Sandro Bologna - ENEA Claudio Balducelli – YLICHRON (ENEA)Massimo Gallanti - CESI Ricerca Workshop – AICTRoma 6 Dicembre, 2007

ICT nella gestione del Sistema Elettrico: opportunità e nuovi problemi

ENTE PER LE NUOVE TECNOLOGIE L’ENERGIA E L’AMBIENTE

Current electrical network from source-to-sink

Generation Transport Distribution Loads

The primary aim of an electricity supply system is to meet the customer’s demands for energy

(in sufficient quantity and quality, at the required time and at an acceptable price)

Current Structure of the Electrical System in Europe

TransmissionNational / International

SubtransmissionRegional

Low Voltage

Distribution System

National Control Center

TCI

RTU

RTU

RTUMUX

Optical Fibre

Current Electrical Network Management

Regional Control Center

Change of energy marketenvironment, e.g. globalization, competition

Business process optimization,e.g. new communication channels, Web

Pressure on prices and cost togetherwith the trend to more automation

Increased value of information, especially with regard to real-timeinformation

Stronger customer focus

Technology innovation

1st revolution: Open Energy Market

Generationcompany

Transmissioncompany

Subsidiary

TraderDistributioncompany

Businessprocesses

Communication

kWh

Powerexchange

Localgeneration

Serviceprovider

Distribution Systems ClientsTransmission System

GeneratorsQualifiedClientsIPP

TradingCompanies

MarketOperat

or

SystemOperator

Private Communications Network

Public Communications Network

Growing Interdependencies between Electrical and Telecommunication Systems in the Open Energy Market

Operational Planning

Real time Control

Energy Management

2nd revolution: Distributed Generation

The increasing diffusion of Distributed Generation (DG) makes the distribution networks to evolve:

from a mainly passive structure, toward an active model, very similar to the current

transmission networks

Smart Grid: The Vision

Coordinated, local management and full integration of Distributed Generation DG and Renewable Energy Resource RES with large scale central power generation

Extensive small generation connected close to end customers

Flexible, optimal and strategic grid expansion, maintenance an operation

User specified quality security and reliability of supply for the digital age

Integrated approach involving technical, commercial and regulatory issues

Source: EU 2006

Integrated infrastructures for active network operation

Meter

storage

Demand response

Gx

GyCommunicati

on control local area 3

G2

G3

storage

Demand response

Meter

Communication control

local area 2

DSO 1

Communicationnetwork

G1

storage

Demand response

Meter

Communication control

local area 1

Bulk gen.

TSO

DGop n

DGop 2

DGop 1

DSO n

DSO 2

InformationCommunication

control

Power flow

Microgrid

Microgrid

Microgrid

Power grid

Addressing active network management: the CESI RICERCA approach

OBJECTIVE

REFERENCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Experimental microgrid composed of microgenerators, dispatchable loads, and storage systems

Design and experimentation of microgrids management and control functions. The following functions have been implemented:

• economic dispatching of generators

• frequency and voltage regulation

• pseudo islanding operation (meeting a predefined power exchange profile with the main network)

Microgridcentralcontrol

storagefuel cellPV

CHP

DSO EMS

Forecast data

distribution grid &central generators

electricityheatinformation

MV network 0.4 kV

local lontrol

Microgrid communication channel

Addressing active network management: the CESI RICERCA approach

Control system of the experimental microgrid implemented at CESI RICERCA’s premises

Addressing the safety and security issue: the ENEA SAFEGUARD approach

OBJECTIVE

REFERENCE INFRASTRUCTURE

A supervisory and control system (SCADA) of the electrical transmission network

Development of a network of software components (agent oriented) to increment the survivability of information intensive critical infrastructures as the electrical transport and distribution networks, during attacks, intrusions, or anomalies caused by network instabilities.

