samuel mccormick - the political identity of the philosopher

8/11/2019 Samuel McCormick - The Political Identity of the Philosopher

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Te Political Identity of the Philosopher:Resistance, Relative Power, and theEndurance of Potential

Samuel McCormick

Te troublemaker is precisely the one who tries to force sovereign

power to translate itself into actuality.—Giorgio Agamben

“”

In the second half of the s, Bertolt Brecht began a series of short storiesabout a “thinking man” named Mr. Keuner. Among the first stories he pub-lished was “Measures Against Power” (“Maßnahmen gegen die Gewalt”),the opening passage of which provides the subject of this essay:

As Mr. Keuner, the thinking man [Denkende ], was speaking outagainst power in front of a large audience in a hall, he noticedthe people in front of him shrinking back and leaving. He lookedaround and saw standing behind him—Power [Gewalt ].

“What were you saying,” Power asked him.“I was speaking out in favor of Power,” replied Mr. Keuner.



the political identity of the philosopher

After Mr. Keuner had left the hall, his students inquired abouthis backbone [Rückgrat ]. Mr. Keuner replied: “I don’t have a back-bone to be broken. I’m the one who has to live longer than Power

[Gerade ich muß länger leben als die Gewalt ].” (, )

How are we to understand the political activity of this “thinking man”?Clearly, Mr. Keuner is no Cynic. Unlike Diogenes, who famously ordered Alexander the Great to step out of the way and then openly rebuked hisauthority as king, Mr. Keuner refuses to play the part of the parrhesiastes .1 His political activity more closely resembles that of a Stoic philosopher.Consider, for instance, the way his reply to Power echoes that of Seneca

the Younger: “It seems to me erroneous to believe that those who have loy-ally dedicated themselves to philosophy are stubborn and rebellious, scorn-ers of magistrates or kings or of those who control the administration ofpublic affairs. For, on the contrary, no class of man is so popular with thephilosopher as the ruler is” ( Ep. .– [, ]).

Given this attitude toward the powers that be, we might also figureMr. Keuner’s conduct in terms of the Straussian practice of “philosophicpolitics.” For Leo Strauss, one of the most striking, and sometimes stri-dent, twentieth-century scholars to consider the political identity of the

philosopher, philosophic politics consists in “satisfying the city that thephilosophers are not atheists, that they do not desecrate everything sacredto the city, that they reverence what the city reverences, that they are notsubversives, in short, that they are not irresponsible adventurers but goodcitizens and even the best of citizens.” Tis is the defense of philosophy thatis required “always and everywhere,” Strauss concludes, regardless of whatthe dominant political order might be (, –).

Although he is certainly willing to appease Power, Mr. Keuner dif-fers from Strauss’s philosophic politician in three fundamental ways, eachof which suggests that a closer examination of his speech and action is inorder. First, the Straussian practice of philosophic politics does not consistin advocating for political or social change but in defending the disciplineof philosophy. For Strauss, “there is no necessary connection betweenthe philosopher’s indispensible philosophic politics and the efforts whichhe might or might not make to contribute toward the establishment ofthe best regime” (, ). For Mr. Keuner, however, the discipline ofphilosophy—and with it his identity as a “thinking man”—is neither in

need of defense nor distinct from his political activity but, instead, avail-able for use as a persuasive resource in his interaction with Power. How he



avails himself of the tropes and topoi of philosophical inquiry can only bedetermined by examining his conduct closely.

Second, the proper site of philosophic politics is not the political

activity of “thinking” men and women but their philosophical tracts andtreatises. Tus, in searching for the “philosophic politics” of Mr. Keuner,Strauss would have us focus not on his interaction with Power but on the writings for which he has come to be known as a “thinking man.” As Iargue in a recent edition of this journal (, –), this emphasis on thepolitical unconscious of philosophical discourse brings with it a tendency toignore the overt political activity of philosophers. Second only to the neo-Nietzschean, deconstructionist critique of philosophy, the Straussian hunt

for philosophic politics has enabled this trained incapacity to persist. As a“thinking man” engaged in political culture, Mr. Keuner brings with him anopportunity to counteract this trained incapacity.

