scenarios for south africa

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1 The Scenario Building Process and Scenarios for South Africa Making the impossible happen Making the impossible happen Dr. Llewellyn B. Lewis Dr. Llewellyn B. Lewis The Strategic Forum www.strategicforum.co.za BMI S tudium A d P rosperandum V oluntas in C onveniendum BUILDING RESEARCH STRATEG Y CO N SU LTIN G U N IT cc R eg.N o.2002/105109/23 BMI S tudium A d P rosperandum V oluntas in C onveniendum BUILDING RESEARCH STRATEG Y CO N SU LTIN G U N IT cc BMI BMI BMI BMI S tudium A d P rosperandum V oluntas in C onveniendum BUILDING RESEARCH STRATEG Y CO N SU LTIN G U N IT cc R eg.N o.2002/105109/23 BMI S tudium A d P rosperandum V oluntas in C onveniendum BUILDING RESEARCH STRATEG Y CO N SU LTIN G U N IT cc BMI BMI BMI BMI BMI BMI THE STRATEGIC FORUM THE STRATEGIC FORUM A place of assembly for strategic conversations

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  1. 1. The Scenario Building Processand Scenarios for South Africa Making the impossible happen Dr. Llewellyn B. Lewis The Strategic Forum www.strategicforum.co.za
    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM
    • A place of assembly
    • for strategic conversations
  2. 2. CHANGE ENVIRONMENTALYDIRECTED REACTIVE CHANGE : THE RECOVERY TROUGH SHOCK DENIAL BARGAINING ANGER SADNESS DEPRESSION ACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE PREDICTING THE FUTURE POSSIBLE RESULTS FIRST CURVE SECOND CURVE CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT BENCHMARKING SURVIVAL RESISTANCE TO CHANGE (Based on Handy : 1994)
  3. 3. CREATING THE FUTURE SELF-DIRECTED TRANSFORMATION CRITICAL MESS ENVIRONMENTALCHANGE RISK RUDE AWAKENING CHAOS UNCERTAINTY FIRST CURVE SECOND CURVE CREATING THE FUTURE IMPOSSIBLE RESULTS EMERGING ORDER STRANGE ATTRACTORS (Based on Handy : 1994) THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT THE EDGE OF CHAOS ZONE OF CREATIVITYAND ADAPTABILITY
  4. 4. CREATING THE FUTURE CREATIVETENSION
    • SEEKS RESOLUTION : RESULTS IN ACTION
    • STRATEGIC ACTION PLANS
    • PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES
    • BUDGETS
    • DONEBY MANAGEMENT
    STRATEGIESA LOGIC AND FIRST LEVELOF DETAIL, FOR HOWTHE VISION CAN BE ACHIEVED DEVELOPEDBY LEADERSHIP CONTEMPORARY ANALYST 2020 2011 CURRENT REALITYINFORMED BY MEMORIES OFTHE PAST (HISTORY) HISTORIAN VISIONINFORMED BY MEMORIES OF THE FUTURE (SCENARIOS) PROPHET CONTEXT : ACOMPELLING PICTUREOF THE FUTURE WE WANT TO CREATE. CREATEDBY LEADERSHIP
  5. 5.
    • STRATEGIC FORUM
    • A place of assembly
    • for strategic conversations
    • THE
    • SCENARIO BUILDING PROCESS
  6. 6.
    • A well- designed scenario process has great value the first time it is used, but like a good wine, it improves with age. The tool promotes mental agility by opening minds to multiple possibilities.
    • - - - - - - - - - - - -, If you use scenarios, youll never read the newspaper the same way again.(Charles M. Perrotet, in Learning from the future : 1998 : 139)
    Making sense of the future with Scenarios
  7. 7. FIRST QUESTION What percentage of your timeis spent onEXTERNAL rather thanINTERNAL issues ??
  8. 8. SECOND QUESTION Of this time spent looking OUTWARD how much of it is spent considering how the world could beDIFFERENT in five or ten years???
  9. 9. THIRD QUESTION Of the time devoted to looking FORWARD and OUTWARD how much of it is spent in CONSULTATION WITH COLLEAGUES where the objective is to build a DEEPLY SHARED, WELL TESTED VIEW OF THE FUTURE as opposed to a personal and idiosyncratic view???
