schmidt (2005) competing realist conceptions of power

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Competing Realist Conceptions of Power

Brian C. Schmidt

Realists are the theorists of power politics. Although realists basetheir analysis of international politics on the role of power, there is agood deal of variation in how individual realist scholarsconceptualise the concept. The article makes use of the importantinsight that rather than being monolithic, there actually are a numberof different and competing realist theories. It closely examines howclassical, structural, and modified realists understand and employ‘power’ with the underlying aim to determine how each version ofrealism comprehends this elusive concept.

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In the field of international relations (IR), the concept of power is closelyassociated with the theory of realism. Although all of the various schoolsof IR theory have something to say about the nature and role of power, itis the highly influential realist school that has been most closely identifiedwith the study of power. Realists throughout the ages have argued thatpower is the decisive determinant in the relations among separate politicalcommunities and of crucial importance to understanding the dynamics ofwar and peace. Indeed, as witnessed by the actions of the United States inIraq, Thucydides’s ancient dictum that the strong do want they want andthe weak endure the consequences is as relevant today as it was when hedescribed Athens’ behaviour toward the tiny island of Melos in 400 BC.For all realists, John Mearsheimer writes, ‘calculations about power lie atthe heart of how states think about the world around them’.1

Although realist theory remains indispensable to understandingthe contemporary practice of international politics, critics continue to

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I would like to thank the editors of Millennium for their helpful comments andsuggestions for improving the paper that I presented at the ‘Facets of Power inInternational Relations’ conference at the London School of Economics on 30October 2004, and Tim Dunne for his assistance in developing the threecategories of realism that appear in this article.

1. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W.Norton, 2001), 12.

© Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2005. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol.33, No.3, pp. 523-549

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2. For an excellent review of the literature, see David Baldwin, ‘Power andInternational Relations’, in Handbook of International Relations, eds. WalterCarlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 177-191.

3. See, for example, Stephen G. Brooks, ‘Dueling Realisms’, InternationalOrganization 51, no. 3 (1997); Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Michael Doyle, Ways of War andPeace (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); and Benjamin Frankel, ‘Restating theRealist Case: An Introduction’, Security Studies 5 (1996).

identify a variety of problems and inconsistencies in many of its centraltenets. This is especially the case with respect to the manner in whichrealists define, measure, and utilise the concept of power. From thebirth of the modern realist school to the present, critics havecommented on the ambiguity of the realists’ conceptualisation ofpower. In fairness to the realists it must be admitted that there is ageneral lack of consensus on the most appropriate manner toconceptualise and measure power.2 But since it is the realists who arguethat power is the sine qua non of international politics, critics havetargeted much of their criticism of realism at what they consider to beits inadequate understanding of power. While such criticism has somemerit, the fact that these critics often assume that all realists have thesame understanding of powers does not do justice to the complexity ofrealist thought.

Realists are the theorists of power politics; the role of power hasbeen, and continues to be, central to any theory of realism. But whileit is true that realists base their analysis of international politics on therole of power, there is a good deal of variation in how individualrealists conceptualise the concept. The aim of this article is to surveythe competing realist conceptions of power. Although all realistscharacterise international politics in terms of a continuous struggle forpower, they reach this conclusion through a variety of differentassumptions. Not only do realists disagree on the underlying reasonwhy international politics can be described as a struggle for power,they also disagree on numerous other issues. These issues include: thestrategies that states employ to acquire additional power, how poweris utilised to attain desired ends, how power should be measured, and how – if at all – the pursuit of power can be managed withinacceptable limits.

To facilitate the task of investigating the realist conception ofpower, I make use of the important recent insight that rather than beingmonolithic, there actually are a number of different and competingrealist theories.3 While there is a typical set of assumptions commonlyassociated with realism, key assumptions made by individual realists


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do vary, and sometimes conflict. Not only is there variability in themain assumptions of realism, but there is also disparity in how thoseassumptions are utilised in the process of theory building. Rather thanviewing this lack of a consensus as an indication of a fundamentalshortcoming of realist thought, recognition and acceptance of a diversearray of realist positions opens up a creative space in which to evaluatecritically the realist conception of power.

The belief that there is not one realism, but many, leads logically tothe task of differentiating among different types of realism. In the firstsection of the article, I briefly outline three different strands of realisttheory: classical, structural, and modified.4 Next, I summarise some ofthe issues and positions that have characterised the study of power inIR. After sketching the broad outlines of the debate on power, I closelyexamine how classical, structural, and modified realists understand andemploy the concept of power. In so far as there are different strands ofrealism, we should find that classical, structural, and modified realistsprovide us with different and competing conceptions of power. My aimin this article is to determine how each version of realism comprehendsthe concept of power. The analysis of each of the three respectiveversions of realism is organised around the following questions dealingwith power: 1), how is power defined? 2), where is power located? 3),what are the effects of power and what are the prevailing patterns ofbehaviour that result from the struggle for power? And 4), how arecapabilities and influence measured? In this manner, the article aims tobring the different realist conceptions of power into focus (see tablebelow for a summary).

Realisms

One of the main criticisms that the early generation of realists putforward against the scholars of the interwar period was that they hadneglected the fundamental role of power in international politics. Themost famous critique of the interwar scholars’ failure to recognise thecentrality of power was provided by E.H. Carr in The Twenty Years’ Crisis,1919-1939. Carr explained that he had written the book ‘with thedeliberate aim of counteracting the glaring and dangerous defect ofnearly all thinking, both academic and popular, about international

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4. For an additional elaboration of these three categories of realism, see TimDunne and Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Realism’, in The Globalization of World Politics: AnIntroduction to International Relations, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith, 3rd ed.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).


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politics in English-speaking countries from 1919 to 1939 – the almosttotal neglect of the factor of power’.5 In their effort to shift the analyticalfocus of the field away from the study of international law andorganisation and toward what they termed ‘international politics’, a newgroup of scholars, which included Frederick Sherwood Dunn, FrederickL. Schuman, Georg Schwarzenberger, and Nicholas Spykman arguedthat the essence of the alternative model rested on the recognition that inthe absence of a higher authority, sovereign states were compelled toseek power in order to ensure their own survival and security.6

According to Dunn, who was one of the original members of the YaleInstitute of International Studies, which was formed in 1935,‘international politics is concerned with the special kind of powerrelationships that exist in a community lacking an overriding authority’.7

The close relationship that exists between the realist school and theconcept of power stems from its basic insight: conflict and competitionare intrinsic to the practice of international politics. Given thisunquestioned assumption by realists, which they argue is supported byhistory, they submit that the acquisition and management of power isthe central feature of politics among nations. Thus, as Barry Buzanasserts, the ‘focus on power politics provides the apparent continuity ofthe realist tradition’.8 To explain the activity of international politics,according to the realists, it is necessary to focus on the concept of power.

