Saratoga campaign

The Saratoga Campaign in 1777 was an attempt by theBritish high command for North America to gain militarycontrol of the strategically important Hudson River valleyduring the American Revolutionary War. It ended in thesurrender of the British army, which historian EdmundMorgan argues, was a great turning point of the war, be-cause it won for Americans the foreign assistance whichwas the last element needed for victory.[5]

The primary thrust of the campaign was planned and ini-tiated by General John Burgoyne. Commanding a mainforce of some 8,000 men, he moved south in June fromQuebec, boated up Lake Champlain tomiddle NewYork,then marched over the divide and down the Hudson Val-ley to Saratoga. He initially skirmished there with the Pa-triot defenders with mixed results. Then, after losses inthe Battles of Saratoga in September and October, his de-teriorating position and ever increasing size of the Amer-ican army forced him to surrender his forces to the Amer-ican General Horatio Gates on October 17.The elaborate plans drawn up in London all failed.Colonel Barry St. Leger was assigned to move on Albany,NewYork east through theMohawk River valley, but wasforced to retreat during the siege of Fort Stanwix afterlosing his Indian allies. The major expedition from thesouth never materialized due to miscommunication withLondon when General William Howe sent his army totake Philadelphia rather than sending it up the HudsonRiver to coordinate with Burgoyne. A last-minute eortto reinforce Burgoyne from New York City was made inearly October, but it was too little, too late.The American victory was an enormous morale boost tothe edgling nation. More important, it convinced Franceto enter the war in alliance with the United States, openlyproviding money, soldiers, and munitions, as well ghtinga naval war worldwide against Britain.

1 British strategyToward the end of 1776 it was apparent to many in Eng-land that pacication of New England was very dicultdue to the high concentration of Patriots; and so Londondecided to isolate New England and concentrate on thecentral and southern regions where Loyalists supposedlycould be rallied.[6]

In December 1776General John Burgoynemet with LordGermain, the British Secretary of State for the Coloniesand the government ocial responsible for managing the

war, to set strategy for 1777. There were two mainarmies in North America to work with: General GuyCarletons army in Quebec and General William Howesarmy, which had driven George Washington's army fromNew York City in the New York campaign.[7]

1.1 Howes plan to attack PhiladelphiaOnNovember 30, 1776, Howethe British commander-in-chief in North Americawrote to Germain, outliningan ambitious plan for the 1777 campaign. Howe said thatif Germain sent him substantial reinforcements, he couldlaunch multiple oensives, including sending 10,000 menup the Hudson River to take Albany, New York. Then,in the autumn, Howe could move south and capture theU.S. capital of Philadelphia.[8] Howe soon changed hismind after writing this letter: the reinforcements mightnot arrive, and the retreat of the Continental Army overthe winter of 177677 made Philadelphia an increasinglyvulnerable target. Therefore, Howe decided that he wouldmake the capture Philadelphia the primary object of the1777 campaign. Howe sent Germain this revised plan,which Germain received on February 23, 1777.[9]

1.2 Burgoynes plan to capture AlbanyBurgoyne, seeking to command a major force, proposedto isolate New England by an invasion from Quebec intoNew York. This had already been attempted by GeneralCarleton in 1776, although he had stopped short of a full-scale invasion due to the lateness of the season. Carletonwas heavily criticized in London for not taking advantageof the American retreat from Quebec, and he was alsointensely disliked by Germain. This, combined with ri-val Henry Clinton's failed attempt to capture Charleston,South Carolina, placed Burgoyne in a good position to getcommand of the 1777 northern campaign.[10]

Burgoyne presented a written plan to Lord Germain onFebruary 28, 1777; Germain approved it and gave Bur-goyne command of the main expedition.[11]

Burgoynes invasion plan from Quebec had two compo-nents: he would lead the main force of about 8,000 mensouth fromMontreal along Lake Champlain and the Hud-son River Valley while a second column of about 2,000men (which Barry St. Leger was chosen to lead), wouldmove from Lake Ontario east down the Mohawk Rivervalley in a strategic diversion. Both expeditions wouldconverge upon Albany, where they would link up with

1

2 2 AMERICAN STRATEGY

General John Burgoyne, portrait by Joshua Reynolds

troops from Howes army marching up the Hudson. Con-trol of the Lake Champlain-Lake George-Hudson Riverroute from Canada to New York City would cut o NewEngland from the rest of the American colonies.[12]

The last part of Burgoynes proposal, the advance byHowe up the Hudson from New York City, proved to bethe most controversial part of the campaign. Germain ap-proved Burgoynes plan after having received Howes let-ter detailing his proposed oensive against Philadelphia.Whether Germain told Burgoyne, who was still in Lon-don at that time, about Howes revised plans is unclear:while some sources claim he did,[12] others state that Bur-goyne was not notied of the changes until the campaignwas well underway.[13] Historian Robert Ketchum be-lieves that Burgoyne would probably have been aware ofthe problems that lay ahead had he been notied of thePhiladelphia plan.[14]

Whether Germain, Howe, and Burgoyne had the sameexpectations about the degree to which Howe was sup-posed to support the invasion from Quebec is also un-clear. What is clear is that Germain either left his generalswith too much latitude, or without a clearly dened over-all strategy.[15] In March 1777 Germain had approvedof Howes Philadelphia expedition and did not includeany express orders for Howe to go to Albany. Yet Ger-main also sent Howe a copy of his instructions to Carletonwhich plainly stated that the northern army was to make ajunction with Howes army at Albany.[16] In a letter fromGermain to Howe dated May 18, 1777 he made clear thatthe Philadelphia expedition should be executed in timefor you to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed

from Canada and put itself under your command. Thislast letter, however, was not received by Howe until af-ter he had departed New York for the Chesapeake.[14]To attack Philadelphia Howe could either have movedoverland through New Jersey or by sea via the DelawareBay, both options would have kept him a position to aidBurgoyne if necessary. The nal route he took, throughthe Chesapeake Bay, was immensely time-consuming andleft him wholly unable to assist Burgoyne as Germain hadenvisioned. The decision was so dicult to understandthat Howes more hostile critics accused him of deliber-ate treachery.[17]

Burgoyne returned to Quebec on May 6, 1777, bearinga letter from Lord Germain which introduced the planbut lacked some details.[18] This produced another of theconicts of command that plagued the British throughoutthe war. Lieutenant General Burgoyne technically out-rankedMajor General Carleton, but Carleton was still thegovernor of Quebec. Germains instructions to Burgoyneand Carleton had specically limited Carletons role tooperations in Quebec. This slight against Carleton, com-bined with Carletons failure to get command of the ex-pedition, led to his resignation later in 1777, and to hisrefusal to supply troops from the Quebec regiments togarrison the forts at Crown Point and Ticonderoga afterthey were captured.[19]

2 American strategyGeorge Washington, whose army was encamped atMorristown, New Jersey, and the American militarycommand did not have a good picture of British plansfor 1777. The principal question on the minds of Wash-ington and his generals Horatio Gates and Philip Schuylerwho both were at turns responsible for the ContinentalArmy's Northern Department and its defense of the Hud-son River was of the movements of Howes army inNew York. They had no signicant knowledge of whatwas being planned for the British forces in Quebec, inspite of Burgoynes complaints that everyone in Montrealknew what he was planning.[20] The three generals dis-agreed on what Burgoynes most likely movement was,and Congress also rendered the opinion that Burgoynesarmy was likely to move to New York by sea.[21]