  10. 10. THE 40 / 30 / 20 RULE Senior management devotes LESS than 3% [40% x 30% x 20% = 2,4%] of its energy in building a CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE OF THE FUTURE
  11. 11. THE 40 / 30 / 20 RULE Managing the Here and Now Managing the There and Then
  12. 12. SYSTEMS MODEL OF SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT www.strategicforum.co.za Scenario B Scenario Input Scenario Determinants Normative Scenarios Scenario C Scenario D Development Scenario A Stability Actors Actors Core drivers Actors Values Policies Strategies StrategicPosture
    • Strategic Issues
    • Key
    • Uncertainties
    • Critical Success
    • Factors
    • Critical Resources,
    • Key Capabilities
  13. 13. CREATING THE FUTURE WITH SCENARIOS KEY ACTORS STRATEGIC POSTURE SCENARIO LOGICS SCENARIO STORY LINES IMPACTS MONITORING CURRENT REALITYvsSCENARIOS STRATEGICINTERVENTIONS CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS SCENARIO VARIABLES DRIVING STRUCTURAL CHANGE FOCAL ISSUE STRATEGIC INTENT STRATEGIES STRATEGIC ISSUES KEY CERTAINTIES KEYCHALLENGES COREDRIVING FORCES KEYUNCERTAINTIES
  14. 14. CREATING THE FUTUREThere are always two parties, the party of the past and the party of the future; theestablish ment and themove ment(Ralph Waldo Emerson) The future never just happens;it is created (Will and Ariel Durant : The Lessons of History)
  15. 15. Making sense of the futureThe State of the Nation : 2010 -2020 The Reinvention Scenario logics CORE DRIVING FORCES EVENTS TRENDS AND PATTERNS The Virtuous Cycle The Vicious Cycle VARIABLE BEHAVIOUR CHANGING STRUCTURES Causal relationships SCENARIOS KEY STAKEHOLDERS STRATEGICPOSTURE The Iceberg STRATEGIC ISSUES; KEY UNCERTAINTIES; CRITICAL RESOURCES; KEY CAPABILITIES. Increasing ability to understand
  16. 16. TYPES OF CHANGE
    • Cyclical change :
    • Is temporary
    • Comes in fits and starts (can return to prior status)
    • Demands a tactical response
    • Structural change:
    • Is a fundamental transformation of some activity or institution from a previous state
    • Is irreversible
    • Demands permanent adjustment
    • Demands a strategic response
  17. 17. TYPES OF CHANGE
    • Cyclical :
    • Gold price
    • Inflation - interest rates
    • Violence
    (Examples in South Africa today)
    • Structural:
    • Changing black/white population ratio
    • Urban black/white mix
    • Redistribution of wealth
    • Educational mix
    • Privatisation and deregulation
    • Trade union activity and power
  18. 18. SCENARIO PLANNING PROCESS
    • When crisis happens, managers know but dont take action timeously
    • Why dont management pick up signs before crisis ?
    • The mind cannot see what is has not experienced before
    • Older companies have good institutional memory, therefore a better chance for survival
    • Hypothesis : Bombarded with overload of information - the brain needs a filter
    • A memory of the future must becreated to provide this filter
    • Every incoming signal is tested against theAlternative Time Pathscreated.If the signal is relevant to an Alternative Time Path -it is heard.
  19. 19. FALL INTO THREE GROUPS
    • More of the same but better
    • Worse (decay and depression)
    • Different but better (fundamental change)
    SCENARIOS - THE ART OF THE LONG VIEW
    • To reperceive
    • To question assumptions
    • To change the view of reality
    • To liberate peoples insights
  20. 20. SCENARIOS - THE ART OF THE LONG VIEW THREE POINTS OF VIEW Status Quo : Tomorrow will be more or less the same as today Cassandra : The world is always on the brink of disaster Dr Panglos : The world is the best it can be and can only get better !
  21. 21.
    • Group planning pioneered scenario planning- amethod for summarising alternative future trends
    • They concluded that :
    • The stable predictable oil world was about tochange
    • Europe, Japan, USA becoming more dependenton oil imports
    • Oil exporting countries Iran, Iraq, Libya,Venezuela becoming concernedabout falling reserves
    • Others, eg Saudi Arabia, were reaching the limitsof their ability to productively invest oil revenues
    SHELL
  22. 22.
    • With the following impacts :
    • Historical smooth growth in oildemand and supply threatened
    • Likely to give way to chronicsupply shortfalls
    • Leading to excess demand
    • Thereby stimulating a sellersmarket controlled by the oil- exporting nations
    SHELL
  23. 23.
    • Slow investment in refineries
    • Designed refineries that could adapt to whatever type of crude oil was available
    • They forecast energy demand at a lower level
    • They accelerated their development of oil fields outside OPEC countries
    • Decentralised controls because they believed different nations would adopt different pricing policies
    SHELL
  24. 24.
    • Continued investment program
    • Slower reaction to what they saw as being more of a specific / temporary event
    • Persisted with overestimating demand
    • Responded at a slower pace
    • Reigned in controls to facilitate overview - became less maneuverable
    OTHER OIL COMPANIES
  25. 25. 1970 : Weakest of 7 largest oilcompanies 1979 : Strongest of 7 largestoil companies SHELL
  26. 26.
