schellens & jong_argumentation schemes in persuasive brochures

8/18/2019 Schellens & Jong_Argumentation Schemes in Persuasive Brochures

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Argumentation Schemes in Persuasive Brochures

PETER JAN SCHELLENS and MENNO DE JONG

University of Twente

Faculty of Behavioural Sciences

Department of Communication Studies

P.O. Box 217

7500 AE Enschede

The Netherlands

E-mail: p.j.m.c.schel [email protected]

[email protected]

ABSTRACT: Many public information documents attempt to persuade the recipients that

they should engage in or refrain from specific behaviour. This is based on the assumption

that the recipient will decide about his or her behaviour on the basis of the information

given and a rational evaluation of the pros and cons. An analysis of 20 public information

brochures shows that the argumentation in persuasive brochures is often not marked as such.

Argumentation is presented as factual information, and in many instances the task of making

argumentational links and drawing conclusions is left to the reader. However, since the infor-

mation offered does follow familiar argumentational schemes, readers can, in principle, recon-

struct the argument. All the brochures make use of pragmatic argumentation (argumentation

from consequences), i.e., they formulate at least certain benefits of the desirable behaviour

or disadvantages of the undesirable behaviour. In addition, they make regular use of argu-

mentation from cause to effect and argumentation from example. Argumentation from rules

and argumentation from authority are less frequently used. This empirical analysis of the

use of argumentation schemes is a solid base for interesting and rich hypotheses about thecognitive processing of persuasive brochures. Central processing requires the reader to be

able to reconstruct argumentation from informational texts and to identify and evaluate

various types of argumentation.

KEY WORDS: appeal to expert opinion, argumentation from analogy, argumentation from

authority, argumentation from cause to effect, argumentation from consequences, argumen-

tation from example, argumentation from rules, argument schemes, causal reasoning, central

route, persuasion, public information

1. INTRODUCTION

Public information documents often attempt to persuade recipients that they

should engage in or refrain from some specific behaviour. That behaviourmay be in the direct interests of the recipient (e.g., in the case of health

education documents), in the interests of society as a whole (e.g., in cam-

paigns promoting environmentally friendly behaviour), or in the interests

of others (e.g., campaigns for charities).

In public information, it is assumed that recipients take decisions about

their behaviour freely and independently, and that they do so on the basis

of relevant information and argumentation. Unlike commercial advertise-

Argumentation 18: 295–323, 2004.

© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.


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ments, persuasive brochures used for public information purposes normallyprovide the arguments on the basis of which the source believes recipients

should decide to perform the desirable behaviour.

In this paper we ask two questions. First, what types of argumentation

are used in persuasive brochures? And second, what does that mean for

the assumed processing of persuasive messages by recipients? In answering

the first question, we make use of the typology of argumentation schemes

developed by Schellens (1985). In answering the second question, we make

use of theoretical insights provided by Petty and Cacioppo (1984, 1986)

about the central route in the processing of persuasive texts. We discuss

these questions below, starting with the second question.

Central processing of persuasive messages

In socio-psychological literature, a distinction is made between two ways

in which the recipients of persuasive communication can process the infor-

mation they are offered: peripherally or centrally (Petty and Cacioppo,

1984, 1986). In peripheral processing, recipients put little or no effort into

the processing and evaluation of the information offered. They reach their

decision either on the basis of the source, or by applying a single rule of

thumb to non-content-based characteristics (the peripheral cues) of the

message, for instance the attractive style of a message or the number of

arguments given. In central processing, they process the information offered

to them carefully, relate it to their previous knowledge and on that basis

arrive at a well-considered conclusion. The route chosen by recipients

depends on their motivation and capacities. If the subject matter is

personally relevant to them and they are able and capable of investing time

and effort into it, they will be more inclined to process the message cen-

trally.

Most readers process public information brochures and leaflets only

peripherally. Nonetheless, the content of such brochures and leaflets does

usually require central processing: in public information documents, as far

as possible, the target group is presented with information specially

designed to point them in the desired direction when making a rational

choice. There is good reason for such an approach: according to Petty and

Cacioppo, attitude change via the peripheral route is less stable and provides

less certainty about the performance of the eventual behaviour than attitude

change via the central route (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986, p. 21; Petty et al.,1995).

Although the theory of Petty and Cacioppo, known as the Elaboration

Likelihood Model, is well grounded in experimental research into many

types of persuasion, its cognitive aspect has not been worked out in detail.

The theory has little to say about the mental operations involved in periph-

eral processing and even less about those involved in central processing.

The following description of central processing is illustrative:

296 PETER JAN SCHELLENS AND MENNO DE JONG


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The first, or ‘central route’ to persuasion involves effortful cognitive activity wherebythe person draws upon prior experience and knowledge in order to carefully scrutinize

all of the information relevant to determining the central merits of the position advocated.

(. . .) the message recipient under the central route is actively generating favorable and/or

unfavorable thoughts in response to the persuasive communication. The goal of this

cognitive effort is to determine if the position advocated by the source has any merit

(Petty and Priester, 1994, pp. 98–99).

Petty and Cacioppo (1984) explain the role of argumentation in central

processing in slightly more detail. With respect to the outcome of central

processing, they write as follows:

According to this view, if under scrutiny the message arguments are found to be cogent

and compelling, favorable thoughts will be elicited that will result in attitude change in

the direction of the advocacy. If the arguments are found to be weak and specious, theywill be counter argued and the message will be resisted – or boomerang (change opposite

to that intended) may even occur (Petty and Cacioppo, 1984, p. 70).

In their description of the peripheral route (particularly in what it does not

entail) the role of argumentation emerges:

Attitude changes that occur via the second or peripheral route do not occur because the

person diligently considered the pros and cons of the issue; they occur because the person

associates the attitude issue or object with favorable or unfavorable cues or makes a simple

inference about the merits of the advocated position based on various simple cues in the

persuasion context. For example, rather than carefully evaluating the issue-relevant argu-

ments, a person may accept an advocacy simply because it is presented during a pleasant

lunch or because the message source is an expert (Petty and Cacioppo, 1984, p. 70).

Central processing thus involves checking whether arguments are cogent

and convincing or weak and specious, considering the pros and cons of a

position, and evaluating the relevant arguments carefully. Although the

terminology fluctuates somewhat, it is clear that central processing requires

careful evaluation of arguments on the basis of earlier experience and prior

knowledge possessed by the recipient. However, the theory of Petty and

Cacioppo does not say anything about what such an evaluation might

involve.

In this article we try to formulate a hypothetical answer to the question

how central processing of persuasive messages takes place. Our answer will

be based on an empirical analysis of argument schemes in persuasive

brochures on the one hand and the assumption that argument schemes are

the crucial units of evaluation in central processing on the other hand.

Argumentation analysis of persuasive messages

We believe that argumentation analysis can help to further our under-

standing of the notion of central processing in two ways. First, by analysis

of persuasive texts, we can gain insight into the types of argumentation that

appear in them and thus arrive at a more precise definition of what it is

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES IN PERSUASIVE BROCHURES 297


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that is subjected to central processing. For example, text analysis can revealwhether the argumentation in persuasive communication is only concerned

with the consequences of the behaviour being advocated or discouraged.

Second, normative theories on the quality of argumentation enable us to

formulate hypotheses about the central processing of persuasive texts. The

ideal central processor of argumentation in persuasive texts operates in

accordance with what normative theories about the quality of arguments

prescribe. In this way, we hope to be able to productively bridge research

in argumentation theory and socio-psychological research.

In order to gain insight into the argumentation in persuasive messages,

this study investigates which types of argumentation (as distinguished by

Schellens, 1985) are used in persuasive brochures (see also Schellens, 1987

and Kienpointner, 1992, pp. 201–214). Schellens’ typology of argumenta-tion schemes builds on the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969)

and Hastings (1962) and on manuals for academic debate, such as those

of Freeley (1976). (See Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, and Garssen,

1997, 2001, for a comparable approach from a pragma-dialectical per-

spective.) We will use the typology of Schellens because of the systematic

link he claims between argument schemes and evaluation criteria: different

schemes are distinguished if and only if they require different evaluation

criteria in the form of critical questions.

