2-16 49 pages Sartre: BN Ontology

11-15Onto Ontology in Being and Nothingness...................................................................................................3

Being and Nothingness, Tr. by Hazel Barnes,.................................................................. New York, Philosophical Library, 1956...........[Original translation modified by Sartrean term

clarifications] 3Counting cigarettes: ‘Unreflectivelived consciousness renders reflection [réflexion]posited possible’ (BNliii). .4Theticposited and non-theticlived (indexes)........................................................................................................6

Consciousness ‘(of) pleasurenot posited is constitutiveBN of pleasureposited as its own existenceI’ (BNliv-lvi)....................................................................................................................................................8

Absoluteontology (index)................................................................................................................................10

11-15Onto BN Introduction: The Pursuit of BeingI, Section V (lx-lxvii)...................................................13V. The Ontological ProofI (BNlx-lxii).........................................................................................................13

Objectposited ‘of consciousness must be distinguished from consciousnesslived by its absence’ (BNlx)........................................................................................................................................................13Consciousness ‘is born supported by a being[-there] which is not consciousness’ (BNlxi-lxii).....15

VI. Being-in-itselfontology (BNlxii-lxvii).........................................................................................................16The for-itselfontology (Index).........................................................................................................................21For-itselfontology and in-itselfontology are radicallyontology distinct modes of being[there] (BN617-24, out of

sequence)........................................................................................................................................22For-itself’sontology becoming specifically not in-itselfontology (BN177, out of sequence)..................................28

12-15Onto BN: Part Two, Chapter One, Immediate Structuresdial of the For-Itselfontology (BN73-105).....29Sartre’s cogitolived, ontological or concept.................................................................................................................29

Descartes [1595-1650] (index)......................................................................................................31Cogitoconcept as Descartes’ substance, Husserl’s phenomenalism, Heidegger’s ‘trap for larks’ (BN73)..............................................................................................................................................31

I. PresenceI to SelfI (BN73)..........................................................................................................................31Sartre’s ‘first condition of all reflection [réflexivité] is a pre-reflectiveI cogito’ (BN74-79)..........34Husserl’s necessity of fact supports Sartre’s cogitoI (BN282, out of sequence)..............................37

II. The Facticitylived of the For-Itselfontology (BN79-84)..................................................................................37Page 83 out of sequence at Sartre\Temporality-As lived experience ‘facticity and past indicate the same thing’...............................................................................................................................37

III. The For-Itselfontology and the Being[-there] of Value (BN84-95).............................................................37Page 85 out of sequence at Herein-Cogito as Descartes’ substance, Husserl’s phenomenalism, Heidegger’s disdain.......................................................................................................................37Pages 86-7 out of sequence at Sartre\Negation-Lack with two sub-topics..................................37Page 92, out of sequence at Sartre\Bad Faith-Sadness as intentional, not constitutiveBN modality........................................................................................................................................................37Page 94-5, Ftn. 12, out of sequence at Sartre\Negation-Hegel ‘opposes being to nothingness as thesis and antithesis’ at the same time...........................................................................................38Page 95, out of sequence at Sartre\Lifework-value.....................................................................38

IV. The For-Itselfontology and the Being[-there] of Possibilities (BN95-102).................................................38Unutilized possibles announce to praxisI other ends through other means (FI4:46)......................40

2-16Onto BN: Part Two, Chapter Three, Transcendencelived/1neg (BN171-218)..........................................41Transcendencelived/1neg or 2neg..........................................................................................................................41

Transcendence-transcendinglived/1neg................................................................................................42Transcendence-transcendedlived/2neg.................................................................................................42Transcended-transcendencelived/1neg.................................................................................................43

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Transcendence_in_immanence......................................................................................................43RealismI and idealismI of externallyI united substances (BN171)...............................................................47Page 172 out of sequence at Sartre\Language&Comprehension-There ‘is only intuitive knowledge

[connaissance]: When reached, methods used to attain it are effaced before it’ (BN 172).............48Terms: spatialityI, extensionI, the real is realizationlived/1neg (BN179)...........................................................48Pages 187-8 out of sequence at Sartre\Flaubert’s School Years-Investing qualityI into quantityI solicits

dreaded competition.......................................................................................................................49Pages 189-90 out of sequence at Sartre\Negation-[above] To ‘what’ being is the for-itselfontology

presence?........................................................................................................................................49Page 218 out of sequence at Sartre\Phenomenology-The strict order of examining the body as

ontologically being-for-itself before ontologically being-for-others (BN303-5,218)......................49

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E N D O F T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

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11-15Onto Ontology in Being and NothingnessSartre\Index of Terms-ONTOLOGY ; virtually defined by its flags on Sartrean terms.Herein-RConsciousness ‘is born supported by a being[-there] which is not itself’Sartre\Phenomenology-RII. The Phenomenon of being[-there]: ‘is the phenomenonI of being[-there]I

attained identical to the being[-there]I of the phenomenonI (BNxlviii-l) inaccessable title, with BN (p. xlviiic) "...being[-there] will be disclosed to us by some kind of immediate access—boredom, nausea, etc., and ontology will be the description of the phenomenonlived of being[-there] as it manifests itself; that is, without intermediary..."-RThe strict order of examining the body as ontologically being-for-itselfontology before

ontologically being-for-othersontology (BN303-5, 218)Sartre\Temporality-II. The OntologyI of TemporalityI

-RThe term ‘was’ as an ontological leap from present into pastlived

-RBirth of consciousness conundrum as ontological, not metaphysicalSartre\The Other-ROntologicallyI distinct: The other’s being[-there]-as-objectI for me vs. my being[-

there]-as-objectI: ‘WeI are lookingI atontology/1neg themI’ vs. ‘TheyI are lookingI at usontology/2neg’ (BN413)

BN: (p. 150c) "...all our ontology has its foundation in a reflective [réflexion] expérience..." (p. 181c) "Perceptionlivedc is articulated only on the ontological foundation of presence_to

the world, and the worldI is revealed concretely as the ground of each individual perceptionI."(p. 625c) "Ontology itself can not formulate ethical precepts. It is concerned solely with

what is, and we can not possibleI derive imperatives from ontology’s indicatives..."CDR (p. 57c, Fr. 172) "9. But our task involves more than establishing the existence of an ontological

region of totalizationdial/lived within which we are situated. For if dialectical_Reasonconcept existsI, the totalizing movementdial must, at least in principle, be intelligible to us everywhere and at all times..."

Being and Nothingness, Tr. by Hazel Barnes, New York, Philosophical Library, 1956.

[Original translation modified by Sartrean term clarifications]5-16Onto Counting cigarettes: ‘Unreflectivelived consciousness renders reflection [réflexion]posited possible’ (BNliii) Sartre, BN (p. liii, Fr. 19) "["...there must be an immediate non-cognitive connectionlived&lived

ok [of three degrees] of the selflived/2neg to selflived/1neg."] Furthermore the reflecting [réflexive]lived/2neg consciousness posits**2 the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchie]posited/1negcR as its object. In the act of reflecting [réflexion]posited I [je] pass judgment on the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchie]lived, I [je] am ashamed of it, I am proud of it, I will it, I refuse it, etc. The immediate consciousness which I have of percevinglivedc does not permit me either to judgeposit or to willposit or to be ashamedI. It [the immediate consciousness] does not know [connaît] my perceptionpositedc, does not posit it; all that there is of intentionlivedc in my actual consciousness is directed toward the outside, toward the world. In return, this spontaneous consciousness of my perceptionlived/2neg is constitutiveBN of my perceptiveposited consciousness. In other words, every positionalposited consciousness of an objectI is at the same time a non-positionallived***2 consciousness of itself. If I count the cigarettes which are in that case, I have the impression of disclosing an objectiveposited property of this collection of cigarettes: they are a dozen. This property appears [appataît] to my consciousness as a property existing in the world. It is very possibleI that I have no positionalposited consciousness of counting them. I do not know [connais]lived myself as counting. Proof of this is that children who are capable of making an unreflective addition spontaneously can not explain susequently how they set about it [non-positionally]. Piaget’s tests, which show this, constituteBN excellent refutation of the formula of Alain—Knowledge [Savoir]concept is to know [savoir]concept that one knows [sait]concept. Yet at the momentdial/posited when these cigarettes are disclosed to me as a dozen, I have a non-theticlived consciousness of my adding activity. If anyone interrogated me, in effect, if anyone should ask, ‘What

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are you doing there?’ I should reply at once, ‘I am countingposited.’ This reply aims not only at the instantaneous consciousnessposited which I can achieve by reflection [réflexion] but at those fleeting consciousnesses which have passed without being[-there] reflected-on [réfléchie], those which are forever unreflected [irréfléchi]not lived in my immediate pastlived. Thus reflection [réflexion]posited has no kind of primacy over the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchie]lived. It is not reflexion [réflexion]posited which reveals the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchie]lived to itself. At the same time it is the non-theticlived consciousness of counting which is the very condition of my actI of addingposited. If it were otherwise, how would the additionposited be the unifying theme of my consciousnesslived? In order that this theme should preside over a wholedial series of syntheses of unifications and recognitions, it must be present_tolived itself, not as a thing but as an operative intentionI which can exist only as the revealing-revealed (révélante-révélée), to use an expression of Heidegger’s. Thus in order to countposited it is necessaryBNontology to be conscious of countinglived.

(BNp. liii-liv, Fr. 20) "Of course, someone will say, that this makes a circle. For is it not necessaryBNontology that I [actually] countposited in factconcept in order to be conscious of countinglived? That is truelived. However there is no circle, or if you like, it is the very nature of consciousness to existI ‘in a circle.’ It can be expressed in these terms: Every conscious existenceposited e.g. existsI as consciousness of existinglived e.g.. (p. liv) We comprehendok now why the first consciousness of consciousnesslived is non positional; it is because it is one with the consciousness of which it is consciousnessposited. At one stroke it determinesdial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] itself as consciousness of perceptionlived and as perceptionposited. The necessityI of syntax has compelled us hitherto to speak of the ‘non-positional consciousness of self.’ But we can no longer use this expression in which the ‘of selfI’ still evokes the idea of knowledge [connaissance]concept. (Henceforth we shall put the ‘of’ inside parentheses to show that it merely satisfies a grammatical requirement.)" [continued-7, back-7]

-------------------------------------------------See Sartre\Being-there-Unreflected action continuously transforms our projects without a reflexive [réflexive]posited consciousness (out of sequence, E52-7)

-------------------------------------------------**2 Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-POSIT & POSITIONAL [pose, poser; position, positionner]; virtually defined by its flags on Sartrean terms.

Within lived experience positional and non-positional refer to objects, theticposited and non-theticlived refer to the self.

(BNp. li-lii, Fr. 17) "All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something. This signifies [signifie] that there is no consciousness which is not a positing [position] of a transcendentlived/1neg object**posited...." Note this above statement that all consciousness is positional is limited and does not apply to being-there. (p. lii) "Not all consciousness is knowledge [connaissance]lived (there are statesI [il y a] of affective consciousness [being-there], for example), but all knowing [connaissante] consciousness can be knowledge [connaissance] only of its objectposited.

Transcendence of the Ego (p. 5) "...Third_degreeposited**** is necessaryBNontology in order to positR2 it [anything]. Moreover, there is no infinite regress here, since a consciousnesslived has no need at all of a reflecting [réfléchissante] consciousnessposited in order to be conscious of itselflived. It simply does not positI itself as an objectI****.

The Psychology of Imagination: (p. 16c, Fr. 24) "...Every consciousness [eg. perception, imaginative] posits its object, but each does so in its own way. Perception, for instance, posits its objectI as existing. The image [consciousness] also includes an act of beliefpositedc, or a positional actI..."

BN: (p. liii, positing vs. intention, above) "...It [the immediate consciousness]lived does not know [connaît] my perceptionpositedc, does not posit it; all that there is of intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward the outside, toward the worldlived..."

(p. 27c, positing as transcendence) "...In short an empty intention is a consciousness of negation which transcendslived/1neg itself toward an objectposited which it posits as absent or non-existent."

(p. 102c) "...but the possibleI repletion [of the desired glass of water2neg] appears [paraît] as a non-positionallived correlate of the non-theticI consciousness (of) self..."

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(p. 449c) "...The for-itselfontology is therefore the consciousness of this causelivedcok. But this

positionalposited consciousness of the causeIok is a non-theticlived consciousness of itself as a project toward an end.

In this sense it is a motivelivedok, that is, it experiencesFr=? itself non-theticallylived as a projectI..."

Sartre\Being-there-Unreflected action continuously transforms our projects without a reflexive [réflexive]posited consciousness (out of sequence, E52-7)

The Family Idiot (5:156c) "...the conduct of failurelived. By this we mean a behavior with two objectives, the more superficial beingI to reach a definite goal and the more profound beingI to fall short of it. The first is the objectposited of a formulated intention, one that is quite conscious; the second, implicitc but equally intentionalI, is the very meaning CDR lived of lived experience..."

-------------------------------------------------***2 Sartre\Index of Terms-NON-POSITIONAL [position, positionner]

Within lived experience, positionalposited and non-positionallived refer to objects; theticposited and non-theticlived refer to the selflived.

Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 44c) "...Insofar as my reflecting [réfléchissant]lived consciousness_is_consciousness_(of)_itselflived it is non-positional consciousness...";

The Emotions: (p. 50c) "...Emotional consciousness is, at first, unreflectivelivedc [irréfléchi], and on this planeok it can be conscious of itself only on the non-positional lived mode ...";

BN (p. 102c) "...But the possibleI repletion [of the desired glass of water] appears [paraît] as a non-positionallived correlate of the non-theticlivedc consciousness of self [conscience (de) soi] on the horizon of the glass-in-the-midst-of-the-worldlived.";

(p. 221c) "Consider for example shame... It is a non-positionallived consciousness of self, conscious (of) itself as shamelived; as such, it is an example of what the Germans call Erlenislivedc and accessile to reflection [réflexion]positedc. In addition its structuredial is intentionallived; it is a shameful apprehension of something and this something is me...";

11-15Onto Theticposited and non-theticlived (indexes)Within lived experience positional and non-positional refer to objects, theticposited and non-theticlived refer

to the self.Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-THETIC posited [thétic]

See thetic below in non-thetic cites: The Emotions (p. 57c); BN (p. 157c); (p. 449c); (p. 477c); The War Dairies: (p. 180P).Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-NON-THETIC lived [thétic]

Within lived experience, positionalposited and non-positionallived refer to objects; theticposited and non-theticlived refer to the selflived.

Transcendeence of the Ego: (p. 46c) "...But every unreflective [irréfléchi] consciousness, being non-theticlived consciousness of itself, leaves a non-thetic memory [souvenir]livedc that one can consult..."

