , the impressions thus left onthe mind

,which cause i t in the View of the Samkhya to

attain ever new births,un ti l at last the true knowledge i s

reached,and there ceases to be the poss i bili ty of rebirth , as

the source being cut away no more impressions can beformed . This concep tion corresponds very closely with theBuddhi st , and the use of the term Samskaras , which i s nota very natural one

,possibly poin ts to direct borrowing .

A second similarity of great imp ortance i s the preci secorrespondence of the two ideas

,of the Sarnkhya that the

essential knowledge i s to realize that anything empiric i snot I

,and of the Buddhist that i t i s essenti al to free oneself

from the delusion that there i s anything whi ch i s or belongsto the self. A further point of close similari ty i s the factthat both systems lay great stress on the conception ofcausality , and that they devote deep consideration to thenature of the world-process

,though there i s a great distinction

between the Buddhist resolution of i t into a series ofimpressions determined causally and the Samkhya concept ion of nature . Here

,too , may be mentioned the defin ite

correspondence between the four truths of the Buddhistsystem and the fourfold divis ion of the doctrine of finalrelease in the Samkhya-Yoga . The latter falls under theheads of that from which final release i s to be sought

,final

release , the cause of that from which release is to be sought ,and the means to attain release

,which are compared with

the medical heads of disease,health , the cause of disease ,

and healing . The four Buddhist truths are misery , theorigin of misery

,the removal of misery

,and the means to

i ts removal,which in one Buddhist text are compared with

disease,i ts origin

,i ts healing and the prevention of

recurrence,but the similari ty i s not conclusive of borrowing .

Yet a further striking parallelism with the Samkhya i s theatti tude of Buddhism towards the end of endeavour. It i sperfectly plain tha t thi s is not looked upon as annihilation ,however clear it i s that i t i s metaphysically nothing else :the doctrine of the Buddha i s full of the s avour of Nirvana ,and the repeated occurrence of that term in the epic suggests


that the expression was borrowed from the Brahmanicalspeculations by the Buddhists . S imilarly in the case ofthe Samkhya , though the attainment o f knowledge wouldreally be the end of all real ex i stence and nothingness , i t i sexpressly recorded that thi s i s not the aim of the seekersa fter the true knowledge , who on the contrary attaini solation as something in i tsel f enduring and perfect .These points , as well as the common possession of the

rejection of the absolute,are striking

,but at the same time

i t must be remembered that,in addition to the absence of

the doctrine of the Gunas,there is one other case of the

first importance in which the Samkhya is very di fferentfrom

,and more advanced than , Buddhism . The Samkhya

goes to the logical extreme , in its treatment of the differencebetween spiri t and all else , of attributing the whole of theapparent empiric exi stence to the activi ty of nature

,though

that activi ty i s only conscious by the union of nature withSpiri t . It therefore postulates that there i s no real un ion ofspiri t and nature : and in thi s result i t is quite logical , but ,of course

,at the same time it brings about i ts own refutation

since,i f there is no union , there can be no release . In the

Buddhist View the release i s regarded as a real one,not

as something which is unreal and unconnected with thesubstitute for sel f in Buddhism . Nor has Buddhism anyof the imagery by which nature i s represented as a dancerperforming for the benefit of spiri t

,or the union of spiri t

and nature i s regarded as the union of the lame and theblind . In thi s and in i ts elaborate series of psychologicalconceptions , i t i s clear that the Samkhya as we know it i sfar more advanced than Buddhism .

It seems best,therefore

,to draw the conclusion that

Buddhism did not draw its inspiration from the Samkhyain the form in which it appears even in the epic

,for there

the doctrine of the i solation of Spiri t and nature and of thethree Gunas i s fully and completely evolved . We haveindeed no means to assert that the Samkhya or i ts closelyrelated Yoga may not have existed in gradually changingshapes long before i t assumed its epic form

,and that there

may not have ex i sted a variety of its development whichdirectly affected the growth of Buddhism . But we have no


means to reconstruct thi s stage of Samkhya,nor can we say

whether there ever was a system under that name withoutthe Gunas : the period from the Up anisads to the epicSamkhya is a long one , and must have been marked by muchintellectual activi ty

,one form of which may have been

a doctrine which cannot definitely be named Samkhya,and

from which both Samkhya and Buddhism are derived .

That such an athei st doctrine should have been evolved atan early date i s not in the slightest degree wonderful .There is abundant evidence of the plenti ful supplyof heretical doctrines in India from an early date

,and an

atheist philosophy* can have hardly been Op en to moreserious objection than an idealism which placed all realityin an incomprehensible absolute

,and insi sted that all real

things were a mere illusion . t

The Mimamsa is a the istic indeed ,bu t i t as a p h ilosophy was

dou btless h e ld to b e sup p lemented by the Vedan ta . Neverthe less ,howeve r , it shows tha t a the ism was not who lly u n — Ind ian . C f .

Ganganath Jha ,Th e Pra bhakara S ystem of P i va Mimamsa, p p .

85-8 .

1“There is

, of course , a bundan t la te r evidence of the knowledgeof Buddh ist teachers of Samkhya , as in the ca se o f Nagarjuna ( J . H .

Woods , Yoga S ystem of Pa ta ri ja li, p . xviii ) Tha t the Samkhyasystem was known to the Digha Nika

’

ya is d isp roved by Rhys Davids ,Am erican L ectures on Buddhism , p p 25ff.


language which may have their source merely in theessential similarity of human Assuming that theBhagavadgita i s of indep endent Indian origin , C arbe thas endeavoured to show that i t was originally a thei sti ctract

,with a philosophical basis in the Samkhya-Yoga

system,

‘

and in this form belongs to the early part of thesecond century B C ,

while in its present form,in which i t

has been affected by Vedantism , i t belongs to the secondcentury A.D . But part of his argument rested on thetheory that the reputed founder of the Yoga Sutra , Patafijali,was identical with the grammarian

,and therefore belonged

to the second century B C ,and with the disapp earance of

this doctrinet his earlier date becomes extremely imp robable .

We are,therefore

,left to conclude that the Bhagavadgita as

we have it i s probably not later than the second centuryA .D .

,though even for that date there is no absolutely

cogent proof . In any case,i t may be assumed that i ts

materi al i s often older,and the same * considerations apply

to the other philosophical portions of the Mahabha'

rata .

The philosophy p resented by the ep i c in the form whichwe have it is a conglomerate of very different views

,and

,

what is most important , of very different views rep eated inimmediate prox imity to one another without any ap p arentsense of their incongruity . There is , however , one decidedcharacteristi c which holds good for the ep i c philosop hy ,and that i s i ts thei sti c tinge

,which constantly intrudes

,and

which i s natural in an ep ic which had a far more p opularappeal than had the more p hilosophical speculations whichare here and there referred to in i t . Hence we need not besurpri sed that the ideali sti c interp retation of the Upanisads ,which seems in all emp i ri c reality nothing but the sel fi llusion of the Brahman

,i s rep resented only in the feeblest

degree in the epi c,and that there i s no p assage there which

can fairly be set beside the bold declaration of theSveta

'

s'

vatara Upanisad ( iv , 10 ) that nature i s nothing but

S ee Garbe , Indien und das Christentum (Tub ingen ,

p p . 253-258 .

‘

I'

D ie Bhagavadgita (Le ip zig, p p . 58-64 .

I S ee H . Ja cob i xxxi,2 4- 29 ; below , p p . 56

,5 7 .

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREAT EPIC 3 1

i llusion,Maya. On the other hand

,the epic has often the

doctrine of the development o f the whole un iverse as

a reality from the Brahman . Thus the self i s said (xi i ,285 , 40 ) to send out from itself the Gunas , the consti tuentsof nature , as a Spider emits a web , and the same idea of

the productive activi ty of the Brahman i s found in othershapes/Characteri sti c of thi s strain of thought

,and

linking i t closely with the Brahmana tradi tion , i s thestatement (xi i , 3 11, 3 ) that from the Brahman was crea tedthe god Brahman

,who sprang forth from a golden egg

, and

that thi s forms the body for all creatures .But in addition to thi s view

,in which we have still all

derived from one principle , there ari se s to prominence theview that nature i s other than the sel f

,which in thi s aspect

begi ns to receive frequently the designation of spirit ,Purusa , though it i s st ill conce ived as

ccosmic . Thus welearn that nature creates , but under the con trol o f spiri t

(xi i , 3 14 , or that Spiri t impels to activity the creat iveelements

,and i s therefore akin to them ( x i i , 3 15 , The

question of the un i ty of Spi ri t and reali ty i s expresslystated and denied in the Anugita

’

(xiv , 48,

andelsewhere (xi i , 2 2 2 , 15 , 16 ) i t is expressly stated that allactivi ty rests in nature

,that spiri t i s never active and that

i t i s merely delusion when spi ri t considers itsel f active,and

i t is made clear that Spirit is not one only . The di stinctionof spiri t as inactive and nature as all-productive i srecognized in the Bhagavadgita

’

(vi , 3 7 , 19 , and i soften emphasized , though in other places the idea is foundthat while creation and destructi on are the work of nature ,still nature is really an emanation from the Spiri t

,in to

which it resolves i tself from time to time ( x i i , 303 , 3 1ff ) .

The result of the development which transfers allactivity to nature and denies i t to sp i ri t i s to make thelatter the subject of knowledge only

,that is , to make spiri t

a synonym for the abstraction of subject from object inconciousness

,an idea which is , of course , expressed among .

other conceptions in the B rhadaranyaka Upanisad ( i i , 4 ,14 ; i i i , 4 , 2 ; iv , 3 , In the Anugita (xi , 50 , 8ff )the distinction of nature and of Sp i ri t as object andsubject is expressed in the clearest manner

, and the


subjecfm

is declared to be free from any contrasts,without

p arts , eternal , and essentially unconnected with the threeconstituents which make up nature ./In thi s passage andelsewhere the Spiri t i s described as the Ksetra- jha ,

theknower of the place , as opposed to the Ksetra , . the body ,and the relation of the two is described in terms which Showthat all activi ty belongs to the empiric self , while the realspiri t i s a mere spectator (xi i , In this a sp ect spiri t i sset over against the twenty- four principles of nature as thetwenty-fifth , the former being the objects of , the . latter thesubject of

,knowledge (xi i , 306 , 39 , " B ut the relation

of these two principles i s not detailed : i t i s a mysterywhich i s therefore expressed in vague terms /Such as thebinding of Spirit in nature , or again i t is said in theAnugita (xiv , 50 , 14 ) that Spirit uses nature as a lampwith which i t enters the darkness : the two are connectedlike the fly and the fig leaf

,the fish and water . But i t i s

perfectly clear that final release comes through therecogn ition of the fundamental distinction of the spiri t andnature ; on thi s being attained all intermixture with natureceases for spiri t (xi i , 30 7 ,On the other hand , beside thi s enumeration of twenty

five principles,which entirely declines to recognize the

existence of any personal deity and recognizes a multi tudeof individual spiri ts

,there stands a view which adds a

twenty- sixth princip le . When the Spiri t realizes its

distinction from nature,and attains enlightenment , i t , as free

from the Gunas,recognizes nature as possessing the Gunas

and unspiritual,and it becomes one with the absolute

,thus

attain ing its own true self,free from empiric reali ty ,

unageing and immortal . In thi s condition,as all dual i ty

has di sappeared , the spi rit ceases to have knowledge , whichis essentially a result of multiplicity " From this p oint ofview also i t i s p ossible to give an an swer to the insi sten tproblem of the number of souls

,and to overcome the

discrepancy between the views of multipl ici ty and of unity .

The souls so long as they are in union with nature arenumerous , but as soon as they realize their d istinction fromnature

,they fall back into the twenty- S ixth principle ,

which is the inner sel f of all corporeal be ings , the onlooker ,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREAT EPIC 33

free from the Gunas,which can be seen by no one who is

connected with the Gunas/(xii, 3 50 , 2 5 , 26 ; 351, 2The holders of thi s view represent the Yoga of the epic , asthe maintainers of the twenty-five principles alone representthe samkhya school . The statement i s several times madethat the two schemes lead to one end and are notfundamentally di fferent

,but thi s claim i s made only from

the point o f view of the,Yoga , and its inaccuracy i s

expressly shown by the discussion i n xii, 300 , where the

di fferences of the two systems are_found to lie in the fact

that the Sarnkhya di sowns an ISvara , while the Yogaaccepts one ; and the Samkhya relies on reasoning , while theYoga relies on the direct perception of the devotee . Thispassage is of import ance also in showing the original forceof the terms Samkhya and Yoga : the first must refer notmerely to the enumeration of principles but to reflectivereasoning , while Yoga denotes rel igious practices , and inspeci al the striving after the ideal of freedom by means ofthe adoption of various devices to secure mental exaltationand the severance of mind from things of sense .

The tendency to obli terate the distinction of 5amkhyaand Yoga by insi sting on thei r common goal

,and to remove

the distinction between them and the more orthodoxUpanisad doctrine by attributing to the Yoga the Brahmanas the twenty- s ixth principle , i s a striking illustration of thetendency of the epi c to see in all the philosophic doctrinesmerely vari ations of the Brahman doctrine of the Upanisads .From the religious s ide of the epic , the Sar

‘

nkhya system i sstrangely taken up into t he Bhagavata fai th by theequation of the four Vyuhas of the supreme Spiri t Vi shnu tofour of the principles of the Samkhya philosophy . ThusVasudeva is equated to Spiri t

, Sar'

nkarsana to the individualsoul , Pradyumna to mind , and Aniruddha to individuation .

The last three emanate each from his predecessor,and from

Aniruddha comes Brahman,and from him the created world .

The wise reach the unity with the highest by the way ofreturn through Aniruddha , Pradyumna and Samkarsana toVasudeva , and i t i s expressly stated that the Samkhyasas well as the Bhagavatas hold this belie f . In theBhagavadgita itsel f the unity of Samkhya and Yoga i s


insi sted upon,and the Samkhya doctrine is , at least in

the p oem as i t now stands ,* overlaid by the twofolddoctrine that both Spiri t and nature are ultimately derivedfrom the one and the same source , which , from the point ofv iew of the Vedanta

,i s the Brahman

,but from the religious

point of view is Krsiia .

In addition to the exposition of the fundamental

p rinciple of the San‘

Ikhy ,a the difference between the

subject and the object , there i s found already in the epi cmany of the elements which make up the classical system .

Nature is repeatedly declared to consist of three consti tuents ,S attva , Raj as and Tamas , which are called Gunas , a termfound in the Upan i sads not before the late Maitrayani

( iv , 3 ; v , In the Anugita stress 15 laid on the fact thatthese three consti tuents are p resent throughout all things ,though in differen t degree . The three Gunas are oftenregarded as the fetters of the souls , since they rep resentnature

,and one divi s ion of men given in x i i , 348 , presents us

with the three classes of Sattvikas in which the quality ofgoodness prevails

,VyamiSras in whom the Raj as and

Tamas,desire i and indifference , elements are mixed with

goodness,and the Vaikarikas

,in whom the quality of

indi ffere nce prevails throughout , and who , indeed , with anatural inconsi stence from the normal doctrine

,are declared

to be devoid of any portion of goodness . A doctrine of theclassic Samkhya occurs not rarely , according to which thequaliti es of goodness

,des i re and indifference are character

istic of the worlds of the gods,of men and of beasts and

plants,respectively

,and the Anugita

’

(xiv , 36 - 3 8 )distingui shes three classes of beings according as throughgoodness they advance upwards to the world of the gods

,

or through desire remain in the world of men,or through

indi fference descend to the world of beasts and plants .From nature

,in the Samkhya o f the ep ic as in the

classical samkhya , are derived the various portions of theempiric world

,but on thi s subject there p revails in the ep i c

an abundant pro fusion of views . It i s clear that the

And p e rhap s a b initio , se e E . W . Hop kins , 1905

p p . 384-389 .


reflective Sp i ri t greatly occup ied itsel f in devising enumerations of the portions of the self : eight was a favouritenumber

,but the elements of the eight differ . Thus in one

version they are the five senses,mind

,intellect and the

Spirit,as Ksetrajfia (xii , 248 , 17 in another for the spirit

,

Citta,thought

,i s substituted

,and the spirit is reckoned as a

ninth element (xii , 2 7 5 , 16 ,Even such an absurdity

i s achieved as when a complex of fi fteen i s made up ofspi rit

,nature

,intellect

,individuation in two forms , as

Ahamkara,and Abhimana , the senses , and thei r objects , and

the whole complex includirig spirit i s derived from nature .

In xi i, 3 13 , however , we find enumerated , as derived from

nature,the five o rgans of percep t ion , the five organs of

action,mind

,individuation

,and intellect

,which in its

substance corresp onds with the products of the classicalSamkhya . ,

’ A nearer approach to the later doctrinei s

,however

,to be found in the Anugita

’

(xiv , 40where the order of developmen t and not merely theresults i s given : from the unevolved i s produced thegreat self

,from it individuation , from it the five elements

,

from them,on the one hand

,the qualities of sound

,etc .

,and

on the other the five vital airs , while from individuationarise the eleven organs of sen se , five of perception

,five of

action and mind .