Schellens’ typology, first of all, differentiates between restricted (or

‘bound’) and unrestricted (or ‘unbound’) argumentation schemes. Restricted

argumentation schemes are those whose application is limited to a certain

type of position or conclusion: some schemes lead to a conclusion of a

descriptive kind, others to a conclusion of a normative kind. Within the

group of restricted argumentation schemes, a distinction is made between

regularity-based argumentation (used in support of a descriptive statement

about the present, the past or the future), rule-based argumentation (used

in support of a normative statement about the value of a situation or process)

and pragmatic argumentation (leading to a statement about the desirability

of intended behaviour). By contrast, unrestricted argumentation schemes,

including argument from example, analogy and authority, are not used

specifically in support of descriptive or normative statements, but may be

used for either category of position.

In regularity-based argumentation (Schellens, 1985, pp. 77–102), argu-

mentation is given for a proposition of a factual or descriptive nature onthe basis of a regularly recurring empirical link. In many cases, such a

regularly recurring link is causal in nature, but that is not necessarily the

case: the link may also be correlative, or a sign link (argument from sign).

A causal link may be used to support predictions or explanations. In argu-

mentation from cause to effect, a prediction that a phenomenon will occur

is derived from a recurring relationship. In argumentation from effect (or

sign) to cause, a diagnosis is made: the regularity of a causal link makes



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it possible to make an assertion with some degree of probability about itscause, on the basis of observed consequences (or symptoms).

In rule-based argumentation (Schellens, 1985, pp. 115–151; see also

Gottlieb, 1968 on rule-guided reasoning), arguments are given for a state-

ment of a normative (evaluative or prescriptive) nature. In argumentation

from evaluation rules (e.g., evaluation standards or evaluation criteria),

arguments are given for evaluating a situation favourably or unfavourably.

In argumentation on the basis of rules of conduct, arguments are given for

a decision about the appropriateness or acceptability of certain behaviour.

In pragmatic argumentation or argumentation from consequences, a

position on the desirability of a given action, behaviour or measure is advo-

cated on the basis of its advantages and/or disadvantages (Schellens, 1985,

pp. 153–178; see also Walton, 1996, pp. 75–77). In the simplest case, theargumentation is limited to mentioning one positive or negative effect. More

extensive forms of argumentation from consequences provide a detailed

consideration of the various advantages and disadvantages of a number of

alternatives, in which the feasibility, acceptability and cost of an action

are taken into account.

In addition to these restricted argumentation schemes, Schellens also

distinguishes three unrestricted forms: argumentation from authority, argu-

mentation from example and argumentation from analogy (Schellens, 1985,

pp. 179–205). These schemes are not limited to a position or conclusion

of one particular type, but have a wider application. (See also Hastings,

1962 on free-floating arguments.) Argumentation from authority can, for

instance, be used in support of a statement that something is factually true,

or to argue for the desirability or undesirability of behaviour on the basis

of the judgment of an authority.

Given the nature of the central claim or conclusion of a persuasive message,

we may expect a particular pattern of argumentation to appear: a config-

uration of various argumentation schemes that is typical of the field of argu-

mentation in question (cf. the fields of reasoning described by Toulmin

et al., 1979, pp. 195ff.)

In persuasive brochures, which aim to convince their recipients that they

should do something or refrain from doing something, the following pattern

is to be expected:

1. Since the position taken in persuasive communication relates to the

desirability of behaviour , we expect a dominant role to be taken bypragmatic argumentation, in which the desirability or undesirability of

behaviour is argued on the basis of the probability and desirability of

its consequences.

2. Statements about the probability of a consequence occurring may be

supported by sub-argumentation in the form of argumentation from cause

to effect, in which it is argued on the basis of one or more causal links

that the predicted effect is likely to occur.



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3. Statements about the desirability of a consequence can be supported bysub-argumentation in the form of rule-based argumentation in which it

is argued, on the basis of an evaluation rule, that the desirability of a

consequence is plausible.

4. The position relating to the desirability of behaviour , considered sepa-

rately from its consequences, can be advocated on the basis of an appeal

to rule-based argumentation in which the conduct is judged on the basis

of one or more relevant rules of conduct.

5. Argumentation from authority, example or analogy can be used both to

support the position about the desirability of behaviour and to support

statements about the probability or desirability of consequences.

In sum, the goal of our empirical analysis of persuasive brochures is three-

fold: to identify the argument schemes used, to see if the expected patternof argumentation is found and to formulate hypotheses about the central

processing of persuasive messages.

2. ANALYSIS OF 20 PUBLIC INFORMATION BROCHURES

2.1. Method

We analysed a total of 20 public information brochures and leaflets to deter-

mine which schemes of argumentation are used in them. The purpose of

all the brochures and leaflets was to persuade the reader of the desirability

or undesirability of an action or behaviour. The purpose of nine of the 20

brochures was to discourage undesirable behaviour, varying from obvious

topics such as smoking and gambling to importing souvenirs made with or

of endangered plants or animals. Eleven brochures were designed to

promote desirable behaviour (e.g., the use of sun care products, and support

for Amnesty International). The brochures and leaflets were produced by

government agencies and non-profit organisations. Brochures produced by

for-profit organisations were excluded from consideration.

The brochures and leaflets varied in length from a gatefold leaflet (an

A4 folded into three), with text on five of the six pages, to a brochure

of 17 pages. The number of words varied from approximately 400 to

3,100.

Passages in the brochures that contained clearly marked argumentation

were identified and analysed; the argumentation was also reconstructed top-down from the desirable or undesirable conduct. Other passages, which

were not clearly argumentative in nature, were only included in the analysis

if argumentation or sub-argumentation for the position in question could

be extracted from them. The arguments identified in this way were classi-

fied in terms of the argumentation schemes defined by Schellens (1985)

(whereby the two types distinguished above, argumentation from an eval-

uation rule and argumentation from a rule of conduct, were included under



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argumentation from rules). The following argumentation schemes weredistinguished:

• Argumentation from cause to effect

• Argumentation from effect to cause

• Argumentation from rules

• Argumentation from consequences

• Argumentation from authority

• Argumentation from example

• Argumentation from analogy

For each brochure, we identified which argumentation schemes are used

in it. In this way we can answer the question in how many brochures an

argumentation scheme is used. The total number of arguments has not been

counted to avoid problems of counting argumentation from consequencesand argumentation from example: in many cases it is difficult to decide

whether a number of consequences or examples form part of a single

argument or must be considered as separate argumentations.

2.2. Overall results

An overview of the results is given in Table 1. All 20 brochures use argu-

mentation from consequences (pragmatic argumentation) to persuade the

reader of the desirability or undesirability of a particular action. This

confirms one of the expectations that we based on the restricted character

of argumentation. Pragmatic argumentation is a scheme that is specifically

bound to claims or standpoints about the desirability or undesirability of

actions, measures or behaviours.

In addition, most of the investigated brochures used argumentation from

cause to effect and argumentation from example. The former type of argu-

mentation is expected where additional arguments are given for the pre-

dicted effects of desirable or undesirable behaviour. In principle, as an

unrestricted scheme of argumentation, argumentation from example lends

itself for use in support of various sorts of positions. Argumentation from

rules and argumentation from authority were used less frequently. In what


Table 1. Argumentation schemes in persuasive brochures

Argumentation schemes Number of brochures in which

the argumentation scheme is used

Argumentation from consequences 20

Argumentation from cause to effect 15

Argumentation from example 14

Argumentation from rules 08

Argumentation from authority 06

Argumentation from effect to cause 03

Argumentation from analogy 02


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follows, we will discuss at what points in the argument those sorts of argu-ments occur and in what forms. Argumentation from effect to cause and

argumentation from analogy occurred only incidentally and we therefore

leave them out of account.

The sources of the excerpts discussed below are identified by the

italicised title of the brochure or leaflet in question (see the list given

after the endnotes). The original excerpts in Dutch are presented here in

translation.