Partly as a result of this indecision, and the fact that itwould be isolated from its supply lines if Howe movednorth, the garrisons at Fort Ticonderoga and elsewherein the Mohawk and Hudson valleys were not signicantlyincreased.[21] Schuyler took the measure in April 1777 ofsending a large regiment under Colonel Peter Gansevoortto rehabilitate Fort Stanwix in the upper Mohawk val-ley as a step in defending against British movements inthat area.[22] Washington also ordered four regiments tobe held at Peekskill, New York that could be directedeither to the north or the south in response to Britishmovements.[23]

3American troops were allocated throughout New Yorktheater in June 1777. About 1,500 troops (includingthose of Colonel Gansevoort) were in outposts along theMohawk River, about 3,000 troops were in the HudsonRiver highlands under the command of General IsraelPutnam, and Schuyler commanded about 4,000 troops(inclusive of local militia and the troops at Ticonderogaunder St. Clair).[24]

3 International interest

Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes, portrait by Antoine-Franois Callet

Ever since the Seven Years War, Frances foreign min-isters, beginning with Choiseul, had followed the generalidea that the independence of Britains North Americancolonies would be good for France and bad for Britain,and furthermore that French attempts to recover parts ofNew France would be detrimental to that cause. Whenwar broke out in 1775, the Comte de Vergennes, then theForeign Minister, outlined a series of proposals that ledto secret French and also Spanish support of Congress,and some preparations for the possibility of war, includ-ing expansion of their navies. Vergennes did not thinkopen participation in the war was diplomatically or polit-ically feasible until Washingtons army demonstrated itsstrength and ability to gain military victories without sig-nicant assistance.[25]

To further the aim of French participation in the war,Vergennes closely monitored news from North Amer-ica and London, and worked to remove impediments toSpanish participation in the war. Vergennes went so faras to propose war to King Louis XVI in August 1776, butnews of Howes capture of New York City scuttled thatplan.[26]

4 Campaign begins

Most of Burgoynes army had arrived in Quebec inthe spring of 1776, and participated in the routing ofContinental Army troops from the province. In addi-tion to British regulars, the troops in Quebec includedseveral regiments from the German principalities ofHesse-Hanau (from whose name the common referenceof Hessian comes) and Brunswick under the commandof Baron Friedrich Adolph Riedesel. Of these regularforces, 200 British regulars and 300 to 400 Germanswere assigned to St. Legers Mohawk valley expedition,and about 3,500 men remained in Quebec to protect theprovince. The remaining forces were assigned to Bur-goyne for the campaign to Albany. The regular forceswere supposed to be augmented by as many as 2,000mili-tia raised in Quebec; by June, Carleton had managed toraise only three small companies.[27] Burgoyne had alsoexpected as many as 1,000 Indians to support the expe-dition. About 500 joined between Montreal and CrownPoint.[28]

Burgoynes army was beset by transport diculties beforeit left Quebec, something that apparently neither Bur-goyne nor Carleton anticipated. As the expedition ex-pected to travel mainly over water, there were few wag-ons, horses, and other draft animals available to move thelarge amount of equipment and supplies on the land por-tions of the route. Only in early June did Carleton is-sue orders to procure carts sucient to move the army.Consequently, the carts were poorly constructed of greenwood, and the teams were driven by civilians who were ata higher risk of desertion.[29]

On June 13, 1777, Burgoyne and Carleton reviewed theassembled forces at St. Johns on the Richelieu River,just north of Lake Champlain, and Burgoyne was cere-monially given command.[30] In addition to ve sailingships built the previous year, a sixth had been built andthree had been captured after the Battle of Valcour Is-land. These provided some transport as well as militarycover for the large eet of transport boats that moved thearmy south on the lake.[31]

The army that Burgoyne launched the next day had about7,000 regulars and over 130 artillery pieces ranging fromlight mortars to 24 pound (11 kg) pieces. His regularswere organized into an advance force under BrigadierGeneral Simon Fraser, and two divisions. Major Gen-eral William Phillips led the 3,900 British regulars on

4 5 TICONDEROGA FALLS

the right, while Baron Riedesels 3,100 Brunswickersand Hanauers held the left. His regular troops startedout in good condition but some, notably some of theGerman dragoons, were poorly equipped for wildernessghting.[32]

Colonel St. Legers expedition was also assembled bymid-June. His force, a mixed company of British regu-lars, Loyalists, Hessians, and rangers from the Indian de-partment, numbering about 750 men left Lachine, nearMontreal, on June 23.[33]

5 Ticonderoga falls

Fort Ticonderoga from Mount Deance

Main articles: Siege of Fort Ticonderoga (1777), Battleof Hubbardton and Battle of Fort Anne

Burgoynes army traveled up the lake and occupied theundefended Fort Crown Point by June 30.[34] The screen-ing activities of Burgoynes Indian support were highlyeective at keeping the Americans from learning the de-tails of his movements.[35] General Arthur St. Clair, whohad been left in command of Fort Ticonderoga and its sur-rounding defenses with a garrison of about 3,000 regularsand militia, had no idea on July 1 of the full strength ofBurgoynes army, large elements of which were then just4 miles (6.4 km) away.[36][37] St. Clair had been orderedby General Schuyler to hold out as long as possible, andhad planned two avenues of retreat.[38]

Open skirmishing began on the outer defense works ofTiconderoga on July 2. By July 4, most of the Amer-ican garrison was either at Fort Ticonderoga or nearbyMount Independence, the extensive fortications on theVermont side of the lake. Unknown to the Americans,their withdrawal from an outer defensive position cleareda way for the British to place artillery on the hilltop knownthen as Sugar Loaf (nowMount Deance), whose heightscommanded the fort.[39] St. Clair withdrew the night af-ter spotting British cannon on Sugar Loaf on July 5, andBurgoynes men occupied the main fortication and the

positions on Mount Independence on July 6.[40] The un-contested surrender of the supposedly impregnable fortcaused a public and political uproar.[41] Although a laterinvestigation cleared both Schuyler and St. Clair of anywrongdoing in the withdrawal, it caused the ContinentalCongress to replace Schuyler with General Horatio Gatesas commander of the Northern Department of the Con-tinental Army in August.[42][43]

General Arthur St. Clair, portrait by Charles Willson Peale

Burgoyne sent forces out from his main body to pursuethe retreating army, which St. Clair had sent south viatwo dierent routes. The British caught up with elementsof the retreating Americans at least three times. GeneralFraser and elements of Baron Riedesels troops faced de-termined resistance in Battle of Hubbardton on July 7,and a skirmish that same day between the vanguard ofthe main army met Pierse Long's retreating companies ina skirmish at Skenesboro. These were followed by an-other stando in the Battle of Fort Anne on July 8, inwhich a forward company of the British army was nearlydecimated. These actions cost the Americans about 50%more casualties than those incurred by the British, andthey demonstrated to the British ocers present that theAmericans were capable of putting up sti resistance.Burgoynes army was reduced by about 1,500 men as aresult of the Ticonderoga actions. He left 400 men togarrison the magazine at Crown Point and another 900 todefend Ticonderoga, and the battles that followed resultedin about 200 casualties.[44]