In the epic the three entities,intellect

,individuation anid

mind , have all often a fully cosmic function : they arenatural expressions for the activi ty of a personal creator

,

whether developed or not from the Brahman,and as we

have seen are adopted In this sense by the Bhagavatas inthe series of Sar

‘

nkarsana ,Pradyumma and Aniruddha ,

though in that series mind and Pradyumna rank aboveindividuation and Aniruddha . The distinction

,however

,

between intellect and individuation i s a Sl ight one,and i s not

normally made : rather i t i s assumed that intellect per se involvesindividuation , and when both terms occur it must be held thatwe have a resiilt of a further process of analysi s . Beside thecosmic function of these powers they figure largely in epicpsychology . The principle of individuation passes for afactor in will , and at other times describes the function ofattention : i t is even by a false abstraction further subdivid


ed and appears as two Species,the other be ing Abhimana

(xi i , 205 , The other terms are variously exp lained ,but i t i s a common idea that data are given by sense , thatthe mind ponders upon them or rai ses doub ts , and that theintellect decides (xi i , 2 7 5 , 17 ; 285 , while the Sp i ri t i sa mere spectator

,a view which corresp onds with the doctrine

that spiri t i s the subject without which all these psychicprocesses would be b lind

u

and uncon scious . On the other]

hand , stress i s often (xi i , 3 11 ; xiv , 2 2 ) laid on the factthat the senses require the operation of mind to produce

p erceptions : without mind there is no result,but equally .

without the senses mind is empty . It accords well with thisview that to mind is attributed the function of dreams .Mind also

,in xi i

, 3 13 , i s brought directly into connectionwith the organs of action

,to which it must be conceived as .

conveying the commands aris ing from the deci sions ofintellect , but in _xii, 299 , 20 the function of acting towardsthe organs of action as the mind acts to the organs ofperception is attributed to strength

,Bala

,a conception

which , however , i s not main tained .

The intellect is often,as in the tKatha Upanisad ,

compared to a charioteer,whose reins are mind and whose

horses the senses . The traveller in the chariot i s in theAnugita (xiv , 5 1, 4 ) declared to be the Bhutatman

, aconception which corresponds roughly to the psychicapparatus of the classical samkhya which , consi sting ofmind

,individuation

,intellect

,the ten senses

,the fine

elements and the subtle p ortions of the gross elements ,accompanies the Spiri t in all its transmigrations . There is ,however

,no trace in the epic of a preci sely corresp onding

enumeration of entities as forming part of the Bhutatman,

for the epic often does not recogn ize the fine element s atall . * Other terms for this migrating apparatus are Linga ,which

,however

,also denotes the gross corporeal body , and

Retah-Sarira,seed body

,which recalls the doctrine of the

classical Samkhya , that the gross body i s producted fromthe seed of the subtle p ortions of the gross elements , whichform part of the psychic apparatus .

S ee 0 . S trauss , Vienna Oriental J ournal, xxvn ,25 7 -2 75 , who,

howeve r , oversta te s the case .


and free-will,and is further complicated by the be l ief in the

saving power of devotion to God,and his p ower to help .

The fate of the souls on death is described more or lessclosely in accord with the doctrine

,

of the Up an i s ads : therei s the way of the gods

,which leads to the world of Brahman

and to freedom from transmigration ; there i s the way ofthe fathers

,which i s the fruit of good deeds and leads back

to rebirth OII earth ; there i s the thi rd p lace , rebirth as a beastor a plan t

,and there i s also the possibil i ty of pun i shment in

hell . Final release can be obtained either by knowledge inthe form of reflect ion

,the Sar

‘

nkhya way which uses themeans of percep tion ,

in ference and scrip ture , or by the praotice of Yoga

,which results in an intuit ive perception of the

final truth . The truth takes two distinct forms : in the ‘ onecase the end is the recognition of the identity of theindividual self and the absolute , which results in thepossessor of that knowledge becoming the absolute ; for inthe strict sense the individual self is

,as in the Vedan ta , the

absolute self,and not a part of it

,or at least the individual

i s merged in the absolute,i f

,as often may be the case , the

feeling i s tha t the individual i s for the time at least real , andrelease i s a merger rather than an ident ification . Thisstate of identification

,or merger

,i s the state of supreme

bli ss,though past all comprehension and understanding ,

which is styled Nirvana .

-On the other hand , there appearsoften in the closest connection wi th thi s view the moreprop erly Samkhya view of the goal being isolation ,

and thesaving knowledge not that of the uni ty of the individual andthe absolute

,but the re alization of the distinction between

sel f as spirit and nature . The result of thi s knowledge isthe freedom of the spiri t from all individuali ty and allconsciousness

,the Spiri t being freed for ever (xiv , 4 7 , 8ff .

This i s not merely the aim of the followers of Samkhya , butof the

_followers of Yoga also , who , despite their acceptanceof an ISvara , devotion to whom by meditation up on him is a

p owerful assistance to final release,nevertheless in their

desire for release aim at the i solation of the souls fromnature

,not at un ion with an absolute

Not only has the epi c the terms Samkhya and Yoga bothin their more general sense

,and also as denoting the systems

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREAT EP IC 39

with twenty-five and twenty—S ix principles,respectively , but

the names of three teachers,who are given in the last verse

of the Samkhya Karika as the handers down of the system ,

duly app ear in xii , 3 19 , 59 as teachers of the doctrine witha twenty—fi fth Spiritual princip le along with J aigisavya ,

Asita Devala, ParaSara ,

Varsaganya , Bhrgu , Suka , Gautama ,Arstisena , Garga , Narada , Pulastya , Sanatkumara , Sukraand Kasyapa . Of the three mentioned here and in theKa

’

rika’

,Kapila plays a great figure in the philosophy of the

epic : he is authoritat ive in all philosophic matters , and hi stenets are of the most diverse kinds . In the stri ct sense ofthe word he is

,indeed

, the on ly founder of a systemrecognized in the ep ic , the other person s being eithergods or his disciples

,He himsel f i s identified with Agni ,

with S iva and Visnu : he also appears , as in the SvetasvataraUpanisad (v , as identical with Hiranyagarbha (xii , 339 ,6 8 ; 342

,Moreover

,Asuri and PaficaSikha appear

also in i xii,2 18 , 14

,as teachers of the doctrine of the

Brahman . The system of PaficaSikha* i s develope d in greatdetail in x i i

,2 19 : not only has i t in detai l no speci al con

nection with the Samkhya,but in its fundamental princip les

i t i s not Samkhya at all ; on the contrary , while the separateexistence for the time being of the individual soul i s asserted ,i t i s expressly made clear that i t flows as a stream to theocean , and that at the end i t i s merged in the great ocean ofbeing and embraced on all sides , losing then consciousness .As the deer leaves i ts old horn

,or the snake its worn- out

Skin , or the bird the falling tree , so the freed soul abandonsits woe , and goes on the perfect way , leaving behind pleasure ;and pain without even a subtle body . In addition tothis exposition of the doctrine of Brahman without illusion ,

PaficaSikha di ffers in his psychology from the orthodoxSamkhya : he holds the belief in the existence of power asthe sixth organ with the organs of action

,corresp onding to

mind as the sixth of the organs of perception . He alsoholds that activi ty i s produced by the combined result ofknowledge , heat and wind : the first element produces thesenses and their objects

,separate existence

,perception

Se e E . W . Hopk ins , Grea t E p ic of India , p p . 149ff .


and mind ; heat produces gall and other bases ; windproduces the two vital breaths . Further

,he discusses the

question of the nature of deep sleep and the fact thatthe senses are not then really active . In both theserespects , the importance attached to the vital airs and otherphysical bases

,and in the stress laid on the question of the

nature of deep Sleep, PaficaSikha i s truly Vedantic and

not an upholder of the Samkhya .

The degree of faith which can be attributed to thi saccount of the views of PaficaSikha can be judged from thefact that in xi i , 3 2 1, 96 - 112 we have a differen t account ofthe views of that sage . Here there are thirty principles ,with God*‘ superadded . They are the

,

ten senses and mind ,power being ignored : intellect

, Sattva , i ndividuation , thegeneral disposition , ignorance , the source , the mani festation ,

the unification of doubles such as p leasantness and unp le a

santness , t ime , the five gross elements,being and not being ,

cause,seed and power . The source of all these factors ‘ i s

the unevolved , which i s evolved by means of these principles ,and as evolved i s the individual . The way of li fe to besought i s renunciation . Yet another account of theprinciples i s given in a version ascribed in xii

,2 7 4 to Asita

Devala,but the details of thi s version devi ate more and

more from any normal schedule,the organs o f knowledge

being reckoned at eight .The question arises whether we can

,on the strength of

these notices , attribute any serious value to the traditionpreserved in the Samkhya Karika. The answer as regardsKapila and A suri can hardly be in the affirmative

,in the

sense that the notice of the Karika receives any supportfrom the epic . I f there was ever a sage

,Kapila

,who

expounded philosophy,he had disappeared into a mass of

obscure tradition at an early date . Moreover, there i s gravedoubt to suspect his real exi stence at all

,in view of the fact

that he may owe his name merely to the use of Kapila inthe Sveta

’

s'

vatara Upanisad (v , 2 ) as a description ofHiranyagarbha . The likelihood i s that the name Kapila i s

S ee E . W . Hopkins , Great E pic of India , p . 152 . F . O . S chrader

lxviii, 106 , n . 3 ) sugges ts instead nature and sp ir it, bu tth is seems an error .


merely that of a divinity which has, for whatever reason ,been associ ated closely with the 8amkhya philosophy in i tsatheisti c form , though it is essenti al to note that theassoci ation i s not epic

,in which Kapila is by no means

exclusively an expounder of the Samkhya,and where there

preva ils the vague idea that the Samkhya i s at bottom quiteconsi stent with bel ief in the Brahman . Asuri is a merename

,and we cannot possibly a ccept him as a his torical

philosopher without more proof . The epic assert s th at hetaught PaficaSikha , whence no doubt comes the statement inthe Karika.

The case of »PaficaSikha . offers more di fficul ty , and hehas often been treated as an authenti c teacher : indeed

,the

Chinese tradition * attributes to him the work known as

Sastitantra , though doubtless by an error . There has beenseen a certain similari ty between the doctrines attributed toPaficaSikha in the few passages quoted from him in the

commentary on the Samkhya Sutra and doctrines expressedin the epic . Thus his View of the infinitely small size of thesoul may be compared w i th the same doctrine expressed inxi i

, 346 , 13-18 , and his View of the unenlightened individualwith that expressed in xi i

, 3 10 ,but these compari sons do

not carry us any further , as they do not by. any meansconnect even the Par

’

icaSikha o f the epic wi th the reputedPaficaSikha of the school tradition . The only conclusionavailable i s that the identity of the presumably actualteacher mentioned by the commentators and the epicPaficaSikha i s not proved , and that the latter , at least ,certainly did not teach as he i s represented any S ingledoctrine , and certainly not a sainkhya one . We have

,there

fore , two possibil i ties open to us : e i ther we can assume thatthe name , PaficaSikha , was that of an ancient sage , perhapsas may be indicated by Buddhist evidence ci ted below

,

originally a divine personage,to whom

, as to Kapila , forreasons unknown to us , certa in doctrines were ascribed , justas , for instance , Sanatkumara , cle arly a divine being , i s citedas an authority in the epic

,or that the late epic uses the

Takakusu ,Bu lletin d

’

E cole F rangaise d’E xtréme Orient, iv, 5 7

sq ; Tuxen , Yoga , p . 14 .


name . of an actual teacher of high rank in the SamkhyaYoga school , but simp ly ascribes to him doctrines at random ,

indifferent to their inner consi stency and still more to theirconsistency with the views which were actually held by theteacher in question . In the latter case the question a riseswhether PaficaSikha can be dated early enough to renderplausible his appearance in the epic , which was practicallycomplete by 500 A .D . even as regards the p hilosophicportions , and which probably con tained these sections muchearlier than that .The information which has been preserved as to the v iews

of PaficaSikha i s fragmentary , but not unimp ortant , and

the definitene ss of some of these Opinion s suggests a realpersonality . The same impression of reality is borne . out

by the fact that Vacasp atimiSra ,in his commentary on the

Yoga Sutra , regularly ident ifies as hi s views certain remarksquoted as from the teacher by Vyasa in his commentary , andthat views are exp ressly given as hi s in the S amkhya Sutra .

He appears also,i f we may

_trust Vyasa and Vacasp atimiSra ,

to have styled Kapila the Adividvan and to have assertedthat he taught Asuri , but he does not hint that he himsel fwas the pupil of Asuri

,a fact which discredits the assertion

of this fact in verse 7 0 of the S amkhya Karika. From theform in which his v iews have been preserved for us

* i twould clearly seem that he wrote a work in prose Sutras .The account of the three Gunas attributed to him in thecomment on the S amkhya Sutra ( i , 12 7 ) i s perfectly in

keep ing with the normal Samkhya-Yoga view ,and his

doctrine of the reason of the eternal connection of spiri t andnature quoted in the Sutra (vi , 6 8 ) is the obviously correctone that i t i s due to lack of discrimination

,a view much

more thorough than the reply of the teachers generally thati t was caused by works or that of S anandana , who is elsewhere unknown , that it was caused by the internal body or

p sychic ap paratus , s ince clearly the first answer merelygives a prox imate cause

,and the s econd not even a cause ,

but the mere form in which the connection exp resses itself .Further , i t is certainly in better agreement with the view of

S e e Yoga Sutra Bhashya ,i, 4 ; Samkhya Sutra ,

v,32 ; vi, 68 .

S e e a lso Garbe , F estgruss an R . van Roth . p p . 7 5ff .

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREAT EP IC 43

many spiri ts in the Samkhya that each should be regardedas atomic

,as i s expressly* recorded in the Yoga Sutra

c'

ommentary ( i , 36 ) as the View of Par‘

icaSikha : fail ing therecognition that the spiri t must be considered as not inspace

,which is not ach ieved by any school of Indi an

philosophy,i t is clear that with an infinity of spiri ts

the doctrine of their infin i te extent is d ifficult , and i t i sprobable enough that in thi s v iew

,which is accepted

throughout the rest of the history of the Samkhya , there i sto be seen a trace

'

of the influence of the Vedanta .

While thi s doctrine points to the early date of Paficasrkhain the Samkhya school tradition , i t would be an error toplace his date unduly high

,for in the Samkhya Su

'

tra

(v , 3 2 ) he i s ci ted as giving a defin ition of Vyap ti, pervasion ,which rests on the basi s that in tellect

,etc . , and nature , etc . ,

stand to one another in the relation of what i s to besupported and the support This definition shows thatPaficaSikha must have been familar with the terminologyof the Nyaya school and , without postulating that he musthave known the Nyaya Dars

’

ana as preserved to us , i tindicates that he does not belong to an early period , for theNyaya school i s certainly , along with the Va iSesika ,

thelatest of the orthodox systems , being barely known even inthe latest parts of the great epic . This fact harmonizeswell with the fact that hi s style agrees most closely withthat of the writer S ab arasvamin

,whose period has been

fixed by J acobi’

i‘

as comparatively late,perhaps the fi fth

century A.D . There i s no reason to p lace PaficaSikha solate as this : i t i s most probable that he is older thanISvarakrSna , who is not to be dated after 300 A .D . Thedate of the first century A .D . ,

ascribed conjecturally toPaficaSikha by may therefore be . regarded as notexcessively early : the evidence for the present hardlycarries him beyond the second century A.D . This datewould leave i t open for his fame to become distorted and

J . H . Woods , Yoga System of Pa tafija li, p . 7 4 , su ggests tha tPaficaSikha

’

s view was not genera l . bu t re ferred on ly to some p a rticu la r s tage of the se lf . Th is is dou btfu l .

T xxxi , 2 4 II: S arnkhya Philosophie , p . 34


for strange doctrines to be ascribed to him in the epic . Iti s

,however

,in keeping with his independent position that the

epic should ascribe to him the older doctrine that the grossbody was composed of all five elements

,as against the theory

of the Samkhya Sutra that i t was made up of one only , theother four serving merely ancillary purposes .In the Buddhist texts ,* not only late but early , there i s

mention of a Gandhabb a PaficaSikha as in the v icin i ty ofthe Buddha : i t would probably be unwise to see in thi spersonage a

'

reflection of the hi storic PaficaSikha , as i t wouldbe necessary to bring down the affected texts very low ,

or tosee in i t an interpolation . The similari ty of name is therefore to be regarded as accidental , for i t i s most improbablethat the man should derive his name from the demon .

Another teacher of Yoga who i s mentioned in the epici s J aigisavya , who , according to the Karma Purana , was afellow pupil of Paficaéikha . The one certain piece ofin formation regarding him contained in the commen tary onthe Yoga Sutra ( i i , 54 ) shows him as a teacher of Yogadoctrine . His reality i s , therefore , assured in a

'

very di fferentdegree than that of S ana

,Sanaka , Sanatana , Sanatkumara ,

and Sanatsujata , who with Vodhu are given as teachers inthe epic . Of these the last only , in whose name a degradedform of Buddha has been seen ,t but wholly without ground ,appears to have any historical reality : the list of Samkhyateachers to whom an oblation of water i s daily offered bythe orthodox Brahman includes his name after Kapila andAsuri and before PaficaSikha , while an atharva PariSiStaplaces him even before Asuri . It would be unwise to placeany faith on these evidences of chronology , but i t i s worthnoting that the Chinese translation of the commentary on theS amkhya Ka

’

rikat suggests a series of teachers in whichafter PaficaSikha come

_Garga , and Uluka , or perhapsVodhu ,

before Varsa and ISvarakt sna .

In the law book of Manu , which i s contemporaneouswith the main body of the didactic epic , we find the Samkhya

H . O ldenberg, Buddha , p . 111 .

TWeber cited by Garbe , op . cit. p . 35 .

1 Bu lletin d’

E cole F rancaise d’

E xtréme Orient, iv, 59 .


Visnu , as supreme spirit , is one not only with spirit butwith nature , and with time . The Matsya Purana againfinds that the three Gunas in the

,

great p rinciple areidentical with Brahman

,Vi snu and S iva . Naturally these

and similar views * in the Puranas give us no informationof worth as to the antiquity of the Samkhya system or itsprimitive character .The question inevitably ari ses as to the nature of the

system of Samkhya taught in the epic . The view adopted byGarbe ’

r i s that the Samkhya of the epic i s merely a populariz ing and contamination of the true Samkhya

,which he

considers i s of too individual a type to have been producedexcep t as the creat ion of some one mind . AS he holds thatthi s ingen ious system was in vogue before the ri se of theepic , or at least before the epic took its present shape , i t i snatural that so important a philosophy should have left i tstraces unmistakeably in the epic

,and equally natural that

the form in which it appears should be one far removedfrom the preci s ion and clarity of the true sys tem ./To thisargument the most serious objection is the fact that there i sno real evidence that the Samkhya p hilosophy existed as a

complete whole as early as the p eriod of the epic , say 200B .C . to 200 A .D .

