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ART. I. THE NATIONAL TERRITORY

Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islandsand waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines hassovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains,including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and othersubmarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of thearchipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal watersof the Philippines.

< Constitution ! municipal law ! binding only within the territorial limits of thesovereignty

< BASELINE METHOD:1) Normal- the breadth of the territorial sea is measured from the low water-

line, following the indentations of the coast2) Straight- drawn as straight lines connecting appropriate points on the

coast, without departing to any appreciable extent from the generaldirection of the coast

Internal Waters – ABSOLUTESOVEREIGNTY. Waters around,between and connecting theislands of the Phil. Archipelago,regardless of their breadth anddimensions, including the waters in

bays, rivers and lakes. No right ofinnocent passage for foreignvessels exists. Also known aswaters on the landward side ofbaselines from which the breadthof the territorial sea is calculated.

Territorial Sea – [12 n.m.] anadjacent belt of sea with a breadthof 12 nautical miles measured fromthe baselines of a state and overwhich the state has sovereignty.Ships of all states enjoy right ofinnocent passage.Right of Innocent Passage:

1. International Straits (seeCorfu channel case)

2. Territorial Sea – NO airpassage for aircraftgenerally allowed

3. Archipelagic Waters – airpassage allowed

Contiguous zone – [24 n.m.]over which the coastal state mayexercise limited control necessary

to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws andregulations within its territory or territorial sea.

Exclusive economic zone – [200 n.m.] A coastal nation has control of all economicresources within this zone, including fishing, mining, oil exploration, and any pollution of

those resources, which include the sea, seabed, and subsoil to the exclusion of other

states. However , other nations have the right of navigation and overflight over this area,subject to the regulation of the coastal state. (has to be proclaimed by the State).

Continental Shelf - This is the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent tothe coastal state but outside the territorial sea. The continental shelf extends 200 n.m.,and in some cases may extend up to 350 n.m., following the natural prolongation of thesoil. The coastal state has the right to explore and exploit the natural resources in thisarea, but does not extend to other materials such as shipwrecks.

I.

UNCLOS

Archipelagic state A State constituted wholly by 1 or more archipelagos and mayinclude other islands

Archipelago A group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnectingwaters and other natural features which are so closelyinterrelated that such form an intrinsic geographical, economicand political entity, or which historically have been regarded assuch

Territorial sea A marginal belt of maritime water adjacent to the base linesextending 12 nm outwardSubject to the right of innocent passage* by other states

Baselines Low waterline along the coast as marked on large scale chartsofficially recognized by the coastal state

Internal

waters/territorialwaters(ALL criminal lawsapply)

All parts of the sea landwards from the baseline and inland

rivers and lakes [under 1973 Consti, no right of innocentpassage]Established right of innocent passageBUT: this new rule only applies to areas NOT previouslyconsidered as internal waters

Insular shelf Composed of:1) Seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent

to the coastal state but outside the territorial sea2) Seabed and subsoil adjacent to islands

Right to:1) Explore and exploit natural resources2) Erect installations needed3) Erect safety zone with radius of 500 m.

*Innocent passage- passage not prejudicial to the interest of the coastal state orcontrary to the principles of international law.

Test – WON it is an intrusive entry or is threatening to the sovereignty of the State.

II. National Territory under the 1987 Consti

..all other territoriesover which thePhilippines hassovereignty or jurisdiction

Changed wording from the 1973 version

… its terrestrial, fluvialand aerial domains,including its territorialsea, the seabed, thesubsoil, the insularshelves, and other

submarine areas

1) Terrestrial- all surfaces of land above the sea2) Fluvial- inland waters: bays and rivers, streams,

internal waters, sea waters landwards from thebaseline

3) Aerial- air directly above its terrestrial and fluvialdomains



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Magallona vs. Ermita [Baselines Law, Art. I, UNCLOS, RA9522]RA9522 adjusted the country’s archipelagic baselines and classified the baseline regimeof nearby territories. Amended the old Baselines law (RA3046), which was compliant toUNCLOS I and codified the sovereign right of states parties over their territorial sea butdid not determine its breadth. RA9522, is compliant with UNCLOS III, which prescribesthe water-land ratio, length and contour of baselines of archipelagic states like thePhilippines and sets the deadline for the application for the extended continental shelf.RA9522 therefore shortened 1 baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints aroundthe archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely the Kalayaan Island Group

(KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes of islands” whose islands generate theirown applicable maritime zones. Constitutional .

First, RA9522 is a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zones andcontinental shelf under the UNCLOS III, and not to delineate Philippine territory. UNCLOSIII has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treatyregulating sea-use rights over maritime zones, contiguous zone, and continental shelvesthat UNCLOS III delimits. On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA9522 areenacted by the state parties to mark out specific basepoints along their coasts from whichbaselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting pointsto measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Thus, they arenothing but statutory mechanisms for the states parties to delimit with precision theextent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to therest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarineareas within which states parties exercise treaty-based rights.

Second, RA9522’s use of the framework of regime of islands to determine the maritimezones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal are not inconsistent with the Philippines’claim of sovereignty. Petitioners believe that such weakens our territorial claim. A look atRA3046 and RA9522 show that the latter mainly followed the base points mapped by theformer; under both, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal are still outside of the baselinesdrawn around the Philippine archipelago. RA9522, by optimizing the location of thebasepoints, increase the Philippines’ total maritime space. Congress, if they included bothislands inside our baselines, might be accused of “departing to an appreciable extent fromthe general configuration of the archipelago.”

Third, RA9522 and UNCLOS III are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation ofinternal waters. Petitioners contend that the law converts internal waters into archipelagicwaters, hence subjecting them to the right of innocent passage. Philippines still exercisessovereignty over these waters under UNCLOS III. The political branches of the Philippinegovernment, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may passlegislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sealanes passage. In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms in UNCLOSIII operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters,subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise.

ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES:

PRINCIPLES:

Sec. 1: The Philippines is a democratic and Republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

Elements of a State:

A community of persons more or less numerous, permanently occupying adefinite portion of territory, independent of external control, and possessing anorganized government to which the great body of inhabitants render habitualobedience (people, territory, sovereignty, government).- People: Community of persons sufficient in number and capable of

maintaining the continued existence of the community and held together bya common bond of law.

- Sovereignty:o Legal sovereignty: supreme power to affect legal interests either

by legislative, executive or judicial action (lodged in the peopleand exercised by state agencies).o Political sovereignty: sum total of all the influences in a state,

legal and non-legal which determine the course of law.- Government: Institution or aggregate of institutions by which an

independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which arenecessary to enable men to live in a social state.

Can Muslims have a state? Yes based on the definition it is possible.Self executing v. non-self executing: When there is a specific right (OPOSA) then itcan be a source of rights and obligation.

Presidential form of government: there is a separation of powers -- legislative,executive and judicial.Parliamentary government:

1.

The members of the government or cabinet or the executive arm are alsomembers of the legislature.2. The government or cabinet consisting of the political leaders of the majority

party or of a coalition who are also members of the legislature, is in effect acommittee of the legislature.

3. The government or cabinet has a pyramidal structure at the apex of which is theprime minister.

4. The government or cabinet remains in power only for as long as it enjoys thesupport of the majority of the legislature.

5. Government and legislature are possessed of control devices with which eachcan demand the other immediate political responsibility.

Republican State: wherein all government authority emanates from the people andexercised by representative chosen by the people.The Philippines is not only a representative or republican state but also shares someaspects of direct democracy such as initiative and referendum.

State: is the corporate entityGovernment: is one of the elements of a state and is the institution through which thestate exercises its powers.Administration: consists of the set of people without a change in either state orgovernment (changes)

Tondo Medical v. CAIn 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). Petitionersquestioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals,particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring ofgovernment hospitals. Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the aforementionedreforms had resulted in making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible toeconomically disadvantaged Filipinos. Posited that the HSRA is void for being in violation



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of the following constitutional provisions: Art. II, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, and 18.The SC dismissed the petition since the abovementioned provisions do not contain judicially enforceable rights.

BCDA v. COA:Congress passed an act that created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority(BCDA). The Board had the power to make compensation scheme for its employees.BCDA adopted a 10,000peso year-end benefit (YEB) grant for contractual, regular andpermanent employees following that of the BSP’s scheme. BSP then increased its YEB to

30,000-35,000. The BCDA then increased to 30,000 and granted the same to BCDAmembers and consultants this was disallowed by COA. The SC held that under the law theBCDA members are only allowed to receive per diems of 5,000 per meeting and not toexceed 4 meetings in one month. YEB is only granted to the employees, but consultantsdo not have an employee-employer relationship with the BCDA. The claim of petitionersthat under Art. 2 of the Constitution under the declaration of policies they should begranted the benefits because they have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill. The SC heldthe provisions in Article 2 are non-self executing and therefore cannot be used to supporttheir argument.

Functions of government :1. Constituent: compulsory functions which constitute the very bonds of society

(peace and order from violence and robbery etc.).2. Ministrant: Optional functions of the government (for public welfare that private

wont usually do or that the government can do better than private).

Due to complexities of modern society more things are considered governmentalfunctions such as housing, water supply etc.

Bacani v. NACOCONACOCO is NOT a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the RevisedAdministrative Code of 1917. Corporations performing certain functions of government donot acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under theclassification of municipal or public corporation. While the National Coconut Corporationwas organized with the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a positionindependent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for thebetter curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, afunction the government chose to exercise to promote the coconut industry; it was givena corporate power separate and distinct from government, for it was made subject to theprovisions of Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that itmay exercise are concerned. It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any otherprivate corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.

Unincorporated Corp. ACCFA v. CUGCO:ACCFA was charged with ULP by the Union because of violations of the CB. ACCFA thenbecame ACA. Union sought to be declared as exclusive bargaining unit (EBU). The Courtof Industrial Relations (CIR) granted this. ACA filed certiorari contesting the jurisdiction ofthe CIR. The SC held that the ACA was doing government functions now not constituentbut ministrant (optional for government welfare due to complexities of modern society).Therefore being a government agency cant have an EBU because the right to strikecannot be granted to them.

GOCCVFP vs. ReyesThe issue is whether the VFA’s officers have been delegated some portion of thesovereignty of the country, to be exercised for the public benefit. The Court ruled that the

functions of petitioner corporation enshrined in Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 264031 should

most certainly fall within the category of sovereign functions. The protection of theinterests of war veterans is not only meant to promote social justice, but is also intendedto reward patriotism. All of the functions in Section 4 concern the well-being of warveterans, our countrymen who risked their lives and lost their limbs in fighting for anddefending our nation.

InstrumentalitiesMIAA v. CAMIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the

National Government and thus exempt from local taxation; it does not have capital stockthat is divided into shares. It is also a non-stock corporation because it has no members.MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to performefficiently its governmental functions. It is like any other government instrumentality,except MIAA is vested with corporate powers. MIAA exercises the governmental powers ofeminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges, at the same time,MIAA exercises "all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar asthese powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order. Likewise,when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, theinstrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although notintegrated with the department framework.

Quasi-Public Corp.Phil. Society v. COA:The Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was incorporated as a

corporation by special law since at the time of its creation there was no corporation codeyet. Under the law they had the power to fine violators of the law (half would go to themunicipality and the other half to them). These powers however were subsequentlyrevoked. An EO was made that wanted to examine their books by COA. They claimed thatthey are not a GOCC that would be subject to that. The SC held that they are NOT aGOCC but a private corporation. The charter test does not apply here because during thattime there was no corporation code yet. Petitioner’s charter also shows that it is notsubject to any control or supervision by any government agency of the state and lastly just because their functions redound to the public does not necessarily make it a publiccorporation.

Serana vs. SBPetitioner contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary orremuneration as a UP student regent. In Aparri v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that:A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which fora given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, anindividual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, tobe exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The administration of the UP is asovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimategovernmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, thesciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training. Moreover, U ismaintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporationcreated for profit.

Legitimacy of Governments:1. De jure: Established by authority of a legitimate sovereign

a. Cory government was de jure since established by the authority of thelegitimate sovereign, the people.

b. GMA’s was also de jure2. De facto: established in defiance of a legitimate sovereign

a. Government gets possession and control of or usurps by

force or by the voice of the majority.



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b. Established and maintained by invading military forcesc. Established as an independent government by inhabitants of a country

who rise in insurrection against the parent state.Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Khe:The issue in this case was WON the proceedings during the Japanese period still apply orcontinue after the occupation? The SC held yes because the governments established inthe Philippines under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic ofthe Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de factogovernments. It is classified as a de facto government of the second kind or a

government of paramount force.

The judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which arenot of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-knownprinciple of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and validafter the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines. It is part of international law thatacts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de factogovernment are valid.

There are several kinds of de facto governments:1. That government that gets possession and control of or usurps by force or by

the voice of the majority the rightful legal government and maintains itselfagainst the will of the latter.

2. That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade andoccupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war (government of paramount

force—this was the kind of government in this case).a. Its existence is maintained by active military power within theterritories and against the rightful authority of an established andlawful government.

b. That while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters byprivate citizens who by acts of obedience rendered in submission tosuch force, do not become responsible as wrongdoers for those acts,though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.

3. Established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country whorise in insurrection against the parent state.

Letter of Associate Justice PunoThe CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC existing prior to EO33, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by therevolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of the people power(EDSA) revolution in 1986.A revolution has been defined as “the complete overthrow of the establishedgovernment in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it” or as “asudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usuallyeffected with violence or at least some acts of violence.” In Kelsen's book, GeneralTheory of Law and State, it is defined as that which “occurs whenever the legal order of acommunity is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the firstorder itself.”From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as “aninherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radicalreforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising whenthe legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate orare so obstructed as to be unavailable.” It has been said that “the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state” and from there is derived “the right of thepeople to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regardto the existing constitution.”

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due toconstitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions ofthe 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declaredMr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be saidthat the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance andher control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other keyofficers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of theJudiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect,had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.

Q: Was the Bill of Rights in effect during the interregnum after the actual andeffective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following thecessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediatelybefore the adoption of the Provisional Constitution).NO. The government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by noconstitution, there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. Nevertheless, the Filipinopeople continued to enjoy, under the ICCPR and the UDHR, almost the same rights foundin the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumedresponsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which thePhilippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State “torespect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdictionthe rights recognized in the present Covenant.” Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, therevolutionary government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one shall be subjected to

arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.”The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2)that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories tothe Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration,the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles ofinternational law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was alsoobligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under theDeclaration. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escaperesponsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations underinternational law. (Republic vs. SB)

Sovereignty:People v. Gozo:Gozo bought house and lot inside the US naval reservation. She was told by the Mayor’soffice that she didn’t have a permit for reconstruction of her house. Gozo was chargedwith a violation of a municipal ordinance. She claimed that it was unconstitutional or thatit should not apply to her because she was inside the US bases and so the Mayor had no jurisdiction over her since US law governed there. The SC held that the Mayor has jurisdiction even if inside a military base because Philippine sovereign power is stillpresent. The Philippine has not abdicated its sovereignty but has consented (based oncomity) to the US to have preferential but NOT EXCLUSIVE jurisidiction of such offenses.

“Any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereignrights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary incharacter. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinctlanguage of Jellinek , “is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusivecapacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.” A state then, if it chooses to,may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.” The opinionwas at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance.



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“Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor doesthe matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in theexercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by nomeans follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retaintheir status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may bediminished, but it does not disappear . So it is with the bases under lease to theAmerican armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are notand cannot be foreign territory.”

Sec. 2: The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts thegenerally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land andadheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with allnations.

The Philippines denounces aggressive war NOT defensive war.

Some generally accepted principles of international law:1. right of an alien to be released on bail while awaiting deportation when his

failure to leave the country is due to the fact that no country will accept him.2. The right of a country to establish military commissions to try war criminals.3. The duty to protect the premises of embassies and legations.

Adoption of International law and the doctrine of incorporation:As applied to Treaties and AgreementsTañada v. Angara: [generally accepted principles of law common to civilizednations]Petition seeking to nullify the ratification of the Philippines to the WTO because the WTOwould allow foreign market to invade Filipino market to the detriment of the people. Theyfurther claimed that the WTO would limit, restrict and impair Philippine economicsovereignty. The SC held that the WTO was not absolute but only regulates somecommercial restrictions and that the WTO was the only viable structure for multilateraltreaty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of state power inexchange for greater benefits granted or derived from convention or pact. Whilesovereignty has traditionally been seen absolute it is subject to restrictions and limitationsvoluntarily agreed upon so it is not isolated from the rest of the world.

- In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts thegenerally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land,and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation andamity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound bygenerally accepted principles of law, which are considered automatically partof our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must beperformed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates alegally binding obligation on the parties.

- A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in itslegislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment ofthe obligations undertaken.

Equal Standing of International Law and Municipal LawLim vs. Executive SecretaryA rather recent formulation of the relation of international law vis-à-vis municipal law wasexpressed in Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, to wit:

x x x Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of theland does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over nationallaw in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most

countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, tonational legislation.

From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal lawpursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Further, a party to a treaty is notallowed to “invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure toperform a treaty.”Our Constitution espouses the opposing view. As stated in section 5 of Ar ticle VIII, the SChas the power over “all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,international or executive agreement , is in question.”

Ichong v. Hernandez, ruled that the provisions of a treaty are always subject toqualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police powerof the State.In Gonzales v. Hechanova, it was held that our Constitution authorizes thenullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also,when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

Phillip Morris vs. Fortune TobaccoPetitioners claim that an infringement of their respective trademarks had been committedand prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction against respondents. They claimthat they have registered the aforementioned trademarks in their respective countries oforigin and that, by virtue of the long and extensive usage of the same, these trademarkshave already gained international fame and acceptance.

The Philippines’ adherence to the Paris Convention effectively obligates the country tohonor and enforce its provisions as regards the protection of industrial property of foreignnationals in this country. However, any protection accorded has to be made subject to thelimitations of Philippine laws. Hence, despite Article 2 of the Paris Convention whichsubstantially provides that (1) nationals of member-countries shall have in this countryrights specially provided by the Convention consistent with Philippine laws, and enjoy theprivileges that Philippine laws grant to its nationals, and (2) while no domicilerequirement in the country where protection is claimed shall be required of personsentitled to the benefits of the Union for the enjoyment of any industrial property rights,foreign nationals must still observe and comply with the conditions imposed by Philippinelaw on its nationals.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care v. Duque: [Soft law]The milk code was passed to give effect to the International code of marketing treaty.DOH made regulations which was claimed to have expanded the coverage of the law (MilkCode). The SC held that it did expand the provisions of the law. Under the treaty itprovides a prohibition on advertisement (which was what the regulation was about) butthe Milk Code did not adopt this and thus we are not bound to do this. Furthermore, it

was not proven or established that it was customary international law, which would makeit incorporated in our country/laws. It was propounded that WHA Resolutions mayconstitute "soft law" or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence statebehavior.

"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law, it is an expressionof non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior. (ex. UNDeclaration of Human Rights, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), aspecialized agency on intellectual property, International Labor Organization and the Foodand Agriculture Organization).WHO has resorted to soft law during the SARS outbreak. It represented significant stepsin laying the political groundwork for improved international cooperation on infectiousdiseases. These resolutions clearly define WHO member states' normative duty tocooperate fully with other countries and with WHO in connection with infectious diseasesurveillance and response to outbreaks. The duty is neither binding nor

enforceable, but it powerful politically.



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For an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established thatsuch rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply withsuch rules (opinio juris). Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that theWHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced orpracticed by at least a majority of the member states; neither have respondents proventhat any compliance by member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory innature.Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions arecustomary international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. Legislation is

necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. Theprovisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law ofthe land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of alaw enacted by the legislature.

Sec. 3: Civilian authority is at all times, supreme over the military. The armed forces ofthe Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure thesovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

Civilian Supremacy : IBP v. Zamora:What is being assailed is the constitutional grounds of the order of president Erap indeploying marines to join the PNP in visibility campaignto patrol the metropolis becauseof high crime rates. The SC held that it was not unconstitutional because of thePresident’s power as commander in chief . This power is not limited to emergency butalso ensuring maintenance of day-to-day peace. Furthermore it does not violate civiliansupremacy clause because the marines aren’t doing anything but providing support andcooperation, in fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.

Sec. 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. Thegovernment may call upon the people to defend the State and in the fulfillment thereof,all citizens may be required, under the conditions provided by law, to render personalmilitary or civil service.

Sec. 5 : The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Kilosbayan vs. MoratoAs already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer

rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative orexecutive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effectdetermined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, thePCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by thePAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciableissue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity asit sees fit ."

Sec. 6: The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

STATE POLICIES:

Sec. 7 : The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with otherstates the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity,national interest, and the right to self-determination.

Generally, these provisions are that they are not self-executing provisions and thus needsome implementing acts of Congress.

The government must maintain an independent foreign policy and give paramountconsideration to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and self-determination.

Lim v. Executive Secretary:Balikatan exercises between the US and the Philippines (training program after 911) was

being conducted based on the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). It was claimed that the MDTwas only to be enforced in case of armed attack of an external aggressor. The SC heldthat the Balikatan was covered by the VFA which allows regulatory mechanism allowingthe US to visit when approved by the Philippine government. The constitution showsantipathy towards foreign military troops and WON they are engaged in combat is aquestion of fact (here it is combat related activities and not actual combat itself which justifies the exercise).

Sec. 8: The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policyof freedoms from nuclear weapons in its territory.

The policy is freedom from nuclear weapons exception to this policy however can bemade when made by political departments and justified by demands of the nationalinterest (the policy doesn’t prohibit the use of nuclear energy).

Sec. 9: The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standardof living and an improved quality of life for all.

Sec. 10: The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

Social justice: equalization of economic, political, and social opportunities with specialemphasis on the duty of the state to tilt the balance of social forces by favoring thedisadvantaged in life.

Sec. 11: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respectfor human rights.

Sec. 12: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthenthe family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the

mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right andduty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development ofmoral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Wisconsin v. Yoder: [Compulsory Education]Respondents are members of the Amish community. Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or private schooluntil reaching age 16 but the respondents declined to send their children, ages 14 and15, to public school after they complete the eighth grade as part of their Amish practiceto avoid their modern influences. There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having ahigh responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for thecontrol and duration of basic education. Providing public schools ranks at the very apex ofthe function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was made to yield to theright of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. Asthat case suggests, the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing

and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high



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place in our society. Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly werank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamentalrights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause ofthe First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religiousupbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, prepare (them) foradditional obligations.

Meyer v. Nebraska: the state may not prohibit the teaching of foreign languages tochildren.

In education, the primary right belongs to the parents. The Constitution affirms theprimary right of parents in the rearing of children to prepare them for a productive civicand social life and at the same time it affirms the secondary and supportive role of theState.The State as parens patriae has authority and duty to step in where parents fail to orare unable to cope with their duties to their children.

Sec. 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation- building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. Itshall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvementin public and civic affairs.

Protection begins from conception in order to prevent the State from adopting thedoctrine in the US Supreme Court decisions, which liberalized abortion.

Sec. 14: The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure thefundamental equality before the law of women and men.

Sec. 15 : The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instillhealth consciousness among them.

Sec. 16: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced andhealthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Oposa v. Factoran: [Inter-generational Responsibility]Minors represented by parents as a class of taxpayers filed a case against the DENRsecretary enjoining the latter to cancel all timber licenses and cease and desist fromrenewing or approving new timber licenses based on right to a balanced and healthfulecology. The SC held that the case involved a class suit where all have a common andgeneral interest – representing their generations and generations yet unborn

(intergenerational responsibility). There is a cause of action based on Art. 2, S. 16 of theConstitution which was deemed self-executing.

These basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed toexist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in thefundamental charter, it is because of the fear of its framers that without such mention,there will come a time when all would be lost. Such right carries with it the correlativeduty to refrain from impairing the environment.

MMDA Manila Bay Case: Continuing mandamus for environment cases (also upheld theright and related it to the right to life).

Sec. 17 : The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture,and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and promotetotal human liberation and development.

This however does not mean that the government is not free to balance the demands ofeducation against other competing and urgent demands.Neri after appearing and testifying before the Senate refused to answer three questionspertaining to the NBN-ZTE deal invoking executive privilege. After not showing up, he wascited for contempt. The SC ruled that the invocation of executive privilege was properlymade and the Senate failed to show a compelling reason in rebutting the presumption ofexecutive privilege for the divulging of the answers.

Sec. 18: The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the

rights of workers and promote their welfare.

Sec. 19: The state shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economyeffectively controlled by Filipinos.

Garcia v. BOI: Taiwanese investors of Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) wantedto transfer from Bataan to Batangas because they felt there were better labor conditions,LPG gas, and they would partner with Shell. The SC held the r ight of final choice where totransfer was not with the investors. Under the Constitution there are provisions regardingnational economy and patrimony. Petrochemical affects national interest thus governmentshould have final choice and Bataan was the better choice because there their partnerwould be a local company (PNOC) while if they went to Batangas it would be a foreigncompany (SHELL).

Sec. 20: The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise and provides incentives to needed investments.

Sec.21: The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform

Sec. 22: The state recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous culturalcommunities within the framework of national unity and development.

Sec. 23: The State shall encourage non-governmental community-based, or sectoralorganizations that promote the welfare of the nation.

Sec. 24: The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.

Sec. 25 : The State shall ensure the autonomy of Local Governments.

Sec. 26: The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and

prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

Pamatong v. Comelec:Petitioner wanted to run for President but the COMELEC denied his certificate ofcandidacy. Petitioner, thus, filed this petition alleging that his right to “equal access toopportunities for public service” under Section 26, Article II of the Constitution has beenviolated. The Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional right to run for or holdpublic office, Section 26 neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to thelevel of an enforceable right. There is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed bylaw. Moreover, the SC explained, that provisions under Article II are generally considerednot self-executing.Equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations such aspracticality, costs, etc. As long as the limitations apply to everyone without discriminationthen equal access clause is not violated.



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Sec. 27 : The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.

Sec. 28: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts andimplements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.Neri vs. Senate Neri after appearing and testifying before the Senate refused to answer three questionspertaining to the NBN-ZTE deal invoking executive privilege. After not showing up, he wascited for contempt. The SC ruled that the invocation of executive privilege was properly

made and the Senate failed to show a compelling reason in rebutting the presumption ofexecutive privilege for the divulging of the answers.

There are certain types of information which the government may withhold from thepublic," that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect tostate secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters"; and that"the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privilegedinformation’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meantPresidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-doorCabinet meetings.”

PSB and Garcia vs. Senate Impeachment Court [Carpio Dissent]:Government officials and employees have the “obligation” to disclose their assets to thepublic, and the public has “the right to know” the assets of government officials andemployees. This “obligation” of government officials and employees to disclose all theirassets is absolute and has no exception. The right of the public to know the assets ofgovernment officials and employees is also absolute and has no exception.

In Re: Production of Court Records:In line with the publics constitutional right to information, the Court has adopted a policyof transparency with respect to documents in its possession or custody, necessary tomaintain the integrity of its sworn duty to adjudicate justiciable disputes. This grant,however, is not as open nor as broad as its plain terms appear to project, as it is subjectto the limitations the laws and the Court’s own rules provide. As heretofore stated, for theCourt and the Judiciary, a basic underlying limitation is the need to preserve and

protect the integrity of their main adjudicative function. To qualify for protectionunder the deliberative process privilege, the agency must show that the document is both(1) predecisional and (2) deliberative:

A document is “predecisional” under the deliberative process privilege if it precedes, intemporal sequence, the decision to which it relates. Communications are considered

predecisional if they were made in the attempt to reach a final conclusion.

A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand, if it reflects the give- and-take of theconsultative process. The key question in determining whether the material isdeliberative in nature is whether disclosure of the information would discourage candiddiscussion within the agency. If the disclosure of the information would expose thegovernment’s decision- making process in a way that discourages candid discussionamong the decision-makers (thereby undermining the courts’ ability to perform theirfunctions), the information is deemed privileged.

Gamboa vs. Teves [generally, provisions outside Art. II-self-executing, unless“as may be provided by law”]While some constitutional provisions are self-executing, others are not. A constitutionalprovision is self-executing if it fixes the nature and extent of the right conferred and theliability imposed such that they can be determined by an examination and construction of

its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the

legislature for action. On the other hand, if the provision needs a supplementary orenabling legislation, it is merely a declaration of policy and principle, which is not self-executing.

ARTICLE VI: THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1: The legislative power shall be vested in the congress of the Philippines, whichshall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,Except to the extent reserved to the people by provision on initiative and referendum.

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them.

Bicameralism:1. Allows a body with national perspective to check the parochial tendency of

representatives.2. Allows for more careful study of legislation.3. Serves as training ground for national leaders.

Unicameralism: Simplicity of organization resulting in economy and efficiency, facility inpinpointing responsibility for legislation and avoidance of duplication.

Kinds of Legislative Power:1. Original Legislative Power: possessed by sovereign people2. Derivative Legislative Power: From sovereign delegated to legislative bodies.

3.

Constituent: the power to amend or revise the Constitution4. Ordinary: power to pass ordinary laws.

Limits on Legislative Power:1. Substantive: curtail the contents of law2. Procedural: curtail manner of passing laws

Plenary power is legislativeLegislative’s power to legislate is plenary and can legislate on any subject matter. For thisreason, Congress cant make irrepealable laws as this would curtain the plenary power offuture Congress.