The bulk of St. Clairs army retreated through the NewHampshire Grants (present-day Vermont). St. Clair is-sued appeals to the states for militia support, and alsoarranged to have as much of the areas livestock andsupplies delivered to Fort Edward on the Hudson River,where the American armies would regroup. St. Clair

5reached Fort Edward on July 12 after ve days of gru-eling marches.[45] Some of the remnants that had beenscattered at Hubbardton rejoined the army, but SethWarner and the remains of his regiment were stationedat Manchester in the Grants.[46]

6 Reaction and delayBurgoyne settled into the house of Loyalist Philip Skeneat Skenesboro while the pieces of his army regroupedand he considered his next steps. He penned letters de-scribing the British victory, intended for public consump-tion. When this news reached the capitals of Europe,King George was happy, and the Comte de Vergenneswas not, as the news eectively scuttled an early proposalfor French entry into the war. British diplomats increasedpressure on the French and Spanish, demanding that theyclose their ports to American shipping. While this de-mand was refused, it markedly increased the tensions be-tween the powers. The news was also harshly receivedby Congress and the American public, including slandersthat St. Clair and Schuyler had been bribed.[47]

On July 10 Burgoyne issued orders for the next series ofmovements. Most of the army was to take the rough roadfrom Skenesboro to Fort Edward via Fort Anne, while theheavy artillery was to be transported down Lake Georgeto Fort Edward. Riedesels troops were sent back up theroad toward Castleton, primarily as a diversion intendedto suggest that he might be aiming for the ConnecticutRiver.[48] Burgoynes decision to move the army overlandvia Fort Anne was a curious one, for it contradicted hisown earlier commentaries on planning the expedition, inwhich he presciently observed that defenders could eas-ily block the route. His decision appears to have beenmotivated by two factors; the rst being the perceptionthat moving the army over water via Lake George wouldrequire a retrograde movement that could be perceivedas a retreat, and the second being the inuence of PhilipSkene, whose property would benet by the improvedroad Burgoyne would have to build.[49]

General Schuyler, at Albany when he received word ofTiconderogas fall, immediately rode to Fort Edward,where there was a garrison of about 700 regulars and1,400 militia.[50] He decided to make Burgoynes pas-sage as dicult as possible, using the axe as a weapon;as it was much easier to fell large trees in the enemyspath than to remove them after they were down, thisbrought Burgoynes advance to a crawl, tiring his troopsand forcing them to use up supplies. On July 11 Burgoynewrote to Lord Germain, complaining that the Ameri-cans were systematically felling trees, destroying bridges,and damming streams along the road to Fort Edward.[51]Schuyler also employed scorched earth tactics to denythe British access to local provisions. In spite of Bur-goynes lack of movement, his scouts were active; someof Schuylers work crews were attacked.[52]

Schuylers tactics required Burgoyne to build a roadthrough the wilderness for his guns and troops, a taskthat took about two weeks. They moved out of Skenes-boro on July 24, and reached Fort Edward on July 29,nding that Schuyler had already abandoned it, in a re-treat that ended at Stillwater, New York.[53] Before he leftSkenesboro, Burgoyne was joined by about 500 Indians(mostly Ottawas, but also Fox, Mississauga, Chippewa,and Ojibwe, as well as members of the Iroquois) fromthe Great Lakes region under the leadership of St. Lucde la Corne and Charles Michel de Langlade.[54][55]

7 St. Legers expeditionMain articles: Siege of Fort Stanwix and Battle ofOriskany

Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger sailed up the St. Lawrenceand crossed Lake Ontario to arrive at Oswego withoutincident. He had about 300 regulars, supported by 650Canadian and Loyalist militia, and they were joined by1,000 Indians led by John Butler and the Iroquois warchiefs Joseph Brant, Sayenqueraghta and Cornplanter.Leaving Oswego on July 25, they marched to Fort Stan-wix on the Mohawk River, and began besieging it on Au-gust 2. About 800 members of the Tryon County militiaand their Indian allies marched to relieve the siege, butsome of St. Legers British and Indians ambushed themon August 6 at the bloody Battle of Oriskany. While theAmericans held the eld of battle, they retreated becauseof the heavy casualties they suered, including the mor-tal wounding of their leader, General Nicholas Herkimer.Warriors from Iroquois nations fought on both sides of thebattle, marking the beginning of a civil war within theSix Nations. During the Oriskany action, the besiegedAmericans staged a sortie from Fort Stanwix and raidedthe nearly empty Indian camp. Combined with the signif-icant Indian casualties at Oriskany, this was a signicantblow to Indian morale.[56]

On August 10, Benedict Arnold left Stillwater, New Yorkfor Fort Stanwix with 800 men of the Continental Armyfrom Schuylers Northern Department. He expected torecruit members of the Tryon County militia when he ar-rived at Fort Dayton on August 21. Arnold could onlyraise about 100 militia, as most of the militia men thathad been at Oriskany were not interested in joining, sohe instead resorted to subterfuge. He staged the escape ofa Loyalist captive, who convinced St. Leger that Arnoldwas coming with a much larger force than he actually had.On this news, Joseph Brant and the rest of St. Legers In-dians withdrew.[57] They took most of his remaining sup-plies with them, and St. Leger was forced to raise thesiege and head back through Oswego to Quebec. Arnoldsent a detachment a short way after them, and turned therest of his force east to rejoin the American forces atSaratoga. St. Legers remaining men eventually arrived

6 8 MOUNTING DIFFICULTIES

Burgoynes march on Albany JuneOctober 1777

at Fort Ticonderoga on September 27.[58] Their arrivalwas too late to eectively support Burgoyne, whose armywas already being hemmed in by the growing Americanforces around him.[59]

8 Mounting dicultiesMain articles: Battle of Bennington and Jane McCrea

The advance of Burgoynes army to Fort Edward was, aswith the approach to Ticonderoga, preceded by a waveof Indians, which chased away the small contingent oftroops left there by Schuyler.[60] These allies became im-patient and began indiscriminate raids on frontier familiesand settlements, which had the eect of increasing ratherthan reducing local support to the American rebels.[61]In particular, the death at Indian hands of the attractiveyoung Loyalist settler JaneMcCrea was widely publicizedand served as a catalyst for rebel support, as Burgoynesdecision to not punish the perpetrators was seen as unwill-ingness or inability to keep the Indians under control.[62]

Even though the bulk of his army made the trip fromSkenesboro to Fort Edward in just ve days, the armyslack of adequate transport served to delay the army again,as the supply train, hampered by a lack of draft animalsand carts and wagons that were capable of dealing withthe rough tracks through the wilderness, took time tofollow.[19]

On August 3, messengers from General Howe nally suc-ceeded in making their way through the American linesto Burgoynes camp at Fort Edward. (Numerous attempts

General John Stark, the Hero of Bennington

by the British generals to communicate were frustrated bythe capture and hanging of their messengers by the Amer-icans.) The messengers did not bring good news. On July17 Howe wrote that he was preparing to depart by seawith his army to capture Philadelphia, and that GeneralClinton, responsible for New York Citys defense, wouldact as occurrences may direct.[63] Burgoyne refused todivulge the contents of this dispatch to his sta.[63]

