schierup quasi proleterian buraucr patr soviet studies 1992

8/3/2019 Schierup Quasi Proleterian Buraucr Patr Soviet Studies 1992

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University of Glasgow

Quasi-Proletarians and a Patriarchal Bureaucracy: Aspects of Yugoslavia's Re-PeripheralisationAuthor(s): Carl-Ulrik SchierupSource: Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1 (1992), pp. 79-99Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/152248 .

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CARL-ULRIK SCHIERUPdomestic research and development capacity, combined with increased inter-national cooperation and openness to technological and organisational change,also seemed to support this promise. If we, in line with Cohen (1987, 220ff.),consider the quality, composition and reproduction patterns of the labour force atleast as important as conditions for the structuringof the international division oflabour as is the geographical location of the accumulation of capital, Yugoslaviawould have good prospects for achieving an advanced position in the worldeconomy, based on accumulating resources of highly skilled and qualified labourwhich, in contrast to other countries of'real socialism', were exposed to continu-ous and less restrained communication with advanced Western centres of knowl-edge and learning.Yet today we find Yugoslavia in a position on the edge of the modern worldsystem, apparently not less peripheralthan its position as a poverty stricken neo-colonial appendix to the European core economies before World War II (cf.Schierup, 1990). A director of a large Yugoslav textile plant recently summarisedthe effects of this dire 're-peripheralisation' of Yugoslavia within a changinginternational division of labour in almost aphoristic terms:

Yugoslavia... is movinginto a phasewhich... will in a few years imply a situationwherewe becomesub-contractorso the producers f the Far East.And this means, nessence, hat ourworkers,nsteadof theirs,will then come to work or ahandfulof rice.In the following we take as our point of departureone of the most conspicuousaspects of this re-peripheralisation, the reproduction and simultaneous trans-formation of the pattern of labour utilisation which has become known inYugoslavia under the notion of the 'peasant-worker'strategy (see further,Puljiz,1977; Schierup, 1990). From being once an essential element of socialist economicreconstruction and an expansive process of 'self-centred' industrialisation, peas-ant-workers and an extended 'rural-urban symbiosis' are now situated in thecontext of pervasive processes of re-peripheralisation.We contest what we regardas one-sided explanations of this condition in terms of theories of world marketdependence. We argue for investigation of the concrete historical conditionscircumscribingthe development of unique forms of class and labour relationshipsassociated with Yugoslav 'real self-management' and their specific forms ofarticulation in the context of a changing international division of labour.Alongside a reaffirmationof the proto-peasantmanual working class we find herea fermentinghidden economy connected with the dominance of informal relation-ships, a dramatic marginalisation of the technical intelligentsia and systematicattempts at 'levelling' the expectations of young people, in ways correspondingwith the peripheralposition of Yugoslavia in the modern world system. These areessential social conditions which have been inherited by and could be expected tobe reproducedby today's motley assembly of 'post-communist' ruling coalitions.

Planning strategies and the new workingclassLike the USSR after the October Revolution, in 1945 Yugoslavia was in asituation in which so-called 'primitive accumulation' on the basis of peasant

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QUASI-PROLETARIANS AND BUREAUCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA 81agriculturewas regardedas an unquestionable necessity by the political leadership(Hamilton, 1968), and was to become the single most important source of so-called 'external accumulation' for industry during the first two post-war decades(Korosic, 1988).2After the national liberation war it was the ambition of the political leadershipto liberate the country from its pre-war dependence and underdevelopmentthrougha rapid process of autonomous industrial development. The peasantry,asthe all-dominant population group in by far the most important economic sector,was to have a key role in economic reconstruction and development. Agriculturewould provide the new labour for industrial development and food for thegrowingurbanpopulation, supplyraw materials for domestic industry, and exportcrops to pay for the import of industrial technology from abroad.In the period immediately after 1945 a number of non-economic legal andpolitical measures were used to increase surplus production in agriculture (seePuljiz, 1977). A scheme of administratively imposed obligatory deliveries ofagriculturalproducts created considerable hostility among a peasantry that hadformed the backbone of the national liberation struggle.This hostility culminatedin spontaneous obstruction and protest following a Stalinist-style attempt atforced collectivisation from 1947.In the beginning, the mobilisation of industrial labour from agriculture waslargely done by non-economic means, whether by administrative conscription,channelling spontaneous popular enthusiasm and a national spirit of self-sacrificeinto largeworks of reconstruction, or a combination of both. Economic incentivesfor wage labour were small. The peasantry had almost completely retreated intosubsistence production during the interwar economic crisis and had thus mini-mised their immediate needs for cash income. At the same time there was notmuch to offer in the form of remunerationfor work, and not much to buy that thepeasants themselves did not produce.From the beginning of the 1950s, however, a totally new situation wasestablished. Administrative deliveries and forced collectivisation were abandonedand most peasant production cooperatives dissolved. From that time the peasant-workerstrategybecame the dominant form of primitive accumulation and was toremain so until the mid-1960s (see further, Schierup, 1990).Extensive land reforms had cut down the most market-orientedtop layer of theold peasantry, curtailed the forces of proletarianisation operating in pre-warYugoslav villages, and created a numerous stratum of highly homogeneouspeasant households predominantly oriented towards subsistence agriculture. Adecentralised strategy of labour-intensive industrialisation brought the factoriesclose to the villages and peasants, while cooperation between individual peasanthouseholds and the socialised sector of agriculture became the basis for amodernisation which generated a growingsurplusof labour in peasant agricultureand a demand for new forms of employment. A reorientation from an initial'Stalinist' insistence on heavy industry towards a more balanced pattern ofindustrial development (see Hamilton, 1968) gave more room for the productionof a variety of consumption goods that a peasant-workerwould be motivated tobuy. Wages were high enough to attract the growingruralsurplus population, but