,the evidence of the p riori ty of such a

system to Buddhism being , as has been seen above , far -fromcogent . Nor again is there really any sufficient ground to .

hold that the Samkhya system is the bold and originalproduct of a single mind . On the contrary

,the system on

close examination can be seen to be a somewhat illogicalreduction of principles which are expressed in the Brahman

p hilosophy of the Up anisads , and in opposition to the theoryOf a rapid development must be set the far more p robabletheory of slow growth , which can be traced through thelater Upani sads , the Katha and the Svetas

‘

vatara , whichhave clear traces o f the doctrine of evolution

'

of princip lesin the Samkhya manner . Moreover i f

,as i s supposed

,the

Pu rusa and Prakrti are o ften iden tified with the ma le and

fema le p r incip les : h ence Sakti, and P rak t ti become iden tified , and in

th e Tan tras Prakt ti and Sakti are one and the same the crea tivefirst p rin cip le which is exa lted even over the sup reme du ty .

1“Samkhya Philosophie , p p . 4 7 -52 .


full Samkhya system was in existence before the epic , i t isdecidedly strange that the epic should practically ignorethe doctrine of fine elements which that system has so

clearly . On the other hand , the terminology applied in theKarika to these fine elements , and to the gros s element s , thefirst being described as V iSesa , and the latter as AviSesa , i sdecidedly unnatural and curious and contrasts sharply withthe simple description of the gross elements and thei r characteristics , V iSesas , in the epic .A very different theory of the epic Samkhya i s presented

by Dahlmann .

* In hi s view the epic i s not,as is usually

supposed,a heroic epic into which there has been put at

various times vast masses o f didacti c and unepic material .From its earliest period the epic was , he holds , not di fferentfrom what i t now is : i t was essentially a book of customarylaw and usage

,which the epic tale i llustrates . I t follows

from this View that the ep i c i s held to be of great antiquity ,and that in place of seeing in i t a heterogeneous mass ofcontradictory views

,we must see in i t the expression of one

single doctrine . This is the epic Samkhya which representsthe development o f the unsystematic teachings of the earlyUpanisads . I t i s essentially a science of the Brahman

,

Brahmavidya, but i t i s at the same time based on logic,

Anviksiki, and while i t never abandons traditional foundat ions— only once

,and that on the doctrine of Ahirnsa,

which he supports against tradition,i s Kapila pronounced

the holder of an unorthodox view in the epic— still i t freelyuses the processes of reasoning . Its speci al aim i s theinvestigation and setting - forth of the number of principlesinvolved and their evolution from the absolute . I t i s athe

istic merely in the sense that i t denies any personal dei tysuch as that accepted by the Yoga , but not in the sense thati t denies the absolute and impersonal Brahman

,which on

the contrary i t unquestionably recognizes,and in which the

individual soul finds Nirvana . But be side the absolute i trecognizes the existence of a materi al nature

,which is the

source of the mani fold character of the empiric sel f,S ince

Nirvana ( 189 7 ) and Samkhya Philosophie Cf . A . E .

Gough ,Philosophy of the Upanisads , p p . 200ff ; S . K . Belvarkar

Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, p p . 181- 184 .


through i t the absolute becomes multiplied,and it sets

i tsel f to define in detai l nature and i ts workings . It ismerely in its substance a clearing up of the doctrines whichare contained in the older Upanisads , such as theB rhadaranyaha and the Chandogya : these texts lay greatstress on the fact that there i s one self or absolute

,and that

all else i s not true reality,and that it i s a mistake which

leads to transmigration to believe that the empiric i s thetrue reality . But these Upanisads do not deal distinctly

wi th the nature of the empiric reality : the question whetheri t i s merely an illusion i s not discussed and the doctrine ofmere illusion i s not set out , though no doubt the extremestress laid on the unreality of the world of experience

,from

the point of view of true reality,tends to render the growth

of this doctrine not unnatural . Ultimately the epicSamkhya wi th i ts logical theory of the Brahman becomes

,on

the one hand , the classical Samkhya which has learned to dowithout the Brahman

,and on the other hand

,by the laying

of increased stress on the unreality of the world is developedthe illusion theory of Samkara . Dahlmann traces the originof the theory not merely back to the older Upanisads : hesees in the hymn of the Rgveda ,

x , 129 , the creation of theun iverse from an indefinite substance described as water byan absolute already ex i sting

,and he considers that the fact

that the Atman is called the twenty-fifth in the Satapathaand Sahkhayana B rahmanas i s a foreshadowing of thetwenty- four principles of the Samkhya other than the self

,

while the three Gunas he finds adumbrated in the Atharvaveda , where (x , 8 , 43 ) mention i s made of the nine-dooredlotus with three coverings in which there i s a soul

,a theory

which has , as we have seen , no probability .

It i s clear that the theory of Dahlmann i s extremelyingen ious

,and it i s of minor importance that the efforts to

trace the twenty-fi fth principle a s Atman is probably basedon the mi staken rendering of A tman as self instead of trunkof the body , as Op p osed to the hands , feet , fingers and toes ,which are the other twenty- four principles . It is a differentthing to conjecture that thi s fondness for the numbertwenty-five which is often seen in the Brahm anas , wherePrajapati is described as twenty-five fold , is not one of the


sources of the doctrine that there are twenty-five principles .'

But the attempt to hold ' that the epic i s a unity and that i tteaches a unitarian philosophy i s one which offends everycanon of cri ti ci sm and commonsense , and the maindoctrine that the athei sti c Samkhya i s really a doctrinewhich accepts the Brahman

,but denies the personal dei ty of

the Yoga,i s a tour de force . The epic

,which certainly i s

devoted to the doctrine of the'

Brahman and to the reverenceof great personal dei ties

,on the other hand

,certainly tends to

regard the Samkhya system as a sort of Brahmaism,but i t

i s perfectly obvious from the epi that the system itself wasnot one of thi s kind at all . he truth of the matter i smuch better expressed by

‘

HOpkins ,* who finds in the epic thetraces of at least six systems , Vedic orthodoxy , Brahmaism ,

i. a. ,the doctrine of the Brahman but without the illusion

theory,rarely the doctrine of the Brahman with the illusion

theory,the Samkhya , the Yoga , and the

,

PaSup atas andBhagavatas , sectari an worship pers of S iva and Vi snurespectively

,who adopt in their systems a good deal o f

Samkhya-Yoga philosophy .

The rejection of Dahlmann ’s theory of the exi stence in

the epic of a Samkhya which acknowledged the absoluteinstead of reducing all to spi ri ts and nature

,as being totally

unhistorical , leaves open the question whether such a doctrinei s the basi s of the Samkhya of the epi c in the sense thatthat system is a development from a philosophy whichrecognized the absolute . The alternative to this theory i sthe view that the samkhya i s a conception based entirely onthe view of the difference between subject and object , andthat thi s concep tion was formed independently o f theexisting A tman-Brahman p hilosophy , or at least in consciousreaction from i t . S tress has been laid by Garbe i on theun-Brahmanic character of the Samkhya philosophy , and hehas attributed i t in large measure to the influence of theKsatriyas. The force of thi s argument i s greatly dimin i shedby the fact that Garbe is also inclined to attribute the

Hop kins , G réat E p ic of India , p . 81.

"

I Samkhya Philosophie , p p . 3ff. So J . S . Sp eyer, Die indischeTheosophie , p p . 64

,10 7 .


Brahman doctrine in large measure to the same influence,in

which case i t seems impossible to treat the S itrhkhya asmarkedly opp osed in its basi s to the Brahman doctrine . Inany case

,the arguments for the un-Brahman i c character of

the Samkhya are wholly devoid of weight . The homelandof the Samkhya is placed in the east by Garbe , on the groundthat Buddhism

,which was in his Opinion derived from the

Samkhya , flourished in the east,and the east was certainly

less completely subjected to the influence of Brahmanismthan the western middle country . The argument , however ,i s subject to the grave defects that the dep endence on thesamkhya of Buddhism i s not proved

,and that

,i f i t were

p roved , the fact would merely Show that the samkhya at thetime of the ri se of Buddhi sm was of great importance in theeast : i t could never Show that i t was first produced in theeast . Nor can any weight be allov

’

ved to the argument thatin Kap ilavastu ,

the birthp lace of the Buddha , we are to see

the name of the town of Kapila the founder of the Samkhya

p hilosophy . That Kap ilavastu really meant the town ofKapila

, and i s not a name drawn from the descrip tion ofthe place

,as suggested by Oldenberg*

,i s very doubtful

,and

even i f the name re ferred to a Kap i la , that thi s Kap i la wasthe Samkhya sage i s an idea which is not hinted at in theBrahmanic al tradition ,

which says nothing of a townconnected with and named after him .

Other arguments for the un-Brahmanic character of theSamkhya adduced by Garbe are the facts that the Samkhyaand Yoga

,PaSup ata and Paficaratra and the Veda are set

side by side as di fferent systems in x i i,349

,6 7

,and that . the

5amkhya and Yoga are men tioned ( ibid . 7 6 ) as two eternalsystems beside all the Vedas . This

,however

,merely p roves

that these systems differed from the Vedic tradition,not

that they were opposed to that tradition or that thesupporters of the V iews of these p hilosophies wereun-Brahmani cal . Kap ila , as we have already seen , appearsbut once in confl ict with the Vedas

,when he condemns

sacrifice of animals,and the text plainly supports the sage

in his battle for Ahir'

nsa.

,

-’

Moreover , the samkhya never

Buddha , p . 111.


abandons the right to appeal for proof to scripture , and infact there are numerous appeals to scripture in the laterSamkhya texts , while the brief Karika

'

expressly recognizesi t with percep t ion and inference as the three modes of proof .It i s true that the use of scripture made by the Samkhya i sa more limited one than that o f the later Vedanta , but theessence of the Samkhya is its rationalism ,

and thatrationali sm could not develop in Brahman ical circles i s anassertion for which no proof ei ther is or can be adduced .

The extraordinarily ingenious and elaborate system of thesacrifice

,as thought out by the philosophers who p roduced

the Brahmanas , is a clear proof of the interest in reasoningtaken by the Brahmans . *

While there are no arguments of any value which can beadduced for the View that the Samkhya is a product o fum-Brahmanical circles

,there i s every evidence that the

system i s a natural growth from the philosophy of theUpan i s ads . We have seen that the Upani sads , in their laterperiod of development beginn ing with the Katha

,Show

traces of the doctrines which we find in the Samkhya , suchas the evolution of principles

,and the drawing up of classes

of principles . The Upani sads , however , differ essenti allyfrom the Samkhya in the fact that they defini tely accepte ither the doctrine of the absolute in i ts pure form

,as does

the Katha,or the doctrine in a thei stic form

,as does the

Sv etas'

vatara . There is , in detail , in the Samkhya li ttle thatcannot be found in the Upani sads in some place or other :not only the doctrine of the Gunas but also that of theTanmatras can be found there

,and the work of the Samkhya

in l arge measure evidently takes the form of systematizingand develop ing of ideas which were not the creation of theSamkhya , but which required to be p ut into a definite system .

Indeed , in one sense , the Samkhya must be treated asone of the early attempts to systematize and reduce to orderthe somewhat confused mass of speculation found in theUpan isads , the characteristic feature of the systematiz a

tion being the attention paid to order and the p rinciple ofdevelopment .

S ee S . Levi . La Doctrine du S acrifice (Pa ris ,


On the other hand , there must b e recognized in theSamkhya the definite rejection of the absolute and thesubstitution for the absolute

,which is the real basi s of the

individual souls,of a multitude of Spirits . These spirits i f

examined are clearly nothing but abstractions of the conceptof subject

,and are philosophical absurdities

,S ince in the

abstract there can be but one subject and one object,neither

,

of course,being anything without the other /I

‘

o a philosophical absurdity the system can only have arrived by ahi storical process , and in the number of spiri ts we mustrecognize an attempt to reproduce the number of the finite.

souls of experience,while in the abstract conception of the

essence of Spir it we have a reflex of the abstract view takenof the absolute

,which i s represented in the Brhadaranyaha

Upanisad , and elsewhere , as the unseen seer , the unthoughtthinker

,and so forth . On the other hand , the independent

position given to nature i s a distinct concession to realismnature as objective i s not dependent on Spiri t , though it isthe object of spirit and i s unconscious without spiri t

,and

though intellect— made conscious by Spirit— rises fromnature

,and from it other things are evolved

,even so in the

class i cal samkhya there i s a tendency to regard the nonorganic world as in some way in direct connection withnature . /The insistence on the multitude of souls and theconceding to them of quasi- individual existence and theallowing of a certain reality to the world are characteri sti cfeatures of the interpretation of the Upanisads as set outin the Brahma Sutra of Badarayana , and in point of factthe Upanisads

‘contain clear traces of a doctrine whichallows to the world of matter and to the individual souls acertain reality .

"

I he purely ideali sti c attitude towards theabsolute

,which is doubtless the real interpretation of the

doctrine of Yajfiavalkya in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad ,i s not so frequently found in the Upanisads as the pantheistic , while S ide by side with these higher forms of doctrinewe often find the conception of the absolute producingmatter

,into which it enters in the form of the soul

,from

which it i s but a step to the doctrine that the individual soulthus produced has some self- importance of its own andstands in a quasi—independent relation to the absolute self .

SAMKHYA AND YOGA

THE Yoga philosophy , according to the epi c , i s a systemwhich i s ancient l ike the Samkhya , and this parallel posit ion belongs to the Yoga in the whole of its hi storical exis

tence . The p ractises of Yoga , as they are revealed to us inthe Yoga Sutra of Patafijali , the oldest text-book of theschool

,contain much that i s in i tsel f a relic of very primi

t ive conceptions of the value of psychic . states of profoundexcitement . This tendency to attribute importance to theobtaining of such states i s widespread : there i s a strikingexample for this form of belief in the hi story of Greekreligion in the seventh and S ixth centuries B .C . ,

and in the

Rgveda i tsel f (x , 136 ) there i s a ment ion of the mad Muni ,probably a p redecessor of the later Yogin . It i s unneces

sary,therefore

,to see in the Yoga practice any borrowing""

from the aboriginal tribes,though we need not doubt that

these tribes p racti sed similar ri tes and that their influencemay have tended to maintain and develop Yoga to theextraordinary popularity which it has achieved in India .

On the other hand , i t‘

is perfectly clear that the introduction of Yoga into the practi ce of high p hilosophy wasnatural and proper in the case of a p hilosophy , which , likethe A tman doctrine

,den ied the p ossibil ity of knowledge of

the self as subject . As the Kena Upanisad ( i i ) has i t ,the self cannot be known by him who has knowledge

,but

only by him who has n o knowledge . Hence comes the effortto subdue all the act ivi ty of senses and of mind

,to emp ty

the intellect a nd thus to make it ready for a new app rehen

Suggested by A. E . Gough ,Philosophy of the Upanisads , p p .

18,19 ; Garbe , Samkhya Philosophie , p p . 185

,186 .

SAMKHYA AND YOGA 55

si on,the normal aim of the mystic o f all lands and places .

It i s to thi s theoret ic aim that Deussen* ascribes the originof the practice

,but i t i s clear that in adopting the Yoga

practice s for this purpose - the holders of the A tman fai thwere not innovators

,but were turning exi sting materi al to a

more refined and speculative use .

The development of the Yoga theory i s first clearlyrevealed in the same Upanisads as deal with those doctrineswhich later are adopted as part of the samkhya systemthat i s

,of the older Upanisads , the Katha and SvetaSvatara”

and later by far the Maitrayani. In the conception of Yoga,

literally yoking,there seems to be an almost necessary ,t or

at least normal,reference to a fixing of the mind on God .

The use of Yoga is,however

,as well adapted to the case of

the believer in the absolute Brahman as to the devotee of anindividual dei ty : the former stage is presented in the Katha

and Maitrayani, the latter in the Svetasvatara Upanisad .

The term in its technical sense also occurs in these Up ani

sads , and when opposed to Samkhya it denotes doubtlessthe practical side of religious concentration as Opposed tothe theoretical investigation . It follows necessa ri ly fromthi s very contrast

,and from the nature of the case , that Yoga

could not primarily be a separate system of p hilosophy , andhence i ts natural dependence on other systems .In the epic the relation of Samkhya and Yoga i s pre

cisely as in the Up anisads z the two stand side by side asphilosophy and religion

,as theory and practice

,and some

deta ils of the Yoga practise, as given , Show how much the

system had advanced in the direction in which i t appearsin the Yoga Sutra . But there appears a di stinct tendencyto ascribe to the Yoga

,as Opposed to the Samkhya , a twenty

sixth princip le , a perfectly enlightened Spirit with whichthe individual Spiri t is really identi cal . The Samkhya i sresolutely without an ISvara , but the Yoga has an ISvara ,

Allgemeine G eschichte der Philosophie , I , iii, 507 .

“I“As he ld by Rajendra lala M itra , Yoga Aphorisms

, p . x11 ; P .

O ltrama re , L’

histoire des Idées Théosophigu es , i, 308-310 . Garbeden i es th is exp lanation . Tuxen ( Yoga , p . 32 ) a ccep ts Vyasa

’

s ren

dering as S amadh i ; Charp entier lxv , 4 7 ) takes it as

Praxis .


who is identified with Brahman,who i s here a sup reme

spiri t into which the individual spi ri t i s resolved , havingbeen in essence a part of the absolute Spiri t which multiplied i tsel f. The end oi Yoga is in accordance with thisview

,the vi sion of the one true self (vi, 30 , 10 , 12 ; xiv , 19 ,

17 - 19 ) but i t i s also represented in more accurate agreement with the Samkhya in its athei sti c form as an isolationof the Spirit from matter (xi i , 306 , 16 , 17 ; 3 16 , 14ff ) .