2.3. Argumentation from consequences

In argumentation from consequences,1 in its simplest form, an action or

behaviour is advocated or opposed on the basis of a single desirable con-sequence (a pro) or undesirable consequence (a con):

Action A leads to B

B is desirable

Therefore, action A is desirable

Action A leads to B

B is undesirable

Therefore, action A is undesirable

In textual form, one of the premises and/or the conclusion are usually left

implicit in such schemes.2 In the following excerpt, both argumentation

schemes are used simultaneously:

(1) It has been shown that sunburn in childhood increases the risk

of developing skin cancer later in life. (. . .) It is therefore very

important to protect children well against the sun. (Watch out

for your skin)

Schematically:

(1a) Sunburn in childhood increases the risk of skin cancer

[Increased risk of skin cancer is undesirable]

[Therefore, sunburn in childhood is undesirable]

(1b) [Sun protection prevents sunburn in children]

[Preventing sunburn is desirable ≅ conclusion 1a]

Therefore, sun protection for children is desirable (≅ impor-

tant)

In the first step, the argumentation is on the basis of an undesirable con-

sequence. In the second, it is on the basis of a desirable consequence.

It is highly unusual for the argumentation in a brochure to focus on

only one single desirable or undesirable effect. In most cases, the argu-

mentation takes account of several favourable and unfavourable effects. For

example, in a brochure about amphetamines (‘speed’), a total of seven



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(short-term) advantages and more than 25 (long- and short-term) disad-vantages are mentioned. The following passage is illustrative:

(2) What does the amphetamine (speed) user feel?

(. . .) the mental effect: for a time, speed makes users feel active,

happy, alert and self-confident. Self-criticism disappears and it’s

easier to talk fluently. But speed can also have a quite different

effect: users can become irritable, restless and fearful, particu-

larly when the effect begins to wear off. They can suddenly

become overtired. Regular users often complain of chronic tired-

ness, lethargy and despondency. (Speed: The answers)

We find comparable forms of argumentation, in which several desirable and

undesirable effects are reviewed, in connection with topics such as drinking,smoking and sleeping tablets and sedatives.

Excerpt (2) also serves to illustrate other characteristics often exhibited

by pragmatic argumentation. First, the desirability or undesirability of the

consequences is often left unexpressed. The facts that happiness and self-

confidence are desirable and tiredness and lethargy are undesirable are left

to speak for themselves (as they do, of course). Whether the suppression

of self-criticism is a desirable or undesirable effect is open to question,

but given its place in the favourable set of effects and its position before

the oppositional conjunction but , the author seems to assume that it is.

(An alternative interpretation, for which the text offers no direct evidence,

is that the disappearance of self-criticism is the cause of the user being able

to talk more easily and more animatedly.)

Second, in line with the fact that the premise about the desirability or

undesirability of effects is left implicit, the position or conclusion is also

left implicit. There is no mention of a position about the undesirability of

the use of amphetamines, neither in this excerpt nor anywhere in the whole

brochure. The obvious conclusion is left entirely for the reader to draw.

When such an approach is maintained consistently, the brochure takes on

an informative form. No explicit argumentation is given, but the informa-

tion on which readers can build their own argumentation mounts up. The

question-and-answer form chosen in Speed. The answers reinforces the

informative ‘look’ of the brochure. The same sort of approach is taken in

brochures about sleeping pills and sedatives, and partly also those about

eating habits during pregnancy.

Argumentation from consequences is by no means limited to mentioningfavourable and unfavourable effects of a single action or behaviour. In a

more extensive form of pragmatic argumentation, the positive and negative

consequences of alternative actions are presented and weighed against each

other (see the ‘extended standard scheme for pragmatic argumentation’ in

Schellens, 1985, p. 177). In a number of brochures, we find an explicit

comparison of the effects of alternatives; for example, in the following

excerpt from the Exercise book for all age groups:



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(3) If you don’t take much exercise . . .. . . your muscles, lungs, heart and arteries are not used to work-

ing. So when they do need to work, they will find it difficult.

And you will feel it. You’re soon out of breath and tire quickly.

As a result, you’re soon discouraged from exercising again.

If you take enough exercise . . .

. . . your muscles, lungs, heart and arteries are used to working.

And that feels a lot better. You feel fitter and more energetic –

energetic enough to do lots of enjoyable things, for example.

(Thirty minutes’ exercise a day works wonders: Exercise book

for all age groups)

Here, too, it is left to the reader to work out that the effects of enough

exercise are preferable to those of taking too little exercise, and that takingenough exercise is therefore preferable. Since mention is made only of the

disadvantages of one of the alternatives (not taking much exercise), and

only of the advantages of the other (taking enough exercise), the decision

process is presented as a very simple one.

A consideration of the advantages and disadvantages is usually left to

the reader. Occasionally, the reader is expressly invited to make such a

deliberation.

(4) The advantages and disadvantages

Make your own list of the pros and cons. What advantages and

disadvantages does drinking alcohol have for you? The advan-

tages might include a sociable atmosphere, the pleasant taste

of the drink, the pleasant sensation alcohol gives you, or the fact

that you can talk more easily when you’ve had a glass or two.

The disadvantages might include the fact that alcohol is expen-

sive, that it cause stomach trouble, or that your partner or other

people make denigrating remarks about your drinking.

Weigh up the balance. Are there only advantages? Or are there

also some disadvantages? If some of the aspects of drinking

alcohol are less pleasant in your case, perhaps you would prefer

to get rid of them. (What sort of drinker am I?)

Underneath this text, on the same page, there is a column headed

Advantages and a column headed Disadvantages. There are 15 blank lines,

with three bullet points to suggest that at least three advantages and three

disadvantages should be filled in.

The most concealed form of argumentation from consequences is to be

found in brochures in which the reader is invited to take a test. The above-

mentioned Exercise book starts with such a test:

(5) How do you want to feel?

(. . .) Choose from the following list what you would like. They

are all possible, so tick all of them if you wish:



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❑ I’d like to feel more energetic❑ I’d like to have more stamina

❑ I’d like to cut down the chances of developing heart

problems

❑ I’d like to keep my bones as strong as possible

❑ I’d like to sleep better

❑ I’d like to stop being so tired

❑ I’d like to avoid weight problems

❑ I’d like to feel more relaxed

❑ I’d like to be less prone to getting ill

❑ I’d like to feel a good bit younger

It sounds almost too good to be true, but it is: thirty minutes’

exercise a day can give you all this . . . (Thirty minutes’ exercisea day works wonders)

Here the reader is explicitly invited to agree that certain effects are

desirable. In this way, the reader is forced (in argumentation-theoretic

terms) to make a number of concessions, i.e., to agree in advance with a

number of statements (potential arguments). As a result, the information

given later about causal links between exercise and the effects the reader

has ticked as desirable, can no longer be dismissed as irrelevant.

2.4. Argumentation from cause to effect

In its prototypical form, argumentation from cause to effect predicts that

a specific effect (Bi) will occur if phenomenon (Ai) occurs, on the basis

that phenomenon (A) generally leads to effect (B).3 Schematically:

A (generally) leads to B

Ai is the case

Therefore, Bi is (probably) the case

In a frequently occurring hypothetical variant, Ai is not a fact but is pre-

cisely the behaviour being advocated or opposed, e.g., to quit smoking, or

start smoking. The conclusion is therefore a conditional: ‘If Ai is the case,

Bi will probably occur’.4

In persuasive brochures, such individual predictions appear to be omitted:

they are often left to the reader to make. The argumentation remains limited

to generalised causal links between the behaviour advocated or opposed

and the generally occurring effects. Argumentation can be given for suchgeneralised causal links in the form of a chain of more easily understand-

able or plausible causal links. As we will see, argumentation from cause

to effect is then found in the form of a hypothetical

syllogism (often with one of the premises remaining implicit).

A (generally) leads to B

(B (generally) leads to C)

Therefore, A (probably) leads to C



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Table 1 shows that argumentation from cause to effect is found in 15 of the brochures analysed. However, it is certainly not the case that such a

form of argumentation supports all the effects of desirable or undesirable

behaviour in those brochures. In general, authors of informational brochures

make assertions about the effects without offering further argumentation

(cf. Excerpt 2). They seem to assume that readers normally accept such

assertions on the basis of their previous knowledge or on the basis of the

authority of the source.