The Emotions: (p. 57c) "...In short, unreflective [irréfléchi] behavior is not unconscious behavior; it is conscious of itself non-theticallylived, and its way of being[-there] theticallyposited conscious of itself is to transcendlived/1neg itself and to grasp [transformslivedtoposited as 1neg&2neg] the world as a quality of things...";

BN: Herein-RIV. The For-Itselfontology and the being of Possibilities, with (p. 102c) "...but the possibleI repletion [of the desired glass of water2neg] appears [paraît] as a non-positional correlate of the non-theticlived consciousness (of) self on the horizon of the glass-in-the-midst-of-the-worldlived.";

(p. 157c) "Thus reflection [réflexion] is consciousness of the three ekstasicRc dimensions. It is a non-theticlived consciousness (of) flowc and a theticposited consciousness of durationpositedc...";

(p. 389c) "...desire of the other’s body... is—within the unity of a single act—the non-theticallylived lived project of beingI swallowed up in the bodyI

e...";(p. 259c) "..."Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice I have just glued my ear to

the door and lookedI through a keyhole. I am alone and on the level of a non-theticlived consciousness of self. This means first of all that there is no selfI to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can refer my actsI in order to qualify them. They are in no way known [connu]posited, but I am my actsI, and hence they carry in themselves their whole justification. I am a pure consciousness of things..."

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(p. 426c) "...Confronting an inanimate thing which has not been worked on, for which I myself fix its modeok of use and to which I myself assign a new use (if, for example, I use a stone as a hammer), I have a non-theticlived consciousness of my self as a person; that is to say, of my selfness, of my own ends, and of my freeBN inventiveness...";

(p. 439c) "...I am necessarilyBNontology a consciousness (of) freedomI since nothing exists in consciousness except as the non-theticlived consciousness of existingI...";

(p. 449c) "...The for-itselfontology is therefore the consciousness of this causelivedok. But this

positionalpositedc consciousness of the causeI [motif] is a non-theticlived consciousness of self as a projectI toward an end. In this sense it is a motivelived

ok, that is to say, it experiencesFr=? the self non-theticallylived as a projectI, more or less keen, more or less passionate, toward an endI at the very momentdial at which it is constitutedBN as a revealing consciousness of the organization of the world into causesI. Thus causeI and motivelivedI are correlativec, exactly [in reverse order] as the non-theticlived self-consciousness is the ontological correlateI of the theticposited consciousness of the objectposited..."

(p. 477-8c) "...The end is a theticposited consciousness of the endI. But it can be only by making itself a non-theticlived consciousness of its own possibility. Thus my endI can be a good meal, if I am hungry. But this meal ... is projected [projeté] as the meaningBNlived of the road (it goes toward a hotel ... where I am expected) can be apprehended only correlatively with my non-theticlived project toward my own possibilityI of eating this meal...." (p. 478) my endI is a certain objective state of the world, my possibleI is a certain structuredial

of my subjectivitylivedc; the one [objective state] is revealed to the theticpositedI consciousness, the other [the possible] flows back over the non-theticlived consciousness in order to characterize it...";

The War Dairies: (p. 179-180P, Fr. 221) "...One must not, of course, see in the word ‘surpassing1neg’c (dépassement) any indication of an act. (WDp. 180) It is merely a mode of existing. Consciousness existsI for-itselfontology beyond that tree as this which is not that tree; the nihilatingcR joiningok

c reflection [reflet] and reflected on [reflété] makes it be for itselfI only by reflecting [reflétant]livedc itself as being[-there] precisely nothingnessI of the world where there is that tree. That which signifies that it is non-theticlived consciousness of itself as theticposited consciousness of that tree; the tree is the transcendentlived/1neg theme of its nothingnessI. Thus, for example, intuitive knowledge [connaissance] is irruption of the nothingI into immanence, which transformslivedc the immanenceI of the in-itselfontology into the transcendencelived/1neg of the for-itselfontology. Thus the pure event which makes that being[-there] its own nothingness makes the world appear [apparaître] as totalitydial/lived of the In-itselfconcept surpassed1neg through being[-there]I that nothingness itself1neg. Being[-there] in the worldlived/2neg and beingI

ok numbed by Nothingnesslived/1neg are one and the same thingc..."The Family Idiot: (4:46c) "...we frequently tell ourselves we are dreaming. But this non-theticlived

consciousness of dreaming does not freeI us from the world without possibilities into which we are plunged by faith..."

11-15Onto Consciousness ‘(of) pleasurenot posited is constitutiveBN of pleasureposited as its own existenceI’ (BNliv-lvi)

Sartre, BN (p. liv, Fr. 20, out of sequence from Sartre\Phenomenology-IV. The being of the Percipi [to perceive], [continued-7, back-7]) "This self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, but as the only modeok of existence which is possibleI for a consciousness of something. Just as an extended object is compelled to existI according to three dimensions, so an intentionc, a pleasureRc, a grief can existI only as immediate selfI-consciousness. If the intentionI is not a thing in consciousness, then the being[-there] of the intentionI can be only consciousnesse... PleasureI cannot be distinguished—even logically—from consciousness of pleasureI. Consciousness (of) pleasure not posited is constitutive BN of the pleasure posited as the very mode of its own existenceR, as the material of which it is made, and not as a form which is imposed by a law upon a hedonistic materialI. PleasureI can not existI ‘before’ consciousness of pleasureI—not even in the form of potentiality or potency. A potential pleasureI can existI only as consciousness (of) beingI potential. Potencies of consciousness existI only as consciousness of potencies.

(BNp. liv-lv, Fr. 21) "Conversely, as I showed earlier**, we must avoid defining pleasureI by the consciousness which we have of it. This would be to fall into an idealism of consciousness which would bring us by indirect means to the primacy of knowledge [connaissance]posited. PleasureI must not disappear behind its own consciousness of selfI; it is not a representationposited, it is a concretelivedc event, full and absoluteontology. It is

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no more a quality of consciousness of selfI than consciousness of selfI is a qualityI of pleasureI. There is no more first a consciousness which receives susequently the affectc ‘pleasureI’ like water which one stains, than there is first a pleasureI (unconscious or psychological) which receives subsequently the qualityI of ‘conscious’ like a pencil of light rays. (p. lv) There is an indivisible, indissoluble beingI—definitely not a substance supporting its qualitiesI like particles of beingI, but a beingI which is existence through and through. PleasureI is the beingI of consciousness of selfI and this consciousness of selfI is the lawc of beingI of pleasureI. This is what Heidegger expressed very well when he wrote (though speaking of Dasein, not of consciousness): ‘The "how" (essentia) of this being[-there]I, so far as it is possibleI to speak of it generally, must be conceived in terms of its existenceI (existentia).’ This means that consciousness is not produced as a singular instance of an abstract possibilityI but that in rising to the center of beingI, it creates and supports its essencelivedc—that is, the syntheticdial/lived order of its possibilitiesI.

(BNp. lv, Fr. 21) "This means also that the type of beingI of consciousness is the inverse [inverse] of that which the ontological proof*** reveals to us. Since consciousness is not possibleI before being[-there]I, but since its beingI is the source and condition of all possibilityI , its existence_implies_its_essencec. Husserl expresses this aptly in speaking of the ‘necessityBNlived of fact.’ In order for there to be an essence of pleasureI, there must be first the factI of a consciousness (of) this pleasureI

e...""This selfI-determinationdial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] of consciousness must not be conceived as

a genesis, as a becoming, for that would force us to suppose that consciousness is prior to its own existence. Neither is it necessaryI to conceive of this selfI-creation as an act, for in that case consciousness would be consciousness (of) itself as an actI, which it is not. Consciousness is a plenum of existenceI, and this determinationI of itself by itself is an essential characteristic..."

(BNp. lvi, Fr. 22) "e...The paradox is not that there are existencesI through the self, but that there is no other kind. What is truly unthinkable is passivelivedc existenceI; that is to say, existenceI which perpetuates without having the force either to produce or to preserve. From this point_of_viewdouble connection of 1st&2neg there is nothing more unintelligible than the principle of inertialivedc

ce...""Thus by abandoning the primacy of knowledgeI [connaissance]posited, we have discovereddial/lived the

being[-there] of the knower [connaissant] and encountered the absoluteontology, that same absoluteI which the rationalists of the seventeenth century had defined and logically constitutedBN as an objectposited of knowledge [connaissance]positedc. But precisely because the question concerns an absoluteIc of existence and not of knowledge [connaissance]positedc, it is not subject to that famous objection according to which a known [connu]livedc absolute is no longer an absolute because it becomes relative to the knowledge [connaissance]livedc which one has of it. In fact the absolute here is not the result of a logical construction on the terrain [terrain] of knowledge [connaissance]positedc but the subject of the most concrete of expériences. And it is not at all relative to this expérienceI because it is this expérienceI. Likewise it is not a non-substantial absolute. The ontologicalI error of Cartesian rationalismposited is not to have seen that if the absolute is defined by the primacy of existence_over_essencec, it cannot be conceived as a sustance. Consciousness has nothing substantial, it is pure appearancelivedc in the sense that it exists only to the measure to which it appearsI [s’apparaît]. But it is precisely because consciousness is pure appearanceI, because it is an emptiness (since the entire world is outside of it), it is to this identityontology of appearanceI and existenceI that it can be considered as the absoluteontologyc."

-------------------------------------------------** Sartre\Phenomenology-There ‘must be an immediate, non-cognitive connectionok

lived&lived [of three degrees] of the self to itself’*** Herein-Consciousness ‘is born supported by a being[-there] which is not consciousness’

11-15bein Absoluteontology (index)Sartre\Index of Terms-ABSOLUTE ontology; cf. absolute_Negationconcept and absolute_Otherconcept.The Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 63c) "...hatred is not of consciousness. It overflows the

instantaneousness of consciousness, and it does not bow to the absoluteontology law of consciousness for which no distinction is possibleI between appearance [paraître] and being[-there]...";

Psychology of Imagination: (p. 3-4c) "It is necessaryBNontology to repeat at this point what has been known [sait] since Descartes: that a reflective [réflexive] consciousness gives us absolutelyontology certain givens2neg. That he who becomes aware ‘of having an image’ by an act of reflection [réflexion] cannot deceive himself...

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(p. 4) The actI of reflection [réflexion] thus has an immediately certain content of which we shall call the essence of the image..."

BN: (p. xlvic) "...Thus we arrive at the idea of the phenomenonlived such as we can find, for example in the ‘phenomenology’ of Husserl or of Heidegger—the phenomenonI of the relativeposited-absoluteontology. Relative the phenomenonI remains, for ‘to appear [paraître]’ supposes in essence somebody to whom to appearI [paraître]. But it does not have the dual relativity of Kant’s Erscheinung. It does not point over its shoulder to a truelived beingI which would be, for it, absolute. What it is, it is absolutelyontology, for it discloses itself as it is. The phenomenonI can be studied and described as such, for it is absolutelyontology indicative of itself.";

(p. xlviiic, Fr. 14) since there is nothing behind the apparitionok, and since it indicates only itself (and the total seriesI of apparitionsI

ok), it can not be supported by any beingI other than its own. The apparitionI

ok can not be the thin film of nothingness which separates the being-of-the-subject from absoluteontology-being[-there].

(p. lvic) "Thus by abandoning the primacy of knowledge [connaissance]posited, we have discovereddial/lived the being[-there] of the knower [connaissant] and encountered the absoluteontology e... an absoluteontology of existence and not of knowledge [connaissance]posited**e... Consciousness has nothing sustantial, it is pure ‘appearance’Fr=? in the sense that it existsI only to the degree to which it appearsI [s’apparaît]. But it is precisely because consciousness is pure appearanceI, because it is total emptiness (since the entire world is outside it)—it is because of this identityontology of appearanceI and existenceI within it that it can be considered as the absoluteontology.";

(p. lxiic) "...Absoluteontology subjectivity can be established only in the face of something revealed; immanencelivedc can be defined only within the apprehension of a transcendentlived/1neg... We are here on the ground of being[-there] not of knowledge [connaissance]posited ... consciousness implies in its beingI a non-conscious and transphenomenal beingI.";

(p. lxiiic) "...In particular the preceding reflections have permitted us to distinguish two absolutelyontology separated regionsc of being[-there]: the beingI of the pre-reflective [préréflexif] cogitolived and the beingI of the phenomenonlived...";

(p. 15c) "...Negation cannot touch the nucleus of being[-there]I of beingI [d’être de l’être] which is absoluteontology plenitude and entire positivity..." [elaborated in BN (p. liic) "...if my consciousness were not consciousness of beingI consciousness of the table, it would then be consciousness of the table without consciousness of beingI so..."];

(p. 44c) "...Evidently it is necessaryBNontology to find the foundation of all negation in a nihilationc

Fr=? which is exercised in the very heart of immanencelivedc; in absoluteontology immanenceI, in the pure subjectivity of the instantaneous cogitolived we must discoverdial/lived the original act by which man is to himself his own nothingness...";

Sartre\Temporality-RB. The Dynamic of Temporality, with (BNp.143c) "...Since the link with the pastlived replaces the pseudo-necessityBNlivedc of permanence, the problem of durationpositedc can and ought to be posited in relationI [propos] to absoluteontology changes...";

(p. 150c) "But aside from the fact that it is difficult to explain the upsurge ex nihilo of the reflective [réflexive]posited consciousness it is completely impossible in this way to account for its absoluteontology unity with the consciousness reflected-on [réfléchie], a unity which alone renders conceivable the laws and the certainty of the reflective [réflexive] intuitionc...";

(p. 154c) "...The motivationok of reflection (reflexion) [réflexion]livedc consists in a double attempt, simultaneously an objectificationc and an interiorizationlivedc. To be to itself as an objectI-in-itselfontology in the absoluteontology unity of interiorizationI—that is what the beingI-of-reflection [réflexion] has to be...";

(p. 251c) "...Thus we must ask the for-itselfontology to deliver to us the for-others; we must ask absoluteontology immanence to throw us into absoluteI transcendencelived/1neg. In my own inmost depths [absolute immanenceI] I must find not reasons for believing that the other exists but the otherc himself as not beingI me [absolute transcendenceI].";

(p. 270-3c) Sartre\The Other-RSimultaneously, I experience [éprouve]ontology/2neg the other’s subjectivity in theirI lookontology/1neg and the otherI experiencesI my objectivityontology/2neg (BN270);

(p. 282c) "e...What the cogitoontology reveals here, is simply one factual_necessityontology: it finds itself—and this is indisputable—that our being[-there] in that joiningok with its being-for-itselfontology [the for-

9

Sartre: Ontology

itself] is also for-itself-for-othersontology; the beingI which is revealed to the reflective [réflexive] consciousness is for-itself-for-others. The Cartesian cogitoconcept makes only an affirmationdial of the absoluteontology truthlived of a fact—that of my existence: In the same way, the cogitoontology a little enlarged of which we use here is revealedI to us as a fact the existenceI of the other and my existenceI for the otherI. This is all that we can saye..."

Sartre\The Other-RWhat ‘is the being[-there] of being-for-othersontology’ (BN282-6), See page 286.

(p. 308c) "...We have descried it in Part Two [and] showed there that the nihilated in-itselfontology, engulfed in the absoluteontology event which is the appearance of the foundation or the upsurge of the for-itselfontology, remains at the heart of the for-itselfI as its original contingency...";

(BNp. 460c) "...Thus it is not truelived that I proceed by degrees from that table to the room which I am in, and then going out, pass from there to the hall, to the stairway, to the street in order finally to conceive as the result of a passage to the limit, the world as the sum of all existences. Quite the contraryI, I can not perceive any instrumental thing whatsoever unless it is in terms of the absoluteontology totalitydial/lived of all existentsI, for my first beingI is being-in-the-world.";

Sartre\Freedom-RUnreflective ‘spontaneous self-projection can never be deceived’, See BN p. 471, Fr. 516.