Finally, even when philosophic politicians do commit themselves toadvocating for political or social change, they do not proceed as Mr. Keunerdoes, openly expressing and then immediately recanting their opposition toestablished figures of authority. Rather, they rely on what Strauss describesas “a peculiar technique of writing, and therewith to a particular type ofliterature, in which the truth about all crucial things is presented exclu-

sively between the lines” (, ).2 At the center of philosophic politics,then, is not a willingness to contradict oneself, depending on the occasion,but an effort to craft and circulate polysemous texts, in which unorthodox views are at once conveyed to potential sympathizers and concealed fromestablished figures of authority. For better and for worse, there is no lexicalambiguity in Mr. Keuner’s public discourse. He simply contradicts himself. As a “thinking man” heedless of the law of noncontradiction, Mr. Keuner warrants careful consideration.

Given these distinctions between Mr. Keuner’s conduct and the Straussianpractice of philosophic politics, our opening line of inquiry remains: Howare we to understand the political activity of this “thinking man”? Of specialimport is the inconsistency of his discourse. Does this inconsistency servean overarching political purpose, or is it limited to his stated effort to outlivePower? And is there anything more at stake in this effort than Mr. Keuner’sphysical well-being? Finally, what do the answers to these questions tellus about the broader, historical relationship between philosophy and poli-tics, principle and power, in the Western tradition?

However selfish Mr. Keuner’s conduct might appear, it does more thanenable him to outlive Power. And in outliving Power, he does more than




preserve his physical well-being. In fact, on close inspection, Mr. Keuner’seffort to outlive Power can be shown to function as a subtle yet highlyeffective mode of political resistance. What distinguishes his conduct from

other forms of dissent is its undecidability, specifically the way in whichit enables Mr. Keuner to equivocate between rhetorics of opposition andobedience. At issue here, as we shall see, is a political resource for contest-ing, without directly challenging, established figures of authority. In speak-ing out against Power, Mr. Keuner goads it into an executive posture; andby immediately disavowing his critique, he delegitimizes its authority topunish him. In so doing, he not only escapes the grasp of Power but alsorenders Power mute and inoperative. Teorizing this act of resistance is the

primary task of this essay.I begin by suggesting that modern democratic political culture brings with it an aversion to conduct such as that of Mr. Keuner. In an effort tospecify the basic attributes of this conduct, as well as the stakes involved inits analysis, I then compare and contrast Mr. Keuner’s behavior with theresistant practices of marginalized individuals and groups. I go on to definethe subject position of this “thinking man,” especially as it intersects withthe political identity of the Western philosopher. With this intersectionin mind, I then return to Mr. Keuner’s speech and action, paying close

attention to its operation as a mode of resistance. By way of a conclusion,I draw out the political and theoretical significance of his endeavor to out-live Power.

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Whatever else “resistance” might mean, many of us expect it to be orga-nized, collective, and sustained, rather than uncoordinated, individualized,and opportunistic. Moreover, we expect it to be oppositional and openlyconfrontational, rather than appropriative and apparently accommodating.3 With expectations of this sort, it is diffi cult to understand, much less toappreciate, the resistant potential of Mr. Keuner’s conduct.

Underlying these expectations is an ideology of dissent in which oneline of conduct reigns supreme: the coordinated social movement. Bycoordinated social movement I mean the organized, collective, and sustainedeffort by ordinary people to pose a direct, public challenge to established

figures of authority. How are we to account for the predominance ofthis social formation in our collective imagination? History provides an



answer: with the development of centralized, relatively democratic statesin North America and Western Europe came unprecedented opportunitiesand resources for ordinary people to mount, coordinate, and sustain con-

frontations with powerful opponents. And with these opportunities andresources came the coordinated social movement (arrow , ).

For this reason, coordinated social movements have often been thoughtto index the health and vibrancy of democratic public culture. “Te rise andfall of social movements mark the expansion and contraction of demo-cratic opportunities,” Charles illy explains: “If social movements begin todisappear, their disappearance will tell us that a major vehicle for ordinarypeople’s participation in public politics is waning” (, ). Our penchant

for coordinated social movements, and with it our aversion to conduct suchas that of Mr. Keuner, is in this sense bound up with our commitment tothe modern democratic state.

Given this historico-political kinship, it is not surprising that coor-dinated social movements and modern democratic states share many ofthe same threats. Governmental decentralization, extensive privatizationof governmental activities, the eclipse of the national state by transnationalpowers—all are common dangers. Tat these dangers have never loomedlarger than they do today makes it especially important to reflect on our

inherited conceptions of resistance. Must resistance be organized, collec-tive, sustained, and confrontational in order to effect lasting social change?