The plenary powers of the legislative are subject only to Constitutional limitations. Thus,we have the following examples of Constitutional limitations to legislative power:A law passed by Congress cannot violate the ConstitutionCongress cannot pass a law that amounts to a usurpation of executive or judicialprerogativesCongress cannot pass a law that allows it to appoint officials in the executive departmentThe Senate cannot initiate appropriation and tariff bills

Non-delegability of Legislative PowerLegislative power is generally non-delegable under the principle of delegata potestasnon potest delegari. The sovereign people saw it fit to delegate legislative powers toCongress. Congress, therefore, cannot abdicate itself of this mandate by furtherdelegating this power to another body.

This principle however admits several exceptions in our jurisdiction:1. Delegation of legislative power to local governments2. Delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies3. Constitutionally recognized exceptions



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Grant of Quasi-Legislative Power to LGUs and Administrative Bodies

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (1919)Valid vs. Invalid delegation"The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law,which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or

discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The firstcannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."

Discretion may be committed by the legislature to an executive department or official.The legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officialsthereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions offact. The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the "necessity," ofthe case.

Legislative delegation to local authoritiesAn exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the centrallegislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.

Instances of Delegation allowed by the Constitution • Congress may, by law, grant the President necessary powers during times of

war and national emergencies for a limited period and subject to restrictions.This grant of power may include legislative power. [Art. VI, Sec 23(2)]

• The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits,and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties orimposts within the framework of the national development program of theGovernment. [Art. VI, Sec. 28(2)]

Valid Delegation of Legislative PowerNecessity of delegating subordinate legislationThe validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutionallandscape. In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and theincreasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demandingits attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies thepower of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here. (SJS v. DDB, 2008)

Requisites of a valid delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies:It must be made clear that legislative power cannot be delegated to administrativeagencies. What is delegated is only rule-making power or law execution.

They are allowed to:o “Fill up the details” of an already complete statute through

implementing rules and regulationso Or to ascertain facts necessary to bring a contingent law into actual

operation.

How do you distinguish between delegation of law-making powers and thedelegation of law execution powers?There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation oflegislative power, viz., the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.

Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when itleaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will haveto do is enforce it.Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in thelaw to map out the boundaries of the delegateÊs authority and prevent the delegationfrom running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislativeauthority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature andexercise a power essentially legislative. (Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA)

Elements of a Valid Delegation1. Completeness:• The Law must be complete in itself• It must set forth therein the policy to be carried out or implemented by the

delegate

What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, notwhat the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of thelegislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to thedelegate. (Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA)

2. The law must fix a sufficient standardLimits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinableThese will guide the delegate in the performance of his functions.The standards formulated need not be in precise language rather it can be drawn fromthe declared policy of the law and from the totality of the delegating statute.It may even be embodied in other states on the same subject as the challenged law.

Sufficient standards of delegation of legislative powerParenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards “publicinterest” in People v. Rosenthal , “ justice and equity” in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, “public convenience and welfare” in Calalang v. Williams, and “simplicity, economyand efficiency” in Cervantes v. Auditor General , to mention only a few cases. In theUnited States, the “sense and experience of men” was accepted in Mutual Film Corp.v. Industrial Commission, and “national security” in Hirabayashi v. United States.(Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA)

“Public Interest” as a standard[T]he term "public interest" is not without a settled meaning. "Appellant insists that thedelegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion isuncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a

mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations,The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision inquestion show the contrary. (People v. Rosenthal, 1939)

A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. Norneed it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes onthe same subject as that of the challenged legislation. (Chiongbian v. Orbos, 1995)

Others based on case law:

Standard Delegation

Law requiring every public utility tofurnish annually a detailed report offinances and operations which theBoard may from time to timeprescribe.

Invalid delegation because it was togeneral. (Compania general detabacos v. Board)



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If for any cause conditions ariseresulting in an extraordinary rise ofpalay, the Governor general canpromulgate temporary rules andemergency measures fixing the priceof cereals

Invalid since no standard to guide theGovernor General as to whatconstitutes an extraordinary rise in theprice of palay. (United States v. Ang)

A regulation penalizing electro fishing. Invalid as it was not one of the formspunished in the Fisheries Act. It wentbeyond the scope. (People v. Maceren)

RA 6640 decreed a wage increasehigher than the CBA increase, DOLEthen issued a regulation whichprovided that salary increases madepursuant to a CBA would not beconsidered as compliance with thenew law.

Invalid since it expanded the law itselfby providing such condition (CebuOxygen & Acetylene v. Sec. Drilon).

Oil deregulation law provided twofactors to consider in effecting fullderegulation of oil industries. Anotherfactor however was considered.

Invalid because resulted in therewriting of the standards set forthunder the law. (Tatad v. Sec. Departof Energy)

Secretary of Agricultural by law wasauthorized to restrict the use of anyfishing net or fishing device for theprotection of fish fry or fish eggs.

Thus, a regulation was passedprohibiting the use of trawls.

Valid since details were provided bylaw ( Araneta v. Gatmaitan).

LOI was issued requiring the use ofEarly Warning Devices

Valid since the standard of “safetransit upon the roads” is sufficient.Furthermore we accept the generallyaccepted principles of international law(based on Geneva Convention onRoads Signs and Signals). ( Agustin v.Edu).

Law which authorized the MedicalBoard of Examinations to have testsfor entrance to medical schoolsassailed because no sufficientstandards.

Valid, the standard found in the law’sdesire for the “standardization andregulation of medical education.”(Tablarin v. Gutierrez).

Contingent Legislation

While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to theenforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them,including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends,the rationale being that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactmentof legislation is not of itself a legislative function but is simply ancillary to legislation.(ABAKADA v. Ermita, 2005)

Laws may be made effective on certain contingencies. The legislature may delegate apower not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts issuch a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative inascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of alaw. (People v. Vera)

Where the effectivity of the law is made dependent on the verification by the executive ofthe existence of certain condition, it is not a delegation of legislative power. This is called

contingent legislation. Congress provides the conditions required before a law takeseffect; the executive factually determines when those conditions exist. (ABAKADA v.Ermita, 2005)

Filling in detailsThere is no undue delegation of legislative power when there is only a grant of the powerto “fill up” or provide the details of legislation because Congress did not have the facilityto provide for them.

To a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations tobe adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, anact of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule ordefinite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of thediscretionary powers delegated to it. (People v. Vera, 1937)

Undue DelegationThe legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the ProbationAct to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincialboards to determine. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in itsprovince, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for thesalary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to theprovincial boards. (People v. Vera)

Legislative Veto of Implementing Rules and RegulationsAfter the enactment of a law, congressional oversight is limited to scrutiny andinvestigation. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powersguaranteed by the Constitution.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrativeagency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congresswhich, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” toapprove or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. It is unconstitutional

Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon thelegality of IRR’s by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing thecalculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. The discretion to approve ordisapprove Rules and Regulations is a judicial power. (Abakada v. Purisima)

Rules and regulations may have the force of penal laws if:1. the delegating statute itself must specifically authorize the promulgation of

penal regulations2. The penalty must not be left to the admin agency but provided by the statute

itself.3. The regulation must be published in the official gazette or a newspaper of

general circulation.- There should be designated limits of the penalty and it should not be left to the

discretion to the judge (penalty of “imprisonment, in the discretion of the court”is invalid because it is not for the court to fix the term of imprisonment whereno points of reference have been provided by the legislature- (People v.Dacuycuy ).

Dagan v. PRC:Phil. Racing Commission (PhilRaCom) made a directive pursuant to law to come up withrules on how to check horses for Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA). The Philippine RacingClub and Manila Jockey Club then came up with their own rules. Race horse

owners contested the rules. The SC said that the delegation to PhilRaCom is



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valid pursuant to the need to control the security of racing. Also there was no delegationfrom PhilRaCom to Philippine Racing Club or Manila Jockey because what was issued wasmerely a directive and it was up to them how they are to implement it, the duty andobligation to do such coming from their respective franchises.Sec. 2: The senate shall be composed of twenty-four senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines,as may be provided by law.

Sec. 3: No person shall be a senator unless:

1.

He is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines2.

On the day of the election is at least thirty-five years of age3. Able to Read and Write,4. A Registered voter5. And a Resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately

preceding the day of the election.Day of the election means the day the votes are cast

Sec. 4: The term of office of the Senators shall be Six years and shall commence, unlessotherwise provided by law, at noon on thirtieth of June (June 30) next following theelection. No senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntaryrenunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruptionin the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

A person may serve as a senator for more than 2 terms, provided they are notconsecutive

Sec. 5:(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and

fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislativedistricts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area inaccordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of auniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be electedthrough a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties ororganizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total numberof representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive termsafter the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-listrepresentatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from thelabor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, andsuch other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fiftythousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make areapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in thissection.

Classification of House Representatives1. District Representatives

a. Elected on the basis of geographic divisions called legislative districts2. Party-List Representatives

a. Elected through the party-list system

Legislative Districts Made by law and are based on proportional representation.

Party List:Based on underrepresented and marginalized (not geographic based)Registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations submit a list ofcandidates in order of priority.During congressional elections, such parties or organizations are voted for at large andthe number of seats a party or organizations will get out of the 20% allocated for party-list representatives will depend on number of votes garnered worldwide.Details for operation of party list will be provided by law.

Guidelines for Party List:1. The party or organization must represent the marginalized andunderrepresented.

2. Political parties who wish to participate must comply with this policy.3. The religious sector may not be represented. (But a religious person/leaders

may be elected the prohibition is representation of a religious sect).4. The party or organization must not be disqualified under RA 7941.

a. It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or associationorganized for religious purposes;

b. It advocates violence or unlawful;c. It is a foreign party or organizationd. It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political

party, organization directly or indirectlye. Violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to

elections;f. It declares untruthful statements in its petition;g. It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; orh. It fails to participate in the last two preceding elections OR fails to

obtain at least two percentum of the votes cast under the party-listsystem in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which ithas registered.

5. The part or organization must not be an adjunct of or a project organized or anentity funded or assisted by the government.

6. Its nominees must comply with requirements of law7. Nominee must be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of

legislation that will benefit the nation.It is for the COMELEC to decide WON a party list system is qualified or not.

Qualifications for Party List Representative:1. Natural born citizen of the Philippines2. Registered Voter

3. Resident of the Philippines for at least one year immediately preceding the dayof the election

4. Able to read and write5. Bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for

at least 90d preceding the day of the election6. At least 25y of age on the day of the election

( If youth sector he must be at least 25y old but not more than 30y of age on the day ofthe election – If he turns 30y old during his term he will be allowed to continue).

Party-list representationThe 20% allocation for party-list representatives is not mandatory. It merely provides theceiling as to the maximum number of party-list seats in Congress. (VeteransFederation Party v. Comelec, 2000)



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Can Congress require parties to obtain at least 2% of the total number of votesbefore it can be entitled to a seat in Congress? Can Congress prohibit partiesfrom holding more than 3 seats in the house?Yes. Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates fromthe people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them, but to have meaningfulrepresentation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number ofpeople. (Veterans)However, this 2% threshold was held unconstitutional in Banat .

What are the parameters of the Filipino Party-list system?1.

The twenty percent allocationthe combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twentypercent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, includingthose elected under the party list.

2. The two percent thresholdonly those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total validvotes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in theHouse of Representatives.

3. The three-seat limit-each.A qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, isentitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one “qualifying” and twoadditional seats.

4. Proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes.”

What are the guidelines for screening party-list participants?1. First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the

marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941.2. Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the

Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with thedeclared statutory policy enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized andunderrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives.

3. Third, the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system.4. Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA

7941.5. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or

an entity funded or assisted by, the government.6. Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law. Its

nominees must likewise do so.

7. Seventh, not only candidate party or organization must represent marginalized andunderrepresented sectors. So also must its nominees.

8. Eighth, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewisebe able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation thatwill benefit the nation as a whole.

Can political parties participate in the party list system?For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on thebasis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the TenthCongress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.(RA 7941)

Under the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) 7941, political parties cannot be disqualifiedfrom the party-list elections merely on the ground that they are political parties. (AngBagong Bayani v. Comelec, 2001)

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veteransdisallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directlyor indirectly. (BANAT v. Comelec, 2009)

Can a party nominate a person who is not a member of the sector that isrepresented by the party?It is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized andunderrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list

organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized andunderrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5, and the persons nominated bythe party-list candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalizedand underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.” (Ang Bagong Bayani v.Comelec)

How do we determine the number of seats for Party representatives?1. Determine the number of seats allocated for party list representatives. We do this by

dividing the total number of legislative Districts by 80% and multiplying the quotientby 20%. The product is the total number of party-list seats.

2. The parties are then ranked on the basis of their percentage of their votes inproportion to the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates.

3. All Parties that garner 2% of the votes qualify for 1 seat in Congress. This is the firstround.

4. The second round is to determine the number of additional seats [a two stepprocess]:

a. First, multiply the percentage of votes of every party by the number ofremaining seats. The product, rounded down, is the number of additionalseats that party is entitled to.

b. Second, assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank untilall available seats are completely distributed.

5. Each party is entitled to no more than 3 party-list seats.

Example:R ank

P ar

t y

V o t e s R

e c .

V o t e s

r e c .

ov

er

t o t al

v o t e s f or

p ar

t y

G u ar

an

t e e d

S e a t

( F I R

S T

A d d t l

S e a t

( S E

C .R

O UND

)

( C )

B

+ C

i n

wh

ol e

i n t e g er

( T

o t al

r e c .

s e a t s )

A p pl y

3

s e a t

c a p

1 Buhay 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.2 Bayan

Muna979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A4 APEC 621, 171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 Na(etc. it just keeps going like this until zero na yung additional seats)TOTAL 17 55

Why did Banat abandon the formula used in Veterans for determining additionalseats?The allocation of additional seats according to the 2% threshold is unconstitutionalbecause it makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number ofavailable party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. Thus,it frustrates the attainment of the 20% permissive ceiling provided in the Constitution.The SC therefore struck down the two percent threshold only in relation to the

distribution of additional seats as found in RA 7491 since it is an unwarranted



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obstacle to the full implementation of Sec. 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution to attain “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the HR.”

The 2 percent threshold is therefore struck down only in relation to the distribution of theadditional seats.

Additional Issues: 1. The reason behind the three-seat cap was in order to prevent any party from

dominating the party-list election.2. Neither the constitution or RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from

participating in the party-list system. To be able to be a party-list organization’snominee he need not be poor or wallow in poverty. It is enough that he belongsto the marginalized or underrepresented sectors (if he is representing fisherfolkhe should be a fisherman, if he is representing senior citizens he should be asenior citizen)

3. The constitution does not mandate the filling up of the entire 20% allocation ofparty list system, but we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision inthe law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% partylist representatives from being filled.

ApportionmentApportionment - the determination of the number of representatives which a State,county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats ina legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so asto equalize population

Reapportionment - the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about bychanges in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality ofrepresentation.

Gerrymandering: formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for thepurpose of favoring a candidate or a party, is not a allowed

Sema v. Comelec:The creation of cities and provinces necessarily includes the creation of legislative districtswhich only congress can do. Thus the creation of the ARMM resolution is unconstitutionalsince it creates a new province (which necessarily results in the creation of a legislativedistrict a power only the congress can exercise).

Thus, reapportionment may be done through a special law or through a city charter.

Congress cannot delegate the power to create a province or city because this powerinherently involves the power to create a legislative district. A delegate[ARMM] cannotalter the very composition of the Congress by creating legislative districts (orCities/provinces which are in turn, entitled to legislative representation). (Sema v.Comelec, 2008)

Rules on Apportionment 1. It must be in accordance with the number of the respective inhabitants and on the

basis of a uniform and progressive ratio2. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,

and adjacent territory3. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,

shall have at least one representative.4. Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a

reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this

section.

Aquino v. Comelec (2010)There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum populationthat must compose a legislative district.

The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum populationrequirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by

another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.Navarro v. Ermita (2011)Requirements for creating a city or a province:

1. Average annual income, of not less than Twenty million pesos2. And either of the following requisites:

(i) Contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square km; or,(ii) Population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants

Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and incomeof the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimumrequirements prescribed herein.

" The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands or is separatedby a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

" The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created

is composed of 1 or more islands." The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,

exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

Bagabuyo v. Comelec (2008)The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carryout any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a localgovernment unit. No plebiscite requirement exists under the legislative apportionmentor reapportionment provision.

Sec. 6: No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is anatural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, aregistered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a

period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Congress CANNOT increase or decrease the qualifications provided under theConstitution.

Bengson v. HRET and Cruz (2001)There are three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a formercitizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that anaturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as anaturalized Filipino citizen. If he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost hisPhilippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC:



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In this case the Court clarified what is meant by residence. What is required is not justtemporary residence but domicile. A person’s domicile is his domicile of origin and if aperson never loses his domicile then the one year requirement is not relevant becauseone is never deemed to left the place. But if a person loses his domicile and seeks to re-establish domicile then the one year requirement becomes relevant. In this case recordsshow that although she registered in a different place, and many residences in order tofollow her husband she still had close ties with her domicile, she still had birthdays there,her ancestral home was there, etc.

For domicile there must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi . Thepurpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;the change of residence must be voluntary and the residence at the place chosen for thenew domicile must be actual.

To establish new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled withconduct indicative of that intention. While with residence all that is required is bodilypresence in a given place.

Domino v. Comelec: Domino had a lease contract in Sarangani which is indicative ofintent to reside there but does not show the kind of permanency required to proveabandonment of one’s original domicile. Also Domino still a registered voter of QuezonCity, although it is not conclusive it is a strong presumption.

Maquera v. Borra: Congress cannot pass a law requiring that candidates for the House must post a bond ofone year’s salary. Such amounts to a property qualification which is contrary to the social justice provision in the constitution.

The requirement of a mandatory drug testing for Senatorial candidates [and othercandidates whose qualifications are prescribed by the Constitution] amounts to animposition of additional qualifications to the office. Such an imposition is unconstitutional.(SJS v. DDB, 2008)

Sec. 7: The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of threeyears which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shallserve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for anylength of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service forthe full term for which he was elected.

A member of the House may serve for more than three terms as long as it is notsuccessive.

Fariñas v. Executive Secretary :An elective official who files his certificate of candidacy is not considered ipso facto resigned, an appointive official however who files a COC is deemed ipso facto resigned.(The old rule used to be that any elective official whether local or national would bedeemed ipso facto resigned if he runs for any other office other than the one he isholding—this has ben repealed).

Term v. Tenure: Term is the period that an official is entitled to hold office while tenure isthe period during which the official actually holds the office.

Sec. 8: Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the

Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

Sec. 9: In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a specialelection may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but theSenator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for theunexpired term.

If there is a vacancy it is NOT MANDATORY to have a special election, the matter is left tothe discretion of congress.Lucero Case: In case of special elections there is no need to fill in unless Congress

decides to. However, if there is a failure of elections Congress MUST fill in the vacancy.Tolentino v. COMELEC:Guingona was appointed by GMA as VP and thus there was a vacancy in senate. Underthe law the special elections to fill such would be held during the next election. COMELECthen made the candidate with the 13th highest vote to fill that seat. However it wascontended that COMELEC never gave notice regarding it and thus should not beconsidered. The SC held that the failure to give notice is not a problem since there wasalready a law, which provides that the next election would have that and thus the date ofwhen the special elections is deemed fix. The people are charged with knowledge as towhat the law is and when and where the next elections are.

Sec. 10: The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall bedetermined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after theexpiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives approving such increase.

Increase in emoluments seem to be permitted since the prohibition is with regard to theimmediate increase of compensation/salaries. However, if we follow the spirit of Philconsav. Mathay the prohibition is an absolute ban on any form of direct or indirect increase ofsalary.

Congress may increase limit on allowances for travel and office since such do not formpart of the salary or compensation, allowances take effect immediately.

Sec. 11: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while theCongress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

The privilege against arrest is available only when congress is in session whether regular

or special and whether or not the legislator is actually attending a session (thus notavailable during recess).

The privilege of speech granted to Congress is limited only to forums other than Congressbut does not protect the speaker from disciplinary authority of the Congress.

- It is an absolute protection against suits for libel.- Speech or debate includes utterances made in the performance of official

functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, votes casts, as well asbills introduce and other acts done in the performance of official duties.

- Not necessary that congress is in session for privilege of speech what isessential is that the utterance constitutes legislative action.

- Privilege extends to agents of assemblymen, provided that agency consistsprecisely in assisting the legislator in the performance of legislative action.

People v. Jalosjos:



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Jalosjos was charged with statutory rape and claimed that he should be allowed to attendsessions in Congress to give voice to people of Zamboanga since they elected him. TheSC ruled that there is no reason to exempt him from imprisonment as the immunity doesnot apply to him rape being a crime punishable for more than 6 years. Furthermore, toallow him to attend session five times a week would be a mockery to the justice system.The voters of Zamboanga knew when they voted him that he had limitations due to theimprisonment also there is no substantial distinction between a Congressman and anyother person that would give him preferential treatment from other detainees.

Trillanes v. PimentelAllowing a detained member of Congress to attend congressional sessions and committeemeetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with allthe privileges appurtenant to his position such an aberrant situation not only elevates hisstatus to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of thecorrection system.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred bythe voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in theConstitution and echoed by jurisprudence the mandate of the people yields to theConstitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang:Plaintiffs sought recovery from Cabangbang for damages based on an open letter claimedto be libelous. Claimed that as a member of the HR at the time such speech was made heis immune. The SC held however that a letter does not fall under the immunity but themessage of the letter was actually not libelous because it did not really say that theywere liable for anything rather that they were being used as tools in a corrupt plan.

Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago:During a speech delivered in Congress, Santiago said she wanted to spit on Chief JusticePanganiban’s face and she criticized the courts. The SC ruled such was privileged since itwas pursuant to opening the eyes of people for further investigations in anomalies in the judiciary. But the SC went further to say that senate should have disciplined her andreminded her of her duty to respect the courts.

Sec. 12: All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, uponassumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. Theyshall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from thefiling of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.

Sec. 13: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any otheroffice or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentalitythereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any officewhich may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term forwhich he was elected.

Liban v. Gordon: The Philippine red cross is not a GOCC but is a private corporation performing a publicfunction thus the fact that Gordon is the chairman does not mean that he forfeits his seatin the Senate.

Even if a member of congress resigns his seat he cannot accept an appointment to anoffice which may have been created or emolument increased during his term.

Sec. 14: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appearas counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicialand other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interestedfinancially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by theGovernment, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including anygovernment-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

There are three prohibitions under Sec. 14:1. Personal appearance as counsel before any court, quasi-judicial body, or tribunal2. Direct or indirect financial interest in any government contract, franchise or special

privilege during his term.a. The contracts referred to here are those involving "financial interest," that

is, contracts from which the legislator expects to derive some profit at theexpense of the government.

b. Provision uses the word “term” and not “tenure”3. Intervention in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary

benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.a. The last sentence restores an inhibition originally imposed by the 1935

Constitution. Although this provision has never been judicially interpreted,it may be surmised that the rule shall apply to the case, say, of thechairman of the committee on banks serving as legislative consultant for aprivate bank. (Senate.gov.ph)

Puyat v. De Guzman (1982)An assemblyman cannot indirectly fail to follow the Constitutional prohibition not toappear as counsel before an administrative tribunal like the SEC by buying a nominalamount of share of one of the shareholders after his appearance as counsel therein wascontested.

If the legislator is not trying to indirectly appear as counsel for another, can heintervene in a case representing himself?It can be argued that he can.

Sec. 15: The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for itsregular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in sessionfor such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of itsnext regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The Presidentmay call a special session at any time.

In a special session called by the President is done when legislature is in recess andduring the session the legislature can only consider the subject matter designated by thepresident.

Sec. 16:(1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker,

by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such otherofficers as it may deem necessary.

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smallernumber may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absentMembers in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

(3)

Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members fordisorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall

not exceed sixty days.



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(4)

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish thesame, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; andthe yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of theother, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in whichthe two Houses shall be sitting.

Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona:Senators Fernan and Tatad contested for the Senate Presidency. Fernan won by a vote of20 to 2. With the agreement of Sen. Santiago, Tatad manifested that he was assumingthe position of minority leader explaining that those who had voted for Fernan comprisedthe majority while those who voted for him were minority. However LAKAS senatorschose Guingona as minority leader. Fernan recognized G as such and so S and T filedbefore the SC. The SC held first that they had power and jurisdiction to inquire whetherthe Senate or its officials committed violation of the Constitution or exercised GAD inexercise of their functions. Art. 6, Sec. 16 is explicit on the manner of electing a SenatePresident and House speaker but silent on the manner of electing other officers. Themethod therefore should be left to internal rules prescribed by the Senate. Thus ongrounds of respect for separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internalaffairs of the legislature.

Avelino v. Cuenco (Quorum)When the constitution states that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean all the members. There is a difference between a majority of “all the members of the House” and a majority of “the House” the latter requiring lessnumber. Thus an absolute majority of 12 members of the senate is a constitutionalmajority of the Senate for purpose of a quorum.

1 senator who was in the US was not considered in determining the quorum. This isbecause he is beyond the jurisdiction of Senate’s compulsory powers.

A controversy over the selection of Senate president is not within the jurisdiction of theSupreme Court, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of thecontroversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its ownpresident, which power should not be interfered with nor taken over by the judiciary. Theselection of the presiding officer of the Philippine Senate affects only the senatorsthemselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstatethem.

Datu Abas Kida v. Senate (2011) A law that requires a 2/3 supermajority vote by Congress to amend or repeal isunconstitutional. The 2/3 vote is more than what the Constitution demands and gives thelaw the character of an irrepealable law. The requirement would restrain the plenarypowers of future Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.

Arroyo v. De Venecia (Internal Rules and Discipline)The validity of a law on tax on cigarettes and beer was assailed as invalid because theyfailed to get the yeas and nays and didn’t listen to objections of Senator Arroyo when hegave them contrary to the provisions of the Rules of the HR and under the Constitutionthe HR can make their own internal rules and a violation of such is a violation of theConstitution. The SC ruled that such were merely internal rules and are procedural withwhich the Court has no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislativebody. (Enrolled Bill: Under the Enrolled Bill Doctrine, the signing by the Speaker and the

President of the Senate and the certification of the secretaries of both houses are

conclusive of its due enactment and is a conclusive presumption except when there isnecessity to go behind and consult the journal to determine whether certain provisions ofa statute have been approved. In this case however, there is no necessity to go behindthe enrolled bill doctrine and so the Court will respect the certification that the bill hasbeen duly passed.)Osmeña v. Pendatum:Osmeña during a privileged speech made accusations about the president and saying thathe was corrupt. The Senate however cons idered it disorderly conduct and suspended him.He claimed privileged immunity. He now claims that he can’t be suspended because

under the House rules, can only suspend after the speech before taking up other mattersand in this case it was done after other matters were taken up etc. The Court howeverruled that the rules adopted by the legislature are subject to revocation, modification,waiver, at the pleasure of the legislature. Mere failure to conform with internal rules willnot invalidate the procedure. (With regard to parliamentary immunity, although they maybe immune from courts they are not immune from disciplinary action that the legislaturemay take against them to discipline them).

US v. Pons (Duty to keep Journals and Records)In this case Pons was being punished for Act 2381 which penalized illegal importation ofopium. Pons claims that the law is invalid because it was made after the session ofcongress was closed. He claimed that although the date of adjournment of the Senatewas on February 28. The law was enacted after midnight or on February 29, he claimedthat they stopped the clock etc. so that the records would reveal that the law was madewhen the legislature adjourned sine die (on the day itself) at 12 midnight of Feb. 28. Thushe seeks to introduce extraneous evidence to prove all of this. The SC said that the courtsmay not go behind the legislative journal for the purpose of determining the date ofadjournment when such journals are clear and explicitly that they adjourned sine die.

Casco Philippines v. Gimenez:Casco claims that under the law which exempts from taxation “urea formaldehyde” theraw materials of “urea” and “formaldehyde” are also exempt based on the intent of thesenate that can be supported by the statements made during the deliberation of the bill.The SC said that the enrolled bill which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” is conclusiveupon the courts as regard the tenor of measure passed by congress and approved by thePresident. If there is a mistake in the printing etc the remedy is amendment or curativelegislation not judicial decree. The wording of the enrolled bill prevails. (If the signatureson the enrolled bill are not complete or are retracted then there is no enrolled bill and youcan go to the journals to check).

ABAKADA v. Ermita:

The Bicameral Conference Committee was meant to harmonize conflicting provisionsbetween the Senate and the House. In this case the following were agreed on (basicallySenate amendments were adopted):

1. What rate, 10% or 12%? To bridge the gap they decided 10% first then whenother circumstances present 12%.

2. WON VAT on electricity should not be passed on consumers? Denied. No pass onprovision.

3. In what manner should input tax credits be limited? 70% credit rather than100%.

4. NIRC provision on corporate income should be amended.

Osmena v. Pendatum: The Court may not exercise judicial review over the disciplinary action taken by Congressagainst one of its members because the Congress is the sole judge of what disorderlybehavior is.



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What is the Enrolled Bill doctrine?The signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President iand thecertification of the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that such bill was passed areconclusive of its due enactment. (Arroyo v. De Venecia)

The respect due to a co-equal department requires the courts to accept the certification ofthe presiding officer as conclusive assurance that the bill so certified is authentic.(Casco)

But if the officers withdraw their certification, then the presumption is no longerconclusive.

Sec. 17: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an ElectoralTribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, andqualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed ofnine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated bythe Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House ofRepresentatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportionalrepresentation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered underthe party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shallbe its Chairman.

Election Contest: When a defeated candidate challenges the qualification and claims theseat of a proclaimed winner, the respective Electoral Tribunal of each House is the sole judge (Not The SC nor the House of Congress, nor the COMELEC). --- The COMELEC en

banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates ofcanvass.