From the former point of view i t i s not difficult to see thedevelopment of the meaning of devotion to God

,which it

o ften has in the Bhagavadgita, or the further sense in thattext , especi ally in chapters three and five

,of action without

hope of reward or desire of reward .

The theory has often been held that Yoga was firstathei sti c

,and that the theism of the classical system of the

Yoga Sutra and of the epic alike i s due to a concession topopular feeling

,nor i s there any doubt whatever that in the

Sutra the connection of the divin i ty wi th the system is reallya loose one

"

But the theory that there was an earlier atheistic Yoga as a philosophical system i s clearly not madeprobable by the evidence of the epic , which shows the Yogaas clearly dist inguished from the Samkhya by its twentyS ixth principle

,though it ever tries to assimilate the

Samkhya to the Yoga,and both to the doctrine of the

Brahman . It is , therefore , perfectly possible that the posit ion of the classical Yoga i s due to i ts close associ ation withthe samkhya , which has accentuated its real indifference tothe idea of a dei ty

,which i s certainly not philosophically

,

though perhaps historically,essential to the conception of

Yoga .

Now great importance attaches to the date of the YogaSutra of Patafijali, in view of the fact that i f i t could beplaced in the second century B .C . ,

there would be attained avery definite date for the growth of the Samkhya schoolwith which in all essenti als except athei sm the Yoga agrees .Unfortunately , thi s view rests only on the theory thatPatafijali is the same as the author of the Mahabhasya ,whose date i s now usually admitted to be the middle of the

S ee P . Tuxen , Yoga ( Cop enhagen , p p . 56ff .

SAMKHYA AND YOGA 57

second century B .C . This view,however , cannot stand

examination . I t i s clear that in his philosophIC‘ views as

to the nature of substance and quali ty,the grammari an stands

on a lower plane of developmen t than the philosopher,and on

the other hand the philosopher violates one at least of thegrammarian ’s laws of grammar. Further

,the Sutra contains

some doctrines which are probably late borrowings : thus ini , 40 the theory of atoms which belongs to the V aiSesika is

clearly referred to,nor less clearly in i i i

,5 2 i s the doctrine

of the Buddhi st Sautrantika school that time consists ofmoments , Ksanas , which are themselves forms of development of ever restless nature . This doctrine i s found also inthe VaiSesika school , as i t accords with the Atomic theory ,but not until the PraSastapadabhasya . It i s less certain i fwe can attribute to the Sutra the doctrines of Sphota , whichbelonged to the school of grammarians

,and which i s sup

posed by the commentator, Vyasa , to be referred to in i i i , 17 ,

or that of the infini te size of the inner organ , which i s seenby him in iv

,10 ,and which is supposed by Jacobi "‘ to have

been borrowed from the VaiSeSika school , in opposit ion tothe view that thi s organ was of mean size , which i s assertedby Vijfianabhiksu to have been the view of the Samkhyaschool , though thi s has been questioned t More deci sive is ,perhaps , the fact that the Yoga Sutra seems to attack thedoctrine of the V ijfianavadins , and that therefore i t isprobably not older than the third century A.D . , and probablyi s younger . The great supporters of that school , Vasub andhuand Asar

’

iga , lived in all probabili ty about A.D . 300 , but theschool i tself may

,of course

,have existed earlier,so that no

absolutely certain result can be attained . It i s , however , notat all unlikely that the production of the Yoga Sutra wasmore or less directly mot ived by the revival of the Samkhyaand i ts definite setting out in the Samkhya Karika

'

ofISvarakrsna , who was an earlier contemporary , according toChinese evidence

,of Vasubandhu . The attack on the ideal

ism of Vasubandhu thus found in the Yoga Sutra would beextremely natural .

xxxi, 28 .

‘

I' J . Charp entier , lxv, 848 ; Tuxen ,

Yoga , p . 101.


It may be added that no further light on the date ofeither Samkhya or Yoga can be gained from a notice in theKautilya Arthas

'

astra ,* which ranks as Anviksiki, logical

sciences , the views of the Lokayata , the Samkhya and theYoga schools . This enumeration , i f i t could be establishedthat the work of Kautilya was really a work of the beginningof the third century B .C . , would not indeed carry the quest ion much beyond the evidence afforded by the epic

,but i t

would afford a more secure basi s for considering the valueof the epic data

,but unfortunately the date of the Artha

sastra is very uncertain , and may be very much later thanthe suggested date t It might possibly be thought thatthe combination of samkhya and Yoga with the certainlyathei sti c Lokayata would permit the conclusion that the Yogawas at one period atheistic

,but there seems no possible

ground to insi st on reading such an implicat ion into theterms

,while i t may be observed that the Lokayata can only

be called Anviksiki by a stretch of the imagination , since itsfirst characteristi c is i ts resolute dogmatic refusal to acknowledge the existence oi any means of proof save perception .

S ee H . Jacob i, S itz . der K . Preuss . Akad . der Wiss .

,19 11, p p .

7 32 - 7 43 ; followed by Charp en tier lxv, 844 , n . 1 .

t Ke ith , 19 16, p p . 130-7 ; Jolly ,

lxviii, 355-9 .

THE SASTITANTRA

IN the last verse of the Samkhya Karika i t is expresslystated that that compendium of the Samkhya system containsthe substance of the whole Sastitantra , omitting only thei llustrative stories and the discussions of the views of Otherphilosophies . The verse is not original , i t be ing agreedthat the text of ISvarak t sna terminated at verse 6 9 , butthere i s no reason to doubt the correctness of the vers ion o ffact given in i t . It is

,however

,not clear that the term

Sastitantra represents , as has been suggested by Garbe"" a

special work : on the contrary the context and the wordingof the verse suggest that Sastitantra i s a term for theSamkhya philosophy as a system of sixty principles . This ,moreover , i s the sense in which the expression was taken bythe Rajavarttiha as cited by Vacasp ati. According to thisaccount the S ixty referred to are the fi fty Bhavas of theSamkhya system

,together with a set of ten fundamental

princip les , stated as the reali ty , unity , and purposefulnessof Prakrti, its difference from Spirit and its action for thesake of spiri t

,the plurality of spirits

,their distinction from

and connection with Prakrti, the evolution of the otherprinciples , and the inactivi ty of spiri t , an order of topicswhich may have been rendered incoherent by theexigencies of the verse . The explanation is older thanthe Ra

'

javarttika , for i t i s found in the Chinese versionof the commentary on the S amkhya Kariha

'

made byParamartha in the sixth century A.D . But despite itsan tiquity , the explanation of the number i s Open to thecriticism that i t confounds two di fferent principles of

Samkhya Philosophie , p p . 58 , 59 . O n the Ra’

javarttika S ee J .

H . Woods , Yoga S ystem of Patafijali, p . xxu .


divis ion : the Bhavas should be included unde r theMalikarthas . This seems to have been realized even inthe tradition of the school

,for Narayanatirtha in his

commentary on the Samkhya Karika gives as the tenrequired to make up the sixty not the fundamentalprinciples , but spirit , Prakrjti, intelligence , individuation , the three Gunas , the Tanmatras , senses , and grossmatter , an enumeration which i s clearly arbitrary andunjustifiable .

Some further light on the Sastitantra is thrown by themention of that s ystem along with the system of Kapilain the Anuyogadvara Sutra of the J ains as Kavilam andS atthitantam

, which has a parallel in the mention of thesame systems as Kavila

’

and S amhha'

jogi in the AupapatikaSutra .

* The commentator,Abhayadeva , on the latter

passage explain s the system of Kapila as the atheisti cSamkhya

,and the Samkhya as the thei sti c Samkhya , treating

Yoga as a separate head , but the paralleli sm with the firstpassage and the fact that only one representative of SamkhyaYoga is given , Show that but one system is meant , whichunited the two s ides of Samkhya and Yoga .

More light on thi s system is perhaps to be obtainedfrom the Ahirbudhnya S amhita, a text of the Paficaratraschool , of uncertain date , but apparently with some claimto antiquity . In its twelfth Adhyaya are described the fivesystems

,the Vedas

,the Yoga

, the PaSup ata , the Satvata ,and the Samkhya . The latter is described as a Tantrawith sixty d ivi sions

,which are set out in detail , in two

series or Mandalas,the first consi sting o f thirty-two and

the second of twenty-eight . Of these the first are Prakrtis ,

while the second are Vikrtis . These terms,however

,are used.

in a manner which differs essentially from that of theorthodox Samkhya : in the first series are included all theprinciples of the Samkhya and some other concept ions ,while the second list contains the chief concepts of apractical physiology and ethics , these affections of the soulbeing termed V ik t tis or modifications , because they come intoexistence only as a result of the activity of the creat ive

See F. O . S chrader, lxviii,10 1-110 .


presumably handled the questions alluded to in SamkhyaKariha

’

2,in which the insufficiency of empiricism and

Vedic practices for the removal of misery i s expounded .

The categories of misery,Siddhi and Kashaya , have

parallels in the Samkhya in the threefold forms ofmisery

,the Siddhi s and the Asiddhis , Vip aryayas , ASaktis

and Tustis . The Samaya may have dealt with Opposingviews , and the last head i s that of Moksha , final release .

The enumeration of topics i s enough to Show that theredid exist some system of philosophy of the nature indicated ,one which must have been closely allied with the epic Yogasystem . But there is also evidence regard ing the author ofa work bearing the name Sagtitantra , from whichprobably enough the term as a designation of the Samkhyasystem may have been derived . That work i s stated ina Chinese tradition* to have been composed inSlokas and to have been written by PaficaSikha . Thestatement seems , however , to lack probabili ty

,and its

origin can easily be accounted for by the fact thatPaficaSikha i s mentioned as the third in the order oftradition of the doctines of the school in the S amkhyaKarika and i t is said that the doctrine was widelyextended by him , words which may have been unders toodin the literal sense as denoting that an extensive text bookwas composed by him . On the other hand

,there i s the

express testimony of the commentator Balarama that theauthor of the Sagtitantra was Varsaganya , and thistestimony receives some support from the fact that in hi scommentary on the Yoga Sutra ( iv , 13 ) Vyasa cites a passagefrom the Sastra which i s expressly attributed byVacasp atimiSra in his commentary on the Brahma Sutra

( i i , 1 , 3 ) to Varsaganya ,and which he seemst to have

believed to be taken from the Sattitantra . This evidence,

in i tsel f far from clear,i s strongly supported by the further

Chinese tradition,which ascribes to V indhyavasa , who i s in

Takakusu ,Bu lletin de l

’

E cole F rangaise d’

E xtréme Orient,iv

,59 .

T In h is commentary on Yoga Sutra , 1. c . S . K . Be lva rkar

(Bhandarkar Memoria l Volume, p p . 17 9 , 180 ) incorrectly ascribes to

Vyasa the mention of the S agtitantra .

THE SASTITANTRA 63

all likelihood to be identified with ISvarakrSna ,* the

re -writing of a work attributed to Vrsagana or Varsagana .

The term re -wri ting seems to have been actually justified ,in view of the contents of the Sastitantra as sketched in theAhirbudhnya S amhita, and of the fact that the Sastitantrawas evidently a manual of the Samkhya-Yoga , and not ofthe Samkhya in its atheisti cal form , and i t is a reasonableconjecture that the origin of the Samkhya Karika was dueto an effort to set out in an authoritative form , in order toconfute the doctrine of the Buddhists , a Brahmanicalsystem which equally dispensed with the conception o f God ,but which avoided the difficulties attending the Buddhi stdenial of the reality both of an external world and of thesoul .There i s nothing to contradict thi s hypothesi s , though

also nothing to establi sh it,in the four or five citations

known of Varsaganya zt i t has been sugge sted ,t on the groundthat one of these citations i s in verse and the rest in prose ,that we must distinguish two Sastitantras , of which the onesets out the doctrine of 8amkhya-Yoga and the other that ofthe Samkhya

,the former being composed in verse and the

latter in prose . In favour of thi s hypothesi s , however ,there is no evidence of any kind available

,unless i t be

considered that the assumption of two di fferent texts wouldbe st explain the claim made that the Samkhya Karikaincludes the whole meaning of the Sastitantra , but i t i sunnecessary to press thi s point . The claiin IS not made byISvarakrsna himsel f , and i t was Op en for a later hand tohold that the essenti al doctrines of the Samkhya were fullyset out by ISvarakrsna , even i f he omitted those portions ofthe doctrines of the Sarirkhya Yoga school which were defi

As p roved by Takakusu,1. c . Cf . Tuxen ,

Yoga , p . 14 ; Cha r

p entier, lxv,845 , 846 ; be low , p . 68 .

T In the Yoga S atra Bhasya ( iii , 53 ) he is cited as op p os ing the

a tomic theory of the V a iSesikas ; in Vacasp atim iSra’

s commen tary onKarika, 4 7 , as d ealing w ith the four fold characte r of ignorance ; th eSastitantra c ita tions in the Yoga Bhasya ,

iv,13 and in Gaudapada

’

s

commen tary on Karika 17 ( and p e rhap s on 7 0 ) are ne ith er sp ec ifica llysamkhya or Yoga . Bu t the cita tion on Karika 17 looks like a versefragm en t .

1 S chrader , lxviii,110 .


nitely thei sti c . Thi s view i s confirmed by the fact that thesuccession of the doctrine is asserted in the first of theverses added to the text* to have been from Kapila to Asuriand then to PaiicaSikha ,

for the evidence available regardingthat teacher shows him , as we have seen ,

to have representedthe Samkhya-Yoga , not the athei stic Samkhya school .

’r

There is no rea l p oss ibility of dou bt tha t the Karika origina llycons isted of 7 0 verses

, omitting 7 0-7 2 of the recorded text, and p robablyin serting anothe r verse ( cf. S anskrit Research, I , 10 7

TTh is fact inva lidates th e argument of S . K . B e lvarkar (Bhandarkar Commemora tion Volum e

, p . 18 1) tha t the Sagtitantra mus t havearr ived a t a n ega tive conclu s ion on the exis ten ce of God , wh ich isin itse lf wholly in comp a tible w ith the con tents o f th e text . I t isa lso imp oss ib le to a ccep t h is views tha t the Sastitantra rep resen ts a

s tage p rior to the severance of S amkha and Yoga ,and is p r ior to th e

Yoga Su'

tra of Pa tafija li ( circa 150 a de cis ive p roof of thein corre ctness of th is da ting of Pa tafija li is given by J . H . Woods ,Yoga System of Pa tafija li, p p . xv-xix .

GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND THE SAMKHYA

F OR the age of the Samkhya important informationmight be obtained i f i t were possible to trace definiteborrowings of Samkhya ideas from the s ide of Greekphilosophy . The a rre tpov of Anaximander has beencompared with the nature of the Samkhya , and the doctrinesof the constant flow of things and of the innumerabledestructions and renewals of the world found in Heracli tusare no doubt Similar to tenets o f the Indian system .

Empedocles,like the Samkhya , asserts the doctrine of the

pre-ex istence of the product In the cause . Anaxagoras i s adualist

,Democri tus agrees with Empedocles in his doctrine

of causali ty and believes in the purely temporary existenceand mortali ty of the gods . Epicurus uses in support of hisathei sm the argument of the 8amkhya

,that otherwise the

divine nature must be accorded attributes which are inconsistent with its supposed character , and often emphasizes thedoctrine of infinite possibil i ties of production .

Garbe* adds to these parallels,which he admits not to be

conclus ive evidence of borrowing,the fact that Persi a was a

perfectly possible place in which Greek thinkers,of whom

travels are often recorded , should acquire knowledge of theIndian views

,and supports hi s Opin ion that borrowing i s

probable by the case of Pythagoras,who i s supposed to have

borrowed from India hi s theory of transmigration,hi s

conception of a religious commun i ty , hi s distinction of a

fine and a gross body of the soul,hi s di stinction o f a

sensi t ive organ , evade , and of the imperi shable soul , qbpr'

jv,

Samkhya Philosophie , p p . 85-105 .


his doctrine of an intermediate world between earth andSky filled by demons

,the doctrine of five elements including

ether , the Pythagorean problem ,the irrational and other

things . Into thi s question of the relation of Pythagoras toGreek thought and to India it is unnecessary to go , as theSamkhya elements— as contrasted with the elements whichare not specifically Samkhya in his teachings— arenegligible . Von Schroeder

,* indeed

,invents an older form of

Samkhya , which he understands as denoting reckoning , inwhich number p l ayed a much greater part than in theclassi cal Samkhya ; Garbe thinks that Pythagoras may haveinvented his doctrine of numb er as the result of hi s misinter

p reting the fact that the Samkhya owed its name to i tsenumeration of principles

,into the view that the Samkhya

made number the basi s of nature . Both theories are basedon a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the viewsof Pythagoras ,t and the only possible conclusion is that wehave no early Greek evidence for the exi stence of theSamkhya school .It is further not necessary seriously to cons ider the

possibili ties of borrowing on the part of Plato or ofAristotle

,though the influence of the samkhya has been seen

in the case of both . More plausible i s the effort to find proofof Samkhya doctrines in Gnostici sm

,an attempt to which there

i s not a priori any reason to take exception . The actual

p roofs of such influence adduced are not important : thecomparison of soul or spirit to l ight

,which does not occur

in the oldest Samkhya authorities , i s anticipated byAristotle

,and is Platonic in essence ; the contrast of Sp i ri t

and matter i s Platonic . Perhaps more value attaches tosuch minor points as the Gnosti c d ivi sion of men into threeclasses

,which may be compared with the classificat ion of

men according to the predominance in them of the threeGunas of the Samkhya , and the assigning of p ersonalexistence to such functions as intellect and will . But suchparallels

,whatever they are worth

,do not help definitely as to

the date of a real Samkhya .