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CARL-ULRIK SCHIERUPlow enough to force the worker to keep a foothold in the village and on the land.This became the basis for a continuous process of primitive accumulation and'cyclical migration' (cf. Meillassoux, 1981), and for the peasant-workers'emerg-ence as a major stratum of the new industrial working class (Kostic 1955;Markovic, 1974; Cvjeticanin et al., 1980; Puljiz, 1977). Owing to the partialreproduction of this large labour force within the framework of a rural subsis-tence-oriented economy, wages in the socialised sector of the economy could bekept low, and a 'free rent' from peasant agriculturecontinuously harnessed as asource of external accumulation (Korosic, 1988) for the purpose of 'socialistreconstruction and development'.3Situational peasants and quasi-proletariansPeasant-workersofficially made up close to half of the total employed Yugoslavlabour force in all occupations and a dominant section of the industrial labourforce in 1960. The number of industrial workerswho directly or indirectly earnedsome of their means of subsistence from private agriculturewas, however, muchhigher than that (Puljiz, 1977; Cvjeticanin, 1980).In reality, the majority of the population were living in a complex 'rural-urbansymbiosis', as expressed by Vlado Puljiz (1987). Also, most 'non-agricultural'workers' households were more or less dependent on the village and agriculture.Hence, small-scale subsistence production provided an essential contribution tothe living standardsof many workers' households in the villages or on the outskirtsof the towns, although these were statistically registered as 'non-agricultural'.Other non-agriculturalworkers' households would barter labour and other ser-vices with agriculturalhouseholds for food. Even most workers who had migratedpermanently to large urban centres remained tied to their rural communities oforigin by innumerable primordial bonds, and became involved in longstanding,informal rural-urban exchange patterns which were important for their subsis-tence. All this contributed to these people's 'domestic' sources of accumulation inYugoslavia's post-war economic development, which was what earned them thename of 'peasant-urbanites' (see Simic, 1973). Finally, to complete the picture,many of the households statistically designated 'rural' were in fact 'mixed'peasant-workerhouseholds, for they provided a seasonal or irregular abour forcefor construction projects and industries not registered in the employmentstatistics.

Rural-urban symbiosis as a condition of re-peripheralisationIt has been argued that the Yugoslav working class has conserved, or lately evenreinforced, its markedly semi- or proto-rural character (Korosic, 1988, 88ff.;Cvjeticanin, 1988; Puljiz, 1987, 1988). Purely statistically, the importance of therural population has decreased quite dramatically since the war (Puljiz, 1977;Livada, 1988). Officially also, the proportion of'peasant-workers' in the Yugoslavworkingclass has decreased considerably since the early 1960s (Cvjeticanin et al.,1980: 22ff.). Nevertheless, most of the population still live in villages or minor

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QUASI-PROLETARIANS AND BUREAUCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA 83urban centres. Even though they are employed outside the farm, and are officiallyregistered as 'workers',they continue to live at the homestead, which remains anessential part of the family economy. They are the numerous village-basedcommuters (see Oliveira-Roca, 1984, 1988). The other characteristic fact is thatthe urban population still does not sell its agricultural and,but keeps it (partlyorcompletely), mainly to supplement an insufficient income (see Cvjeticanin, 1988)or to conserve a defensive platform of retreat in the event of misfortune or crisis(Cvjeticanin, 1980, 172ff.; CvjetiEanin, 1988). This (Korosic, (1988: 91) meansthat both in the village and in the town we find a population which we could call'ad hoc' or 'situational' peasants. In the village we do not find genuine peasants,but rather surviving relics of the peasantry who more or less support themselveson the basis of the land, and in the urban-industrialareas we find elements of apeasant economy.With the intensification of Yugoslavia's economic crisis during the 1980s therelationship between the inflow of foreign loans and the drain on the economyrepresented by repayments and interest was to become negative. Since 1982Yugoslavia became an exporter of capital to the old industrialised countries(OICs). Migrant remittances also decreased from the mid-1980s, both in relativeand absolute terms.This renewed the importance of private agriculture,which was to become themost important 'shock-absorber'for the crisis when the urban-industrialsegmentof the economy was being forced to wake up afterhaving been 'doped' by 'externalaccumulation' (i.e. foreign loans and migrant remittances) during the 1970s(Puljiz, 1987, p. 15). The great economic reforms and incipient prosperity of the1960s and a conspicuous petro-dollar boom duringthe 1970s seemed to fade outof sight as historical intermezzos as a latent economic crisis came out into theopen by 1980. At this juncture a still fairly traditionalist peasant agricultureshould once again, as during the great depression of the 1930s (see Schierup,1990), become the main bastion of retreat. Thus, as Puljiz argues,

with historicalrony... the individualpeasantholdingwhich heagrarian olicy,duringthewholepost-warperiod,has endeavouredo beat downas a survival rompast times,has todaybecome the main cushionfor the crisis,wardingoff social miseryof hugedimensions. Puljiz,1988,20;see alsoMitrany,1951;Schierup,1990a.)A culturalbacklash and 're-traditionalisation' of all social relationships go hand

in hand with the reaffirmation of a 'rural-urban symbiosis' embracingthe majorpartof the population. Those who are the most exposed to dramatically decreasingliving standardstoday are members of the urbanpopulation living exclusively ontheir wages or pensions. As the crisis makes the population rely more heavily onprivate land and other supplementarysources of income, the 'mixed' agriculturalhousehold and 'peasant-worker'stratum in the villages have become reaffirmed(see Cvjeticanin, 1988). Also, a large part of the urban population, symbolicallyand economically reinforcing their social relationships with the village popula-tion, revive their interest in inherited agricultural plots (like, for example,industrial and office workers from Zagreb, Belgradeand other largecities who goback to the villages to cultivate their inherited plots during weekends). Hence 'a


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CARL-ULRIK SCHIERUPmassive trend started moving in the opposite direction' of the pervasive post-warprocesses of industrialisation and urbanisation: 'i.e. from the non-agriculturaltothe agriculturalsector', as Cvjeticanin (1988, pp. 128-29) tells us.