- Each house has the power to defer the oath-taking of members until the finaldetermination of election contests filed against them.

Electoral Tribunals:- Once the candidate or the party-list nominee has been proclaimed, taken his

oath, and assumed office, the COMELECE !s jurisdiction over election contestsrelating to his qualifications ends

- The jurisdiction transfers from the COMELEC to the Electoral Tribunal once thewinning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as amember of the HR.

- Although the HRET decides when a party-list REPRESENTATIVE is qualified, theCOMELEC has the authority to decide WON a party-list organization is qualified.

- Congress does not possess the powers to regulate even the procedural matters

of the Electoral Tribunals.- Litigants that appear before HRET are bound to know and are expected to

properly comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the tribunal andthus there is no grave abuse of discretion if the Electoral Tribunal applies itsrules strictly (Garcia v. HRET).

- The power of ETs as sole judge of contests also gives them the power to maketheir own rules meaning that they can have different periods then thoseprovided in election code.

Vera v. Avelino ( Definition of election contest)A Comelec gave a report to the president that there was terrorism and violence in NuevaEcija and therefore the elections there didn’t really reflect the true and free expression ofpopular will. Senate then made a resolution because of this and petitioners were not yetallowed to sit in congress. Petitioners filed a case with the electoral tribunal to make themsit. The SC said that it is the Congress itself and not the Electoral Tribunal doesn’t have

jurisdiction because they only handle election contests meaning that the person who files

wants to replace someone. An Electoral Tribunal was given the power to decide “allcontests” (as compared to “all the powers of the House or Senate as the sole judge of theelection.”). This definition of relating only to contests limits it to when there are proteststo a return or candidate, if it is not given this limitation then they would have the powerto look into even the election of members who have not been protested. If a member ofthe House inquires into the qualification of any member it is NOT A CONTEST becausethere is no ousting to replace the person and this power is no longer with the Electoraltribunal but a House power itself.The Senate has the power to postpone or suspend their assumption into office, they may

suspend a member and the courts cannot order that they be reinstated etc otherwise itwould amount to judicial predominance.

Abayon v. HRET ( Jurisdiction over party-list) The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five fromamong them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. Butwhere an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed adisqualified nominee to become its party-list representative, the resolution of the disputeis taken out of its hand. It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particularqualification of a nominee – the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or arepresentative of his party-list organization.

Bondoc v. Pineda (Non-partisan)As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge theirfunctions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independencefrom the political party to which they belong. Hence, “disloyalty to party” and “breach ofparty discipline” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.

Membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, theexpiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,resignation from-the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation withanother political party, or removal for-other valid cause. A member may not be expelledby the House of Representatives for “party disloyalty” short of proof that he has formallyaffiliated with another political group.

Sec. 18: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of theSenate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House ofRepresentatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation fromthe political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list systemrepresented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of atie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session

days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority voteof all the Members.

Function of the COA: legislative check on appointing authority of the President.

Daza v. Singson (political alignments):The House of Representatives may change its representation in the Commission onAppointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the politicalalignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanentand do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severanceof political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from onepolitical party to another.

Coseteng v. Mitra(proportional representation):The apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on

Appointments is done on the basis of proportional representation of the political



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parties therein. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lonemember represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she isnot entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be ableto claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political partyshould represent at least 8.4% of the House membership

Guingona v. Gonzales (undue reduction of representation of another party):LDP was entitled to 7.5 members to sit on COA and was rounded to 8 giving Romulo ofLDP a seat. LP was entitled to 0.5 seats so given 1 seat. The SC said such rounding off isviolative of the Constitution because it should be based on proportional representation.And if you use this method you increase your share by decreasing other party’srepresentation. Furthermore, the Constitution doesn’t mandate that all 12 seats in COAshould be filled. The may perform their functions as long as there is the required quorum,usually a majority of its membership. The COA may perform its functions and transact itsbusiness even if only ten senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists.

Sec. 19: The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall beconstituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shallhave been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commissionon Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of itsChairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as areherein conferred upon it.

- The commission must act on all appointments submitted to it within thirtysession days from submission.

- The commission shall decide by a majority vote.- The Commission can meet and act ONLY when Congress is in session.

Sec. 20: The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and beopen to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by theCommission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to andexpenses incurred for each Member.

Sec. 21: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committeesmay conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall berespected.

Senate Blue Ribbon v. Judge Majaducon: Anyone except the President and Justices of the Supreme Court may be summoned.

Neither the can the court prevent a witness from appearing in such hearings.

Senate v. Ermita" Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized

exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege.”

" When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for departmentheads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They arenot exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.

" Section 1 of E.O. 464, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VIof the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid oflegislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances ofdepartment heads in the question hour contemplated in said Section 22, but

could not be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of

legislation. The requirement to secure presidential consent under Section 1,limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.

" When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be affordedreasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of thepossible need for invoking the privilege.

Executive privilege It has been defined as “the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress,” as well as “the right of the President and high-levelexecutive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, andultimately the public.”Nature of the information is controllingExecutive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, isrecognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. Theextraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavilyagainst executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.Privilege as to a class of personsPrivilege is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not tocategories of persons.

Claims of priviliegeDue respect for a co-equal branch of government demands no less than a claim ofprivilege clearly stating the grounds therefor

Guidani v. Senga:The President has constitutional authority to prevent a member of the armed forces fromtestifying before a legislative inquiry, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, andthat as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before itof a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under lawto compel such attendance. The President may be commanded by judicial order to compelthe attendance of the military officer.

Requisites of Inquiry under Sec. 21Bengzon v. Senate Blue RibbonThe power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is notabsolute or unlimited. The investigation must be:

1. In aid of legislation

2. In accordance with its duly published rules of procedure3. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall berespected.

The rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right todue process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self.

Inquiry must be in aid of LegislationDe la Paz v. Senate:De la paz went with a delegation representing the government in Moscow. On their wayback he was found in the airport with 45k Euros, he was allowed to return to thePhilippines but the money was confiscated. Upon his return he was subpoenaed by theSenate Committee for investigation. He claimed lack of jurisdiction because it did notinvolve foreign relations and so they could not pass upon it. The SC ruled however it didinvolve foreign relations since under Senate rules all matters relating to

relations of the Philippines with other nations will be under the jurisdiction on



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the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Moscow incident could create otherconsequences toward the Philippines and its relation to other countries and our obligationwith the international community to comply with our international obligations (UNCAC,etc.). Furthermore, The Senate has decided that legislative inquiry will be jointlyconducted with the Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of PublicOfficers and Investigations). The Senate Rules mandate the Blue Ribbon to conductinvestigation on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance inoffice by officers of the govt. The petitioner as a retired PNP General and a member of thedelegation had with him millions of public funds.

Romero v. Estrada (2009):A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings have differentpurposes. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid oflegislation.Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate Committee from requiring persons to appearand testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance withits duly published rules of procedure.

Neri v. Senate:" The right of Congress or any of its committees to obtain information in aid of

legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to public information." The right to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate

cases, to constitutional precepts." Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim of

privilege with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the

privilege is meant to protect." The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. To be valid,

it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly publishedrules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by suchinquiries be respected.

The elements of presidential communications privilege:(Citing US v. Nixon)1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power.”2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor

of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must bein “operational proximity” with the President.

3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may beovercome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely

contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhereby an appropriate investigating authority.

! The Senate cannot immediately cite a witness in contempt when that witness is notunwilling to testify, but refuses to answer a question upon orders of the president toinvoke executive privilege. The Senate must first rule on the validity of the claim ofprivilege.

! To cite him in contempt without determining the validity of the claim is arbitrary andviolative of his rights

Power to punish a person under investigation Arnault v. Nazareno:Since the Court has no power to determine what legislation to approve or not to approve,it cannot say that the information sought from a witness which is material to the subjectof the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed or possible legislation. It is not

within the province of the Court to determine or imagine what legislative measuresCongress may take after the completion of the legislative investigation.

Limit to imprisonment for contemptThere is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contemptto the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating theexistence of that body. While the existence of the House of Representatives is limited tofour years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The Senate is a continuing body whichdoes not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House ofRepresentatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contemptin cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted.

Why does Congress have the power to cite witnesses in contempt?The power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriateauxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectivelyin the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended toaffect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisiteinformation - which is not infrequently true - recourse must be had to others who dopossess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are oftenunavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate orcomplete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (Arnault v.Nazareno)

Sabio v. Gordon:An inquiry in aid of legislation was conducted due to losses incurred by the PHILCOMSAT

because of improprieties in the operation of their Board of Directors. Sabio of the PCGGwas asked to attend but he declined due to prior commitment and invoked Sec. 4 of EO 1that said that no member of the Commission will be required to testify in any proceedingconcerning matters within its official cognizance. The SC held that Section 4(b) directlyrepugnant with Article VI, Section 21 and thus cannot be upheld. Section 4(b) exemptsthe PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot becountenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. TheCongress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns theadministration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It evenextends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions arewithin the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class.

Congress may keep a contumacious witness in detention until the legislative body ceasesto exist upon its final adjournment.

Sec. 22: The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent ofthe President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to theirdepartments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or theSpeaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduledappearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may covermatters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requiresand the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executivesession.

Is the oversight function under Sec. 22 the same as a Question Hour?No. In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the “question hour” has adefinite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the PrimeMinister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the



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government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. It cannotbe imposed in a Presidential system of government because of the separation of powers.

What is the difference between Congressional inquiries in aid of legislationunder Sec. 21 and inquiries pursuant to its oversight function under Sec. 22?When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementingthe statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as thatof the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a reportof their performance as a matter of duty. But when the inquiry in which Congress requirestheir appearance is “in aid of legislation”, the appearance is mandatory. The oversightfunction of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it isperformed in pursuit of legislation. (Senate v. Ermita)

Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, its aim is to elicitinformation that may be used for legislation while Section 22 pertains to the power toconduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit ofCongress’ oversight function. (Neri v Senate)

Sec. 23:(1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled,voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize thePresident, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, toexercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless

sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the nextadjournment thereof.

(In connection with Art. 7, s. 18) Here you are just stating a fact: the existence of a stateof war NOT declaring a state of war. – To declare war it is not lodge in Congress but withthe executive power which holds the sword of the nation.The president can exercise commander in chief powers even if Congress doesn’t declare.What if Congress doesn’t make a law? Then the president can act under Art. 7, s. 18.(DAVID V. ARROYO reconciles it).

Sec. 23(2) Is an example of constitutionally sanctioned delegation of Emergency powersby Congress. Congress may even delegate legislative powers to the president ifnecessary.

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary

" Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring astate of rebellion.

" The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, ismerely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18,Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section23 (2), Article VI.

Ampatuan v. DILG Secretary (2011)The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in thethree places mentioned. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppresslawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in thePresident. There is no need for congressional authority to exercise the same.

Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the publicdebt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House ofRepresentatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

1. Appropriation: Money set aside from public – general appropriations act, IRA.2. Tariff/Revenue Bill: Proposal to earn money for government.3. Increase of Public Debt: increase ceiling of borrowings to be able to loan money.4. Bills of local application: Conversion of city, naming street.5. Private Bill: Relate to private person (citizenship law, etc.).

Tolentino v. Secretary of financeIt is not the law—but the revenue bill—which is required by the Constitution to “originateexclusively” in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because abill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that theresult may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conferencecommittee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as aresult of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenuestatute—and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in theenactment of the law — must substantially be the same as the House bill would be todeny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “proposeamendments.” It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the twohouses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

What is the purpose of Sec. 24?The main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives is to bring in

sizeable revenues for the government to supplement our country’s serious financialproblems, and improve tax administration and control of the leakages in revenues fromincome taxes and value-added taxes, and the Senate, approaching the measures fromthe point of national perspective, can introduce amendments within the purposes of thosebills. (ABAKADA v Ermita)

Sec. 25:(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President forthe operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, andmanner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unlessit relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision orenactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, andshall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or tobe raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, thePresident, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, theChief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, bylaw, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for theirrespective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such

guidelines as may be prescribed by law.



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(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the generalappropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect untilthe general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

Exception – special elections

Garcia v. Mata: An appropriations Act providing that “after the approval of this Act, andwhen there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippinesmay be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of fiveconsecutive years,” is void for being a rider.

Transfer of Funds P.D. No. 1177 empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from onedepartment, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program,project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the GeneralAppropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or notthe funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are tobe taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item towhich said transfer is to be made. It is void and unconstitutional. (Demetria v. Alba)

Sec. 26:(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall beexpressed in the title thereof.

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readingson separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to itsMembers three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to thenecessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon thelast reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shallbe taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

One subject in title is mandatory: But the rule should be interpreted liberally rather thanstrictly or technically. As long as it is embraced in the general subject and it is germaneto the subject.

1. To prevent hodge podge legislation2. To prevent surprise or fraud on legislature3. Fairly appraise people thru publication.

What is the process:- 1st Reading: Only title sent to deliberations committee.- 2nd Reading: debate and deliberations.- 3rd Reading: title and no more amendments and voting.

Riders: provisions that do not relate to a specific appropriation but a general provision oflaw. It is not for an appropriation bill but better left to be in a separate law.Requiring every bill passed to embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in thetitle thereof is aimed against the evils of the so- called omnibus bills and log-rollinglegislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches.Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not beso narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation.The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is not a mere ruleof legislative procedure, directory to Congress; it is mandatory.The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be

comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.

If the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions ofthe act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficientcompliance with the constitutional requirement.

Sec. 27:(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to thePresident. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and returnthe same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter theobjections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after suchreconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill,it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewisebe reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shallbecome a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determinedby yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered inits Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where itoriginated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become alaw as if he had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in anappropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items towhich he does not object.

When do the yeas and nays have to be taken:1. Upon last and third readings of a bill.2. At the request of one-fifth of the Members present.

3. In repassing of a bill over the veto of the President’s veto.

The effect of an invalid veto is as if there was no veto at all – considered inaction on thePresident’s part and so it becomes a law.

An item veto does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax butrather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate.

- An item is “an indivisible some of money dedicated to a stated purpose and notsome general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriationbill. It

- Doctrine of inappropriate provision: a provision that is constitutionallyinappropriate for an appropriation bill may be singled out for veto even if it isnot an appropriation or revenue item (refers to riders).

- Generally an item veto is only for appropriation, revenue and tariff bills.- If you veto a provision in an ordinary bill – considered as if you vetoed the

whole thing.- A condition in an appropriation bill may not be vetoed without vetoing the items

to which it is attached.

Executive Impoundment: Impoundment simply means refusal of the President tospend funds already allocated by Congress for a specific purpose.

Sec. 28:(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, andsubject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import andexport quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within theframework of the national development program of the Government.



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(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto,mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall beexempt from taxation.

(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of amajority of all the Members of the Congress.

The general limitation on the power to tax is that it should be exercised only for a publicpurpose.

- Since it affects property rights it is also subject to due process and equalprotection clauses of the Constitution.

When is a tax Uniform?A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where thesubject of it is found. Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shallbe taxed alike. (CIR v. Lingayen Gulf)

When is a system of taxation Progressive?It is progress when the rate increases as the tax base increases (for equitable distributionof wealth).

Does Sec. 28 prohibit regressive or indirect taxes?No. Although the Constitution requires Congress to “evolve a progressive system oftaxation,” this is only a directive, just like the directive to give priority to the enactment

of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social, economic andpolitical inequalities. These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives tolegislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance)

Can Congress delegate the power to tax?No. But it can delegate the power to determine when the required conditions for the taxto take effect arise. See contingent legislation.

CIR v. Santos: The court cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates of other countries should beused as a yardstick in determining what may be the proper subjects of taxation in ourown country. The State is free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has beenrepeatedly held that “inequalities which result from singling out of one particular class fortaxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.

Abra v. Hernando and Roman Catholic Bishop:For the exemption of lands, buildings and improvements, they should not be exclusivelybut also actually and directly used for religious charitable or educational purposes. Theremust therefore be proof of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings andimprovements for religious or charitable (or educational) purposes to be exempt fromtaxation.

Cir v. CA: The YMCA is not an educational institution within purview of constitution for it to begranted the exemption. Furthermore, the claim for exemption from income tax has nobasis because the Constitutional exemption applies only to property taxes.

John Hay v. Lim:Under RA 7227 only the Subic SEZ is exempt from taxes, the extension of the same bythe President to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein.

Lung Center v. QC :60% of its beds are used exclusively for charitable purposes. Only such portion will beexempt from tax, those leased out to private entities however are not exempt from realproperty tax.

Sec. 29:(1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriationmade by law.(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, otherreligious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, ordignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or governmentorphanage or leprosarium.

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as aspecial fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fundwas created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred tothe general funds of the Government.

Is a law providing automatic debt service appropriation valid even if theactual/exact amounts are not stated in the law?Yes. The legislative intention [of such a law] is that the amount needed should beautomatically set aside in order to enable the State to pay the principal, interest, taxesand other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as

guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate lawappropriating funds therefor as the need arises.Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid,necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amountsnevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. Theexecutive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debtservicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normalbanking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures orsecurity or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred byvirtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executiveimplementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of theTreasury.

Sec. 30: No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SupremeCourt as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

Congress can increase the SC’s appellate jurisdiction if the SC agrees to it.

Sec. 31: No Law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.

Sec. 32: The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative andreferendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose andenact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress orlocal legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten percentum of the total number of registered voters, of which very legislative district must berepresented by at least three per centum of the registered voters.

Defensor-Santiago v. ComelecThe right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through thesystem of initiative requires an implementing law from Congress



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The system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of theConstitution is not self-executory.Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded the power to “directlypropose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through thesystem of initiative—they can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, orresolutions.”

Lambino v. Comelec

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon apetition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people

o First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal;o second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in

a petitionThe full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of thepetition, or attached to it, and if so attached, the petition must state the fact of suchattachmentA signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature hasnot first seen what it is that he or she is signing.An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the peoplethe full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, likealtering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances, and

there is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, aswhen the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.

Amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without alteringthe basic principle involved; Revision generally affects several provisions of theconstitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision beingamended.

ART.VII. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

I. Executive Power

- Ceremonial functions: the President remains and will always be the ceremonialhead of the gov’t and must take part with real or apparent enthusiasm in arange of activities

- The Cabinet: an institution that is extra-constitutionally created, consisting ofthe heads of departments who through usage have formed a body ofpresidential advisers who meet regularly with the President. They possess noauthority over the president and serve at his pleasure and behest.

Marcos vs. Manglapus [residual power]:Marcos, in his deathbed, signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But thenPresident Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a timewhen the stability of government is threatened by Marcos supporters and communistmovements, and when the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, hasstood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Does the Presidenthave the power to do so? YES. The Supreme Court held that the enumerations found

under Art. 7 are not exclusive. “Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers

so enumerated.” It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the governmentthat is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. In other words, as applied tothe present issue, even if the right to impose restrictions for entrance into one’s countryis not expressly granted under Article 7 of the Constitution, it is a residual power of thePresident by virtue of Art.7 Sec.1. Moreover, the President has the obligation under theConstitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the nationalinterest.

Pontejos vs. Ombudsman [power to grant immunity to state witnesses]:

Acting on a complaint against the HLURB, the OMB found probable cause on thecomplaint against Pontejos and Atos, but they also ruled that Atos should be extendedimmunity from criminal prosecution and discharged as state witness. Atos was merely asubordinate who could have acted only upon the prodding of Pontejos. Also, hertestimony was necessary to build a case against Pontejos. The decision on whether toprosecute and whom to indict is executive in character. Essentially, it is not a judicialprerogative.The fact that an individual had not been previously charged or included in aninformation does not prevent the prosecution from utilizing said person as a witness.

Biraogo vs. Truth Commission:Pres. Noynoy signed EO No.1 establishing the Phil. Truth Commission, who is tasked toinvestigate reports of graft and corruption committed by the previous administration andwould have the powers of an investigative body. [Truth Commission was declared asunconstitutional for not being able to pass the equal protection test.] "Executive power" isnot only the power to enforce the laws. The President has powers inherent in such

position unless the Constitution withholds it. The Constitution provides that the executionof the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President otherpowers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over thecountry's foreign relations. Powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only tothe specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Executive power is more than thesum of specific powers so enumerated. One of the recognized powers of the Presidentgranted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoccommittees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if lawshave been faithfully executed. The President has the obligation to ensure that allexecutive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law.

II. Executive Privilege

US VS. Nixon:The issue in this case is whether President Nixon can claim absolute privilege in order to

quash a subpoena duces tecum issued against him by the district court in a criminalproceeding. The court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor theneed for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain anabsolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under allcircumstances. The President's need for complete candor and objectivity from adviserscalls for great deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely onthe broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of suchconversations, a confrontation with other values arises.

A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office isgeneral in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence ina criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminalcase in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminalprosecution may be totally frustrated.



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When the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in acriminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevailover the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specificneed for evidence in a pending criminal trial.

Senate vs. Ermita:Invitations were sent to various officials regarding the North Rail Project by the SenateBlue Ribbon Committee. A day before said officials could appear before Senate, thePresident issued EO 464 which in effect prohibited said officials from appearing beforeCongress without the consent of the President. Said EO is being assailed asunconstitutional for being violative of the public’s right to information and the Senate’spower of inquiry.

E.O. 464:Sec. 1: All heads of Executive departments shall secure the consent of the President priorto appearing before Congress. When the security of the State or public interest requiresand the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted inexecutive session.Sec. 2(a): Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between thePresident and the public officers covered by this EO, including: conversations andcorrespondence between the President and public officers covered by this EO; Military,diplomatic and other national security matters; Information between inter-governmentagencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements; Discussions inclose-door cabinet meetings; and other matters affecting national security and publicorder.Sec. 2(b): The following officers are covered by the executive privilege: Senior officials ofexecutive departments who in the judge of the department heads are covered by theexecutive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the AFP and such other officers who inthe judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the privilege ; PNP officers with rank ofsuperintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the PNP Chiefare covered by the privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of theNational Security Adviser are covered by the privilege ; and such other officers as may bedetermined by the President.

Sec. 3: All public officials enumerated under 2(b) shall secure consent of the Presidentprior to appearing before Congress.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to thepower of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege.” Since

the term figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions,its preambular clauses, and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucialfor determining the constitutionality of EO 464.

Sec.1 is similar to Sec.3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure theconsent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. However, Sec.1 specificallyapplies to department heads. It does not, unlike Sec.3, require a prior determination byany official whether they are covered by EO464. The President herself has, through thechallenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, likewise unlike Sec.3,the coverage of department heads under Sec.1 is not made to depend on the departmentheads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. Infact, in marked contrast to Sec.3 vis-à-vis Sec.2, there is no reference to executiveprivilege at all. The claim of privilege under Sec. 3 in relation to Sec.2(b) is invalid. Thesaid provision allows the executive branch to evade congressional requests forinformation without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons

therefor. under said sections, instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the

claim of privilege, a person may merely invoke that he is among the officials enumeratedunder EO 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given herconsent to be excused from appearing before Congress. Moreover, the Court notes thatSec.2(b) virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is amisuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked inrelation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons. Said sectionis further invalidated by the fact that by mere silence of the President, an executiveofficer may invoke the privilege.

Neri vs. Senate:Neri appeared before respondent and testified for about 11 hours on matters concerningthe the "NBN Project, a project awarded by the DOTC to ZTE. Petitioner disclosed thatthen COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200Mn in exchange for his approval of theNBN Project. He further narrated that he informed Pres. Arroyo of the bribery attemptand that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further onPresident Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitionerrefused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." Citing the case of US vs. Nixon, theCourt laid out the 3 elements needed to be complied with in order for the claim toexecutive privilege to be valid. These are:

1.) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegablepresidential power;

2.) It must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President orthe President himself. (The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operationalproximity” with the President); and

3.) It may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the informationsought “likely contains important evidence,” and by the unavailability of theinformation elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In this case:1) Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument that thecommunications elicited by the 3 questions “fall under conversation and correspondencebetween the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policydecision-making process,” and that “the information sought to be disclosed might impairour diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” It isclear then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relation.2) The communications were received by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a

member of the President's Cabinet.3) There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation ofthe privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriateinvestigating authority.

Akbayan vs. Aquino [JPEPA]:Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA including thePhilippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinentattachments and annexes thereto. At this time, negotiations for JPEPA had still not beenconcluded. From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it isevident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towardsits execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They onlyclaim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thusconstituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public



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disclosure. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcomeby a sufficient showing of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis.

III. Immunity from Suit< No provision in the Consti, but according to Fr. Bernas, it was already

understood from jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during histenure

a. The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, maynot be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need toprovide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity ofthe high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can bedragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it isimportant that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance ordistraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of hisofficial duties and functions. (David vs. Arroyo)

b. Ratio for the grant is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties andfunctions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that theChief Exec is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’stime, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege may only beinvoked by the holder of the office; not by any other person in thePresident’s behalf. (Soliven vs. Judge Makasiar)

c. As a non-sitting President, he cannot enjoy immunity from suit. It willbe anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability forunlawful acts and omissions. Unlawful acts of public officials are not

acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as suchbut stands in the same footing as any trespasser. (Estrada vs.Desierto)

Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of thePhilippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on theday of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications andterm of office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. He may beremoved from office in the same manner as the President.The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointmentrequires no confirmation.

< The VP is essentially a President on reserve

< In deference to his office, an appointment as department head extended to himdoes not need the consent of the COA

o But the President is not obliged to give the VP a Cabinet position

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June nextfollowing the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six yearsthereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who hassucceeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualifiedfor election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciationof the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in thecontinuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-Presidentshall be held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the boardof canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed tothe President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President ofthe Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all thecertificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint publicsession, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due executionthereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in casetwo or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwithbe chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to theelection, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

< Election of the President and VP: elected by direct vote by the people< Term of the President and the VP

o President- fixed term of 6 years to begin at noon on June 30 th following the year of the election and to end at noon also on June 30th,

6 years aftero The fixing of the exact date and time excludes the right to “hold-over”o The President is not eligible for any re-election for that office, either

immediately after his term or even after an interval of 1 or more termso VP- may not serve for more than 2 successive terms

# Voluntary renunciation for any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in his service

# If the VP succeeds to the Presidency, if he serves for lessthan 4 years, he may run for election as President (not acase of re-election)

I. Congress as National Board of Canvassers< Congress is given the authority to make a determination of the authenticity and

due execution of the returns coming from the provincial and city board ofcanvassers in accordance with the manner provided for by law.

Pimentel vs. Joint Committee [non-leg]:Petitioner seeks to have the joint committee’s continued existence be declared null andvoid to determine the authenticity of the due execution of the certificates of canvass andpreliminary canvass of the votes cast for the positions of President and Vice Presidentduring the May 2004 Elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June11, 2004. Petitioner goes on by saying that the all pending matters and proceedingstermination upon the expiration of Congress. As further proof, he relied on the legislativeprocedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress.The legislative functions of the 12th Congress may have come to a close upon the finaladjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Sec.4,Art.VII to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-



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President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished itsconstitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed itsfunctions is it rendered functus officio.

II. Breaking a presidential or vice-presidential tie< Congress has authority to break a tie< Sec.4 (5) provides the method for breaking the tie in case 2 or more shall have

an equal and highest number of votes. It is broken by vote of a majority of theall the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately

III.

Presidential or Vice-Presidential ControversiesTecson vs. Lim [need for post election issue]:The issue of citizenship of FPJ is brought up to challenge his qualifications as apresidential candidate. It is alleged that he is not a natural born Filipino citizen. The rulescategorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President and not of "candidates" forPresident or Vice-President. The election contest can only contemplate a post-electionscenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined bySection 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly broughtbefore it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

Section 5. Oath of Office

Section 6. Official Residence

Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at thebeginning of their terms.If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President untilthe President-elect shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as Presidentuntil a President shall have been chosen and qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died orshall have become permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, orwhere both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senateor, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act asPresident until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act asPresident shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, incase of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.

Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation ofthe President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term.In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both thePresident and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, theSpeaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President orVice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the

President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject tothe same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.

Start of Term as of Noon June 30 (Sec. 7):

Fails to Qualify Not Chosen Death; P. Disability

Pres. VP Both Pres. VP Both Pres VP Both

VPacts as

P.

N/A SenateP. or

Speakeracts asP.

VPacts as

P.

N/A SenateP. or

Speakeracts asP.

VP ISP.

AfterJune

30, §9canapply.

SenateP. or

Speakeracts asP.

During or Mid- Term (Sec. 8):

Death; P. Disabled; Removal; Resignation Death; P. Disabled;Resignation

Pres. Vice Pres. Both Acting Pres. (SP/SH)

VP IS P. Pres. Willnominate VP fromCongress (§9)

Senate P. orSpeaker acts as P.

By Law

Q: So should §10 apply?

I. Filing a Vacancy in the Presidency

Estrada vs. Desierto (succession):The case is about Erap’s resignation as President. Petitioner is alleging that he is thelawful and incumbent President, temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his officeand that GMA is only President in an Actin capacity. Under the totality test, Erap hasresigned. There must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts ofrelinquishment. Whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act andomissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a materialrelevance on the issue.

Totality Test:1. Intent to resign

2. Acts of relinquishment.

Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during theterm for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from amongthe Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume officeupon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,voting separately.

Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after thevacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordancewith its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for aspecial election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such specialelection shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of thisConstitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the

Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any



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current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4,Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot besuspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if thevacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and theSpeaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable todischarge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a writtendeclaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of theSenate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration thatthe President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-Presidentshall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to theSpeaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, heshall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all theMembers of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and tothe Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the Presidentis unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide theissue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not insession, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirdsvote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, thePresident shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

I. Incapacity of the President< Deals with the thorny issue of whether the President is still able to perform his

functions or not. If the President is able to make the decision and is willing todeclare himself disabled, he certainly has the power to declare so.

Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of thestate of his health. The members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreignrelations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be deniedaccess to the President during such illness.

I. Serious illness of the President< Sec. 11 deals with illness which results in incapacity, while Sec.12 presumably

deals with serious illness that is not incapacitating because access to him is keptopen for Cabinet members in charge of national security and foreign relations

o To allow the President to make the important decisions in those areasof gov’t, which suggests a situation where the President is still able

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and theirdeputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold anyother office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or befinancially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege grantedby the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly

avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of thePresident shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the ConstitutionalCommissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlledcorporations and their subsidiaries.

I. Prohibition against holding another office or employment< Prohibits the President, VP, members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and

assistants from holding any office or employment during their tenure< Except for the VP who may be appointed to the cabinet, and the Secretary of

Justice who is made ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council, theofficials enumerated under Sec.13 may not hold another office.

< The stricter prohibition is imposed on members of the Cabinet. It thereforeapplies not just to department secretaries, but to any one who is a member.

Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control Board [designation and ex-officiocapacity]:Petitioner was contesting the membership of the Embroidery and Apparel Control andInspection Board by RA3137 which consists of a rep from BOC to act as Chairman, a repfrom Central Bank , a rep from the Dept of Commerce and Industry, a rep from the Nat’lEconomic Council and a rep from the private sector from the AEAEP. An examination ofthe questioned statute reveals that for the chairman and members of the Board to qualifythey need only be designated by the respective department heads. With the exception ofthe representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to be designated

they must already be holding positions in the offices mentioned in the law. No newappointments are necessary. This is as it should be, because the representatives sodesignated merely perform duties in the Board in addition to those they already performunder their original appointments.

CLU vs. Executive Secretary [stricter prohibition on president’s official familyagainst multiple offices]:Petitioner challenged EO284, issued by then Pres. Cory which in effect allowed Cabinetmembers, their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of theExecutive Department to hold in addition to his primary position, not more than 2positions in the govt and govt corporations. The EO further stated that the limitationwould not apply to ad-hoc bodies, or to boards, councils or boards of which the Presidentis chairman. EO was declared as unconstitutional. Although Sec.7, Art.IX-B contains ablanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in thegovernment for both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional

Commission saw it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Art.VII, specificallyprohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies andassistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unlessotherwise provided in the Constitution itself. The intent of the framers of the Constitutionwas to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far asholding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned

II. Other Prohibitions< Prohibited participation in a contract with the gov’t can include being a member

of a family corporation which has dealings with the gov’t< If 4th degree relatives are already in office when a President assumes office, the

relatives are not thereby ousted from their positionso What is prohibited is appointment or reappointment and not

uninterrupted continuance in office



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Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unlessrevoked by the elected President, within ninety days from his assumption or reassumptionof office.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to theend of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, excepttemporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

I.

Midnight appointments< This provision is a limitation on the President’s power of appointment. There is

no similar limitation on the power of appointment of local executives.

De Castro vs. JBC:This is a consolidation of 7 petitions regarding the legality of Pres. GMA’s appointment ofthe successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his compulsory retirement by May 17, 2010,only 7 days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Under Sec.4(1), inrelation to Sec.9, Art.VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from theoccurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the JBC for everyvacancy.” But, under Art.VII, Sec.14, “Appointments extended by an Acting Presidentshall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days fromhis assumption or reassumption of office. Also, under Sec.15, “Two months immediatelybefore the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or ActingPresident shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executivepositions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger

public safety.” The prohibition under Sec.15, Arti.VII does NOT apply to appointments tofill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. As can beseen, Art.VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists thepowers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power ofappointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Art.VIII is dedicated tothe Judicial Department. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of SupremeCourt Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at leastthree nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill thevacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Section 15, Article VII doesnot apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel ornaval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this

Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whoseappointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may beauthorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of otherofficers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads ofdepartments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of theCongress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effectiveonly until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournmentof the Congress.

I. Nature of the appointing power< Since the power to appoint is neither legislative nor judicial, it must be

executive.o The legislature may not usurp such function

# It may only create an office and prescribe the qualificationsof the person who may hold the office, but it may neitherspecify the person who shall be appointed to such office noractually appoint him

< The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon whichno limitations may be imposed by Congress except those resulting in the needof securing the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments

< The appointing authority, however, should not be confused with the authority ofthe legislature to impose additional duties on existing offices.

Government vs. Springer [power to appoint as executive]:The NCC was created by Act2705 which purports to vest the voting power of the gov’towned stock in the Senate President and the Speaker of the HR. The Gov-Generalasserted the sole power to vote the stock of the gov’t. The power of appointment is in theexecutive department and the membership in the voting committee in question is anoffice or executive function. The NCC is an instrumentality of gov’t, and that the duty tolook after gov’t agencies and property belongs to the executive.

Datu Abas Kida vs. SenateAssailing the court decision upholding the synchronization of the ARMM election to 2013,petitioner herein question the said decision, among some is the power given to thepresident to appoint OICs during the interim period. The power given to the president toappoint OIC during the interim period is necessitated by the Constitutional mandates of1) synchronization of national elections and 2) unconstitutionality of shortening orlengthening the periods of elected officials. The Congress may not extend the terms of

local officials.The second group of officials the President can appoint are “all other officers of theGovernment whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whomhe may be authorized by law to appoint.” This acts as the “catch-all provision” for thePresident’s appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the power to appoint isessentially executive in nature. The wide latitude given to the President to appoint isfurther demonstrated by the recognition of the President’s power to appoint officialswhose appointments are not even provided for by law . Given that the Presidentderives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it fallsunder the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence ofSection 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the President’s appointment power thus restson clear constitutional basis.

With this, it was just necessary for the president to appoint OICS, so that there wouldn’tbe disruption of government during the interim period in the ARMM. This is not to be

confused with the power to CONTROL, because it is still a SUPERVISORY power becauseas mentioned, after the appointment of the OICS, the president no longer has the powerto recall such appointments.

II. Kinds of presidential appointments

Sec.14 - ActingPresident

When the elected President assumes or reassumes office, he is given90 days within which to revoke appointments made by the ActingPresident. If he does not revoke them, they remain as if made by theelected President.

Sec. 15 -Midnightappointments

Made by a President within 2 months before the next presidentialelections and up to the end of his term. In order not to tie the handsof the incoming President through midnight appointments,appointments made during that period can only be temporary andtherefore revocable by the next President.



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Sec. 16 -RegularPresidentialappointments

With or w/o confirmation by Commission on Appointments, and withad-interim appointments

Pimentel vs. Ermita [acting Secretaries]Congress commenced their regular session on July 26, 2004. On Aug. 25, theCommission on Appointments was constituted. Meanwhile, PGMA issued appointments tothe respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments. The date ofappointment was Aug. 15 and Aug. 23 (while Congress was in session) The respondentslikewise took their oath of office and assumed their duties as acting secretaries. Congressadjourned on Sept. 22. The next day, PGMA issued ad interim appointments torespondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed inan acting capacity. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporarynature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until theappointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an officeoccupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary,the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretarybefore the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through alaw, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically theundersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary orpermanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise ofprescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alterego should be.

Ad Interim v. Appointments in an Acting Capacity

Ad Interim Acting Capacity

Effective upon acceptanceExtended only during a recess of Congress Extended anytime there is a vacancySubmitted to the Commission ofAppointments for confirmation/rejection

NOT submitted to the Commission onAppointmentsWay of temporarily filling important officesbut, if abused, they can also be a way ofcircumventing the need for confirmationby the Commission on Appointments.

III. Scope of the power of the Commission on Appointments< 1st sentence: a 3-step process, namely nomination, consent and appointment

o Those that need consent of Commission on Appointments:# Heads of the executive departments# Ambassadors, and other public ministers and consuls# Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval

captain# Other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the

Constitution• Chairmen and commissioners of the CSC, Comelec

and COA• Regular members of the JBC

< 2nd sentence: only of appointment

Sarmiento vs. Mison [1st sentence- enumeration is limited; 3rd sentence- use ofthe word “alone” as mere lapsus; head of bureau; no CA confirmation]:Petitioners seek to enjoin Mison from performing the functions of the Office ofCommissioner of the BOC on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of

the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by

the Commission on Appointments (COA). The 1st sentence enumeration is limited, as the4 groups are appointed with the consent of the CA. In the 1987 Constitution, the clearand expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments fromconfirmation by the CA, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the firstsentence of Sec. 16. The use of the word “alone” was a mere lapse. The position ofCommissioner of the BOC (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group ofappointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required.

Bautista vs. Salonga [1st sentence- “other officers” whose appointments arevested in the President; CHR Chair, CA confirmation]:

Under EO163 creating the CHR, Pres. Aquino appointed the petitioner as Acting Chairman.Petitioner took her oath and discharged the functions and duties of the Office of theChairman. She received a letter from the CA who disapproved her “ad interimappointment”. Since the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is notspecifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of theCSC, the Comelec and the COA, whose appointments are expressly vested by theConstitution in the President with the consent of the CA. The President appoints theChairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the 2nd sentence in Sec.16, Art. VII, thatis, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they are amongthe officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law toappoint."

Rufino vs. Endriga [2nd sentence- “whose appointments are not otherwiseprovided for by law”]:Pres. Marcos issued EO 30 creating the CCP as a trust governed by a BOT of 7 members.

PD 15 (CCP Charter) increased the members of the BOT from 7 to 9 members. Then EO1058 increased it to 11 trustees. During the term of Ramos, the CCP Board includedEndriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Cabili and Manosa (Endriga Group).Subsequently, Pres. Estrada appointed 7 new trustees (Rufino Group) for a term of 4years to replace Endriga Group. Endriga Group files a petition for quo warrantoquestioning the appointment of the Rufino Group. Allegations were: 1) that under Section6(b) of PD 15, it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President fill suchvacancies; 2) that when Estrada appointed the Rufino Group, only one seat was vacant.Sec 6(b) and (c) are inconsistent with the Constitution. These provisions empower theremaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, allowing them to electtheir fellow trustees. On the other hand, Sec 16 (Art VII) allows the heads ofdepartments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only “officers lower in rank”than such “heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.” This excludes asituation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Sec6 (b)and (c) makes CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their fellow trustees.

The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President’spower to appoint.

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

I. Power of control< The President is given control of “all the executive departments, bureaus and

offices.”o Control is not just over the department head but also over all

subordinate officers of the department< Control: power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a

subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitutethe judgment of the former for that of the latter

< Doctrine of qualified political agency: all executive and administrativeorganizations are adjuncts of the Executive department, the heads of



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the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the ChiefExecutive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by theConstitution or law to act in person or in the exigencies of the situation demandthat he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions ofthe Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments,and the acts of the secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regularcourse of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the ChiefExecutive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Ang-Angco vs. Castillo [distinguish President’s power over “acts” and “person”

of appointee in classified service]:Petitioner, a Collector of Customs, on the belief that Pepsi had complied with therequirements of withdrawing some commodities from the customs house, allowed itsrelease. When the Commissioner learned this, he filed an admin charge against petitionerfor grave neglect of duty. The Exec Secretary, by authority of the President, declared thathis conduct was prejudicial to the best interest of the service and considered him to beresigned. Petitioner appealed, on the ground that he was deprived of the right to have hiscase appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals. The President does not have blanketauthority to remove any officer or employee of the government but his power must stillbe subject to the law that passed by the legislative body particularly with regard theprocedure, cause and finality of the removal of persons who may be the subject ofdisciplinary action. This power of control couched in general terms for it does not set inspecific manner its extent and scope. The power merely applies to the exercise of controlover the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It onlymeans that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in

the performance of his duties.

Joson vs. Torres [power to discipline local officials]:Petitioner, a governor, was placed under preventive suspension by the Exec Secretary becof a charge of grave misconduct and abuse of authority under the recommendation of theSec of DILG. He is now questioning such preventive suspension. The power to disciplineevidently includes the power to investigate. As the President has the power to investigatecomplaints against local government officials, AO 23 nevertheless delegates the power toinvestigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee. This is not unduedelegation, contrary to Joson’s claim. What is delegated it the power to investigate, notthe power to discipline. Furthermore, the power of the DILG to investigate administrativecomplaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency,which is based on the control power of the President. Control is said to be the very heartof the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive, the President may delegatesome of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the

Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he actspersonally. Each head of the department is and must be the President’s alter ego in thematters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.

KMU vs. Dir.-Gen. of NEDA:Pres.GMA issued EO420 requiring all government agencies and government-ownedcorporations to streamline and harmonize their Identification Systems in order to reducecosts, achieve efficiency and reliability and ensure compatibility and provide convenienceto the people. Under the power of control, the President may by executive oradministrative order direct the gov’t entities under the executive department to adopt auniform ID data collection and format. The President’s constitutional power of control isself-executing and does not need any implementing legislation. The Constitution alsomandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are severallaws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general,improve public services. The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under

EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve publicservices.

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of thePhilippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion orrebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixtydays, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martiallaw or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall

submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by avote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revokesuch proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by thePresident. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, ifthe invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, thesufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate itsdecision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplantthe functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment

of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able tofunction, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with,invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thusarrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall bereleased.

I. Commander-in-chiefship< The President is not a member of the armed forces but remains a civilian

o Elected as the highest civilian officer – a civilian president holdssupreme military authority and is the ceremonial, legal and

administrative head of the armed forces< Does not require the President to possess military training and talents, but ascommander-in-chief he has the power to direct military operations and todetermine military strategy

< President has control and direction of the conduct of war, whether the war bedeclared or undeclared

< 3 powers:1) Calling out power2) Power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus3) Power to impose martial law

Lansang vs. Garcia [habeas corpus reviewable by SC]:Due to the throwing of 2 hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing thedeath of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth ofMaoist/communist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al. were invited by the



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Philippine Constabulary headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang etal. questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension doesnot meet the constitutional requisites. 2 conditions must concur for the valid exercise ofthe authority to suspend the privilege of the writ (a) there must be "invasion,insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" mustrequire the suspension of the privilege. As commander-in-chief, the President has 3courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writof habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.He had already called out the armed forces, but this proved inadequate. Of the two otheralternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

The court finds that the PP889 is valid because the requisites for the suspension of writ ofhabeas corpus are present. Such presidential determination of the existence of theconditions required by the Constitution to justify a suspension of the privilege of the writis no longer conclusive on the other branches. This Court may legitimately inquire into itsvalidity.

Sanlakas vs. Executive SecretaryDuring the Oakwood mutiny where members of the Armed Forces of the Philippineoccupied the Oakwood apartments in Makati, the President GMA issued Proclamation No.427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring "a state of rebellion" and calling out theArmed Forces to suppress the rebellion. The petitioners claim that the declaration of stateof rebellion is an exercise of emergency powers, which amounts to a usurpation of thepower of Congress. The SC ruled that the President has the power to declare state ofrebellion in the exercise of her Commander-in-Chief powers. However, in calling out the

armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. As to the issue ofexercising emergency powers without the grant of such power by the Congress, the SCruled that there is no proof that the President exercised powers beyond her powers as theChief Executive or Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellionand in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her ChiefExecutive and Commander-in-Chief powers.

David vs. Arroyo [PP1017]These petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national emergency)and General Order No. 5 issued by President GMA. While the cases are pending, PresidentArroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased toexist, thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017. The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is theenabling clause: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders andregulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.” Does this give thePresident the power to enact laws and decrees? This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017

is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President GMA the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. To besure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justifyPresident Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customslaws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts andthe like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to itsduty to suppress lawless violence.

Ampatuan vs. PunoAfter the massacre in Maguindanao, President Arroyo issued Proc 1946 placing theprovinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato under a state of emergency. Shefurther issued AOs 273 and 273-A delegating the supervision from OP to DILG. Petitioners

assail the said Proc and AOs for being unconstitutional and that the President does nothave a basis for calling out those powers. The Court ruled that it is not unconstitutional.

II. 3 Types of “Martial Law”< 3 kinds of military jurisdiction (in American jurisprudence):

1) Jurisdiction under military law- exercised both in peace and war;2) Military government- exercised in the time of foreign war without the

boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion and civil war withinthe states or districts occupied by rebels treated as belligerents; and

3) Martial law proper- exercised in times of invasion or insurrection within the

limits of the United States, or during rebellion within the limits of statesmaintaining adhesion to the National Gov’t, when the public dangerrequires its exercise.o Martial law in the Philippines is the 3rd one

III. Martial law proper is essentially police power< Public safety is the concern of police power, which is also the object of the

exercise of martial law< The exercise of the power which resides in the executive branch to preserve

order and insure public safety in times of emergency, when other branches ofgovernment are unable to function, or their functioning would itself threatenpublic safety

< Martial law depends on 2 factual bases:1) Existence of invasion or rebellion, and

2) Requirements of public safetyo Necessity creates the conditions for martial law and at the same time

limits the scope. Therefore the degree and kind of vigorous executiveaction needed to meet the varying kinds and degrees of emergencycould not be identical under all conditions, they can only be analogous.

# COMMON DENOMINATOR IN THE EXERCISE OF MARTIALLAW POWER: the exercise by an executive officer of thediscretion and judgment normally exercised by a legislativeor judicial body

Call in AFP Suspend Privilegeof the Writ of HC

Declare MartialLaw

Grounds:1. Prevent/Suppresslawless violence

2. Invasion3. Rebellion

Yes

YesYes

??

YesYes

??

YesYesPeriod:1. Prevent/Suppresslawless violence2. Invasion3. Rebellion

??

Notice ?? Congress within 48 hours?? Congress

Judicial Review

Period

?? Yes. The test is whether the President didNOT act arbitrarily, and the sufficiency ofthe factual basis.- Decide in 30 days.

Who can question? ?? Any citizen.Courts and

Legislative

Open Open Open

GR: 60 Days Except: if extended or revoked



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AssemblyCharges and towhom applicable

?? File in court within 3 days from arrest forthe offense of rebellion related to invasion.

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in thisConstitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remitfines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of allthe Members of the Congress.

I.

Purpose of executive clemency< Tacit admission that human institutions are imperfect and that there are

infirmities in the administration of justiceo Instrument for correcting these infirmities and for mitigating whatever

harshness might be generated by a too strict application of the law< Non-delegable power and must be exercised by the President personally

II.

Constitutional limits on executive clemency< Sec.19 sets down 3 limitations on the power of executive clemency:

1) It cannot be exercised over cases of impeachment;2) Reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remission of fines and

forfeitures can be given only after final conviction by final judgment;3) Grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence of a majority of all the

Members of Congresso Art. IX, C, Sec.5 also says that no pardon, amnesty, parole or

suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules andregulations shall be granted without the favorable recommendation ofthe COMELEC.

Reprieve Commutation Pardon Fines Amnesty

Whoexercises

Pres. Pres. Pres. Pres. Pres. Plus majority of allCong.

Effect Postponesexec. to a daycertain

Remission ofpart ofpunishment

- exempt fr.punishment(looksforward)- relievedfr.

Consequence- civ.liability

?? - abolishoffense(looksbackward)

Requisites Final J. Final J. Final J. Final J. - beforeconviction-treason/political offense/law ofnations.

Beneficiary individual individual individual individual Class ofpoliticaloffenders

Limitations impeachment

Election

Same

Same

Same

Same

Same

??

??

Same

offense- onlyw/ comelecreco.

Tax Amnesty- need leg.concurrence

Cases CristobalMonsantoTorres

DrilonLlamasGarcia

SalleBacangCasido

Llamas vs. Orbos [clemency on administrative penalties]:Respondent governor was found guilty under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act andwas suspended. He filed an MR and pending such, the Executive Secretary issued aResolution granting him executive clemency. Petitioner is assailing the constitutionality ofsuch act, stating that executive clemency may only grant it in criminal cases. TheConstitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may beexercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. There is novalid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency inadministrative casesIf the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, andremit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grantexecutive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminaloffenses.

Torres vs. Gonzales [violation of conditional pardon]:Petitioner was convicted of estafa in the CFI and affirmed by the CA. A conditional pardonwas granted by the President on the condition that petitioner would not again violate anyof the penal laws of the Philippines. Petitioner accepted. On the basis of several criminalcharges, the Minister of Justice recommended the cancellation of the conditional pardon.

The conditional pardon was cancelled and petitioner was arrested. The grant of pardonand the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purelyexecutive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The acceptance of the conditionsof the pardon imports the acceptance of the condition that the President will alsodetermine whether the condition has been v iolated.

III. Pardon: nature and legal effects< An act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of

laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed, from thepunishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed

< No legal power can compel the executive to give it< A conditional pardon has no force until accepted by the condemned because it

may be less acceptable to him than the original punishment and may in fact bemore onerous

Monsanto vs. Factoran [reinstatement to former rights]:Monsanto, an assistant treasurer, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of estafa throughfalsification of public documents. While her MR was pending, Pres. Marcos extended toher absolute pardon which she accepted. She asked to be reinstated to her formerposition which the Office of the President denied, stating that she cannot be reinstated asacquittal can only produce such, and not absolute pardon. She was also required toindemnify the amount she owed to the gov’t. Petitioner may apply for reappointment tothe office which was forfeited, but the facts constituting her offense must be and shouldbe evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once againbe entrusted with public funds. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removingher disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. Toregain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo theusual procedure required for a new appointment. Finally, she still has to pay. Civil liabilitysubsists, notwithstanding an absolute pardon.

IV.

Amnesty



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< May be only given with the concurrence of the majority of all the members ofCongress

< The grant of a general pardon to a class of political offenders either afterconviction or even before the charges are filed

< To avail of amnesty, it is not necessary for the accused to admit hisresponsibility for the commission of the criminal act

PARDON AMNESTY

A private act granted by the ChiefExecutive which must be pleaded andproved by the person pardonedbecause the courts do not take noticethereof

A public act by proclamation of theChief executive with the concurrenceof Congress of which the courts shouldtake judicial notice

Granted to one after conviction Granted to a class of persons orcommunities who may be guilty ofpolitical offenses, generally before orafter the institution of the criminalprosecution and sometimes afterconviction

Looks forward and relieves theoffender from the consequences of anoffense of which he has beenconvicted – abolishes or forgives thepunishment and does not work therestoration of the rights to hold public

office, or the right of suffrage, unlesssuch rights be expressly restored bythe terms of the pardon, and no waysexempts the culprit from the paymentof civil indemnity

Looks backward and abolishes andputs into oblivion the offense itself, itso overlooks and obliterates theoffense with which he is charged thatthe person released by amnestystands before the law as though he

committed no offense

V. Other forms of executive clemency< Reprieve: postpones the execution of an offense to a day certain< Commutation: remission of a part of the punishment, a substitution of a less

penalty for the one originally imposed< Remission of fines and forfeitures: merely prevents the collection of fines or the

confiscation of property, it cannot have the effect of returning property whichhas been vested in third parties or money already in the public treasury

Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the

Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subjectto such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirtydays from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress acomplete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed bythe Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have theeffect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided bylaw.

I. Power to contract or guarantee foreign loans< Having learned from the Marcos regime which enslaved the Philippines to

foreign banks, this provision created a more effective way of checking thePresident

o The President can no longer contract or guarantee foreign loanswithout the concurrence of the Monetary Board

< These rules are applicable to foreign laws, but legislation can also make it

applicable to domestic loans

Section 20 Section 21

Instrument Loans of the State -International Agreements-Treaties

Requirements Requires the PRIOR concurrenceof the Monetary Board.

Requires SUBSEQUENTratification of 2/3 of the Senate.

LegalCharacteristicunder IL

State can borrow from:a) In’t Org. (i.e. IMF)b) Other States

- Like an Int’l Agreeement.c) International Banking

Inst.- Like a contract.C’s remedy: seek relief in nativestate (i.e. US) who will in turnsue on behalf of the bank.

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unlessconcurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

I. Senate concurrence in international agreements< Treaties of any kind, whether bilateral or multilateral, require Senate

concurrence< Treaties are not the only forms of international agreements the President can

enter intoo The authority to enter into executive agreements without concurrence

of the legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

< Treaty-making involves 2 phases: negotiation and the actual making of thetreaty, in the negotiation phase, the President excludes the legislature.However, the fruit of the executive’s negotiation cannot bind as law unless it hasthe concurrence of Senate

< Ratification is given by at least 2/3 of all the members of Senate

TREATIES EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

International agreements involving politicalissues or changes of national policy andthose involving international arrangementsof a permanent character

International agreements embodyingadjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditionsand those involving arrangements of amore or less temporary nature

Gonzales vs. Hechanova [nature of executive agreements]:The Executive Secretary authorized the importation of foreign rice to be purchased fromprivate sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of the otherrespondents for the implementation of said proposed importation. The Governmentexecuted contracts with the governments of other countries for the importation of rice.Petitioner, as a rice planter and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn PlantersAssociation, filed the instant petition, alleging that the importation violates RA3452, whichexplicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn Administration orany other government agency.” It was not sufficiently established by the respondentsthat the contracts were executive agreements. (In fact, they even insisted that theywere contracts.) Even assuming that they were executive agreements, the same wereunlawful. Under the Constitution, the President has the power to enter into executiveagreements without previous legislative authority. However, he may not enter intotransactions through executive agreements if such transactions are prohibited

by statutes enacted prior thereto.



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II. Termination of Treaty< May be arrived at by formal agreement of the parties or the treaty itself may

contain the manner of terminating its lifeo International law recognizes the right of 1 party to terminate a treaty

for breach by the other party or when the fundamental circumstancesfor which the treaty was entered into have changed (rebus sicstantibus)

< Since Congress has legislative power and since statutes and treaties are of thesame rank, Congress can pass a law negating the terms of a treaty

o Will only affect the domestic force of the treaty under the theory of

dualism

III. Other Foreign Affairs PowerForeign relations powers of the President:1) Power to make treaties (Art. VII, Sec. 21)2) Power to appoint ambassadors (Art. VII, Sec. 16)3) Power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers (part of statutory

law)4) Power to deport (under the Administrative Code)

< The President is the “sole organ” of the state for foreign relations

Vinuya vs. Romulo:Petitioners were all members of a comfort women group, who approached the ExecutiveDept assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers. The

Exec Dept declined, and took the position that the individual claims for compensation hadalready been satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty executed betweenboth countries. The court ruled that there was no GAD by the Exec Dept’s refusal to assistthe petitioners. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has theexclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interestof the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in theTreaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from theopening of every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budgetof expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposedrevenue measures.

I.

The Budget

< The budget, which becomes the basis of the general appropriation bill, isprepared by the President and submitted to Congress within 30 days from the

opening of every regular session< Congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the President for

the operation of the Gov’t as specified in the budget< The term “sources of financing” has reference to other sources other than

taxation foreign aid

Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regularsession. He may also appear before it at any other time.

ARTICLE VIII: THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1: The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such LowerCourts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights, which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whetheror not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: such capricious andwhimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be patent

and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform aduty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power isexercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

Judicial Power has not done away with the political question doctrine.

Infotech Technology v. Comelec :Comelec awarded the contract for automation of counting and canvassing of the ballots toMega Pacific an entity that didn’t even participate in the bidding. In this case there wasGAD. There is GAD when an act is done contrary to the constitution, law or jurisprudence.Also when an act is executed whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily out of malice, ill willor personal basis.

The power given to courts is Judicial Power nothing more thus it cannot:1. Attempt or assume nor be compelled to perform non-judicial functions.2. Nor may it be charged with administrative functions except when reasonably

incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. 3. Neither is it its function to give advisory opinions.

a. Declaratory judgment is one with real parties and conflicting legalinterests, the judgment being bidning on the parties. While anadvisory opinion only a legal issue is posed in the abstract in advanceof an actual case.

Judicial Power:Santiago v. Bautista:Before a tribunal, board or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it isnecessary that:

1. there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property

under which adverse claims to such rights are made; and2. the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before the tribunal, board orofficer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is andthereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.

In re Laureta:• When the Court holds persons in contempt, there is no vindictive reprisal involved.

The Court's authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act topreserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer,mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legalprofession.

• The Supreme Court is Supreme and no other agency of the Government, includingthe Tanodbayan, may declare its decisions unjust

Noblejas v. Teehanke:



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SC has no power to discipline officers in other branches with equivalent rank of judges• Granting executive officers the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court

and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation would beunconstitutional. It would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers,by charging the SC with the administrative function of supervisory control overexecutive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the ChiefExecutive over such officials.

• The Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot berequired to exercise any power or to perform trust or to assume any duty notpertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial function.

Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio:The Courts have no power to suggest to the President or to express an opinion that wouldreflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the Chief Executive on matters purelypolitical in nature. It would be to violate the principle of separation of powers for the judiciary to interfere or attempt to influence the exercise by the Chief Executive of thepolitical powers of his office.

Justiciable Controversy:SBMA v. COMELEC:Courts may decide only actual controversies not hypothetical questionsWhen a municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage, it is not yet an approved law.Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It isonly when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance orresolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this

point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mereconjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actualcontroversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.

Distinguished from declaratory relief:

Tano v. Socrates:Disregard of the hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only because of theimposition upon the precious time of this Court, but also because of the inevitable andresultant delay in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded to thelower court,Lower courts are often better equipped to resolve factual issues since this Court is not atrier of facts.The judicial policy that the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redressdesired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling

circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of aprimary jurisdictionSupreme Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory reliefeven if only questions of law are involved.

