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Case [4] DPrivHastings Sample Student Answers [October 28, 2010] SFODMS/6610656.1 1 Case 4 – According to U.S. law, were the installation of the Trojan horse and the replication of the complete hard disk lawful? Jurisdiction o Issue: Can the police investigate and try and obtain evidence from C. Racker’s computer? o Rule: The police can, pursuant to a search warrant, try and obtain specific evidence when a crime has been committed. o Analysis: In this case, free dispersal of newly released movies is a copyright violation, and is theft. The police can try and obtain evidence from C. Racker’s computer if they suspect him of the theft. o Conclusion: The police can try and obtain evidence from C. Racker’s computer Substantive Law o Fourth Amendment Issue: Does the insertion of a Trojan Horse into C. Racker’s computer fall within a search as defined by the Fourth Amendment? Rule: A search falls within the protection of the Fourth Amendment so long as the defendant either had a reasonable expectation of privacy and society is willing to allow that expectation to be considered reasonable Analysis: In this case, the Trojan Horse application falls within the Fourth Amendment’s definition of a search. By encrypting his computer, C. Racker was obviously trying to keep what was on his computer private. Also, in this day and age a significant number of people own a personal computer; their bank account information, bills, we surfing history, personal documents, are all stored on their personal machine. The machine itself is usually stored within the home, a constitutionally protected area under the Fourth Amendment. The insertion of the Trojan Horse onto C. Racker’s computer is definitely within the Fourth Amendment definition of a search. Conclusion: The insertion of the Trojan Horse onto C. Racker’s computer is a search within the Fourth Amendment definition. o Fourth Amendment – Search Warrant Issue: Is the Trojan Horse application a valid method of executing a search warrant within the scope of the Fourth Amendment? Rule: A valid search warrant must list with peculiarity what the police hope to find in their search, and also when the search is terminated. Analysis: While the police did obtain a search warrant to place the Trojan Horse on C. Racker’s computer, the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The warrant must state with peculiarity what exactly the police are searching for, and cannot be openended.

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Case [4]

DPrivHastings Sample Student Answers

[October 28, 2010]

SFODMS/6610656.1     1  

Case  4  –  According  to  U.S.  law,  were  the  installation  of  the  Trojan  horse  and  the  replication  of  the  

complete  hard  disk  lawful?  

• Jurisdiction  o Issue:    Can  the  police  investigate  and  try  and  obtain  evidence  from  C.  Racker’s  

computer?  

o Rule:  The  police  can,  pursuant  to  a  search  warrant,  try  and  obtain  specific  evidence  when  a  crime  has  been  committed.  

o Analysis:  In  this  case,  free  dispersal  of  newly  released  movies  is  a  copyright  violation,  

and  is  theft.    The  police  can  try  and  obtain  evidence  from  C.  Racker’s  computer  if  they  suspect  him  of  the  theft.      

o Conclusion:  The  police  can  try  and  obtain  evidence  from  C.  Racker’s  computer  

• Substantive  Law  o Fourth  Amendment  

Issue:  Does  the  insertion  of  a  Trojan  Horse  into  C.  Racker’s  computer  fall  within  

a  search  as  defined  by  the  Fourth  Amendment?   Rule:  A  search  falls  within  the  protection  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  so  long  as  

the  defendant  either  had  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  and  society  is  

willing  to  allow  that  expectation  to  be  considered  reasonable   Analysis:  In  this  case,  the  Trojan  Horse  application  falls  within  the  Fourth  

Amendment’s  definition  of  a  search.    By  encrypting  his  computer,  C.  Racker  was  

obviously  trying  to  keep  what  was  on  his  computer  private.    Also,  in  this  day  and  age  a  significant  number  of  people  own  a  personal  computer;  their  bank  account  information,  bills,  we  surfing  history,  personal  documents,  are  all  stored  

on  their  personal  machine.    The  machine  itself  is  usually  stored  within  the  home,  a  constitutionally  protected  area  under  the  Fourth  Amendment.    The  insertion  of  the  Trojan  Horse  onto  C.  Racker’s  computer  is  definitely  within  the  

Fourth  Amendment  definition  of  a  search.   Conclusion:  The  insertion  of  the  Trojan  Horse  onto  C.  Racker’s  computer  is  a  

search  within  the  Fourth  Amendment  definition.  

o Fourth  Amendment  –  Search  Warrant   Issue:  Is  the  Trojan  Horse  application  a  valid  method  of  executing  a  search  

warrant  within  the  scope  of  the  Fourth  Amendment?   Rule:  A  valid  search  warrant  must  list  with  peculiarity  what  the  police  hope  to  

find  in  their  search,  and  also  when  the  search  is  terminated.  