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If Mr. Keuner’s conduct functions as a mode of resistance, but does notshare the attributes of coordinated social protest, what are its salient fea-tures? On my reading, the behavior of our “thinking man” has four basiccharacteristics: () it requires little or no coordination or planning, () itrelies on implicit understandings and information networks, () it resem-bles a kind of individual self-help, and () it avoids direct confrontation with established figures of authority.4 In short, Mr. Keuner’s conduct isopportunistic, appropriative, individualized, and evasive.

Given these characteristics, his speech and action parallel the resis-tant practices of many marginalized individuals and groups. Consider, forinstance, the accommodation techniques of immigrant groups (Gibson), the “counter-school” culture of working-class youths (Willis ,

–), the passing practices of queered identities (Schlossberg , ), andeveryday forms of peasant resistance such as foot shuffl ing, dissimulation,




false compliance, and feigned ignorance (Scott , xv). His conduct alsorecalls persuasive techniques characteristic of ordinary political culture suchas the request (Goffman ), negative politeness (Brown and Levinson

, –), and the tag question (Lakoff , –), as well as discourseparticles such as “yeah-no” (Burridge and Florey ) and “I don’t know”(Beach and Metzger ), both of which work wonders in the transitionfrom one speaker to the next.

However, these are all “weapons of the weak,” to borrow James C. Scott’smemorable phrase. What distinguishes the resistance of Mr. Keuner is therelative power with which he wields it. Clearly, he is a teacher—perhapseven a university professor. In either case, he has enough linguistic authority

to address and be heard by a mass audience.5

Indeed, he already possesses what many marginalized individuals and groups struggle to achieve: insti-tutionalized access to prevailing media of publicity. o figure his conduct interms of resistance, then, is to open ourselves to a curious, if only becauserarely pursued, line of inquiry: How can people in positions of relativepower work against the very systems that give them privilege?6

In order to begin answering this question, we must widen the gyre of“resistance” to include not only conduct occurring in the margins of society—be it a mundane form of dissent or a full-fledged social movement—but

also speech and action located at the very center of power. We must con-sider the ways in which resistant citizen-subjects can position themselvesin and against existing relations of power, especially their ability to mobilizecertain power relationships in order to oppose others. At issue here is what Jean-François Lyotard identifies as “a strategy which can dispense withexteriority, which, as far as language is concerned, would not place itselfoutside the rules of the discourse of ruth, that is of the discourse of power,but inside those rules.” In using “what is said” to pronounce and withstand“what allows one to say it,” he concludes, strategies of this sort can “tap thestrength of power to neutralize it” (, ).7

Tat established authority can be infiltrated and rendered inoperativedoes not mean its function as a repressive apparatus can be altered. Onthe contrary, as Alain Badiou notes in his consideration of state power: “itcannot change, save hands” (a, ). o this extent, it is not enough tobroaden our understanding of resistance to include opposition occurring atthe center of power. We must also be willing to subtract our understand-ing of resistance, if only for a moment, from the politics of emancipation,

notably the classical Marxist call for a revolutionary suppression of thestate. Scholarship on the resistant practices of marginalized individuals and



groups has already taken this chance by studying how relatively powerlesscitizen-subjects can work prevailing systems of authority to their minimumdisadvantage.8 Mr. Keuner’s interaction with Power calls us in a similar

direction, further refining our line of inquiry: How can relatively powerfulcitizen-subjects confound and defy these same systems, without in turnforfeiting their place in them?

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Despite his linguistic authority, Mr. Keuner is unable to baulk established

figures of authority without in turn jeopardizing himself. Like manyuniversity professors, he is a member of the dominating group but among itsmore subordinate constituents. He is, to borrow André Gorz’s descriptionof mid-twentieth-century France, a dominated agent of the dominating class .9 Tis subject position corresponds directly with his status as a “thinkingman.” In fact, cultivating this liminal subject position has often been theprimary political task of major Western thinkers. From Seneca the Youngerto Christine de Pizan to Immanuel Kant to W. E. B. DuBois, the historyof Western thought is riddled with efforts to inhabit the borderlands

between sovereignty and subordination. If indeed the resistant potential ofMr. Keuner’s conduct is intimately tied to his status as a “thinking man,” which in turn connects him to “thinking” men and women from acrossthe face of history, it is important to consider his relation to the broaderhistorico-political identity of the Western philosopher.