Section 2: The Congress shall have the power to define prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its Jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security oftenure of its members.

Malaga v. Penachos: A law is passed prohibiting courts from issuing injunctions in cases involvinginfrastructure projects of the government. The SC said such prohibition can only refer toadministrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in

technical cases. Outside of this, the courts cannot be prevented from exercising theirpower.P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed byadministrative agencies

Sec. 3: The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the judiciary may notbe reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year andafter approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

Sec. 4:

(1)

The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and Fourteen Associate Justices. It may s it en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five or sevenmembers. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days form the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executiveagreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court, en banc , and allother cases which under the Rules of Court are Required to be heard en bancincluding those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances and otherregulations shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the members whoactually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with theconcurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberationson the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrenceof at least three of such members. When the required number is not obtained or principle, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of

law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may bemodified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

People v. Dy: The divisions of the Supreme Court are not distinct courts. The actions of the divisionsand decisions rendered therein are in effect by the same tribunal. Decisions or resolutionsof a division of the court are not inferior to an en banc decision.

Cases which must be hear en banc: 1. Cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty.2. All cases which the Rules of Court require to be heard en banc .3. All cases involving the constitutionality, application or operation of presidential

decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations;4. Cases heard by a division when the required majority in the division is not

obtained;

5.

Cases where the Supreme Court modifies or reverses a doctrine or principle oflaw previously laid down either en banc of in division;6. Administrative cases involving the discipline or dismissal of judges of lower

courts7. Election contests for president or vice president.

- When the SC sits en banc you need a quorum (which is 8) and you would needa majority of the members who took part of the deliberations so you would needat least 5 votes to decide a case en banc.

Firestone Ceramics v. CA: Decisions of a division are not appealable to the SC en banc , because such decisions arealready a decision of the SC itself. En Banc is not an appellate court. Each division is notconsidered an inferior body to the Court en banc.

De Castro v. JBC (2010)



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The prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does notextend to appointments in the Judiciary.Section 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of aMember of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy—thefailure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill thevacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definitemandate for the President as the appointing power.JBC has no discretion to submit the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the SC to thePresident after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period to make the

appointment.The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President’smandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidateswhose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretionof the JBC.

Fortich v. Corona:In this case they claimed that the motion for reconsideration that received a 7-7 voteshould not have in effect affirmed the prior decision because under the constitution if theconcurrence of the majority is not achieved then it should be referred en banc. The SChowever differentiated between original cases and matters and in this case the MR beinga matter need not be referred to en banc.

Cases v. Matters:A Case is a controversy brought before the Court for the first time. Where the required

number of votes is not obtained, there is no decision.If it is case and the number of votes required (majority of those who deliberated) are notobtained then you can go to the court en banc.Matters are those which include motions, which are resolved already, a motion forreconsideration is a matter.If it is a matter and the majority vote is not obtained then the prior decisions is affirmed.

Sec. 5 The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers

and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,and habeas corpus.

(2)

Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or theRules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:(a)

All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or

executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,ordinance, or regulation is in question.(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any

penalty imposed in relation thereto.(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest mayrequire. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consentof the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,

pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or

modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicialbodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Congress may diminish only statutory powers or jurisdiction of the SC but it cant diminishthe jurisdiction granted by the Constitution itself.

Judicial Review: Power of the SC to declare a law, treaty, international or executiveagreement, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulationunconstitutional.

Essential Requisites:1. There must be an ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY calling for the exercise of judicial

power.a. Mariano v. COMELEC: The validity of the creation of the City of Makati

being challenged on the ground that it will allow the Mayor to extend histerm is premature because the elections wont be until after three years.

2. The question before it must be RIPE for adjudication (the governmental beingchallenged must have had an adverse effect on the person challenging it).

3. The person challenging the act must have STANDING to challenge, that is he musthave a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained orwill sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.

a. People v. Vera: One only has standing if he has a personal and substantialinterest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injuryas a result of its enforcement.

b. Telecommunications v. COMELEC:

i. He has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury.ii. Injury is fairly traceable to the challenged actioniii. The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

c. The rule however is flexible and allows a liberal approach when the subjectis of transcendental interest, due to the over breadth doctrine, when it’s ataxpayer’s suit, third party standing.

i. For the third party standing three important criterion must bemet: the litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact giving him asufficient concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute;the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; andthere must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability toprotect his or her own interest.

d. Taxpayer’s Suit:i. He has sufficient interest in preventing illegal expenditure of

money raised by taxation

ii.

That he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcementof the questioned statute.iii. Gonzalez v. Narvasa: President appropriated 3m for operational

expenses of PCCR sourced from funds of the president’s office. Ataxpayer does not have standing since what is in exercise her isnot an act of congress in its taxing or spending power. What wasinvolved was President’s power to apportion

Auxiliary Rules:1. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity

(exception however is when the court in the exercise of sound discretion).

Operative Fact: The declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute doesn’t mean thatthere are no rights, duties or protection afforded. Before an act is declaredunconstitutional it is an operative fact, which can be the source of rights and duties.



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- Agbayani v. PNB: The period before a moratorium law was declaredunconstitutional was not allowed to toll the prescriptive period of the right toforeclose a mortgage.

Judicial Review flows from judicial power and so inferior courts have power to exercise judicial review.

Political Questions: Courts have no power to pass upon political questions.

Baker v. Carr Guidelines

1. There is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue toa political department or;

2. Lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it or;3. The impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without

expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government or;4. An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made

or ;5. The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various

departments on one question.- Not everything from Baker is applicable to the Philippine setting because of the

Court’s existence of grave abuse of discretion and thus the fact that there is an “unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already madeor the potentiality of embarrassment” wont bar the SC.

o It is political when the question goes into the wisdom of the decision oract, when it goes into the legality of the act then it is justiciable.

Court Review of Capital Sentences: automatic review is now with the CA for death penaltythen to the SC for final disposition of the case.

- Garcia v. People: only in cases where the penalty imposed is death is thereautomatic review. When it is RP the petitioner must appeal.

Torrecampo v. MetropolitanThe determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a roadextension is obviously not within the province of this Court. It is a political question. Suchdetermination belongs to the Executive branch.

Rule Making:Writ of Amparo: Remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, andsecurity is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a publicofficial or employee, or of a private individual or entity (covers extralegal killings,

enforced disappearances or threatens thereof).Writ of Habeas Data: Remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a publicofficial or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collectingor storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondenceof the aggrieved party.

Writ of Kalikasan: remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized bylaw, people’s organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest groupaccredited by or registered with a government agency, on behalf of person whoseconstitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated or threatened by anunlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity,involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health orproperty of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

Republic v. Gingoyon:Expropriation cases involve both a procedural and substantive aspect. The Congress canalways change or amened the substantive aspect through legislation, the proceduralmatters are to be left to the SC as part of their rule making power.

The rule making power includes the power to suspend its own rules in particular cases inorder to do justice.

Limitations to rule making:1. Should be simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of

cases.2. Should be uniform for all courts of the same grade.3. Should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.- If the rule takes away a vested right such as the right of appeal etc, then it is

not merely procedural. But if it operates only as a means of implementing anexisting right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

1 st Requisite: Ripe for Adjudication:

PACU v. Secretary of Education:An act was approved that provides that a private school must first obtain a permit fromthe Secretary of Education before they can open to the public. This SC however foundthat all of the petitioners had permits and none of the permits were sought to be revoked.

The power of the Courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interestsof litigants require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actualinterference. Thus a hypothetical threat being insufficient.

Tan v. Macapagal:A resolution was being assailed saying that it was invalid because it in effect sought torevise the Constitution by adopting a new form of government. In this case, the proposedamendment was still unacted thus there is no need for interposition of judicial oversightunlike in previous cases where the court said that the matter was ripe for adjudication inthis case it was not yet.

2nd Requisite: Standing:

Concepcion v. COMELEC:Under Section 1, Rule 65, an aggrieved party is one who was a party to the original

proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65.The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not available to any person who feels injuredby the decision of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.He has no standing to file a petition for certiorari.

Taxpayers:Pascual v. Sec. of Public WorksThe rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislationappropriating local or state public funds has greater application in the Philippines thanthat adopted with respect to acts of Congress of the United States appropriating federalfunds.The validity of a statute may only be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury asa consequence of its enforcement.Taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raisedby taxation and therefore may question the constitutionality of statutesrequiring expenditure of public moneys.



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Contra: Gonzales v. Marcos (1975)"[T]he funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from donations [and]contributions [not] by taxation." Accordingly, there was that absence of the "requisitepecuniary or monetary interest."

Citizens and associations: transcendental importance:

Legaspi v. CSC:The fundamental right to information on matters of public concern can be invoked in a

Mandamus proceedingWhen a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement ofpersonal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen.

Joya v. PCGG:A writ of mandamus may be issued only when the public right to be enforced and theconcomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy therequirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest isinvolved.Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official actsdone by the government.Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valuedpieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal rightwhatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Board of Optometry v. Colet: Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civilaction and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party ininterest.Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence of an organizedassociation of persons that is made a party must be averredUnregistered organizations have no standing to sueIndividuals who are not registered optometrists cannot sue to prohibit a law regulatingthe practice of optometry for having no standing

Tondo Medical v. CA:Present substantial interest, which will enable a party to question the validity of the law,requires that a party sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement –it is distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or

inconsequential interestThe rule on constitutional questions of transcendental importance cannot be invokedwhere a party’s substantive claim is without merit -- a party’s standing is determined bythe substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof.

Anak Mindanao v. Exec. Secretary:For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that:

a. it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result ofthe allegedly illegal conduct of the government,

b. the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, andc. the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

The transcendental importance of the issues raised must relate to the merits of thepetitionAbstract claims and Vague propositions that the implementation of the assailed orders willwork injustice and violate the rights of its members cannot clothe MDOI with the requisitestanding.

Other Rules “Raise at earliest opportunity & constitutionality is the very lis motaof the case”:

People v. Vera:If Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whosename the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Ofgreater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is themortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalidstatute.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliestopportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may be raised at the trial,and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. Exception:Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a questionaffecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented.Criminal cases: although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that thequestion may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in thetrial court or on appeal.Civil cases: it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raisedfor the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessaryto a decision of the case.A constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where itinvolves the jurisdiction of the court below.

Prov. of North Cotabato:

For a party to have locus standi , one must allege “such personal stake in the outcome ofthe controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentationof issues upon which the court largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutionalquestion.

1. When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is acitizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.

2. For a taxpayer there should be an assertion that public funds are illegallydisbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose.or there is a wastage of public fundsthrough the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.

3. For a legislator or member of congress an act of the executive that injures theinstitution of congress causes derivative but nonetheless substantial injury thatcan be questioned by legislators.

4. An Organization may be granted standing to assert the irghts of its member(but the mere invocation of the IBP or any lawyer that they are pursuing it due

to their duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it withstanding).5. LGU can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own and of

the other LGUs.

The Court however has discretion to relax this requirement when the constitutionalquestion being raised is of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance. Inthis case the SC said the following have locus standing:

1. The different provinces (North Cotabato, Zamboanga, Sultan Kudarat,etc.) because of the direct and substantial injury that they as LGUswould suffer since their territories would be included in the domain ofBJE.

2. Former Senator Pimientel, incumbent Mayor of Makati and Resident ofCagayan don’t have standing for failure to specify some right orprivilege or that there is a wastage of public funds, but due tothe transcendental issues they were given standing.



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3. Drilon and Tamano have standing as taxpayers because they assertedthat government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegaland unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory plus theyinvoked transcendental importance.

4. Senator Roxas as member of the Senate and citizen on theconstitutional right to be informed in the matter in litigation has legalstanding.

5. Various Muslim Organizations have legal standing since they have legalinterest and stand to be benefited or prejudiced as the case may be.

Effect of unconstitutionality:De Agbayani v. PNB:Prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must havebeen in force and had to be complied with.Until the judiciary declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect.Prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with.The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination (of unconstitutionality), isan operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The pastcannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

Automatic Review:People v. Mateo:While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of caseswhere the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere,however, has it proscribed an intermediate review.

Allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated tothe Supreme Court on automatic review is a procedural matter within the rule-makingprerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress.

Change of Venue:People v. Gutierrez:The courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintainevery quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of governmentOne of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial ofcases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever theimperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice,so demands.The Supreme Court possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial anddisposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another whenever:the interest of justice and truth so demand

serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial triallead to a miscarriage of justice.

Power to Promulgate Rules:Santero v. CFI-Cavite:Petitioners claim that the respondents should not be granted allowance for supportbecause they are already of age and are gainfully employed as provided in the Rules ofCourt, which provides support is only for incapacitated children and spouse. The SC saidthat such is a procedural rule which cannot prevail over the Civil Code which is asubstantive law (the CC says that children should be supported without distinction as towhether employer or of age or not).

Damasco v. Laqui (1988)

Francisco v. CA: where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offenseincludible within the graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offenseif it has already prescribed.While the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protectionand enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts,the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and the legal assistance to theunderprivileged, such rules shall not however diminish, increase or modify substantiverights

Baguio Market Vendors v. Cortes (2010)

Our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing scheme between thelegislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules, but the 1987 Constitutiontextually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deletingCongress’ subsidiary and corrective power.The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Courtconcerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed ormodified by Congress as one of the safeguards of the Supreme Court’s institutionalindependenceThe power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’sexclusive domain

In re Cunanan:Suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at- law in the practice of theprofession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function andresponsibility.

Congress can make a law for qualifications but such can only be a minimum and it is upto the SC in the end to fix it.By trying to retroactively change the passing rate, Congress is in fact trying to modify thepast decision of the SC as to who the latter has chosen to admit into the practice of law.It is an encroachment on the prerogative of the judiciary.

In Re: Letter of UP Law Faculty That freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers forusing intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly beinvocation of academic freedom.The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equallyprimordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influenceor interferenceNo matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is simplyno excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the

courts and the legal profession into disrepute.PNB v. Asuncion:

• A substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural law.• Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over

Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while thelatter, substantive.

Substantive law = defines rights and obligationsProcedural law = defines the manner of enforcing substantive rights and obligations

People v. Lacson:Lacson was charged with multiple murder. He sought the dismissal of the entire case onthe ground that under CrimPro there is a 2 year time bar rule when a case is provisionallydismissed to determine probable cause and the case is not acted on againwithin 2 years. The SC however said that the 2 year time bar rule doesn’t apply



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when the requisites are not met. In this case the provisional dismissal was doneWITHOUT his consent (his consent should be obtained for the rule to apply) nor was thereany notice given to the heirs that the case was to be provisionally dismissed. Furthermorethe rule being sought application did not come into affect until after this case had alreadybeen filed and thus cannot be made to apply retroactively. Because if it were to beapplied retroactively it would be against the state and contrary to the intent of theframers as it would give the state a shorter period of time (only 1 year and 3 monthsinstead of the 2 years) within which to open the case again.

Supervision over the judiciary:

Ampong v. CSC:• Exclusive authority to discipline employees of the judiciary lies with the Supreme

Court• The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative

supervision over all courts and judicial personnel.• Administrative jurisdiction over petitioner belongs to the Supreme Court, the action

having been instituted by the CSC at the time when petitioner was already a judicialemployee.

• the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against petitioner, a judicial employee, before the OCA.

• However, we are constrained to uphold the ruling of the CSC based on the principleof estoppel.

Sec. 6: The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

Administrative supervision of lower inferior courts:Maceda v. Vasquez:It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’scompliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if theycommit any violation thereof! No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul

by the doctrine of separation of powers.! The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted

to it by the Constitution,3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specificmandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court overall courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Ombudsman should first refer the matter of the Court for determination of whether saidcertificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the

necessary records to make such a determination.! The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of

government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter

Sec. 7(1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate

court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the SupremeCourt must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years ormore, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but noperson may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and amember of the Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,probity, and independence.

Sec. 8:

(1)

A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of theSupreme Court composed of the:

a. Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman,b. the Secretary of Justicec. and a representative of Congress as ex-officio members, (can be from

the senate or HR). d. a representative of the Integrated Bar,e.

a processor of law,f.

a retired member of the Supreme Courtg.

and a representative of the Private Sector.

(2)

The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for aterm of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

Of the members first appointed, the representative of the integrated bar shall serve forfour years, the professor of law for three years, the retired justice for two years, and therepresentative of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex-officio of the counciland shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular members of the council shall receive such emoluments as may bedetermined by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.(5)

The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary.

It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

Sec. 9: The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower court shall be appointedby the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial BarCouncil for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

The lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from thesubmission of the list.

Sec. 10: The Salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the SupremeCourt, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance inoffice, their salary shall not be decreased.

- The salary of justices and judges are subject to income tax.

Diminution of Salary:Nitafan v. CIR:

Judges sought to prohibit the CIR from taxing their salaries claiming it amounted to adimunition of their salary. The SC held that it was taxable (the ruling in Perfecto v. Meerthat granted the exemption is discarded). The intent of the famers of the new constitutionwas to make the SC share in the expenses of government otherwise it would violate theuniformity of taxes and the EPC since other branches of government are taxed on theincome they earn.

Sec. 11: The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold officeduring good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitatedto discharge the duties of their office.

The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, ororder their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the members who actually took part in thedeliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Security of Tenure:



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Vargas v. Rilloraza:The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may only be exercised by the Chief Justice andAssociate JusticesIf, according to section 4 of said Article VIII, "the Supreme Court shall be composed" ofthe Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein referred to, its jurisdiction can only beexercised by it as thus composed.To disqualify any of these constitutional component members of the Court is nothingshort of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by thefundamental law.Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power

No temporary composition of the Supreme Court is authorized by the Constitution. It isone of the permanent institutions of the government.The clause "unless otherwise provided by law" found in section 4 of Article VIII can not beconstrued to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the SupremeCourt, as determined by the constitution, for however brief a time as may be imagined.In principle, what really matters is not the length or shortness of the alteration of theconstitutional composition of the Court, but the very permanence and unalterability ofthat composition so long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent andunaltered.

People v. Gacott:The Court en banc has power to discipline because of the grant of power to determine theprocedure.It was not intended in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution that all administrativeproceedings should be heard and decided by the whole Court.

In instances involving dismissal of judges, the administrative cases must be deliberatedupon and decided by the full Court itself.It is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year ora fine of P10,000, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division

" Abolition of a judicial office is valid when done in good faith and not for political orpersonal reasons.

! A judge still sitting in the bench cannot present himself as a congressional candidatesince it amounts to misconduct.

• The compulsory retirement age in the judiciary is seventy years.

Sec. 12: The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shallnot be designed to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Sec. 13: The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en

banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to aMember for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed bythe Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case andserved upon the parties. Any Members who took no part, or dissented, or abstained froma decision or resolution, must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall beobserved by all lower collegiate courts.

Absence of the certification would not mean the case submitted for decision had not beenreached in consultation before being assigned to a member for the writing of the opinionof the court since the regular performance of duty is presumed (may just be the basis forholding the official responsible), it wont make the decision invalid.

Sec. 14: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearlyand distinctly the facts and law on which it is based.No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall berefused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

Macario Tayamura v. IAC : A decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based refersonly to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the provision that “Nopetition for review shall be refused due course without stating the legal basis therefore.”A court after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, manifestations,comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that thequestions raised are factual or no reversible error, there is sufficient compliance with theconstitutional requirement.

Minute Resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in thedeliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice.

Air France v. Carroscoso:The law solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which thecourt's conclusion is drawnA decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, mayresult. So long as the decision contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it isno error for a court to withhold therefrom "any specific - finding of facts with respect tothe evidence for the defense."As this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires".The mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and thereasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to therequirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution.

Francisco v. Permskul:

Allowing memorandum decisions is not unconstitutionalThe memorandum decision should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of thedecision.For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to thefacts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to thesaid decision.Memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth

Salazar v. Margomen:The case had to do with a charge against J. Margomen for bias and impartiality in anelection case. The SC said that the judge did show bias and impartiality and that he failedto state in his decision why he had invalidated 90 ballots in favor of the protestant and tospecify the ballots being set aside and thus violated the constitutional mandate to state

clearly the law and facts on which the decision is based.Sec. 15(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or

resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court,and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiatecourts, and three months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filingof the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by thecourt itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signedby the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copythereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties.The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered orissued within said period.



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(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, withoutprejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof,shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination,without further delay.

For Sandiganbayan the rule is a period of 3 months.

After the lapse of the reglamentary period, nothing happens to the case it remainsundecided, but the court is enjoined to decide the case or question without further delay.

- it can be a ground for impeachment or other disciplinary action.

- Even when there is delay and no decision or resolution is made within theprescribed period, there is NO automatic affirmance of the appealed decision.

Sec. 16: The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regularsession of the congress, submit to the president and the Congress an annual report onthe operations and activities of the Judiciary.

ART. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

A. Common Provisions

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the CivilService Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

I. Constitutional Commissions< All perform key functions in the government; in order to protect their integrity,

they have been independent constitutional bodies< CSC: personnel office< COA: auditing office< COMELEC: administration of the electoral process

Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold anyother office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or inthe active management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected bythe functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, inany contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of itssubdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlledcorporations or their subsidiaries.

Section. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law andshall not be decreased during their tenure.

Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees inaccordance with law.

Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annualappropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadingsand practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish,increase, or modify substantive rights.

I. Independence of the Commissions

< Sec.2: imposes a list of prohibitions engaging in activities which can distractthem from their responsibilities or subject them to pressures and temptations

o The clause which says that a Commissioner shall not “engage in thepractice of any profession or in the active management or control ofany business which in any way may be affected by the functions of hisoffice

# A lawyer who teaches law does not violate the prohibition ofpractice of a profession

# “Active management” of a business does not prohibit aCommissioner from owning a business but it prohibits him

from being a managing officer or a member of the governingboard of a business “which in any way may be affected bythe functions of his office,” a qualifying phrase which doesnot apply to the prohibition of practice of a profession

o Prohibition of financial interest in government contracts or franchisesapplies also to contracts with “subsidiaries” of gov’t corporations

< Sec.3: protects their salary from diminution during their continuance in office< Sec.4: gives them independent powers of appointment but in accordance with

law< Sec.5 : gives them fiscal autonomy, their approved annual appropriations shall

be automatically and regularly released and shall not be subject to pre-audit< Sec.6 : gives them authority, sitting en banc, to promulgate rules of procedure

o In case of conflict between a rule of procedure promulgated by aCommission or a Rule of Court, the rule of the former should prevail if

the proceeding is before a Commission, but if it is before a court, theRules of Court prevailo The SC has no power to disapprove Commission rules except through

the exercise of judicial review when such rules violate the Constitution# These rules should not diminish, increase, or modify

substantive rights# If the rules of a Commission are inconsistent with a statute,

the statute prevails< Commissioners are given a fixed term and are removable only by impeachment

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any caseor matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decisionor resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon thefiling of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commissionor by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any

decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court oncertiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

I. Decisions of the Commissions< As collegial bodies, the decisions are made by the body and not by individual

members< No individual member may make a decision for the Commission< Decisions are reached by majority vote, which suffices to establish a decision of

a Commissiono The Commissions may not promulgate a rule which requires unanimity

– applies whether the Commission is sitting en banc or in division< Sets down a mandatory period within which decisions of the Commissions must

be reachedo If a decision is not reached within the reglamentary period, such

failure does not affect the merits of the case



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Fil. Engr. & Machine Shop vs. Ferrer [final orders reviewable by SC]:For the 1998 national elections, COMELEC issued an Invitation to Bid calling for thesubmission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of voting booths.Petitioner and Acme were among the bidders. Comelec issued a resolution awarding thebid to Acme subject to some conditions, which they accepted. The SC has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions of the COMELEC relative to the conductof elections and enforcement of election laws. However, an order of the COMELECawarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposalssubmitted in response of its invitation to bid does NOT come within the purview of a “finalorder” which is exclusively and directly appealable to the SC on certiorari. What is

contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewableby certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions orproceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in theexercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

Section 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided bylaw.

B. Civil Service Commission

Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of aChairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippinesand, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with provencapacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective

position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with theconsent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years withoutreappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, aCommissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, withoutreappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary oracting capacity.

I. Organization of the Commission; Term< The Civil Service system is administered by a Civil Service Commission

composed a Chairman and 2 Commissioners appointed by the President with theconsent of the Commission on Appointments

< Chairman and Commissioners must be:o

Natural-born citizenso At least 35 years of age at the time of their appointmento Proven capacity for public administrationo Must not have been candidates for any elective position in the

elections immediately preceding their appointment< The term of Commissioners is set at 7 years and may not be reappointed

o Prohibition of reappointment applies even if the Commissioner hasserved for les than 7 years

o Of the 1st Commissioners appointed, the Chairman serves for 7 years,another for 5, and the third for 3

# The intent in staggering the terms of the first appointees isto achieve continuity by not allowing the term of allCommissioners to expire all at one time

# Every 2 years, the term of 1 Commissioner expires leavingalways 2 veteran Commissioners behind

Gaminde vs. COA:The President appointed petitioner, ad interim, as CSC Commissioner. She assumed officeon June 22, 1993 after taking an oath of office. The Commission on Appointmentsconfirmed it and her appointment paper stated that her term will expire on Feb. 2, 1999.The Office of the President opined that her term of office would instead end on Feb.2,2000. She relied on said opinion and stayed in office even after 1999. The issue iswhether petitioner’s term of office ends on 1999 or 2000. The SC ruled that it ended onFeb.2,1999. Her successor’s term must be deemed to start on Feb.2,1999-Feb.2,2006.The terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissionsunder the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations

in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that theexpiration of the first terms of 7, 5 and 3 years should lead to the regular recurrence ofthe 2-year interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditionsto the case at bar, the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the firstappointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be onFeb.02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belatedappointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actualqualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter.

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporationswith original charters.

(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness tobe determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-

determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.

(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except forcause provided by law.

(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in anyelectioneering or partisan political campaign.

(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.

(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law.

I.

Scope of the system< “all branches subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Gov’t”

o Covers not all GOCCs, but only those with original charters, that isthose corporations that have been created by special law and notthrough the general corporation law

# Test for determining whether officers and employees of a

GOCC comes under the CSC system is the manner of creationof the corporation to which they belong

< In terms of personnel, the system includes both “officers and employees”o Employee- includes any person in the service of the gov’t or any

branch thereof of whatever grade or classo Officer- officials whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature,

may be considered to involve the exercise of discretion in theperformance of the functions of government, whether such duties areprecisely defined by law or not

II. Under Civil Service Law

MWSS vs. Hernandez [GOCCs with charter and created by special law]:



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A complaint was filed with the NLRC against petitioner for failure to pay wagedifferentials, etc. MWSS contends that it was a GOCC hence the NLRC has no jurisdiction.The court ruled that MWSS employees are covered by the Civil Service Laws as MWSSwas created by RA6234 as a GOCC.

III. GOCCs under Corporation Code

BLISS vs. Callejo [GOCCs without charter and created under Corporation Code]:Petitioner union filed a petition for certification election with DOLE which dismissed itstating that majority of BLISS is owned by the Human Settlement Dev’t Corp, a wholly-

owned gov’t corporation. The court ruled that BLISS is a GOCC created under theCorporation law. It is without a charter, and therefore governed by the Labor Code. The1987 Constitution provides that the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions andinstrumentalities and agencies of the gov’t, including GOCCs with original charter.

IV. Classifications and Appointments< Sec.2 is the basis for classifying positions in the civil service into competitive

and non-competitive positionso Non-competitive: those which by their nature are policy-determining,

primarily confidential or highly technicalo The principal significance of the classification is in relation to the

appointing process# Non-competitive positions exempts them from competitive

examination as a means for determining merit and fitness# Appointment to a competitive position must be made

according to merit and fitness as determined, as far aspracticable, by competitive exams

< It is the nature and not just the label of the position which makes it non-competitive

o Primarily confidential- not only confidence in the aptitude of theappointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy whichinsures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedomfrom misgivings or betrayals of personal trust on confidential mattersof state

o Policy-determining- charged with the duty to formulate a method ofaction for gov’t or any of its subdivisions

o Highly technical- required to possess a technical skill or training in thesupreme or superior degree

<

The competitive and non-competitive positions roughly correspond inclassification into CAREER and NON-CAREER serviceo Career service shall be characterized by:

# Entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as faras practicable by competitive exams

# Opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and# Security of tenure

o Non-career service shall be characterized by:# Entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of

merit and fitness utilized for the career service# Tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which

is coterminous with that of the appointing authority orsubject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration ofa particular project for which purpose employment was made

Samson vs. CA [positions in competitive service]:

Talens, a civil service eligible, was appointed by the mayor as ASST. secretary to themayor. A new mayor succeeded where he summarily terminated Talens on the ground ofloss of confidence. Under RA2260, the position of secretaries to city mayors is non-competitive. The court ruled that asst. secretaries are not deemed to be non-competitiveemployees. Only secretaries are considered to be non-compettive. As a general rule,position in all branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities of the gov’t, including those inGOCCs belong to the competitive service except those that are expressly declared by lawto be non-competitive.

Griño vs. CSC [test of confidentiality of positions]:

When petitioner assumed office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo, he informedrespondents who occupied the positions of Provincial Attorney, Senior Legal Officer andLegal Officer II that he was terminating their services based on loss of trust andconfidence. Respondents appealed such termination to the CSC who ruled that such wasillegal. The court ruled that only the position of Provincial Attorney is one of trust,therefore his removal is valid. But those of Senior Legal Officer and Legal Officer II arenot confidential.