Pythagoras und die Inder , p p . 7 2 - 7 6 .

TS ee Ke ith ,1909

, p p . 569 -606 .

GREEK PH ILOSOPHY AND THE SAMKHYA 67

On the other hand,the further effort to find Samkhya

influences in neo-Platonism must be held to be completelymistaken . Plotinus ( 209- 269 A.D . ) held that his objectwas to free men from misery through his philosophy , thatSpirit and matter are essenti ally d ifferent , that Spiri t isreally unaffected by misery

,which i s truly the lot of matter ;

he compares the soul to light and even to a mirror in whichobjects are reflected ; he admits that in sleep , as the soulremains awake

,man can enjoy happiness ; he insists on the

realization of God in a condition of ecstasy broughtabout by profound mental concentration . Porphyry ( 23 2304 A.D . ) teaches the leadership of spiri t over matter , theomnipresence of the soul when freed from matter , and thedoctrine that the world has no beginning . He also forbidsthe Slaying of animals and rejects sacrifice . Abammon , alater contemporary

,mentions the wonderful powers obtained

by the exerci se of contemplative ecstasy . But there isnothing here that can possibly be considered as necessari lyderived from India . The opposi tion of matter and Spirit ,the removal of spiri t from the world of reality

,and the View

that the only power to approach to i t i s through ecstasy arethe outcome of the Greek endeavour to grasp the problembrought into prominence by Plato of the contrast of spirit andmatter , and the views of Plotinus are the logical , and indeedinevitable , outcome of that development .* The protestagains t sacrifice i s as old as Greek philosophy , the winningof supernatural powers by ecstasy i s a popular conceptionwhich appears in Pythagoras and beyond all others in theBacchic religion . On the other hand

,the real extent of

knowledge of Indian philosophy available to Plotinus andPorphyry alike seems to have been most severely limited .

See E . Ca ird,E volution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers

who deve lop s in de ta il th e dedu ction of P lotinu s’ view fromP latonism . The same view is taken by P . Deussen , AllgemeineG eschichte der Philosophie , I , iii , 6 16 .

THE SAMKHYA KARIKA

W ITH the Samkhya Karihawe emerge from the region ofconjecture and doubt , and arrive at the classic statement ofthe doctrine of the Samkhya philosophy . It i s admittedlyby far the most bri lli an t account of the system

, and i tscla im to be the oldest exposi tion of the doctrine in systematicform is challenged only by Max Miiller ’

s suggestion* thatthe oldest tex t-book of the 8amkhya is the Tattvasamasa

,a

work of wholly unknown date and authorship . The claimruns counter to the ti tle of the work

,which shows i t to be

,

like theKarikas themselves,nothing more than a compendium

of the doctrine of the School : the in troduction i s modern inappearance

,and the techn i cal terms which make up the

greater portion of the content o f the short tract are morenumerous and more elaborate than anything foun d in theS amkhya Karika. There i s

,therefore

,the probabili ty that

the Tattvasamasa represents a later period of the schoolthan the Karika : certainty , in the absence of any source ofinformation as to the Tattvasamasa , i s not to be attai ned .

The date of the work i s app rox imately known . Itappears to have been among the works which the Buddhistmonk

,Paramartha

,took with him to China in 546 A.D .

,and

it i s recorded that he made a translation of i t and of acommentary on i t during the last period of hi s li teraryactivi ty

,which falls in the years from 55 7 -56 8 , the date of

his death .T This translation has fortunately been preserved,

and proves the authentici ty of the S anskri t text as i t now

S ix S ystems of Indian Philosophy , p p . 318 , 319 ; see be low, p . 89 .

TS ee Takaku su ,Bu lletin de l

’

E cole F ranga ise d’

E xtrém e Orient,

iv . . l fi .


researches of Takakusu have definitely established the factthat thi s commentary differs too greatly from that ofGaudap ada to have been derived from it , and that both itand the commen tary of Gaudapada must go back ultimatelyto a common source . This conclusion i s incidentally confirmed by the evidence of the very full account of the Karika

“

given by Alb iruni ( 1030 who actually mentions aGauda as authority . His statements

,however

,cannot be

derived entirely * from the work of Gaudapada , and it i sclear that he used two di fferent authorities . Who theauthor of this older commentary was i s uncertain : there i s aChinese tradition that i t was V asub andhu himself , but thissuggestion is supported by no evidence

,and can easily be

explained away as a misunderstanding of the fact thatVasubandhu wrote a work to refute the Karika. There i s

therefore plausibility in the suggestion}L that the author was

ISvarakrsna himself , especially as the nature of the Karika“

i s such as urgently to require an interpretation . If , however ,thi s was the case

,before the work was taken to China there

had already been app ended to i t the last verses , whichare not recogn ized by Gaudapada ,

but which are given andexplained in the Chinese commentary . It i s probable thatGaudap ada

’s commentary was distinctly later than the origin

al o f the Chinese version : a terminus ad quem i s given by theuse of Gaudap ada by Alb iruni in the eleventh century A.D . ,

and by his priority to Vacasp atimiSra , whose commentaryon the Karika the S amkhyatattvakaumudi , written in theninth century A .D .

,t ranks high among the authori ties on theSamkhya philosophy

,and has been made the subject of

Several sup er- commentaries . Later i s the commentary ofNarayanatirtha , which i s of li ttle value .

According to the Karika the end of the Samkhyaphilosophy i s to discover the means of removing the three

As he ld by Garbe , Samkhya Philosophie , p p . 62 -68 .

‘

I’

Takakusu ,op . cit . p . 58 . S . K . Be lvarkar (Bhandarkar Com

m emoration Volume, p p . 17 1ff ) argu es tha t the original of the Ch inese

vers ion was the Mathara-Vrtti, wh ich he is ed iting , bu t th is cannot b ep roved , as derivation from a common source is still equally p robable .

1 Ke ith , 19 14, p . 1098 .

THE SAMKHYA KARIKA 7 1

fold misery of the world,that i s , the commentators explain ,

the sorrows brought on us by ourselves , those brought byothers

,and those infl icted by fate . The removal of misery

cannot be achieved either empirically or by devotion toreligious practi ses . Good fortune on earth i s peri shabl e

,

and moreover i t i s not posit ive pleasure but freedom frommisery that the

’

wise man seeks . The practice of religion,

again,i s in sufficient ; the performance of sacrifice not only

involves the Sl aying of victims which offends against therule of non- injury

,but the rewards of such actions are

transitory,and the performer must fall back again

,after the

enjoyment of the fruit of his deeds in yonder world,into an

earthly existence : moreover , the result of such actions leadsto posi tive not to the freedom from pain whichis the ideal of the sage .

The statement of the object of the system i s ofimportance in that i t brings out clearly the fundamentalpre- suppositions on which the Sei rhkhya , like the otherphilosophical systems

,rests . I t i s assumed as sel f-evident

that the world i s a condit ion of misery , that the soul issubject to transmigration

,and that there is some degree of

truth at least in the Vedic tradition . Whatever the originof the doctrines in quest ion

,the first two assumptions are of

universal validi ty for all schools of Indian thought,with the

exception of athei sti c and materi ali st Carvakas , and theSamkhya makes no effort to establi sh their validi ty . Thethird assumption i s of much les s importance from thephilosophical View

,for unlike the first two it has no real

effect on the substance of the Samkhya philosophy,but for

the adherents of the system it had the great advantage ofmaking the school rank as orthodox , and so on a higherplane not merely than the Buddhists or J ains

,but even than

the sectarian worshippers of Vi snu and Siva .

The real mode of freedom from the misery of exi stencelies in the knowledge of the principles of the Samkhya , theevolved , the unevolved , and the knower , but the preliminary

So P . Deussen , Allgemeine G eschichte der Philosophie , I . iii.415 . The commentators hold tha t envy is p rodu ced by the s igh t ofothe rs’

grea ter bliss .


question of the mode in which truth i s to be attained is not

ignored in theKarika”

. The three means of proof are exp resslyasserted to be p ercep tion , inference and correct tradition ,

which are sufficient, on the one hand , to establi sh every prin

cip le , and all of which , on the other hand , are essen ti al toaccount for ex i stence as known to us . Perception is definedto be mental apprehension of a present object

,inference i s

declared to be threefold and distinguished by the presence ofa mark and the bearer of a mark

,while correct tradition i s

equated with the holy scripture, Sruti , rightly understood .

The use of scripture,however

,is restricted to those cases only

which cannot be dealt with by the use of the other modes ofproof , and the instances in which i t has to be resorted to arereduced to such as are beyond perception by the sense andbeyond inference by analogy : such cases are the Vedic gods ,Mount Meru

,and the Uttara Kurus

,all things whose truth

is vouched for in scripture,but which cannot be known by

any other means . The three forms of in feren ce are not

described in the Karika,and the commentaries differ

,but

the commentary on the Nyaya Sutra ( i , 1 , 5 ) explain s them as

in ference from cause to effect,as from the presence of clouds

to rain,from the effect to the cause

,as from the swelling of

the streams in the valleys to rain in the hills,and by analogy

,

as when we infer from the fact that a man al ters hi s placewhen he moves that the stars

,since they ap pear in different

places,must move also .

* In these cases in the Indianconception of logic the clouds

,the swollen streams

,the

change of p la ce of the stars are the mark , and the rain tocome , the rain in the hills , and the movement of the starsare the bearers of the mark .

The absence of any attempt to examine more closely thenature of perception and of inference and their mutualrelations i s striking

,and indicates how firmly fixed was the

view of the system that perception gave immediate knowledgeof reality , and that inference gave mediate knowledge . The,

S ee D eussen,A llgemeine Ges chichte der Philosophie , I, iii.

367 -3 7 0 . The th ird typ e is taken more genera lly as inductive byVacasp a tim iSra and V ijfianabhiksu ,

s e e Garbe,Samkhya Philosophie ,

p p . 153-154 ; Jacob i , Gattingische G e lehrte Anzeigen ,1895

, p . 204 .

Cf . A Biirk , Vienna Orienta l J ourna l , " V ,25 1-2 64 .


admission by the side of these two principles,which alone

were allowed by the VaiSesika school , of the conception ofauthori ty

,harmon i ses wi th the uncritical atti tude of the

school to the problem of knowledge , and with i ts essenti allypractical end

,the removal of misery . The belief in the

Vedic tradition from the point of view of purely scientificinterest could not be accepted without examination : to thesupporters of a system with a definite means of salvationthe presence in the midst of their tenets o f one which mightnot bear close examination was indifferent , since i t did notvi tally affect the main structure o f the system .

The essenti ally in ferior position as a means of proof ,allotted to tradition , i s attested by the samkhya doctrine o fcausality : despite the numerous passages in the sacredscriptures which might be adduced for the doctrine that nonexistence was the source oi being

,the Samkhya asserts the

doctrine that the result really exists beforehand in its cause,

j ust as the clay serves to form a p ot, or the threads form apiece of cloth . For this theory five grounds are adduced :the non- existent cannot be the subject o f an activi ty ; theproduct i s really nothing else than the materi al of which i tis composed ; the product exists before its coming into beingin the shape of i ts materi al ; only a definite product can beproduced from each materi al ; and only a specific materialcan yield a specific result . The last four arguments

,which

are in effect but two , rest on the perception that in theproduct the original material i s contained

,though under

change of appearance,and that defin i te materials give

definite and distinct results ; the first argument , on the otherhand

,rests not merely on the fact that the coming into being

of any object save from a definite material i s not observed ,but also on the argument that i f a thing does not exi st therecan be no possibil ity of its doing anything . Hence i tfollows that in its ultimate essence causali ty is reduced tochange of appearance in an abiding entity , a conception o fgreat importance for the system .

From the principle of causali ty i s deduced the fact that theultimate basis of the empirical universe is the unevolved ,Avyakta . Individual things are all l imited in magni tude .and this is incompatible with the nature of the source of the


universe . All individual things are analogous one to another ,and therefore no one can be regarded as the final source ofthe other . Moreover , as they all come into being from a source ,they cannot constitute that source . Further , an effect mustd iffer from its cause , though i t must consist of the cause ,and therefore the empiric universe cannot i tsel f be the finalcause

,but must be the product of some ultimate cause .

The obvious difficulty that the unevolved cannot be p erceived i s met with the argument that its fine nature renders itimperceptible

,j ust as other things

,of whose existence there

i s no doubt,cannot be perceived ; either because of their too

great distance or p roximity , through the intervention of athird object

,through admixture with similar matter

,through

the presence of some more powerful sensation , or the blindness or other defect of the senses or the mind of theObserver .From the nature of the final cause follow the essenti al

di fferences between the unevolved and the evolved . Theproducts have a cause , on which they depend , and to whichthey are related : the source i s uncaused and independent .They are many in number , and limited in space and name :the source i s one , eternal and all-pervasive . They haveactivit ies

,and parts : the source i s immanent in all but has

nei ther activities nor parts . They are the mark : the sourcei s distinguished by them .

The process of development of the unevolved is throughthe activity of three constituents out of which it is madeup

,S attva , Raj as and Tamas . The first of these const i

tuents , or factors , i s that in nature which i s light , whichreveals

,which causes pleasure to man : the second is what

i s impel ling and moves , what produces activity in man :the third i s what i s heavy and restrains

,what produces

the state of indifference or inactivity in man . The threeconstituents act essen ti ally in close relation : they overpowerand support one another, produce one another and intermingle with one another . They are compared in a homelyS imile to the constituents of a lamp , that i s , i t seems , to theflame

,oil , and wick , respectively . The origin of the

conception seems to be in the main psychologic,but even in

the Karika i t i s impossible not to realize the materi al nature


also accorded to the Gunas . No proof of their exi stence isoffered : i t is to be in ferred that they were held to beestablished by observation bo th of nature and of man .

From the possession of the three consti tuents , which i scommon to both the evolved and the unevolved , followcertain further characteri stics of these entities , which formthe discrimination between them and the other greatprinciple of the Samkhya , Purusha , or Sp i ri t . Unlike Spiri t ,the evolved and the unevolved are without the power ofdiscriminating between themselves and Spiri t : indeedwithout Spiri t they are wholly unconscious ; they areobjective only while spirit is the subject ; they are commonto all Spirits whereas each spiri t is unique ; they are eithercreative

,created or both creative and created , while Spiri t

is neither created nor creative . While,however , i t i s

expressly said that these distinctions ari se from thepossession by the unevolved of the three consti tuents whichare likewise present in the evolved

,the mode of the

derivation of the characteristi cs i s not given . Nor i s thi sdefect remedied in the account given of the argum ents forthe existence of the Spiri t as these arguments essenti allyassume that the nature of the unevolved and the evolved i ssomething independently ascertained .

The arguments put forward for the existence of Spiri tare that the aggregate of nature must exist for the sake ofsomething , that there must be something to be the p residingpower for which the evolution of the universe takes place

,

that there must be a subject to experience the three consti tuentsof the universe , that the development of the world proceedsfor the sake of the emancipation of something

, and thatsomething must exist with qualities opposed to those of theuniverse . Further , i t i s deduced that there must be manySpirits , since experience shows us separate bi rth and death

,

separate organs and different actions,and

,further

,Spiri t

must be the reverse of nature,which i s essenti ally one and

the same to all . S imilarly,by reason of the same contrast

,

Spiri t i s the subject , not the object , i t reaches and possessesfreedom because of i ts power of discerning the differencebetween itsel f and nature : i t i s conscious , as againstunconscious nature ; i t i s without partic ipation in activity


in any form , and , unlike nature , produces nothing . Nevertheless , the empiri c self is explained only by the union ofspirit with nature : through thi s union the fine body whichi s a product of nature becomes

,though i tsel f without

consciousness , conscious . On the other hand,though the

consti tuents alone possess activity by reason of the un itingwith Spiri t , Sp iri t , really indifferen t , app ears

'

as an actor .But the conj unction of the two i s essenti ally not intendedto be permanent : i t is , in fact , l ike the un ion of a blind manwith a lame man : Spiri t joins forces with nature in orderthat nature may be revealed to Spiri t

, and that Spirit mayobtain freedom from its connection with nature .

This conception is the fundamental point of the wholeSamkhya system

,and its difficulties are obvious . There is

no possibili ty of mediation between the spiri t which is

removed from all action,and the active b ut unconscious

nature . The famous S imile of the blind man who carrieson his back the lame man , and thus places his activity underthe control of the directing power of the other

,suffers from

the fundamental difficulty that the two men with which itdeals are both possessed of activity and so can co-op erate .

Spirit cannot act , and on the other hand nature,being

unconscious,i s not capable of receiving directions from the

conscious Spiri t . S ti ll more serious i s the difficulty that ,while the aim of the union of the lame and the blind i sobviously the serving of a useful purpose , no such purp osecan be conceived for the un ion of spirit and nature .

Unconscious nature cannot exp erience misery : spiri t ini tself does not experience misery , and the union of the two ,which results in the apparent experience of misery by spiri t

,

which wrongly thinks that the misery which it brings tolight in nature i s misery which it i tsel f endures

,thus creates

the very misery which it is the object of the un ion to abolish .

It i s impossible to imagine that so comp li cated a systemcould have arisen from independent Sp eculation on the natureof ex i stence . The conception of spiri t in the Samkhya i sclearly nothing more than the carrying to a further limit ofthe conception of the self in the teaching of the BrhadaranyahaUpanisad . The distinction of the subjective and the objective ,and the recognition of the fact that the subject i s in a sense


cation of this abstract conception as the Samkhya asserts .The existence of numerous individuals who are conscious i s atotally difi erent thing , for their number and individualityare conditioned by the possession of a different objectivecontent in consciousness , and when this i s removed therewould remain nothing at all

,or at the most the abstract

conception of subject , which could not be a multi tude ofindividual Spirits . Had the Samkhya conception been thatof a number of souls as Opposed to spirits

,no logical

objection could be rai sed to the theory of multiplicity , butthe sharp distinction of spiri t and nature

,and the assertion

that there i s no real connection between them,deprive Spirit

of any poss ible reality .