Among the more enduring attributes of “philosophy” is its relationof alterity to everyday life and offi cial culture. From Greek antiquity tolate capitalism, philosophers have struggled to subtract themselves fromthe intellectual pursuits of ordinary people and the ideological interests ofestablished authority. Te distinction between the discipline of philosophyand the intellectual pursuits of ordinary people finds its representativeanecdote in the sixth book of the Republic , where Plato struggles to insulate

philosophia from the “multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose soulsare bowed and mutilated by their vulgar occupations even as their bod-ies are marred by their arts and crafts” (d–e [b, ]). At issue inthis characterization is not only the subordination of “those dedicated tolabor to those endowed with the privilege of thought” but also the authority

of privileged thinkers to determine who, among the totality of thinkingmen and women, has the right to practice “philosophy” (Rancière , ).




In confining the intellectual activities of ordinary people to a “discourseon non-philosophy, on illegitimate modes of thinking,” Plato secures the roleof the philosopher in the legislation of legitimate thoughts (Rancière ,

). More specifically, he designates the philosopher as the proper spokes-person for the inferior class to which these maimed impersonators of phi-losophy belong. With the advent of Marxism, this designation took on anew form, manifesting itself as an intense commitment to “the purity of themasses, the plebians or the proletariat” (Rancière , ).10 Rather thansimply censor the intellectual activities of ordinary individuals, philoso-phers now celebrate their anonymous inclusion in specific social catego-ries, suggesting that “people like that are the more to be admired the more

they adhere strictly to their collective identity, and that they become sus-pect, indeed, the moment they want to live as anything other than legionsand legionaries” (Rancière , ). “Solemn admiration for the unknownsoldiers of the proletarian army,” “tender-hearted curiosity about theiranonymous lives,” “nostalgic passion for the practiced movements of thecraftsman”—all are f reely offered (Rancière , ).

What enables this power/knowledge structure to persist is the mutualopposition of “the philosopher and his poor” to established figures ofauthority. In addition to compensating for the demotion of ordinary intel-

lectuals to nonphilosophers by celebrating their membership in collectiveidentities, philosophers after Marx have a tendency to blame the result-ing, hierarchical separation of “the philosopher” from “the people” on anevil third party—the petty bourgeoisie, the ideologist, the master thinker.Consider, for instance, Gramsci’s indictment of “the Church” for maintain-ing a hierarchical split between “intellectual” and “simple” communities ofthe faithful: “Tis split cannot be healed by raising the simple to the levelof the intellectuals (the Church does not even envisage such a task, whichis both ideologically and economically beyond its present capacities), butonly by imposing an iron discipline on the intellectuals so that they do notexceed certain limits of differentiation and so render the split catastrophicand irreparable” (, ). Only in defiance of this third party can the intel-lectual and the simple, the philosopher and the people, “destroy the wide-spread prejudice that philosophy is a strange and diffi cult thing just becauseit is the specific intellectual activity of a particular category of specialists orof professional and systematic philosophers” (Gramsci , ).

In their mutual exclusion f rom the vocation of the philosopher, “the peo-

ple” and “the ideologist”—the representative figures of ordinary and offi cialcultures—function as negative conditions of possibility for the discipline of



philosophy. It is atop this relation of alterity that philosophers have oftenexaggerated the positivity of the people as an active subject and pitted thissubject against the interests of an overarching ideological apparatus. In

so doing, they have been able to achieve what Jacques Rancière cleverlyrecognizes as “a dignity independent of their occupational status alone”(, ). It is precisely here, in the institution of an authority in excess ofthe discipline of philosophy, that the political identity of the philosopherfinds its origin. It is here, in “reverence for non-philosophy and denuncia-tion of ideological vanities,” that our “thinking man,” Mr. Keuner, secures hismarginal political status (Rancière , xxvii). As a dominated member ofthe dominating class, he is able to wield weapons of the weak against estab-

lished figures of authority without calling attention to, let alone endanger-ing, his relatively privileged subject position. How political activity of thissort can render Power mute and inoperative remains to be seen.

Given their reverence for dominated groups, it is not surprising to seephilosophers appropriating weapons of the weak. And given their denun-ciation of ideological vanities, it is not surprising to see them deploying

these weapons against established figures of authority.11 However, this isnot the only use to which their marginal status has been put. Te history of Western thought suggests two other applications, both of which must bedistinguished from Mr. Keuner’s speech and action.

Te first is Straussian and provides a counterpart to the practice of“philosophic politics.” In addition to guarding themselves against estab-lished figures of authority, philosophers often seek their protection from what Plato famously refers to as “the madness of the multitude” (Rep. c[b, ]).12 “I do not believe in the possibility of a conversation ofSocrates with the people ,” Strauss writes to Alexandre Kojève. Rather, “therelation of the philosopher to the people is mediated by a certain kind ofrhetoricians who arouse fear of punishment after death; the philosopherscan guide these rhetoricians but can not do their work” (, ).13 rappedbetween the depravity of the people and the persecution of the ideologist,the philosopher seeks to avoid both hazards by advising the ideologist onhow best to pacify the people.