Although the realists were successful in helping to make the studyof power become a central focus of the field, and did much to fuseconsiderations of international politics with considerations of power,the adequacy of their understanding of power continues to bechallenged. There are important disagreements among realiststhemselves on the best way to conceptualise and measure power. Some

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5. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Studyof International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), vii.

6. See Frederick S. Dunn, ‘The Scope of International Relations’, World Politics1 (1948): 142-146; Frederick S. Schuman, International Politics: An Introduction tothe Western State System (New York: McGraw Hill, 1933); GeorgSchwarzenberger, Power Politics: An Introduction to the Study of InternationalRelations and Post-War Planning (London: Jonathan Cape, 1941); and Nicholas J.Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance ofPower (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1942).

7. Dunn, ‘The Scope of International Relations’, 144. 8. Barry Buzan, ‘The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?’, in International Theory:

Positivism and Beyond, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 51.


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9. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 4.

realists define power in terms of measurable attributes, such as the sizeof a country’s population and military forces, while others define powerin a relational manner as the ability to exercise influence over otheractors in the international system. Power is considered by some realiststo be an end in itself, while others assert that it is a means to an end.

The classical realist lineage begins with Thucydides’srepresentation of power politics as a law of human behaviour. The driveto amass power and dominate others is held by classical realists to be afundamental aspect of human nature. The behaviour of the state as aself-seeking egoist is understood to be a reflection of the characteristicsof the people that comprise the state. It is, according to classical realists,human nature that explains why international politics is necessarilypower politics. This reduction of the driving force behind internationalpolitics to a condition of human nature is one of the definingcharacteristics of classical realism and is most famously represented inthe work of Hans J. Morgenthau. Morgenthau held that ‘politics, likesociety in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots inhuman nature’.9 The important point for Morgenthau was, first, torecognise that these laws exist and, second, to devise policies that areconsistent with the basic fact that human beings possess an inherentwill to power. For both Thucydides and Morgenthau, the essentialcontinuity of states’ behavior is their power-seeking, which is rooted inthe biological drives of human beings.

Structural realism, which is most often associated with KennethWaltz’s landmark book, Theory of International Politics (1979), shifts thefocus away from the laws of human nature and argues that the power-seeking behaviour of states is a function of international anarchy. Forstructural realists, who find their progenitor in Thomas Hobbes, thecondition of anarchy – that is, the fact that there is no ‘higher power’ toensure the peace among sovereign states – is often viewed assynonymous to a state of war. Structural realists argue that becausethere is always the possibility that any particular state may resort toforce, the outbreak of war is a likely scenario in an anarchicalenvironment. According to Waltz, anarchy prevents states fromentering into co-operative agreements to end the state of war.Moreover, Waltz argues that it is the structure of the system thatcompels states to seek power. There is, however, a recent controversyamong structural realists over the question of whether states areprimarily security-maximisers or power-maximisers. This debate



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between defensive and offensive realists is discussed below, but theimportant point to emphasise is that all structural realists insist thatsystemic forces explain why international politics is necessarily acontinuous struggle for power.

The modified realist category includes those realist thinkers whohave ventured to transgress Waltz’s maxim to steer clear of reductionisttheory. While accepting the importance of systemic forces, modifiedrealists have sought to move beyond the limiting confines of structuralrealism and endeavoured to incorporate unit level characteristics intotheir account of the struggle for power among nations. Modifiedrealists, especially neoclassical realists such as Randall Schweller,Fareed Zakaria, and William Wohlforth, introduce a variety ofintervening variables that stand between the state and internationaloutcomes. By considering the role of variables operating at thedomestic and individual level of analysis, neoclassical realists providea different account of the power-seeking behaviour of states.

Nature of power

Location of power

Measurement of power

Effect/pattern ofbehavior

Classical Realism

Relational

Materialresources

Individuals andStates

Elusive attempt to combine quantitative andqualitative elements

Power optimization

Structural Realism I[Defensive]

Materialresources

International anarchy, relative distribution ofcapabilitiesamong states

Capabilities thatrepresent the sumtotal of variousnational attributes

States as security-maximisers

Structural Realism II[Offensive]

Materialresources

International anarchy, relative distribution ofcapabilitiesamong states

Military power and latent power

States as power-maximisers

ModifiedRealism

Materialresources

Individual, domestic structure, andinternational anarchy, Relativedistribution ofcapabilities

Decision-makers’perceptions

State strength

States as influence-maximisers

Table 1: Realist Conceptions of Power


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On Power

One of the main obstacles in the endeavour to make power the centralfocus in IR is the difficulty of reaching a consensus on the mostappropriate way to define and measure such an elusive concept.Power, like a host of other important concepts in IR, is an essentiallycontested concept – it means quite different things to different people.David Baldwin describes the two dominant traditions of poweranalysis in IR ‘in terms of the elements of national power approach,which depicts power as resources, and the relational power approach,which depicts power as an actual or potential relationship’.10

Proponents of the elements of national power approach equate powerwith the possession of specific resources. All of the important resourcesthat a state possesses are typically combined in some fashion todetermine its overall aggregate power. The resources that are mostoften used as an indicator of national power include the level ofmilitary expenditure, size of the armed forces, gross national product,size of territory, and population. While tangible elements such aspopulation, military expenditure, and GNP are almost alwaysincluded in calculations of national power, some scholars also includeintangible elements such as the quality of political leadership andnational moral. Regardless of the particular tangible and intangiblepower resources that one chooses to identify, those endorsing theelements of national power approach believe they can be measuredand combined to provide an indicator of the aggregate power of a state. Stefano Guzzini refers to this as a ‘lump concept of powerwhich assumes that all elements of power can be combined into onegeneral indicator’.11

One of the difficulties with the elements of national power approachis the issue of power conversion; that is ‘the capacity to convert potentialpower, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by thechanged behavior of others’.12 At the end of the day, it is not the merepossession of power resources that matters, but the ability to convertthese into actual influence. This leads to a second problem with thisapproach; namely, determining the degree to which various componentsof national power are fungible or interchangeable. Baldwin explains that


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10. Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations’, 185. 11. Stephano Guzzini, ‘The Use and Misuse of Power Analysis in International

Theory’, in Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories, ed. Ronen Palan(London: Routledge, 2000), 55.

12. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction toTheory and History, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), 59.