Analysis:  While  the  police  did  obtain  a  search  warrant  to  place  the  Trojan  Horse  on  C.  Racker’s  computer,  the  application  of  the  warrant  did  not  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.    The  warrant  must  state  with  

peculiarity  what  exactly  the  police  are  searching  for,  and  cannot  be  open-­‐ended.    

Case [4]

DPrivHastings Sample Student Answers

[October 28, 2010]

SFODMS/6610656.1     2  

The  Trojan  Horse  was  an  application  placed  on  the  defendant’s  computer  

indefinitely;  and  every  time  the  computer  is  turned  on  the  program  sent  a  copy  of  the  hard  drive  to  the  police.    The  police  therefore  had  access  to  EVERYTHING  on  the  defendant’s  computer,  and  got  an  updated  copy  everytime  the  computer  

was  turned  on.    This  open-­‐ended  application  violates  the  Fourth  Amendment.   Conclusion:  The  application  of  the  Trojan  Horse  violates  the  Fourth  Amendment.  

o 18  USC  §2705  –  Delayed  Notice  

Issue:  Does  the  lack  of  notice  satisfy  the  18  USC  §2705,  and  is  therefore  valid,  or  is  it  a  violation  of  the  Fourth  Amendment?  

Rule:  18  USC  §2705  applies  to  electronic  communications  stored  at  a  3rd  party  

locations.   Analysis:  The  statute  listed  above  does  not  apply  to  the  specific  information  

stored  on  a  personal  computer  that  is  not  also  stored  at  a  3rd  party  location.    In  

Mapp  v.  Ohio,  the  police  refused  to  turn  over  the  search  warrant  while  searching  the  defendant’s  house.    The  court  held  this  was  a  violation  of  the  Fourth  Amendment;  when  the  police  enter  a  residence  they  must  present  the  

search  warrant  to  the  residents  of  the  house.    In  this  case,  while  the  police  themselves  did  not  physically  invade  the  defendant’s  house,  the  Trojan  Horse  application  did  physically  invade  C.  Racker’s  computer,  which  is  an  intrusion  into  

C.  Racker’s  home  since  the  computer  resides  in  his  home.    Based  on  Mapp,  a  court  would  likely  find  the  lack  of  notice  a  violation  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.  

Conclusion:  The  Fourth  Amendment  was  likely  violated  by  the  lack  of  notice.  

 Case  4  –  According  to  German  law,  were  the  installation  of  the  Trojan  horse  and  the  replication  of  the  

complete  hard  disk  lawful?  

• Jurisdiction  o Issue:  Can  the  German  Police  investigate  C.  Racker’s  computer  in  order  to  find  evidence  

of  theft?  

o Rule:  Objects  which  may  be  of  importance  as  evidence  for  the  investigation  shall  be  impounded  or  otherwise  secured.  

o Analysis:  In  this  case,  C.  Racker’s  computer  may  contain  the  original  data  stolen  from  

movie  studios.    The  police  require  this  evidence  to  prosecute  him  for  theft  of  the  studios’  movies.  

o Conclusion:  Yes,  police  do  have  the  authority  to  seize  C.  Racker’s  computer  since  it  may  contain  evidence  of  a  crime.  

• Substantive  

o German  Constitution  –  Article  2  

Case [4]

DPrivHastings Sample Student Answers

[October 28, 2010]

SFODMS/6610656.1     3  

Issue:  Does  the  Trojan  Horse  application  violate  Article  2  of  the  German  

Constitution:  the  right  to  Personal  Freedom  and  Development?   Rule:  Every  person  has  the  right  to  freely  develop  his  personality  so  long  as  it  

does  not  violate  the  rights  of  another.  

Analysis:  These  days  a  computer  is  not  only  fairly  common  in  everyday  usage,  but  the  primary  way  people  investigate  areas  they  are  interested  in.    Not  only  that,  the  computer  is  also  where  things  of  paramount  interest  are  stored.    The  

information  on  a  computer  is  directly  tied  to  a  person’s  developing  personality.    In  this  case,  the  Trojan  Horse  application  merely  informs  the  police  what  is  being  stored  on  C.  Racker’s  computer.    Therefore,  the  police  may  argue  they  are  

not  infringing  on  C.  Racker’s  right  to  free  development;  they  are  merely  watching  how  he  is  developing  his  personality.    However,  by  watching  what  C.  Racker  is  doing,  they  are  infringing  on  his  free  personality  development;  if  C.  