Realizing that he now had a serious supply problem, Bur-goyne decided to act on a suggestion that Baron Riedeselhad made to him in July. Riedesel, whose forces Bur-goyne had stationed at Castleton for a time while he wasat Skenesboro, had observed that the area was rich indraft animals and horses, which might be seized for thearmys benet (including the mounting of Riedesels cur-rently unmounted dragoons).[64] Pursuing this idea, Bur-goyne sent Colonel Friedrich Baum's regiment towardwestern Massachusetts and the New Hampshire Grantson August 9, along with some Brunswick dragoons.[65]Most of Baums detachment never returned from the Au-gust 16 Battle of Bennington, and the reinforcements hehad sent after them came back after they were ravagedin the same battle, which deprived Burgoyne of nearly1,000 men and the much-needed supplies. What Bur-goyne had been unaware of was that St. Clairs callsfor militia support following the withdrawal from Ticon-deroga had been answered, and General John Stark hadplaced 2,000 men at Bennington. Starks force envelopedBaums at Bennington, killing him and capturing much ofhis detachment.[66]

The death of Jane McCrea and the Battle of Benning-ton, besides acting as rallying cries for the Americans,had another important eect. Burgoyne blamed his In-

7dian and Canadian allies for McCreas death, and, evenafter the Indians had lost 80 of their number at Ben-nington, Burgoyne showed them no gratitude.[67] As a re-sult, Langlade, La Corne, and most of the Indians leftthe British camp, leaving Burgoyne with fewer than 100Indian scouts.[68] Burgoyne was left with no protectionin the woods against the American rangers.[69] Burgoynewould later blame La Corne for deserting him, while LaCorne countered that Burgoyne never respected the Indi-ans. In the British Parliament, Lord Germain sided withLa Corne.[70]

9 American change of fortune

While the tactic of delay worked well in the eld, theresult in the Continental Congress was a dierent mat-ter. General Horatio Gates was in Philadelphia whenCongress discussed its shock at the fall of Ticonderoga,and Gates was more than willing to help assign the blameto reluctant generals. Some in the Congress had alreadybeen impatient with General George Washington, want-ing a large, direct confrontation that might eliminate oc-cupation forces but whichWashington feared would prob-ably lose the war. John Adams, the head of the WarCommittee, praised Gates and remarked that we shallnever hold a post until we shoot a general.[71] Over theobjections of the New York delegation, Congress sentGates to take command of the Northern Department onAugust 10. It also ordered states from Pennsylvania toMassachusetts to call out their militias.[71] On August 19,Gates arrived at Albany to take charge. He was coldand arrogant in manner, and pointedly excluded Schuylerfrom his rst war council. Schuyler left for Philadelphiashortly after, depriving Gates of his intimate knowledgeof the area.[72]

Throughout the month of August, and continuing intoSeptember, militia companies arrived at the Continen-tal Army camps on the Hudson. These were augmentedby troops Washington ordered north from the HudsonHighlands as part of General Arnolds operation to re-lieve Stanwix. Those troops arrived at the end of Au-gust and included the crack sharpshooters of Daniel Mor-gan's rie corps, which he sent north from his ownarmy.[73][74] News of the American successes at Benning-ton and Fort Stanwix, combined with outrage over thedeath of Jane McCrea, rallied support, swelling Gatesarmy to over 6,000 rank and le.[75] This number did notinclude Starks small army at Bennington, which was re-duced in size by disease and the departure of some ofits companies, but was also augmented by several hun-dred troops raised by General Benjamin Lincoln, whowas assigned to make attacks against Burgoynes supplyand communications.[76]

10 Saratoga

General Horatio Gates, portrait by Gilbert Stuart

Main article: Battles of Saratoga

The Battle of Saratoga is often depicted as a singleevent, but it was actually a month-long series of ma-neuvers punctuated by two battles. At the beginning ofSeptember 1777, Burgoynes army, now just over 7,000strong, was located on the east bank of the Hudson.[77][78]He had learned of St. Legers failure at Stanwix on Au-gust 28, and even earlier that Howe would not be givinghim substantial support from New York City. Faced withthe need to reach defensible winter quarters, which wouldrequire either retreat back to Ticonderoga or advance toAlbany, he decided on the latter. Subsequent to this deci-sion, he made two further crucial decisions. He decidedto deliberately cut communications to the north, so thathe would not need to maintain a chain of heavily fortiedoutposts between his position and Ticonderoga, and hedecided to cross the Hudson River while he was in a rela-tively strong position.[77] He therefore ordered Riedesel,whose forces were in the rear, to abandon outposts fromSkenesboro south, and ordered the army to cross the riverjust north of Saratoga, which it did between September13 and 15.[79] Moving cautiously, since the departure ofhis Indian support had deprived him of reliable scouting,Burgoyne advanced to the south.[80] On September 18 thevanguard of his army had reached a position just north ofSaratoga, about 4 miles (6.4 km) from the American de-fensive line, and skirmishes occurred between the leadingelements of the armies.[81]

WhenGates took over Schuylers army, much of it was lo-

8 10 SARATOGA

cated near the mouth of theMohawkRiver, south of Still-water. On September 8 he ordered the army, then about10,000 men (of whom about 8,500 were eective combattroops), to Stillwater with the idea of setting up defensesthere. The Polish engineer Tadeusz Kociuszko foundthe area inadequate for proper defensive works, so a newlocation was found about three miles further north (andabout 10 miles (16 km) south of Saratoga). At this lo-cation Kosciusko laid out defensive lines stretching fromthe river to the blus called Bemis Heights.[82][83]

The right side of these defenses was nominally given toGeneral Lincoln, but as he was leading troops intendedfor a diversion against Ticonderoga, Gates assumed com-mand of that portion of the line himself. Gates put Gen-eral Arnold, with whom he had previously had a goodrelationship, in command of the armys left, the westerndefenses on Bemis Heights. The relationship between thetwo soured when Arnold chose to sta his command withfriends of Schuyler, whom Gates hated. Combined withthe prickly natures of both Gates and Arnold, this even-tually brought internal power squabbles to a boil.[84]

Artists conception of General Benedict Arnold, color mezzotintby Thomas Hart

10.1 Freemans Farm

Both Generals Burgoyne and Arnold recognized the im-portance of the American left ank. Burgoyne recog-nized that the American position could be anked, anddivided his forces, sending a large detachment to the west

on September 19. Arnold, also recognizing that a Britishattack on the left was likely, asked Gates for permission tomove his forces out to Freemans Farm to anticipate thatmaneuver.[42] Gates refused to carry out a general move-ment, since he wanted to wait behind his defenses for theexpected frontal attack;[85] but he did permit Arnold tosend Daniel Morgans riemen and some light infantryout for a reconnaissance in force. These forces precipi-tated the Battle of Freemans Farm when they made con-tact with Burgoynes right ank.[86] In the ensuing battle,the British gained control of Freemans Farm, but at thecost of 600 casualties, ten percent of their forces.[87]