From this perspective it could appear as if the wheel of history has turned fullcircle and is returningthe Yugoslav economy to its initial post-warposition withits reliance on the peasant economy as a source of 'extra accumulation'. Thequestion now, however, is not so much about a 'primitive accumulation' directedtowards a dynamic process of domestic industrialisation. Rather, a major part ofthe free rent reaped from a subsistence-oriented agriculture (see notes 2 and 3) istransferreddirectly abroad in the context of a growingtransnational dominationof the whole economic process. Hence, the structuralcontext of peasant-workerstrategies has been fundamentally altered. Today's increasinglywidespread 'rural-urban symbiosis' is intrinsically connected with a trend of re-peripheralisationduring the 1970s and 1980s.The most important mechanism for the transfer of surplus value abroad hasbecome subcontracting,where foreign companies make arrangementswith Yugos-lav firms for utilising existing production facilities, exploiting village-basedlabourin return for subminimal wages. Perhaps the most conspicuous example of this isthe development of the textile and clothing industry (Chepulis, 1984a), which ineffect means the continuation of a tradition of foreign dominance established inthe inter-war period (as described by Chepulis, 1984b; see also, Schierup, 1990,pp. 39-40, 46ff.). Because of the low productivity of labour and unfavourableconditions on the world market during the 1980s, textiles have generally beenexported at prices way below the cost of production, and export itself has become'an economic sacrifice and necessity for maintaining production' (Chepulis,1984a, p. 12). This is a direct effect of the prevailingeconomic policies duringthe1980s which, through a number of measures, have enforced a reorientationtowards 'export at any price' (Ibid.).Given these export conditions, subcontractinghas become a much sought afteralternative. Firms that used to market their products independently now subcon-tractwith foreign firms which place their products on the world market.The pricefor this is high.Subcontractingictatesmore than it offers. The foreignsupplierdictatesthe wholemanufacturingrocessandevenphysicallyupervises.However,he domesticcompanymustpayreimbursementor anywastageor errors hatmayoccurduringproduction.Subcontractingoes not increase mployment,inceagreementsremadeon thealreadyexistingcapacitieswithinthe factory.Moreimportantly,his type of work is not evencontinuous hroughouthe year.It is seasonallybasedwork,especially n the clothingindustry,which has a maximum ime limit of six months... Themoment here s lessdemand for the productson the worldmarket,factoriesengaged n subcontractingreceive ewer, f any, subcontractingrders.Meanwhile,heproductionapacity emainsthesame-basicallyidle.Furthermore,t is difficultor aclothingactoryobegin o lookfornewmarkets r widenthepresentone,if it is notproducing finishedproductIbid.,p. 13).A comparative advantage of the Yugoslav textile industry is its proximity toEuropeanmarkets. Nevertheless, the crisis has driven wages down to far below the

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QUASI-PROLETARIANSAND BUREAUCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA 85minimum level of subsistence. The textile industry pays lower wages than anyother industry and is said to have the 'highest level of exploitation in the world'(Ekonomska Politika, 1989, 15ff.). Thus, with an average of less than 3 dollars aday, Yugoslav textile workers' wages fell below those of countries like Indonesia,Taiwan and South Korea, which are some of Yugoslavia's main competitors onthe world market (Ibid.). As in other NICs, unskilled female workers with closeties to the village and agricultureform the bulk of the labour force in the textileindustry (cf. G6mez & Reddock, 1987). Most come from 'mixed' agricultural(peasant-worker)households and their wages are only a small supplement to thetotal family income.

A question of 'world market dependence'?We regard the reaffirmation of the peasant-workercategory and the spread of a'rural-urban'symbiosis' in the 1980s, possibly more extended than ever before inthe post-warperiod, as one of the most conspicuous phenomena of a profound re-peripheralisation process under the specific economic and social class conditionsprevailing in Yugoslavia-that is, in a country where large-scalesocialist agricul-ture made only comparatively modest inroads on private peasant land ownershipand where, owing to the protective measures of the state, 'classical' forms ofproletarianisation of the peasantry have had only limited impact.Against this background it is important to analyse the transformation andreproduction of labour relations in Yugoslavia in a global perspective, emphasis-ing the structural effects of a changing international division of labour and theways in which unequal terms of trade are influencing economic and socialconditions. However, this in no way implies that increased world marketdependence should also be the sole or even primaryexplanation for the emergenceof processes of re-peripheralisationand the degradationof work within particularsocial foundations. This would be to succumb to the kind of 'dependence theory'represented in, for example, the writings of Andre Gunder Frank (for example,1980, 1981, 1982), explaining the crises in Third World and NIC countries one-sidely in terms of dependence, based upon flows of foreign aid, foreign investmentand reliance upon an unstable export-basedindustry subject to the domination oftransnational capital.

Affiliating herself to this tradition in Marxist thought, Rita Chepulis (1984b)has attempted to explain the 1980s Yugoslav crisis as a result of tightening creditmarkets, deteriorating terms of trade and discriminating austerity measuresimposed by international financial organisations, notably continuous pressurefrom the IMF and World Bank on the Mediterranean countries to rely one sidedlyon export-led development. This international pressurehas been creating an evergrowing dependence on the world market in these countries since the 1950s,resulting in economic instability and exorbitant foreign debts. In Yugoslavia,Chepulis concludes, the development of world market dependence culminated inthe international monetary organisations' imposing of crushing 'super-austerity'measures during the 1980s, as well as their infiltration into and manipulation ofthe country's internal political development.


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CARL-ULRIK SCHIERUPChepulis also argues that this imposed export-led development has become a'limiting factor' for future development. World market dependence has under-mined the accumulative capacity of the entire economy. The increasing prices ofimported raw materials since 1978 severely cut the competitiveness of thecountry's exports, but even more important was the steep rise in the prices ofimported spare parts and components, which are of strategic importance to lightindustry, the backbone of the export-led development strategy. If the producersare to compensate for this by increasingtheir exports they are often forced to raisetheir competitiveness by selling on the world market below the cost of production.Export prices range from 15% to 68% below the world market prices paid forimported goods from countries like Austria,the FRG and France (Chepulis, 1984,p. 7, citing Ekonomska Politika, 1984, pp. 32-33.The response to the crisis in the export sector has thus become 'increasedexports at any cost', despite the economy's falling productivity (Ibid.). In a

situation where most of industry's foreign currency inflow was set aside forvarious taxes, including the repaymentof foreign debts, its basic investment needscould be satisfied. The possibilities of substitutingdomestic products for importedones, expanding production capacity and satisfying local consumer needs wereseverely curtailed. Falling revenues have forced an increasing number of enter-prises into subcontractingwith foreign transnational companies in order to securea regularincome for their employees (Chepulis, 1984).'Exporting at any cost' was promoted at the expense of workers' incomes andthrough raising the prices of consumer goods on the domestic market. In 1988 adramatic rise in inflation had brought down the average standardof living to the1960 level. In 1983, after four years of acute crisis, many workersin the socialisedsector of the Yugoslav economy were already living 'on the borderline of actualpoverty'. The end result 'is none other than furnishing cheap labour to the exportsector', Chepulis (Ibid., p. 8) concludes.There is no doubt that world-market dependence is a central component andmajor cause of the present Yugoslav crisis, as it is of the severe crises occurringinmany NICs in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The weakness of the explanation,however, is its monocausality. The analysis focuses one-sidedly on the impact ofglobal capitalist exchange structures. The result is 'a sweeping denunciation ofworld capitalism in terms chargedwith emotion' (Portes & Walton, 1981, p. 10).The dependent countries'production relationships and internal economic dynam-ics tend to remain a black box, the contents of which fall outside the scope of theanalysis.The critical potency of the theory is greatly limited by its failure to look at the'operation of specific historical, cultural and political forces within countries'(Dicken, 1986, p. 412). The approach is conceptually close to world-systemstheory and what has been called the theory of the 'New International Division ofLabour' ('NIDL', see Frobel et al., 1980). All three-dependence theory, world-systems theory and NIDL theory-'exhibit the weaknesses of excessive "econom-ism"... with the social and political relations that surround the productionprocess being almost wholly neglected in favour of discussion of aggregatetradeand investment transactions, which reflect the power of capital' (Cohen, 1987,