CSC vs. Salas [nature of duties determinative of the confidentiality of position]:Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff member andassigned to a casino. His employment was terminated by the PAGCOR Board of Directorsfor loss of confidence. He appealed such termination, alleging that he is not a confidentialemployee which the CSC denied stating that he was, based on PD1869 which providesthat employees of casinos and related services are classified as confidential appointees.The court ruled that the status of being a confidential employee depends upon the nature

of the functions of the employee and not upon the designation given by law. Whether aposition is policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical is determined notby the title but by the nature of the task that is entrusted to it.

V. Removal for Cause / Security of Tenure< Basic in a healthy civil service system is a guarantee of security of tenure, a

guarantee against arbitrary impairment, whether total or partial, of the right tocontinue in the position held

< Sec.2(3) guarantees that suspension or dismissal can be made only “for causeprovided by law”

o Dismissal includes demotion or transfer which involves reduction ofpray or rank

< PD807, The Civil Service Code details both the substantive grounds and theprocedure for disciplinary action

< It is incorrect to say that officers or employees occupying policy-making orhighly technical positions or primarily confidential positions do not enjoy securityof tenure

o Only removable as provided by lawo Primarily confidential is an exception because their term is deemed to

be coterminous with the confidence.

< Security of tenure cannot be circumvented by resort to abolition of officeo Only when the abolition is done in good faith and not merely as a

cover for removal will it be allowed. Thus to escape the taint ofunconstitutionality, it must be made:1) In good faith2) Not for personal or political reasons3) Not in violation of the law



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< Security of tenure also covers transferso Transfer of a permanent employee to another permanent position

without his consent violates security of tenureo Violates security of tenure if the transfer is done as a preliminary step

for his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from the permanentposition, or designed to indirectly terminate his service or force hisresignation

Hernandez vs. Villegas [loss of confidence as ground for termination –expiration of term not removal from office]:Villegas was appointed Director of Security of the Bureau of Customs. He went to the USto study and when he returned, he was temporarily detailed to the Arrastre Service.Another person became Acting Director of Security. Villegas was then permanentlyappointed as Arrastre Superintendent. His appointment involved a change of designationand status from Director of Security which is confidential to Arrastre Superintendent, aclassified position. The court ruled that such transfer was illegal. A person occupying aprimarily confidential position can only be removed for cause as provided by law. Thetermination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidencebecause in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely theexpiration of the term of office. As long as confidence in them endures, the incumbent isentitled to continue in office.

Briones vs. Osmeña [abolition in good faith]:Petitioner Briones is a 1st grade civil service eligible and he was appointed as Clerk-Stenographer in the Office of the City Treasurer and then transferred to the Office of theMayor. Petitioner Rosagaran is a 2nd grade civil service eligible and was employed in theOffice of the Mayor and promoted to Administrative Officer, and was publicly declared tobe a “Model Employee”. A resolution by the Municipal Board was passed abolishingpositions in the Mayor’s office among them of the petitioners’. The court ruled that theabolition of the position (reason alleged to be economy and efficiency) was a meresubterfuge for the removal without cause. For being a member of the Civil Service, histenure of office is protected by the Constitution. While abolition of the office does notimply removal of the incumbent, the rule is true only where the abolition is made in goodfaith; that the right to abolish cannot be used to discharge employees in violation of thecivil service law nor can it be exercised for personal or political reasons. That ruling isconclusive on the case now before us.

VI.

Electioneering or Partisan Political Activity< Sec.2(4) is intended to keep the Civil Service free of the deleterious effects ofpolitical partisanship

< Partisan political activity includes every form of “solicitation of the elector’s ofthe elector’s vote in favor of a specific candidate, and includes contribution ofmoney for election purposes and distribution of handbills

< Does not prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views on currentpolitical problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of candidates forpublic office whom he supports, nor does it prohibit a person from voting orfrom joining civic organizations that are non-partisan in character

< The rule does not apply to members of the Cabinet since their positions areessentially political and they may engage in partisan political activity

Santos vs. YatcoSantos, Secretary of National Defense, conducted a house-to-house campaign forGovernor Marti. Yatco prohibited Santos from campaigning personally or in his official

capacity. The Court held that the position of department secretaries is not embracedand included within the terms officers and employees of the Civil Service. When Santos, amember of the Nacionalista Party, campaigned for Gov. Martin, a candidate of theNacionalista Party, he was acting as a member of the Cabinet in discussing the issuesbefore the electorate and defending the actuations of the Administration to which hebelongs

VII. Right to Self-Organization and Right to Strike< Although the right to form organizations is guaranteed in other provisions of the

Constitution, it was thought nonetheless that this central right should also be

specifically placed in the Article which deals with government officers andemployees< Only talks about organizing, uniting as a union

GSIS vs. Kapisanan [no strike]:A 4-day concerted demonstration, rallies and mass walkout was in front of the GSIS mainoffice by GSIS personnel members of the union Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS.It was directed against the General Manager and his management style. They were issueda rally permit by the mayor but without prior approved leave. The court ruled that theconstitutional guarantee of the right to strike is qualified with the provision “in accordancewith law”. This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate this right, oreven deny certain sectors such right. Employees in the public service may not engage instrikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of governmentemployees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, withoutincluding the right to strike.”

VIII. Temporary Employees

Gloria vs. CA:Dr. Icasiano was appointed Schools Divisions Superintendent by President Aquino. He wasthen recommended by DECS Secretary to be Superintendent of Marikina Institute ofScience and Technology (MIST) in acting capacity. It was approved. The issue waswhether such reassignment is a violation of Icasiano’s security of tenure. The court ruledthat the reassignment appears to be indefinite as the appointment was made because it “best fits his qualifications and experience being an expert in vocation and technicaleducation.” While a temporary transfer of personnel is permissible even without theemployee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary steptoward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position ordesigned to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation, such transfer wouldin effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are

in the Civil Service.Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of theGovernment, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. Itshall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resourcesdevelopment programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climateconducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress anannual report on its personnel programs.

I. Powers of the Commission< As an administrative agency, it can only perform executive powers, quasi-

judicial powers and quasi-legislative or rule-making powers< Enumerates the key functions of the Commissions

o Promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actionso Classify positions

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o Prescribe conditions of employment except as to compensation andother monetary benefits which shall be provided by law

Section 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to upholdand defend this Constitution.

I. Oath to Defend the Constitution< The provision is meant to cover all civilian public officers, whether elective or

appointive

Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation ofgovernment officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlledcorporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their positions.

Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after suchelection, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned orcontrolled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

I. Political lame ducks< Prohibits the appointment of defeated candidates within 1 year following their

defeat to any office in the gov’t or in any GOCCs or in any of their subsidiaries< This, together with Sec.7, is intended to help eradicate the “spoils system”

Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any

capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointiveofficial shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlledcorporations or their subsidiaries.

I. Political opportunism and spoils< 1st paragraph governs elective officials: prohibits elective officials other than

members of Congress from accepting appointment during their tenureo If the elective official accepts an appointment without first resigning

his elective position, the appointment is invalido Unlike appointive officers in the next paragraph, Congress may not

create an exception to this rule

< 2

nd

paragraph deals with appointive officers: may not hold any other office oremployment in the gov’t or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,including GOCCs or their subsidiaries

o The prohibition is not absolute as they may hold another office ifallowed by law or by the primary functions of their position

o Primary functions of an office does not necessarily mean appointmentto a different office, it could simply mean that new functions havebeen added to 1 office

Flores vs. Drilon [prohibition against designation of elective officer duringtenure]:Under the Bases Conversion and Dev’t Act, Mayor Gordon of Olongapo City was appointedChairman and Chief Executive Officer of the SBMA. Because a mayor is an electiveposition, such appointment is beign challenged for its constitutionality. The court ruledthat such provision violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or

designation of elective officials to other gov’t posts. ArtIX-B Sec.7 expresses the policy

against the concentration of several public positions in 1 person, so that a public officer oremployee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery ofpublic services. The position is not merely ex officio to the position of mayor of OlongapoCity, hence it is not an exception to the general rule. As he is an incumbent, an electiveofficial remains ineligible for appointment to another public office. He does notautomatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by theConstitution, hence the appointment is necessarily null and void.

Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without

the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from anyforeign government.

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirectcompensation.

I. Additional or double compensation< The prohibition against additional or double compensation except when

specifically authorized by law is another constitutional curb on the spendingpower of the gov’t

< This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a publicoffice is a public trust. It is expected of a gov’t official or employee that hekeeps uppermost in mind the demands of public welfare.

< Difference b/w additional and double compensation:o Additional compensation: when for one and the same office for which a

compensation has been fixed there is added an extra reward in theform, for instance, for a bonuso Double compensation: refers to 2 sets of compensations for 2 different

offices held concurrently by 1 officer. There is no general prohibitionagainst the holding 2 offices which are not incompatible; but when anofficer accepts a 2nd office, he can draw the salary to such 2 nd officeonly when he is specifically authorized by law to receive doublecompensation

Saduesta vs. Municipality of Surigao [specific authority from law to receiveadditional compensation]:Petitioner was the district engineer for the Province of Surigao. Pursuant to the RevisedAdministrative Code, he was designated as sanitary and waterworks engineer for thesame province. Additional compensation was provided for. The municipality failed to givehim his salary. He filed an action to institute its recovery but the complaint was dismissed

because the law which authorized such additional compensation has been repealed. Thecourt held that since there is no law which the appellant is authorized to receiveadditional compensation for his services, his claim must fail. of the Revised AdministrativeCode is a general authority given to all district engineers. The authority required by theConstitution to receive double or additional compensation is a specific authority given to a particular employee or officer of the Government because of peculiar or exceptionalreasons warranting the payment of extra or additional compensation. The purpose of theConstitution is to prohibit generally payment of additional or double compensation exceptin individual instances where the payment of such additional compensation appears to benot only just but necessary.

C. The Commission on Elections

Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of aChairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the

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Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holdersof a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective positions in theimmediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman,shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law forat least ten years.

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with theconsent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years withoutreappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years,two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, withoutreappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary oracting capacity.

I. Composition, qualifications, appointment, term

< Chairman and the Commissioners must be:o Natural born citizenso At least 35 years of age at the time of their appointmento Holders of a college degree but a majority which includes the

Chairman should be members of the Philippine Bar for at least 10years

o Must not have been candidates for any elective position in theimmediately preceding elections

< Appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on

Appointments for a term of 7 years without reappointmento Those of the first appointed, 3 shall hold office for 7 years, 3 for 5

years, and the last three for 3 yearso The result is that any one time only 3 Commissioners retire togethero Since appointment to any vacancy is only for the unexpired portion of

the term of the predecessor, the regularity of the staggered rotationalsystem remains undisturbed even by vacancies occurring in mid-term

Cayetano vs. Monsod [meaning of practice of law]:Respondent was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Comelec Chairman.Petitioner opposed the nomination on the ground that respondent did not possess therequired qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.The court ruled that respondent possessed the required qualification, as the practice of

law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legalprocedure, knowledge, training and experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod doesnot possess the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least10 years is incorrect since his past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and alawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor –more than satisfy the constitutionalrequirement for the position of COMELEC chairman.

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an

election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2)

Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials,and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials

decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangayofficials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contestsinvolving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, andnot appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,including determination of the number and location of polling places,appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4)

Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies andinstrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of thePhilippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful,and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitionswhich, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission onElections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Thosewhich seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuseto uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreigngovernment shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute

interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additionalground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in additionto other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court forinclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecutecases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constitutingelection frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, andto prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, andnuisance candidacies.

(8)

Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it hasdeputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation ordisregard of, or disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on theconduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

I. Powers and Functions of the COMELEC< Possessed with executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers but by

exception, it has been given judicial power as “sole judge of all contests relatingto the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective local officials

o This judicial power is given in a limited way ! COMELEC cannot claiminherent powers of courts

# Has limited powers to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition andmandamus granted by BP697,Sec.50 but only in connectionwith its appellate jurisdiction under Art.IX,Sec.2(2).

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< Among its quasi-legislative powers is the power to issue rules and regulations toimplement election laws ! deemed implicit in the power to implementregulations

o Should there be conflict between a rule of procedure promulgated bythe COMELEC and a provision of the Rules of Court, if the proceedingis before the COMELEC, the former shall prevail; but if the proceedingis in court, the Rules of Court prevail.

Atienza vs. COMELEC:

Drilon as President of the Liberal Party announced his party’s withdrawal of support forthe administration of GMA. But petitioner who was LP Chairman denounced this move. Hethen declared all position in LP vacant and elected new officers. Drilon filed a petition withCOMELEC to nullify the elections which was granted. SC ruled that COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute. The LP had another election beforeDrilon’s term expired. Mar Roxas was elected as new LP President. Atienza was expelledfrom the party. COMELEC ruled that such election was valid. Petitioners are now assailingthat COMELEC committed GAD when it ruled on the election issue instead of ruling firston Atienza’s expulsion. The SC ruled that the validity of Roxas’ election as LP President isa leadership issue that COMELEC had to settle. The LP President certifies the officialstandard bearer of the party. Atienza’s expulsion does not affect the leadership of theparty because its validity is purely membership issue that had to be settled by the partyas an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by theCourt. The Court ruled that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article

IX-C of the Constitution, “include the ascertainment of the identity of the political partyand its legitimate officers responsible for its acts.” The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and allcontroversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conducttheir activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene indisputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutionalfunctions.

II. Sec. (2): Election contests

< Among the more important powers is the power to be judge of election contests< Jurisdiction:

o Exclusive original jurisdiction: all contests relating to the elections,returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and cityofficials

o Appellate jurisdiction: all contests involving elective municipal officialsdecided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving electivebarangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction

o Excludes jurisdiction over elections for Sangguniang Kabataan ! givento DILG

< Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contestsinvolving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executor and notappealable

o Non-appealable character refers only to questions of fact and not oflaw

o Remain subject to the SC’s jurisdiction through Rule 65< Before proclamation, any problem should be resolved in a “pre-proclamation”

proceeding by the COMELEC because of its powers under Secs2(1) and (3).

o Only questions that may not be touched are those “involving the rightto vote”

o However COMELEC has authority to decide whether a person hasconstitutional qualifications needed to be voted for even on thenational level

o COMELEC’s jurisdiction is administrative or quasi-judicial and isgoverned by less stringent requirements of administrative due process

< After proclamation, when the controversy should already be a “contest” (adefeated candidate seeks to oust the proclaimed winner and claims the seat) !

the tribunals and courts should have jurisdictiono COMELEC’s jurisdiction is judicial and should be governed by the

requirements of judicial due process

III. Sec. 2(3): Powers not given

< Not empowered to decide questions “involving the right to vote”o This is a judicial question and the power to resolve has been excluded

from the Commission’s powers ! under the jurisdiction of the courts< Not empowered to transfer municipalities from 1 congressional district to

another for the purpose of preserving proportionality

IV. Deputizing law enforcement agencies

< Can only be exercised with the concurrence of the Presidento

Officers who can be deputized are under the jurisdiction of thePresident as Commander-in-Chief< Has no disciplinary powers over the officers it may deputize, all they can do is

recommend disciplinary action to the President

V. Sec.2(5) Registration of parties and organizations

< A political party or organization acquires juridical personality by registrationo In order to participate in the party-list system, it must be registeredo Informs the people of the party’s or organization’s existence and of its

ideals and identifies the parties and its officers for purposes ofregulation by the COMELEC

< Exceptions to registration:1) Religious denominations and sects2) Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful

means3) Those which refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution4) Those which are supported by any foreign gov’t

VI. Sec.2(6) Prosecution of election offenses

< The power to investigate and prosecute violations of election laws by theCOMELEC is exclusive ! intended to enable the COMELEC to insure free, orderlyand honest elections

o Fiscals or prosecutors can only file an information charging an electionoffense when they have been deputized by the COMELEC

< The task of the COMELEC as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon anyelection offense complaint, is not physical searching and gathering of proof in

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support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election offense< Covers not only criminal cases but also administrative cases

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,including pre- proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard anddecided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decidedby the Commission en banc.

I. Commission Decisions

< Whether COMELEC sits en back or in division, decisions on any case or matterare reached by majority vote

o Rules may not require unanimity< Omnibus Election Code, Sec.257 requires that the COMELEC decide all election

cases brought before it within 90 days from the date of submission ! but thisrule may be relaxed

< 2 impt rules:1) Motions for reconsideration are decided en banc; but a decision en banc is

required only when the subject for reconsideration is a “decision”, that is, aresolution of substantive issues

2) Election cases are decided in division

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the

enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportationand other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, orinstrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or itssubsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, andequal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates inconnection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credibleelections.

I. Regulation of public utilities, media, franchises

< Transportation and other public utilities as well as mass media play a veryimportant role in elections and can be used to disrupt free, orderly and honestelections

o During election periods they may be supervised or regulated by theCOMELEC

< Power subsists not just during the period of voting for public officers but alsoduring referenda and plebiscites especially if constitutional amendments are atissue

< Print media may not be compelled to allocate free space to the COMELEC ! would amount to a prohibited taking of property without just compensation

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation ofelection laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without thefavorable recommendation of the Commission.

Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the freechoice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.

Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall bevalid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in thisConstitution.

Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-listsystem, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of electioninspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitledto appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

I.

Political rights

< Promotes a multi-party or open party system

o Free and open party system refers to a disengagement from the sterile2-party system of the past and the multi-party system will be allowedto develop

Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election periodshall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty daysthereafter.

I. “Election period”

< Election period is the period of time needed for administering an election andcan go beyond the date for the casting of ballots

o 90 days before the day of the election to 30 days thereafter# In special cases, the COMELEC is authorized to fix a different

period< Campaign period refers to the period of active solicitation of votes

o May be set by the legislature for a period less than the election period

Section 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form ofharassment and discrimination.

I. Equal protection of candidates

< Nothing more than a specification of the equal protection clause of the Bill ofRights

< This provision is to be understood as having special reference to unaffiliated orpartyless bona fide candidate

Section 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses forholding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shallbe provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be releasedautomatically upon certification by the Chairman of the Commission.

I. Fiscal autonomy

< This provision, together with the exemption of the COMELEC from pre-audit,should help towards strengthening the independence of the Commission

D. The Commission on Audit

Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and twoCommissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time oftheir appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, Certified Public Accountantswith not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the

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Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, andmust not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong tothe same profession.

(1) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President withthe consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven yearswithout reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold officefor seven years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissionerfor three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall beonly for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall

any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

I. Purpose, organization, composition, appointment< Congress, through its power to tax, raises public funds and, through its power

to appropriate, authorizes the expenditure of public funds for specific purposes.Various administrative officials collect, keep and expend these public funds andare required to keep accurate financial records.

o It is the function of COA to examine the accuracy of the records keptand to determine whether expenditures have been made in conformitywith law and take corrective action when necessary

o It is through COA that people can verify whether their money has beenproperly spent

< Composed of a Chairman and 2 Commissioners who must be:o Natural born citizenso At least 35 years old at time of appointmento

Certified public accountants with a minimum of 10 years of auditingexperience, or members of the Bar with a minimum exposure of 10years in the practice of law ! but at NO TIME shall all of them belongto the same profession

o Must not have been candidates for any elective position in theelections immediately preceding their appointment

< Appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission onAppointments

< Terms of 7 years each, like those of the members of the COMELEC arestaggered

< Reappointment and temporary appointment or designation are absolutelyprohibited

Mison vs. COA [COA as collegial body]:The Commissioner of Customs declared that the Philippine Navy’s seizure of M/V HyojinMaru is illegal and ordered its release together with its cargo. The cargo was returned butthe vessel sank while in the custody of the Bureau of Customs. Claimants then filed aclaim with COA for the payment of the value of the vessel. The Manager of the TechnicalService Office of COA denied the claim. They filed an MR, but the Acting COA Chairmanalso denied the motion as the said decision had already become final and executory. Butin a 4th Indorsement addressed to the Auditor of the Bureau of Customs, the Commissionreconsidered the claim and granted it. The court ruled that the 4 th Indorsement was thebinding decision. The decision rendered by the Manager of the Technical Service was voidab initio as he had no power at all to render or promulgate a decision for the Commission.Even the Chairman, alone, does not have that power. As clearly set out in theConstitution then in force, the power was lodged in the Commission on Audit, "composedof a Chairman and two Commissioners." 20 It was the Commission, as a collegial body,which then as now, had the jurisdiction to "(d)ecide any case brought before it withinsixty days from the date of its submission for resolution," subject to review by theSupreme Court on certiorari .

Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty toexamine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, andexpenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to,the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post- auditbasis:

(a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been grantedfiscal autonomy under this Constitution;

(b)

autonomous state colleges and universities;(c)

other government-owned or controlled corporations and their

subsidiaries; and(d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or

indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by lawor the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition ofsubsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of theaudited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt suchmeasures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessaryand appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the generalaccounts of the Government and, for such period as may be providedby law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertainingthereto.

(2)

The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish thetechniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and

auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention anddisallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, orunconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.

I. Powers and functions< Gives a broad outline of the powers and functions of COA:

1) To examine and audit all forms of gov’t revenues2) To examine and audit all forms of gov’t expenditures3) To settle gov’t accounts4) To define the scope and techniques for its own auditing procedures5) To promulgate accounting and auditing rules including those for the

prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,extravagant or unconscionable expenditures

6) To decide administrative cases involving expenditure of public funds

< The power of COA to define the scope of its audit and examination and toestablish the techniques it will follow is exclusive

< Auditing authority of the COA over GOCCs extends only to those with originalcharter

< Has authority not just over accountable officers but also over other officers whoperform functions related to accounting such as verification of evaluations andcomputation of fees collectible, and the adoption of internal rules of control

< Only has post-audit authority over:o Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted

fiscal autonomy under this Constitutiono Autonomous colleges and universitieso Other GOCCs and their subsidiarieso Such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or

indirectly, from or through the gov’t, which are required by law or bythe granting institution to submit to such audit as a conditionof subsidy or equity

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# BUT: where the internal control system of the auditedagencies is inadequate, COA may adopt such measures,including temporary or special pre-audit as are necessaryand appropriate to correct the deficiencies

< The power of COA to settle gov’t accounts has reference only to liquidatedclaims and not to unliquidated claims

< COA’s auditing power is non-exclusive: therefore gov’t institutions with privateinvestments in them require the presence of private auditing firms, notexclusively, but concurrently

o BUT the COA’s findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those

of private auditors, at least insofar as gov’t agencies and officials areconcerned

POI vs. Auditor General [power to settle accounts]:POI entered into a barter agreement with the Bureau of Prisons where they agreed on adelivery of sawed lumber. The barter agreement did not state the value. They failed tofulfill their obligations and so POI filed a claim with the Auditor General. The court ruledthat the Auditor General did not have jurisdiction over POI’s claim because such claimwas unliquidated. The power of the treasury over the settlement of accounts has alwaysbeen distinguished from their power over claims. It has been generally held that anaccount is something which may be adjusted and liquidated by an arithmeticalcomputation and that claims for unliquidated damages cannot be considered as accountsand are not committed by law to their control and decision.

ICNA vs. Republic [power to act on specific debt claim]:Plaintiff insurance company filed a claim in the CFI an action for recovery for the insuredvalue of a shipment of 82 cartons of goods that was lost in the custody of the Bureau ofCustoms, an agency of the Republic. The court ruled that the claim should have been filedwith the Auditor General. In the present case, the amount of the claim is already fixedand is readily determinable from the bills of lading and other shipping papers.Accordingly, such claim should be addressed to the Auditor General.

Blue Bar Coconut Phil vs. Tantuico [post-audit authority]:Under PD232, the Philippine Coconut Authority was created. Subsequently, a coconutstabilization fund was created where end-users would remit the collection of levy in everyfirst sale of copra to the fund. COA then initiated a special audit of coconut end-usercompanies, which included petitioners with respect to their fund levy collections and thesubsidies they had received. As a result of the initial findings, an order was given by COAto collect the short levies and overpaid subsidies and to apply subsidy claims to thesettlement of short levies in case the petitioners failed to remit them. Petitioners allegethat COA has no jurisdiction to audit them as they are private corporations. The courtruled that the Constitution states that private entities who handle government funds orsubsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their handling of said funds by gov’tauditors.

Section 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or itssubsidiaries in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

Section 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within thetime fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of theGovernment, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its audit, andrecommend measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shallsubmit such other reports as may be required by law.

ARTICLE X: LOCAL GOVERNMENT:

Sec. 1: The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

There are only two autonomous regions allowed by the constitution, should a third one bedesired a constitutional amendment will be required.

Sec. 2: The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power:

- There is decentralization of administration when the central governmentdelegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden thebase of government power and in the process to make local governments ‘moreresponsive and accountable,’ and ‘ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit ofnational development and social progress.’

- Decentralization of power involves an abdication of political power in favor ofLGU declared to be autonomous. The autonomous government becomesaccountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.

Magtajas v. Pryce: LGUs have certain powers given by the Constitution which may not be curtailed by thenational government, but that outside of these, local governments may not passordinances contrary to statute.

Laguna Lake Devt Authority v. CA: The SC denied the municipalities around Laguna Lake the power to authorize theconstruction or dismantling of fish pens etc, the municipalities were claiming authority ontheir general powers granted under the Local Govt. Code. LLDA claimed power based onlaw. The SC ruled the specific powers of LLDA prevail over the general power of localgovernments.

Batangas v. CA: LGUs don’t have the power to grant franchises to operate a CATVsystem.

San Juan v. Civil Service Comm:

The law provides that the budget officer will be appointed by the Department head uponrecommendation of the head of the local government. None however of thoserecommended by the local government head meets the requirements of law. Thedepartment head cant just choose any other person, he must return therecommendations and ask for new ones.

Leynes v. COA: COA may not reduce the allowance given to judges by local governments. The LocalGovernment Code allows LGUs to give allowance to judges and decide how much to give.Reducing what has been decided by the local government interferes with their localautonomy and thus is prohibited.

Drilon v. Lim:Under the LGC the Secretary of Justice is granted power to act on casesinvolving the approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures. Pursuant

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thereto, the Secretary of Justice declared ordinance 7794 as void for failure to follow theprocedure under the law (no notice of public hearing which is required, and it was nottranslated to Filipino). City of manila filed a petition saying the law is unconstitutionalbecause it gives the SOJ power of control, which is lodged by the constitution to thepresident alone and violates the local autonomy of manila. The SC said that the SOJ insetting aside the law did not make a new one or replace the judgment of those who madelaw, it is only supervisory power granted to the SOJ to make sure that laws are followed.

Sec. 3: The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a moreresponsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of

decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocateamong the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resourcesand provide for the qualifications election appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials and all other matters relating to theorganization and operation of the local units.

Garcia v. COMELEC:The 1991 LGC now provides for “initiative and referendum” on the local level which itdefines as the “legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unitmay directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.” As worded the law authorizesinitiative and referendum not just on ordinances but also on resolutions.

Recall was also tested in this case and the SC said that the Constitution did not providefor any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibitthe adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The Constitution provides that

Congress was given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as itsdiscernment dictates.

Sec. 4: The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over localgovernments.

Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities andmunicipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of theircomponent units are with the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

President --- supervision over LGProvinces --- supervision over component cities and municipalitiesCities and municipalities –- supervision over component barangays

General supervision: The power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officersperform their functions in accordance with law. It does NOT include the power tosubstitute one’s judgment for that of a lower officer in matters where a lower officer hasvarious legal alternatives to choose from.

Ganzon v. CA: Does the President through the DILG or Congress by law have the right to suspendsomeone despite local autonomy? Yes. The power of general supervision of the Presidentincludes the power to investigate and remove. Also the Constitution (Sec. 3, Art. 10)provides that the LGC may provide fro removal showing that it can be subjected to law.

Autonomy does not transform local governments into a kingdom unto themselves. ThePresident has the power of general supervision over them (although not the power ofcontrol).

Taule v. Secretary Santos: The secretary of the DILG may not annul the election ofofficers of barangay officials as such would be tantamount to control.

Province of Negros v. COA: COA committed GAD in disallowing the release of premiums paid fro the hospitalizationand insurance benefits granted by the Province of Negros to its officials and employeessince that is a form of control not granted to the President or executive officers.

Sec. 5: Each Local Government Unit shall have the power to create its own sources ofrevenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations asthe Congress may provide consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the Local Governments.

Basco v. PAGCOR:PAGCOR being exempt from taxation does not violate the right of LGUs to create its ownsource of revenue, since the power of the LG to impose taxes and fees is still subject tolimitations which Congress may provide.

Petron v. Mayor: The power of LG to tax is liberally interpreted in favor of the State.However for LG it is strictly construed against the LG and in favor of the taxpayer.

Yamane v. BA Lepanto: An LG may not impose business taxes unless it is shown that the entity is engaged inbusiness. In this case having a Condominium Corporation does not mean it engages inbusiness seeing that it is made only for the benefit of the owners and assessmentscollected are only for expenses to be used for the common areas.

Philippine Petroleum v. Mun. of Pililla: The power of LG to raise revenue cannot belimited by administrative order since it can only be limited by Congress.

Batangas Power v. Batangas City :The LGC has widened the tax base of LGUs to include taxes which were prohibited underprevious laws. Batangas Power cannot rely on the Basco case since it was decided prior tothe LGC when there was still no law that granted LGUs the power to tax instrumentalitiesof the government.

Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna:When there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute the taxing power of LGUs mustbe deemed to exist and they are granted general and broad tax powers subject tolimitations given by Congress. This power however is unlimited and one must still ensurethat:

1. The taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple andunreasonable impositions.

2. Each LGU will have its fair share of available resources.3. The resources of the government will not be unduly disturbed4. Local taxation will be fair, uniform and just.