After the battle the feud between Gates and Arnolderupted. Not only did Gates not mention Arnold at all inthe ocial account of the battle he sent to Congress, buthe also transferred Morgans company (which had beentechnically independent but operated under Arnoldscommand in the battle) to his direct command. Arnoldand Gates had a noisy argument in Gates quarters, inwhich Gates said that General Lincoln would be replac-ing him. Following the argument Arnold drafted a letterto Gates outlining his grievances and requesting a trans-fer to Washingtons command.[88] Gates gave Arnold apass to leave, and continued to inict petty indignities onArnold.[89] A commonly referenced reason why Arnoldchose to remain is that a petition signed by all of theline ocers except Gates and Lincoln convinced him tostay.[89] While proposals for such a document were con-sidered, there is no contemporary evidence of one actu-ally being drafted and signed.[90]

Burgoyne considered renewing the attack the next day,but called it o when Fraser noted that many men werefatigued from the previous days exertions.[91] He there-fore dug his army in, and waited for news that he wouldreceive some assistance from the south, as a letter he re-ceived from General Clinton in New York on Septem-ber 21 suggested that a movement up the Hudson woulddraw o some of Gates army.[92] Although he was awareof the persistent desertions that were reducing the sizeof his army and that the army was running short of foodand other critical supplies,[93] he did not know that theAmerican army was also daily growing in size,[94] or thatGates had intelligence on how dire the situation was in hiscamp.[95]

10.2 Attack on TiconderogaUnknown to either side at Saratoga until after the bat-tle, General Lincoln and Colonel John Brown had stagedan attack against the British position at Fort Ticonderoga.Lincoln had collected 2,000 men at Bennington by earlySeptember.[96] After marching north to Pawlet, they re-ceived word that the guard at Ticonderoga might be sus-ceptible to surprise. Lincoln sent three detachmentsof 500 men each to annoy, divide, and distract theenemy.[97] One went to Skenesboro, which was found tobe abandoned by the British. The second went to capture

10.4 Bemis Heights 9

Mount Independence on the east side of Lake Champlain,while the third, led by John Brown, made the approach toTiconderoga.[97]

General Benjamin Lincoln, portrait by Charles Willson Peale

On the morning of September 18, Brown surprised theBritish defenders at the southern end of the portage trailconnecting Lake George to Lake Champlain. Rapidlymoving up the trail his men continued to surprise Britishdefenders and capture artillery pieces until they reachedthe height of land just before Ticonderoga, where theyoccupied the old French lines (so named because itwas there that a French defense improbably held againsta much larger British army in the 1758 Battle of Caril-lon).[98] On the way he released 100 prisoners (thus in-creasing the size of his force) and captured nearly 300.His demand for the forts surrender was refused, and forthe next four days Browns men and the fort exchangedcannon re, to little eect.[99] Since he had insucientmanpower to actually assault the fort, Brown then with-drew to Lake George, where he made an unsuccessfulattempt to capture a storage depot on an island in thelake.[100]

General Gates wrote to Lincoln on the day of FreemansFarm, ordering his force back to Saratoga and that notone moment should be lost.[101] Lincoln reached BemisHeights on September 22, but the last of his troops didnot arrive until the 29th.[101]

10.3 Sir Henry Clinton attempts a diver-sion

Main article: Battle of Forts Clinton and Montgomery

General Howe, when he left New York for Philadelphia,had put General Sir Henry Clinton in charge of NewYorks defense, with instructions to assist Burgoyne if op-portunities arose. Clinton wrote to Burgoyne on Septem-ber 12 that he would make a push at [Fort] Montgomeryin about ten days if you think 2000 men can assistyou eectually.[102] When Burgoyne received the letterhe immediately replied, appealing to Clinton for instruc-tion on whether he should attempt to advance or retreat,based on the likelihood of Clintons arrival at Albany forsupport.[103] Burgoyne indicated that if he did not re-ceive a response by October 12 he would be forced toretreat.[104]

On October 3, Clinton sailed up the Hudson River with3,000 men, and on October 6, one day after receivingBurgoynes appeal, captured the highland forts namedClinton and Montgomery.[105] Burgoyne never receivedClintons dispatches following this victory, as all threemessengers were captured.[106] Clinton followed up thevictory by dismantling the chain across the Hudson, andsent a raiding force up the river that reached as farnorth as Livingston Manor on October 16 before turn-ing back.[107] Word of Clintons movements only reachedGates after the battle of Bemis Heights.[108]

10.4 Bemis Heights

General Daniel Morgan, portrait by Charles Willson Peale

In addition to the Lincolns 2,000 men, militia unitspoured into the American camp, swelling the Americanarmy to over 15,000 men.[109] Burgoyne, who had puthis army on short rations on October 3, called a coun-cil the next day. The decision of this meeting was to

10 11 SURRENDER

launch a reconnaissance in force of about 1,700 men to-ward the American left ank. Burgoyne and Fraser ledthis detachment out early on the afternoon of October7. Their movements were spotted, and Gates wantedto order only Daniel Morgans men out in opposition.Arnold said that this was clearly insucient, and thata large force had to be sent. Gates, put o one lasttime by Arnolds tone, dismissed him, saying, You haveno business here.[110] However, Gates did accede tosimilar advice given by Lincoln. In addition to send-ing Morgans company around the British right, he alsosent Enoch Poor's brigade against Burgoynes left. WhenPoors men made contact, the Battle of Bemis Heightswas underway.[111]

The initial American attack was highly eective, andBurgoyne attempted to order a withdrawal, but his aidewas shot down before the order could be broadcast.[112]In intense ghting, the anks of Burgoynes force were ex-posed, while the Brunswickers at the center held againstLearneds determined attack.[113] General Fraser wasmortally wounded in this phase of the battle.[114] Whilefrequently claimed to be the work of Timothy Murphy,one of Morgans men, the story appears to be a 19th-century fabrication.[115] After Frasers fall and the arrivalof additional American troops, Burgoyne ordered whatwas left of the force to retreat behind their entrenchedlines.[114]

General Arnold, frustrated by the sound of ghting hewas not involved in, rode o from the American head-quarters to join the fray. Arnold, who some claimedwas in a drunken fury,[116] took the battle to the Britishposition. The right side of the British line consistedof two earthen redoubts that had been erected on Free-mans Farm, and were manned by Brunswickers underHeinrich Breymann and light infantry under Lord Bal-carres. Arnold rst rallied troops to attack Balcarres re-doubt, without success.[117] He then boldly rode throughthe gap between the two redoubts, a space guarded by asmall company of Canadian irregulars. Learneds menfollowed, and made an assault on the open rear of Brey-manns redoubt.[118] Arnolds horse was shot out fromunder him, pinning him and breaking his leg. Brey-mann was killed in the erce action, and his position wastaken. However, night was falling, and the battle cameto an end.[119] The battle was a bloodbath for Burgoynestroops: nearly 900 men were killed, wounded, or cap-tured, compared to about 150 for the Americans.[120]

11 SurrenderSimon Fraser died of his wounds early the next day, butit was not until nearly sunset that he was buried.[121] Bur-goyne then ordered the army, whose entrenchments hadbeen subjected to persistent harassment by the Ameri-cans, to retreat. (One consequence of the skirmishing wasthat General Lincoln was also wounded. Combined with