Racker  starts  developing  in  an  area  that  the  police  consider  illegal  the  police  can  stop  C.  Racker  from  continuing  down  that  path.    However,  the  German  Constitution  specifically  states  a  person  is  only  allowed  free  development  so  

long  as  it  does  not  impinge  on  another’s  right.    In  this  case,  if  the  police  do  find  the  original  movie  data,  C.  Racker  has  officially  impinged  on  the  movie  studio’s  copyright.    Therefore,  the  Trojan  Horse  application,  as  it  pertains  to  this  specific  

piece  of  evidence,  does  not  violate  the  German  Constitution.   Conclusion:  The  Trojan  Horse  application,  as  it  pertains  to  the  original  movie  

data,  does  not  violate  the  German  Constitution.  

o German  Constitution  –  Article  10   Issue:  Does  the  Trojan  Horse  Application  violate  Article  10  of  the  German  

Constitution:  the  Privacy  of  Correspondence  and  Telecommunications?  

Rule:  The  privacy  of  correspondence,  posts  and  telecommunications  shall  be  inviolable.  

Analysis:  While  the  Trojan  Horse  Application  is  being  used  to  determine  

whether  the  original  movie  studio  data  is  on  C.  Racker’s  computer;  by  taking  an  image  of  his  hard  drive,  the  Trojan  Horse  is  also  exposing  C.  Racker’s  private  

email  communication,  without  a  definite  need  to  do  so.     Conclusion:  The  Trojan  Horse  application  violates  Article  10  of  the  German  

Constitution.  

o German  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure   Issue:  Does  the  implanting  of  the  Trojan  Horse  violate  the  German  Code  of  

Criminal  Procedure’s  Order  of  Seizure?    

Rule:  The  order  of  Seizure  allows  seizure  of  items  pertinent  to  an  investigation  with  a    judicial  order.  

Case [4]

DPrivHastings Sample Student Answers

[October 28, 2010]

SFODMS/6610656.1     4  

Analysis:  In  this  case,  the  German  Police  would  have  gotten  a  judicial  order  in  

regards  to  the  Trojan  Horse  application.    The  German  police  are  “seizing”  the  data  on  the  computer  in  order  to  determine  if  the  original  movie  data  is  on  C.  Racker’s  computer.    According  to  Article  10  of  the  German  Constitution,  notice  

is  not  constitutionally  necessary;  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  only  discusses  notice  in  regard  to  a  search  conducted  without  a  judicial  order.    Therefore,  the  police  would  most  likely  be  following  the  German  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  

with  the  Trojan  Horse  Application   Conclusion:  The  Trojan  Horse  Application  satisfies  the  requirement  of  the  

German  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure’s  Order  of  Seizure.  

Case [4]

DPrivHastings Sample Student Answers

[October 28, 2010]

SFODMS/6610656.1     5  

Was  the  use  of  the  Trojan  Horse  lawful?    

Was  the  use  of  the  Trojan  Horse  lawful  under  United  States  law?    Does  the  transmission  of  hard  drive  images  constitute  a  “search”  under  the  Fourth  Amendment?      A  search  falls  within  the  protections  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  when  government  action  intrudes  into  an  area  where  a  person  has  a  reasonable  and  justifiable  expectation  of  privacy.    

Here,  government  agents  used  a  Trojan  Horse  virus  to  allow  them  to  capture  copies  of  the  suspect’s  hard  drive.  The  question  of  whether  or  not  this  was  an  unreasonable  search  under  the  fourth  amendment  hinges  on  (1)  whether  the  suspect  had  a  subjective  expectation  of  privacy  regarding  his  computer’s  hard  drive  and  (2)  whether  that  expectation  is  reasonable  and  justifiable    

Did  the  suspect  have  a  subjective  expectation  of  privacy?    

A  search  requires  an  intrusion  into  an  area  where  a  person  has  a  subjective  expectation  of  privacy.  Absent  a  determination  of  the  suspect’s  subjective  expectation  of  privacy,  there  can  be  no  finding  of  a  government  intrusion  into  the  “private  sphere.”  Here,  the  suspect  used  pseudonym  and  complex  encryption  to  protect  his  data.  The  state  may  argue  that  such  intensive  efforts  to  protect  privacy  are  evidence  the  suspect  knew  his  data  was  insecure  and  therefore  had  no  subjective  expectation  of  privacy.  The  suspect,  however,  will  argue  that  the  very  fact  that  he  went  to  such  great  lengths  to  secure  his  privacy  proves  that  he  expected  his  privacy  to  be  secure.  Because  he  went  to  such  great  lengths,  the  court  will  likely  find  he  did  hold  an  expectation  that  this  encrypted  data  would  remain  private.    