Petron v. Mayor: The power of LG to tax is liberally interpreted in its favor against thestate BUT it is strictly construed against the LG and in favor of the taxpayer.

Smart Comm. v. City of Davao: Aside from national franchise tax, the franchisee is still liable to pay the local franchisetax, unless it is expressly and unequivocally exempted from payment thereof under itslegislative franchise. The “in lieu of all taxes” clause should state whether the exemptionapplies to both local and national taxes.

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Sec. 6: Local Government Units shall have a Just Share, as determined by law, in thenational taxes, which SHALL be AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED to them.

Pimentel v. Aguirre: A provision in the law which provides that pending the assessment by the DevelopmentBudget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, 10% of the allotment ofLGUs will be withheld is a violation of the Constitution.

Batangas v. Executive Secretary: Congress may not impose conditions on the release of the share of LG. In this case the

release of the funds of the LGUs without the Oversight Committee’s prior approval isconstitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA and therefore a part of the just share of the LGUs in just taxes.

Alternative Center v. Zamora: In the GAA of 2000 10 billion of the IRA was set aside for “Unprogrammed Fund” that wasto be released on the condition that the revenue collections would meet the revenuetargets originally submitted by the president. THE SC ruled that such is violation ofconstitutional right of LGUs to fiscal autonomy because under the law it has to bereleased automatically to them without condition. The congress only has control over the “just share” or the amount that they will receive but not as to the manner of its releasebecause it must be automatic.

Sec. 7: Local Governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of theutilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the

manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of directbenefits.Fund Sources of Local Governments:

1. Local taxes, fees, and charges2. Its share in the national taxes3. Share in the proceeds of the utilization of natural resources within their

respective areas4. Other sources of revenue which they may legitimately make use of either in

their public of governmental capacity or private or proprietary capacity.

Sec. 8: The term of office of elective officials, except barangay officials, which shall bedetermined by law, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more thanthree consecutive terms.

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as aninterruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

An incumbent mayor dies and so the vice mayor succeeds by operation of law, is thisconsidered part of the term in that office for purposes of the three-term limit? No. Theterm of limit of elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected aswell as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it isn’t enough thathe served 3 consecutive terms in an elective local official, he should have also beenelected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification canapply.

Borja jr v. COMELEC :The three-term limit of local elective officials under the Constitution ( except for barangayofficials1) applies when:

= But see Bolos vs. Comelec on §43(b) of the LGC.

1. The local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times.2. He has fully served three consecutive terms.

Lonzanida v. COMELEC: L was serving his term but it was challenged and he had toabandon office. The SC held he could run for the next election because he did not servethree full terms.

Adormeo v. COMELECO: T lost when he ran for a third term. On recall however it wasfound that he really won so he served the rest of the former winner’s term. HE can stillrun in the next election because he had not served three full terms.

Socrates v. COMELEC: H served for three full terms. In the first year after the end of histhird term, he ran in a recall election. He is still qualified to run for another term becausedue to the recall election there was an interruption thus breaking the successiveness.

Latasa v. COMELEC: During the third term of the mayor of a municipality themunicipality was converted to a city. Could he run as Mayor of the city in the nextelection? No since there has been no change in territory nor in constituency.

Ong v. Alegre: After serving a full three-year term, A was declared to have beeninvalidly elected. The term should still be elected for purposes of the tree term limit, it isof no consequence that he was declared not elected since he already served.

Alboin v. COMELEC: Preventive suspension of a local elective official does not interrupthis term for purposes of computing the three-term limit.

Dizon v. COMELEC:Dizon sought cancellation of Morales’ 2007 Certificate of Candidacy on the ground thatMorales was proclaimed as the municipal mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga during the1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections and has fully served the same; so the 2007-2010term is Morales’ fifth term in office. The COMELEC Second Division and En Banc ruled thatthe there was a gap in Morales’ term when he failed to qualify as a candidate for the 2004elections when the SC ruled in another case that he violated the three term rule, thusallowing him to run in 2007. This was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc saying that thethree-term limit is not applicable because: 1) Morales was not the duly-elected mayor ofMabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term because he was not evenconsidered a candidate thereat; and 2) He has failed to serve the entire duration of theterm of office because he has already relinquished the disputed office on May 16, 2007more than a month prior to the end of his supposed term. The SC ruled that indeed therewas a gap in Morales’ term because Morales cannot be deemed to have served the fullterm of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration ofthe term. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap forpurposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 termis effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. There shouldbe a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1)that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the

same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutiveterms.

Bolos v. COMELEC:Petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay three times. During his third term, he ran forMunicipal Councilor, won, and therefore left his post as Punong Barangay. He ran again asPunong Barangay in 2007 and won. Respondent filed a case to disqualify Petitioner forviolation of the three-term limit rule. Comelec ruled that Petitioner violated the three-term rule because his abandonment of post by running for another office isconsidered a voluntary renunciation of office, which does not interrupt the

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service. The SC agreed with the Comelec. When he ran for higher office he knew it wouldentail abandonment of his current office and therefore the renunciation of his position wasvoluntary. Thus there is no interruption.NOTE: LGC §43(b) provides that barangay officials are covered by the three-term limit,while §43(c) states that the term of office of barangay officials shall be 5 years.

Aldovino v. Comelec:Asilo was elected councilor for three terms. During his third term the Sandiganbayansuspended him for 90d due to a criminal case but this was subsequently lifted and heresumed office after. He then filed again a certificate of candidacy. The SC ruled that the

preventive suspension did not interrupt his term and therefore he reached the 3-termlimit. The SC held that temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions ofan elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption ofa term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective breakfrom holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred fromexercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barredfrom performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in themeanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is aconsequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.Preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs afterthere has been a break in the term.The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy

exists.Sec. 9: Legislative Bodies of Local Governments shall have sectoral representation asmay be prescribed by law.

Sec. 10: No Province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteriaestablished by local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votescast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Tan v. COMELEC:Being assailed was the constitutionality of BP 885 which created the province of Negrosdel Norte with 3 cities and 8 municipalities which would be separated from the province ofNegros Occidental. A plebiscite was conducted for this purpose. The petitioners claim thatexcluding the other inhabitants and the other cities of Negros Occidental violated theConstitution. The SC held that two political units would be affected. The first would bethe parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantiallyaltered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtractedfrom the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform tosaid constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either ofthese two component political units [in this case the participation of the parentprovince was excluded]. The term “areas affected” include those that are left behind dueto the fact that boundaries would be altered etc. To form the new province of Negros delNorte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parentprovince of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose boundaries will beconsequently substantially altered.The fact that the plebiscite was already held doesn’t make it moot and academic since aslong as the province has been created and is existing the constitutionality of its formationmay be questioned.

League of Cities v. COMELEC (2011):Several municipalities sought to be converted into component cities, not all however wereacted upon by Congress and thus there were pending bills left to the next Congress.While these bills were pending however, the Congress passed a new law which increasedthe income requirement solely from locally generated sources from 20m to 100m to bequalified to become a component city. The issue is the application of this law to thepending bills. The SC held that the LGUs were exempt from the coverage of the newincome requirement.

- Congress during the time of the enactment of the law to increase income wasaware of the pending bills and in the deliberations it was discussed that it would

be unfair to allow the law to retroactively apply to the pending bills, thecongress however did not put the language into the law since the deliberationsand interpretation would form part of the bill and therefore their intent toexclude the pending bills was made manifest.

- Even if we are to disregard the deliberations the SC said that the municipalitieshad already proven themselves as viable and capable to become componentcities of their respective provinces, they were centers of trade and commerce,points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral andother natural resources and flourishing tourism spots.

- The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the expressarticulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from thecoverage of R.A. No. 9009.

- Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect,the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses foundtherein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned

municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are,therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself.

It was also claimed that the Cityhood Laws violated Article 10 with regard to the “justshare” received by the petitioners since it would be decreased if the municipalities wouldbe converted into cities.

- The SC held first that there was no violation of the EPC. In imposing the 100mannual income it was arbitrarily made, it was not supported by evidence orempirical data or inflation rates. It was made simply in order to make it difficultfor municipalities to become component cities. Therefore it cannot be said thatthe amount must be strictly followed to determine if a municipality has sufficientacceptable standards to provide for all essential government facilities andservices and special functions commensurate with the size of its population. Thefact remains that even if these cities did not reach the 100m mark they are stillviable and self-sustaining. Thus the substantial distinction between the pendingbills is not merely the fact that they are pending as compared to other bills butlies in their capacity and viability to become component cities of their respectiveprovinces.

- Petitioners in these cases complain about the purported reduction of their “justshare” in the IRA. To be sure, petitioners are entitled to a “just share,” not aspecific amount. But the feared reduction proved to be false when, after theimplementation of the Cityhood Laws, their respective shares increased, notdecreased. What these petitioner cities were stating as a reduction of theirrespective IRA shares was based on a computation of what they would receive ifrespondent municipalities were not to become component c ities at all.

- April 2011: The share of local government units is a matter of percentageunder Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share ofthe cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area(25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number ofexisting cities, such that when the number of cities increases, morewill divide and share the allocation for cities. However, we have to

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note that the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and caneither increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitledto share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment(IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amountreceived may be more than that received in the preceding year.

Navarro vs. ErmitaThe issue in this case is the constitutionality of the law creating the province of DinagatIslands. It is claimed that the law is unconstitutional because Dinagat Islands does nothave the requisite land area or population to be a province under the LGC (2,000 square

kilometers, while Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951). It was also pointed out that when the local government unitto be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land arearequirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the localgovernment unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. Thisexemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a

province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2)of the LGC-IRR. There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption shouldapply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physicalconfiguration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands orgroup of islands would form part of the land area of a newly created province than inmost cities or municipalities.The Supreme Court said that the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability ofDinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following theexemption from the land area requirement. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative

powers, Congress gave validity to that exemption in the LGC-IRR and transformed it intolaw when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat. Therefore, thecreation of Dinagat Province is valid.

Sec. 11: The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisionssubject to a plebiscite as set forth in section 10 hereof.The Component Cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall beentitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies.The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limitedto basic services requiring coordination.

The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is a body composed of severalgovernment units:

1. Twelve cities: Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon,Muntinlupa, Las Piñas, Marikina, Parañaque and Valenzuela.

2. Five municipalities: Malabon, Navotas, Pateros, San Juan and Taguig.

MMDA:RA 7924: Metropolitan Manila was declared as a special development and administrativeregion and the administration of metro-wide basic services affecting the region placedunder a development authority.

Metro-Wide Services: services which have a metro-wide impact and transcend localpolitical boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for saidservices to be provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro Manila.

7 BASIC METRO-WIDE SERVICES:1. Development planning2. Transport and traffic management3. Sold waste disposal and management4. Flood control and sewerage management

5. Urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services6. Health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control7. Public Safety.

The powers of the MMDA are limited to:1. Formulation2. Coordination3. Regulation4. Implementation5. Preparation

6. Management7. Monitoring8. Setting of policies9. Installation of a system and administration.• There is no grant of police power nor legislative power. It is not an LGU and

thus has no power to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriatefunds for the general welfare of the people of Metro Manila.

MMDA v. Bel-Air : MMDA cannot order Bel Air Village to open Jupiter Street to the publicbecause it is not an LGU with police power.

MMDA v. Garin: MMDA may confiscate and suspend or revoke a driver’s license when atraffic law or regulation has been violated as part of its mandate to managetransportation and traffic as well as the administration and implementation of all trafficenforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.

Sec. 12: Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component citieswhose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall beindependent of the province.The voters of component cities within a province whose charters contain no such prohibition shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.

Kinds of cities:1. Highly urbanized cities as determined by law

a. Don’t vote in provincial elections (they are independent from theprovince)

2. Cities not raised to the highly urbanized category but whose existing chartersprohibit their voters from voting in provincial elections

a. Don’t vote in provincial elections (they are independent from theprovince)

b. Envisioned as an ad-hoc category to take care of existing charters butthey can become either highly urbanized or become a component citiesqualified to vote.

3. Component citiesa. Cannot be denied the right to voteb. Can rise to level of a highly urbanized city.

Abella v. COMELEC : A resident of a component city whose charters prohibit voting in aprovincial elective official may not run for a provincial elective office.

Sec. 13: Local Government Units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate theirefforts, services and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordancewith law.

This doesn’t create a new juridical entity.LGUs may create grouping even prior to an enabling law.



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a. Bangsamoro people: natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao. Andits adjacent islands including Palawan and Sulu archipelago and theirdescendants including their spouses.

b. Bangsamoro people therefore not only includes Moros as traditionallyunderstood but ALL INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF MINDANAO AND ITSADJACENT ISLANDS.

2. Territory: The BJE is defined as the geographic area of ARMM and otherprovinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays (Brgys. In Zamboanga, Palawan,sulu, etc.)

3. Resources: BJE is free to enter into economic cooperation and trade relations

with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade mission inthose countries.a. External defense is to remain with the national government.b. The national government is to take steps to ensure that the BJE is able

to participate in international meetings and events like the ASEAN andthe UN.

c. Governance: The relationship between the RP government and BJE isassociative. It provides that “provisions requiring amendments to theexisting legal framework shall take effect upon signing of thecomprehensive compact and upon effecting the aforesaidamendment.”

Substantive Issues:1. The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.

a. International Law Concept of Association: when two states of unequalpower voluntarily establish durable lings. One state the associate,delegates certain responsibilities to the other – the principal—whilemaintaining its international status as a state (middle ground betweenintegration and independence). It is usually used as a transitionaldevice of former colonies on their way to full independence.

b. The Associative concept in the MOA-AD has many provisions, whichare consistent with this international concept of association.

i. Capacity to enter trade relations with foreign countriesii. Participation in meetings and events of ASEAN and UN.

c. The concept of association is NOT recognized under our Constitution.i. The concept implies powers that go beyond anything granted

by the Constitution to any local or regional government.Implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state.The Constitution however does not contemplate any state inthis jurisdiction other than the Philippine State.

2. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized inthe Constitution.

a. BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria laid down in theMontevideo Convention (permanent population, defined territory,government, capacity toe enter into relations with other states) – thuscontrary to the Constitution.

b. Furthermore, the fact that the components of the ARMM already had aplebiscite for the ARMM doesn’t render having another plebisciteunnecessary because BJE is a completely different entity that wouldrequire another plebiscite.

3. The MOA-AD would not comply with Article 10, Section 20 of the Constitution:a. To accept the BJE and MOA-AD would require an amendment to this

Article to expand the list in the provision.b. Under sub-paragraph 9 of Section 20 of Article 10 allows increasing

the powers of the region by passage of law. However the mere

passage of law pursuant to this would not suffice since any law thatmight vest in the BJE powers found in the MO-AD should also complywith other provisions of the Constitution. Thus, if a law would bepassed for instance to give treaty-making power to the BJEC it wouldgo against the our Constitutional system that provides that thePresident is the sole organ and authority for external relations.

c. Not only is it inconsistent with the Constitution but also statutory lawsuch as the Organic Act of ARMM and the IPRA.

i. Under the organic act the term Bangsamoro contrasts withthe definition therein where under the act a distinction

between Bangsamoro people and tribes people is made whilein the MOA-AD they are lumped together.ii. IPRA lays down prevailing procedure of delineating and

recognizing ancestral domain, the MOA-AD’s manner is aclear departure from that procedure. (In IPRA it is moredetailed procedure, in MOA-AD it just states that the landmass, maritime, terrestrial, fluvial, etc embracing themindano-sulu-palawan geographic region).

Ordillo v. COMELEC : The province of Ifugao which was the only province which voted fora Cordillera Autonomous Region cannot constitute an autonomous region since theConstitution provides that it should be made of provinces not just one province.

Spouses Badua v. Cordillera Bodong Administration: Since the CAR was rejected byall provinces except IFUGAO the Cordillera Bodong Administration as well as the specialcourts created do not exist and neither do these courts posses juridical power andtherefore cannot render any valid executor decision.

Abbas v. COMELEC :Even if the Organic Act of Mindanao is violative of the Tripoli Agreement it is still validsince international agreements and statutes are on the same level and which ever is latersupersedes the earlier one.

- The approval of an organic act doesn’t automatically create the autonomousregion. It is still subject to ratification in a plebiscite.

- It is enough for the creation of the autonomous region that some provinces,cities and geographic areas vote favorable and need not be a majority vote of allthose units.

Sec. 19: The first congress elected under this constitution shall, within eighteen monthsfrom the time of organization of both houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomousregions in Muslim Mindanao and Cordilleras.

Sec. 20: Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitutionand national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

1. Administrative organization2. Creation of sources of revenues3. Ancestral domain and natural resources4. Personal, family and property relations5. Economic, social and tourism development6. Educational policies7.

Preservation and development of the cultural heritage and8.

Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of thegeneral welfare of the people of the region

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The enumeration is not exhaustive as to what the Organic Act may give to theautonomous regions.

Sec. 21: The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be theresponsibility of the local police agencies, which shall be organized, maintained,supervised and utilized in accordance with applicable laws.The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the nationalgovernment.

ART. XI. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times,be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

II. Public office is a public trust< Sums up the high sense of idealism that is expected of every officer of the

government< The basic idea of gov’t in the Philippines is that of a representative gov’t, the

officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people< Provisions are designed to exact accountability from public officers< “lead modest lives”: means to live within one’s means, and if one’s means are

generous, not to flaunt them in conspicuous display

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, theMembers of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed fromoffice on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Allother public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, butnot by impeachment.

I. Impeachment: Who can be impeached/grounds for impeachment

< Sec.2 enumerates the officers who are removable only by impeachment:1) President2) VP3) Members of the SC4) Chairmen and members of the CSC, COMELEC and COA5) Ombudsman

< In prohibiting the legislature from increasing the number of impeachableofficers, the intention was to prevent the creation of a special class of statutorilyprotected officials.

< The right to be removed only by impeachment is the Constitution’s strongestguarantee of security of tenure

< Grounds for impeachment:1) Culpable violation of the Constitution: willful and intentional violation and

not those committed unintentionally or involuntarily or in good faith orthrough honest mistake or judgment

2) Treason3) Bribery4) Graft and corruption

5) Other high crimes: offenses, which, like treason and bribery, are indictableoffenses and are of such enormous gravity that they strike at the very lifeor orderly working of the government

6) Betrayal of public trust: intended to be a catch-all phrase to cover anyviolation of the oath of office; refers to all acts, even if not punishable bystatute as penal offenses, which would render the officer unfit to continuein office

Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of

impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House ofRepresentatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by anyMember thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten sessiondays, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shallsubmit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared forconsideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessaryeither to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of theCommittee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall berecorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles ofImpeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5)

No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more thanonce within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. Whenthe President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Courtshall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without theconcurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal fromoffice and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines,

but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,trial, and punishment, according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry outthe purpose of this section.

I. Procedure and Penalty

In re: Gonzales [disbarment against an impeachable public officer]:The issue here is whether Justice Fernan, a member of the Supreme Court, can be thesubject of disbarment proceedings. Members of the SC, must, under Art.8(7)(1) of theConstitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed only byimpeachment. To grant a complaint for disbarment of an SC member during hisincumbency would in effect circumvent and hence to run afoul of theconstitutional mandate.

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Estrada vs. Desierto [judgment in impeachment]:After Erap ‘”resigned”, several cases previously filed before the Ombudsman were set inmotion. Erap was saying that these cases should be prohibited because he had not beenconvicted in the impeachment proceedings against him. The SC rejected this argument,as his impeachment proceedings were deemed functus officio by the Senate. Such plea byErap, if granted, would be a perpetual bar against his prosecution.

Francisco vs. HR [initiation]:The 1st impeachment complaint filed against Davide was made on June 2, 2003. TheHouse Committee on Justice dismissed it for being insufficient in substance. 4 months

after, a 2nd

impeachment complaint was filed still against Davide, accompanied by aresolution of endorsement signed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House ofRepresentatives. The issue is whether the filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint comeswithin the 1-year bar provided in the Consti; the resolution of this issue hinges on theinterpretation of the term "initiate."

It clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of thecomplaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "theobvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as containedin the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood onceand for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of thecomplaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment doesnot initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of averified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."

According to Fr. Bernas, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term"proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided bythe Senate. Only the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case tothe Senate. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a"proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. It takes place not in the Senatebut in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verifiedcomplaint either by a Member of the House or a private citizen endorsed by a Member ofthe House; (2) the processing by the proper Committee which may either reject thecomplaint or uphold it; (3) whether the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, theresolution must be forwarded to the House; and (4) there is the processing of theHouse of Representatives which either affirms the resolution of the Committee oroverrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at leastone third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment areprepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates animpeachment case."

Therefore, initiation takes place by:(1) the act of filing the impeachment/verified complaint; AND(2) Congress' taking initial action of said complaint by its referral to the house committeeof justice.Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another maynot be filed with the same official w/in 1 year.

Gutierrez vs. HR:Before the 15th Congress opened, the Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaintagainst OMB Gutierrez. Barely a week after the opening, the Reyes group also filed animpeachment complaint. On the same day the 2nd complaint was filed, the HRprovisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings. HR thensimultaneously referred the complaints to the Comm on Justice. It was found to besufficient in form. The rules were then published. Petitioner is alleging that the 2impeachment complaints go against the 1-year bar and that the rules were published a

day after ruling the sufficiency of the complaints. SC ruled that the Consti did notprescribe a specific method of promulgation; hence it was up to Congress to determinehow to promulgate its Impeachment Rules. For the 1-year bar to apply, initiation startswith the filing of the complaint which must accompanied with an action to set thecomplaint moving. It refers to the filing + Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint.Such initial action is referral to the Comm on Justice. There mere filing of a complaint isnot the “initiation” contemplated by the Consti. Referring the complaint to the propercommittee ignites the impeachment proceeding. Only 1 impeachment PROCEEDINGshould be filed against the impeachable officer per year, not COMPLAINTS. Hence multiplecomplaints are allowed as long as they are consolidated.

People of the Philippines v. Renato C. Corona (Verdict)WHEREFORE, in accordance with Article XI, Section 3 (7) of the Constitution, the penaltyof removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of thePhilippines is hereby imposed upon respondent Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

Penalty: Removal or censure?Oddly enough, the Senate Rules on Impeachment do not provide for a penalty uponconviction.

The 1987 Constitution provides that the penalty in an impeachment case is removal fromoffice and perpetual disqualification from holding any public office. But in previousimpeachment cases in the United States of America–where the Philippine system ofimpeachment is based–the alternative penalty of censure has been imposed which allowsthe impeached official to stay in office.

Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue tofunction and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

I. The Sandiganbayan< Sec. 4 reaffirms the continuing existence of the Sandiganbayan which has

jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices< Congress has the authority to fix its jurisdiction< Generally, the jurisdiction of the SB is over public officers, but in case private

individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with thepublic officers or employees, they shall be tried jointly

Lecaros vs. Sandiganbayan [crimes in relation to public office]:Petitioner was a mayor and charged before the SB for grave coercion wherein he tookover the operation and control of a gas station owned by Par. He opposed, alleging that

the SB had no jurisdiction over the case because the offense does not relate to his dutiesas a mayor. The SC dismissed it, ruling that it is clear from the Consti that SB has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corruptpractices committed by public officers and employees but also over other crimescommitted by them in relation to their office. The information clearly alleged that he tookadvantage of his position as mayor when he intimidated the gas station’s owner and tookover its operations.

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composedof the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least oneDeputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the militaryestablishment may likewise be appointed.

Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than theDeputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman, according to the Civil ServiceLaw.

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Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the SpecialProsecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter maybe provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman createdunder this Constitution.

I. Tanodbayan now the Special Prosecutor

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan:Petitioner as a governor, sought to restrain the SB and the Tanodbayan from proceeding

with the prosecution of his case on the ground that the cases were filed by the latterwithout legal and constitutional authority. He argues that under the 1987 Consti, it is onlythe Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with the SB. Since the power toinvestigate has been given Sec.13(1) to the Ombudsman,, the Special Prosecutor couldneither investigate nor prosecute unless authorized by the Ombudsman.

Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of thePhilippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have beencandidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsmanmust have, for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in thePhilippines.

During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article 1X-A of this Constitution.

Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from alist of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list ofthree nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require noconfirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur.

Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman andMembers, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive thesame salary which shall not be decreased during their term of office.

Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven yearswithout reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the electionimmediately succeeding their cessation from office.

I. Qualifications, appointment and term of the Ombudsman< Appointed by the President from a list of nominees presented by the JBC< Have the rank of Chairman and Members of the Constitutional Commissions< Serve for a term of 7 years

< Qualifications are set down in Sec.8

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employeesof the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify thecomplainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

I. Duty to act on complaints vs. gov’t officials< The present Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is mandated to act

promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner

Almonte vs. Vasquez [form and manner of complaint – unsigned letter]:

The Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum due to an anonymous letter purportedto be from an EIIB employee alleging some corrupt practices being made in the saidoffice. Petitioners are contesting on the ground that an unsigned and unverified lettercomplaint is not an appropriate case within the concept of the Consti where theOmbudsman can oblige petitioners to produce the documents for the investigation. TheSC ruled that “in an appropriate case” means any case concerning official acts oromissions which is alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The Constiexpressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed “in any form or manner”.

Cabalit vs. COA – Region VII

The Office of the Ombudsman in Visayas found three officers of the Land TransportationOffice in Bohol were liable for dishonesty for tampering with the official receipts to makeit appear that they collected lesser amounts than what was actually collected. Thepenalties of dismissal from service, cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture ofretirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government servicewere imposed on them. Petitioner Cabalit argues that the Ombudsman does not have thepower to impose penalties, but only the power to recommend the imposition of the same.The SC ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrativeliability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory. The implementation of theorder imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,and duties:

(1)

Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission ofany public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omissionappears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee ofthe Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as wellas of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, andcorrect any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official oremployee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

(4)

Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to suchlimitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documentsrelating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving thedisbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to

the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in thedischarge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent recordsand documents.

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrantand with due prudence.

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, andcorruption in the Government and make recommendations for their eliminationand the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

(8)

Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.

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I. Powers and responsibilities of the Ombudsman; deputies. In General.< Functions essentially as a complaints and action bureau< One of the principal functions of the officer contemplated in this section is the

capability to attend and act immediately on complaints not leading toprosecution but to correction or implementation of the request, either phonedin, or simply made orally or even in writing

< Given fiscal autonomy by sec.14< Congress enacted the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which among others, authorized

the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigations and to prosecute.< Where the Ombudsman has the power to investigate a complaint, he also hasthe authority to dismiss a complaint

o If he finds that it is insufficient in form or substance, or otherwise noground to continue with the inquiry, he may dismiss it

< Has no authority to substitute his judgment for the discretion of an agencywhich has the expertise on a subject matter

< While the power to investigate is primary, it is not exclusive and under theOmbudsman Act of 1989, he may delegate it to others who have the power toinvestigate and take it back anytime he wants to

Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan [concurrent jurisdiction with the PCGG]:An info was filed by the PCGG Chairman with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner ofdoing acts to the damage and prejudice of the gov’t. When petitioner filed a motion toquash, PCGG to amended the info, saying that the petitioner was a subordinate or

crony/associate of Marcos who used undue advantage of his public office by using hisrelationship with Marcos. Petitioners allege that due to the 1987 Consti, PCGG no longerhad any authority to prosecute cases, as such is solely within the Ombudsman’s powers.The SC ruled that even if the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction under theOmbudsman’s Act over the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, this authority is notexclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the gov’t. Thus theauthority of the PCGG to conduct preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth and/orunexplained wealth is maintained. (but in this case it was a case not under the Marcoscronies so the authority of the PCGG to investigate this case had to be assigned by thePresident)

NOTE: the difference between the Truth Commission and the PCGG was that the latterwas made under the legislative power of Cory Aquino before the enactment of the 1987Consti. But remember that held that the President had the power to create the TruthCommission, it just didn’t pass the equal protection test.

Salvador vs. Mapa [no power to decide constitutional questions]:The Presidential Ad Hoc-Finding Committee on Behest Loans filed a sworn complaint withthe Ombudsman against respondents which the Ombudsman dismissed. The Ombudsmanruled that prescription had already set in and that the AO and MO creating the committeewere ex-post facto laws and thus unconstitutional. The court ruled that the crime had notyet prescribed as the prescriptive period for the offenses should be computed from thediscovery of the commission and not from such commission. The Ombudsman also has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law, therefore acting inGAD.

II. Preventive Suspension and Imposition of Penalties

Buenaseda vs. Flaiver [when to suspend]:The Ombudsman directed the preventive suspension of petitioners who were all officers ofthe Nat’l Center for Mental Health in connection to a complaint filed against them for

violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The court ruled that such action wasproper. In order to conduct an investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, theOmbudsman may need to suspend the respondent. The suspension given was merelypreventive and there is nothing improper with such act. The power of the Ombudsman to “recommend the suspension” refers to suspension as a punitive measure.

III. Jurisdiction over Criminal Cases

Lastimosa vs. Vasquez [prosecutor’s assistance]:The 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor and the provincial prosecutor refused or failed to file a

criminal charge as ordered by the Ombudsman. Because of this, an administrativecomplaint was filed against them. The court ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman hasthe power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case.The case was a rape case against a mayor. The Ombudsman has the power to investigateand prosecute of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether they arerelated to or connected with or arise from the performance of his official duty. It’s enoughthat it was committed by a public official. He is authorized to call on prosecutors forassistance under the Ombudsman Act. Even if the preliminary investigation had beengiven over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of theoffense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of theOmbudsman.