Monument at Victory, New York

Arnolds wounds, this deprived Gates of his top two eldcommanders.)[122]

It took the army nearly two days to reach Saratoga, inwhich heavy rain and American probes against the col-umn slowed the armys pace. Burgoyne was aided bylogistical problems in the American camp, where thearmys ability to move forward was hampered by delaysin bringing forward and issuing rations. However, Gatesdid order detachments to take positions on the east sideof the Hudson to oppose any attempted crossings.[123]By the morning of October 13 Burgoynes army wascompletely surrounded,[124] so his council voted to opennegotiations.[125] Terms were agreed on October 16 thatBurgoyne insisted on calling a "convention" rather than acapitulation.[126]

Baroness Riedesel, wife of the commander of theGerman troops, vividly describes in her journal the con-fusion and besetting starvation of the retreating Britisharmy. Her account of the tribulation and death of ocersand men, and of the terried women who had taken shel-

11

ter in the cellar of what later became known as the Mar-shall House dramatizes the desperation of the besiegedarmy.On October 17, following a ceremony in which Burgoynegave his sword to Gates, only to have it returned, Bur-goynes army (approaching 6,000 strong) marched outto surrender their arms while the American musiciansplayed "Yankee Doodle".[127]

12 Aftermath

British troops withdrew from Ticonderoga and CrownPoint in November, and Lake Champlain was free ofBritish troops by early December.[128] American troops,on the other hand, still had work to do. Alerted to Gen-eral Clintons raids on the Hudson, most of the armymarched south toward Albany on October 18, whileother detachments accompanied the "Convention Army"east.[129] Burgoyne and Riedesel became guests of Gen-eral Schuyler, who had come north from Albany to wit-ness the surrender.[130] Burgoyne was allowed to returnto England on parole in May 1778, where he spent thenext two years defending his actions in Parliament andthe press. He was eventually exchanged for more than1,000 American prisoners.[131]

In response to Burgoynes surrender, Congress declaredDecember 18, 1777 as a national day for solemnThanksgiving and praise in recognition of the militarysuccess at Saratoga; it was the nations rst ocial obser-vance of a holiday with that name.[132]

12.1 Convention Army

Main article: Convention Army

Under the terms of the convention Burgoynes army wasto march to Boston, where British ships would transportit back to England, on condition that its members notparticipate in the conict until they were formally ex-changed. Congress demanded that Burgoyne provide alist of troops in the army so that the terms of the agree-ment concerning future combat could be enforced. Whenhe refused, Congress decided not to honor the terms ofthe convention, and the army remained in captivity. Thearmy was kept for some time in sparse camps through-out New England. Although individual ocers were ex-changed, much of the Convention Army was eventuallymarched south to Virginia, where it remained prisonerfor several years.[133] Throughout its captivity, a largenumber of men (more than 1,300 in the rst year alone)escaped and eectively deserted, settling in the UnitedStates.[134]

13 ConsequencesErected 1887 By

JOHN WATTS de PEYSTERBrev: Maj: Gen: S.N.Y.

2nd V. Prest Saratoga Mon't Asst'n:In memory of

the most brilliant soldier of theContinental Army

who was desperately woundedon this spot the sally port of

BORGOYNES GREAT WESTERN REDOUBT7th October, 1777

winning for his countrymenthe decisive battle of theAmerican Revolution

and for himself the rank ofMajor General

Inscription on the Boot Monument

On December 4, 1777, word reached Benjamin Franklinat Versailles that Philadelphia had fallen and that Bur-goyne had surrendered. Two days later, King Louis XVIassented to negotiations for an alliance.[135] The treatywas signed on February 6, 1778, and France declaredwar on Britain one month later, with hostilities beginningwith naval skirmishes o Ushant in June.[136] Spain didnot enter into the war until 1779, when it entered thewar as an ally of France pursuant to the secret Treatyof Aranjuez.[137] Vergennes diplomatic moves followingthe French entry into the war also had material impact onthe later entry of the Dutch Republic into the war, anddeclarations of neutrality on the part of other importantgeopolitical players like Russia.[138]

The British government of Lord North came under sharpcriticism when the news of Burgoynes surrender reachedLondon. Of Lord Germain it was said that the secretaryis incapable of conducting a war, and Horace Walpoleopined (incorrectly, as it turned out) that we are ... verynear the end of the American war.[139] Lord North is-sued a proposal for peace terms in Parliament that didnot include independence; when these were nally deliv-ered to Congress by the Carlisle Peace Commission theywere rejected.[140]

14 RemembrancesMost of the battleelds of the campaign have been pre-served in some way, usually as state or national parks,but also as historic sites under state or federal control.Some monuments erected to mark the battles are listedas National Historic Landmarks and some are separatelylisted on the National Register of Historic Places. Manyof the battles are regularly reenacted, and the Battle of

12 15 NOTES

Bennington (although it was actually fought in present-day Walloomsac, New York) is marked in the state ofVermont by Bennington Battle Day.[141]

The commemorations of Benedict Arnolds contributionsto the American success of the campaign are particularlynoteworthy. The obelisk at Saratoga National HistoricalPark has, on three of its four sides, alcoves bearing statuesof three generals instrumental in the success at Saratoga:Gates, Schuyler, and Morgan. The fourth alcove, repre-senting Arnold, is empty.[142] The park also contains theBoot Monument which, though again without identifyingArnold by name, clearly honors his contribution in thesecond Saratoga battle.[143]

15 Notes[1] This number is an estimate of the total number of Ameri-

can combatants involved in the campaign. While Nicker-son details a signicant number of the troop counts duringthe campaign (pp. 435451), Pancake (1977) providesa more ready source of numbers for recruitments. TheNorthern Department (under Schuyler and then Gates),started with about 5,500 men (Pancake, pp. 151152),and the Highland Department under Putnam, based ontroop deployments ordered, had about 3,000 men (pp.153,180). Militia recruitment after the fall of Ticon-deroga and the killing of Jane McCrea was substantial:known recruitments included Stark and Warner 2,000 (p.153), Lincoln 1,500 (p. 178), and Herkimer 800. Gateshad 15,000 to 18,000menwhen Burgoyne surrendered (p.189), which did not include about one-half of Putnamsand Starks men, the Mohawk River outposts, Herkimerstroops, or earlier losses due to battle, disease, or expiringenlistments. It did include Morgans 300+ riemen, dis-patched from Washingtons main army. Considering thatPutnams forces were also swollen by militia following theBattle of Forts Clinton and Montgomery (one British re-port claimed 6,000 men were following them on October16, Pancake p. 188), the number of Americans in the eldin mid-October was probably well over 20,000.

[2] Nickerson (1967), p. 437, and other sources report Bur-goyne starting with 7,800 men. Nickerson notes (p.105) that this number does not include ocers and non-combatant sta and camp followers, who would also re-quire supplies. That number also does not include Indi-ans and Loyalists who arrived after the capture of Ticon-deroga (about 700, Nickerson p. 439).

[3] See Siege of Fort Stanwix for details.

[4] See Battle of Forts Clinton and Montgomery for details.This number includes all troops Clinton sent north fromNew York, not all of which were involved in battle.