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QUASI-PROLETARIANS AND BUREAUCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA 87p. 232). Hence, policies 'to promote exports or attractforeign capital, for instance,are seen as a result of the "needs" of capital at the centre, rather than as theoutcome of local class struggle' (Jenkins, cited by Cohen, 1987, p. 232; see alsoPortes & Walton, 1981, p. 10). Global patterns of trade, financial aid andtechnological transfer do not in themselves explain the development in particularcountries. It is the ways in which these various forces coincide with endogenoussocial forces which explain why general forms of crisis manifest themselvesdifferently from country to country or become more destructive in one countrythan in another.

A contradictoryalliance and its inherent dilemmasIn a variety of contemporarydiscourses on the bureaucraciesof 'real socialism' wecan find interesting theoretical insights into an understanding of the role ofendogenous forces in shaping the retrograde types of labour reproduction socharacteristic for today's Yugoslavia. One important contribution to the debate isthe late Zagrebeconomist MarijanKorosic's 1988 book on the Yugoslav crisis. Hearguesthat the economic horizons and organisationalsetup of these bureaucraciesgo no further than a crude primitive accumulation based on the mechanicalpooling of pre-capitalist resources, and an initial widespread industrialisationbased on administrative labour mobilisation in economically underdevelopedsocial formations. Korosic describes the historical project of actually existingsocialism as a pervasive industrialisation in economically backward countries.Because of the crudeness of state bureaucratic mechanisms of economic man-agement, however, this industrialisation can never be taken beyond the stage atwhich it can readily be controlled with a predominantly administrative mobil-isation of resources. The concentration of the means of production takes on adefinite mechanical character rather than that of differentiation and functionalintegration.Yugoslav socialism's chronic inability to develop functionally integrated econ-omies of scale can therefore be explained by a continuity of bureaucraticdominance over the economy, Korosic argues. The lack of economic criteriafavours a process of concentration of resource which is mainly of a mechanicalnature. Hence, even though industrialist megalomania is one of the essentialproperties of the state bureaucracies of actually existing socialism (Korosic 1988),these societies are inherently impotent when it comes to creating functioningeconomies of scale. In spite of the management's overt bureaucratic centralisa-tion, the economy becomes characterisedby many parallel non-specialised unitswithout any functional links between them.Under historical circumstances such as prevailed in Yugoslavia the ideal type oflabour force for this type of economy is a numerous, low-skilled, proto-peasantworking class. The step towards functionally differentiated modern economiesand the economic utilisation of creative and intellectual human labour needs, inthe long run, a sophisticated market economy. To be socialist this must be a self-managed market economy, Korosic argues,founded on social ownership and witha planning system that is not based on pedantic and autocratic administrative


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CARL-ULRIK SCHIERUPvoluntarism, but on minimally necessary fiscal policies in order to enforce broaddemocratically agreed general priorities. However, in spite of serious efforts atreform during the 1960s, this decisive change towards a self-managed marketeconomy was never allowed to take place, Korosic laments. Instead, the generalsituation during the whole post-war period has been one where the market hasbeen almost completely eliminated and replaced by a bureaucratic 'dictatorshipover needs', corresponding to the general character of the economies of EastEuropean 'real socialism', as described by Feher et al. (1983).The extensive work of the sociologist Josip Zupanov discussing the formationand social character of the Yugoslav working class demonstrates, however, thatthese limitations of bureaucraticleadership cannot simply and solely be deducedfrom the social character or the ideological horizon of the bureaucracy itself orfrom the nature of an inflexible state administrative planningprocess as such. Theincapacity of the post-revolutionary state bureaucracyto lead the nation beyond acertain limit of modernity is politically 'overdetermined', so to speak, owing to thetype of class alliance that lies at the root of the bureaucracy's leading role insociety.Bureaucracyand labour in 'realself-management'The way in which the new post-war Yugoslav working class was formed hadimportant political consequences. Much of the old politically radicalworkingclassperished during World War II or left the ranks of the workers after the war to passinto the political and administrative structures of the new socialist state appara-tus. With the massive inflow of peasants into industrial work, the working classtook on a number of new features reminiscent of the southern Slav tradition ofclosed, corporate, egalitarian village communities; it was submissive and humbletowards state power, to which it had always been tied as taxpayers and soldiers,but sufficiently far from the state to conserve a measure of internal autonomy(Korosic, 1988, p. 97; cf. Mouzelis, 1978).Zupanov (1977) locates the central dilemma for Yugoslav socialist developmentin the contradictory relationship between a traditionalist society in the world'seconomic periphery and a conception of socialism that originated from theWestern labour movement (see also Katunaric, 1988, p. 153). Industrialism makespossible, at least for some time, a compromise between the two. The mediatingvalue is an 'egalitarianism' of a traditionalist type, which starts from theperspective of equal redistribution and an image of the limited good pertaining tothe local corporate community. Extensive initial economic development, espe-cially a forced process of industrialisation, made the seeming equalisation of thedifferent parts of the countrypossible over a shorter time perspective. At the sametime it formed the basis of extensive employment growth, which likewiseappeared to promote equal opportunities.This model of society as a whole was put into practice at the micro level in thestructural unit of the working organisation. The economy was fragmented alongirrational lines (of administrative and political control) into functionally discon-nected and isolated 'segmentary associations' characterised by a dual power

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QUASI-PROLETARIANS AND BUREAUCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA 89structure(Zupanov, 1969), i.e. one that is derived from the techno-structure andfrom self-management principles, and one that is derived from the power ofinformal groups. It is the latter which eventually comes to predominate in theshape of an informal corporatistcoalition between localised bureaucraciesand thequasi-proletariansof a fragmented and traditionalist working class, crystallisingaround the central values of redistribution and egalitarianism (see further,Schierup, 1990). The result is a levelling of income differences within organisa-tions and local communities which is, however, matched by a steadily growinginequality among organisations, local communities and regions, based on theadministrative favouritism of a sectional political system. This fragmenting typeof social and economic development is furthered by the dominant localistconception of 'self-management'and the central political leadership's continuousobstruction of tendencies to form a trade unionism integrating the working classin a horizontal sense (Katunaric, 1988).