    • STRATEGIC FORUM
    • A place of assembly
    • for strategic conversations
    • THE
    • STRATEGIC FORUM
    • SCENARIOS FOR
    • SOUTH AFRICA
    • 2010 - 2020
  27. 27. The STRATEGIC FORUM Scenarios for South Africa Political transformation Economic transformation Ubuntu South Africa united Autocracy Liberalisedautocracy Democracy Long walk to Freedom South Africa unchanged 1994Election 1999Election Pretoria will provide South Africa entitled Social transformation Cry the beloved Country South Africa corrupted Limiteddemocracy
  28. 28. Political Transformation NOW,2Q 2010Muddling along as we are,or change . . .Government intervention, PPPs;Subsidies, InfrastructureSA Social Capitalism; Growth through Redistribution; The Golden Triangle. SA Social Democracy ; Redistribution withGrowth SA Communism;Redistribution with or without growthSA AThird World Country 1. Ubuntu Scenario 2. Long Walk to Freedom 3. Pretoria will Provide NO CONFIDENCELOWAVERAGEHIGHCONFIDENCE Risk AvoidanceRisk AversionRisk ToleranceRisk Taking Economic Transformation 4. Cry the Beloved Country Drivers of Change and the SA Scenario Map www.strategicforum.co.za (Based on Gerald Harris: The Art of Quantum Planning: 2009) Closed SystemOpen System Paradigm RegressionParadigm ParalysisParadigm ShiftParadigm Reinvention Racial conflictRacial tensionRacial toleranceRacial reconciliation (Ubuntu) GDP GROWTH > 5 % PA INFLATION 5 - 8 % PA EMPL GROWTH > 400 000 PA GDP GROWTH3 - 5 % PA INFLATION 8 - 10 % PA EMPL GROWTH 150 - 400 000 PA GDP GROWTH 2 - 3 % PA INFLATION 10 - 15 % PA EMPL GROWTH 50 - 150 000 PA GDP GROWTH < 0 % PA INFLATION 15 - 25 % PA EMPL GROWTH < 50 000 PA Social Transformation
  29. 29.
    • THESTRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-2020
    Economic Transformation Political Transformation GDP GROWTH > 5 % PA INFLATION 5 - 8 % PA EMPL GROWTH > 400 000 PA GDP GROWTH3 - 5 % PA INFLATION 8 - 10 % PA EMPL GROWTH 150 - 400 000 PA GDP GROWTH 2 - 3 % PA INFLATION 10 - 15 % PA EMPL GROWTH 50 - 150 000 PA GDP GROWTH < 0 % PA INFLATION 15 - 25 % PA EMPL GROWTH < 50 000 PA NO CONFIDENCE /LOW /AVERAGE /HIGH CONFIDENCE Risk AvoidanceRisk AversionRisk ToleranceRisk Taking Closed SystemOpen System One Party StateMulti-Party Democracy Closed SystemOpen System Paradigm RegressionParadigm ParalysisParadigm ShiftParadigm Reinvention Racial conflictRacial tensionRacial toleranceRacial reconciliation April 1994 Elections ThePolitical Miracle The future of South Africa depends on progress along thethree axis ofPOLITICAL- ,ECONOMIC-, ANDSOCIAL TRANSFORMATION . The solution lies in an approach that inextricably links economic policy, social development and transformation. The UBUNTU scenario requires an entrenched democracy, a reconciled Nation, united behind a common vision, an open Economic system, the alleviation of poverty and social delivery of housing, health and education. UBUNTU South Africa unitedMedium to High growth Medium to Strong OppositionEntrenched Democracy Non Racist, Non Sexist, Reconciled Nation LONG WALK TO FREEDOM South Africa unchanged Average to Medium growth Weak to Medium Opposition Espoused Democracy Tolerant Nation PRETORIA WILL PROVIDE South Africa entitled Average to Weak growth Weak to non- existent Opposition Shaky Democracy Tense Nation CRY THE BELOVED COUNTRY South Africa corruptedWeak to Negative growth One Party State Ignored Democracy Divided Nation Social Transformation
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    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-2015
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    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-2015
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    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-2015
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    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-2015
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    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-2015
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    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-201
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    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-2015
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    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-2015
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    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-2015
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    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-2015
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    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-2015
  45. 45. RACIAL CONFLICT CLOSED SYSTEM RECONCILIATION ANDNATION BUILDING OPEN SYSTEM High Road Ubuntu Scenario Low Road Cry the BelovedCountry Scenario Lower Middle Road Pretoria willProvide Scenario Upper MiddleRoad Long Walk toFreedom Scenario 10% 40% 30% 20%
    • THE STRATEGIC FORUM SCENARIOS FOR SOUTH AFRICA : 2010-2015