[5] Edmund Morgan, The Birth of the Republic: 1763-1789(1956) pp 82-83

[6] John Martin Carroll; Colin F. Baxter (2007). The Amer-ican Military Tradition: From Colonial Times to thePresent. Rowman & Littleeld. p. 14.

[7] Ketchum (1997), pp. 42, 51, 65

[8] Nickerson (1967), p. 78

[9] Black (1991), p. 127

[10] Ketchum (1997), pp. 19, 7782

[11] Ketchum (1997), pp. 7984

[12] Ketchum (1997), p. 84

[13] Samuel B. Grith, The War for American Independence:From 1760 to the Surrender at Yorktown in 1781

[14] Ketchum (1997), p. 104

[15] Black, p. 126

[16] Fisher, Sydney George. The Struggle for American Inde-pendence Vol. II (1908) pp. 73-74

[17] Adams, Charles Francis. Campaign of 1777 Proceedingsof the Massachusetts Historical Society, Volume 44 (1910-11) pp. 25-26

[18] Ketchum (1997), pp. 8788

[19] Nickerson (1967), pp. 188189

[20] Nickerson (1967), p. 137

[21] Nickerson (1967), p. 138

[22] Pancake (1977), p. 139

[23] Nickerson (1967), p. 139

[24] Pancake (1977), pp. 151152

[25] Nickerson (1967), p. 6566

[26] Nickerson (1967), pp. 55, 75

[27] Nickerson (1967), pp. 106107

[28] Ketchum (1997), p. 111

[29] Ketchum (1997), p. 107

[30] Nickerson (1967), p. 104

[31] Ketchum (1997), p. 129

[32] Ketchum (1997), pp. 136137

[33] Nickerson (1967), pp. 195197

[34] Ketchum (1997), p. 163

[35] Ketchum (1997), pp. 160161

[36] Pancake (1977), pp. 121122

[37] Ketchum (1997), p. 172

[38] Nickerson, pp. 138140

[39] Pancake (1977), p. 122

[40] Nickerson (1967), pp. 146147

[41] Pancake (1977), p. 125

13

[42] Ketchum (1997), p. 356

[43] Smith (1882), p. 95

[44] Nickerson (1967), pp. 146157, 438

[45] Ketchum (1997), pp. 217220

[46] Nickerson (1967), p. 180

[47] Nickerson (1967), pp. 161-62

[48] Nickerson (1967), p. 160-61

[49] Ketchum (1997), p. 240

[50] Nickerson (1967), p. 173

[51] Ketchum (1997), p. 244

[52] Ketchum (1997), p. 249

[53] Nickerson (1967), pp. 179180

[54] Nickerson (1967), p. 178

[55] Ketchum (1997), pp. 265268

[56] Nickerson (1967), pp. 195211

[57] Nickerson (1967), pp. 271275

[58] Nickerson (1967), pp. 276277

[59] Nickerson (1967), pp. 354355

[60] Ketchum (1997), p. 273

[61] Nickerson (1967), p. 183

[62] Ketchum (1997), pp. 275278

[63] Ketchum (1997), p. 283

[64] Nickerson (1967), p. 233

[65] Nickerson (1967), p. 240

[66] Ketchum (1997), pp. 285323

[67] Ketchum (1997), pp. 281282,322

[68] Ketchum (1997), p. 322

[69] Nickerson (1967), p. 269

[70] Tousignant

[71] Ketchum (1997), p. 335

[72] Ketchum (1997), p. 337

[73] Ketchum (1997), p. 338

[74] Scott (1927), pp. 267, 292

[75] Nickerson (1967), p. 288

[76] Nickerson (1967), p. 268

[77] Nickerson (1967), pp. 290295

[78] Luzader (2008), p. 230

[79] Nickerson (1967), p. 296

[80] Nickerson (1967), p. 299

[81] Nickerson (1967), p. 300

[82] Ketchum (1997), pp. 346347

[83] Luzader (2008), p. 210

[84] Ketchum (1997), pp. 350353

[85] Ketchum (1997), p. 355

[86] Ketchum (1997), pp. 356360

[87] Ketchum (1997), pp. 360368

[88] Ketchum (1997), pp. 386387

[89] Ketchum (1997), p. 388

[90] Luzader (2008), p. 271

[91] Luzader (2008), p. 248

[92] Ketchum (1997), p. 375

[93] Ketchum (1997), p. 381

[94] Nickerson (1967), p. 327

[95] Ketchum (1997), p. 380

[96] Ketchum (1997), p. 376

[97] Ketchum (1997), p. 377

[98] Nickerson (1967), p. 324

[99] Nickerson (1967), p. 325

[100] Ketchum (1997), p. 379

[101] Nickerson (1967), p. 326

[102] Nickerson (1967), p. 320

[103] Nickerson (1967), p. 344

[104] Nickerson (1967), p. 345

[105] Nickerson (1967), pp. 343344

[106] Ketchum (1997), p. 384

[107] Nickerson (1967), p. 405

[108] Nickerson (1967), p. 394

[109] Luzader (2008), p. 249

[110] Ketchum (1997), p. 394

[111] Nickerson (1967), p. 361

[112] Ketchum (1997), p. 398

[113] Nickerson (1967), p. 362

[114] Ketchum (1997), p. 400

[115] Luzader (2008), p. xxii

[116] Ketchum (1997), p. 399

[117] Ketchum (1997), p. 402

14 17 FURTHER READING

[118] Nickerson (1967), p. 365366

[119] Ketchum (1997), p. 403

[120] Ketchum (1997), p. 405

[121] Ketchum (1997), p. 406

[122] Nickerson (1967), p. 371

[123] Ketchum (1997), p. 410

[124] Ketchum (1997), p. 417

[125] Nickerson (1967), p. 387

[126] Ketchum (1997), pp. 420425

[127] Ketchum (1997), pp. 428430, 437

[128] Ketchum (1997), p. 439

[129] Ketchum (1997), pp. 437439

[130] Nickerson (1967), pp. 400404

[131] Ketchum (1997), p. 436

[132] Bennett (2008), p. 456

[133] Ketchum (1997), p. 435

[134] Ferling (2007), p. 432

[135] Nickerson (1967), p. 411

[136] Nickerson (1967), p. 412

[137] Nickerson (1967), p. 413

[138] Nickerson (1967), p. 415

[139] Ketchum (1997), p. 442

[140] Mary A. Giunta, J. Dane Hartgrove (1998). Documents ofthe emerging nation. Rowman & Littleeld. p. 72. ISBN978-0-8420-2664-2.

[141] See the individual battle articles for more detailed infor-mation about a battles remembrances.

[142] Walworth (1891), p. 82

[143] Murphy (2007), p. 2

16 References Bennett, William J; Cribb, John (2008). The Amer-

ican Patriots Almanac. Thomas Nelson Inc. ISBN978-1-59555-267-9.

Black, Jeremy (1991). War for America: The Fightfor Independence, 1775-1783. New York: St. Mar-tins Press. ISBN 0-312-06713-5.

Boatner III,MarkMayo (1974). Encyclopedia of theAmerican Revolution. New York: McKay. ISBN 0-8117-0578-1.