(p. 581c) "...the functionposited of the act is to make manifest and to present to itself the absoluteontology freedomI which is the very beingI of the person...";

Notebooks for an Ethics (p. 301c) "As for the world, it is stolen from me since events have their key outside of me... [M]yI cogitolived grasps [transformslived/1negtolived/2neg] itself as absoluteontology truthlived/1neg and as an epiphenomenonlived, I am existenceI and I have a nature whose secret is in another’s hands..."

11-15Onto BN Introduction: The Pursuit of BeingI, Section V (lx-lxvii)See sections I to IV at Sartre\Phenomenology-BN Introduction: The Pursuit of Being

11-15Onto V. The Ontological ProofI (BNlx-lxii)

11-15Onto Objectposited ‘of consciousness must be distinguished from consciousnesslived by its absence’ (BNlx)

Sartre, BN (p. 1x, Fr. 26) "All consciousness_is_consciousness_(of)_somethingR. This definition of consciousness can be taken in two very distinct**ontology senses: either we [as Bishop Berkeley] understandposited

ok by this that consciousness is constitutiveBN of the being of its objectposited, or it signifies that consciousness in its inmost nature is a connectionok [of three degrees]1neg&2neg to a transcendentlived/1neg being[-there]. But the first interpretation of the formula destroys itself: to be conscious of something is to be confronted with a concrete and full presence which is not consciousness. Of course one can be conscious of an absenceR1. But this absenceI appears [paraît] necessarilyBNlivedc as a ground [fond] of presenceI. As we have seen consciousness is a real subjectivity and the impression is a subjectiveI plenitude. But this subjectivityI cannot go out of itself to posit a transcendentI objectposited in such a way as to endow it with a plenitude of impressions [as Bishop Berkeley’s].7 If then we wish at any price that the being[-there] of the phenomenonlived dependok on consciousness, the object must be distinguished from consciousness not by its presence I but by its absence R2 , not by its plenitude, but by its nothingness . If being[-there]I belongsok [appartient] to consciousness, the objectI is not consciousness, not to the extent that it is another being[-there], but that it is non-being. This is the appeal to infinity of which we spoke in the first section of this work.*** For Husserl, for example, the animation of the hyleticc nucleus by the only intentionc which can find their fulfilment (Erfüllung) in this hyleI is not enough to bring us outside of subjectivityI. The truly objectifying intentionsI are empty intentionsIc, those which aim beyond the present subjectiveI apparitionok at the infinite totalitydial/lived of the seriesI of apparitionsI

ok.(BNp. lxi, Fr. 27) sartre¶We must further understandposited

ok that the intentionsI aim at apparitionsI [visent en tant qu’elles ne peuvent] which are never to be given2neg at one time [Abschattung]e... [It] is their absence which gives them objective being[-there]I. Thus the being[-there] of the objectI is pure non-beingI. It is defined as a lackdial/lived. It is that which escapes, that which by definition will never be given2neg, that which lives only in fleeting and successive profiles [AbschattungIc]."

10

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-------------------------------------------------BNFtn. 7, "i.e., in such a way that the impressions are objectifiedI into qualities of the thing. Tr."Ref Sartre\Negation-Possibility ‘of non-being conditions questions of being[-there] and limits the reply’

Sartre\Flaubert’s Neurosis-CapacitésI, professionalsI, and eliteI see Knights of NothingnessI as ‘menI of experience’ (5:278)

-------------------------------------------------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-DISTINCTION [distinction]; to distinguish between is ontological. Not the same as distinquished in The Family Idiot only;

BN (p. 617c) "...we found ourselves confronting two radicallyontologyc distinct modesok of beingI: that of the for-itselfontology which has to be what it is—i.e., which is what it is not and which is not what it is [is and is notontology]—and that of the in-itselfontology which is what it is..."*** See Sartre\Phenomenology-BN phenomenologyposited converts dualisms of interior/exterior, being/appearance, potency/act to that of the ‘infinite in the finite’

11-15Onto Consciousness ‘is born supported by a being[-there] which is not consciousness’ (BNlxi-lxii)Sartre, BN (p. lxi-lxii, Fr. 28) sartre¶"But how can non-being be the foundation of being[-there]. How can

the absent, expected subjective become thereby the objective? A great joy which I hope for, a grief which I dread, acquire from that fact a certain transcendencelived/1neg. This I admit. But transcendenceI in immanence does not bring us out of the subjectiveI. It is truelived that things give themselves in profile; that is, simply by apparitions**ok. And it is trueI that each apparitionok refers to other apparitionsok. But each of them is already in itself alone a transcendentlived/1neg being[-there]***, not a subjectiveI material of impressions—a plenitude of being, not a lackdial/lived—a presence, not an absenceposited..." "Consciousness_is_consciousness_(of)_somethingc. This means that transcendencelived/1neg is the constitutiveBN structuredial of consciousness; that is, that consciousness is born supported by a being[-there] [in-itself] which is not itself [for-itself]. This is what we call the ontologicalR proof. No doubt someone will reply [with the primary argument against ontologyI] that the existence of the demand of consciousness does not prove that this demand ought to be satisfied. But this objection can not hold up against an analysis of what Husserl calls intentionality, though, to be sure, he misunderstoodFr=? its essential character.** To say that consciousness_is_consciousness_of_somethingI means that for consciousness there is no being[-there] outside of that precise obligation to be a revealing intuition of something—i.e., of a transcendentI beingI

e... Now a revealingI intuition implies something revealed. (BNp. lxii) Absolute subjectivity can be established only in the face of something revealedI; immanencelivedc can be defined only within the apprehension of a transcendentI. It might appearI [croira retrouver] that there is an echo here of Kant’s refutation of problematical idealism. But we ought rather to think of Descartes. We are here on the ground of being[-there]ok not of knowledge [connaissance]. It is not a question of showing that the phenomenalived of inner sense imply the existence of objective spatial phenomenaI, but that consciousness implies in its beingI a non-conscious and transphenomenal being[-there]. In particular there is no point in replying that in fact subjectivityI implies objectivityI and that it constitutesBN itself in constitutingI the objectiveI; we have seen that subjectivityI is powerless to constituteI the objectiveI. To say that consciousness_is_consciousness_(of)_somethingIc is to say that it must produce itself as a revealed-revelation**** [révélation_révélée] of beingI which is not it and which gives itself as already existingI when consciousness reveals it.

(BNp. lxii, Fr. 28) "Thus we have left pure appearance and arrived at full beingI. Consciousness is a beingI whose existence_posits_its_essencec, and inverselyok it is consciousness of a beingI, whose essence_implies_its_existenceIc; that is, in which appearanceI lays claim to beingI. Being[-there] is everywhereR. Certainly we could apply to consciousness the definition which Heidegger reserves for Dasein and say that it is a beingI such that in its beingI, its beingI is in question. But it would be necessaryBNontology to complete the definition and formulate it more like this: consciousness is a beingI such that in its beingI, its beingI is in question in so far as this beingI implies a being[-there-]I otherI than itself."

-------------------------------------------------See Herein-Consciousness ‘(of) pleasure is constitutiveBN of pleasure as its own existenceI’;

-For-itself’sontology becoming specifically not in-itselfontology as being-in-the-world, and referencesRef Herein-being-in-itselfontology

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Sartre: Ontology

** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-APPARITION [apparition]BN (p. 280c) "...For the apparitionok of a man as an objectI [rather than subject] in the field of my

expérienceok is not what informs meI that there are men [as subjects]. My certainty of the others [as subjects] existence is independent of these expériences [of objects] and is, on the contraryI, that which makes them possibleI."*** See Herein-Cogitoconcept as Descartes’ substance, Husserl’s phenomenalism, Heidegger’s disdain**** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-REVEALED-REVELATION [révélation-révélée];

BN: (lxiiic, Fr. 30) "1. That this elucidation of the meaningBNlived of beingI is validdial/lived only for the being[-there] of the phenomenonlived. Since the beingI of consciousness is radicallyontology different, its meaningI will necessitateBN a particular elucidation, in terms of the revealed-revelation of another type of beingI, being-for...";

(p. 85c) "[Heidegger’s] goal is itself to show it [Dasein] immediately as care; that is, as escaping itself in the project of self toward the possibilitiesI which it is. It is this projection of the selfI outside the selfI which he calls ‘comprehension’Fr=? and which permits him to establish human_reality as being a ‘revealing-revealed [revélante-révélée]’[Sartre uses révélation-révélée in sub-topic below]..."

11-15Onto VI. Being-in-itselfontology (BNlxii-lxvii)

Sartre, BN (p. lxii-lxiii, Fr. 29) "We can at the present give some precision to the phenomenonlivedR of being[-there], which we have considered in order to make the preceding observations. Consciousness is the revealed-revelation [révélation-révélée] of existentsR, and existentsI answer a summons before consciousness on the foundation of their being[-there]I. Nevertheless the primary characteristic of the being[-there] of an existentI

is never to disclose himself in person to consciousnesse... (BNp. lxiii) Consciousness can always surpass1negc the existentI, not toward its being[-there], but toward the meaningBNlived of this being-[there]. That is why we call it ontic-ontological**1, since a fundamental characteristic of its transcendencelived/1neg is to transcendI the ontic2neg toward the ontological1neg. The meaningBNI of the beingI of the existentI in so far as it disclosesI itself to consciousness is the phenomenonlivedc of beingI. This meaningI has itself a beingI, on the foundation of which it manifests itself.

sartre¶(BNp. lxiii, Fr. 29) "It is from this point_of_viewdouble connection of 1st&2neg that we can understandpositedok the

famous Scholastic argument according to which there is a vicious circle in every proposition which concerns being[-there] ok, since any judgment about being [1, below] already implies being [2]. But in fact there is no vicious circle, for it is not necessaryBNontology again to surpass1neg the beingok [1] of this meaningI toward its meaningI [2]; the meaningI of being is validdial/lived for the being[-there]ok

I of every phenomenonI, including its own being[-there]ok. The phenomenonI of being[-there] is not being[-there]I, as we have already noted.***1 But it indicates beingI and requires it—although, in truth, the ontologicalI proofR which we mentioned above is not validI especially or uniquely for it; there is one ontologicalI proof validI for the wholedial domain of consciousness. But this proof is sufficient to justify all the information which we can derive from the phenomenonI of being[-there]I. The phenomenonI of beingI, like every primary phenomenonI, is immediately disclosed to consciousness. We have at each instant what Heidegger calls a pre-ontologicalc comprehensionFr=? of it; that is, one which is not accompanied by a fixing in conceptsposited and elucidation. For us at present, then, there is no question of considering this phenomenonI for the sake of trying to fix the meaningI of beingI. We must observelived always:

(1) That this elucidation of the meaningI of beingI is validI only for the beingI of the phenomenonI. Since the beingI of consciousness is radicallyontology different [from the being of phenomenon], its meaningI will necessitateBN a particular elucidation, in terms of the revelation-revealed [révélation-révélée] of another type of beingI, being-for-itselfontology..."

(2) That the elucidation of the meaningI of being-in-itselfontology****1 which we are going to attempt here can be only provisional. The aspects which will be revealed imply other significations which ultimately we must grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] and further settle. In particular the preceding reflections have permitted us to distinguish two absolutelyontologyc separated regionsc

ok of beingI: the beingI of the pre-reflective [préréflexif] cogitolivedc and the beingI of the phenomenonlived... [on how we precede from here]"

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(BNp. lxvi, Fr. 32-3) "e...For being[-in-itself]ontology is the being[-there] of becoming and due to this fact it is beyond becoming. [Fr. 33] It is what it is. This signifies that by itself it [-in-itself]ontology can not even be what it is not [is and is notontology]; we have seen in effect that it can envelop no negation. [Fr. 33] It is full positivity*****1. It knowsFr=? no alteritylived; it never posits itself as other than another being. It can support no connectionok [of three degrees]1neg&2neg with the other. It is itself indefinitely and it exhausts itself in beingI. From this point of view we shall see later that it [-in-itself]ontology is not subject to temporalityBNlived. It is, and when it collapses, one can not even say that it no longer is. Or, at least, a consciousness can be conscious of it as no longer beingI, precisely because consciousness is temporalI. But being[-in-]itself does not exist as a lackdial/lived there where it was; the full positivity of being [-in-itself]ontology is re-formed on its collapsing. It was and at present otherI beings[-there] are: that is all.

[3] "Finally—this will be our third characteristic—being-in-itselfontology is. This means that being[-there] can neither be derived from the possibleI nor reduced to the necessaryBNlivedc. NecessityBNIc concerns the joining [liaison] between the ideal propositions but not that of existentsI. An existingI phenomenonI can never be derived from another existentI qua existentI. This is what we shall call the contingency of being-in-itselfontology. But neither can being-in-itselfontology be derived from a possibilityI. The possible is a structuredial of the for-itselfontology; that is, it belongs to the other regionIc of beingI. Being-in-itselfontology is never either possibleI or impossible. It is. That is what consciousness expresses in anthropomorphic terms by saying that being[-there] is superfluous de-trop—that is, consciousness absolutelyontology cannot derive beingI from anything, either from another beingI, or from a possibilityI , or from a necessaryBNlived law. Uncreated, without reason for beingI , without any connectionI

ok with another being[-there], being-in-itselfontology is de-trop for eternity.(BNp. lxvi-lxvii, Fr. 33) "Being is [inaccessibleconcept?]. Being is in-itselfontology. Being is what it is. These

are the three characteristics which the preliminary examination of the phenomenonI of being allows us to assign to the being of the phenomenaI. For the present it is impossible to push our investigation further. This is not yet the examination of the in-itselfontology—which is never anything but what it is—which will allow us to establish and to explain its relationsok [of three degrees]1st&2neg with the for-itselfontology. (BNp. lxvii) Thus we have left ‘apparitionsok’ and have been led progressively to posit two types of beingI, the in-itselfontology and the for-itselfontology, concerning which we have as yet only superficial and incomplete information. A multitude of questions remain unanswered: What is the ultimate meaningI of these two types of beingontology? For what reasons do they both belong to being[-there] in general? What is the meaningBN of that being[-there] which comprehends [comprend] within itself these two radicallyontology separated regions of beingontology? If idealism and realism both fail to explain the connection [rapport] [of three degrees]1neg&2neg which in fact unite these regionsI which in theory are without communication, what other solutions can we find for this problem? And how can the being[-there] of the phenomenonI be transphenomenal?

"It is to attempt to reply to these questions that I have written the present work."-------------------------------------------------

Barnes, "Sartre as Materialist" (p. 679) "...We may admit that what has been transformed is no longer in-itself; nevertheless, it does seem as if the in-itself has done something... [W]e can say that the emergence of for-itself from in-itself results from an activity which, if not originally purposive, results in the introduction of purpose. At the very least, we have Sartre’s own words... ‘The affirmation [of the in-itself] is like a passive ekstasis of the in-itself which leaves the in-itself unchanged yet is achieved in the in-itself and from the standpoint of the in-itself.’"