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‘fungibility refers to the ease with which power resources useful in oneissue-area can be used in other issue-areas’.13 Simply because a statepossesses some kind of power does not necessarily mean that it can beused to attain a specific benefit. For instance, the possession of nuclearweapons, which the elements of national power approach wouldconsider to be an important source of power, does not guarantee that theycan be used to gain influence in an issue-area such as trade. Because theelements of national power approach adopts a ‘lump concept of power’it assumes power is fungible. However, whether power actually isfungible is difficult to demonstrate, and critics of the aggregated powerapproach suggest it is not.14

An alternative to the power as resources approach is the relationalpower approach that was championed by behavioural oriented politicalscientists during the 1950s and 1960s.15 According to Robert Dahl, whowas an influential advocate of the relational conception of power, ‘A haspower over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that Bwould not otherwise do’.16 Fundamental to the relational conception ofpower is the ability to demonstrate a change in outcomes. According tothis view, power is a process of interaction whereby a state is able toexercise influence over the actions of another state. Power as a set ofresources is deemed to be less important than the actual ability of actorA to change the behaviour of actor B.

One of the motivations for developing the relational approach topower was to overcome the fungibility problem associated with the lump concept of power. The relational approach rejects both thelump concept of power and the fungibility assumption, and insteaddefines and specifies power in a multidimensional, causal manner.Rather than power being a ‘one size fits all’ category, the relationalapproach disaggregates power into a number of component parts in order to demonstrate how it is exercised in specific issue areas. The dimensions of power typically include ‘its scope (the objectivesof an attempt to gain influence; influence over which issue), itsdomain (the target of the influence attempt), its weight (the quantityof resources), and its costs (opportunity costs of forgoing a

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13. Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations’, 180. 14. See Robert O. Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and

Beyond’, in Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ada W. Finifter(Washington, DC: APSA, 1983).

15. The classic work is Harold D. Laswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power andSociety: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press,1950).

16. Robert Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’, Behavioral Science 2 (1957): 202.


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17. Stefano Guzzini, ‘Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist PowerAnalysis’, International Organization 47, no. 3 (1993): 453.

18. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 25. 19. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 102. 20. Schuman, International Politics, 491.

relation)’.17 Proponents argue that the relational concept of powerallows one to investigate how influence or control is achieved in avariety of specific settings. Since the relational approach equatespower with outcomes, the analyst must be able to demonstrate howan actor is able to cause another to do something that they would nototherwise do.

While realists are the theorists of power politics, they disagree onthe best way to conceptualise and measure power. The next sectionsreveal that realist thinkers can subscribe to either (or even both) of thetwo dominant traditions of power analysis.

Classical Realism and Power

Forefathers of classical realists such as Thucydides and Machiavelli, aswell as the members of the power politics school that arose at the end ofthe interwar period, conceptualised international politics, and politicsmore generally, in terms of a fundamental and never-ending struggle forpower. In the beginning of Politics Among Nations, Morgenthauproclaimed that ‘international politics, like all politics, is a struggle forpower’. He added that ‘whatever the ultimate aims of internationalpolitics, power is always the immediate aim’.18 Carr concurred withMorgenthau, claiming that ‘politics are, then, in one sense always powerpolitics’.19 And Frederick Schuman, whose popular text InternationalPolitics (1933) was a harbinger of the realism that Morgenthau wouldpopularise after the Second World War, claimed that ‘all politics is astruggle for power, but while power is sought in domestic politics as ameans toward other ends, power is sought as an end in itself ininternational politics’.20

When it comes to providing a definition of power, Morgenthau iscomplex in that he appears to have endorsed both the relational and theelements of national power approach. On the one hand, he clearlystates that ‘when we speak of power, we mean man’s control over theminds and actions of other men’. Morgenthau defines political poweras ‘a psychological relation between those who exercise it and thoseover whom it is exercised. It gives the former control over certainactions of the latter through the influence which the former exert over



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21. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 26-27. 22. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The

Free Press, 1947), 152.23. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 27.24. Ibid., 129.

the latter’s minds’.21 This definition clearly places Morgenthau in therelational approach to power camp. His view closely follows MaxWeber’s relational definition of power as ‘the probability that one actorwithin a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his ownwill despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probabilityrests’.22 By endorsing a relational conception of power, Morgenthaucommits himself to demonstrating how a political actor, whether it bean individual person or a state, is able to induce a change in outcomefavourable to the one who is exercising power. Morgenthau does,however, make a sharp distinction between political power andphysical force. He argues that there is a fundamental differencebetween threatening the use of violence to achieve a particular outcomeand its actual use; the latter, for Morgenthau, represents an ‘abdicationof political power in favour of military or pseudo-military power’.23

The psychological aspect of power is lost when overt physical violenceis used to influence the behaviour of another actor.

Yet, on the other hand, it is equally apparent that Morgenthau alsodefined power in terms of the elements of national power approach.Like other classical realists, Morgenthau equated power with thepossession of identifiable and measurable resources. Morgenthaudistinguished between two types of elements that contributed to thepower of a nation: those that are stable and those subject to constantchange. The stable elements, which were largely of a quantitativenature, included geography, natural resources (food and raw materials),industrial capacity, military preparedness, and population.Morgenthau identified four qualitative factors that have a bearing onnational power: national character, national morale, the quality ofgovernment, and the quality of a nation’s diplomacy. Morgenthausingled out the quality of diplomacy as the most important factorcontributing to the power of a nation. According to Morgenthau, ‘theconduct of a nation’s foreign affairs by its diplomats is for nationalpower in peace what military strategy and tactics by its military leadersare for national power in war’.24

Carr equated international politics with power politics, but henever provided an explicit definition of power. Carr argued that powerwas indivisible, yet he claimed that for purposes of discussion it could


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be divided into three categories: military power, economic power, andpower over opinion. Yet because of the ever-present possibility of warbreaking-out, Carr argued that military power was the most importantform of power in international politics. Carr explained that ‘thesupreme importance of the military instrument lies in the fact that theultima ratio of power in international relations is war’.25 He admittedthat the primary importance of economic power lay in its closeassociation with the military instrument. Carr in fact concluded thatmilitary power was such an essential element in the life of the state thatit served as both a means and an end in itself.