Te second use to which this marginal status has been put is Marxist

and draws on the foregoing discussion of the political identity of the philos-opher. In contrast to Straussian political agendas, Marxist intellectuals have




a history of using their membership in the dominating class to advance theinterests of dominated individuals and groups. “Te philosophy of praxisdoes not tend to leave the ‘simple’ in their primitive philosophy of common

sense,” Gramsci explains, “but rather to lead them to a higher conception oflife” (, ). At issue here is a political program that transforms the phi-losopher “from a supplier of the productive apparatus into an engineer whosees it as his task to adapt this apparatus to the purposes of the proletar-ian revolution” (Benjamin , –). For the Marxist philosopher, then,the political identity of “thinking” men and women consists in a decisivebetrayal of their class origins.

If Straussian philosophers use the ideologist to subdue the people,

which in turn enables them to protect their occupational status, Marxistphilosophers use their occupational status to mobilize the people, which inturn enables them to challenge the ideologist. Although Mr. Keuner sharesa subject position with these philosophers, his measures against Power areneither Straussian nor Marxist. Unlike Straussian philosophers, who medi-ate their relation to the many (the people) through their relation to the few(the ideologist), Mr. Keuner refuses to allow Power to seclude him fromhis mass audience. But neither does he use his interaction with Power asan opportunity to galvanize an alliance with this audience, as the Marxist

philosopher would. Instead, Mr. Keuner allows his students to observe hisinteraction with Power, thereby transforming them from addressees to wit-nesses. Tey are no longer the passive recipients of his public discourse but,rather, its judging spectators.

In activating the judging potential of his students, Mr. Keuner neithersubdues nor mobilizes them. Unlike the Marxist philosopher, who provides the people with revolutionary leadership, he presents his audience with what Walter Benjamin refers to as a “political model.” For Benjamin,one of Brecht’s most invested commentators, Mr. Keuner’s political activ-ity is a model of “cold and incorruptible thought,” the purpose of whichis to help his students clarify “the assumptions that have led them to theso-called leaders, the thinkers or politicians, their books or speeches.” Withthis newfound clarity, Benjamin concludes, they can then “subject theseassumptions to as thorough a criticism as possible” (, ). Clearly,Mr. Keuner’s students are critical of his response to Power. Tat their cri-tique finds expression in the form of a question about his “backbone” sug-gests that they are also critical of the assumptions that initially led them

into his audience. But what of their attitude toward Power? Are they alsocritical of the assumptions that led them to shrink back, and even to flee,



when Power entered the lecture hall? o what extent does Mr. Keuner’sconduct encourage them to doubt, and perhaps even to contest, its sover-eignty?

Brecht does not answer these questions. Neither does Benjamin. Nev-ertheless, we now know enough about our “thinking man” to indicate howhis conduct functions as resistance. As we have seen, Mr. Keuner’s subjectposition is characterized by linguistic authority and political subordination.He has access to a mass audience but is not invulnerable to establishedfigures of authority. He is able to speak and be heard but hardly free fromcensorship. His political activity reflects this liminal subject position. Oneminute he is speaking out against Power, and the next he is disavowing

his critique. As he toggles indecisively between these rhetorics of opposi-tion and obedience, Mr. Keuner calls our attention to a middle groundbetween outright defiance and fearful submission, a zone of indiscernability“in which conformity is often a self-conscious strategy and resistance isa carefully hedged affair that avoids all-or-nothing confrontations” (Scott, ).

At issue here is a line of conduct that is entirely subtracted from thephilosophical tradition of “frank speech” ( parrhesia ) but that also resistscharacterization as “philosophic politics.” Mr. Keuner neither challenges

Power directly nor allows it to operate unrestrained. Instead, he goads itinto an executive posture and then, when a direct conflict seems imminent,relies on techniques of submission and compliance to delegitimize the useof force. Te display of power is in this way denied access to the exercise of violence. “How provoking it can be to have nothing justifiable to be pro- voked about, to find oneself sputtering with rage while the object sits theresweetly,” John Durham Peters explains: “Aggressiveness is instantly exposedas illegitimate” (, ).