SAFEGUARD multi-agent architecture

Control system of electrical network (RTUs & Control Centers)

Home LCCIs

Topology agent

Negotiation agent

MMI agent

Other LCCIsForeign electrical

networks Communication networks

-------------------

Correlation agent

Action agent

Low

level ag

en

tsH

igh

level ag

en

ts

Network state

monitors

Intrusion Detection wrappers

Anomaly detector agents

Actuators

Commands and information Only information

Network protection at global level

Network protection at

local level

Area 1

Area 2Area 3

Substations Loads GeneratorsPower transport network

Supervisory and Control System

Electrical system physical layer

SIA-RSIA-R

SIA-R

CCNCCR CCR

SIA-C SIA-CSIA-C

Remote Units Control CentersInformation Network

Communication Network

Data concentrators

IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARD TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

RTURTURTU

Event sequences checking agent

Invariant checking agent Communication ports checking agent

RTU state hybrid detector

ENEA Testing Platform of SAFEGUARD Technology

emulation on a local network of the components belonging to a SCADA distributed system

RT

U

1R

TU

2

RT

U

3R

TU

n

Electrical load-flow simulator (e-Agora)

SCADA Control Center National

Network Data Base

(Gegional DB)

Network Data Base

(National DB)

SCADA data exchange bus

Attacks/faults

Console design

running

log/documen

t

TEST PLATFORM

Safeguard high level agents

(correlator, action ect.)SCADA Control Center Regional

Message “broker”

Event sequences hybrid detector

(Case Base reasoning)

Hybrid detector for State Estimation

(Checking Invariants)

RTU state hybrid detector

(Neural Network)

Communication hybrid detector

(Data Mining technique)

Low

Level

Agents

ENEA TEST PLATFORM OF SAFEGUARD TECHNOLOGY

OBJECTIVE:

REFERENCES INFRASTRUTTURES: An electrical distribution network

A public voice/data tele-communication network

Provide a technology (named MIT, Middleware Improved Technology) which will reduce the risk of cascading failures caused by interdependency between Large Complex Critical Infrastructures (LCCI)

MIT system will support information sharing between LCCIs operators to augment their mutual situational awareness. MIT system will support negotiation and coordinated actions between neighbouring systems for the establishment of effective and optimal measures;

Addressing the cascading failures issue: the ENEA IRRIIS approach

Electric.Net

TlcNet

Interdependencies between Tlc Net and Electrical Net

Interdependencies between Electrical and Telecommunication Networks

Overall IRRIIS MIT architectureOverall IRRIIS MIT architecture

Telecom

Data Base

Inter LCCIs

data exchange

Communication

Components

LCCIs Data Bases & Alarm

logsLCCI 1 LCCI 2 LCCI n

Add-on Components

The Italian IRRIIS Scenario

MANAGING “INTERDEPENDENCY” BETWEEN DIFFERENT INFRASTRUCTURESMANAGING “INTERDEPENDENCY” BETWEEN DIFFERENT INFRASTRUCTURES

The scenario regards the black-out occurred in Rome on January 2004 at the Italian Telecom infrastructure. The described scenario is approximate and refers to subsystems that caused the interruption of the Telecom services that are critical for the ACEA distribution system operators.

The main power supply is normally furnished by the service (1) produced by the National power network or, alternatively, by a backup emergency diesel generator (2).

A second backup power supply is guaranteed by the battery packs (3), but in this case the power reserve may decrease quickly.

Telecom Rome nodeAcea Power Supply

Telecom users

ACEA Control Centers

Generic users

Fiumicino Airport operations

The Italian IRRIIS Scenario

MIT components

Telecom

MIT components Electricity

Local attacker Telecom

Telecom network

simulation

Power backup

simulation

Electrical network

simulation

Local attacker Electricity

Global attacker

SCADA emulation

Test Bed communication

channel

Local LAN Local LAN

Additional analysis tools

Experimentation GUI

Logger

Local LAN

Experimentation Archive

MIT communication channel

Electricity monitoring panel

Experimentation SERVER

Telecom monitoring panel

View of the IRRIIS Test Bed at ENEAView of the IRRIIS Test Bed at ENEA

Conclusions and R&D challenges

•More than 50% of the electrical load is highly dispersed •Increasing part of generation is becoming dispersed•Energy market is always more open and interconnected •Increasing penetration of ICT for “better” control•Improve monitoring information flow issues•Distributed control algorithms and models issues•Reliability/safety/security issues•Inter-dependencies issues•Trans-border issues