Classical realists argue that the permanent struggle of states forpower, in which the goal of every state is to maximise their own relativepower, is ultimately explained by the sinful and power-seeking natureof man. They belong to what Arnold Wolfers once referred to as the ‘evilschool’, which places emphasis on the role of forces within people andstates and the overall focus is on flaws in human nature and states.26 InWaltz’s terminology, classical realists are ‘first-image’ thinkers whoargue that the struggle for power arises ‘because men are born seekersof power’.27 Thus, as a result of the theoretical primacy they assign toindividuals, classical realism is sometimes referred to as human natureor biological realism.28

Thucydides and Machiavelli can both be viewed as classicalrealists in that their respective views of politics were largely derivedfrom their account of the nature of human beings.29 Both held the viewthat the limitless desire for power, either for its own sake or in theelusive quest for security, was attributable to human nature. Michael


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25. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 109. 26. On the ‘evil’ school, see Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on

International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); andMichael Spirtas, ‘A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory’, SecurityStudies 5 (1996).

27. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1959) 35.

28. For an elaboration of biological realism, see Donnelly, Realism andInternational Relations.

29. I am fully aware of the difficulties and limitations of interpreting thesefigures as belonging to one particular school of realism. See, for example, Doyle,Ways of War and Peace; Rob Walker, ‘The Prince and the “Pauper”: Tradition,Modernity, and Practice in the Theory of International Relations’, inInternational/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, ed. JamesDer Derian and Michael Shapiro (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); and DanielGarst, ‘Thucydides and Neorealism’, International Studies Quarterly 33, No. 1(1989).


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Doyle refers to this form of realism as fundamentalism, which‘characterizes all social interaction as fundamentally rooted inmankind’s psychological and material needs that result in a drive forpower’.30 For Thucydides and Machiavelli, the passions of fear, glory,and self-interest manifest themselves in a diabolical urge to dominateothers. The will to power that arises from the egoistic nature of man isassumed to describe the behaviour of macroscopic political entitiessuch as city-states and nation-states.31 Classical realists maintain that theessential continuity of politics as a permanent struggle for power stemsdirectly from the fundamental human drive for power.

Unlike some of his fellow realists, Morgenthau provided anexplanation to account for the ubiquitous struggle for power. AlthoughMorgenthau argued that the struggle for power took a different form inthe domestic and international realm, the underlying reason why theactivity of politics was reducible to the pursuit of power was the same:human nature. Like Thucydides and Machiavelli, Morgenthau locatedthe pursuit of power to the basic human drive to dominate others. Oneof Morgenthau’s core assumptions about human nature was that allmen held an insatiable ‘lust for power’. According to Morgenthau, ‘manis a political animal by nature’ who ‘is born to seek power’.32

Morgenthau argued that while all men are born to seek power, thereality was that most people find themselves to be a ‘slave to the powerof others’. He held that the dynamic interaction between seeking andresisting domination contributed to the evil nature of politics.Although Morgenthau believed that the selfishness of man was afundamental cause of political strife, he attributed the universal desirefor power to two distinct human drives. The first was rooted in thedrive to survive: to secure vital needs such as food, shelter, and sex. Theproblem here is competition and scarcity: ‘what the one wants forhimself, the other already possesses or wants, too’. Consequently,‘struggle and competition ensue.’33 The second, and more diabolicaldrive, is what Morgenthau termed the ‘animus dominandi’, the desire todominate. Unlike the first selfish drive, the second desire for power isnot associated with mere survival, but with the position of oneindividual in relation to another. Morgenthau reasoned that while there

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30. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 46. 31. For a fuller explanation of this move, see Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Reconstructing

Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory’, in Roots of Realism, ed.Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996).

32. Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1946), 168.

33. Ibid., 192.


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34. Ibid., 193. 35. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 31.36. See Bahman Fozouni, ‘Confutation of Political Realism’, International

Studies Quarterly 39, no. 4 (1995). 37. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 211.38. Ibid., 36; and Morganthau, Scientific Man, 192. 39. Schuman, International Politics, 493.

were limits to the physical selfishness of man, the desire for power waslimitless. Morgenthau wrote that ‘while man’s vital needs are capableof satisfaction, his lust for power would be satisfied only if the last manbecame an object of his domination, there being nobody above or besidehim, that is, if he became like God’.34

Morgenthau transfers the bedrock assumption of man’s inherentlust for power to describe the behaviour of states. Because of the‘ubiquity of the struggle for power in all social relations on all levels ofsocial organization’, Morgenthau concluded that ‘international politicsis of necessity power politics’.35 Just like individuals, he claimed, thegoal of every state was to maximise power to the optimal level.36 Heviewed the activity of international politics ‘as a continuing effort tomaintain and to increase the power of one’s own nation and to keep incheck or reduce the power of other nations’.37 Morgenthau likened thethree basic patterns of the struggle for power among states – to keeppower (status quo), to increase power (imperialism), and todemonstrate power (prestige) – to man’s lust for power that wasmanifest in the ‘desire to maintain the range of one’s own person withregard to others, to increase it, or to demonstrate it’.38

According to this view, international politics is a continuous strugglebetween the status quo and revisionist powers. Left to their own devices,Schuman argued, ‘each state tends to extend its own power over as widea sphere as possible’.39 But the quest for power does not take place in avacuum. Rather, each state’s attempt to act in terms of interest defined aspower directly influences the actions of other states. This makes itincumbent on the statesmen to measure accurately the power andintentions of other states so as to differentiate between an imperialist andstatus quo foreign policy. While acknowledging the importance of themilitary instrument, Morgenthau warned against the tendency to focus ona single component of power to the neglect of all the others. Hemaintained that one of the most complicated tasks of foreign policy wasto evaluate how the individual elements of power contributed to theoverall power of one’s own nation as well as that of others. According toMorgenthau, the ability to differentiate between a status quo and



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imperialist policy, as well as the successful pursuit of the balance of power,depends on an accurate assessment of national power. Indeed, thebalance of power system only reaches a state of equilibrium when eachstate’s power is at its optimal level.