In ruling out aggression, Mr. Keuner manages to escape the grasp ofPower. Here, I am thinking of the German term Gewalt , which Brecht usesto suggest not only “lordship” but also “grip,” “force,” and “violence.” Tus, what Mr. Keuner escapes is not his subordination to established authoritybut the executive potential of Gewalt , specifically its undivided claim to thelegitimate use of force. Moreover—and this is the crucial point—he doesso without challenging this claim and yet in such a way that renders Powerinoperative. How is this possible?

In speaking out against Power before a mass audience, Mr. Keuner

compels Power to reveal itself as a repressive apparatus, thereby depriv-ing it of all mystical advantage. If being powerful means not having to




act, Mr. Keuner revokes this privilege. Power no longer has the ability toconceal its executive potential.14 But neither does it have the ability toactualize this potential. By inverting his critique with an all-too-perfect

attention to detail—“I was speaking out in favor of Power”—Mr. Keunerarrests Power in its passage from a state of executive potential to oneof executive action. It is precisely here, in the revelation and seizure ofthis potentiality, that Mr. Keuner’s conduct becomes legible as a mode ofresistance.

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I began by positioning Mr. Keuner’s speech and action in a broader lineof inquiry: How can people in positions of relative power resist the verysystems that give them privilege? More specifically, how can they do so without forfeiting their place in these systems? At issue in this criticalinquiry, I went on to suggest, is the degree to which we are willing to sub-tract our understanding of resistance from the politics of emancipation.By way of a conclusion, I would like to return to this topic. In particular,I would like to consider some of its political and theoretical entailments,especially as they find expression in Mr. Keuner’s final comment: “I’m the

one who has to live longer than Power.”One way to understand these parting words is within the framework of

Hegelian political philosophy. I have in mind here Hegel’s use of the term Eigensinn , meaning “stubbornness” or “obstinacy” or, as it is often translated,“self-will.” Subordinates who have not “experienced the fear of death,” hetells us, can achieve little more than tactical prowess—a narrow clevernessin the service of petty, finite self-interests. Teirs is what Hegel describesas “freedom which is still enmeshed in servitude,” where “enmeshed”translates the German stehenbleibt , meaning “paused,” “standing still,” and“arrested” (§ [, ]).15 Trough the optics of Hegelian Eigensinn, itis Mr. Keuner, not Power, who is arrested in the passage from potentialityto actuality—in this case, his potential to speak freely.

However, this is not the only way to make sense of Mr. Keuner’s finalcomment. Another comes to us in Giorgio Agamben’s treatment of theGreek adynamia , meaning “incapacity” or “the potential not to be.” Build-ing on Aristotle’s account of sensation (aisthēsis ), Agamben rightly notesthat every potential to be or do is always also a potential not to be or do. If

this were not the case, which is to say, if every potentiality (dynamis ) wasnot always also an impotentiality (adynamia ), “potentiality would always



already have passed into act and be indistinguishable from it” (Agamben, ).16 It is within this “abyss of potentiality” that freedom takes root.“o be free,” Agamben concludes, is “to be capable of one’s own impotential-

ity ” (, ). In this sense, the determining feature of freedom is not our“mastery over . . . the whole of objective being,” as Hegel suggests, but ourability to exist in relation to our own privation, our own incapacity—inshort, our own non-Being (§ [, ]).

Clearly, Mr. Keuner has the potential to speak out against Power. But itis his ability to remain silent, to not -actualize this potential, that enables himto escape the grasp of Power and in so doing to preserve this ability—along with himself—for future skirmishes. o the extent that Mr. Keuner experi-

ences freedom, then, it is not simply because he retains an ability to speakout against Power. Nor is it simply because he retains an ability to not -speakout against Power. Rather, his freedom consists in the preservation of hispotential to speak out and to shut up—to be and not to be—depending onthe occasion. It is his ability to determine the moment, the means, and theextent of his resistance that enables Mr. Keuner to elude Power. And it ishis retention of this ability that enables him to outlive it.