These difficulties come out in great prominence in theeffort to deduce the evolution of nature for the sake of spirit .From nature ari ses the great one

,often called intellect

,

Buddhi ; then ari ses individuation , Ahamkara ; thence comethe five organs of perception , Buddhindriya ; the five organsof action

,Karmendriya , and the five fine elements

,Tanmatras ;

from the five elements ari se the -five gross elements,

Mahabhutas , and from them the world . The series up tothe five gross elements

,including nature i tsel f

,number

twenty- four,and with spirit as twenty-fifth make up the

princip les of the system . The first,nature

,is evolvent

only : the rest , save the gross elements , are evolved and

evolvent,the gross elements are evolved

,and Spirit is neither

evolvent or evolved , but this d istinction i s of no weight forthe system . The series i s in all probability of historicalorigin

,as i t finds , as we have seen , an analogue in the

Katha Upanisad , and perhaps for this reason its deductionis full of difficulty .

The essential conception i s that from unconscious naturethere i s developed for the sake of spirit a whole universe ,that the development tak es place for each individual Spiri tseparately

,but yet at the same time in such a manner that

nature and i ts evolutes are common to all Spirits . Thequestion

,how nature , consi sting of the equilibrium of the

three constituents , Sattva , Raj as and Tamas , can be broughtinto activity at all remains unsolved : i t is i llustrated by theS imile of the unconscious milk which flows to nourish the .

THE SAMKHYA KAR IKA 7 9

calf , yet nature is said to proceed for the freedom ofSpiri t as men proceed to bring to cessation their desi res .But nature i s essentially other than Spiri t : i t is not , as inthe Vedanta , a production of ignorance , but i s as real asSpiri t i tself

,though it i s only under the influence of union

with Spiri t that i t evolves itself . But for that union theconstituents

,though credited with the power of action

,

would not alter from their condition of equilibrium .

The conception of intellect as the first evolute from naturei s doubtles s to be traced to the derivation from the Avyaktaof the great soul in the Katha Upanigad ( i i i , Thisfact , and its posi tion in the series o f evolutes before theprinciple of individuation

,suggest that the primary sense

of the express ion i s cosmic,but the exact force of a cosmic

intellect in a system which has not a creator or world- souli s difficult to appreciate

,though in the Vedanta i t is easy to

understand how from the impersonal Brahman can bederived the personal Hiranyagarbha who can be regardedas the world- soul . At most the conception aimed at maybe that the influence of spiri t i s to convert the whollyindeterminate nature into a consciousness

,which for lack

of principle of individuation can only be conceived asa potential consciousness . But this cosmic posi tion o fintellect is feebly grasped in the Karika

,in which on the

contrary stress i s laid on the intellect as psychological .It is defined as the power of decision

,by which i t seems

to be distinguished from mind,as the power which

formulates the possible courses and carries out the deci sion,

while on the intellectual s ide m ind brings up the materialfor concepts which the intellect formulates . * Viewed inthis light , intellect , which like all the products of natureconsi sts of three constituents

,in i ts S attva aspect i s

di stinguished by the performance of duty,knowledge

,

freedom from desire,and divine powers : in i ts aspect as

Tamas i t is distingui shed by the reverse of these qualities,or

more correctly i t is the Raj as aspect which produces desire .

It is clear that considered thus intellect cannot be prior to

Cf . Deussen , Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie . I , iii,436

,439 . Garbe ( Samkhya Philosophie , p p . 2 52 , 253 ) restricts m ind

to wish and dou bt and to its connection with the organs .


mind or individuation,and that i t performs a twofold

and inconsistent part in the scheme .The princip le of individuation can only be understood

as the principle through the action of which the severalSpiri ts become endowed each with a separate substratum ,

which results in the appearance of human individuals . It isimpossible to interpret the principle of individuation inany real cosmic sense , as i f thi s is done we would findourselves faced with the conception of a really consciousworld Spirit , which i s not accepted in the Karika. Psychologically the principle stands midway between intellect andmind : the sensations communicated through mind are

referred to the self and result in a perfect concept ; thesuggestions of action sent up by mind are referred to theself by the action of individuation

, and result in the decisionO f intellect , and the derivation of mind and the senses fromindividuation , like that of individuation from intellect , isagain logically impossible .The pyschological character of the principle of in

dividuation is emphasized by the derivation from it in itsSattva aspect of the mind and the five organs of perceptionand the five organs o f action

,and from it in its Tamas

aspect o f the five fine elements , thus developing a furtherparallelism of the s ubjective and the objective elements .In each derivation the Raj as aspect plays i ts part , both as

serving to set the other constituents in action and asactually present in the results . The five organs ofperception are those of S ight

,hearing

,smell

,taste and touch ;

the five organs of action are the tongue,feet

,hands , and the

organs of evacuation and reproduction . Mind is , like theseten , an organ through which external reality i s app rehended ,but it has the imp ortant function of arranging the senseimpressions into precepts

,of suggesting altern atives

,and of

carying out the decisions of the will by means of the organsof action . The function of the organ s of perception is

merely observation,in contrast with the action of the organs

of action . Mind with the organs "" appears to be considered

So Sar’

nkara , and ap p arently Gaudap ada . Vacasp atim iSra at

tribu te s the activity to mind , ind ividuation and inte llect.


as producing by thei r action the five vital airs , which in theVedanta system are given an independen t place as the supporters of the li fe of nutrition as opposed to the consciousli fe . The distinction of ten sen ses i s not exp lained , s aveby a reference to the diverse development of the constituents .Mind shares with intellect and individuation the

peculi arity that there i s no distinction between organ andfunction

,as there i s in the case of the other ten senses . In

perception all four functions , the senses , mind , individuation ,and intellect are active : in other cases only the latter threeare employed , but their activity must rest upon the result ofprevious perception

,a memory picture , or an idea . The

action in both cases may be simultaneous , or step by step , butin the former case the real sense i s

,i t seems , that the process

is too swi ft for the steps to be observed : thus an object i sseen by the senses , the sense impression i s developed into apercept by mind

,related to the self by individuation

,and

made’

into a concept by intellect,or suggested decisions are

formed by mind , brought into individuation , and the deci sionis given by intellect , whereupon mind sees to their execution .

Thus in i ts widest sense the organ can be described as

thirteen -fold : the three functions , intellect , individuation ,and mind form the inner organ

,the ten senses the outer

organ , through which alone can the inner organ be set inactivi ty , either directly in perception or through the influenceof a former perception . The outer organ i s thus bound tothe present in time

,the inner can deal with past and future .

The organs are mutually helpful,but thei r ultimate aim is

for the sake of Spirit . The senses are the door,while the

inner organ i s compared to the doorkeeper . Between the

organs of perception and of action there i s a distinction inthe nature of their objects ; the former contemplate both thefine and the gross elements

,including all the world under

the latter head ; sp eech has sound as i ts object , while theother four organs deal wi th all the five gross elements andthe world derived from them .

The posit ion of intellect,however , i s one of speci al

importance : all the action of the other organs i s carried outfor the intellect

,and it works d irectly for Spirit

, p roducingits experience of all existence on the one hand and on the


other securing the discernment of the subtle distinctionbe tween spirit and nature .

The fine elements are described as without d ifference inthem , while the gross elements which ari se from them areexpressly described as possessing this quali ty

,from which i t

would seem that the gross elements are considered,as in the

Chandogya Upanigad where,however

,there are but

three elements in question , to be produced by the intermingling of the fine elemen t s

,the elements receiving their special

names from the presence in them of the greater amount ofthe specific element , in accordance with the View of theVedanta , in which each element consists of a half of oneelement and one- eighth each of the other four. The alternative view suggested by the Taz

’

ttiriya Upanisad ( i i , 1 )under which the gross elements would arise from thecompounding of the fine elements by the process ofaccumulation , wind , for example , having both the quali tiesof audibility and tactibility, i s adop ted by Gaudapada andVacasp atimiSra , but seems to have less probabili ty , since ini t ether would have but one quality

,audibili ty

,and so could

not be contrasted as a gross element with the correspondingfine element .Together with the organs the fine elements form part of

the Lifiga , the psychic apparatus , which passes from li fe tol i fe . The Lifiga , howeve r , includes as a necessary part of i tthe subtle parts of the gross elements, which serve as theseed whence the p hy sical body springs . These subtleportions are as n ecessary to the psychic apparatus as thecanvas to a picture or

,by a less appropriate Simile

,a p illar

to a Shadow . This psychic apparatus,which -is incorporeal ,

and is prior to the concep ti on of time , accompanies the soulsthroughout transmigration , from body to body , in accordancewith the rule of causality

,playing like an actor various

parts,a power which it possesses s ince i t Shares in the

property of all pervadingness which belongs to nature .

This conjunction of spiri t with the psychic apparatus i s thecause of misery , and lasts unti l the attainment of trueinsight .The gross elements , however , have a further character

istic. They consist of two further portions , those des cr ibed

THE SAMKHYA KARIKA 83

as born of father and mother , which go to make the body ofthe psychic apparatus

,growing out of the seed in the form

of the subtle portions of the gross elements , and thePrabhutas , which form the mass of inorgan i c nature . Thesetwo elements grow out from the subtle portions , and thuseach individual spi ri t i s provi ded with a complete world ofi ts own ari sing from it self . At the same time

,however , i t i s

exp ressly indicated that these last two portion s of the grosselements fall back at death into the body of nature

,and i t

i s clear that the conception of the soul s as monads i s notcarried out to i ts full extent . The reason for thebreach in the un ity of the idea is obvious . i t i sintended to meet the case of the difficulty whicharises as to the existence in the empiric world ofother souls in human and other bodies , and of inorganicnature . To con sider all these as developed from the fineelements separately for each spiri t would seem unnatural ,and though

,therefore

,the gross elements are expressly derived

from the fine elements , and though these are derived fromthe p rinciple of individuation ,

which cannot be cosmic,none

the less these two port ions of the gross elements are treatedas being the same for all

,not merely S imilar and

,therefore

,as

cosmic . This fact reveals a realist ic basi s at the bottom ofthe Samkhya conception , and suggests that nature i s to somedegree at least directly responsible for inorgan i c things , andeven for the corporeal parts of organ i c things . Of thelatter fourteen classes are enumerated

,eight divine

,given

variously,by Gaudapada as Brahman , Prajapati , Soma ,

Indra,Gandharvas

,Yaksas , Pisacas , and Raksases , five of

beasts,given by the same scholi ast as wild an imals

, domesti

cated animals,birds

,rep tiles , and p lants , and one of men .

In the worlds of the gods the constituent Sattva prevails , inthat of men Raj as , in the rest Tamas . Of inorgani c naturenot a hint i s given

,a fact which suggests that the difficulties

of i ts position were decidedly felt by the author .

Cf . vv . 22 , 39 and 41 of the Karika : the su btle p ortions seemto p ick from nature th e ma teria l for the Mata

'

p itgjas . S e e D eu ssen ,

Allgemeine G eschichte der Philosophie , I , iii, 447 , 448 , 49 7 ; be low ,

p 9 7 . The obje ctions of O . S trau ss , Vienna Orienta l J ou rna l, xxvii,2 62

,a re no t convincing .


In its passage through the world,from body to body , in

the course of time each soul , or spiri t with its psychic body ,is subject to determination , which cannot be deduced fromits own nature as spiri t nor from the psychic body

,but must

be derived directly from nature . This determination is

afforded by the Bhavas , psychic states , which are insep ar

ably bound up with the psychic apparatus : the two gotogether so long as the spiri t i s not finally freed from thepsychic apparatus . Each individual li fe starts with adefinite equipment of states

,and i t adds others in its l i fe

apparently those with which it starts exhaust themselves inthe course of i ts l i fe , and when i t passes away and in duecourse a new li fe begins the new li fe carries with i t thestates accumulated in the last existence .The direct connection of the states with nature is shown

by the fact that the eight enumerated are those which havealready been given as the characterist i cs of the S attva andTamas aspects of intellect . They are performance of dutyand the reverse , which lead respectively to a higher place inthe next li fe and to degradation ; knowledge , which leads tofinal release ; ignorance , which entails con tinued bondage ;indi fference to desire

,which helps to loosen the bond between

Spiri t and desire , which leads to rebi rth ; divinepower

,which leads to freedom from obstacles , and the posses

s ion of the Siddhis,perfections ; and lack of divine power

which has the reverse effect .The Karika, however , gives , beside this eightfold division

which is frequently referred to , another division of fi ftystates , divided under four heads . These are the five

Vip aryayas, erroneous views , the twenty- eight ASaktis , lackof p ower ; the nine Tushtis , satis faction s ; and the eightSiddhis

,perfections . The five Vip aryayas, which are com

parable with the five KleSas of the Yoga system , Avidya,Asmita, Raga , Dvesha , and AbhiniveSa , are Tamas , darkness ;Moha

,confusion ; Mahamoha , deep confusion ; Tamisra ,

gloom ; and Andhatamisra , dark gloom . There are eightkinds of Tamas

,explained by the commentators a s the error

See Deussen ,Allgemeine G es chichte der Philosophie , I , in , 451.

Absorp tion in nature is the render ing of the commentators .


the psychic apparatus must wander from birth to birth ,gathering from nature at each birth the portions of the grosselements described as born of father and mother in order toassume a physical body . All this time nature by evolvingfor spirit in the hope of enabling i t to attain final releasei s like a dancer who displays herself on the stage and thenretires again

,her task unaccomplished . But in the end

nature succeeds in her object,and like a bashful maiden

seen in déshabillé, who withdraws for ever from the Sight ofthe man who has seen her

,nature

,having fulfilled her

object,withdraws from spiri t for ever

,when spiri t has

realized its essenti al di stinction from nature . Then comesto an end the p aradox by which spirit , which has really noconnection with nature and i s unaffected by the misery inhe ren tin nature

,considers itself bound and suffers transmigration ,

while nature undertakes the changes of evolution for thesake of spirit

,s ince in hersel f she i s not conscious of

misery . In truth the spirit i s not bound,does not undergo

transmigration , and is not released , but these processes areapplicable to nature , but only for the sake of Spirit .There i s only one means by which nature can succeed in

freeing spiri t from fancied dependence on her,though she

makes efforts in diverse ways : of the eight psychic stateswhich are seen in intellect seven merely keep Spiri t fast inits bonds ; with the eighth , knowledge , however , release i sachieved . The knowledge which results in l iberation is therealization that the spirit i s not one or all of the principles ,that i t has no empiric ex i stence

,that nothing belongs to

i t,and that i t does not exist as an emp i ri c individual .

The attainment of this knowledge through considerationof the facts of exi stence results in the cessation of thecreative activi ty of nature : the other seven psychicstates come to an end for ever

,and sp i rit , in contentment ,

gazes as a mere sp ectator up on nature which no longerbinds it . Recognizing that nature i s not connectedwith it

,Sp iri t i s indifferen t to her , nature recogn iz ing

that her true character i s understood ceases her activi ty ,and ,

though the union of the two remains in existence evenafter the attainment of true

‘

knowledge , there i s no p ossibilityof further p roduction . But as the potter ’s wheel continues

THE SAMKHYA KARIKA 7

to revolve for a time,after he ceases to maintain i ts motion ,

by reason of the acquired velocity , so the psychic stateswhich result from the previous li fe have to be finallyexhausted

,and not until the impres sions

, Samskaras , thusexisting in the mind have been removed , can the completerelease be attained in death

,when spiri t obtains the con

dition o f complete isolation , which is unending , and whichi s free from any other characteri stic .Nothing i s more convincing p roof of the close derivation

of the Samkhya from the orthodox doctrine of the Up ani

sads than the terms in which the attainment of release i sdescribed . In the system itself the doctrine of the bondageof spiri t in nature is essential to explain the misery ofexistence , but at the same time it is admitted that there i s noreal bondage . No reason is given for the belief of spiritthat i t i s bound

,yet

,as the bondage is unreal

,i t i s clear that

i t must be produced by ignorance,since i t i s removed by

knowledge , but thi s doctrine i s not set out in the Karika,which on the contrary consi stently treats the union of spiritand nature as a union for the final release of spiri t . Thereis no conception of a development o f Spiri t by i ts unionwith its opposite , ,

resulting in a synthesi s which i s far morerich in content than the two factors involved : on the contrary , the connection of Spi ri t with matter terminates wi ththe withdrawal of spiri t into a condi tion of absolutefreedom , which must , however , a t the same time be absolutenonentity . In following the doctrine of the Upanisadsthat true knowledge involves the den i al of individuality ,the Samkhya system leads i tsel f into the difficult positionthat it thus really denies the reality of its system ‘

Of manyspirits , since there can be no multiplici ty without individuality to distinguish the several members of the group ofSpirits . In the Upanisads , on the contrary , the idea i sj ustifiable , since the denial of individual i ty is due to thefact that all seeming individuals are really merely one singleself . In the Up anisads,moreover , there i s a real possibili tyof the binding of the self ; whether the bonds be real ormerely illusory

,still in the first case they can be destroyed

in the appropriate manner,and in the second the false

belief can be removed by knowledge,but the Samkhya


denies any real connection whatever , and , while it thereforeleaves i t to be assumed that the apparent connection i scaused by ignorance , i t does not , like the Vedanta , elevatethat ignorance into a metap hysical ent ity , thus leaving itsexistence even on the basi s of the system unexp lained .

In the case of any individual self , the connection ofSpiri t and nature rests indeed on the lack of discriminationin a previous existence

,which leaves its impression on the

mind , and in the next exi stence leaves the Sp i ri t bound , butthis does not meet the objection to an infinite regress whichin other cases the Samkhya system “

sharply refuses to allow .