For Morgenthau and the classical realists, international politics wasmore of an art than a science. The power of nations could never bemeasured in the same way that physicists measured atmosphericpressure. Political life was filled with ambiguity and Morgenthau soughtto provide a map for understanding the landscape of internationalpolitics. Classical realists argued that the most basic pattern of behaviouramong states was their perpetual struggle for power. This behaviour,according to classical realists, was ultimately explained by specificbehavioural traits found in the nature of man. Morgenthau and theclassical realists have been criticised for trying to construct a generaltheory of international relations on the basis of concepts as elusive aspower and human nature. Stanley Hoffmann, for example, declared that‘the decision to equate politics and the effects of man’s “lust for power,”and the tendency to equate power and evil or violence, mutilate reality’.40

Structural Realism and Power

Structural realists concur with classical realists that the realm ofinternational politics is a continuous struggle for power, but they do notendorse the classical realist assumption that this is attributable to certainpropensities found in the nature of man. Waltz, for example, writes‘international politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and ofaccommodation’.41 Thomas Hobbes, who is often interpreted as astructural realist, argued that in the absence of an overarching powerhuman beings exhibited ‘a perpetual and restless desire of power afterpower, that ceaseth only in death’. For Hobbes, man’s desire ‘of powerafter power’ was neither the result of greed nor from an intrinsic delightin dominating others, but rather ‘because he cannot assure the powerand means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition ofmore’.42 Instead of explaining the ubiquitous quest for power in theinternational realm on the basis of human nature, structural realists, inArnold Wolfers’ terms, substitute tragedy for evil. According to thetragedy view ‘the insecurity of an anarchical system of multiplesovereignty places the actors under compulsion to seek maximum____________________

40. Stanley Hoffmann, ‘International Relations: The Long Road to Theory’,World Politics 11, no. 3 (1959): 350.

41. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: RandomHouse, 1979), 113.

42. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson. (New York: PenguinBooks, 1985), 161.


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43. Arnold Wolfers, ‘The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference’, WorldPolitics 4, no. 1 (1951): 42.

44. Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, in The Originand Prevention of Major Wars, eds. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 43.

45. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, 17.

power even though it run counter to their real desires’.43 Structuralrealists shift the locus of the struggle for power from human nature tothe anarchical environment that states inhabit.

Waltz explains that ‘from the vantage point of neorealist theory,competition and conflict among states stem directly from the twin facts oflife under conditions of anarchy: States in an anarchic order must providefor their own security, and threats or seeming threats to their securityabound’.44 In the absence of a superior authority, structural realists arguethat self-help is necessarily the principle of action. Writing much earlierthan Waltz, Nicholas Spykman observed that in an anarchicalinternational society, ‘each individual state has continued to depend forits very existence, as much as for the enjoyment of its rights and theprotection of its interests, primarily on its own strength or that of itsprotectors’.45 Because of the possibility that force may at any time be usedby one state against another, all states must take appropriate measures toensure their own survival. Structural realists argue that the mostimportant measure that a state can take to help guarantee its ownsurvival is to accumulate a sufficient amount of power.

Given the criticism leveled against realists that their theory ofpower is overly simplistic, it is somewhat odd that Waltz does notprovide a sophisticated definition of power. He simply endorses theelements of national power approach and equates power with thepossession of material resources. However, based on the manner thatWaltz has constructed his structural theory, it cannot be any other way.His commitment to parsimony necessitates that he define power interms of resources and, furthermore, that he assume that theseresources are highly fungible. Waltz is most interested in providing arank ordering of states so that he can ascertain the number of greatpowers in any given international system. This, by necessity, leads himto reject the relational, multidimensional notion of power and insteadendorse the lump concept of power. According to Waltz,

The economic, military, and other capabilities of nations cannot besectored and separately weighed. States are not placed in the toprank because they excel in one way or another. Their rank dependson how they score on all of the following items: size of population



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46. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 131, emphasis in original. 47. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1981), 13. 48. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 131. 49. See Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations’, 183. 50. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 192. 51. Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations’, 183. 52. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 113.

and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, militarystrength, political stability and competence.46

Conceived in this manner, the capabilities of a state represent nothingmore than the sum total of a number of loosely identified nationalattributes. A similar degree of generality is evident in Robert Gilpin’sdefinition of power. According to Gilpin, ‘power refers simply to themilitary, economic, and technological capabilities of states’.47 UnlikeMorgenthau, neither Waltz nor Gilpin provide a detailed discussion ofstate capabilities or indicate precisely how they should be measured.Although Waltz identifies a few items that allegedly determine the rankof a state, he fails to specify the criterion by which to measure them orindicate how they can be combined into an aggregate score. While Waltzdoes admit that ‘states have different combinations of capabilities whichare difficult to measure and compare, the more so since the weight to beassigned to different items changes with time’,48 he makes it seem thatany competent student of international politics can differentiate betweenthe capabilities of states and identify the great powers in theinternational system.

Not only is Waltz in fact vague on the issue of how to appraise andrank the power of states, but he never carefully specifies what he meansby capabilities. While he equates resources with capability, the questionof ‘capability to get whom to do what’ is never addressed.49 Indismissing those analysts who define power in terms of getting one’sway, Waltz remarks that he relies on ‘the old and simple notion that anagent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than theyaffect him’.50 David Baldwin notes that, in all likelihood, a ‘carefulreading of Waltz generates a strong suspicion that war-winning abilityis the unstated standard by which states are being ranked.’51 EchoingCarr, Morgenthau, and Schuman, Waltz claims ‘in international politicsforce serves, not only the as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first andconstant one’.52 It does seem that for Waltz, power in internationalpolitics is roughly equivalent to military might.

Lack of clarity aside, Waltz and other structural realists argue thatthe distribution of capabilities in the international system is the key


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53. Ibid., 98.54. Waltz, ‘The Origins of War’, 40. 55. Ibid., 40. 56. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 128. 57. Ibid., 126.

independent variable to explaining international outcomes such aswars, alliances, and the operation of the balance of power. Althoughcapabilities are a unit level attribute, Waltz argues that it is a structuralattribute in that he is most interested in how capabilities are distributedacross the international system. Waltz explains that ‘althoughcapabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of capabilities isnot’.53

What effect does the international distribution of power have onthe behaviour of states, particularly their power seeking behaviour?Waltz argues that states, especially the great powers, have to besensitive to the capabilities of other states. In order to ensure their ownsurvival in a self-help environment, neorealists such as Waltz assumethat prudent states will only seek an appropriate amount of power.According to Waltz, power is a means to the end of security. In asignificant passage, Waltz writes ‘because power is a possibly usefulmeans, sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it’. Headds, ‘in crucial situations, however, the ultimate concern of states isnot for power but for security’.54 In other words, rather than beingpower-maximisers, states, according to Waltz, are security-maximisers.Contrary to Morgenthau, who ‘viewed power as an end in itself’,neorealism ‘sees power as a possibly useful means, with states runningrisks if they have either too little or too much of it’.55 The implication,for Waltz, is that states will sometimes forgo acquiring additionalamounts of power if this is seen as potentially jeopardising theirsecurity. The most important factor that Waltz identifies for why a statewill be disinclined to maximise its relative power is rooted in his centralproposition that ‘balances of power recurrently form’.56 Aggressive andexpansionist behaviour often, according to Waltz, proves to becounterproductive because it triggers a counterbalancing coalition.Waltz concludes that ‘because power is a means and not an end, statesprefer to join the weaker of two coalitions’. He continues, ‘if states wishto maximise power, they would join the stronger side’, but ‘this doesnot happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behaviorinduced by the system’.57

As a result of Waltz’s belief that states are strongly inclined tobalance against aggressive powers, they can be described, in JosephGrieco’s terms, as ‘defensive positionalists’ and ‘will only seek theminimum level of power that is needed to attain and to maintain their



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58. Joseph Grieco, ‘Realist International Theory and the Study of WorldPolitics’, in New Thinking in International Relations Theory, eds. Michael W. Doyleand G. John Ikenberry (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 167.