-------------------------------------------------**1 Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-ONTIC-ONTOLOGICAL ; only hit. Heidegger’s term.***1 Herein-Consciousness ‘is born supported by a being[-there] which is not consciousness’

-------------------------------------------------****1 Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-BEING-IN-ITSELF/IN-ITSELF ontology; cf. being-for-itselfontology, in-itself-for-itself; cf. phenomenonlived; See Being-in-itself concept capitalized , below; [‘being in-itself’ and ‘being in itself’ had hits; no hits on ‘Being in-itself’; ‘Being in itself’ had 1 hit].

BN: (above and before, p. lxvii) "...This is not yet the examination of the in-itselfontology—which is never anything but what it is—which will allow us to establish and to explain its relationsok [of three degrees]1st&2neg with the for-itselfontology [or being-for-others, below] ... these regionsI which in theory are without communication..." Note: this for-itselfI above can ontologically be either being-for-itselfontologyR or being-for-

13

Sartre: Ontology

othersontology. See Sartre\Phenomenology-RThe strict order of examining the body as ontologically being-for-itself before ontologically being-for-others, with BN (p. 305c) "...We cannot continue to confuse the ontologicalR levels, and we must in succession examine the body first as being-for-itselfontologyR and then as being-for-othersontologyR

e..."(p. 86c) "...the nature of the in-itselfontology, which is all positivity...";(p. 103c) "...the Egoconcept is in-itselfontology, not for-itselfontology...";(p. 171c) "...what is the original relation of human_reality to the being[-there] of phenomenon livedc

or being-in-itself ontology ? In the introduction we were obliged to reject bothok the realistR solution and the idealistR solution. It appeared to us at once that the transcendentlived/1neg being[-there]I could not act on consciousness and that consciousness could not ‘construct’ the transcendentI by objectivizing elements borrowed from its subjectivity. Consequently we concluded that the relationok [of three degrees]1st&2neg of the regions of beingI [for-itself and in-itself] is a primitive upsurge,’ we said, ‘and it forms a part of the very structuredial of these beingsI.’ The concreteI is discovereddial/lived by us as the synthetic_totalitylived of which consciousness, like the phenomenonIlived, constitutesBN only the articulations."

(p. 439c) "...For the for-itselfontology, to be is to nihilateI the in-itselfontology which it is..."(p. 485c) "...Actually freedomI is not a simple undetermined power. If it were, it would be

nothingness or in-itselfontology..."Herein-RFor-itselfontology and in-itselfontology are radicallyontology distinct modes of

being[there] (BN617-24), with (BNp, 617c) "...two radicallyontologyc distinct modes of being[-there]: that of the for-itselfontology which has to be what it is—i.e., which is what it is not and which is not what it is [is and is notontology]—and that of the in-itself ontology which is what it is...";

(p. 621c) "...The phenomenonI of in-itselfontology is an abstraction without consciousness but its being is not an abstractionI..."

CDR: R. D. Laing and D. G. Cooper, Reason and Violence (p. 16, no ce) "...being-for-itselfontology and being-in-itselfontology, the fundamental categories of BN, are absorbed into praxis and process."

(p. 45c) "The ontological status to which [imagination] lays claim by its very definition is that of the in-itselfontology, the inert...";

The Famiy Idiot : Sartre\Flaubert’s Neurosis-There ‘is no more specific problematic of human_reality’ than man as in-itselfontology

Other occurrences of the terms for-itself, in-itself, and in-itself-for-itself in lower-case are listed at for-itself.

-------------------------------------------------Being-in-itself/In-itself concept capitalized The War Dairies: (p. 180c) "...Thus the pure event which insures that Beingconcept

ok is its own nothingness makes the world appear [apparaître] as totalitydial/lived/2neg of the In-itselfok

concept surpassed1neg through being[-there] that nothingness itself1neg..."

BN: (p. 227c, Ftn. 68) "...the very structuredial/lived of action as the organization of the unorganized primarily relates the for-itselfontology to its alienatedc being[-there] as Being-in-itselfconcept..."

CDR: (p. 227c, Ftn. 68) "...For those who have read Being and Nothingness, I can describe the foundation of necessityCDRdial/lived as practice: it is the For-itselfconcept as agent, itself initially as inert or, at best, as practico-inert [totality]lived, in the milieu of the In-itselfconcept..."

-------------------------------------------------*****1 Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-POSITIVITY [positivité];

BN: (p. 21c) "...Between wholly positive realities (which however retain negation as the condition of the sharpness of their outlines, as that which fixes them as what they are) and those in which the positivity is only an appearanceFr=? concealing a hole of nothingness, all gradations are possibleI ...";

CDR: Search for a Method (p. 92c) "...In relation to the objectlived/2neg aimed at, praxis1neg is positivity, but this positivity opens onto the ‘non-existentc,’ to what has not yet been...";

The Family Idiot: (5:105c) "...A certain positivity is concealed in these authors by absolute_Negationconcept, which should be understoodposited

ok not as an activity but as a permanent attitude; and the objectI of that negation, rarely named, loser today, perhaps winner tomorrow, is the bourgeois..."

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12-15Onto The for-itselfontology (Index)Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-FOR-ITSELF /BEING-FOR-ITSELF ontology

BN (p. 150, Fr. 186) "The reflective [réflexive] is the for-itselfontology conscious of itself. As the for-itselfontology is already a non-theticlived consciousness of self..."

(p. 187-8c) "...The perception of white is the consciousness of the impossibility on principle for the for-itselfontology to exist as color—that is, by being[-there] what it is [is and is notontology]c... (p. 188) ...To say that a quality is a qualityI-beingI is not to endow it with a mysterious support analogous to substance; it is simply to observe that its mode of being[-there] is radicallyontology different from its mode of beingI ‘for-itselfontology.’ The beingI of whiteness or of sourness indeed could in no way be apprehended as ekstatic.";

Sartre\Phenomenology-RThe strict order of examining the body as ontologically being-for-itself before ontologically being-for-others, with BN (p. 305c) "...We cannot continue to confuse the ontologicalR levels, and we must in succession examine the body first as being-for-itselfontology and then as being-for-othersIontologyR

e...Herein-RFor-itselfontology and in-itselfontology are radicallyontology distinct modes of being[there], with

(BNp, 617c) "...two radicallyontologyc distinct modes of being[-there]: that of the for-itselfontology which has to be what it is—i.e., which is what it is not and which is not what it is [is and is notontology]—and that of the in-itselfontology which is what it is...";

Sartre\Temporality-RAs lived experience ‘facticity and past are the same thing’;Sartre\Phenomenology-RI. The Body as Being-For-Itselfontology: Facticitylived

The Family Idiot (1:141c) "...Even on the levelok of non-theticlivedc consciousness, intuition is conditioned by individualI history; the rotating twinning can include a refusal, an approval, a futile effort to crush the two terms [above/below, man/beast] in the unity of en-soi [in-itself]ontology. Gustave, even in that fundamental ‘pour-soi [for-itselfontology]c,’ labors under frustration, his presence_to self is the intuition of a lesser being[-there]..."

(2:109c) "...the absorption of the for-itselfontology by the in-itselfontology...";Sartre\Flaubert’s Personalization-RAutism;

-R[Barnes] Derealization and unrealization in Gustave and ‘Venus de Milo’;Sartre\Flaubert’s Neurosis-RThere ‘is no more specific problematic of human_reality’;R. D. Laing and D. G. Cooper: Reason and Violence (p. 16, no ce) "being-for-itselfontology and being-in-

itselfontology, the fundamental categories of BN, are absorbed into praxis and process [in CDR]."Robert Solomon: In the Spirit of Hegel, (p. 263) "Hegel plays fast and loose with the concepts ‘in itself’

and ‘for itself.’" On (p. 258) Solomon explores Hegel’s erratic use of the terms.Fredric Jameson Foreword to 2004 ed., CDR (p. xxii) "...the dualism ... of the pour-soi and the en-soi, to

which Merleau-Ponty objected, in his own effort to restore a phenomenological monism by way of the corps propre [their own body]..."

12-15Onto For-itselfontology and in-itselfontology are radicallyontology distinct modes of being[there] (BN617-24, out of sequence)

Sartre, BN (p. 617, Fr. 665, out of sequence from Sartre\Existentialism-Existential_psychoanalysis as moral description releasing meanings (BN Conclusion) "We are finally in a position to form conclusions. Already in the Introduction we discovereddial/lived consciousness as an appeal to being[-there], and we showed that the cogitolived refers immediately to a being-in-itselfontology which is the object of consciousness. But after our description of the in-itselfontology and the for-itselfontologyR, it had appearedlivedc difficult to establish a bond between them, and we feared that we might fall into an insurmountable dualism. This dualismI threatened us again in another way. In fact to the extent that it can be said of the for-itselfI that it is, we found ourselves confronting two radically**ontology distinctc modes of beingI: that of the for-itselfI which has to be what it is—i.e., which is what it is not and which is not what it is [is and is notontology]—and that of the in-itselfontology which is what it is. We asked then if the discoverydial of these two types of beingI had resulted in establishing an hiatus which would divide Beingposited/1negc

ok (as a general category belonging to all existents) into two incommunicable regionsok, in each one of which the notion of BeingI

ok must be taken in an original and singularok sense.(BNp. 617-8, Fr. 665) "Our research has enabled us to answer the first of these questions: the for-

itselfontology and the in-itselfontology are reunited by a syntheticdial/lived connection [of three degrees]1neg&2negFr=? which

is nothing other than the for-itselfI itself. The for-itselfI, in fact, is nothing but the pure nihilation of the in-

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itselfI; it is like a hole of beingI at the heart of Beingconceptok e... (BNp. 618) The for-itselfI is not nothingness in

general but a singularok privation; we constituteBN ourself as the privation of this being[-there]. Therefore we have no business asking about the way in which the for-itselfI can be united with the in-itselfI since the for-itselfI

is in no way an autonomous substance. As a nihilation it is made to be by the in-itselfI what it is not and consequently what it has to be. If the cogitolived necessarilyBNlived leads outside the self, if consciousness is a slippery slope on which one cannot take one’s stand without right away finding oneself tipped outside into being-in-itselfontology, this is because consciousness does not have by itself any sufficiency of beingI as an absolute subjectivity; from the start it refers to the thing.

"For consciousness there is no beingI except for this precise obligation to be a revealing intuitionlivedc of somethingce..."

(BNp. 621-2, Fr. 669) "It remains for us to consider the second problem which we formulated in our Introduction: If the in-itselfontology and the for-itselfontology are two modalities of beingI, is there not an hiatus at the very core of the idea of beingI? And is its comprehensionFr=? not severed into two incommunicable parts by the very fact that its extension is constitutedBN by two radically heterogenous classes? What is there in common between the beingI which is what it is, and the beingI which is what it is not and which is not what it is [is and is notontology]? What can help us here, however is the conclusion of our preceding inquiry. We have just shown in fact that the for-itselfI without the in-itselfI is a kind of abstraction; it could not exist any more than a color could existI without form or a sound without pitch and without timbre. A consciousness which would be a consciousness of nothing would be an absolute nothing. But if consciousness is bound to the in-itselfI by an internal_relationok*** [in a totality], doesn't this mean that it is articulated with the in-itselfI so as to constituteI a totalitydial/lived, and is it not this totalityI which would be given2neg the name being or reality****? Doubtless the for-itselfI is a nihilationI, but as a nihilationI it is; and it is in a priori unity with the in-itselfI

e... (BNp. 622) What definition indeed are we to give, in effect, to an existent which as in-itselfI would be what it is and as for-itselfI would be what it is not?R

(BNp. 622, Fr. 670) "If we wish to resolve these difficulties, we must take into account what is required of an existentI if it is to be considered as a totalityI: it is necessaryBNlived that the diversity of its structuresdial be held within a unitary synthesisdial/lived in such a way that each of them considered apart is only an abstractionI; but the in-itselfontology has no needdial/lived of the for-itselfI in order to be; the ‘passion of the for-itselfI only causeslived

ok there to be in-itselfI. The phenomenonlivedc of in-itselfI is an abstractionI without consciousness but its being is not an abstractionI.

(BNp. 622-3, Fr. 670) "If we wish to conceive of a syntheticdial/lived organization such that the for-itselfI is inseparable from the in-itselfI and conversely such that the in-itselfI is indissolubly bound to the for-itselfI, we must conceive of this synthesisI in such a way that the in-itselfI would receive its existence from the nihilationI which causedI

ok there to be consciousness of it. What does this mean if not that the indissoluble totalityI of in-itself-for-itself***** is conceivable only in the form of a beingI which is its own ‘self causeI

ok’e... Of course this ens causa sui is impossible, and the conceptposited of it, as we have seen, includes a contradictione... [of the for-itself’sontology] beingI its own selfI-cause. Thus we begin to grasp [transformsto] the nature of total reality. (BNp. 623) Total beingI e... this ideal beingI would be the in-itselfontology founded by the for-itselfontology and identicalontology with the for-itselfI which founds it—i.e., the ens causa suie..."

(BNp. 623, Fr. 671) sartre¶"e...It is this failureI which explains the hiatus which we encounter at once in the conceptI of beingI

ok and in the existentI. If it is impossible to pass from the notion of being-in-itselfontology to that of being-for-itselfontology and to reunite them in a common genus, this is because the passage in fact from the one to the other and their reuniting can not be effectede... [It] is like a decapitated notion in perpetual disintegration. And it is in the form of a disintegrated ensemble that it presents_to us itself in its ambiguity. There is here a passage which is not completed, a short circuit."

(BNp. 623-4, Fr. 671) "On this plane we find again that notionI of a detotalized_totalitydial/lived which we have already met in connection [of three degrees]1neg&2neg

Fr=? with the for-itselfontology and in connectionIFr=? with

the consciousnesses of others. But this is a third type of detotalizationdial. (BNp. 624) In the simply detotalized_totalityI of reflection [réflexion], the reflexive [réflexif] had to be reflected on [réfléchi], and the reflected on [réfléchi] to be the reflected [réflexif]. The double negation remained evanescent [i.e., could not be synthesized into an affirmation and remained a negation].****** In the case of the for-othersontology the (reflection-reflecting) [reflet]-[reflétant] reflected_on [reflet] was distinguished from the (reflection-reflecting)

16

Sartre: Ontology

[reflet]-[reflétant] reflecting [reflétant] in that each one had to not-be the other. Thus the for-itselfontology and the-other-for-itselfI constitutesBN a being[-there] in which each one confers the being-other on the otherI by making himself otherI. As for the totalityI of the for-itselfI and the in-itselfontology, this has for its characteristic the fact that the for-itselfI makes itself other in connection [rapport] [of three degrees]1st&2neg to the in-itselfI, but that the in-itselfI is in no way other than the for-itselfI in its being[-there]; the in-itselfI purely and simply is. If the connection [rapport] [of three degrees]1st&2neg of the in-itselfI to the for-itselfI were the reciprocallivedc of the connection [rapport] of the for-itselfI to the in-itselfI, we should fall into the case of being-for-othersontologyc

e..."-------------------------------------------------

** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-RADICAL ontology [radical]; ontological;The Psychology of Imagination (p. 10c) "...This is the reasonI we can never perceivelivedc a thought nor

think a perceptionlivedc. The two phenomenalived are radicallyontology distinct: the one [perceiveI or thinkI] is knowledge [savoir] which is conscious of itself and which places itself at once at the center of the objectI; the other [thoughtI or perceptionI] is a syntheticdial/lived unity of a multiplicity of appearances, which slowly serves its apprenticeship."