The ideological world view of the central post-revolutionary political leader-ship, however, was fundamentally one of modernisation. Its dominant long-termdevelopment conception was the construction of a technically advanced society.The realisation of these visions could not forever lean towards the egalitarianistmatrix of a proto-peasantmanualworkingclass, even if this was the main politicalbasis legitimating the bureaucracy'sdominant position in society in the role ofredistributingthe limited good. At a certain stage the elite was forced to lean moreheavily towards methods of economic management based on the allocativefunctions of the market, income differentiation, and the selective acceptance ofexperts' recommendations and stimulation of creative activity.Radical market-oriented reforms in the 1960s can be seen as an attempt toexploit the preconditions for more intensive economic development which hadbeen built up during two preceding decades through the systematic and massiveeducation of new skilled and highly educated labour (Schierup, 1990). As such, thereforms represented even an attempt to integrate the economy into the interna-tional division of labour on more equal terms. In that sense it was a rupturewiththe earlier dominant trends of extensive industrial development, prevalentegalitarian social values in society and the peasant-workersstrategy, as well as arupture with state bureaucratic dominance. The effects of the reforms led to arapid marginalisation of large sections of the manual labour force. The peasant-workers were hit from two sides in that the structural changes in industryhappened simultaneously with the launching of a selective 'green revolution' inagriculture(see further, Ibid., 82ff. and 158ff.).

Re-bureaucratisationand new/old coalitionsThe extensive economic and political reforms of the 1960s-often prematurelydesignated by radical Marxist writers 'the restoration of capitalism' (see forexample, Carlo, 1972)-were however to be no more than an interval before areturn to state bureaucratic rule. Adverse social consequences of the reformpolicywere to undercut traditional sources of the reforming bureaucratic elite's legiti-macy among the manual working class, while simultaneously the elite found it


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CARL-ULRIK SCHIERUPincreasingly difficult to control new social and cultural forces unleashed by thereforms: student revolts, numerous strikes by skilled workers, increasingly centri-fugal forces connected with resurrectedethnic claims. The federal elite's responsebecame a complex combination of authoritarian repression, co-opting permiss-iveness and new pervasive reforms of the social, political and economic system ofcontrol from above during the early and mid-1970s. The proclamation andinstitutionalisation of a new phase in the development of 'self-management'wasintended on the one hand to act to harness popular protest and claims for socialchange to a common socialist cause under the guidance of the established eliteand, on the other, to curtail unwanted tendencies towards economic anarchyand'technocratic' dominance which had resulted from the haphazard manner inwhich the economic reforms of the 1960s had largelybeen conducted (see further,Schierup, 1990).Rather than meaning a new progressive era of popular democracy and efficienteconomic development as claimed, however, the reforms of the 1970s veryquickly came to represent a pervasive re-bureaucratisation. 'Real self-manage-ment' came to equal a flood of bureaucracy, not only in executive state institu-tions, but also in coordinating regional and local bodies for self-managers inYugoslav firms(Ibid., 226ff.). This was made possible by the fragmentationof thetechnostructurein enterprises in the early 1970s based on the unsuccessful launchof an ambitiously conceived so-called 'self-management system of planning'.Writing in the 1980s-in the midst of social and economic crisis-Zupanov(1983b, 1985) speaks of a realignment of the old coalition between the manualworking class and the political bureaucracy.Yet it is important to emphasise thatthis reaction was to cast Yugoslav society in a mould qualitatively different fromthat of the 1950s and 1960s, meaning a profound re-traditionalisation of society.Bureaucratisationduring the 1970s took place mainly at the level of the republic,and became dominated by local bureaucracies without grandiose visions ofinternationalism, popular democracy or economic and technological self-reliance.It exploited the opportunities a transformed 'self-management system' offered fora pervasive bureaucratisation of all social relationships and could take on aprofoundly localised form against the backgroundof constitutional amendmentsthat granted individual republics a large measure of political and economicautonomy.Paraphrasing what Tomasevich (1955, p. 47) considers characteristic of therelationship between the Serbian peasantry and a nascent Serbian bourgeoisie inthe 19th century, one might say that the nascent local Yugoslav state elites of the1970s and 1980s have ruled their incipient 'nation states' according to the mottothat: 'It is possible to rule without, but not against, the working class!'. It is acoalition of unequal partners, in which the patron (the elite) 'protects'the workingclass by guaranteeing existing jobs, a minimal income and extensive socialprivileges, while the 'protected' (the workers)-the much-hailed historical 'work-ing class' of actually existing socialism-guarantee the elite its social legitimacy(Zupanov, 1983b). Such a coalition presupposes mutual communication: labouraccepts the official ideology, while the elite accepts the values of radical egalitari-anism. The elite hardly accepts egalitarianism through genuine belief, but rather

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QUASI-PROLETARIANS AND BUREAUCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA 91because a curtailment of differentiation simplifies the social system and makes iteasier to administer. This communication between the political elite and labourprovides a solid basis for social stability in the face of the deepening economiccrisis (Zupanov, 1985). It is profoundly authoritarianin character.All that everexisted in the way of genuine workers' self-management at the enterprise levellargely died out in favour of the voluntaristic regulation of a burgeoningbureaucraticapparatus.However, the republics' new bureaucraticelites, entrenched within what wereincreasingly looking like new local 'national states', were led by predominantlyparticularist motives, without long-termconceptions of development, and markedby a narrowingspace for manoeuvre in relation to transnational capital. The newregimes had fundamental structuralfeaturesin common with the political elites ofpre-war Yugoslavia. Under the deepening shadow of economic subordinationessential features of a pre-war neo-colonial ancien regime-the reproduction ofstate power through a network of primordial loyalties (see Tomasevich,1955)-were from the early 1970s to blend organicallywith the most authoritarianfeaturesof the social and political relations of real socialism. Ironically,historyhadfinally succeeded in giving birth to a 'rulingcombination of neo-stalinist voluntar-ism and patriarchally territorialised corporatism leading the federation into itspresent condition of fragmentation and "re-peripheralisation" and causing a"degenerative" development of labour relations' (Strpic, 1988, p. 32).