In the 15 brochures in which argumentation is used to make predic-

tions, one to five of the predictions are supported by argumentation from

cause to effect. In the excerpt cited above about skin cancer, for example,

we find it as follows:

(1c) (a) Sunburn in childhood has been shown to lead to an increased

chance of developing skin cancer in later life, because (b) the

earlier skin cells are damaged, the longer they have to develop

into skin cancer. (c) The more UV rays a person is subjected to

when young, the greater the chance of getting skin cancer later

on. (d) It is therefore very important to protect children against

the sun. (Watch out for your skin)

The prediction that sunburn in childhood can lead to an increased risk of

skin cancer is supported by two causal assertions in conditional form in the

two subsequent sentences. Schematically:

(1d) (If skin is subjected to more UV rays in childhood, more cells

are damaged)The earlier cells are damaged, the more chance they have of

developing into skin cancer (b)

Therefore, if skin is subjected to more UV rays in childhood,

then the chance of skin cancer in later life is greater (c)

(If skin is sunburned in childhood, the skin is subjected to more

UV rays)

If the skin is subjected to more UV rays in childhood, then the

chance of skin cancer in later life is greater (c)

Therefore, sunburn in childhood leads to an increased risk of

developing skin cancer in later life (a)

Here we see a relatively complex process that is intended to make plau-sible a link between behaviour and effect that is relevant to the reader. It

is possibly the complexity of such links that generally keeps authors of

informational brochures from including such argumentation.

Argumentation from cause to effect can also be used to support social

and psychological links that are somewhat easier to envisage. For example,

in the following excerpt, it is predicted that caring for a foster child will

require extra attention:



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(6) Foster children aren’t model children: they have their moods,like every other child. They require your attention, perhaps

more, or in a different way, than other children. It is not easy

for them to live apart from their parents. They have often already

gone through a lot. They are still wrestling with their past expe-

riences and that calls for understanding on your part. ( I’m

looking for a house where I need to be home before dark )

From the fact that, just like other children, foster children are not model

children, the deduction is made that they need attention. From the fact that

they live apart from their parents, that they have often already been through

a lot and are wrestling with that, the deduction is made that they need more

attention, or attention of a different kind. All this leads to the conclusion

(not explicitly drawn here) that if someone wants to become a foster parent,

(s)he will need to be able to give the child this extra attention. That is one

of the disadvantages or costs of foster parenthood.

In all the above examples, there is a direct link between the action being

advocated (applying sun protection to children’s skin, becoming a foster

parent) and the desirable or undesirable effects of that action (no skin

cancer, giving a foster child extra attention). In some cases, the predic-

tions involved are rather more distant from the position being advocated.

(7) In the coming years, there will be an increasing need for care

for people with brain disorders. Thanks to great advances in

medicine, people who have brain damage, have had a stroke, or

have meningitis or a brain tumour are living longer. (Thinkingabout brains, brain damage and recovery)

On the basis of the fact that people with brain disorders are living longer,

the prediction is made that the need for care will increase. Only a number

of links further on does it become clear that this prediction is important in

connection with an action being advocated: support for the Dutch Brain

Foundation. In short: ‘an increased need for care requires more medical

research and more information: by supporting the Foundation you will

ensure that that is possible.’

2.5. Argumentation from example

As an unrestricted scheme of argumentation, argumentation from examplecan be used in support of various sorts of claims. The propositions being

supported are of a general nature: a case is made for the fact that some-

thing is always, often or sometimes the case. The proposition being sup-

ported may be descriptive or normative in nature: it may relate to something

that is always, often or sometimes true, or something that is always, often

or sometimes good, justified, beautiful or appropriate. We use the following

scheme for argumentation from example:5



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In example A1, B is the case/appropriate(In example A2 etc., B is the case/appropriate)

Therefore, in cases of A, B is the case/appropriate

With respect to argumentation from consequences, we expected that

examples would be used to support statements about the desirable or unde-

sirable effects of behaviour. In such cases, examples can in principle serve

to argue for the actual occurrence of an effect, or to argue in favour of the

desirability or undesirability of an effect. In addition, we expected that argu-

mentation from example would be used to support the desirability of the

behaviour being advocated.6

These expectations were largely satisfied in the analysis, although there

also were interesting deviations and additions.

First, in none of the brochures did we find examples supporting state-ments about a desirable effect. An author claiming that thirty minutes’

exercise a day leads to a fitter body might cite examples to support the

fact that is a very desirable effect. But such argumentation from example

was not attested. By contrast, it is undesirable effects that are supported

by examples. The following excerpt deals with the use of sleeping tablets

and sedatives:

(8) Unpleasant side effects may occur, such as headache, tiredness,

irritability or a feeling of emptiness, dizziness and despondency.

Interest in sex may also be reduced. (Sleeping tablets and

sedatives)

Both the existence of side effects (‘many side effects may occur’) and theirundesirable nature (‘generally, side effects are unpleasant’) are supported

here by the examples given. A brochure about vivisection, which largely

takes an informative approach, gives the following examples in a factual

explanation of the use of laboratory animals for various purposes:

(9) Many laboratory animals are used to test whether materials are

toxic or not. For example, laboratory animals are forced to eat

soap powder. They have to keep eating it until they become ill

or even die. That way, researchers can work out how much soap

powder people can eat before they become ill (but who would

think of eating soap powder?). Almost all new products are

tested on animals, including shampoo, lipstick, party nibbles,

paint and tobacco. ( If animals could talk . . .)

In the first place, of course, these examples (soap powder, shampoo, lipstick

etc.) serve to support the general assertion made in the first sentence. But,

at the same time, the first example serves to support another position

expressed later on in the text, namely, that the use of laboratory animals

for research purposes leads to a lot of undesirable and unnecessary suf-

fering for the laboratory animals.



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Against our expectations, argumentation from example is not used tosupport the desirability of behaviour, but rather to argue for the feasibility

of desirable behaviour, or, in other words, to show that the alternative

behaviour is practicable. Example 10 comes from the same brochure about

vivisection:

(10) As you know, large numbers of laboratory animals undergo

unpleasant tests. There is another way. Alternatives can be used.

Here are a few examples:

Dead eyes

In order to see whether a shampoo stings when it gets in your

eyes, shampoo is put into the eye of a rabbit. The rabbit is put

in a small cage so that it can’t rub the shampoo out of its eyes.

Researchers leave the shampoo in the eyes for hours, sometimes

days. This is of course a terrible time for the rabbit. Fortunately,

this is no longer necessary. Researchers have discovered that

they can just as well use the eyes of dead rabbits. Then there’s

no need for any pain ( If animals could talk . . .).

This is followed by a number of examples of alternatives involving com-

puters, robots and tissue cultures. In these examples, too, the animal suf-

fering is described in more detail and more graphically than is required

given the claim as formulated (‘Alternatives are possible’). And here too,

we can only consider the description as argumentation from example to

argue for the undesirable nature of vivisection.

The feasibility of the behaviour being advocated is argued at lengthwith examples in the Exercise book for all ages. The examples here do not

serve to support the claim that thirty minutes’ exercise a day is desirable,

but that the desirable behaviour is quite possible and practicable for

everyone.

(11) In addition, there are also possibilities of combining pleasure

with something useful. The possibilities for taking exercise are

all around us in the home.

(. . .)

In and around the home

• Maybe there are regular jobs that you get other people to do

for you, even though you could easily do them yourself –

cleaning windows, for example.• There are more and more appliances that save you work (and

also exercise). Use a hand-propelled mower. Use a brush or

hoe instead of a power blower. Use a sponge and wash-leather

instead of a high-pressure hose.

• No dog has ever complained about being taken for a walk

more often than is necessary – whether it’s your own dog or

your neighbour’s.



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• You can probably think of many other examples . . .(Thirty minutes’ exercise a day works wonders)

Examples of activities and exercises designed to show that the desirable

behaviour, thirty minutes’ exercise a day, can be quite easily done, are given

under the headings ‘Getting from A to B’, ‘Working and Shopping’ and

‘Sporting activities’.