59. Randall L. Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What SecurityDilemma?’, Security Studies 5 (1996): 91.

60. For a general introduction to the debate between defensive and offensiverealism, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ‘Realism and America’s Rise: A Review Essay’,International Security 23 (1998); Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking UnderAnarchy’, International Security 25 (2000/01); and Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Realism asTragedy’, Review of International Studies 30, no. 3 (2004).

61. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 21.62. Ibid., 30-31.

security and survival’.58 According to this ‘defensive realist’ position, themechanism of the balance of the power is such that states will seek poweronly to minimise international power gaps rather than maximise suchgaps to their own advantage. Randall Schweller has noted that thereappears to be a status quo bias among defensive realists such as Waltzwhich begs the question: ‘if states are assumed to seek nothing more thantheir own survival, why would they feel threatened?’59 Schweller,following Morgenthau and the classical realists, argues that while somestatus quo states might only desire security, there are also revisionist statesthat seek more power. The question of whether states are security-maximising or power-maximising entities has become the basis of animportant debate among structural realists. The debate is cast in terms ofan opposition between defensive and offensive realists.60

While sharing many of the same assumptions with Waltz anddefensive realists, John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realismoffers a different account of the struggle for power under anarchy. Mostimportantly, ‘offensive realism parts company with defensive realismover the question of how much power states want’.61 According toMearsheimer, the structure of the international system compels states tomaximise their relative power position. The environment that statesinhabit, Mearsheimer argues, is responsible for the ubiquitouscompetition for power that prompts states to search for opportunities toincrease their power at the expense of rivals. He articulates five basicassumptions about the international system: it is anarchic, all greatpowers possess some offensive military capability, states can never becertain about the intentions of other states, survival is the primary goalof states, and states are rational actors.62 Mearsheimer argues that themost important pattern of behaviour that follows from these bedrockassumptions is power maximisation. Mearsheimer contends that,‘apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and awarethat they operate in a self-help system, states quickly understand that


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63. Ibid., 33. 64. Ibid., 57. 65. Ibid., 56. 66. Ibid., 83-137. 67. Ibid., 55.

the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state inthe system.’63

Contrary to Waltz, Mearsheimer argues that states understand thatthe best path to survival in the self-help, anarchical system is toaccumulate more power than anyone else. The ideal position – albeitone, Mearsheimer argues, that is virtually impossible to achieve – is tobe the global hegemon. The impossibility of attaining globalpreeminence – which according to Mearsheimer is due largely to thedifficulties that can be identified with projecting power across largebodies of water – does not, however, prevent states from trying toachieve hegemony. Consequently, he maintains, all great powers haverevisionist aims and pursue expansionist policies.

Power is the key concept of offensive realism and Mearsheimeradmits that it is only by clearly defining power that we can understandthe behaviour of the great powers. Like Waltz, Mearsheimer endorsesthe elements of national power approach and defines power as ‘nothingmore than specific assets or material resources that are available to astate’.64 Unlike Waltz, however, he devotes greater attention todiscussing these elements and attempts to provide a reliable way tomeasure state power. Mearsheimer begins by distinguishing betweentwo kinds of state power: military power and latent power. The essenceof a state’s effective power is its military power, based largely on thesize and strength of the army, as it compares to the military forces ofother states. Mearsheimer explains that he defines ‘power largely inmilitary terms because offensive realism emphasises that force is theultima ratio of international politics.’65 Yet in Mearsheimer’s view, thereis a clear hierarchy of military power. He demonstrates how specifictypes of fighting forces – sea power, strategic airpower, land power, andnuclear weapons – contribute differently to the overall power of a state.Mearsheimer maintains that land power is the dominant form ofmilitary power and concludes that a state with the most formidablearmy is the most powerful state .66

The ability of a state to build a powerful army is a function of itslatent power. By latent power, Mearsheimer ‘refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power; it is largelybased on a state’s wealth and the overall size of its population.’67 Heengages in a detailed discussion of latent power and provides a way to



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68. Ibid., 67. Measuring latent power in the years between 1816 to 1960,Mearsheimer uses a straightforward composite indicator that accords equalweight to a state’s iron and steel production and its energy consumption; from1960 to the present he uses GNP to measure wealth.

69. Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition’, inPolitical Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner(New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 211.

measure it.68 Mearsheimer repeatedly emphasises the point that latentpower is not equivalent to military power. The historical record,according to Mearsheimer, indicates that states have had different levelsof success in translating latent power to military power, which makes itimpossible to equate wealth with military might.

There is no doubt that, compared to Waltz, Mearsheimer hasdevised a more reliable measure of national power. It is also clear thathis account of the struggle for power is much more intense than Waltz’sbenign description. The question Mearsheimer takes on – do states seekto maximise power or security? – is an important one for realists. It hasimplications for a host of other issues such as the problem of achievinginternational cooperation, the degree to which states balance orbandwagon, and debates about grand strategy. While utilising differentassumptions about the motivations of states, defensive and offensiverealism both operate from the premise that the structure of theinternational system explains the power seeking behaviour of statesand important international outcomes. Both theories are thus limitedby their refusal to consider how factors located at the domestic andindividual level of analysis impact the struggle for power. Byendorsing the view that power is equivalent to the possession oftangible resources, both Waltz and Mearsheimer overlook the extent towhich power is a matter of perception.

Modified Realism

Modified realists share the view of all realists that international politicscan be described as a continuous struggle for power. Modified realistsalso concur with structural realists that international anarchy is animportant factor contributing to the relentless quest for power andsecurity. But unlike structural realists, advocates of neoclassical realismargue, in a manner similar to classical realists, that ‘anarchy is apermissive condition rather than an independent causal force’.69

Anarchy and the distribution of power alone cannot, according toneoclassical realists, explain the particular power-seeking behaviourthat a state adopts. Contrary to structural realists such as Waltz,


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70. Ibid., 211. 71. Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory

of Underbalancing’, International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 164. 72. See William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during

the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 1-17; and Gideon Rose,‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics 51 (1998):151.

neoclassical realists are primarily interested in explaining the foreignpolicy behaviour and decisions of specific states. While the relativepower of a state is held to be an important determinant of foreign policy,‘the causal logic of the theory places domestic politics as an interveningvariable between the distribution of power and foreign policybehavior’.70 Rather than identifying the locus of the desire for power ateither the individual or structural level, neoclassical realists insist that itis an amalgam of the two levels.