New 'nation states' on the margins of the worldsystemReferring to the Yugoslav politician and economist Boris Kidric's theory of statecapitalism from the early 1950s, Caslav Ocic (1983) suggests that the problem ofbureaucratic particularism was a latent feature of Yugoslavia's entire post-wardevelopment-indeed one of the most fundamental structural problems of 'realsocialism' (see Schierup, 1990). Kidric explains a 'localism' and economicparticularismalready manifest immediately after World War II as the expressionof barter for the division of surplusvalue between different sections and levels ofthe state bureaucraticapparatus(see Kidric, 1952, 1969). These strive to establishand perpetuate administrative monopolies over smalleror largersections of socialproperty, even when this leads to economic stagnation and a waste of publicresources.4In the multiethnic community of Yugoslavia manifestations of bureaucraticparticularism have been most dangerous for the socio-economic system at thelevel of the republic. Here lie the best opportunities to centralise social power at asub-federal level and to give divisive power-monopolies public legitimation. Ocic(1983) sees a continuity between the manifestations of local particularism inKidric's time and developing nationalist ideologies legitimating the separatistambitions of the bureaucracies of single republics and autonomous provincesduring the 1980s. Since the beginning of the 1970s, Ocic asserts, politicalbureaucraciesat the republican level have succeeded in centralising power withinrepublic borders to such an extent that the existence of a common Yugoslaveconomy and the very future of the federation were brought into question. As the


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CARL-ULRIK SCHIERUPinterests of the political bureaucracy could not effectively and legitimately beexpressed through the political system of self-management, they have been forcedto 'veil themselves in the disguise of different populist, "nationalist" and similarideologies often presenting themselves as the expression of some scientific theory'(Ibid., pp. 137-138).Ocic uses his conception of bureaucratic particularism to explain the specificterms on which Yugoslavia has become an adjunctto the world economy since theearly 1970s. The nature and causes of a protracted economic crisis cannot bereduced to increased balance of payments problems and foreign dependency.They are connected with the fundamentally centrifugal dynamics of a type of statebureaucratic power relationships leading to a growing disintegration of theeconomic system (see also Mihajlovic, 1981; Bilandzic, 1981; Horvat, 1985).Despite the Yugoslav constitution's emphasis on a unitary Yugoslav market,closed, separate, 'national' sub-economies (corresponding to territories of singlerepublics and autonomous provinces) developed 'slowly but surely' (Ocic, 1983).This territorialisation of single autarchic economies within the federation wasdefended with a number of 'visible and invisible' means by competitive orcomplementary 'national' economic interests located in the individual republicsand autonomous provinces. They produced their own legitimation throughthe fabrication and management of still more openly populist-nationalist andregionally particular political ideologies, Ocic argues (see also Bilandzic, 1981;Katunaric, 1988).The fragmentation and segmentation of the market for commodities andservices, of which Ocic speaks, and also other factors of production like capitaland labour, became more and more evident during the 1970s and 1980s,culminating in the rivalryof today's allegedly 'post-communist' republicelites. Atthe same time the organisational, technological, infrastructuraland every otherfactor of economic integration and cohesion within each separate republic andprovince have been enfeebled.The various republics and provinces developed separate power structures,which favoured the economic autarchy of single administrative units, and,through a number of informal mechanisms, enabled them to protect themselvesfrom competition from commodities produced in other republics. They wouldobstruct attempts by enterprises based in other republics to establish plants ontheir territory. Capital investment has increasinglytaken place only within singlerepublics, while interrepublic transfers of capital have continuously dwindled.Because of exclusiveness and an overwhelming fragmentation the Yugoslaveconomy lost the effects of increasing economies of scale, and of the developmentof functional specialisation throughrepublicand regionalcomparative advantagesin resources, technology, labour and skills. As each republic has endeavoured todevelop its own separate 'national' economy, the Yugoslav economy as a wholehas taken on the appearanceof many undercapitalised, badly integrated, parallel,non-cooperating production units, which, through informal political power struc-tures, have fiercely guarded their own republic and local markets 'at home' whilethey have fought and undercut one another trying to sell similar products on theworld market (Ocic, 1983; Korosic, 1988). Patterns of trade have either been

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QUASI-PROLETARIANSAND BUREAUCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA 93locked inside the borders of each single republicor have flowed from each republicin the direction of the world market (Ocic, 1983).The fragmentationand inner disintegration of the Yugoslav economy found itscorollary in a growing subordination to foreign capital, of which the mostimportant and fatal aspect became the conditions for transfer of technology.5Thecorollary of the autarchy of republics and autonomous provinces, and evensmaller administrative divisions within Yugoslavia, became that of single unitsforging individual bonds with Western partners. Production equipment, indus-trial licences and spare parts have been bought from foreign partners in acompletely uncoordinated and haphazardmanner (Mihajlovic, 1981; Oci, 1983,110ff.). The existence of a multitude of different technical conceptions andsystems, licenses and standardshas acted to impede cooperation among Yugoslavpartners and made Yugoslav plants increasingly dependent on foreign partners;with the collapse of any coherent development conception and policy anydetermined effort at technical research and development was also precluded(Durek, 1981). Thus, instead of promoting integration, 'technological progress'has been a powerful factor of disintegration for Yugoslav economy and society(Ocic, 1983, p. 110; Durek, 1981).

Forming a peripherallabourforceMarginalisation of the intelligentsiaIndeed, as expressed by Korosic (1988, p. 147), the specific forms of articulationbetween the centrifugal and particularistforces of bureaucraticmanagement andthe forces of an unequal international division of labour gave the Yugoslav crisisof the 1980s the characterof a 'crisis of innovation'.In political terms this development is connected with the reaffirmation of apredominantly unskilled proto-peasant working class as the main ally andsupporter of bureaucratic rule. In terms of labour relationships it came to meanthe continued predominance of unskilled or semi-skilled manual labour in'peripheral'labour processes stuctured in a growingdependence on transnationalcapital. At the same time, however, the development duringthe 1970s and 1980srepresented a crisis and a marginalisation of the technical intelligentsia: aparadoxical situation where, as observed by Korosic, a hugebut eventually for themost part structurally superfluous technical intelligentsia is matched by an everdecreasing number of international patents.6At the micro-level this can be seen as a consequence of the ways in whichindividual 'self-managed' enterprises operated. Following Zupanov's (1983a, b)model of a coalition between the bureaucracyand the working class, Yugoslaventerprises could be described as closed protectionist enclaves employing defens-ive egalitarianist strategies to guard the privileges of those already employed,coupled with a reluctance to employ new skilled and technically advanced labour.Innovations and new technology have not been properly implemented andinnovators easily come into conflict with their working organisations (Korosic,1988, p. 147; see also Schierup, 1990, 141ff). Willingness to take risks has beenfundamentally lacking.