In addition to our expectations, in two of the 20 brochures, argumenta-

tion from example is made the structuring principle of the brochure as a

whole. In one leaflet, intended to keep returning travellers from uninten-

tionally engaging in the traffic in endangered plant and animal species by

bringing back prohibited souvenirs, the headings of seven sections are as

follows:

(12) ARE YOU TRAVELLING ABROAD? THEN THINK TWICE

BEFORE BUYING SOUVENIRS SUCH AS . . . (. . .)

. . . IVORY: (. . .)

. . . TURTLES: (. . .)

. . . CORAL: (. . .)

. . . PLANTS: (. . .)

. . . WILD ANIMALS: (. . .)

. . . BECAUSE YOU WILL BE RUNNING THE RISK OF A

HEAVY FINE FOR DESTROYING LIFE ON EARTH . (. . .) (You

wouldn’t be the first one to be inadvertently guilty of smug-

gling endangered animals and plants)

Beneath each of the headings there is a short piece of argumentation as to

why bringing back souvenirs made of ivory, etc. is both unwise and risky.

The text under the final heading contains the following information, which

makes it clear that the above are only examples:

(12b) These are only a few examples. International trade in more than

800 animal and plant species is prohibited. Within the EU, strict

rules are now in force covering more than 20,000 other species

(. . .) (You wouldn’t be the first one to be inadvertently guilty

of smuggling endangered animals and plants).

Finally, we also find cases of argumentation from example that cannot be

linked directly to the premises about effects and the conclusion about desir-able behaviour in pragmatic argumentation. In a number of cases, there is

an indirect link:

(13) Hard or soft PVC can be found everywhere: in foils, credit cards,

rubber boots, pipes, window frames and cables. PVC may also

be present in imitation leather, floor coverings, wallpaper and

Venetian blinds (Stop poisonous toys).



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Here, the examples serve to demonstrate that PVC is to be found in moreproducts than consumers think (sentence 1). In this and several other cases,

argumentation from example forms part of a passage in which the seri-

ousness or extent of a problem (the undesirable situation) is advocated.

2.6. Argumentation from rules

Argumentation from rules is used to justify an evaluation of a situation

or process by appealing to an evaluation rule (an evaluation standard or

evaluation criterion) or a rule of conduct (a moral, legal or conventional

rule). These can be combined in a single scheme as follows:7

If A is the case, then an evaluation E is justified/conduct C is

requiredA is the case

Therefore, evaluation E is justified/conduct C is required

In relation to pragmatic argumentation, we would, first, expect that eva-

luation rules will be used to justify the desirability or undesirability of the

consequences of an action or behaviour. In that case, rule-based argumen-

tation is subordinate to argumentation from consequences. Secondly, rules

of conduct (whether laid down in law or not) can provide argumentation

that directly argues for or against the desirable or undesirable behaviour.

In that case, rule-based argumentation is convergent with argumentation

from consequences.

Although only eight of the 20 brochures made use of argumentation from

rules, those eight largely meet our expectations.

When arguments are given for the desirability or undesirability of certain

effects, they are made on the basis of an appeal to an explicit or implicit

rule or norm, as in the following example.

(14) People with a brain disorder also ought to be able to lead as

comfortable a life as possible. Scientific brain research can con-

tribute to this: greater knowledge of disorders leads to more

practical methods of treatment and better ‘customised care’

(Thinking about brains, brain damage and recovery).

‘Customised care’ in itself is already a possible desirable effect of health-

care research, but its desirability for people with a brain disorder is rein-

forced by the norm that they also have a right to as comfortable a life aspossible. (The causal links between customised care and a comfortable

life are left implicit.)

Sometimes, the norms to which appeal is made remain implicit. The

following excerpt argues that extra understanding for people with a brain

disorder is desirable by referring to their relatively high degree of vulner-

ability. Here, the norm that greater understanding for socially vulnerable

groups is desirable is used implicitly.



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(15) (. . .) As a result, people with brain damage form a separategroup of patients within rehabilitation: they are more vulnerable

when it comes to reintegration into the community than physi-

cally handicapped people. The Dutch Brain Foundation would

like to tackle this problem, too. By informing people about the

brain and brain disorders, they aim to create greater under-

standing amongst the public for people with a brain disorder.

(Thinking about brains, brain damage and recovery)

We believe it is no coincidence that an explicit or implicit appeal to norms

in public information brochures appears precisely in the case of argumen-

tation in favour of humanitarian goals. When the desirability of behaviour

and its effects is directly in the reader’s own interest, further argumenta-

tion is usually unnecessary. Without any problem, readers can be left todecide for themselves just how desirable the effects of the behaviour are.

Argumentation from rules of conduct may be used directly to argue for

the desirability or undesirability of conduct. We find only an occasional

example of that, and only in the case of a rule of conduct that has been

legally laid down, including penalties. In fact, reference to penalties trans-

forms argumentation from rule (in this case, prohibition) into argumenta-

tion from consequences. For the reader, the argumentation may come

down to the prediction of an undesirable effect: getting caught and being

punished.

(16) Coral reefs are vulnerable biotopes on which numerous sea crea-

tures depend for their survival. Many countries have established

a ban on diving for, selling and exporting coral. Before you

return to the EU with your ‘treasures from the sea’, you should

find out whether you need an import licence . . . otherwise the

fine may end up being greater than the cost of your whole

holiday (You wouldn’t be the first one to be inadvertently guilty

of smuggling endangered animals and plants).

The undesirable effect of coral souvenirs (i.e., the destruction of vulner-

able biotopes) is made worse here by the possibility of another undesir-

able effect: a heavy fine, resulting in a multiple argument structure. Readers

can choose: am I going to be persuaded by the danger to vulnerable biotopes

or am I going to be deterred by the fine?

2.7. Argumentation from authority

Argumentation from authority is an unrestricted scheme of argumentation,

and can in principle be used to support any sort of position. Schematically,8

this can be represented as follows:

A says P

Therefore, (I) P



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where P may be an assertion of fact or a value judgement, and where Istands for ‘interpretation of’ (to take account of argumentation in which

the conclusion is a paraphrase of the quotation).

Whenever argumentation from authority is used in connection with argu-

mentation from consequences, it can therefore be expected to be used as

an argument for the probability of one or more of the consequences, or as

an argument for their desirability or undesirability. Argumentation from

authority can also be used to support the desirability of behaviour directly.

In that case argumentation from authority is convergent with argumenta-

tion from consequences.

Argumentation from authority occurs in only six of the 20 brochures. It

should be noted, however, that we did not consider the sources of the

brochures to be argumentation from authority, although readers may of course construct for themselves argumentation from authority (e.g., ‘If

authoritative institutions such as the National Institute for the Advancement

of Health ( NIGZ ) and the Netherlands Institute of Mental Health and

Addiction jointly issue a brochure, then it will be reliable.’) Our analysis

therefore only takes into account those cases in which the text refers to

sources other than the issuer of the brochure to strengthen the message.

Most of the arguments from authority occur in a Greenpeace folder about

soft PVC toys.

(17) In order to make PVC soft and flexible, phthalates (softening

agents) are used. Laboratory research shows that these sub-

stances are linked with liver and kidney damage. Phthalates also

appear on the list of substances suspected to be carcinogenicissued by the International Agency for Research on Cancer

(IARC). Moreover, scientists believe that these substances

disturb the hormonal systems of humans and animals, which can

result, amongst other things, in reduced fertility and stunted

growth in young children. The Dutch Health Protection

Inspectorate (IGB) has shown that children can ingest these

dangerous substances when playing with toys made of soft PVC

(e.g., teething rings) – sometimes in unacceptable quantities.

(Stop poisonous toys)

‘Laboratory research’, the IARC and unnamed ‘scientists’ are used in

support of the statement that there may be risks attached to phthalates.

Subsequently, the IGB is introduced to back up the statement that childrencan ingest phthalates by playing with PVC toys. Apparently, Greenpeace

assumes that if they were to make such statements on their own authority,

these arguments would be less convincing to the target group.