BN: (p, 617c) "...two radicallyontology distinct modes of beingI: that of the for-itselfontology which has to be what it is—i.e., which is what it is not and which is not what it is [is and is notontology]—and that of the in-itselfontology which is what it is...";

CDR (p. 45c) "...A totalitydial/lived, is defined as a being[-there] which, while radically ontology distinct from the sum of its partsdial/livedc, is present in its entirety, in one form or another, in each of these partsI..."

(p. 223c, Fr. 332) "This shows that the first practical expérience of necessityCDRdial/lived occurs in the unconstrained activity of the individual to the extent that the final result, though conforming to the one anticipated, also reveals itself at the same time as radicallyontology other, in that it has never been the objectI of an intention on the part of the agente..."

The Family Idiot (4:315, Fr. 2:2092) "But who knows what is worst: [1] the radical ontology impotence of a dammed species to which Flaubert belongs, or [2] a diabolical Providence that has given2negc him the ambitions of genius while paralyzing his imagination in order to keep him in the realmFr=? of mediocrity?..."

(5:131c) "...he writes to detach himself from his class, the object of his radical ontology contempt, and he demands, directly or indirectly, that this classI grant social status, glory, to this detachment."

-------------------------------------------------*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-INTERNAL_RELATIONS dial/lived [relations interne]; within a totalitydial/lived; all hits listed below; cf. internal_connectiondial/lived

ok [of interior structures of consciousness];Of language

CDR: (p. 99c) "...From this point_of_viewdouble connection of 1st&2neg, the totalitydial/lived of language as an ensemble of internal _relations dial/lived

ok [in a totality] between objective senses is given2neg for and to everyone; words are simply specifications manifesting themselves against the backgroundok of language..."

Of past lived , present , and future [futur] BN: (p. 113c) "Therefore if we study the relations of the pastI to the presentI in terms of the pastI

[positivism], we shall never establish internal_relationsdial/livedok [in a totality] between them...";

(p. 136c, of temporalBNlived) "...Only a being[-there] of a certain structuredial of beingI can be temporalI in the unity of its beingI. The before and after are intelligible, as we have observedlived, only as an internal_relationdial/lived

ok [in a totality]..."; CDR: (p. 92c) "...he [the worker] can only comprehendok himself in his acts, and in hislived/1neg

connectionoklived&posited as 1neg&2neg [of three degrees] to Natureposited/2neg (and indeed, as we shall see, in hislived/1neg

connectionoklived&lived [of three degrees] with otherslived/2neg) if he[1] interprets every partialdial totalitydial/lived in

terms of the overall totalizationdial/lived, and [2, interprets] all their internal_relationsok [in a totality] in terms of their relationsok [of three degrees]1st&2neg to the developing unification, the means in terms of the end and the present in terms of the connectionok

1neg&2neg [of three degrees] which links the future [futur] to the pastlived..."Of knowledge [connaissance]

BN: (p. 151c) "...how can two completely isolated independents, provided with that sufficiency of being[-there] which the Germans call Selbstndigkeit**** enter into relation with each other, and in

17

Sartre: Ontology

particular how can they enter into that type of internal_relation dial/lived ok [in a totality] which we call knowledge [connaissance]?...";

Of groups CDRII: (p. 54-5c) "...In fact, the development of common_praxis has created this

indetermination, by introducing unforeseen changes into internal relationsdial/livedok. For example, the two bodies

[groups] clash because e... neither had the means to carry out its activity on the terrain on which the otherok was operating... (p. 55) This means, for example, that the historian, in order to bring the indetermination to light, will have only to compare the objective meaningCDRlived of the event with the organizational or institutional definition of the functions. Yet this indetermination—although it is an objectiveI character of the group’s internal relationsok, inasmuch as they are entirely under the sway of its actions..."

-------------------------------------------------Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-REAL [reality, ly, istic, not realize]

BN: (p. lc, roman numeral) "...since we have restricted reality to the phenomenonlived...";(p. 320c) "...It is impossible to distinguish ‘sensationc’ from ‘action’ even if we use the terms of

classical psychology: this is what we had in mind when we made the observation that reality is presented to us neither as a thing nor as an instrument but as an instrumentalI-thing. This is why for our study of the body as a center of action we shall be able to take as a guiding thread the reasoning which has served us to reveal the truelived nature of the senses.";

Search for a Method: (p. 12c) "...Kierkegaard was perhaps the first to point out, against Hegel and thanks to him, the incommensurability of the real and Knowledge [Savoir]concept..."

CDR: (p. 19c) "...But there is a general, formalposited principle; that there are strict relations [of three degrees]1neg&2neg between facts. This means: the reallived/2neg is rationallived/1neg...";

-------------------------------------------------***** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-IN-ITSELF-FOR-ITSELF ; cf. circuit_of_selfnessontology&lived

BN: "...By reflection [réflexive] the for-itselfI, which has lost itself outside itself, attempts to put itself inside its own being[-there]I. Reflexion [réflexion]livedc is a second effort by the for-itselfontology to found itself; that is, to be for itself what it is [is and is notontology]. Indeed if the quasi-duality the reflection-reflecting [reflet]-[reflétant] were gathered up into a totalitydial for a witness which would be itself, it would be in its own eyes what it is. The goal in short is to overtake that being[-there]I which flees itself while being[-there]I what it is in the mode of non-being and which flows on while being[-there]I its own flowI, which escapes between its own fingers. The goal of it is to make itself a given2neg, a givenI which finally is what it ise..."

Being-there-Reflected-on [réfléchi] as an appearance for reflective [réflexif] as witness (of) itself: reflective witness (of) reflected-onI as appearanceI to itself (BN 151-4, 174, 239, 298, 340)

Herein-RSartre’s ‘first condition of all reflection is a pre-reflective cogito’The Family Idiot: (2:109c) "...the absorption of the for-itself ontology by the in-itself ontology ..."

Hazel Barnes, Sartre and Flaubert: (p. 105c) "...the statue represents symbolically the unattainable in-itself-for-itself, which every consciousness vainly tries to achieve, which—if it existed —would be an absoluteness of being accompanied by the awareness of freedom and psychic withdrawal...";

Capitalized 1 hit: Sartre\Freedom-RSelf-alienation as extent of demand for other’s alienation, with, "...man project himself in the milieu of the In-itself-For-itselfconcept

ok;-------------------------------------------------

****** BN (p. 284c) "...at the time of the perception of the this in the world, consciousness differed from the this not only by its own individualityI but also in its mode of being[-there]I. It was for-itselfontology confronting the in-itselfontology. In the upsurge of the other, however, consciousness is in no way different from the otherI so far as its mode of beingI is concerned. The otherI is what consciousness ise... The otherI exists for consciousness only as a refused self..."

12-15Onto For-itself’sontology becoming specifically not in-itselfontology (BN177, out of sequence)Sartre, BN (p. 177, Fr. 213) sartre¶"The for itself is outside itself in the in-itselfontology since it causeslived

ok itself to be defined by what it is not; the first bond between the in-itselfI and the for-itselfontologyR is therefore a bond of being[-there]. But this bond is neither a lackdial/lived nor an absenceR1. In the case of absence indeed I make myself determineddial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] by a beingI which I am not and which does not

18

Sartre: Ontology

exist or which is not there; that is, what determines [‘that is, as limitation’] me is like a hollow in the middle of what I shall call my empirical plenitude. On the contraryok, in knowledge [connaissance], taken as a bond of ontological beingsI, the beingI which I am not represents the absoluteontology plenitude of the in-itselfontology. And I, on the contrary, am the nothingness, the absenceR2 which determinesI itself in existence from the standpoint of this fullness. This means that in that type of beingI which we call knowing [connaître], the only being[-there] which can be encountered and which is perpetually there is the known [connu]. The knower [connaissance] is not; he is not graspable [transformableto] e..."

"A psychological and empirical exemplification of this original relationok [of three degrees]1st&2neg is furnished us in the case of fascination. [continued same paragraph at Sartre\The Emotions-Fascination toward the other]

-------------------------------------------------See Sartre\Temporality-Consciousness’ negativeI bond of interiority deniesI being[-there] that beingI to which it is presentI

Herein-Consciousness ‘is born supported by a being which is not consciousness’, with references.Ref Herein-Reflected-on [réfléchi] as an appearance for reflective [réflexif] as witness (of) itself: reflectiveI witness (of) reflected-onI as appearanceI to itself (BN 151-4, 174, 239, 298, 340, inaccessible 2&1/2 pages), with BN (p. 151c) "...We have already discovereddial/lived this ontological structuredial at the heart of the for-itself [in this sub-topic]. But then it did not have at all the same meaningBNlived..."

12-15Onto BN: Part Two, Chapter One, Immediate Structuresdial of the For-Itselfontology (BN73-105) 11-15Onto Sartre’s cogitolived, ontological or concept

Ref Sartre\Index of Terms- cogitolived, ontological or concept; see cogito ontological , cogito concept below.cogitolived

BN: (p. liiic) It is not reflexion [réflexive] which reveals the consciousness reflecting [réfléchie] to itself. Quite the contraryok, it is the non-reflectivec [non-réflexifs] consciousness which renders the reflection [réflexive] possibleI ; there is a pre-reflective [préréflexif] cogitolived which is the condition of the Cartesian cogitolived..."

(p. 24c) "...cogitolived in the Cartesian sense of the discoverydial/lived of consciousness by itself...";(p. 103c, implies the cogito) "...the pure presence_to itself of the pre-reflective [préréflexif]

cogitolived—in the sense that the possible which I am is not pure presence_toI the for-itself as reflection [reflet] to reflecting [reflétant] but that it is absent-presence. Due to this fact the existence of reference as a structuredial of being[-there] in the for-itselfI is still more clearly marked. The for-itselfI is itself over there, beyond its reach, in the far reaches of its possibilitiesI...";

-------------------------------------------------cogitoontology

BN (p. 244c) "...the sole point of departure is the interiority of the cogitoontology. We must understandposited

ok by this that each one must be able by starting out from their own interiorityI, to rediscoverdial/lived the other beingI as a transcendence**3 which conditions the very beingI of that interiorityI...";

Sartre\The Other-RConclusion to III: Discoverydial/lived of oneself and others in the cogitoontology: conditions under which a theory of the existenceI of othersontologyok can be validdial/lived, with BN (p. 250c) "...If the others existence is a necessityBNlived, it is a ‘contingent necessityI;’ that is, it is of the same type of factual_necessityontology which is imposed on the cogitoontology. If the otherI is capable of being[-there]1neg given2neg

to us, it is by means of a direct apprehensionontologyc which leaves to the encounter its character as facticitylived..."(p. 251c) "...The cogitoontology examined once again, must throw me outside it and onto the other,

just as it threw me outside upon the in-itselfontology; and not by revealing to me an a priori structuredial of myself which would point toward an equally a priori other, but by disclosing the concrete, indubitable presence_to me of a such or such concreteI other, just as it has already revealed to me my own incomparable, contingent but necessaryBNlived, and concreteI existence...";

Sartre\The Other-RBeing-seen ‘constitutesBN me as defenseless’ for an_other’sontology/1neg freedom, with BN (p. 268c) "...we must note that this description has been worked out entirely on the level of

19

Sartre: Ontology

the cogitoontology

(p. 273c) "...Just as my consciousness grasped [transformstoontology/1neg] by the cogitoontology bears indubitable witness of itself and of its own existence, so certain particular consciousnesses—for example, ‘shame-consciousness’—bear indubitable witness to the cogitoontology both of themselves and of the existenceI of the otherontology/1neg, indubitably.";

Notebooks for an Ethics: (p. 301c) "As for the world, it is stolen from me since events have their key outside of me...[M]y cogitoontology grasps [transformsontology/1negtoontology/2neg] itself as absoluteontology truthlived and as an epiphenomenon, I am existence and I have a nature whose secret is in an_other’sontology/1neg hands...";

-------------------------------------------------cogito concept BN: (p. 260c) "But, all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is lookingontology/1neg at

meontology/2neg! What does this have to say? It means that I am suddenly affected through my beingI and that essential modifications [e.g., embarrassment] appear [appairaissent] in my structuredial—modifications which I can grasp [transformstoconcept/1neg] and fix conceptuallyconcept through the reflective [réflexive]concept cogitoconcept.

Cogito concept capitalized Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 43-4c) Sartre\Being-there-B. The Cogitoconcept (TE43-4)

(p. 44-5c, Fr. 27-8) "But it must be remembered that all the writers who have descried the Cogito concept / 1neg have dealt with it as a reflective [réflexive] operationconceptc, that is to say, as an operationI of the second_degree. Such a Cogito concept is performed by a consciousnesslived/2neg directed upon consciousnessconcept, a consciousness which takes consciousness as an objectconcept/1neg.

-------------------------------------------------**3 See Sartre\The Other-Other-as-objectposited and other-as-subjectlived: Iontology/1neg make him to lose himselfontology/2neg in the world as heontology/1neg is the one who I have to not beontology/2neg (BN291)

1-16Onto Descartes [1595-1650] (index)Archives\Wittgenstein-RNo private language critiques of cogito, solipsism, and phenomenalismFoucault\Subjectivity&Problemization-RAccedence as methods of conformity and transformation

-Classical age subjects as constitutedBN by Descartes’ and Kant’s practices of the selfHerein-RCogitoconcept as Descartes’ substance, Husserl’s phenomenalism, Heidegger’s disdainSartre\Index of Terms-DESCARTES Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy, posthumously published in 1641, Meditations One on "the

evil genius" and Two on "self as mind" printed in, Cahoone’s anthology, From Modernism to Postmodernism, (p. 29-40)

Sartre, BN (lvc) "...The ontological error of Cartesian rationalism is not to have seen that if the absoluteontology is defined by the primacy of existence_over_essencec, it cannot be conceived as a substance..."(p. 24c) "...the human_reality which is revealed to him and for which he seeks to fix the structuresdial in concepts is his own. He writes, ‘Dasein ist je meines [for gosh sakes, its mine!].’..."

Search for a Method: (p, 3, Ftn. 1c) "...Cartesianism illuminates the period and Situates Descartes within the totalitarian development of analytical_Reason; in these terms, Descartes, taken as a person and as a philosopher, clarifies the historical (hence the singularok) meaningCDRlived of the new rationality up to the middle of the eighteenth century."