Neoclassical realists refuse to ‘blackbox’ the state. Instead theymake a number of modifications to the parsimonious tenets ofstructural realism and incorporate unit level factors such as thepersonalities and perceptions of statesmen, state-society relationships,and state interests into their explanation of international politics. Thesemodifications contribute to a distinctive neoclassical realist conceptionof power. According to neoclassical realists, states are not ‘like units’.Randall Schweller, a leading proponent of neoclassical realism, arguesthat ‘complex domestic political processes act as transmission belts thatchannel, mediate, and (re)direct policy outputs in response to externalforces (primarily changes in relative power)’.71 Neoclassical realists donot discount the importance of the structure of the international system,in fact they argue that it is a key determinant of a state’s foreign policy,but they argue that a plausible theory of international politics must alsoinclude unit level attributes.

Neoclassical realists continue to be preoccupied with determiningthe concept of power. In terms of the debate between the elements ofnational power approach and the relational power approach, theyendorse the material conception of power.72 But while they endorse amaterial definition of power, neoclassical realists insist that it is not just relative capabilities that explain the foreign policy behaviour ofstates. In addition to sheer material capabilities, neoclassical realistsinclude a variety of domestic variables that help to determine the actual power that a state possesses. Compared to structural realistssuch as Waltz, neoclassical realists provide a more subtle definition ofpower that connects in important ways to the insights provided byclassical realists.

Adding additional variables obviously complicates the elusive



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73. Information about the Correlates of War Project can be found athttp://www.correlatesofwar.org/

74. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy ofWorld Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 26-27.

75. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, 2. 76. Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism’, 147.

task of providing a reliable way to measure power. Of all theneoclassical realists, Schweller has made the greatest effort to specifyhow the capabilities of a state should be measured. He utilises datafrom the Correlates of War (COW) project to measure the relativecapabilities of both the great powers and what he refers to as lessergreat powers.73 Schweller argues that the measures comprising theCOW capability index – in which military (forces in-being), industrial(war potential) and demographic (staying power and war-augmentingcapability) are the three distinct measures of national power, – ‘providea reasonably accurate picture of the power bases held by the majoractors with respect to their relative fighting capabilities’.74 WhileSchweller’s effort to provide greater precision in the measurement ofcapabilities is laudable, other neoclassical realists maintain that it isonly the first step.

Neoclassical realists argue that one of the main obstacles toproviding a reliable way to measure power stems from the fact that it isnot national power per se that is of crucial importance, but ratherdecision-makers perceptions of power that matter most. WilliamWohlforth writes ‘if power influences the course of internationalpolitics, it must do so largely through the perceptions of the people whomake decisions on behalf of states’.75 Structural realists make it appearthat the relative distribution of power in the international system has anobjective existence that directly influences the behaviour of states.Neoclassical realists disagree. Not only do they argue that it is politicalleaders’ perception of the distribution of power that is central, they donot assume that there is a direct link between systemic constraints andunit level behaviour. Systemic pressures, they argue, must be translatedthrough intervening variables located at the unit level.

One of the important intervening variables emphasised byneoclassical realists is decision-makers’ perceptions of the distribution ofpower. Gideon Rose explains that ‘foreign policy choices are made byactual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relativepower that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources orforces in being’.76 In highlighting the role of perception andmisperception, neoclassical realists have sought to introduce a greaterdegree of agency into international relations theory. There is no doubt

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77. Ibid., 147. 78. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s

World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 38-39. 79. Ibid., 9.

that including the intervening variable of perception complicates the taskof measuring power, but neoclassical realists claim that one cannotsimply assume that all foreign policy officials accurately apprehend thedistribution of power or that the personalities of statesmen make nodifference in the process by which the distribution of power is calculated.

A second intervening variable that neoclassical realists consider intheir analysis of foreign policy is domestic state structure. Forneoclassical realists, among the reasons states are not ‘like units’ is thatthey have different domestic structures. Variations in state-societyrelationships contribute to different forms of state, which alters themanner by which the power of a state should be measured.Neoclassical realists argue that ‘power analysis must therefore alsoexamine the strength and structure of states relative to their societies,because these affect the proportion of national resources that can beallocated to foreign policy’.77 Fareed Zakaria makes an attempt todifferentiate states on the basis of their ability to extract and directresources from the societies that they rule. When measuring power,Zakaria argues that a distinction needs to be made between nationalpower – namely, the traditional material resources identified byclassical and structural realists – and state strength, which he definesboth as the ability of the government apparatus to ‘extract nationalpower for its ends’, as well as the ‘capacity and cohesion to carry out itswishes’.78 With respect to state strength, Zakaria argues that there isgreat disparity in the ability that governments have to extract resourcesfrom society to put to use in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives.State power, which Zakaria defines as ‘that portion of national powerthe government can extract for its purposes and [which thus] reflectsthe ease with which central decision-makers can achieve their ends’, isthe key variable of his neoclassical version of state-centered realism. 79

Finally, neoclassical realists argue that not only do states havedifferent domestic structures, which directly impacts their relativecapabilities, but they also have different interests. Schweller’s workreminds us that for classical realists such as Carr, Morgenthau, andWolfers, calculating the motivations and interests of states was ofcrucial importance to describing the character that the struggle forpower took at any particular historical moment. He disagrees withstructural realists who submit that states are all motivated by the sameinterests and has attempted to construct a theory that takes into account



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80. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, 22. 81. See Zakaria, From Wealth to Power; and Fareed Zakaria, ‘Realism and

Domestic Politics: A Review Essay’, in The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realismand International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and StevenE. Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

82. Brooks, ‘Dueling Realisms’, 462.

the full range of state interests. Most importantly, Schweller brings therevisionist state back in; allowing for the possibility that, in terms ofpower, some states do indeed ‘value what they covet more than whatthey have’.80

Taken together, the modifications introduced by neoclassicalrealists contribute to a different explanation of the effect that thestruggle for power has on states. The pursuit of power, according toneoclassical realists, is not an end in itself, but rather is one of the mostimportant means that a state has to try and control and shape theenvironment that it inhabits. Rather than describing states as eitherpower-maximising or security-maximising entities, neoclassical realistssuch as Zakaria prefer to describe states as ‘influence-maximers’.81

According to this formulation, as the power of a state increases, so toodo its interests. Reworking Morgenthau’s classic formulation thatnations define their interests in terms of power, Zakaria contends thatas the capabilities of a state increase it will seek greater influence andcontrol of the external environment, and when power resources waneits interests and ambitions will be scaled back accordingly.