The Spiri t not being really connected with nature , there isno ground on which there can be produced the lack of discrimination of Spiri t from nature which causes bondage .In the Vedanta of Samkara the finite and the infinite Spiri tare indeed in reality one

,and the distinction between them

is due to an illusion , but an i llusion i s something which canbe removed by knowledge : a non-existing connectioncannot create a lack of di stinction which produces a connection. Or i f that view of the Upanisads be accepted , inwhich the existence of individual souls and

“

of the outer worldis in some way believed to be real

,then freedom may be won

by the recognition of the true connection between the individual souls and the absolute through meditation upon , anddevotion to , the absolute , or through grace , as in the KathaUpanisad ( i i , 23 ) and elsewhere .* Equally here i s aconnection reali zed between Spiri t and nature

,the absence

of which Shuts off the Samkhya from any possibili ty oflogi cal explanation of its main principles .

See a lso Kausitaki Upanisad , iii, 8 ; Ma ndaka , iii, 2 , 3 .

THE LATER SAMKHYA

SPECIAL attention has been drawn to the short tract ,called the Tattvasamasa , by reason of the fact that MaxMiiller* considered that i t was the real text-book of theSamkhya system anterior to the Samkhya Karika. Theargument in i ts favour i s , that where i t agrees with theKarika i t appears to be the older : this view is not , however ,supported by any detailed argument

,and certainly does not

seem conclusive . All that can be said of i t with certaintyis that V ijfianabhiksu in his commentary on the Sutraattributed i t apparently to the same author as the Sutra ,be ing a brief exposition of what is said at length in theSfitra , and that the text has , in comparatively recent times ,at least in some parts of India , as at Benares , att ained a

popularity which is much greater than that of the Karika.

The language is not marked by any Speci al S ign of date ,and Max Miiller thought that the different order of categoriesand the numerous names not el sewhere used were rathera S ign of primitive and orginal character than of lateness .On the other hand

,i t must be said that the relegation to the

end of the category of pain i s certain ly curious and art ificial in appearance , as contrasted with the posi tion whichpain occupies at the beginn ing of the Karika as giving thetone to the whole system ,

and the fact that the termTattvasamasa shows that the work is a compendium is

surely evidence against the text representing the originalSutras of the school .

S ix Systems of Indian Philosophy , p p . 3 18ff . The later date ,a fter 1400 AD is p re fe rred by Garbe

,Samkhya Philosophie , p p .

68 -7 0,


After an enumeration and explanation of the twenty-fiveprincip les , arranged as the eight evolvents , nature , intellect ,individuation

,and the five fine elements ; the s ixteen

evolutes,arranged as the five organs of perception , the five

organs of action , mind and the five gross elements ; andSpirit

,the tract proceeds to enumerate the three Gunas and

to explain their nature . Then come brief explanations of theprocess of evolution and the resolution of the evolved goingfrom nature to the material elements

,and from the materi al

elements back to nature . Thereafter the intellect , individuation

,mind and the ten senses are set out as psychica l

and subjective over against the objects of their activityand the presiding deities

,a concep t which i s decidedly more

at home in the Vedanta than in the Samkhya . Then comethe five Abhibuddhis , which are forms of the activi ty ofintellect

,ascertainment

,self- re ference

,desire

,will to act and

action , terms of somewhat doubtful sense and import . Thencome the five Karmayonis , sources of action , enumerated asenergy , faith , desire of bli ss , carelessness and desire of knowledge

,but also di fferently explained . The next topic i s the

five winds or vital airs,Prana , expiration connected with the

mouth and nose ; Apana , connected with the navel whichdraws downwards ; Samana , connected with the heart whichmoves equally about , and which has been compared , thoughdoubtlessly erroneously

,with the circulation of the blood ;

Udana'

is connected with the throat and goes upwardVyana is the all-pervader. The presence of these five as aSpeci al topic i s in contrast with the view of the Karika

“

, whichdoes not accept the vital a irs as anything more than thejoint working of mind and the organs . After the vital ai rscome the five Karmatmans , which are descriptions of theactivity o f the self : they are Vaikarika , the doer of goodworks ; Taijasa , the doer of bad works ; Bhutadi, doer ofhidden works ; Sanumana , the doer of what i s reasonable ;and Niranumana , the doer of what is not reasonable .

The next topics discussed are the five Avidyas , thetwenty-eight ASaktis including the seventeen Atustis andAsiddhis, the nine Tustis , and the eight S iddhis . Thencome the eight cardinal facts

, Mulikarthas, which are theexistence , unity , purpose , and devot ion to the interest of

THE LATER SAMKHYA 9 1

another of nature,the otherness from nature , the non- agency ,

and multiplicity of Spirit,and the temporary un ion and

separation of spirit and nature . The next two topics arethe creation of benevolence , the production of the gross fromthe fine elements

,and the Bhfitasarga , the divine creation in

eight divisions,the an imal and the vegetable creation in five

,

and the human creation in one . Bondage i s then describedas threefold

,according as i t is connected with belief in any

of the evolvents as the highest reality , or with bel ie f in asimilar position as to the evolutes , such as i s Shown indevotion to Objects O f sense

,and bondage by sacrificial gi fts .

This curious form of bondage arises when men through misconception give gi fts to the priests

,and is a di stinct S ign of

hostili ty to the sacrifice,which i s not seen in the Karika.

Then come the three kinds of Moksa , release , ari sing fromthe increase of knowledge

,the quieting of the senses

,and

lastly,as the outcome of the destruction of meri t and demeri t

by these means,the destruction of the whole

,producing the

detachment of spirit from nature,and concentration of spiri t

up on itsel f. Then come three forms of proof,and finally

the doctrine of misery,subdivided into three according as i t

i s concerned with and ari sing from the body or mind,caused

by others,or produced by fate . From this misery release

can be obtained by the study of the Tattvasama’

sa .

This summary of the contents of the Tattvasamasa doesnot suggest that i t has any speci al claim to antiquity : i tprobably represents one of several forms of arranging theSamkhya principles

,of which another form is preserved in

the Sastitantra l i st of In any case,however

, as thetreatise itself i s far too brief to give valuable informationregarding the system

,the value of the work i s much inferior

to that of the Samkhya Karika on the one hand , or theS amkhya Satra on the other .It i s probably of importance for the later date of the

Tattvasama’

sa that i t i s not cited by Madhava in his account ,written about 13 80 A .D .

, of the Samkhya in the S arvadarsanasamgraha , where he uses as the basi s of hi s expositionof the system the Karika. He also ignores the Samkhya

Above , Chap . V .


S fitra itsel f , which thus appears to be later than hi s period .

On the other hand , i t cannot be much later , for i t i s commented on by Aniruddha , who wrote about 1500 AD andby V ijfianabhiksu in the second half of the s ixteenth centuryA.D . The work has also been commented on by VedantinMahadeva at the end of the seventeenth century

,and NageSa

Bhatta at the beginning of the eighteenth ; the former in hiscomment on the last five books follows Aniruddha faithfully ,in the first copies V ijfianabhiksu , but has independentvalue ; the latter is a mere imitation o f Vijfianabhiksu .

Despite,however , the modern date , the S fitra is a source of

considerable importance , and may contain a good deal ofold matter , though in its present form i t is certainly not sopure an exposi tion of the system as the Karika.

This is obviously , in some measure at least , the case as

regards the criti ci sms of other philosophies,which make

up an essenti al part Of every Indian, as of other , philosophic

sys tems . The appended verses to the Karika expressly saythat these critiques are omitted , and much of the omissionmay be supplied in the Satra . On the other hand , we cannot say how much the Satra which freely uses the Karikaalso uses phrases borrowed from Samkara , and thereforemust be treated as a work the composers of which were quitecapable of adding much of their own . As the text stands ,practically all the leading philosophical systems receivetheir Share of disapproval . The materi alism of the Carvakasis met by the refutation of their denial of the valid ity ofreason ing by the reference to its self-destructive nature , s inceno amount of percep tion will give a doctrine any validity ,and by the reply to the favourite argument of the production of intelligence from

,unintelligent things , on the analogy

of intoxicating power from an aggregate. of herbs,that the

intoxicating p ower l

is latent in the ingredients , but there isno trace of souls in the psychic organs . The Jain doctrineof the co- extension of soul with body is refuted by theargument that , as all that i s limited is temporary , soulswould be temporary also . Objections are rai sed to theBuddhist denial of the soul

,to i ts assertion of the moment

ary character of the world , and to its belief in the

annihilation of personali ty as final release . The special


view that the released soul has enjoyment as its

characteri stic,a view which contradi cts the whole theory of

the samkhya that i solation alone i s the end . The Samkhyaalso rejects

,in i ts S i ster system of Yoga , the doctrine of a

personal deity and of the eterni ty of the Sphota ,the

concept expressed in the complex of letters of the alphabetwhich make up a word .

* But in rejecting many of thetheories of the other schools the Samkhya Satra shows i tsel fnot uninfluenced by one at least of them : the work makesremarkable effort s to prove that its views are in full accordwith scripture

,to which it attributes conclusive value

,and

endeavours to Show as accordant wi th the Samkhya itsel fthe statements in scripture regarding the pe rsonali ty ofGod ,

the unity in the absolute , the joy which is asserted tobe part of the nature of the absolute

,and the heavenly

bli ss acknowledged in the Vedanta as a step on the way tofinal release . Indeed , the text goes so far as to hold thatObedience to the traditional rules of action has a good effecttowards securing final release , and to talk of the attainmentof the nature of the absolute .In the main doctrines of the system the later texts throw

little new or valuable light . Peculi ar to them is thedoctrine that the spiri t throws light on the inner organ

,or

that the spiri t serves as a mirror in which the inner'

organi s refle cted . The importance of thi s doctrine lies in thefact that i t is held to explain the mode in which spiri t isapprehended . All perception i s due to the inner organform ing in i tsel f a picture of the thing to be perceived ,which is reflected in spiri t ; similarly i t forms such apicture of the Spiri t

, and when the spirit reflects i tsel f inthe inner organ i t brings its reflex,

and therefore its self, toconscious knowledge . Another S imile used to express therelation of spirit and nature which i s in itself purelyunconscious , is that of the reflect ion of the red Hibi scusshoots in a crystal near which the flower lies : the crystalremains unaffected by the reflection . Ingenious as allthese comparisons are , i t cannot be said that they lend

See E . Abegg, F estschrift E . Windisch (Berlin, p p .

188-195 .

THE LATER SAMKHYA 9S

much clearness to the subjec t-matter with which they deal .But they warn us of the danger of treating the evolutes ofnature as be ing essentially materi al and as made intopsychic states by the influence of spirit . The conceptionof the inner organ

,consi sting of intellect , individuation

and mind,cannot be conceived as equivalent , as suggested

by Garbe,

* to the nervous system , to which psychicmeaning i s given by the r eflection in spiri t or the lightthrown by spiri t . Rather the conception i s that everythingincluding the psychic states of experience in an unconsciouscondition

,i s present in the inner organ , waiting to become

actual by the addition of the element of consciousness givenby Spiri t . With this view accords best the fact that thesystem of the Satra regards as p ersi sting in uncon sciousnessin the intellect the impressions of experience which giveri se to psychic dispositions , Sarh skaras .

A further development of doctrine , and not a happyone

,may be seen in the treatment of intellect and individua

tion . The only tolerable theory i s that in some waynature i s converted into intellect or consciou sness by theinfluence of spiri t

,and that the result of indiv iduation i s

to spli t up this consciousness,which must be regarded

as not having attained to consciousness of i tself,

into defin ite individuals possessed of definite selves .These individuals would essenti ally possess also individualconsciousnesses

,as the principle of indiv iduation would carry

wi th i t as an essential presupposition consciousness in orderto become self-conscious : thi s fact explains why in theS iltra ( i i i , 9 ) the consti tuents of the inner organ , fine bodyor psychic apparatus

,are reckoned at seventeen in place of

eighteen , intellect and individuation falling unde r one head .

From the indiv idual principle naturally can be derived thesenses with mind

,and as suggested in the Kausitaki

Upanisad ( i i i ) the objects of the senses in the shape ofthe fine elements

,from which the gross elements proceed

,

and this i s clearly the main view of the Karika. On the other

Samkhya Philosophie , p . 255 . The doc tr ine is p robably de rivedfrom Samka ra '

s system . C f . A . E . Gough , Philosophy of the

Upan isads , p . 39 .


hand, the S fitra evidently regards the whole process as being

a cosmic one , the principle of individuation producingcosmic organs

,and elements , and the individual correspond

ing principles being derived from the cosmic . It i scharacterist i c of the difficulty of the doctrine

,and of i ts

absurdity,that the explanation of the derivation i s nowhere

given : the Sutra ( i i i , 10 ) merely says that from the onepsychic apparatus many were produced by reason of thedifference of the works

,an exp lanation which is subject to

the disadvantage that i t begs the question,since the distinc

t ion of works presupposes individuals,and individuals

presuppose separate psychic apparatuses with which toperform works . The probable explanation of the effort tofill up the system is to be seen in the fact that the Karikai tsel f evidently allows inorganic nature to be in some waydirectly connected with nature

,and not merely , as i t should

consistently be , derived for each individual from the fineelements which form part of his psychic apparatus .In the third place

,the Satra developes in detail the

doctrine of the process O f the creation and the destructionof the world , which presents in a more philosophic shap ethe doctrine of the ages of the world found in the epic andcommon to the philosophies . Nature and Spiri t are everready for creation : the former seeks to develop for theenjoyment and final release of Spirit

,and the latter i s ready

to play its part of onlooker,but

,of course

,i t is impossible to

find any beginning in time'

for the process . Each creationfollows on a period of destruction in which everything hasbeen resolved back in to a state of inactivity

,in the sense

that the three Gunas,instead of intermingling in their

constant activity , merely p roduce each its self . Nevertheless ,as soon as the result of the work done before has found thecorrect time

,the process commences afresh

,all spirit s

having thei r psychic apparatuses evolved according to theimpressions left upon them by the acts done in their lastexistences ,

'

which have left them with a defin i te moralcharacter , and with the disposi tion produced by thei rfailure to recognize the separation of spirit and nature .

During the period of the continuance of the world in astate of destruction , as the psychic apparatuses of the


the body : water sustains the blood,

fire the heat of thebody , ai r the breath , and ether the windpipe . The breathwhich in the Karika plays a very restricted part , hereappears under the influence of the Vedanta as the principlecontrolling the growth of the body under the guidance ofSpirit

,with which , indeed , i t seems to be conceived as united

even before the production of the embryo . The kind ofbody is determined by the power of former action

,but not

the building up of the body , a p oint in which the Samkhyadiffers from the Nyaya and VaiSesika doctrine . The otherorganic beings , those of station superior to man , beasts andplants are similarly composed , but plants are , thoughendowed with bodies , deprived according to the later texts ,but not according to the epic , of outer senses , so that Spirits inthem cannot act , but merely undergo penance for previousactiOnS .

The union of spiri t wi th the inner organ,the senses

,

the fine elements and the body produces the empiricsoul

,Jiva , a term which i s mainly Vedantic , while the inner

organ and the other elements , which produce from spiri t thesoul

,are styled Upadhis , again a term proper to the

Vedanta . The individual soul has , however , no real existenceat all : i t i s not an enti ty ; all that exists on the one hand isthe body and the psychic apparatus , and on the other handpure spirit

,which is really unaffected by the Upadhis ,

but which by its l ight causes them to emerge intoconsciousness . Release consi sts in the realization that spiri ti s not bound by the Upadhis , and cannot be so bound .

The parallelism of this view with that o f the Vedanta i stoo marked to be accidental , and doubtless the influence ofthat school must here be recognized . The connection ofSpirit and its psychical apparatus i s absolutely continuousand without beginning in t ime

,though it can be ended :

i t arises from the failure to discriminate be tween Spiri t andnature

,and this fai lure in each li fe is a consequence of

a failure in the preceding li fe,which leaves in the empirical

soul an impression which becomes real in i ts next ex i stence .

The result of the attainment of discrimination is made verymuch more clear in the S fltra than in the Karika : the fateof Spirit i s existence , but enti rely without consciousness , as

THE LATER SAMKHYA 99

follows inevi tably from the fact that there i s now no Objectfor the subject to become united with . Moreover , the ideathat such a state i s one of bli ss is properly and logically inaccordance with the Karika expressly rejected , as againstthe Vedanta theory .

On the means of proof the later text gives li ttle newlight : the appeal to the evidence of scripture i s far morefrequent than might be expected in a system which layssuch great stress on reason ing

,but thi s appeal i s accep ted

in the Karika, and there is not the slightest reason toassume* that the term Ap tavacana , which i s the normaldesignation of this branch of proof , ever mean t merelyskilled instruction . But a r eal advance i s made on theKarika in the assigning of a definite character to Space andtime

,which are made to be qual ities o f nature regarded

as a unity,and to be eternal and all-present . In the

empiric world both appear as limited,and are explained in

a quite inconsi stent way by origination from the etherthrough i ts condi tioning by the masses of corporeal nature ,on the one hand

,in the case of Space , and by the movement

of the heavenly bodies in the case of time . The firstconception i s no doubt superior to that of the Vedanta

,

which produces space from the A tman,but i t i s not much

superior to the view of the Nyaya and V aiSeSika ,which

call Space and time substances ,t nor in any of the cases isthe real problem of ei ther space or time seriously faced orrealized .

The Sutra also includes many points which the Karikaleaves out as unessenti al . It deals doubtfully with the Old

question of works a s Opposed to knowledge and is

inconsistent , in one place allowing them value while inothers the more consi stent view of their total valuelessnesscomes out , a fact whi ch accords with the lack of any ethicalside to the samkhya system . The necessity of a teacher i slaid down , and the only true teacher i s one who has attainedthe saving discrimination in the period before his finalrelease in death : the winning of such a teacher i s the result

See Ga rbe , S amkhya Ph ilosophie , p p . 59,60 .