2-16Onto Cogitoconcept as Descartes’ substance, Husserl’s phenomenalism, Heidegger’s ‘trap for larks’ (BN73)12-08Onto I. PresenceI to SelfI (BN73)Ref Sartre\Being-there-Reflective [réfléchi] as an appearance for reflective [réflexif] as witness (of) itself: reflective witness (of) reflected-on [reflété] as appearanceI to itself (BN 151-4, 174, 239, 298, 340)

Sartre, BN (p. 73, Fr. 109) "Negation has referred us to freedomBN, freedomI to bad faith, and bad faithI to the being[-there] of consciousness, which is the requisite condition for the possibilityontology of bad faithI. In

20

Sartre: Ontology

the light of requirements which we have established in the preceding chapters, we must now resume the description which we attempted in the Introduction of this work. that is, we must return to the terrain [terrain] of the pre-reflective [préréflexif] cogitolived.

(p. 73-4, Fr. 109, my paragraph break) sartre¶Now the cogito never gives out anything other than what we ask of it. DescartesR questioned it concerning its functional aspect ‘I doubt, II think’ and because he wished to pass without a conducting thread from this functional aspect to existential dialectic, he fell into the error of substance. HusserlR1, warned by this error, remained timidly on the plane of functional description. Due to this fact he never surpasses1neg the pure description of the appearance as such; he has shut himself up inside the cogitoconcept and deserves—in spite of his denial—to be called a phenomenalist** rather than a phenomenologist. His phenomenalism at every momentI borders on Kantian idealism. Heidegger wishing to avoid that descriptive phenomenalism which leads to the Megarian*** antidialectic isolation of essences, begins with the existentialI analytic without going through the cogito. But since the Dasein has from the start been deprived of the dimension of consciousness, it can never regain this dimension. Heidegger endows human_reality with a comprehensionok of self which he defines as an ‘ekstatic pro-ject’ of its own possibilitiesI . It certainly is not my intention to deny [nier] the existence of this project. But how could there be an comprehensionI

ok which would not in itself be the consciousness (of) comprehensionok? [Fr. 110] This ekstatic character of human_realityI will lapse into a thing-like, blind in-itselfontology unless it arises from the consciousness of ekstasisI. In truth the cogito must be our point of departure, but we can say of it, parodying a famous saying, that it leads us only on condition that we get out of it. (BNp. 74) Our preceding study, which concerned the conditions for the possibilityontology of certain types of conduct, had as its goal only to place us in a position to question the cogitoI about its being[-there] and to furnish us with the dialectic instrumentsposited which would enable us to find in the cogitoI

ok itself the means of escaping from instaneity toward the totalitydial/lived of beingIok which constitutesBN

human_reality. Let us return now to a description of non-theticlived consciousness of selfI; let us examine its results and ask what it means for consciousness that it must necessarilyBNontology be what it is not and not be what it is [is and is notontology]." [continued-9]

Heidegger, Being and Time (H. 24) "e...With the ‘cogito sum’ Descartes had claimed that he was putting philosophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined when he began in this ‘radical’ way, was the kind of Being which belongs to the res cogitans [below, ‘the thing which cognizes’], or—more precisely—the meaning of the Being of ’sum’[I am]e... Descartes e... came to suppose that the absolute ‘Being-certain’ (‘Gewisssein’) of the cogito exempted him from raising the question of the meaning of the Being which the entity [I am] possesses. Copied Phenomenology-There ‘must be an immediate, non-cognitive connectionlived&lived of the self to itself’

"Yet Descartes not only continued to neglect this and thus to accept a completely indefinite ontological status for the res cogitans e... ‘the thing which cognizes, whether it be a mind or spirit’: he regarded this entity as a fundamentum inconcussum, and applied the medieval ontology to it in carrying through the fundamental considerations of his Meditationes. He defined the res cogitans ontologically as an ens; and in the medieval ontology the meaning of Being for such an ens had been fixed by understanding it as an ens creatum. God, as ens infinitume..." [Heidegger’s capitalized Being is ontological.]

Sartre, BN (p. 85, Fr. 121, out of sequence from Herein-III. The For-Itself and the Being of Value) "e...And it is indeed true that with Descartes the cogitoconcept is an instantaneous totalitydial/lived, since by itself it makes no claim on the future [avenir] and since an act of continuous ‘creation’ is necessaryBNlived to make it pass from one instantI to another. But can we even conceive of the truthI of an instant? Does the cogitolived not in its own way engage both the pastlived and the future [avenir]? Heidegger is so persuaded that the ‘I think [Je pense]concept’ of HusserlIR2 is a trap for larks, fascinating and ensnaring, that he has completely avoided any appeal to consciousness in his description of Dasein. His goal is to show it immediately as care; that is, as escaping itself in the projectI of selfI toward the possibilitiesI which it is. It is this projection of the selfI outside the selfI which he calls ‘comprehensionok’ and which permits him to establish human_reality as being a ‘revealing-revealed*****.’ But this attempt to show first the escape from self of the DaseinI is going to encounter in turn insurmountable difficulties; we cannot first suppress the dimension ‘consciousness,’ not even if it is in order to reestablish it subsequently. ComprehensionI

ok has meaningBNlived only if it is consciousness of comprehensionI

ok. My possibility can exist as my possibilityI only if it is my consciousness which escapes itself toward my possibilityI. Otherwise the wholedial system of beingI and its possibilitiesI will fall into the

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unconscious—that is into the in-itselfontology. Behold, we are thrown back again towards the cogito. We must make this our point of departure. Can we extend it without losing the benefits of reflectiveFr=? evidencedial/lived? What has the description of the for-itselfontology revealed to us?" [continued]

(BNp. 84) "...the for-itself is conscious of its facticitylived. It has the feeling of its complete gratuity; it apprehendslived itself as beingI there for nothing, as beingI de trop."

(BNp. 85, Fr. 121, continuing) "The for-itselfI can not sustain nihilation without determiningdial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] itself as a lackdial/lived of beingI. This signifies that the nihilationI does not coincide with a simple introduction of emptiness into consciousness. An exterior beingI has not expelled the in-itselfontology from consciousness; rather the for-itselfI is perpetually determiningdial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] itself not to be the in-itselfI. This means that it can establish itself only in terms of the in-itselfI and against the in-itselfI. Thus since the nihilationI is the nihilationI of beingI, it represents the original connection [of three degrees]as 1neg&2neg

Fr=?

between the beingI of the for-itselfI and the being of the in-itselfI. The cogitolived must necessarilyBNontology lead us to discoverdial/lived this total, out-of-reach presence of the in-itselfI. Of course the fact of this presence will be the very transcendencelived/1neg of the for-itselfI. But it is precisely the nihilationI which is the origin of transcendenceI conceived as the original bond between the for-itselfI and the in-itselfI. Thus we catch a glimpse of a way of getting out of the cogitoI. We shall see later indeed that the profound meaningBNI

ok of the cogitoIok is

essentially to refer outside itself. But it is not yet time to describe this characteristic of the for-itselfI [continued same paragraph at Sartre\Negation-Lack]

-------------------------------------------------Ref Herein-Consciousness ‘is born supported by abeing[-there] which is not consciousness’, critiquing Husserl.** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-PHENOMENALISM ; cf. epiphenomenalism;

The Emotions: Peter Caws: Sartre (p. 64) "...The error of the phenomenalists, [Sartre] says, was that ‘having justifiably

reduced the object to the connected series of its appearances, they believed they had reduced its being to the succession of its modes of being (BN lx)’; the modes can be relative and passive, since these terms ‘designate relations between a plurality of already existing beings’, but they cannot do justice to the being of the object in itself."*** Dict: "...Socratic school of philosophy founded by Euclid and Megara and noted for its subtle attention to logic."**** See revealed-revelation for differences in Sartre’s terms.

2-16Onto Sartre’s ‘first condition of all reflection [réflexivité] is a pre-reflectiveI cogito’ (BN74-79)Sartre, BN (p. 74, Fr. 110, repeating last sentence) "...Let us return now to a description of non-theticlived

consciousness of selfI; let us examine its results and ask what it means for consciousness that it must necessarilyBN be what it is not and not be what it is [is and is notontology]."

[continuing-9] "The being[-there] of consciousness, we said in the Introduction, is a beingI such that in its beingI, its beingI is in question. This means that the beingI of consciousness does not coincide with itself in a full equivalence. Such equivalence which is that of the in-itselfontology is expressed by this simple formula: beingI

is what it is..."(BNp. 74-5, Fr. 110) Ins3-13"The distinguishing characteristic of consciousness, on the contrary [to the in-

itselfI], is that it is a decompression of being[-there]. It is impossible in effect to define it as coincidence with self. Of this table I can say only that it is purely and simply this table. But of my belieflivedR I do not mark out boundariesposited saying what is beliefI; my beliefI is consciousness (of) beliefI.**a It is often said that the act of reflection [réflexif] alters the fact of consciousness [belief] on which it is directed . Husserl himself admits that the factI ‘of being seen [looked at by othersontology/2neg]’ involves a total modification for each Erlebnislived. The first condition of all reflexiveness [réflexivité] is a pre-reflectiveR [préréflexif] cogitolived. This cogitoI, to be sure, does not posit an object; it remains within consciousness. But it is nonetheless homologous with the reflective [réflexif]posited above cogito since it [the cogitoposited] appears [apparaît] as the first necessityBNontology for unreflective [irréfléchi] consciousnesslived to be seen by itself [through third_degree consciousness]. Originally then the cogitolived includes this nullifying characteristic of existing for a witnessposited, although the witness for which consciousness existsI is itself. Thus by the sole fact that my beliefIlivedc is apprehended as beliefI, it is no longer only beliefI; that is, it is already no longer beliefI, it is troubled beliefposited. (BNp. 75) Thus the ontological

22

Sartre: Ontology

judgment ‘beliefI is consciousness (of) beliefI’**b can under no circumstances be taken as a statement of identity; the subject [belieflived] and the attribute [troubled beliefposited] are radicallyontology different though still within the indissoluble unity of one and the same being[-there]."

(BNp. 78, Fr. 114) sartre¶"The separationI which separates beliefIlived from itself cannot be grasped or even conceived in isolation. If we seek to revealconcept it, it vanishes... Distanceontology

ok, lapse of time, psychological difference can be apprehended in themselves and include as such elements of positivity; they have a simple negative function. But the fissure*** within consciousness [intraconscientielle] is a nothing except for the fact that it denies and can have being[-there] only as we do not see it."

(BNp. 78-9) "Hence we comprehendok how it was that by interrogating the pre-reflectiveI [préréflexif] cogito without any conducting thread, we could not find nothingnessR anywhere. One does not find, one does not disclose nothingnessI in the manner in which one can find, disclose a beingI. NothingnessI is always an elsewhere. It is the obligation for the for-itself never to exist except in the form of an elsewhere in connection [rapport] [of three degrees]lived&lived as 1neg&2neg to itself, to existI as a being[-there]lived/1neg which perpetually effects in itself a break in being[-there]lived/2neg [as is and is notontology]. This break does not refer us elsewhere to another beingI: it is only a perpetual reference of self to self [as is and is notontology], of reflection [reflet] to the reflecting [reflétant], of the reflecting [reflétant] to the reflection [reflet]. This reference, however does not provoke an infinite movementdial in the heart of the for-itselfI but is given2neg within the unity of a single actlived.**** The infinite movementdial belongs only to the reflective [réflexif] regard which wants to grasp [transformslive to lived] [saisir] the phenomenonlived as a totality and which is referred from the reflection [reflet] to the reflecting [reflétant], from the reflecting [reflétant] to the reflection [reflet] without beingI able to stop.***** Thus nothingness is this hole of beingI, this fall of the in-itselfontology toward the selfI [soi], the fall by which the for-itselfI is constitutedBN. (BNp. 79) But this nothingnessI can only ‘be-made-to-be’ if its borrowed existence is correlative with a nihilating actI on the partI of being[-there] [as is and is notontology]. This perpetual actI by which the in-itselfI degenerates into presence_to itself we shall call an ontologicalI actI. NothingnessI is the putting into question of beingI by beingI—that is, precisely consciousness or for-itselfI. It is an absolute event which comes to beingI by means of being[-there]I and which without having being[-there], is perpetually sustained by being[-there]I

e..."-------------------------------------------------

**a&b Copied Herein-consciousness_is_consciousness_(of)_something*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-FISSURE [fissure, 3 hits on fission];

BN: (p. 29c, Fr. 327) "The first ekstasisc is indeed the tri-dimensional [past, present, future] projection [projet] on the part of the for-itself toward a being[-there] which it has to be in the mode of not-being[-there]I. It represents the first fissure, the nihilationI which the for-itselfI has to be, the wrenching away on the partI of the for-itselfI from everything which it is, and this wrenching away is constitutiveBN of its beingI..."

The Family Idiot: (1:138c, Fr. 145) "This example sufficiently demonstrates that for the animal, culture, at first a simple ambience, an ignored lacuna, becomes under the guise of training the pure negation in itself of animality. It is a fissure=[fission] that leads the beast both above and below his familiar level, raising him toward an impossible comprehensionFr=? just when his misplaced intelligenceI is collapsing in a daze..."

(1:140c) Nevertheless the shattered but indissoluble unity of the reflecting [reflétant] and the reflected-on [reflet]livedc manifests a simple ontological fissure=[fission]..."

(1:142c) This hostility to himself is only a secondary traitok; it cannot be very strong since the hated_self can never entirely be an object for the self_that_hatesposited. Nevertheless, this hostility is constant and it is the relationok [of three degrees]1st&2neg that is found in the non-theticlived fissure of immediate (presence_to self)...";

-------------------------------------------------***** See Herein-in-itself-for-itselflivedR

2-16Onto Husserl’s necessity of fact supports Sartre’s cogitoI (BN282, out of sequence)Sartre, BN (p. 282, Fr. 322) "e...What the cogitoontology reveals to us here is just necessity of fact [factual

necessity]ontology**: it is found—and this is indisputable—that our being[-there] along with its being-for-itselfontology is also for-others; the beingI which is revealedI to the reflective [réflexive] consciousness is [being]-for-itselfI-for-others. The Cartesian cogitoconcept only makes an affirmationdial of the absoluteontologyc truthlived of

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the fact of my existence. In the same way the cogitoontology, a little expanded as we are using it here, reveals to us as a factI the existenceI of the otherontology/1neg and my existenceontology/2neg for the otherI.*** That is all we can saye..." Ref Herein-Cogito as Descartes’ substance, Husserl’s phenomenalism, Heidegger’s trap for larks

-------------------------------------------------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-FACTUAL_NECESSITY ontology [nécessité du fait]; ; cf. fact, facticitylived; ascribed to Husserl’s Ideen I, Sec. 46;

BN: (p. 250c) "...If the other’s existence is a necessityBNlived, it is a ‘contingent necessityI;’ that is, it is of the same type of factual_necessityontology which is imposed on the cogitoontology. If the other is capable of beingI given2neg to us, it is by means of a direct apprehensionlivedc which leaves to the encounter its character as facticitylived..."; Sartre\Freedom-RCauseposited, motivelived, act, and end as simultaneous in for-itself’s transcendencelived/1neg;

Search for a Method: (p. 164c) "...Material [conditions] impose their factual_necessityontology [on praxis]."