PCGG vs. Desierto:Based on a sworn statement of a PCGG consultant, the petitioner filed a criminalcomplaint with the Ombudsman against the respondent whom is alleged to have violated

RA3019. Respondent ombudsman dismissed it, ruling that the offense has prescribed. TheSC ruled that the ombudsman committed GAD in dismissing the complaint. Records showthat the act complained of was discovered in 1992 while complaint was filed 3 years after.Thus the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.

Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approvedannual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

Section 15 . The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by publicofficials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not bebarred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

I. Exemption of gov’t from prescription, laches, estoppels< Imprescriptibility only applies to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth

and not criminal cases

Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for anybusiness purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned orcontrolled bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the Membersof the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions,the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, duringtheir tenure.

I.

Financial accommodation< The list of gov’t officials in Sec.16 includes those of high rank.

o Intention is to prevent such officials from making use of their positionsfor purposes of obtaining financial accommodations from gov’tinstitutions and from firms wherein they have a controlling interest

o By limiting the list to high ranking officials, avenues for financial reliefare not denied to officials of lower rank

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Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as oftenthereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members ofthe Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and otherconstitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, thedeclaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.

I. Disclosure of assets< 2 commands of Sec.17:

1) Filing of a declaration of assets and liabilitieso

Applicable to all public officers and employees regardless of rank2) Public disclosure of assets and liabilities in the manner prescribed by lawo Applicable only to:

# President# VP# Members of cabinet# Congress# SC# Constitutional Commissions# Other Constitutional offices

o Legislature may also require public disclosure of the assets andliabilities of other officials

Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegianceat all times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship oracquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealtwith by law.

I. Allegiance of Public Officers< Public officers are expected to set the example or standard of single-minded

allegiance to the nation and to the public interest

Caasi vs. CA [foreign citizen] *not assigned but mentioned in classPetitions seeking the disqualification of the municipal mayor on the ground that he is agreen card holder, hence he is a permanent resident of the US and not of Bolinao,Pangasinan. Mayor admits that he does hold a green card but he denies that is apermanent resident. The SC ruled that his application for immigrant status andpermanent residence in the US and the possession of a green card attesting to suchstatus are conclusive proof that he is a permanent citizen of the US. The waiver of suchimmigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidencethat there is an irrevocable waiver before he ran for mayor, the conclusion is he isdisqualified to run for said public office. The assumption is that those who are residentaliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest andwelfare of their homeland for with 1 eye on their public duties here, they must keepanother eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in orderto preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

ARTICLE XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY:

Sec. 1: The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution ofopportunities, income, and wealth’ a sustained increase in the amount of goods andservices produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and Full employment Based on soundagricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full anddeficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domesticand foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises, against unfairforeign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all religions of the countryshall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, includingcorporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged tobroaden the base of their ownership.

Goals of the national economy:1. More equitable distribution of wealth2. Increase of wealth for the benefit of the people3. Increased productivity.

*Sec. 2: All lands of the Public domain, waters, minerals coals, petroleum, and othermineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora andfauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state.With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.

The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the fullcontrol utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision ofthe State.

The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, jointventure or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations orassociations at least sixty per centum of whose corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.

Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for notmore than twenty five years and udner such terms and conditions as MAY BE PROVIDEDBY LAW.

The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorialsea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively toFilipino Citizens.

The Congress may by law allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipinocitizens, as well as cooperative fish farming with priority to subsistence fishermen andfishworkers in river, lakes, bays and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involvingeither technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, andutilization of minerals petroleum and other mineral oils according to the general termsand conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth andgeneral welfare of the country.In such agreements, the state shall promote the development, and use local scientific andtechnical resources.

Regalian Doctrine: All lands were held from the crown, ownership is vested in theState (not the head of the State). Any person claiming ownership from the stateaccording to any of the recognized modes of acquisition of title.

Oh Cho v. Dir. Of Lands: Land or public domain may becomeprivate land when it is

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purchased from the government or given by grant. An exception would be thosepossessed since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption thatthe land had never been part of the public domain.

San Miguel v. CA: Alienable land of the public domain may be transformed into privateland when occupied open, exclusive and undisputed for the prescribed period of time.(The thirty year period for possession will only begin from when the time is converted intoalienable prior to that it will not be counted).

Limitations:

1.

Only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated.2. The exploration, development, and utilization of all natural resources shall beunder the full control and supervision of the State either by directly undertakingsuch exploration, development and utilization or through co-production, jointventure or production-sharing agreements with qualified persons orcorporations.

3. All agreements with qualified private sector may be for only a period notexceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years. (25y limitis not applicable to rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial usesother than the development of water power)

4. The use and enjoyment of the marine wealth of the archipelagic waters,territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone shall be reserved for Filipinocitizens.

5. Utilization of natural resources in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons may beallowed on a “small scale” to Filipino citizens or cooperatives.

Reclaimed land to be registered as private property must be classified first to alienableand second must show proof of acquiring the property.

Chavez v. PEA: In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienablelands of the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sellthese lands.

Laurel v. Garcia: Roponggi Property in Japan is property of public dominion andtherefore outside the commerce of man and cannot be alienated.

Aliens cannot lease lands of the public domain because that would involve enjoyment ofthe natural resources of the public domain.

JG Summit v. CA: A foreign corporation may buy shares in excess of 40% in acorporation. The only consequence would be to lose its capacity to hold land (the

restriction of an alien to hold property is only restricted to land he may own other formsof immovable).Krivenko v. Register of Deeds: A lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. Sois an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on the condition that he isgranted Philippine citizenship.

La Bugal-B’lann Tribal Association v. Ramos:The case involves the constitutionality of RA 7942 the Philippine Mining Act, its RR andthe FTAA executed between the govt and Western Mining Corporation which is asubsidiary of an Australian Company. The Court en Banc decided that the FTAA (financialand technical assistance agreement) executed between the two were service contractsprohibited by the 1987 constitution. During the pendency of the case however, WMCshares were sold to Sagittarius which is 60% owned by Filipinos and/Fil owned corps andthe FTAA was subsequently transferred and registered in the name of Sagittarius fromWMCP.

1. The SC ruled that since the FTAA is now to be implemented by a FilipinoCorporation the court can no longer declare it unconstitutional since the casepending is a dispute between two Filipino companies (Sagitarius and Lepanto).

2. The petitioners claim that a Fil. Corp is not allowed to enter into an FTAA withthe government. An analysis of the Consti however does not show this.

a. Under the constitution the mining activities (exploration, developmentand utilization) may be undertaken with Filipino except when it is smallscale utilization – Filipinos can undertake them alone by law and when

the State through agreements with foreign corps involving eithertechnical or financial assistance.b. “involving agreements for financial or technical assistance” does not

exclude other modes of assistance. The use of the word “involving”would show the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistanceor activities thus activities with foreign corps should not be limited onlyto such.

c. Furthermore if it were only financial or technical assistance that wouldbe allowed, then there would be no need to limit them to large-scalemining operations as there would be a far greater need for them in thesmaller-scale mining activities.

d. The framers knew that at that time there were several servicecontracts between Filipino companies and foreign companies and ifthey meant to ban service contracts altogether they would have soprovided for the termination of the contracts.

e. Technical or financial assistance agreements are still service contractshowever with safeguards.—foreign is contractor while Phil. Govt. is theprincipal or owner of the works. The Foreign contractors providecapital, technology and know-how and managerial expertise increating large-scale enterprises and the Govt. through agencies acitiveexercises control and supervision over the project.

3. Did RA 7942 and the IRR give the govt sufficient control in order to direct affairsof enterprises. It was claimed that the FTAA in effect gives full control andmanagement of mining enterprises over to fully owned foreign-ownedcorporations with the State. The SC said the state does not merely become apassive regulator. The agencies are empowered to approve or disapprove(influence, direct and change) various work programs and expenditurecommitments for each of the exploration, development and utilization phases ofthe mining enterprise. RA 7942 and the IRR have sufficient degree of controland supervision.

a. A provision under the RA allows foreign contractors to apply for andhold an exploration permit – is this unconstitutional? The SC said no,the Constitution mandates full control and supervision overexploitation of mineral resources but nowhere does it require thegovernment to hold all exploration permits. These permits serve apractical purpose since during the time of the contract they wouldspend time on exploration works even if not earning revenues.

4. Section 7.9 however is invalid because it gives away the State’s share of netmining revenues without anything in return. Unjust enrichment on thestockholders of WMCP.

Section 7.82 also invalid because it provides that the money that the government paid forbuilding roads etc. to lead to the mine site will also be deductible form theState’s share in net mining – unjust enrichment.

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Sec. 3: Lands of the Public Domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,mineral lands and national parks.

Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to theuses to which they may be devoted.

Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.Private corporations or associations may not hold such lands of the public domain exceptby lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more thantwenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.

Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares or acquire notmore than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology and development andsubject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the congress shall determine, by law, thesize of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held or leased andthe conditions therefor.

Dir. Of Lands v. IAC:The director of lands questioned the judgment of IAC that ordered the registration of 5parcels of land to CME CO., which it bought from the Infiels who were part of the culturalminority. They claimed that the land is public domain and therefore cannot be granted toprivate corporations. The Meralco case which said that a certificate of title is issued to aFilipino is necessary in order for public land to be considered private is wrong. Torrenstitle only used to confirm but not vest title. Nothing in the Constitution, which wouldprohibit corporations from acquiring interests in lands, which were acquired by a personthrough acquisitive prescription.

Dir. Of lands v. CA: The classification of public land is an exclusive prerogative of theexecutive department and not the courts. In the absence of such classification the landremains unclassified (the change of classification does not happen automatically when thenature of the land changes, a positive act by the executive is still required).

Republic v. CA: Owner of agricultural land where minerals are discovered does not ownsuch, the State may stop the use of the person of such land in order to extract theminerals (the owner is entitled to appropriate compensation for the loss of the use of theland).

Sec. 4: Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine by law the specific limits of forestlands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground.

Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may not beincreased or diminished, except by law.The Congress shall provide, for such periods as it may determine, measures to prohibitlogging in endangered forests and in watershed areas.

Sec. 5: The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to theirancestral lands to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing propertyrights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

Ancestral Domain: All embracing concept, which refers to lands, inland waters, coastalareas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture,residential, agricultural and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not.

Cruz v. Sec. of DENR:Assailed is the constitutionality of the IPRA because it amounts to unlawful deprivation ofthe State’s ownership over the lands of the public domain as well as minerals and othernatural resources in violation of the Regalian Doctrine. Also providing an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” or “ancestral lands” violates the rights ofprivate landowners. The SC said it was constitutional (because voting was 7-7).

! Ancestral domains: all areas belonging to ICC/IPP under a claim of ownershipsince time immemorial or as a consequence of government projects or othervoluntary dealings with the government. Ancestral lands are held by ICC/IP

under the same conditions as ancestral domains but are limited to those notmerely occupied and possessed but utilized under a claim of individual ortraditional group ownership.

! Native title in Carnio case that says that native title is private land and wasnever public thus never belonged to the state.

! All lands that were not acquired by government belongs to the public domainhas an exception – any land that should have been in the possession of anoccupant and of his predecessors-in interest since time immemorial.

! The Certificate of Ancestral Title (CADT) is only a formality as ownership isrecognized under customary law and can co-exist with the civil law concept.

! The natural resources are still owned by the state and not included in theenumeration in IPRA. It merely grants management over them to the ICC/IP.

Sec. 7 : Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred orconveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or holdlands of the public domain.

Sec. 8: Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this article, a natural-born citizenof the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of privatelands subject to limitations provided by law.

Who can own private lands:1. Filipino citizens2. Filipino corporations and associations as defined in Section 23. Aliens in case of hereditary succession4. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost Philippine citizenship.

Filipino citizens can both acquire or hold lands of the public domain but they can holdsuch lands by modes other than acquisition, such as lease.

Property sold to a foreigner can be recovered by the Filipino vendor if the original parties

to the violation had already died and been succeeded by administrators whom it would beunjust to impute the pari delicto doctrine. Second it can be recovered when it wouldenhance the declared public policy of preserving lands for Filipinos.

Republic v. IAC : An alien may acquire property when at the time of the acquisition ofthe property there was no prohibition yet. Second if the alien acquired Filipino citizenshiplater on.

Matthews v. Taylor : An alien ahs no right to challenge the validity of the lease of apiece of land which his wife had acquired since he has no right to acquire privateproperty.

Ramirez v. Vda. De Ramirez:Partition of the estate of Ramirez among his widow, grandnephews and hiscompanion Wanda. Under his will he granted usufruct of real property to Wanda

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who is an alien. Usufruct over land is not contrary to the constitution as it does not vestownership onto a person. Also in this case testamentary succession is included in theprohibition.

Halili v. CA:De Guzman, an American citizen, died and his forced heirs were his wife Helen and hisson David who were both American. Helen made a deed of quitclaim assigning allproperties to David. David then sold one of the properties to Cataniag.

Petitioners now question the transfer to David of the properties of Helen. The SC ruled

that although under the Constitution, you cannot transfer properties to aliens except incase of hereditary succession such was deemed cured when David transferred it toCataniag since the purpose of leaving the properties with Filipinos is preserved.

Osmena v. Osmena: Case between the petitioner who is the daughter of Osmena and Sy and the respondent isthe grandchildren. Sy executed a will with the ancestral house but the lot was notincluded and was in the name of respondent’s father so the respondents transferred totheir name after his death. Petitioner claims that she also owns the land from her mother(Sy) and it was only placed on the name of their brother because mother was a Chinesenational and could not acquire land. Court wont allow the contravention of theconstitution (must come to the court with clean hands).

Exemption for former Filipino Citizens

Republic v. CA:

Spouses bought land when they were natural-born citizens. When they applied for itsregistration however they were naturalized Canadian citizens already. The SC said thatthey can still register it even if they were no longer Filipino citizens at that time. UnderArt. 12 a natural born citizen who lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land.As former Filipino citizens they can have the land registered.

Sec. 9: The Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agencyheaded by the President, which shall, after consultations with the appropriate publicagencies, various private sectors, and local government units, recommend to Congress,and implement continuing integrated and coordinated programs and policies for nationaldevelopment.

Until the Congress provides otherwise, the National Economic and Development Authorityshall function as the independent planning agency of the government.

1.

Economic and planning agency

! The creation of such agency is optional since formal economic planning is not anindispensible part of managing the national economy

! Until Congress provides otherwise, the present NEDA will continue as the centralplanning agency which is recommendatory to Congress

! While it is independent of Congress, it is under the President and dependent onthe President who chairs the body

Sec. 10: The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planningagency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or tocorporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by suchcitizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas ofinvestments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation andoperation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within itsnational jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

I. Filipinization

! Particular areas of business may be Filipinized without doing violence to theequal protection clause

! 2nd paragraph commands the state to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the

grant of rights and privileges – and this, provided that the Filipino is “qualified”even if a foreigner is “more qualified”

! Provision is mandatory and enforceable only in regard to the grant of rights,privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony and not toevery aspect of trade and commerce

! 3rd paragraph has reference to both the regulation of the entry of foreigninvestments and to regulation of foreign investments already I place

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS:Pursuant to a privatization program, GSIS wanted to sell Manila Hotel Corp. There weretwo bidders Manila Prince and Renong Berhard an Indonesian company. Renong won thebidding. The SC ruled that the sale of the Manila Hotel to Renong is violative of theconstitution. Although the first paragrpah of Article 12 section 10 is non-self executing asit needs legislation, the second part is a mandate that rights, privileges and concessions

covering national economy and patrimony of the state shall be given preference toqualified Filipinos. Estoppel wont work here when it violates the constitution. Manila hotelis part of Filipino culture and the Filipino first policy does not only cover natural resourcesbut culture as well thus the sale to Renong is void.

Army and Navy Club v. CA:Petitioner entered into a lease contract with the respondent and under it they are to pay250k rent with increase, pay the taxes and construct a hotel within 5y. Petitioner failed.Petitioner then invokes that the Army and Navy Club was declared a national historicallandmark by the National Historical Commission thus its existence cannot in any way beundermined by the simple ejectment suit. The SC said however that there is no showingthat it became a national landmark since the signatories thereto of the certification aremembers of the club so it was self-serving. Such certification is not valid because it didnot even follow the procedure provided by law:

! The director of the national museum will convene panels of experts (naturalsciences, history, fine arts, etc) who carefully study and deliberate which amongthe cultural properties will be considered “National Cultural Treasures.”

! It will then be marked, described , photograph by the national museum etc.

Also even if the certification was valid it would not prevent the suit because beingdeclared a national treasure doesn’t give any kind of possessory right or claim ofownership over it. Nowhere in the law does it provide that such recognition grantspossessory right. Also the case is only an ejectment case so the national treasure, ifit were, is still preserved.

Sec. 11: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation ofa public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations orassociations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty percentum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise,

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certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fiftyyears. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the conditionthat it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when thecommon good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilitiesby the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and allthe executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens ofthe Philippines.

I. Public Utilities

! Public utility: a utility corporation which renders service to the general public forcompensation

o Essential feature is that its service is not confined to privilegedindividuals but is open to an indefinite public

o The public or private character of a utility does not depend on thenumber of persons who avail of its services but on whether or not it isopen to serve all members of the public who may require it

o It is a business or service engaged in regularly supplying the publicwith some commodity or service of public consequence such aselectricity, gas, water, transportation, telephone or telegraph services

! This provision does not determine WHO may grant public utility franchises butonly about the capacity to acquire a public utility franchise

o Congress has the authority to grant franchises but may delegate it togov’t agencies

! Filipinization of public utilities: requiring that any form of authorization for itsoperation should be granted only to Philippine citizens or corporations orassociations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least 60% of thecapital is owned by Filipinos.

o Note that the mere formation of a public utility corporation without therequired Filipino capital is not forbidden, but the granting of afranchise or other form or authorization is

! Franchises granted by the gov’t cannot be exclusive in character nor can afranchise be granted except that it must be subject to amendment, alteration oreven repeal by the legislature when the common good so requires

! The first part of the last sentence which authorizes foreign investors toparticipate in the governing body of public utilities to the extent of theirproportionate share in the capital, is a reversal of the Filipinization trend

o But all executive and managing officers of such corporation/association

must be Filipino citizens

Francisco v. TRB:Marcos authorized the establishment of toll facilities for the use of public improvements.Later a franchise was granted to Philippine National Construction Corporation for 30 yearsto operate toll facilities in NLEX, SLEX, Skyway. The Toll Regulatory Board was alsocreated on the same day to enter into contracts for the construction and maintenance ofthe tollways, grant permits to operate toll facilities, and fix toll rates after due notice andhearing (on behalf of the government).

Cory then became president and the 1987 constitution had the franchise provision whichmade the PNCC seek the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel. It was held thatPNCC may enter into a JVA with private entities without public bidding subject to certainrequirements.

! After a JVA is concluded, a new JV company formed to undertake a specific tollproject.

! The Republic through the TRB (grantor), PNCC (operator) and new JVcorporation (investor/concessionaire) will make a Supplemental Toll OperationAgreement (STOA) to implement the Toll Operation Agreement previouslyissued (TRB and PNCC signed a TOA on Nlex, Slex, with terms of tolloperations).

! Once the project is completed the TRB fixed or approves the initial toll rate afterwhich it prescribes periodic toll rate adjustment.

Claim: TRB does not have the power to grant administrative franchise for tollfacilities because it is an exclusive power of Congress based on Art. 12, sec. 11.! The SC held that such interpretation is wrong. A Franchise is a legislative grant

of a special privilege to someone either from statue or can also be by anadministrative agencies with delegated power to give franchise. Nothing in theConstitution indicates the necessity of a congressional franchise before a publicutility may operate if the law delegates the authority to an administrative bodyto grant a franchise. (Needed to adapt to increase complexity of modern life).

! PNCC’s franchise granted by Marcos, expired in 2007 but even if it had alreadyexpired, the fact of expiration did not carry with it the cancellation of PNCC’sauthority and that of its JV partners to construct, operate and maintain any partof NLEX, SLEX< MMEX.

Claim: The rate fixing power and power to enter into contracts of the TRB is invalid.! The SC held that there is difference between the initial fixing of toll rates and

the periodic or subsequent toll rates. The requirement of notice in hearing forthe approval of denial of petitions for toll rates only refers to adjustments orsubsequent toll rates NOT initial toll rates. The TRB is authorized to approveinitial toll rates without necessity of hearing. Only when there is a challenge onthe toll rates that public hearings are required. In this case the initial toll ratescame to pass without any hearing but there was no challenge on the validity ofsuch.

! Furthermore, the use of a toll way/highway is a privilege with a cost and thuscan’t necessarily say that exorbitant fees are being charged. There arealternative routes or roads that motorists may rely on if they are unwilling topay the toll.

Claim: The STOA entered into by TRB grants it authority to enter into contracts forthe construction, operation and maintenance thereof. One of the STOAs (MNTC)granted to ADB and WB (The lenders of MNTC) unrestricted right to appoint asubstitute entity to replace MNTC in case of an MNTC default before prepayment of

the loans and an option to extend the franchise for another 50 years.! The SC said that the power to determine WON to extend a concessionaire to

operate a tollway is vested in the TRB and law and as such the lenders cannotunilaterally extend the concession period or impose and demand that TRBextend it. Furthermore, even if TRB is granted such power it cannot grant it fora period exceeding 50 years otherwise it would violate the constitution. In thiscase the original period was 30 years, and the clause that would allow extensionif necessary to repay the loans to the lenders is a violation of the 50 yearfranchise threshold in the Constitution.

Gamboa vs. TevesPTIC owns a substantial amount of shares in PLDT. The government wants to sell theseshares to a HK-based corporation. Petitioner, a stockholder of PLDT, wants to nullify thesale of PTIC shares because if the sale would be permitted, the 60-40requirement under the constitution would be violated. SC said that the

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definition of the term “capital” used in our constitution means the shares of stock whichcan vote, i.e. the common shares, not the outstanding capital stock.

The Court in the case held that: “In construing the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XIIof the Constitution to include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abjectsurrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clearabdication of the State’s constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipinocitizens. Such an interpretation certainly runs counter to the constitutional provisionreserving certain areas of investment to Filipino citizens, such as the exploitation ofnatural resources as well as the ownership of land, educational institutions and

advertising businesses. The Court should never open to foreign control what theConstitution has expressly reserved to Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of theConstitution and of the national interest. The Court must perform its solemn duty todefend and uphold the intent and letter of the Constitution to ensure, in the words of theConstitution, “a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled byFilipinos.”

Sec. 12: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materialsand locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.

I. Filipino First Policy

! Gives native products and domestic entities preference in gov’t purchases! The policy can extend beyond Filipino-first in gov’t transactions and into private

transactions

Sec. 13: The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizesall forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

I. Economic exchange

! The forms and arrangements of economic exchange referred to can be anynumber of those which are in practice, e.g. counter-trade, common marketarrangements, multi-country arrangements, etc.

o The idea is not to tie down the country in any 1 formo Must serve the general welfare – which includes not just health,

safety, security but also the idea of protection of local enterpriseso Must be characterized not only by reciprocity but also by equality

which imports mutual benefit

Sec. 14: The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of

Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level technical manpowerand skilled workers and craftsmen in all fields shall be promoted by the State. The Stateshall encourage appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for the national benefit.The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save incases prescribed by law.

I. Filipino professionals and skilled workers

! Reflects the desire not only to develop a ready reservoir of Filipino professionals,scientists and skilled workers but also to protect their welfare

! The limitation on the practice of professions, however, is subject to exceptionsfound in reciprocity laws

! Encourages technological independence and regulation of technology transfersfor the wealth of the nation

Sec. 15 : The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth ofcooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic development.Sec. 16: The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlledcorporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of thecommon good and subject to the test of economic viability.

I. Private corporations

! Purpose is to insulate Congress against pressures from special interestso To permit the law making body by special law to provide for the

organization or formation or regulation of private corporations, wouldin effect to offer to it the temptation in many cases to favor certaingroups to the prejudice of other or to the prejudice of the interests ofthe country

! 2nd sentence: includes the ideas that they must show capacity to functionefficiently in business and that they should not go into activities which theprivate sector can do better

o Economic viability is more than financial viability but also includescapability to make profit and generate benefits not quantifiable infinancial terms

Sec. 17 : In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the Statemay, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarilytake over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affectedwith public interest.

I. Temporary take-over

! Deals merely with the temporary state take-over of the operation of anyprivately owned public utility or business affected with public interest

! Justified in times of national emergency, when the public interest requires ito National emergency- encompassing threat from external aggression,

calamities or natural disasters, but not strikeso Duration of the emergency is the measure of the duration of the

takeover! Business affected with public interest: business that has a lot of repercussion in

public, whether it be public utility or other businesses which may partake of the

characteristics of public utility but which is not yet considered public utility orany business which concerns a mass-based consumer group and especiallyamong the low income groups

David v. Arroyo:PP 1017 does not authorize President Arroyo during the emergency to temporarily takeover or direct the operation of any privately owned public or business affected with publicinterest without authority from Congress.

Certain conditions must be met before the congress can grant emergency powers to thepresident:

! There must be a war or emergency! Delegation is for a limited period! Delegation must be subject to such restrictions as Congress may

prescribe

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! The emergency power must be exercised to carry out a national policy declaredby Congress.

Constitution states that “the State may during the emergency and under reasonableterms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privatelyowned public utility or business affected with public interest,” means the Congress andnot the president.

There is a difference between the President’s authority to declare a state ofnational emergency and her authority to exercise emergency powers.!

State of national emergency (ART. 7, Sec. 18) is a power of the president towhich no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised if she declares it.The exercise of emergency powers requires delegation from congress.

Sec. 18: The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish andoperate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to publicownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.

I. Nationalization

! Authority to impose total nationalization or as least near total! The decision to nationalize may be made by the state through Congress, on the

broad grounds of the interest of the national welfare or defense! If it entails expropriation, it requires that the transfer of ownership can only be

upon payment of just compensation

Republic v. PLDT:PLDT is a public service corporation with a legislative franchise to install, operate andmaintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines. RCA is an American Corp that isauthorized to transact business in the Philippines to operate domestic station for thereception and transmission of long distance messages to the US from PLDT and viceversa. BOTC in 1947 set up its own Government Tel. System and entered into a contractwith PLDT to use their trunk lines. Part of the agreement said that such governmentsystem will not be used for commercial purposes or to call private parties. The Republichowever entered into an agreement with RCA for joint overseas telephone services to andfrom local residents. PLDT then said BOTC was violating conditions since they were usingthe trunk lines not only for government offices but to service private persons or thegeneral public and therefore in competition with PLDT. PLDT then severed the lines beingused by BOTC and isolated the Philippines from the rest of the world. They failed to reachan agreement so RP commenced a suit against PLDT for the latter to execute a contractwith BOTC for the use of PLDT’s telephone system facilities.

The SC said should have made it like an eminent domain case and pay just compensationfor the beneficial use of property. Also under the law PLDT’s franchise is not exclusive,and that PLDT is not even able to cope with the demand of telephone services. PLDT hasright to just compensation for services rendered to the Government telephone system.

Sec. 19: The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest sorequires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.

I. Monopolies and Combinations

! Provision is a statement of public policy on monopolies and on combinations inrestraint of trade ! espouses competition

! Objective of anti-trust law is to assure a competitive economy based upon thebelief that through competition producers will strive to satisfy consumer wantsat the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources

! Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for goods and servicesand, thus matches their desires with society’s opportunity costs.

! Monopolies are not necessarily prohibited, but combinations in restraint of tradeand unfair competition are prohibited

o Monopoly- joint acquisition or maintenance by members of aconspiracy, formed for that purpose, of the power to control and

dominate trade and commerce in a commodity to such an extent thatthey are able, as a group, to exclude actual or potential competitorsfrom the field, accompanied with the intention and purpose to exercisesuch power

Avon v. Luna:Luna worked for Avon, under their agreement there was a clause that they “can’t selldisplay or promote other products other than that sold by the Company.” Luna then soldproducts of Sandre (vitamins and supplements). The agreement was terminated on theground of breach of the exclusivity clause. Luna claimed such was void for being restraintof trade. The SC held that an exclusivity clause is not necessarily void but depends on thecircumstances. In this case, cant be said to be void because it doesn’t really prevent newentrants from entering the market etc., it is only meant for the protection of theinvestment of the company since they are engaged in direct selling.

Sec. 20: The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, themembers of whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall come from the privatesector. They shall also be subject to such other qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money,banking, and credit. It shall have supervision over the operations of banks and exercisesuch regulatory powers as may be provided by law over the operations of financecompanies and other institutions performing similar functions.

Until the Congress otherwise provides, the Central Bank of the Philippines operatingunder existing laws, shall function as the central monetary authority.

I. Central monetary authority

! The main concern in the formulation of this provision was to assureindependence of the central monetary authority from all sectors, local orforeign, but especially from the executive department

o Majority of the body would come from the private sectoro Hence the qualifications set out

! Does not have the same status as Constitutional Commissions! Under current law, the board of directors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas is

the monetary board

Sec. 21: Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation ofthe monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by theGovernment shall be made available to the public.

I. Foreign loans

! 2 things are covered:

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o Foreign loans, whether public or private, can be obtained only inaccordance with laws and regulations

o Information on public foreign loans and gov’t guaranteed loans mustbe made public

! The President may incur or guarantee foreign loans only with the concurrence ofthe Monetary Board

Sec. 22: Acts which circumvent or negate any of the provisions of this Article shall beconsidered inimical to the national interest and subject to criminal and civil sanctions, asmay be provided by law.

I. Penal sanctions

! Congress should penalize acts which seek to circumvent the goals set down bythe economic provisions of the Constitution.

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