Ferling, John E (2007). Almost a miracle: theAmerican victory in the War of Independence. NewYork: Oxford University Press US. ISBN 978-0-19-518121-0. OCLC 85898929.

Ketchum, Richard M (1997). Saratoga: TurningPoint of Americas Revolutionary War. New York:Henry Holt. ISBN 978-0-8050-6123-9. OCLC41397623.

Luzader, John F. Saratoga: A Military History ofthe Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution.New York: Savas Beatie. ISBN 978-1-932714-44-9.

Murphy, Jim (2007). The Real Benedict Arnold.New York: Clarion Books. ISBN 978-0-395-77609-4.

Nickerson, Homan (1928). The Turning Pointof the Revolution. Port Washington, NY: Kennikatreprint. OCLC 549809.

Pancake, John S (1977). 1777: The Year of theHangman. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Al-abama Press. ISBN 978-0-8173-5112-0. OCLC2680804.

Scott, John Albert (1927). Fort Stanwix andOriskany: The Romantic Story of the Repulse of St.Legers British Invasion of 1777. Rome, NY: RomeSentinel Company. OCLC 563963.

Smith, William Henry (1882). The St. Clair Papers:The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair.Cincinnati: Robert Clark. OCLC 817707.

Walworth, Ellen Hardin (1891). Battles of Saratoga,1777: the Saratoga Monument Association, 18561891. Albany: J. Munsells Sons. OCLC 2183838.

Tousignant, Pierre; Dionne-Tousignant, Madeleine(2000). Biography of La Corne St. Loc. Dictio-nary of Canadian Biography Online.

17 Further reading Bird, Harrison (1963). March to Saratoga: General

Burgoyne and the American Campaign, 1777. NewYork: Oxford University Press. OCLC 299497.

Burgoyne, John; O'Callaghan, Edmund Bailey(1860). Orderly book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne:from his entry into the state of New York until hissurrender at Saratoga, 16th Oct. 1777 ; from theoriginal manuscript deposited at Washingtons headquarters, Newburgh, N. Y. Albany, NY: J. Munsell.OCLC 2130372.

15

Chidsey, Donald Barr (1967). TheWar in the North:An Informal History of the American Revolution inand near Canada. New York: Crown. OCLC394996.

Corbett, Theodore. No Turning Point: The SaratogaCampaign in Perspective (University of OklahomaPress; 2012) 436 pages; detailed history; argues itwas not a decisive turning point in the war

Elting, John R (1977). The Battles of Saratoga.Phillip Freneau Press. ISBN 0-912480-13-0.

Glover, Michael (1976). General Burgoyne inCanada and America: Scapegoat for a System. Lon-don: Atheneum Publishers. ISBN 0-86033-013-3.

Graymont, Barbara (1972). The Iroquois in theAmerican Revolution. Syracuse, New York: Syra-cuse University Press. ISBN 0-8156-0083-6. ISBN0-8156-0116-6 (paperback).

Mintz, Max M (1990). The Generals of Saratoga:John Burgoyne & Horatio Gates. New Haven: YaleUniversity Press. ISBN 0-300-04778-9. ISBN 0-300-05261-8 (1992 paperback)

Murray, Stuart (1998). The Honor of Command:General Burgoynes Saratoga Campaign. Imagesfrom the Past. ISBN 1-884592-03-1.

Stone, William Leete (1893). Ballads and poemsrelating to the Burgoyne campaign. Albany: J. Mun-sells Sons. OCLC 1392761.

Taylor, Alan (2006). The Divided Ground: Indians,Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the Ameri-can Revolution. Knopf. ISBN 0-679-45471-3.

Watt, Gavin (2002). Rebellion in the Mohawk Val-ley: The St. Leger Expedition of 1777. Dundurn.ISBN 1-55002-376-4.

18 External links Fort Ticonderoga web site Hubbardton Battleeld State Historic Site National Park Service web site for Fort Stanwix Oriskany Battleeld State Historic Site Bennington Battleeld State Historic Site National Park Service web site for Saratoga NationalHistorical Park

Fort Montgomery State Historic Site The Marshall House, Schuylerville, New York The Saratoga Campaign, Revolutionary War Ani-mated

16 19 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

19 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses19.1 Text

Saratoga campaign Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saratoga_campaign?oldid=673868849 Contributors: Roadrunner, Nonenmac,Jtdirl, CORNELIUSSEON, LouI, Charles Matthews, Sebastian Wallroth, Tpbradbury, Hajor, PBS, Wwoods, Curps, Bobblewik, Edcolins,Albrecht, Neutrality, Rich Farmbrough, Tibbetts, KevinMyers, LtNOWIS, Fawcett5, MattWade, HiFiGuy, Rjwilmsi, Tim!, Koavf, Feydey,Ligulem, Shauni, Cornellrockey, Red Slash, Paul Riedesel, CJK, Rjensen, Moe Epsilon, LaLa, Marc29th, SmackBot, Rjhawkin, Briany-oumans, Menah the Great, Bmearns, Steam5, Gilliam, Hmains, Chris the speller, Colonies Chris, William Allen Simpson, H Bruthzoo, See-wolf, Hoodinski, Andrwsc, Norm mit, Wild Wolf, Civil Engineer III, Americasroof, Jcagney, Van helsing, AmadeoV, Red4tribe, Airviper,Alphageekpa, Canute, Vidor, AgentPeppermint, AntiVandalBot, Shardz, North Shoreman, Sluzzelin, Magioladitis, Ekotkie, Wittyname,MartinBot, Vigyani, Glrx, CommonsDelinker, Etienne2007, PurpleHz, Fredlysh4, M-le-mot-dit, Trip Johnson, Hirokun, Wiki Palehorse,TheNewPhobia, Squids and Chips, Bry9000, Militarybooks, Broadbot, LeaveSleaves, Slingbling, Billinghurst, AHMartin, Flonto, DavisGL,Hadoriel, Radon210, BradMajors, ClueBot, Laudak, Idehill01, Edconn, Jacob.mcdaniel, WikHead, Jbeans, Gazimo, HexaChord, Addbot,Jojhutton, LinkFA-Bot, Tassedethe, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Magicpiano, AnomieBOT, Bsimmons666, Theseeker4, Kieran4, Bob Burkhardt,Jc3s5h, Pinethicket, RockDrummerQ, WikitanvirBot, ThatMorgan, L Kensington, Donner60, $1LENCE D00600D, ClueBot NG, Help-ful Pixie Bot, Malak1man, Gob Lofa, Dionysodorus, Uhlan, Llandale, CitationCleanerBot, Umfspock87, DragonThor, Dexbot, Mogism,JC1008, Zeph77, Monkbot, SkateTier and Anonymous: 83

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British strategyHowes plan to attack PhiladelphiaBurgoynes plan to capture Albany

American strategyInternational interestCampaign beginsTiconderoga fallsReaction and delaySt. Legers expeditionMounting difficultiesAmerican change of fortuneSaratogaFreemans FarmAttack on TiconderogaSir Henry Clinton attempts a diversionBemis Heights

SurrenderAftermathConvention Army

ConsequencesRemembrancesNotesReferencesFurther readingExternal linksText and image sources, contributors, and licensesTextImagesContent license