All the above arguments from authority are used to back up statements

about the effects of behaviour. In the following cases, argumentation from

authority is used directly to support statements about the desirability of

behaviour:



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(18) ‘It is better not to give babies or small children soft PVC toys.’Consumers’ Guide, September 1997 (Stop poisonous toys).

(19) In July 1997, health minister Erica Terpstra wrote to the baby

toy trade: ‘(. . .) I appeal to your reputation and sense of respon-

sibility to take your own voluntary measures to prevent this

unnecessary and undesirable exposure of babies to phthalates

from baby toys’ (Stop poisonous toys).

In (18), the position ‘Don’t buy any soft PVC toys’ is directly supported

by a quotation from the Dutch Consumers’ Guide. In (19), the following

premise remains implicit: ‘If the Minister of Health calls on the trade to

stop selling soft PVC, then for me, as a consumer, it would be wise not to

buy anything containing it.’In the above cases, argumentation from authority involves an appeal to

the expertise of an identifiable source or an anonymous group. Two other

forms of argumentation from authority were found in our analysis. First,

appeal is occasionally made to the opinion of a collective with which the

reader has some connection to back up a position.

(20) More and more people are choosing to follow the working

methods of Solidaridad (Towards a new pattern in the Central

American clothing industry).

(21) Many people are touched by the sight of naked children enjoying

water and sand. But more and more parents know that their

children need to be well protected against the sun, not only to

prevent suffering from sunburn, but also to save them from skin

problems (Watch out for your skin).

Second, in a number of brochures, use is made of testimonials from

representatives of the target group to back up positions relating to desir-

able behaviour and their effects. In the Exercise book for all ages, quoted

earlier, four such testimonials (anonymous but with photograph) are used.

The following excerpt particularly seeks to make the point that thirty

minutes’ exercise a day can have a beneficial effect on weight.

(22) ‘ I exercise instead of dieting’

‘I get desperate from dieting. Every kilogram I lose by dieting

comes back in no time. I didn’t feel that my weekly aerobic club

helped me much. I still go, but at home I also do fifteen minutesevery morning before taking a shower. After work I don’t drive

to the supermarket, but do my shopping on my bike. Besides

that, I also think up as many possible little walks I could take

in between. I’ve stopped dieting and keep a closer eye on what

I eat. Maybe I could do with losing another couple of kilograms,

but at least my weight is stable now’ (Thirty minutes exercise

a day works wonders).



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Although this argumentation could be seen as a special form of argu-mentation from example, we prefer to treat such cases as arguments from

authority: the testimonial provider’s membership of the target group and

the reader’s possibility of identification with him or her, gives the testi-

monial provider the authority of someone who speaks from experience.

Finally, the use of a celebrity as authority is found only once in the

brochures we analysed: in a quotation and with a photograph, Dutch actress

Monique van der Ven endorses the work of the Dutch Brain Foundation

(Thinking about brains).

3. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

In this study, our purpose was to discover which sorts of argumentation

are used in persuasive public information documents. Due to the fact that

different evaluation norms are systematically linked to the various argu-

mentation schemes identified, we can now speculate, on the basis of the

pattern of argumentation found, about the tasks that readers take upon them-

selves in centrally processing a public information document.

If we look at the frequency with which the various argumentation

schemes are used in public information texts, then we see that argumenta-

tion from consequences, argumentation from cause to effect and argu-

mentation from example are the most preferred. These argumentation

schemes were used in three quarters or more of the material investigated.

These preferences are in line with what was found earlier in newspaper

texts. In an analysis of ten contributions to readers’ columns, these

three types were also found to be the most frequent, together with argu-

mentation for explanation (Schellens, 1985, p. 71). This similarity between

public information documents and newspaper opinion pages can be

explained on the basis of the sort of final position being argued for: in

both cases, it concerns the desirability or undesirability of behaviour. In

public information documents, it is usually a question of individual behav-

iour, whereas in contributions to opinion pages it is usually a question

of the behaviour or policy of governmental and other institutions. The

main difference lies in the fact that opinion articles more often present

arguments relating to positions about the causes of problems; whereas

this aspect is virtually absent in public information documents. In an

analysis of 50 newspaper texts (leader articles, reviews, advertisementsand reports), argumentation from rules of evaluation was among the most

frequently used argumentation schemes (alongside argumentation from

cause to effect, argumentation from effect to cause and argumentation from

consequences). This is mainly due to the nature of leader articles and

reviews, which tend to focus on the evaluation of a situation (in politics or

the arts).

In describing the pattern of argumentation that we found in public infor-



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mation documents, we follow the pattern of expectations that we formu-lated at the end of the Introduction.

1. In line with our expectations, the most frequently used argumentation

scheme in persuasive brochures is argumentation from consequences. It

was used in all the brochures analysed. It is striking that in many cases

the argumentation is often hardly marked as such, if at all. The desir-

ability or undesirability of consequences is left implicit and the con-

clusion (often obvious) is not expressed. Readers often have to construct

their own argumentation from a quasi-informative text.

2. The probability of the consequences is often (in 15 of the 20 brochures)

supported by argumentation from cause to effect, in which a consequence

of the desirable or undesirable behaviour is derived from one or more

causal links.3. The desirability of consequences is argued for in only a few cases on

the basis of an explicit or implicit rule of evaluation.

4. The desirability of behaviour is argued for in only a few cases directly

on the basis of an implicit or explicit rule of conduct. In cases where

that rule of conduct is a legal prohibition and violation entails a penalty,

the argumentation automatically takes on a pragmatic character, since

incurring the penalty can be seen as an undesirable consequence of the

prohibited behaviour.

5. Argumentation from example and argumentation from authority are used

regularly, whereas argumentation from analogy is hardly used at all.

Argumentation from example is used (in 14 of the 20 brochures) to

support the plausibility of undesirable effects of undesirable behaviour,

or the practicability of the desirable behaviour. Argumentation from

authority is mostly used (in six of the 20 brochures) to argue for the

probability of effects and the desirability of behaviour.

The average persuasive public information brochure provides information,

by means of a text that is not overtly argumentative, about the consequences

of desirable or undesirable behaviour. The desirability or undesirability of

the consequences themselves is considered to be self-evident. The proba-

bility of the predicted consequences actually occurring is supported in a

number of cases through the use of argumentation from cause to effect,

argumentation from example or argumentation from authority. The practi-

cability of the conduct being advocated is sometimes directly supported

by argumentation from example or argumentation from authority.

What implications does this sort of structuring have for the central pro-cessing of persuasive texts? First, it is important to observe that, at first

sight, many persuasive texts are hardly (if at all) argumentative in nature:

arguments are not given explicitly and the construction of an argumenta-

tion structure is left to the reader. Readers processing texts centrally must

therefore be able and willing to construct their own argumentation on the

basis of an ostensibly informative text. It is perhaps not too difficult to

construct (or reconstruct) an argument on the basis of an informative text



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about the effects of smoking which leads to the conclusion that it is betternot to smoke. In that case, the putative argument follows well-trodden paths.

But in the case of sleeping tablets and sedatives, for instance,

constructing or reconstructing an argument is a rather more complex matter

and any conclusion will also be considerably more subtle.

Second, the predominantly pragmatic nature of the argumentation means

that readers processing the text centrally will at least test the argumenta-

tion they have constructed (or reconstructed) against evaluation criteria

for that type of argumentation. Schellens and Verhoeven (1994, p. 114)

formulate nine evaluation questions applicable to the standard scheme for

argumentation from consequences. It would be going too far to set all the

evaluation questions as potential heuristics used by central processors in

evaluating arguments. (Hastings, 1962, pp. 76–77, for instance, formulatesonly three). Nonetheless, the careful evaluation of arguments assumed by

Petty and Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model must at least involve

the central processors asking themselves, in one form or another, the fol-

lowing questions:

• How desirable or undesirable are the consequences presented as pros or

cons of the behaviour being advocated?

• How likely is it that the consequences mentioned will occur?