2-16Onto II. The Facticitylived of the For-Itselfontology (BN79-84)

Page 83 out of sequence at Sartre\Temporality-As lived experience ‘facticity and past indicate the same thing’

2-16Onto III. The For-Itselfontology and the Being[-there] of Value (BN84-95)

Page 85 out of sequence at Herein-Cogito as Descartes’ substance, Husserl’s phenomenalism, Heidegger’s disdain

Pages 86-7 out of sequence at Sartre\Negation-Lack with two sub-topics

Page 87, out of sequence at Sartre\Emotions-Sartre’s experimental phenomenologyposited vs. epiphenomenalI psychology

Page 92, out of sequence at Sartre\Bad Faith-Sadness as intentional, not constitutiveBN modality

Page 94-5, Ftn. 12, out of sequence at Sartre\Negation-Hegel ‘opposes being to nothingness as thesis and antithesis’ at the same time

Page 95, out of sequence at Sartre\Lifework-valuelived

2-16Onto IV. The For-Itselfontology and the Being[-there] of Possibilities (BN95-102)Sartre, BN (p. 101, Fr. 137) "Every consciousness lacksdial/lived something for something. But it must be

understoodposited that the lackI does not come to it from without as in the case of the crescent moon as related to the full moon.** The lackI of the for-itselflontology is a lackI which it is. The outline of a presence_to-itselflived as that which is lackingI to the for-itselfI is what constitutesBN the being[-there] of the for-itselfI as the foundation of its own nothingnesslived. The possible*** is an absence constitutiveI of consciousness in so far as consciousness itself makes itself. Thirst—for example—is never sufficiently thirst inasmuch as it makes itself thirst; it is haunted by the presence_tolived the self of thirst-itself. But in so far as it is haunted by this concrete valuelived, it puts itself in question in its beingI as lackingI a certain for-itself which would realizelived it as satisfied thirst and which would confer on it being-in-itselfontology. This lackingI for-itselfI is the Possibleconcept

e..."(BNp. 101-2, Fr. 138) "e...Thus Epicurus is right and wrong at the same time; in itself indeed desirelivedR is

an emptiness. But no unreflective [irréfléchi] project aims simply at suppressing this void. DesireI by itself tends to perpetuate itself; man clings ferociously to his desiree... Hence the constant disappointment which accompanies repletion, the famous: ‘Is it only this?’**** which is not directed at the concrete pleasurelived which satisfaction gives but at the evanescence of the coincidence with selfI. (p. 102) Thereby we catch a glimpse of the origin of temporalityBNlivedR since thirst is its possible at the same time that it is not its possible. This nothingnesslived which separates human_realitylived from itself is at the origin of timee..."

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(BNp. 102, Fr. 139) "We are now in a position to elucidate the modeok of beingI of the possible. The possible is that of which the for-itself lacksI in order to be itself. Consequently it is not proper to say that it is in so far as possible—unless by beingI we are to understandFr=? the beingI of an existent which ‘is made-to-be’ insofar as it is made-not-to-be, or if you prefer, the apparition at a distanceontology of that which I am. The possible does not exist as a pure representation, not even as a deniedok one, but as a real lackI of beingI which, qua lackI, is beyond being[-there] e... Naturally it is not at first thematically posited; it is outlined beyond the worldlived and gives my present perceptionlived its meaningBNlived as this is grasped [transformslivedtolived]as 1neg&2neg in the worldlived/2neg in the circuit_of_selfnesslived/1neg. But neither is it ignored or unconscious; it outlines the limits of the non-theticlivedR consciousness (of) selfI to its degree as a non-theticI consciousness. The unreflective [irréfléchi] consciousness (of) thirst is grasped [transformslivedtolived]as 1neg&2neg by means of the glass of water2neg as desirablelived/1neg, without positioningposited the selfI in the centripetal position as the end of the desireI. But the possible repletion [of the desired glass of water] appears [paraît] as a non-positionallivedc correlate of the non-theticlived consciousness of selfI on the horizon of the glass-in-the-midst-of-the-worldlived."

-------------------------------------------------** See Sartre\Negation-The precipice crossing and creatingI Constantinople (NE 97-8)*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-POSSIBLE ;

BN (p. 129, Fr. 164) "Thus the future [futur] qua future [futur] does not have to be. It is not in itself, and neither is it in the mode of being[-there]I of the for-itselfI since it is the meaningI of the for-itselfI. The future [futur] is not, it is possibilized."

(p. 478c) "Mylivedc end is a certain objective stateposited of the world, my possiblelived is a certain structuredial of my subjectivity; the one [objective state] is revealed to the theticpositedc consciousness, the other [the possible] flows back over the non-theticlivedc consciousness in order to characterize it..."

RBeing-there-Unreflected action continuously transforms our projects without reflection;Sartre\Existentialism-RExistentialist ‘approach as a regressive-progressive and analytic-

synthetic method’; CDR: Sartre\Negation-R Cyclical_societiesI transition to elementary praxisI through possibility (CDR82); CDRII: (p. 41c) "...This relativity of possible Beingconcept

ok—which we will study in itself somewhat further onat Ftn 12—makes the abstract universal into a secondary structuredial of concrete_totalizationdial/lived..." Ftn. 12, Tr. "Sartre was not to make an exhaustive study of possibles in the present work. However ... consult L’Idiot de la famille, (Fr. 2:1815, n.2) and see (p. 334, Ftn. 97, which reads) "Sartre was not to return to it in the present work (see pp. 41, 85, 183, 202, 208, and 219 ff. also SM pp. 93 ff.). In the margin of his notes of the diachroniclived [‘in its human depth’], four major problems to be dealt with are mentioned, as a reminder: Possible, Chance, Progress, Violence."

The Family Idiot: Sartre\Ontology-RUnutilized ‘possibles announce to praxis other means awaiting it if it chooses other ends’ (FI 4:46)

-------------------------------------------------**** Or Peggy Lee’s singing, ‘Is that all there is my friend. Well then lets go on dancing, bring out the booze and have a ball—if that’s all there is.’

2-16Onto Unutilized possibles announce to praxisI other ends through other means (FI4:46)The Family Idiot (4:46, Fr. 2:1815, Ftn. 3 out of sequence from Sartre\Flaubert’s Last Spiral-

TeleologicalI original_beliefI of practical_agentI: ActiveI=transcendenceI; passiveI=immanenceI) "...Every action neglects—as a function of its own end—certain intramundane objects, which, of this fact, remain for the agent halfway between the real and the unreal since they are perceived as objective determinationsdial [‘that is, as limitations/negtions’], yet are not affirmeddial, denial, experienced [éprouve]ontology, or surpassed1neg. Taken in the immediate, they are apparitionsFr=?. On the other hand, the practical_fielddial/lived itself, singularized by the particular actionI, deliversok itself in its radicalontology reality and, by the same token, realizeslived the agent (that is to say it can dissolve in this agent whatever remains of the imaginary and put the imagination in the service of realizationI). To this extent the neglected apparitions Fr=? are indirectly affected by an index of reality: they are linked to facts actuallyI disclosed by the enterprise because, despite everything, they belong to the unity of the field of possibleslivedR; beyond my present concerns, possibilitiesI, and responsibilities provisionally nonsignifying but nevertheless referring to the concrete ensemble of my activitiesI—pastlived, presentI, and future

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[futur], real and virtual—insofar as they are manifest as the undefined but rigorously limited variations of one praxis, mineI, beginning with this anchorage, here and now.

"In other words, the project creates possiblesI by disclosing the real; but unutilized possibles I refer the structure dial of possibility I to praxis R itself by announcing to it that other means await it if it chooses other ends . [4:46, Fr. 2:1816] In this way, the objectsI that are passed over in silence, and limit themselves to designating me in my freedomCDR, are revealedI [dévoilent] in their truthlived: integrated into the practical_fieldI, thus indirectly linked to the means that I at present employ, though neither real nor unrealI for me, they permanently give themselves as realizablesI. This is demonstrated rather well by the type of attention described by Revauld d’Allonnes under the name of ‘reflection [réflexion] with auxiliary fascination.’ Take for example, a man who is seeking the solution to a practical or scientific problem and trying in his own mind, to enunciate all its terms, who at the same time has his eyes turned toward a small clock on his desk. Can we say that he is looking at it? No, the look is practice, it deciphers, analyzes, classifies with an always defined intention. Does he see it? Yes and no: to be trulyI seen it would have to detach itself as a figurec [forme] on a ground [fond]; so we return to the selective lookI

ok. Yet the clock fascinatesI: it imposes itself as pure apparitionFr=? which, as such, aids the reflexive [réflexif] effort; arresting the eyes without soliciting the lookI

ok, it is a means of not lookingIok

elsewhere. But, at the same time, the researcher cannot make it be itself given2neg as a realizableI—its coefficient of adversity—that is to say, a possibilityI, proper to praxis, of changing options. Indeed, at momentsI

the attention is clearly broken and unable to find the word, the idea he has been pursuing, the man realizes the small clock: it emerges from limbo with its own nature, its resistances; for example, it refuses him the time because it has stopped, and the realizable passes into the real when its owner, abandoning his reflections [réflexion] for a instant, decides to rewind ite..."

-------------------------------------------------Ref Herein-Counting cigarettes: Unreflective consciousness renders reflection [réflexion]posited possible

2-16Onto BN: Part Two, Chapter Three, Transcendencelived/1neg (BN171-218)Page BN171 begins below at, RealismI and idealismI of externallyI united substances (BN171)

2-16Onto Transcendencelived/1neg or 2neg

Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-TRANSCENDENCE lived/1neg or 2neg [transcendence]Sartre, BN: (p. 7c) "...If I question the carburetor, it is because I consider it possible that ‘there is nothing

there’ in the carburetor. Thus my question by its nature envelops a certain pre-judicativec comprehensionFr=? of non-being; it is in itself a relationok [of three degrees]1st&2neg of beingI with non-beingI, on the basis of the original transcendencelived/1neg; that is, in a relationFr=? of beingI with beingI.";

(p. 36c, Fr. 71) "e...The consciousness of man in actionlived is unreflective [irréfléchi] consciousness. [It] consciousness[elle]_is_consciousness_(of)_something and the transcendentlived/1neg which discoversdial/lived itself to this consciousness is of a particular natureI; transcendencelived/1neg is a structuredial of exigency in the world which correlatively discoversI in the structuredial complex connections [of three degrees]as

1neg&2negFr=? of instrumentality...";

(p. 180c) "...We shall define transcendencelived/1neg as that inner and realizinglived/1neg&2neg negation which reveals the in-itselfontology/2neg while determining the beingI of the for-itselflived/1neg."

(p. 270c) "...The otherlived is present_to2neg me without any intermediary as a transcendencelived/1neg which is not mine..."; Sartre\Bad Faith-RRefusing his sexual advances, she recognizes only his admiration (BN55)

Search for a Method: (p. 171c, Fr. 126) "...Needdial/lived, negativity [seeking to deny lack], surpassing1neg, projectI, transcendencelived/1neg, form in effect a synthetic_totalitylived..."

CDR: Sartre\Negation-RFirst contradiction: Interiority and exteriority imposed on the same human organism. With transcendencelived/1neg through needdial/lived.

Groups&Reciprocity-RNecessityCDRdial/lived as freeI active_passivitylived, practico-inert [totality]lived as passive_activitylived: Exteriority founds action at the border separating transcendencelived/1neg from immanence (CDR489)

26

Sartre: Ontology

CDRII (p. 55c) "...To transcendlived/1neg is not to liquidate a difficulty or resolve a problem, it is simply to constitutedial what has been transcendedlived/1neg as a particular orientation of praxis. In the example chosen, transcendencelived/1neg will consist in the fact that the sub-group, negating1neg the indetermination and profiting from it, will seek to appropriate a certain seriesI of matters, even though it is not sure they are within its competency..."

2-16Onto Transcendence-transcendinglived/1neg

Sartre, BN: (p. 408c) "... We can maintain ourselves for a greater or less length of time in the attitude adopted depending on our bad faith or depending on the particular circumstances of our history. But never will either attitude be sufficient in itself; it always points obscurely in the direction of the otherlived. This means that we can never hold a consistent attitude toward the otherI unless he is at once revealed to us as subject and as object, as transcendence-tran scending lived/1neg and as transcendence-transcendedlived/2neg—which is on principle impossible. Thus ceaselessly tossed from being-a-lookontology/1neg to being-lookedI-atontology/2neg, falling from one to the otherI in alternate revolutions, we are always, no matter what attitude is adopted, in a state of instability in connectionlived&lived [of three degrees]as 1neg&2neg

Fr=? to the otherI..."Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-TRANSCENDENCE-TRAN SCENDING lived/1neg; [my] transcendence-tran scending lived/1neg [theirs].

2-16Onto Transcendence-transcendedlived/2neg

Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-TRANSCENDENCE-TRANSCENDED ; hyphenated; [my2neg] transcendence-tran - scendedlived/2neg [by his1neg].

BN: (p. 291c) "This otherlived-as-object who suddenly appears to me does not remain a purely objective abstractionposited. He rises before me with his particular significations [significations]. He is not only the objectI which possesses freedomBN as a property, [but] as transcendence 2neg -transcended lived/1neg...";

(p. 408c, above in transcendence-transcending);(p. 414c) "...In the sentence ‘Theyontology/1neg are lookingI at meontology/2neg,’ I want to indicate that I

experience [éprouve]ontology myself as an objectontology/2neg for othersontology/1neg, as an alienated Meconcept, as a transcendence 2neg -transcended lived/1neg..."; Sartre\Emotions-RHatredposited of the other’s freedom as My transcendence 2neg -transcended lived/1neg

2-16Onto Transcended-transcendencelived/1neg

Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-TRANSCENDED-TRANSCENDENCE The Family Idiot: (2:211P , Fr. 1:869) "...When I offer an argument to a stranger, he may be thinking:

‘What a disagreeable voice!’... Against my situation of ‘transcended 2neg -transcendence lived/1neg’ I will defend myself by the use of parasemantic auxiliaries, such as intonation, timbre, facial expression, charm, authority, etc..."

2-16Onto Transcendence_in_immanenceRef Sartre\Index of Terms-TRANSCENDENCE_IN_IMMANENCE ; [Husserl, Ideas, 173]; See Herein-immanence; Archives\Husserl-RCaws supports Husserl’s unbracketed ego as ‘transcendence in immanence’;

BN: all 3hits below, esp. (p. 44) ‘transcendences_in_immanence, condition all negative_transcendences’Sartre, BN (p. 1xic, Fr. 27) sartre¶"But how can non-being be the foundation of being[-there]. How can the

absent, expected subjective become thereby the objective? A great joy which I hope for, a grief which I dread, acquire from that fact a certain transcendencelived/1neg. This I admit. But transcendence in immanence does not bring us out of the subjectiveI. It is truelived that things give themselves in profile; that is, simply by apparitionsok. And it is trueI that each apparitionI

ok refers to other apparitionsIok. But each of them is already in

itself alone a transcendentlived/1neg being[-there]**, not a subjectiveI material of impressions—a plenitude of being, not a lackdial/lived—a presence, not an absence..."