When figured in terms of potentiality, Mr. Keuner’s conduct appearscontingent, not contradictory. It marks an ability to have left undone what

he actually did, to have acted in one way or another—or not at all—in themoments before, during, and after his interaction with Power. In retainingthis ability, Mr. Keuner preserves not only his potential to speak out andto shut up, depending on the occasion, but also his authority to negate anypositive specification of this potential, to override any of its prior actual-izations. Tat he objects to Power in one moment does not preclude hisobedience to it in the next—and vice versa. It is his authority to terminate without foreclosing either line of conduct that distinguishes Mr. Keunerfrom the simple servant. And it is his willingness to exercise this authoritythat distinguishes him from the unwavering dissident.

o this extent, the identity of Mr. Keuner does not consist in a “singleessence.” Rather, as Benjamin notes, it is defined by “a continual readinessto admit a new essence” (, ). If his conduct appears inconsistent, it isbecause we have pigeonholed him as a “thinking man” and in so doing con-fined him to the discipline of philosophy, the modality of which is necessityand the law of which is noncontradiction. o stop here, however, is to missthe fact that his conduct, although attributable to a “thinking man,” has

little in common with philosophical inquiry. On the contrary, as we haveseen, it more closely resembles political engagement, the modality of which




is contingency and the law of which is potentiality. More than violatinghis identity as a thinking man, and thus opening himself to the charge ofinconsistency, Mr. Keuner presses this identity into the service of political

rhetoric and cunning subterfuge. For how could someone with the lin-guistic authority of the philosopher fail to find a mass audience? And why would Power ever doubt a direct public statement—“I was speaking outin favor of Power”—from someone who is ostensibly bound by the law ofnoncontradiction?

o be sure, if there is a contradiction to be found in “Measures AgainstPower,” it does not belong to Mr. Keuner’s speech and action. Rather, itresides in the disjunction between the conduct we expect f rom this “think-

ing man” and the conduct in which he actually engages. Since antiquity, themeasure of “thinking” men and women has been the consistency of theirthoughts and by extension the consistency of their discourse.17 Consistencyalso characterizes their traditional objects of study, the classical canon of which is made up of invariable laws, categories, ideas, and the like. Hence,the historical antagonism between the philosopher and the citizen: “othe citizens’ ever-changing opinions about human affairs, which themselves were in a state of constant flux, the philosopher opposed the truth aboutthose things which in their very nature were everlasting and from which,

therefore, principles could be derived to stabilize human affairs” (Arendt, ). As a “thinking man” with shifting opinions and a taste for politi-cal activity, Mr. Keuner challenges this long-standing antagonism, suggest-ing that the relationship between philosophy and politics can and should besomething other than a “scandalous contradiction between the postulatedunity of truth and the factual plurality of opinions” (Sloterdijk , ).

In this way, Mr. Keuner distinguishes himself from the Straussianpractice of “philosophic politics” and the classical conception of parrhesia ,both of which are driven by a disconnect between the philosopher’scommitment to truth and citizen’s subservience to opinion. For if truthseeking were not dangerous to political order, the philosophic politician would have no excuse to elude the realm of human affairs; and if truthtelling were not dangerous to the philosopher, the parrhesiastes would gainlittle moral authority by challenging the opinions that define this realm.Like both of these historico-political figures, Mr. Keuner is a “thinkingman” engaged in political culture. Yet he neither seeks nor shares the truth.His stake is political, not philosophical. It is the threat of political dark-

ness, not the splendor of philosophical truth, that guides his interaction with Power.18



Where are we now? As we have seen, what qualifies Mr. Keuner’spolitical activity as a mode of resistance is the fact that it comes at theexpense of established authority. In speaking out against Power before a

mass audience, he deprives Power of its impotentiality, specifically its abil-ity to refrain from action, to not -reveal itself as a repressive apparatus. Andby immediately recanting his critique, just as Power is beginning to assumean executive posture, he deprives it of its potentiality, specifically its abil-ity to exercise violence, to actualize its executive potential. In so doing,Mr. Keuner forces Power into the modality of the necessary. He leaves it with no choice but to appear and fail to function as a repressive apparatus.

In this sense, it is Mr. Keuner, not Power, who governs their interac-

tion. And this is precisely what defines his speech and action as “measuresagainst power”— Maßnahmen gegen die Gewalt . If Gewalt calls our attentionto the executive potential of Power, specifically its capacity for violence,Brecht’s use of the term Maßnahmen —meaning not only “measures” butalso “arrangements,” “sanctions,” and “provisions”—enables us to specifythe exact coordinates of Mr. Keuner’s resistance. In taking measures againstPower, he authorizes, anticipates , and arranges for the manifestation andarrest of its capacity for violence.

What we have here is certainly not a politics of emancipation. But nei-

ther is it freedom enmeshed in servitude. Rather, it is a mode of resistancein which endurance still matters. For Mr. Keuner, self-sacrifice is not thefinal testament to his convictions. Against the executive potential of Power,and the control it exerts over life, our “thinking man” posits an incorri-gible unwillingness to die. His is a living opposition—an opposition thatis larger, more extensive, and richer in potentiality than Power. Cultivatingthis opposition is ultimately what it means to outlive Power.