Because neoclassical realists claim that the pursuit of power isinduced neither by a diabolical will to dominate nor by the structure ofinternational anarchy, they allow for a much greater degree offlexibility in explaining how and why a particular state seeks toenhance its power. Stephen Brooks claims that ‘decision makerspursue power because it is the mechanism by which to achieve thestate’s overriding objectives’. And because neoclassical realists viewpower as a mechanism rather than an end in itself, ‘states are expectedto pursue power subject to cost-benefit calculations’.82 In theirassessment of the impact that the struggle for power has on states,neoclassical realists are willing to trade determinacy for greaterempirical accuracy in describing the policies that a state actuallyadopts. Just as the interests and ambitions of states vary, so do theirobjectives. The relative power that a state possesses continues to be akey indicator of a state’s foreign policy, but neoclassical realists arguethat there is no direct transmission belt linking material capabilities toforeign policy behaviour.


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83. Walt, ‘Enduring Relevance’, 222.

Conclusion

This survey has reaffirmed that realists are the theorists of powerpolitics. The image of states perpetually struggling for power andsecurity provides the bedrock foundation of the realist ontology ofinternational politics. Yet while realists share the view that states arecontinuously competing for power, they disagree on the factors thataccount for this perpetual struggle for power. Each of the three differentversions of realism discussed in this article provides a differentexplanation for the power-seeking behaviour of states. In the case ofclassical realism, the power-seeking behaviour of states is attributed tothe nature of man, while structural realists ascribe it to the anarchicalcondition of international politics and the relative distribution of powerin the international system. Neoclassical realists agree with structuralrealists that the struggle for power between states is not merely a logicaloutcome of a biological will to power, but insist that it is influenced byintervening variables located at the level of the individual and the state.Thus while the unifying theme of realism is that states are engaged in acompetition for power, this article has shown that within realism there isa diverse range of explanations to account for this behaviour. Moreover,the three varieties of realism each infer different patterns of behaviourarising from the struggle for power.

This finding supports the increasingly popular view that ratherthan being monolithic, there are a variety of realist positions, whicheach hold different assumptions about the factors that motivate statebehaviour. Yet it is still appropriate to conclude by asking whether thethree different versions of realism clearly offer competingconceptualisations of power. And since the focus on power providesone of the important continuities of the so-called realist tradition, it isalso suitable to ask whether any progress has been made in how realistsconceptualise and understand power. In the remaining paragraphs, Ibriefly address these questions.

It is revealing that after reviewing the recent developments in therealist tradition, Stephen Walt concluded that ‘the concept of power iscentral to realist theory, yet there is still little agreement on how itshould be conceived and measured’.83 While I have showed that realistsdisagree on the factors that give rise to the struggle for power, mysurvey has found that there is a degree of consensus on how they definepower. Although classical realists, and Morgenthau in particular,defined power in terms of both the relational and elements of nationalpower approach, the overwhelming majority of realists in all three



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84. See Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations’, and Keohane, ‘Theory ofWorld Politics’.

85. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, 160. 86. For an additional example of this undertaking by a structural realist, see

Dale C. Copleland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,2000).

categories endorse the latter view. Even though there is disagreementon the most important elements that contribute to the power of a state,realists have been reluctant to infer the power of a particular state basedsolely on its ability to influence or control the actions of another state.Instead, realists have defined power in terms of the possession ofmaterial resources. By refusing to define power in a relational manner,and by insisting that power is largely fungible across diverse issueareas, realists continue to be vulnerable to a wide range of criticisms.84

In addition to defining power in terms of the possession ofmaterial resources, there is a general tendency among realists toassociate power with military might. While not taking them to besynonymous, realists do regard war-fighting ability to be the essence ofstate power. Power is largely defined in military terms by realistsbecause they believe that force is the ultima ratio of internationalpolitics. Waltz’s statement that ‘because any state may at any time useforce, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force withforce or to pay the cost of weakness’ represents another bedrockassumption of realism that has a direct bearing on the manner in whichrealists conceptualise and measure power.85 The view that a greatpower war continues to be a distinct possibility and that war doessometimes pay, also puts realists at odds with numerous critics.

Even if realists generally conceptualise power in terms of materialresources and embrace the view that war-fighting ability is the essenceof state power, they have not reached a consensus on the appropriatecriteria for measuring power. Each of the three categories of realismprovides a different method for calculating the power of a state. I wouldsubmit that since Waltz, who clearly devoted less attention to this issuethan Morgenthau, realists have made progress in providing a morereliable way to measure power. Both Mearsheimer and Schwellerdevote considerable attention to the issue of how to measure power andprovide their own clear criteria.86 Neoclassical realists have sought toimprove on the manner in which structural realists measure power, butin the process they have been willing to forsake parsimony for whatthey believe to be greater explanatory power. Recognising the difficultyof providing an objective basis to measure the relative distribution ofpower, neoclassical realists have incorporated domestic variables and


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87. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’,International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 6. For a different view, see Randall L.Schweller, ‘The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism’, in Progress inInternational Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, eds. Colin Elman and MiriamFendius Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).

88. James Traub, ‘The New Hard-Soft Power’. The Newk York Times Magazine,30 January 2005, 28.

decision-makers’ perceptions into their calculation of state power.While the burgeoning neoclassical research agenda offers manyopportunities to advance our understanding of power, it doesnonetheless have its share of critics who claim that it represents a ‘lessdeterminate, less coherent, and less distinctive realism.’87

And yet, in the end, and notwithstanding all of the conceptual andmeasurement difficulties identified by the critics, the essence of therealist conception of international politics as fundamentally determinedby the struggle for power seems, for many, to be intuitively correct.When Joseph S. Nye Jr., who has been a vocal critic of realism, asked thecurrent United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld about theconcept of “soft power,” Rumsfeld replied “I don’t know what ‘softpower’ is.”88 We can, however, be fairly certain that the practitioners of international politics understand and often act on the basis of the realist conception of power. So was the case in ancient Athens and, today, in Iraq.

Brian Schmidt is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University in Ottowa, Canada

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