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CARL-ULRIK SCHIERUPPrevailing patternsof state bureaucratic intervention in the economy reinforcedthe closed character of individual enterprises (Korosic, 1988). Under this systemfirms running at a deficit could sometimes pay their workers even higher wagesthan firms working successfully according to economic criteria (Zupanov, 1981,p. 270). As the success of a firmcame to depend more and more on administrativeintervention and informal relationships with local bureaucraticpower structures,so economic and functional criteria for employing new labour tended to beeliminated. Instead, 'mechanical solidarity', centred around the primordial loyal-ties of family, friendship, locality and ethnic group, became the most importantcriterion for accepting new members, while relations of 'organic solidarity'increasingly dissolved (Zupanov, 1981, p. 1952; Schierup, 1990, 141ff.).From a macro-perspective, the growing marginalisation of the intelligentsiafrom production had dire consequences for economic development. While earlierimpressive efforts to promote large-scale research and development totally

floundered and collapsed (see Durek, 1981; Horvat, 1985), no new long-termconception of an integrated education of technological personnel was conceived.New functionally integrated networks of smaller-scale,high-tech and researchanddevelopment enterprises and institutions (which are now so evident in the coreindustrial countries) have not even been thought of, let alone begun, andapparently have not been within the horizons of the dominant bureaucraticconception of development (Korosic, 1988, p. 145). The existing technicalintelligentsia have either been 'exported' to the OICs (Joksimovic, 1988), putaway and pacified in some inferior administrative department (Korosic, 1988,p. 146), 'disciplined' according to the static criteria of a conservative manage-ment, or remained unemployed. The comprehensive restructuringof the Yugoslavsecondary school system from the late 1970s could be seen both to reflect andsystematically to reproduce this situation.

Levelling aspirationsPropelled by optimistic and egalitarianvisions of a new modern and technicallyadvanced social era, Yugoslavia in the 1960s witnessed an eruption of social andprofessional aspirations among young people and a mushrooming of all kinds ofhigher educational institutions. The historical result, under the conditions of re-peripheralisation from the late 1960s, was 'hyperproduction' of young 'experts'and intellectuals whom a stagnatingeconomic structurewas unable to absorb (cf.Zupanov, 1981). A long-term trend towards a new, more skilled and educatedreserve army of unemployed workers during the 1970s turned into a permanentstructural feature of the social stratificationsystem in the 1980s (Davidovic, 1986;see also Schierup, 1990). The school system ceased to be a channel for socialmobility, and people increasinglymade their way by means of other (political andtraditional) mechanisms for social promotion. To make a living, young peoplewere forced into what in effect became a massive re-traditionalisation of society,embracing all facets of life. They were driven into the informal veins of anexpanding but technologically primitive underground economy (Kerovec, 1988),or forced to sustain themselves as parasites in a familistic process of barter.

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QUASI-PROLETARIANS AND BUREAUCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA 95Not onlyhavefamilyandkinshipgroupsconservedheircentralmeaning n the life ofthe individual,but have recently akenon a still more important ignificance...Forexample, t is thefamily hat must findrelationshipsnd means hroughwhich hechildcan enrolin schoolsfor intellectualprofessions,t searchesorrelationshipso gethiminto a suitable aculty, hefamilyseeksrelationshipsnddirectlypayssomebodyorhisentry nto a job, the familybuyshis flator in otherwayssolvestheyoungperson'sneedfor a placeto live. Just like his peer200 years agoa youngpersoncannot ean on anyotherinstitution han his own familybackground...Otherinstitutions et him down-and if he hasno rights o expectandsecure hroughheinstitutions f society, henhemustgetthembybarter ndblackmail;ndhere hefamily s his mainsupportZupanov1981, p. 1953).

An army of young, unemployed intellectuals came into conflict not only with achanging social and economic reality, but also with the prevailing politicalleadership's conservative view of extensive industrial development as the onlystrategic option (Korosic, 1988, p. 146). Such a view governed the pervasivereorientation of the educational system during the late 1970s under which anindustrial labour force started to be formed, by administrative means, whichwould fit in with the political leadership's horizons and Yugoslavia's retrogradeposition in the international division of labour. Some of the main tendencies ofthese reforms were the following:? drastic reduction in the number of students allowed into higher academiceducation;* high priority for short-term education directed towards skilled industrialemployment and other skilled occupations;* replacing the secondary school's former stress on versatility and generalknowledge with a system enforcing very early specialisation in extremelynarrowlydelimited subjects directed towards specific categories of jobs;* marked territorialisation of the whole educational process.The explicit goal of the first school reformalong these lines, which was undertakenin Croatia in 1978, was to curtail 'elitist tendencies' in the old school system (fordocumentation, see Podrebarac, 1985). By administratively forcing about 70%ofprimaryschool leavers to enrol in schools leading to working-classprofessions, theeducational system effectively ceased to provide a means of intergenerationalsocial mobility (Zupanov, 1981, p. 1950).

While drastically diminishing the quality of general education and the schoolsystem as a whole, there is no evidence to suggestthat the specialised programmeswere any better than they were before, Strpic (1988) argues. Moreover, theopportunities for youth outside the larger towns to furnish themselves witheducational qualifications would diminish-and this according to a regionalistprinciple. The education reform law in Croatia openly envisaged that the greatlyreduced numbers receiving a general education should be concentrated in largetowns, a measure explicitly intended to prevent inter-regionalmobility among theyounger members of the population and to discourage interregional marriages(Ibid., p. 39). An intricate system of linking contracts to employment in specificorganisations would oblige students to work in the same local areas in which they


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CARL-ULRIK SCHIERUPstarted their education; 'for outside their own local area,without kinship and clanrelationships, it has practically been impossible to get such contracts in theeconomy or in social institutions' (Ibid., p. 39).