T Cf . Frazer , Indian Thought , p p . 9 7 , 98 .


of good deeds in previous lives . A real furtherance, butnot a mean s to secure release

,i s indifference

,Vairagya ,

which , again , is a motive for refrain ing from doing gooddeeds , with which i t i s incompatible : moreover , the samequality i s definitely opposed to a man ’s association withother men

, which i s a hindrance to the desired end .

Indifference i s divided into the higher which arises onlyafter the attainment of discrimination

,and the lower which

precedes i t : i f the latter i s carried to i ts furthest limit , theresult i s birth as a god in the next world period , pendingwhich the person is merged in nature . Mere hearing ofthe teaching of the truth i s not enough : it must beaccompanied by reflection and meditation , and in a markeddegree , in contrast to the earlier Karika, the Sfitra adoptslarge masses of the Yoga technique as a means of producingthe desired isolation of Spirit and nature . Moreover , theSatra also accepts from the Yoga the doctrine of the highvalue of asceticism and the Yogin ’s power to see all thingsfuture and past

,a power which i s consistent with the

Samkhya doctrine of the reality of the product in the cause .It is characteristi c of the Samkhya that i t does not

restrict , l ike the Vedanta , the saving knowledge to the threeupper classes o f the Aryan commun i ty to the exclusion ofthe Sudras . This generosity of outlook i s seen already inthe great epic (xiv , where the result of Yoga l s

distinctly declared to be open even to women and to Sudras ,and the same sentiment can doubtless legitimately berecognized in the fact that the system

,despite its fondness

for sub-division s,actually classes in i ts theory of the kinds

of l iving creatures men in one divi sion only , while divinebeings fall under no less than eight . The motive for thedifference of treatment doubtless lies in the fact that thesamkhya , like the Yoga , does not build on the Veda as anexclusive foundation

,and therefore

,unlike

’

the Vedanta , theydo not fall under the rule which excludes Sudras from evenhearing the Veda recited . The fact that the Veda formedone of the sources of proof of the system was not any moreinconsistent with the system being made available to all ,than the fact that the

,

epic which contains Vedic quotationswas equally open to S iidras to hear.


which i s set out with argumentS’

in the very text ( v , 2- 11 )which he professes to exp ound .

The atti tude adopted by V ijfianabhiksu i s sign ificant ofthe thei sti c Spiri t of his age : in hi s exposition the six systemspresent themselves as nothing but a thei sti c exposition ofthe universe

,presented less directly in the four systems of

the Nyaya and V aiSesika , Samkhya and Yoga , and brough tout in the clearest manner in the Vedanta . By this devicethe Samkhya philosophy is brought into the main current ofIndian thought and relieved from the disadvantages of itsatheism , which doubtless accounts for the comp arativedis favour in which the Samkhya system had long fallen inIndia , and to which V ijfianabhiksuh imself bears emphatictestimony .

While the attempt of Vijfianabhiksu could not expect toresult in the establi shment of the authori ty of the Samkhyaas a system , the influence of that ph ilosophy may doubtlessbe traced directly in the free admission of elements of theSamkhya into the texts of the later Vedanta . This interfusion of Vedanta and Samkhya elements is seen in theBhagavadgitah but the doctrine of Gunas was distinctlyrepudiated by S amkara

,and its reappearance in texts , which

accept his general p rincip les and believe in the illusorycharacter of the world , i s a clear proof that the reason ing ofthe Samkhya was felt to have great weight . Of thi ssyncretist tendency

,which i s seen clearly in the Paficadasi

of Madhay a in the fourteenth cen tury A.D .,the classical

example i s to be found in the Vedantasa’

ra of Sadananda , awork written before 1500 A .D . Sadananda identifies , as inthe Svetds

’

vatara Upanisad ,the Maya

,or Avidya

,o f the

Vedanta with the Prakrti of the Samkhya , and by accep tingthe v iew that Prakrti is composed of three elements Obtainsthe means of fitting much of the Samkhya system into theVedanta . From Brahman

,who

'

i s regarded by him asessenti ally Caitanya ,

or Sp i ri t , i s produced through envelopment with ignorance in its constituent o f Sattva the worldSpirit

, ISVara ,whose causal body out of which he creates all

things is composed by the whole of ignorance . On theother hand

,from the Caitanya through envelopment with

Sattva in an impure form,that i s mixed with the con

THE LATER SAMKHYA 103

stituents, Raj as and Tamas , ari ses the individual spiri t ,Prajfia , which

'

has as its causal body out of which i tcreates ind ividuation , etc . , and i s composed of only a part ofignorance . A further result of envelopment is the creation ofthe world soul ,

'

Sutratman , and the individual soul , Taijasa ,from the world- spiri t and the individual Spiri t , by theproduction

,through the effect of the constituent Tamas , of

the fine body . From the Caitanya enveloped by ignorancethrough the predominance of Tamas ari ses the ether , fromthe ether

,wind ; from wind , fire ; from fire

,water ; and from

water,earth . In each of these elements

,however

,which are

only in a fine state,there i s a port ion of the consti tuents

Raj as and Sattva as well as of Tamas . From these five

Tanmatras arise the fine body, consi sting of five organs of

perception produced from the S attva portions of the

corresponding five elements , of five organs of action ari singfrom the Rajas port ions of the elements

,of intelligence and

mind consi sting of united portions of Sattva from thee lements , and of the five breaths

,consi sting of united

port ions of Raj as from the five elements . In intelligenceand mind spiri t , Citta , and individuation are held to beincluded , and in thi s respe ct , as in the giving of anindependent posi tion to the five breaths

,the Samkhya

doctrine i s abandoned . Similarly,in the view of the

production of the elements from each other in a series ,Sadananda follows the Taittiriya Upanisad ( 11, 1 ) and notthe Samkhya . On the other hand , the development of thegross world body and the individual body

,VaiSvanara and

V iSVa , takes place according to the Samkhya rule of five

elements , not according to the Vedanta rule of three .

At the same time i t must be noted that the influence ofthe Samkhya is clearly limited in extent : the whole systemof four states , Brahman , ISvara and Prajfia , Sutratman andTaijasa , VaiSvanara and Vi3va , i s based on the Vedantaview of the four conditions o f the sel f

,in i ts conditions of

freedom from bondage,deep sleep

,dreaming

,and waking ,

respectively , as set out in the B rhadaranyaka Upanisad

( i v , 3 the Mandfikya Upanisad (3 and in a deveIOp ed form in the Nrsiinhottaratapaniya Upanisad . It is ,however , possible that in the care taken to insi st on the


cosmic”

character of the proce ss , which in the earlierUpanisads i s expressly res tricted to the states of theindividual souls

,there may be seen the influence of the

Samkhya , with its insistence on the cosmic character of thedevelopment of Prakrti, and , despite the constant variationof detail , the importance of the Gunas in the system i sobvious .

While the interaction of Vedanta and Samkhya i s thusmarked , there are few traces of close connection with the

Nyaya school . The most important i s the exposit ion of thedoctrine of inference found in Vacasp atimiSra

’S commentary

on Samkhya Karika 5 , which appears to mark an indep endent development by the Samkhya of principles adopted ,more or less uncritically in the first instance

,from the Nyaya

rather than to contain a record of a doctrine presupposed bythe early form of samkhya .

* In this View inference isd ivided into direct (vita ) and indirect (avita ) ; the lattercategory coincides with sesavat, and means proof by theelimination of alternative explanations ; the former includes

pfirvavat and Samanyato drsta , which differ in that theresult of the former is a judgment dealing with realit ieswhich can be perceived

,while the latter gives knowledge of

such imperceptible entities as the senses or the soul .

As suggested by A Burk , Vienna Orienta l J ournal, " V ,259 , 261.

106

DAHLMANN , J . 47 -49

De ities p res id ing ove rsenses 90

Deu ssen , P . Sn,9n

,13 72

,25

7 l , 7 9n

Dharma 6 1

Dharmadharmau 24

D reams 36

Drsti 6 1

Dvesa 85

EGG cosmic 18,3 1

,45

E 1gh t, se ts of 35

E lements,see Mahabhfita and

Tanmatra

Escha to logy 38 , 86 , 98 , 99E th er 6 7E th ics 37 . 38, 99 , 100

INE e lemen ts, see Tanmatra

Flower, with n ine doors 19 , 48Form 2 3

, 24 , 25

Fou r stages of se lf 103

ARBE,R . 30h

,43 , 46 , 49 , 541i ,

G arbha Up anisad 19Garga 39 , 44

G au dap ada 6 7 , 82 , 83

Gnostic ism 66

Gods p roof of existenceof 7 2 ; and see ISvaraGough ,

A . E . 12n,16n ,

54n,95n

G reek Ph ilosophy 65 -6 7G ross body 44 , 9 7 , 98 ; e lements

,

see Mahabhfi tas

Guna 6 1Gunas 10 . 11, 13 , 19 , 34 , 45 , 46 ,

ELL 38

Hiranyagarbha 8 , 39 , 7 9Hoph ins , E . W . 34n ,

3 7n ,49

Hyp ostatiza tion of one asp e c t ofconsciou sness 7 6 , 7 7

IGNORANCE 23-25; 42,8 7

,

88 , 98

Illusion ,doctrine of 6 , 7 , 20 , 28 ,

THE SAMKHYA SYSTEM

ACO BI , H . 6n ,19n

,22

,30n . 43

J a igisavya 39 , 44Ja ins 92Jevons , F . B . 7 7 n

Jiva 3 7 , 98

ANMAN, C . R . 1911.

Levi, S . l 6n

Lifiga 18 , 36 , 8 2

Lokaya ta 68

ADHAVA 91,102

Madhyamikas 93Mahabharata , and Samkhya 2953

Indifference 100Individua tion , see Ahamkara .

In ference 7 1, 7 2 , 104

Infin ite s ize,of inner organ 5 7

of sp ir it 43Inner organ S 7 , 8 1, 94 , 95Inte llect, see Buddh iIsa Upanis ad 18

ISvara 33 , 38 , 56 , 102

ISva rakrsna 43 , 5 7 , 63

AP ILA 8,12

,42

,4 7 , 50

Kap ilavastu 50

Karmendr iyas 36 , 7 8 , 80

Kartr 6 1

Kasaya 60

Ka tha Upanisad5 1

, 55 , 7 8 , 98n

Kaus itaki (or Sankhayana ) Brahmana

Kaus itaki Upanisad 8 , 16 , 88n ,

95

Kautilya Arthasastra 58

Kavila 60Khyati 6 1KleSa 6 1

Knowledge , as sou rce of release

15,23-25 , 8 7 , 88 , 98

Krsna 34

Krtya Kanda 61Ksatr iyas , and ph ilosop hy 49 , 50Kse trajfia 32 , 35Karma Pu rana 44Ku tsayana 14

INDE"

Mahab h ij tas 13 , 7 8 , 8 1-83 , 95 , 9 7

Mahamoha 84

Mahan ,see Buddh i

Maitrayani Upanisad 8 , 12 , 13 ,

14 . 17 , 1811 , 55

Ma'

ndfikya Upanis ad 103Mann 14 , 44, 45

Matap itrjas 83Mater ia lis ts 18 , 7 1, 92Mathara -Vrtti 68n , 7 0n

Matra 10 , and se e Tanmatra

Matsya Purana 46Ma tter 6-8 , 18 . 3 1, 7 7 -7 9

Max Miiller , F . Sn , 13 71, 68 , 7 7 ,89

Maya 6 . 7 , 20 , 3 1, 48 , 101, 102

Memory 8 1

M ind 36 . 7 9 , 80

M irror,me taphor of 94

Moksa 2 7 , 38, 62 , 85 -8 7 , 9 1, 96-98

Moksadha rma 29

Monad , ind ividua l as 83Mfi likarthas 60 , 9 1

Mu ltip licity , of sou ls 52 . 7 7 , 7 8 ,87 , 10 1

Mundaka Upanis ad 14, 15 , 88nMun i , mad 54

Mystic ism 5 5

NAGARJUNA 20

NageSa Bhatta 92Name 23

,24 , 25

Narayana tirtha 60 , 7 0Na ture 3 1, 43 , 4 7 . 52 , 7 7 -7 9

Neop la ton ism and Samkhya , 6 7

Nervous system 95

N ih ilism 20

Niranumana 90N irvanaNrszmha tapan iya Upan i sad 19Nyaya ,

school 93 ,Nyaya Da rsana 93

O LDENBERG , H . Sn,9n

,22

,

24,25

O ltrama re , P . l 6n ,19n , 2 5

Organs , of a ction 36 , 7 8, 80

PADMA PURl A 101

Pafica ratra 50 , 60

10 7

Pafica é ikha 39 , 41, 42 , 62 , 9 7

Pa ramartha 59

PaSup a ta 45 , 49 , 50 , 60

Pa tafija li 30 , 54, 56 , 5 7Pe rcep tion 7 1Pess im ism 13 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 7 1, 91P lan ts 34 , 98

P la to 17 , 6 7Pradyumna 33 , 35Pra jap ati 83Prajfia 103

Prakrti 18,46

, 59 , 7 7 , 102 , andsee Na ture

Pramanas 45 , 6 1, 7 1, 7 2 , 99Prana 15 , 3 7 , 6 1, 80 , 90 , 98 , 103F ras‘no Upanisad 9Pr iests , hostility to sacr ificia l 7 1Punarmrtyu 16 , 17

Pu ranas 18 , 45 , 46Pu rusa l l , 3 1. 32 , 6 1 , 7 4 , 7 5-88 ,98 - 100

Pfirva Mimamsa 28Pythagoras 17 , 66

RAGA 85Rajendra lala Mitra 55n

Raksases 83

Rajava'

rttika 59

Raja s 12 , 14 , 3 4, 7 4 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 80 ,103

Re bir th 38 . and s ee Transmigration .

Re lease , from transm igra tion , see

Moksa

RetahSa rira 36

Rgveda 8 ,16 , 19 , 48 , 5 4

Rudra 10

S ABARASVAMIN 43

S adananda 102

Sakti 43 , 6 1S amavaya 9 3

éariika ra 6 , 7 , 18 , 20 , 48 , 88 , 92 ,93 ,

94 , 95n ,102

S amka rsana 33 , 3 5S a iiikhajogi 60Samkhya Karika 2 1

,4 1

, 5 1, 62 ,68-7 8

Samkhya S il tra 4 1, 44 . 92 -100

S amskaras 2 3 , 24, 86 , 95


Sana 44

Sanaka 44

Sanandana 42

Sah atana 44

S ana tkumara 39 , 4 1, 44

Sanatsu jata 44S anatsujatiya 29Sanumana 90

S arvadarsanasarizgraha 92

Sastitantra 4 1, 59 64Satapatha B rahmana 16

,

Sa ttva 7 4,7 8 , 7 9

80 , 102 , 103

Sattv ika 34

S atvata 60

S au trantika school 5 7

S chrader ,F . O . l 6n ,

40n

Schroeder , L . v . 66

Scr ip ture , as means of p roof 5 17 2 , 99

S e lf consc iousness 94 , 95Senses 80 . 9 7

S iddh i , 62 , 84 , 90S imile of blind and lame 7 6 ; O f

dancer 85 , 86 ; of lamp 7 4 ; of

m irror 94 , of she g- oa t 11

Siva 10 , 46Sou l, activity of den ied 93 , and

see Atman , J iva , Pu rusaS ound ,

s ee S phota

Sp ace 43 . 99

Sp eyer , J . S . 49n

Sp irit, 2 3 , 3 1, 32 , 38 , 6 1, 7 4-88 ,98- 100

Sp hota 5 7 ,

S ru ti , see S crip tu reSvayambhu 45

Svetasva tara Upanisad12 , 13 , l 8n ,

46, 102

S trau ss , O . 36n

S u btle p or tions , of gross e lemen ts82 ,Sudra s 100S ukh tankar 6

Sfi tratman 163

Svamin 6 1

TAIJAH

SA 90

03

Ta i tti r'

iya ,Upanisad

ULUKA 44

Upadana 24

Up adh i 98

Up an isads 5 - 19 ,8 7

Uvata 14

Takakusu 63n,69

Tamas 12 , 14 , 34, 7 4 , 7 8 , 80 , 103Tam isra 84

Tanmatr a 10 , 13 , 3 7 , 7 8 , 81, 95 ,

Ta ttvasamasa 6 1,68 , 89-92

Teacher, necessity of a 99 , 100

Te ja s 6The ism 7 , 8 , 30 , 31, 4 7 . 56 . 6 1

Th ibau t,G . 6n

Time 5 7,6 1

,99

Trad itiona l ru les , va lu e of 94

Transm igra tion 15,16

,38

,7 1

,

83, 84

Tu sti 62 , 84 , 85 , 90Tu xen , P . 55n

,56n , 5 7 n , 63n

Twen ty-five p r incip les 32 , 48 , 7 8Twen ty-six p rincip les 32 . 55

ACASPATI 42,59 , 62 , 7 0

‘

80n

Va ikar ika 34, 90

V a iragya 6 1 , 100

V a iSesika sys tem 5 7 , 93 , 9 7 , 99,10 1

V a isnava 46

V a iévanara 103

V arsagana , or V rsagana 63

Varsaganya 39 , 62 , 63

V asu b andhu 5 7 , 68

Vasudeva 33Vedanta 2 0 , 3 7 , 43 , 45 , 7 8, 80 , 82 ,8 7

,90

,9 7 , 98 , 100 , 10 1 , 102

V ijfiana 2 3 -25 , 89

V ijfianabh iksu 5 7 , 7 2 72 , 101

V ijfianavada 28 , 5 7 , 93

V ikr ti 6 1

V indhyavasa 62 , 68

V ip aryaya 62 , 84

V iSesa 3 7 , 4 7

V iSistadva ita 6 ,2 2

Visnu ,4 6

Visnu Purana 46

samkhya system

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