• Have all relevant advantages and disadvantages (including costs) of the

advocated behaviour been taken into account?

• Is the advocated behaviour feasible or practicable?

• Do the advantages of the advocated behaviour weigh more heavily than

the disadvantages and the costs?

• Having weighed up the advantages and disadvantages of the behaviour

being advocated, is it preferable to alternatives for that behaviour,

similarly considered?

Third, people who process texts centrally may be expected to consider other

sorts of argumentation used to support the standpoint directly or indirectly.

That means that they must also be able to evaluate, on their various merits,

argumentation from cause to effect, argumentation from rule, argumenta-

tion from example and argumentation from authority. In some form or other,

they will also have to be able to ask and answer relevant evaluation ques-

tions related to those types of argumentation. Here, too, a number of crucial

questions can be distilled from the evaluation questions relating to the argu-

mentation schemes in question. For example, in the case of argumentation

from cause to effect:• Are the causal links being referred to plausible?

• Do the causal links presented make the predicted consequence plausible?

In the case of argumentation from rules:

• Are the evaluation criteria used or the rule of conduct used relevant in

this case?

• Are other evaluation criteria or rules of conduct relevant?

In the case of argumentation from example:



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• Are the examples mentioned plausible and typical of the class to whichthe conclusion relates?

• Are there any counterexamples that undermine the conclusion?

And in the case of argumentation from authority:

• Is the cited authority sufficiently expert to justify acceptance of the

statement solely on his authority?

• Is the cited authority disinterested and impartial?

• Are there any other authoritative sources who assert the contrary?

In reasoning along these lines, we may be giving the impression that

we are equating a normative theory about the quality of argumentation (in

this case the argumentation schemes and evaluation questions of Schellens)

with an explanatory theory about the cognitive processing of persuasive

texts, namely the central route in Petty and Cacioppo’s ElaborationLikelihood Model. Such an equation would go much too far, but we cer-

tainly believe a comparison of the two approaches can yield a number of

useful hypotheses. On the one hand, the explanatory theory of Petty and

Cacioppo has a clearly normative element in that it describes central pro-

cessing as a process of ‘careful judgment’, with a consequent distinction

between strong and weak arguments. However, what is important for the

further specification of the concept of central processing is not so much a

question of what, ideally, should happen in the process of evaluating care-

fully the strength of argumentation, but rather a question of what cogni-

tive operations recipients of persuasive messages actually perform in

processing a persuasive message and evaluating it. On the other hand, the

argumentation schemes and evaluation questions formulated by Hastings

(1962), Schellens (1985) and Walton (1996) also have clear empirical pre-

tensions: the argumentation schemes are based on the forms of argumen-

tation found in argumentative texts and (unlike formal logical evaluation

criteria) the evaluation questions are intended for use by ordinary language

users. In this way, in one form or another, normative schemes constitute

potential hypotheses concerning the cognitive schemes used by language

users when they produce their own argumentation or process that of others.

In the same way, the evaluation questions per scheme can be seen as poten-

tial hypotheses concerning the heuristics used by language users to retrieve

relevant prior knowledge and possible counterarguments. It is then an

empirical question as to what extent schemes and evaluation questions (in

whole or in part, and of a greater or lesser degree of abstraction) also

actually form part of the language user’s cognitive mechanism.Precisely how research into this topic should be carried out is still largely

an open question. Earlier research by Hastings (1962), Schellens (1985)

and Garssen (1997), however, may throw some light on the matter. Hastings

found that argumentation from authority and argumentation from figura-

tive analogy were identified with very high frequencies (100%), nonfigu-

rative analogy and argumentation from cause to effect scored about

70%, whereas the other types he distinguished all scored less than 50%.



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Schellens, who asked subjects to identify various forms of argumentationafter receiving brief instructions, found that the types most frequently

correctly identified were argumentation from consequences (in this case

from goal to means), argumentation from example and argumentation from

cause to effect (identified correctly in 60–70% of the cases); whereas

argumentation from effect to cause and argumentation from rules of

evaluation (in this case from characteristics to value judgment) were

correctly identified in 40–50% of cases. Although the results of Hastings

and Schellens were achieved after instruction, a high score possibly means

that the argument scheme appeals to an already available cognitive scheme.

Garssen (1997, pp. 155ff) asked subjects to classify and group three types

of argumentation verbally, with no prior instruction about argumentation

schemes. He found that subjects correctly classified and grouped argu-mentation from comparison but scored only very moderately on argumen-

tation from causal links and argumentation from sign relation. Similarly,

it emerged in a critical response test that only in the case of argumenta-

tion from comparison do subjects express their criticism of argumentation

in a way that makes it possible to derive any insight into the argumenta-

tion scheme used. One possible explanation of this is that the three sorts

of argumentation distinguished by Garssen, following pragma-dialectical

theory, are defined rather abstractly. As a result, quite different subtypes

are subsumed under the sign and causal link. Nonetheless, the methods

developed by Garssen provide a good starting point for further research

into the argumentative notions used by language users.

One of the Netherlands’ authorities in the field of sports, footballer Johan

Cruijff once famously said: ‘Every advantage has its disadvantage.’ This

suggests that his cognitive mechanisms include at least a partial scheme for

argumentation from consequences. We believe it would be useful to analyse

the evaluations of subjects who are asked to evaluate persuasive texts while

thinking aloud to find indications of argumentation schemes and evalua-

tion criteria. Subsequently, in line with Petty and Cacioppo’s research,

experiments could be carried out to see whether such heuristics are used

less in the case of peripheral processing than in the case of central pro-

cessing.

NOTES

1 We consider ‘pragmatic argumentation’ and ‘argumentation from consequences’ to be two

terms denoting the same type of argumentation. The more usual term (pragmatic argumen-

tation) is found, for example, in the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, pp.

266–270) and Kienpointner (1992, pp. 340–342). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca give the

following description: ‘We call that argument pragmatic which permits the evaluation of an

act or an event in terms of its favorable or unfavorable consequences’ (p. 266). The term

‘argumentation from consequences’ is borrowed from Walton (1996, pp. 75–77). He uses

the term for ‘a species of practical reasoning where a contemplated policy or course of action



26/29

is favorably supporting by citing the good consequences of it. In the negative form, a con-templated action is rejected on the grounds that it will have bad consequences’ (p. 75). We

prefer Walton’s terminology because it allows a clear parallelism in the naming of various

argumentation schemes.

Walton also uses the term ‘argument from consequences’ later in his book (pp. 168ff.)

for a different sort of argumentation, namely ‘accepting the truth (or falsehood) of a propo-

sition by citing the consequences of accepting (or rejecting) that proposition’ (p. 168). (See

Blair, 1999, who correctly points out this inconsistency on Walton’s part.) The usual name

for this fallacy is ‘argument ad consequentiam’.2 This scheme is taken from Schellens (1985, pp. 174–175). A more abstract but compa-

rable scheme for argument from consequences is given by Kienpointner (1992):

‘Wenn die Folgen einer Handlung eine Bewertung X rechtfertigen, ist auch

die Handlung selbst mit X zo bewerten / (nicht) zu vollziehen

Die Folgen der Handlung sind mit X zu bewerten

Also: Die Handlung is mit X zu bewerten / (nicht) zu vollziehen’ (p. 341)

Walton (1996) gives the following scheme:

‘If A is brought about, then good (bad) consequences will (may plausibly) occur

Therefore, A should (not) be brought about’ (p. 76).

The notation for argumentation schemes varies considerably; no clear-cut conventions have

yet been developed for them.3 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) deal with this type in passing as one of the forms

of argumentation in which a causal link is used: ‘argumentation which relies on the inter-

vention of the causal link to try, with a given event as starting point, to increase or decrease

the belief in the existence of a cause which would explain it, or of an effect which would

result from it’ (p. 263). In the latter case, we speak of argumentation from cause to effect.