Was  the  suspect’s  expectation  reasonable  and  justifiable?    

An  individual’s  expectation  of  privacy  must  be  reasonable  and  justifiable.  Here,  the  data  in  question  was  stored  locally,  on  the  individual’s  own  private  computer  (in  addition  to  the  facts  mentioned  above  that  demonstrate  the  length  to  which  the  suspect  went  to  secure  his  data’s  privacy  online).  Additionally,  the  government’s  means  of  obtaining  the  data  involved  a  clandestine,  “specifically  designed  program.”  The  very  fact  that  the  government  required  such  specialized  technology  demonstrates  that  the  suspect’s  data  was  otherwise  quite  secure,  and  that  without  this  specifically  designed  program,  his  data  would  be  otherwise  have  been  inaccessible.  This  supports  a  finding  that  the  suspect’s  expectation  of  privacy  was  both  reasonable  and  justifiable,  because  it  is  neither  reasonable  nor  justifiable  for  the  suspect  to  base  his  expectation  of  privacy  on  the  government’s  potential  to  create  and  use  special  technology.  This  would  render  the  substantive  value  of  a  suspect’s  right  to  privacy  dependent  upon  knowledge  that  he  likely  has  no  access  to.    

Was  the  search  warrant  valid?    

When  a  search  warrant  is  issued  it  must  be  (1)  based  on  probable  cause;  (2)  be  supported  by  oath  or  

affirmation;  (3)  specifically  describe  what  is  to  be  searched  and  seized;  and,  (4)  be  issued  by  a  neutral  magistrate.  Here,  no  facts  were  given  regarding  the  warrant  other  than  the  fact  that  one  was  issued.  

Assuming  police  had  probable  cause  to  believe  Racker’s  hard  drive  contained  evidence  of  a  crime,  that  they  provided  the  requisite  oath  or  affirmation,  and  that  they  went  through  the  proper  channels,  the  search  warrant  is  likely  valid.  Subject  to  the  rules  described  above,  evidence  seized  subject  to  a  valid  search  warrant  does  not  violate  the  4th  Amendment;  therefore,  pursuant  to  this  analysis,  we  find  the  police’s  use  of  the  Trojan  horse  in  this  case  was  lawful  under  US  law.    

Case [4]

DPrivHastings Sample Student Answers

[October 28, 2010]

SFODMS/6610656.1     6  

Was  the  use  of  the  Trojan  Horse  lawful  under  German  Basic  Law?    Does  the  use  of  the  Trojan  Horse  by  police  violate  Article  13  of  German  basic  law?    German  law  states  the  home  is  inviolable,  absent  a  valid  court  order.  Here,  the  police  used  a  false  e-­‐mail  and  specialized  program  to  gain  access  to  otherwise  private  files  stored  on  Racker's  personal  computer.  Racker  will  argue  that  such  a  intrusion  into  his  personal  computer  is  akin  to  an  invasion  of  his  home  and  therefore  is  invalid  under  Article  13.  The  state,  alternatively,  will  argue  that  such  remote  monitoring  cannot  be  compared  to  a  physical  invasion,  since  there  was  no  “physical”  entry  into  his  home  at  all,  merely  an  electronic  entry  into  his  computer.    

Does  the  use  of  the  Trojan  Horse  by  police  violate  Article  10  of  German  basic  law?    Article  10  of  German  basic  law  states  "posts,  electronic  communications,  and  correspondence  are  inviolable,"  absent  a  valid  court  order.  Here,  police  used  a  Trojan  Horse  to  capture  images  of  Racker's  entire  hard  drive  at  regular  intervals.  Because  the  hard  drive  almost  certainly  contained  electronic  communications  and  correspondence,  such  a  search  would  be  invalid  without  a  proper  court  order.    

Effect  of  the  Search  Warrant?    A  search  warrant  is  evidence  the  described  police  action  was  found  lawful  under  judicial  review.  The  

state  will  argue  that  even  if  the  government’s  action  may  otherwise  constituted  an  “invasion  of  the  home”  in  violation  of  Article  13,  or  an  intrusion  into  Racker’s  “posts,  electronic  communications,  *or+  correspondence,”  they  were  lawful  under  the  color  of  a  valid  search  order.