Purdue University

. Te encounter between Diogenes and Alexander is fully depicted in Dios

Chrysostom’s Fourth Discourse on Kingship §§–. Concise commentary on their conver-

sation may be found in Foucault , –.

. See also Strauss , .

. See Scott , .

. See Scott , xvi.

. For more on mass audiences, see Peters .




. Scholarship on race and privilege, particularly the resistant potential of “whiteness,”

is one of the only sites at which this line of inquiry has been systematically pursued.

See Fine et al. , chaps. –. Kindred studies include Leach et al. , Brown

, Tompson , Tompson and White Women Challenging Racism , and atum .

. Hardt and Negri extend this line of thought: “We should be done once and for

all with the search for an outside, a standpoint that imagines a purity for our politics. It

is better both theoretically and practically to enter the terrain of Empire and confront its

homogenizing and heterogenizing flows in all their complexity, grounding our analysis in

the power of the global multitude” (, ). See also de Certeau , xix; and Hariman

, –.

. See, for instance, Scott , Kelley , Weden , and Johnston . Te work

of Detienne and Vernant () is also worth mentioning here.. See Ross , .

. Tis is not to suggest that Marxism marks the beginning of the history of rhetoric

in praise of “the masses.” On the contrary, this history stretches back as far as Pericles’

funeral oration, where he praises the hoi polloi (the many) over and against the hoi oligoi

(the few). See Tucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War .. Rancière seems to have

known as much: “‘Proletarian’ does not mean ‘industrial worker’; it means ‘someone who is

of no importance to the polis ’ because all he has to contribute is his productive and repro-

ductive power” (, ).

. Te politics of this appropriation are worth noting. Clearly, weapons of the weakare not only available to disempowered citizen-subjects. Consider Scott: “Te peasantry

has no monopoly on these weapons, as anyone can easily attest who has observed offi -

cials and landlords resisting and disrupting state policies that are to their disadvantage”

(, ). Pierre Bourdieu () offers two explanations for this phenomenon. On the

one hand, it negates objective relations of power. On the other hand, negations of this

sort are “reserved for those who are suffi ciently confident in their position in the objec-

tive hierarchies to be able to deny them without appearing to be ignorant or incapable of

satisfying their demands” (Bourdieu , ). o this extent, the appropriation of resistant

practices characteristic of marginalized individuals and groups by dominated members of

the dominating class does little to challenge general patterns of inequality. In advancing

this argument, however, we must avoid overstating the difference between marginalized

individuals and dominated members of the dominating class. Although they belong to

distinct social categories, both are subordinate political subjects. Scholars have even gone

so far as to argue that first world citizen-subjects now occupy the subject position of his-

torically disempowered individuals and groups. See, for instance, Sandoval , chap. ;

and de Certeau , xvii.

. In particular, the philosopher seeks the protection of the aristocrat, whom Strauss

identifies as “the political reflection, or imitation, of the wise man”—“well-bred and public

spirited, obeying the laws and completing them, ruling and being ruled in turn” (, ).



. Strauss also writes: “Te philosopher and the non-philosopher cannot have

genuinely common deliberations. Tere is a fundamental disproportion between philoso-

phy and the city” (, ).

. On the concealment of executive potential, and the mode of domination with which it comes, see Badiou b, chap. .

. See also §§, , , , and .

. For Aristotle’s argument concerning aisthēsis , see De anima a (a, –);

for his argument concerning potentiality, see Metaphysics a (b, –).

. See Plato, Protagoras b–b (a, –). On the intimate connection

between the thoughts and the discourse of the philosopher, see Plato, Teaetetus e–a

(d, –) and Sophist e (c, ).

. Tis distinction between Mr. Keuner’s attitude toward political engagement and

those of the philosophic politician and the parrhesiastes has significant implications for thestudy of the relationship between philosophers and their political cultures. Although the

Straussian analysis of philosophic politics dutifully notes the subtle rhetorical maneuvers

of major Western thinkers, it fails to guide us beyond their canonical tracts and treatises.

Conversely, while the study of parrhesia often attends to the political discourse of thinking

men and women, it does little to help us account for their frequent use of indirect, and

oftentimes ambivalent, modes of resistance. Studying conduct such as that of Mr. Keuner,

which is overtly political, reliant on the discipline of philosophy, and characterized by

elusive subversions of authority, enables us to redress these methodological blind spots.

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