Kienpointner (1992) following Schellens (1985) also makes a distinction between explana-

tory and predictive causal argumentation schemes. Schellens (1985, p. 100), Schellens and

Verhoeven (1988, p. 82), Kienpointner (1992, p. 336) and Walton (1996, p. 73) formulate

almost identical argumentation schemes.4 Hastings (1962, pp. 65–77) and Walton (1996, pp. 74–75) also mention this hypothetical

variant of argumentation from cause to effect. Hastings: ‘Cause to effect reasoning may

take two forms. The first is a prediction on the basis of existing conditions, saying that certain

events will occur in the future. The second form is that of a conditional or hypothetical struc-

ture, in which the results of hypothetical conditions are predicted’ (p. 65). Moreover, Hastings

makes no distinction between argumentation from consequences and argumentation from

cause to effect. He subsumes non-argued predictions that a proposed measure will have a

certain effect under argumentation from cause to effect. We, with Walton, reserve the term

for hypothetical or non-hypothetical predictions argued for on the basis of a causal link.5 This scheme is borrowed from Schellens and Verhoeven (1988, p. 108). Kienpointner

(1992, p. 368) makes a distinction between a descriptive and a normative variant. In the

first scheme, the examples take the form: ‘In Beispiel 1 kommt X die Eigenschaft Y zu’

and the conclusion is: ‘Nicht wenigen/zahlreichen/vielen/den meisten X kommt Y zu’. In thenormative variant, the examples take the following form: ‘In Beispiel 1 ist die Bewertung

Y von X gerechtfertigt’ and the conclusion is as follows: ‘In nicht wenigen/zahlreichen/

vielen/den meisten Fällen ist die Bewertung Y von X gerechtfertigt’.

Walton (1996, pp. 50–53) seems to only consider the descriptive variant. His scheme is

as follows:

‘In this particular case, the individual a has property F and also property G.

a is typical of things that have F , and may or may not also have G.

‘Therefore, generally, if x has property F , then x also has property G’ (p. 52).



27/29

Hastings (1962, pp. 25–35) also attaches only descriptive generalizations as conclusions toargumentation from example: ‘In this process of reasoning, the essential characteristic is

the verbal formulation of a description of an aspect of reality from the presentation of typical

instances, examples, or samples of reality’ (p. 25). However, it appears from his examples

that those descriptive generalisations often contain normative elements, for instance in sup-

porting conclusions about ‘inadequate policies’ or ‘misadministration’.6 Various authors point to the problematic distinction between an argument from example

and an illustration. In the former case, an example is used to make a statement plausible; in

the latter case, an example is used to illustrate or clarify a well-known or accepted state-

ment (cf. e.g., Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 357). That distinction, however,

can rarely be used on text-analytic grounds: the linguistic form of the example does not reveal

how the author intended his example to function, nor is it possible to ascertain whether a

reader accepts a statement in advance. We here apply a maximally argumentative interpre-

tation of examples. (Cf. the strategy of ‘maximally argumentative interpretation’ of Van

Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 49.)7 In this scheme, we take together argumentation from evaluation rules and argumentationfrom rules of conduct. Specific schemes for these have been formulated in Schellens (1985,

pp. 139–140, 150) and Schellens and Verhoeven (1988, pp. 73–74, 78). The basis for these

lies in the analysis of evaluation rules of Hare (1953) and the structure for ‘reasoning with

rules’ of Gottlieb (1968). The literature on argumentation types shows a somewhat frag-

mentary picture. In Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), we do not find any separate treat-

ment of argumentation from rules or norms; although, the authors do treat the rule of justice

and arguments of reciprocity under quasi-logical arguments (pp. 218–226), which we view

as subcategories of argumentation from rule. Hastings (1962) includes argumentation in

support of value judgements in the category ‘Argument from criteria to a verbal classifica-

tion’ (pp. 36–45). He thus makes no distinction between verbal classifications of a descrip-

tive nature and those of a normative nature. Windes and Hastings (1969), however, do make

a distinction between ‘reasoning from characteristics to a description (by criteria of defini-

tion)’ and ‘reasoning from characteristics to a value judgment (by criteria of value)’ (pp.

159–168). Kienpointner (1992) classifies argumentation from rule among the normative

variants of the Definitionsschemata (p. 251), Genus-Spezies-Schemata (p. 265) and Ganzes-

Teil-Schemata (pp. 275–276), all leading to the conclusion ‘Wertung Z ist bezüglich X

gerechtfertigt’ or ‘Handlung Z ist angebracht’. Finally, Walton (1996) deals only with

‘argument from an established rule’ (pp. 91–93). There he is concerned only with rules of

conduct laid down in laws, contracts or agreements.8 The scheme presented here is taken from Schellens (1985, p. 186). Kienpointner (1992,

p. 395) formulates more detailed schemes. He distinguishes between a descriptive and a

normative variant:

‘Wenn die Autorität X sagt, dass P wahr/wahrscheinlich ist, ist P wahr/

wahrscheinlich

X sagt, dass die proposition P wahr/wahrscheinlich ist

Also: P ist wahr/wahrscheinlich’

‘Wenn die Autorität X die Bewertung Y (= die normative Proposition P) für

richtig erklärt / die Ausführung der Handlung Z für angebracht erklärt, ist Y

richtig / die Ausführung von Z angebracht.

X erklärt Y für richtig / erklärt die Ausführung von Z angebracht

Also: Y ist richtig / die Ausführung von Z ist angebracht’

In Walton’s scheme (1996, p. 65), only the descriptive variant is taken account of:

‘E is an expert in domain D

E asserts that A is known to be true

A is within D

Therefore, A may (plausibly) be taken to be true’



28/29

He also treats separately the strongly related forms of ‘argument from position to know’(pp. 61–63) and ‘ethotic argument’ (pp. 85–87). Like Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969,

pp. 305–310) and Kienpointner, we subsume all sorts of authorities here under one heading.

Like Hastings (1962, p. 139), we treat argumentation from authority as a ‘free-floating

argument’ or unrestricted argument, which can be employed both for descriptive and nor-

mative claims. We do not discuss here the relationship between argumentation from authority

and the ‘ad verecundiam’ fallacy. See Woods and Walton (1982, pp. 86–91) and Perelman

and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, pp. 305–307).

LIST OF CITED BROCHURES EN FOLDERS

Als dieren konden praten . . . (If animals could talk . . .), Anti-Vivisectie-Stichting, The

Hague, n.d.

Denk eens na over hersenen . . . hersenschade en herstel? (Thinking about brains, braindamage and recovery), Hersenstichting Nederland, The Hague, n.d.

Een half uur per dag bewegen doet wonderen. Beweegboekje voor alle leeft ijden (Thirty

minutes’ exercise a day works wonders: Exercise book for all age groups), Nederlandse

Hartstichting, The Hague, n.d.

Ik zoek een huis waar ik voor donker binnen moet zijn (I’m looking for a house where I

need to be home before dark), Federatie Pleegzorg, n.p., 1998.

Kijk uit voor je huid (Watch out for your skin), Nederlandse Kankerbestrijding, n.p., n.d.

Naar een nieuw patroon in de Middenamerikaanse kledingindustrie (Towards a new pattern

in the Central American clothing industry), Solidaridad, Utrecht, n.d.

Slaap- en kalmeringsmiddelen. De Antwoorden (Sleeping tablets and sedatives: The answers),

Trimbosinstituut, Utrecht, 1997.

Speed. De antwoorden (Speed: The answers), Trimbosinstituut, Utrecht, 1997.

Stop giftig speelgoed (Stop poisonous toys), Greenpeace, Amsterdam, 1997.

U zou de eerste niet zijn die zich onbewust schuldig maakt aan smokkel van bedreigde dieren

en planten (You wouldn’t be the first one to be inadvertently guilty of smuggling endan-gered animals and plants), Cites-Bureau, Dordrecht, n.d.

Wat ben ik voor drinker? (What sort of drinker am I?) Nationaal Instituut voor

Gezondheidsbevordering en Ziektepreventie, Woerden, 1998.

REFERENCES

Blair, J. A.: 1999, ‘[Book Review of] D.N. Walton, Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive

Reasoning’, Argumentation 13, 338–343.

Eemeren, F. H. van and R. Grootendorst: 1992, Argumentation, Commun

schellens & jong_argumentation schemes in persuasive brochures

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