(BNp. 34c) "...But it is by nature transcendence in immanence, and consciousness is not subject to it because of the very fact that consciousness posits it; for consciousness has now the task of conferring on the motiveok its meaningBNlived and its importance. Thus the nothing which separates the motiveI from consciousness

27

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characterizes itself as transcendence in immanence: itFr=? is by producing itself as immanencelivedc that consciousness nihilates the nothing which makes consciousness exist for itself as transcendencelived/1neg..."

(BNp. 44, out of sequence from Sartre\Bad Faith-I. Bad Faith’s intention is hidden: Falsehood’s deception is intended (BN47-52)) "e...Actuallyc [freedomBN] contributes to constitutingBN transcendences in immanence which conditions all negative_transcendences. But this very fact that the transcendencesI of empirical freedomI are constitutedI in immanence as transcendences shows us that we are dealing with secondary nihilations*** which suppose the existence of an original nothingnesslived. They are only a stage in the analytical regression which leads us from the examples of transcendenceslived/1neg called ‘négatitésc’ to the being[-there] which is its own nothingnessI. Evidently it is necessaryBNlived to find the foundation of all negation in a nihilation which is exercised in the very heart of immanence; in absoluteontologyc immanence in the pure subjectivity of the instantaneous cogitolived we must discoverdial/lived the original act by which man is to himself his own nothingnessI..."

-------------------------------------------------CDR: Sartre\Groups&Reciprocity-RNecessityCDRdial/lived as free activity, passivity, practico-inert

[totality]lived as passive activity: Exteriority founds action at the border separating transcendencelived/1neg and immanence

-------------------------------------------------The Family Idiot: (4:38c) "...transcendencelived/1neg is then lived on the terrain of the immanent

[transcendence_in_immanence] as an inertI ‘structuraldial defect’ of immanence itself. When the idea passes into flesh, the body becomes speech, but its message is indecipherable since designation is degraded as disease. There is symbolization without symbolism, without code...";

Sartre\Flaubert’s Constitution-RSimultaneous ‘belonging of soul to world/world to soul, Flaubert calls poetry’: But, ‘The best of me is poetry, is the brute’, for half paragraph on "...Between immanence and transcendencelived/1neg...";

-------------------------------------------------Sartre\Index of Terms-IMMANENCE ;

The Emotions: (p. 47c)"e...we must understandposited if symbolization is constitutiveBN of consciousness, it is permissible to grasp [transformslivedtolived]as 1neg&2neg that there is an immanent bondok of comprehensionFr=? between the symbolization and the symbolI

e..."Psychology of the Imagination: (p. 15c) "...[the image of tree as a consciousness] must possess a certain

consciousness of itself. Let us say that it possesses an immanent and non-theticlived consciousness of itself..."BN (lxiic, Fr. 28) "...Absolute subjectivity can be established in the face of something revealed;

immanence can be defined only within the apprehension of a transcendentlived/1neg..."(p. 34c) "...consciousness has now the task of conferring on the motivelived

ok its meaningBNlived and its importance. Thus the nothingIlived which separates the motiveI from consciousness characterizes itself as immanence. It is by arising as immanence that consciousness nihilatesc the nothingI which makes consciousness exist for itself as transcendencelived/1neg...";

(p. 34c, subsequent paragraph) "...Evidently it is necessaryBNlived to find the foundation of all negationlived in a nihilationI which is exercised in the very heart of immanence; in absoluteontology immanence, in the pure subjectivityI of the instantaneous cogitolived we must discoverdial/lived the original act by which man is to himself his own nothingnesslived...";

(p. 150c) "Before asking how a psychological_durationlivedc can be constitutedBN as the immanent object of reflection [réflexion], we must e... return to the reflexive [réflexif] phenomenonlivedc and determine its structuredial.";

(p. 180c) "...Thus for example, intuitive knowledge [connaissance] is of the nothinglived into immanence, which transforms the immanence of the in-itselfontology/2neg into the transcendencelived/1neg of the for-itselfontology/1neg. Thus the pure event which insures that Beingconcept/1negc

Fr=? is its own nothingness makes the worldlived appear as totality of the in-itselfI transcendedI by self-nihilating being[-there]..."

(p. 251c) "...Thus we must ask the for-itselfI to deliver to us the for-otherslived; we must ask absoluteontology immanence to throw us into absoluteI transcendencelived/1neg. In my own inmost depths I must find not reasons for believing that the otherI existsI but the otherI himself as not being[-there] me..."

28

Sartre: Ontology

The War Dairies: (p. 39c) "...Will, in effect, is the power that consciousness has to escape itself. All immanence is a dream state...";

-------------------------------------------------CDR: Groups&Reciprocity-RNecessityCDRdial/lived as freeI active_passivitylived, practico-inert [totality]lived

as passive_activitylived: Exteriority founds action at the border separating transcendencelived/1neg from immanence (CDR489)

(p. 80c) "...needdial/lived is a link of unilateral immanence with surrounding materiality in so far as the organism tries to sustain itself with it...";

(p. 83c) "...The projectc, as transcendencelived/1neg, is merely the exteriorization of immanence; transcendenceI itself is already present in the functional fact of nutrition and excretion, since what we find here is a relationFr=? [of three degrees]1st&2neg of unilateral interiority1neg between two states2neg of materialityI. And conversely, transcendenceI contains immanence within itself in that its linkFr=? with its purpose and with the environment rests uponS&A exteriorized interiority.";

(p. 101, Fr. 213) "But these negations have a double character. In the first place, they can be perceived only against an undifferentiated background [figure/ground] consisting of the syntheticdial relations [of three degrees]1st&2neg Fr=? which support me together with them in an actual immanence: I could not contrast their ends with mineI without recognizing them as ends..."

CDRII: (p. 16c) "...the dialectical contradiction is immanent ... since it is a rift maintained and produced by the unity it rends...";

(p. 55c) "...And of course, to realize it is to transcendlived/1neg it, to make a practice out of what was a certain inertia, and to organize it in immanence as the structuredial of a projectI: hence, continually to make it an internal_connectiondial/lived

ok [of interior structures of consciousness] in relation of interiority with other interiorizedI relationships..."

-------------------------------------------------The Family Idiot: (1:574c) "Thus the inferior limit of subjective spaceIR is found to be at once an

immanent determinationdial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] of experienceFr=? and a symbolic bondFr=? with the transcendentlived/1neg world..."

-------------------------------------------------** [I.e., In order for the apparition to be seen as negation2 a transcendent negation1 must have dialectically accomodated it as in Sartre\Negation-*Negation1 [transcendence to what is not yet] of the negation2 given.*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-NIHILATION ; French must be looked up.; early works; not néantisation=nothingness.

The War Dairies: Herein-Counting cigarettes: Unreflective consciousness renders reflection [réflexion] possible, with (p. 180c, ce) "...Consciousness exists for-itself beyond that tree as what is not that tree; the nihilating connection [of three degrees]as 1neg&2neg

Fr=? between reflection [reflet] and the reflected-on [reflété] ensures that consciousness can be for itself only by reflecting [reflétant] itself as being, precisely, nothingnesslived of the world where there is that tree [ce remainder of paragraph]..."

-------------------------------------------------BN: (p. 21c) "...Nothingness can be nihilated only on the foundation of beingI...";

(p. 23c) "...by a double movementdial of nihilation [i.e., 2 nihilations], [1] he nihilates the thing questioned in relation to himself by placing it in a neutral state, between being[-there] and non-being—and [2] he nihilates himselflived/1neg in relationFr=? [of three degrees]lived&lived as 1st&2neg to the thinglived/2neg questioned by wrenching himself from beingI in order to be able to bring out of himself the possibility of a non-being...";

(p. 28-9c) "...If the nihilation of consciousness existsI only as consciousness of nihilation, we ought to be able to define and describe a constant mode of consciousness, present qua consciousness, which would be consciousness of nihilation. (p. 29) ...[I]t is in anguish that man gets the consciousness of his [nihilation]...";

(p. 34) "...It is by arising as immanence that consciousness nihilates the nothingI which makes consciousness exist for itself as transcendencelived/1neg...";

(p. 44c) "...Evidently it is necessaryBNlived to find the foundation of all negation in a nihilation which is exercised in the very heart of immanenceI; in absoluteontology immanence, in the pure subjectivity of the instantaneous cogitolived we must discoverdial the original act by which man is to himself his own nothingness...";

29

Sartre: Ontology

(p. 85c) "...Thus since the nihilation is the nihilation of beingI, it represents the original connection [of three degrees]lived&lived as 1neg&2neg

Fr=? between the beingI of the for-itself and the being[-there] of the in-itselfontology. The cogitolived must necessarilyBNlived lead us to discoverdial/lived this total, out-of-reach presence of the in-itselfI. Of course the fact of this presence will be the very transcendencelived/1neg of the for-itselfI. But it is precisely the nihilation which is the origin of transcendenceI conceived as the original bond between the for-itselfI and the in-itselfI...";

(p. 103c) "...Selfness [l’ipséité] represents a degree of nihilation carried further than the pure presence_toc self [soi] of the pre-reflectivec [préréflexif]I cogito...";

(p. 485c) "... to do supposes the nihilation of a given2neg. One does something with or to something...";

Sartre\Freedom-A. My Place, with (p. 492c) "...Nihilation, internal_negation, a determining turning back upon the being-there which I am—these three operationsdial/lived are really one. They are only momentsdial of an original transcendencelived/1neg which launches toward an end by nihilating me so that I may make knownI [faire announcer] to myself what I am by means of the future [futur]e...";

(p. 617c) "...The for-itself, in fact, is nothing but the pure nihilation of the in-itselfontology; it is like a hole of beingI at the heart of Beingconcept...";

Sartre\Negation-H03-1 RWorker must see possible future happiness to see present pain;Sartre\Imagination-RConsciousness, not the objectI, differentiates perception from imagination

-------------------------------------------------CDR: Not found yet.The Family Idiot: Not found yet.

2-16Onto RealismI and idealismI of externallyI united substances (BN171)Sartre, BN (p. 171, Fr. 207) "e...In the introduction we encountered a problem**, and it is this problem

which we have wished to resolve: what is the original relationok [of three degrees]lived&lived as 1st&2neg of human_realitylived/2neg to the being[-there] of phenomenalived/1negc or being-in-itselfontology? In the introduction we were obliged to reject both the realistR solution and the idealistR solution. It appeared to us at once that the transcendentlived/1neg being[-there]I could not act on consciousness and that consciousness could not ‘construct’ the transcendentI by objectivizing elements borrowed from its subjectivity. Consequently we concluded that the original relationI

ok to being[-there] could not be an external_relationok which would unite two substances originally isolated. ‘The relationIas 1neg&2neg

ok of the regionsok of beingI is a primitive upsurge,’ we said, ‘and it forms a part of the very structuredial of these beingsI.’ The concrete is discovereddial/lived by us as the synthetic_totalitylivedc of which consciousness, like the phenomenonI, constitutesBN only the articulations."

------------------------------------------------- ** Copied Sartre\Phenomenology-II. The Phenomenon of Being and the Being of the Phenomenon (xlviii-l)

Page 172 out of sequence at Sartre\Language&Comprehension-There ‘is only intuitive knowledge [connaissance]: When reached, methods used to attain it are effaced before it’ (BN 172)

Page 173-4 out of sequence at Sartre\Temporality-Ontology-Part Two, Chapter 3: Transcendence... I and II (171-218)

2-16Onto Terms: spatialityI, extensionI, the real is realizationlived/1neg (BN179)Sartre, BN (p. 179-80, Fr. 215, preceded by Sartre\Temporality-Knower-known as phenomenon of

‘is and is not’ontology (BN178)) sartre¶ "For example, as we shall see later, the disclosure [dévoilement] of the spatiality**a of being[-there] is one with the non-positional apprehension by the for-itselfontology of itself as unextended. And the unextended character of the for-itselfI is not a positive, mysterious virtue of spirituality which is hiding under a negative denomination; it is a ekstatic relationok through nature, for it is by and in the extension**b of the transcendentlived/1neg in-itselfontology that the for-itselfI announces to itself and realize its own non-extensione...Extension is a transcendentI determinationdial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] which the for-itselfI has to apprehend to the exact measure in which it denies2neg itself as extended. That is why the term which seems best to indicate this inner connection [of three degrees]lived&lived as 1neg&2neg

Fr=? between knowing [connaître]

30

Sartre: Ontology

and being[-there]I is the word realize*** which we used earlier**** in its double ontological and gnosticok meaningBNlived. I realizelived/1negc a [1] projectlived/1neg in so far as I give it being, but I also realizelived/1negc [2] my situation2neg in so far as I live it1neg, make it be with my being[-there]lived/1neg. (BNp. 180) I ‘realizelived/1neg’ the scope of a catastrophe, the difficulty of an undertaking. To know [connaître] is to realizelived/1neg in both senses of the term. It is to make [faire] beingIlived/2neg ‘to be there [for-itself]ontology/1neg’ while having to be the reflected [reflété] negation [in-itself]ontology/1eg of this beingIlived/2neg. The real is realizationlived/1neg. We shall define transcendencelived/1negc as that inner and realiz ing live/1neg negation which reveals the in-itselfontology/2neg while determiningdial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] the being[-there]I of the for-itselflived/1neg."

-------------------------------------------------See Sartre\Language&Comprehension-*differential**a&b Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-SPATIAL [espace] and EXTENSION/UNEXTENSION ; cf. Annex\Heidegger\Dasein-Dasein’s Space; Archives\Space&Time-Time as misconceived spatially

The War Dairies: (p. 177c) "...But a verbal examination will suffice to show that ‘unextended’ is a mere word, hiding a shamefaced negation in its womb. For consciousness to be unextended does not signify a positive virtue; it is purely and simply an elided way of denoting the fact that consciousness is not extended...";

CDR: term not found yetThe Family Idiot: Sartre\Flaubert&Father in Vol. I-RThree-dimensional space...

-------------------------------------------------*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-REALIZE lived/1neg [réaliser, réalisation]; cf. real [ly, istic, ity, ities] below; cf. unrealizationc, derealization;

BN (p. 179c, above) "...I realize a [1] projectlived/2neg in so far as I give it beinglived/1neg, but I also realizelived/1neg [2] my situation2neg in so far as I live it, make it be with my being[-there]lived/1neg..."

CDRII: (p. 55c) "...to realizelived/2neg it is to transcendlived/1neg it, to make a practice out of what was a certain inertia, and to organize it in immanence as the structuredial/lived of a project: hence, continually to make it an internal_connectiondial/lived

ok [of interior structures of consciousness] in relation of interiority with other interiorizedI connectionslived&lived [rapports] [of three degrees]as 1neg&2neg..."

-------------------------------------------------**** cannot find in citations Herein-Part Two, Chapter Three: Transcendence (BN171-218)

Pages 187-8 out of sequence at Sartre\Flaubert’s School Years-Investing qualityI into quantityI solicits dreaded competition

Pages 189-90 out of sequence at Sartre\Negation-[above] To ‘what’ being is the for-itselfontology presence?

Page 218 out of sequence at Sartre\Phenomenology-The strict order of examining the body as ontologically being-for-itself before ontologically being-for-others (BN303-5,218)

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