By its radical regionalisation of education and its curtailment of 'excessiveaspirations', Strpic argues, the political bureaucracyincreased its administrativecontrol over the labour supply and enhanced its ideological command. At one fellswoop it managed drastically to narrow the social basis for recruiting a futuretechnical and humanist intelligentsia, (as well as to block avenues towards socialmobility for the majority of the population (Zupanov, 1981). Moreover, theeducational reforms supported the reproductionand reinforcementof the existingstructure of class-based dominance in society by narrowing the scope of higherand general education and restricting it to largerurban centres (Zupanov, 1981;Strpic, 1988). A few exclusive schools with good reputations were to become theprerogative of those who had the right contacts. Thus, reproduction of the socialelite was not threatened.In its effects, the educational reform was well adapted to the degenerativedevelopment of the dominant economic and political processes, Strpic (1988,pp. 39-40) argues. Extensive semi-industrial and industrial production andallocation of surplus value supported the petrification of primitive accumulationof capital and, as long as it lasted, consolidated the ruleof a primitive bureaucracyin alliance with foreign financial capital. The reformed educational sub-systemwould act as a 'systemic mediator', he concluded his critique of the Croatianeducational reform saying, 'procuring suitable servants and subjects-non-creative, uncritical, unfit for high productivity, self-organisation and socialaction'.While the crisis in the educational system and among Yugoslav youth hasdeeply affected the federation as a whole, in the less developed south and south-east it has taken on specific features. Here we find the most gaping discrepanciesbetween the educational backgroundand expectations of numerous educated (butfrustrated) young people, on the one hand, and rising unemployment andstagnating economies on the other. In addition, here new 'levelling' educationalreforms had not been carried through as they had in the more economicallyadvanced industrialised north. These disproportions are most evident in thefederation's least developed unit-the Autonomous Province of Kosovo (Horvat,1988; Schierup, 1990, 267ff.). Here huge disproportions between the aspirationsof an educated young population and the depressing reality of a discriminatoryYugoslav labour market in crisis led to the build-up of an increasingly explosivesocial and political 'time bomb'. Demonstrations of frustratedAlbanian youth inthe spring of 1989 received support from protests and strikes even amongAlbanian industrial workersand miners. The subsequent armed repression of theKosovo revolt triggered deep structural repercussions in the whole federation.Given the wider context of the generalcrisis and revolutionary transformation of'the other Europe', the aftermath of the Albanian student protests and their brutalsuppression was to be that of a general 'Kosovisation' of the Yugoslav federation,torn by increasing ethnic fragmentation and interregional conflicts. The Kosovorevolt should lead to the destabilisation of the entire political system and the crisis

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QUASI-PROLETARIANS AND BUREAUCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA 97and fall of outworn bureaucraticpower coalitions. It inaugurated the collapse ofan increasingly unstable post-war Titoist compact of 'brotherhood and unity'among nationalities and probably to the end of multiethnic Yugoslavia as a stateformation.Umed University

1 Mirjan Kozinovic, director of the Yugoslav Textile factory Zelengora,interviewedinEkonomskaPolitika,2031 (1991), p. 31.2 Karl Marx's notion of 'primitive accumulation'was a metaphorfor the 'prehistoryofcapitalism' in WesternEurope.Marx conceived of 'primitive accumulation'as the historicalprocessthroughwhich the workingclass and the preconditions orcapitalist ndustrialdevelop-ment are formed when the agricultural roducers, he peasantry,become detached from the soiland from other means of production,which areappropriated y capital.With reference o Marxthe notion of 'socialistprimitiveaccumulation'wasoriginallycoined by the Sovieteconomist,E.Preobrazhensky 1926), during an intense debate on Soviet industrialisationin the 1920s.Preobrazhensky rgued hatsocialismcoulddevelop n a situationwhereagriculturewas the maineconomic sectorin an internationallysolated country.He envisaged he appropriation f a freerentfrompeasantagriculture,mainlyon the basis of terms of trade set in favour of industry,butwarnedagainst provokingthe peasantryby undertakingdrastic administrativesteps. However,the main architectof primitiveaccumulation n the Soviet Union, embodied in the violent anddestructivewaysin which thecollectivisationof agriculturewas enforcedduring he 1930s,was tobe Stalin.3 This, accordingly, epresentsa 'real socialist' version of what the Frenchsocialanthropolo-gist, ClaudeMeillassoux 1981)calls'migration ournante' i.e. cyclicalmigration).He argues hatcapital realizes the means of loweringthe reproductioncosts of labourin the peripheryof itsglobal system (in Third Worldcountries)via the purchaseof thecheap abourpowerbelonging omigrantworkersfeedingthemselves on the basis of peasantsubsistencecrops.This household-basedfood productionnever enters the capitalistmarketor burdens he capitalists'expensesforvariable capital. It is based on unpaid household labour within a separateand qualitativelydifferentpre-capitalistsector of production.It representsa continuedprimitive accumulationeffectedthroughthe migration'of peasant-workersscillatingback and forth between contextsdominated by two juxtaposed modes of production: hat is, on the one hand, the 'rural'(pre-capitalist),so-called 'domesticmode of production'and the dominantcapitalistone. Therefore,at the same time as capital exploits and disintegratesthem, the deliberate and organisedconservation of 'pre-'or 'non-capitalist'systems of reproductionexempted from the ordinarylabour marketbecomes essential for continuedcapitalaccumulation.4 An argument imilar to that of F6her et al. (1983).5 Over 90%of contractswith foreign partners o importtechnologyhave contained variousrestrictiveclauses(Ocic, 1983, 11Iff.). In 1983, for example, 62%of the contractsexcluded theexport of products producedwith purchasedtechnology;44%obliged the Yugoslav buyer toreportanytechnologicalprogressor invention connectedwith the use of purchased quipment othe partnerwith whom the contract was made; and 26% contained clauses that obliged theYugoslavpartners o use the purchasedechnology n combinationwith importedrawmaterials,materials oroperationandmaintenance,andsparepartsfrom sourcesdecidedbythe seller.Theresults have been outspokentechnologicaldependency,stagnatingautonomousdevelopmentoftechnology in Yugoslavia and decreasingcompetitive power on foreignmarkets(Ocic, 1983;Durek, 1981).6 While the size of its intelligentsia s very large, duringthe 1980s, of all the countries ofEurope,Yugoslaviahad the lowest number of patentsregistered n relation to the number ofcitizens(Ocid, 1983, p. 110).

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