schopenhauer - the world as will and representaion - theory of intuitive representation

7/31/2019 Schopenhauer - The World as Will and Representaion - Theory of Intuitive Representation

1/9

CHAPTER I

On the Fundamental View of Idealism

I n endless space countless luminous spheres, roundeach of which some dozen sinaller illuminated ones revolve, hot atthe core and covered over with a hard cold crust; on this crust amouldy fllm has produced living and knowing beings: this is empiricaltruth, the real, the world. Yct for a being who thinks, it is a pre

carious position to stand on one of those numberless spheres freelyfloating in boundless space, without knowing whcncc or whither, andto be only one of innumerable similar beings that throng, press, andtoil, restlessly and rapidly arising and passing away in beginninglcssand endless time. Here there is nothing permanent but matter alone,and the recurrence of the same varied organic forms by means ofcertain ways and channels that inevitably exist as they do. All thatempirical science can teach is only the more precise nature andrulc of thcsc events. But at last thc philosophy of modern times, espe

cially thmugh Bcrkclcy and Kant, has called to mind that all this inthe first instance is only phenomenon of the brain,and is cncumbcrcdby so many great and dilf crcnt subjectiveconditions that i ts supposedabsolute reality vanishes, and leaves room for an entirely dilferentworld-order that lies at the root of that phenomenon, in other words,is related to it as is the thing-in-itself to the mere appearance.

"The world is my representation" is, like the axioms of Euclid, a

profxisition which everyone must recognize as true as soon as heunderstands it, although it is not a proposition that everyone under

stands as soon as hc hears it. To have brought th is proposition toconsciousness and to have connected it with the problem of the relation of thc ideal to the real, in other words, of the world in thehead to the world outside the head, constitutes, together with theproblem of moral freedom, the distinctive characteristic of the philosophy of the moderns. For only after men had tried their hand forthousands of years at merely nbjecrivephilosophizing did they discover that, among thc many thingsthat make thc world so puzzlingand precarious, the first and foremost is that, howcvcr immcasurablcand massive it may be, its existence hangs nevertheless on a single

l31


2/9

t4 ) The World As Will and Represeniadon The World As Will and Representation

thread; and this thread is the actual consciousnessin which it exists. such a certainty. It is quite appropriate to the empirical standpoint

This condition, with which the existence of thc world is irrevocably of all the other sciences to assume the objective world as positively

encumbered, marks it with the stamp of ideality, in spite of all em and actually existing; it is not appropriate to the standpoint of phi

pirical reality, and consequently with tlte stamp of the tncrc phe losophy, which has to go back to what is primary and original. Con

nomenon. Thus thc v orld must be recognized, from onc aspect at sciousnessalone is imnmliately given, hence the basis of philosophy

least, as akin to a dream, indeed as capable of being put in thc same is limited to the facts of consciousness; in other words, philosophy is

class with a dream. For thc same brain-function that conjures up essentially idealistic. Realism, which commends itself to the crude

during sleep a perfectly ohjecfive, perceptible, and indeed palpablc understanding hy appearing to be founded on fact, starts preciselyworld must have just as large a share in the presentation of the from an arbitrary assumption, and is in conscqucnce an empty castle

objective world of vakcfulncss. Though difTerent as regards their in the air, since it skips or denies the first fact of all, namely that all

matter, the two worlds arc nevcrthelcss obviously moulded froin onc that we know lies within consciousness. For that the objective exist

form. This form is thc intcllcct, thc brain-function. Descartes was ence of things is conditioned by a representer of them, and that

probably the first to attain the degrcc of reliection demanded by consequently the objcctivc world exists only as representation, is no

that fundamental truth; consequently, he made that truth the starting hypothesis, still less a peremptory pronounccmcnt, or cvcn a paradox

point of his philosophy, although provisionally only in the form of put forward for the sake of debate or argument. On the contrary,

sceptical doubt. By his taking coglto ergo sum' as the only thing it is thc surest and sintplcst truth, and a knowledge of it is rendered

certain, and provisionally regarding the existcncc of thc world as more difhcult only by the fact that it is indeed too simple, and

problematical, thc essential and only correct starting-point, and at that not everyone has sufficicnt power of reliection to go back to

the same time thc true point of support, of all philosophy was really thc first elements of his consciousness of things. There can ncvcr be

found. This point, indeed, is csscntially and of necessity the subjec an existence that is objecfive absolutely and in itself; such an existtive, ourown corLrciousness, For this alone is and remains that which encc, indeed, is positively inconccivablc, For thc objective, as such,

is immcdiatc; cvcrything else, bc it what it may, is lirst mediated and always and essentially has its existence in thc consciousness of a sub

conditioned by consciousness, and thcrcforc dependent on it . I t is ject; it is therefore the representation of this subject, and conse

thus rightly considered that the philosophy of the moderns starts quently is conditioned by the subject, and moreover by the subject's

from Descartes as its father. N ot long afterwards, Berkeley went forms of representation, which belong to the subject and not to the

farther along this path, and arrived at idealismproper; in other object.

words, at the knowledge that what is extended in space, and hence That the objective world would existeven if there existed no

the objective, material world in general, exists as such simply and knowing being at all, naturally seems at the first onset to bc sure

solely in our representation, and that it is false and indccd absurd and certain, because it can be thought in the abstract, without thc

to attribute to it, as such,an existence outside all reprcscntation and contradiction that it carries within itself coming to light. But if we

independent of thc knowing subject, and so to assume a matter try to reahzethis abstract thought, in other words, to reduce it to

positively and absolutely existing in itself. But this very correct and representations of perception, from which alone (like everything abdeep insight really constitutes thc whole of Berkeley's philosophy; in stract) it can have content and truth; and if accordingly we attempt

it he had exhausted himself. to imagine an objective world i ihi>ur a knowing subject, then we

Accordingly, true philosophy must at all costs bcidealistic; indeed, bccomc aware that what wc are imagining at that moment is in

it must be so merely to be honest. For nothing is morc certain than truth the opposite of what we intended, namel> nothing but just the

that no one ever came out of himself in order to identify himself im process in the intcllcct of a knowing being who perceives an objective

mediately with things different from him; but everything of which he world, that is tosay, prcciscly that which wc had sought to exclude.

has certain, sure, and hence immediate knowledge, lies within his For this perceptible and real world is obviously a phenomenon of

consciousness. Beyond this consciousness, therefore, there can be no thc brain; and so in the assumption that thc world as such might

immediatecertainty; but the first principles of a science must have exist independently of all brains there lies a contradiction.The principal objection to the inevitable and essential ideality oi

' "I thick, tberefore I am." fear,) every object, thc objection whicharisesdistinctly or indistinctly in


3/9

[6 ] The World As Will and Representation The World As Will and Represrnla(ion f 7 I

evcryonc, is certainly as follows: Even my own person is object for these an existcncc independent of knowledge and of the subject ofanother, and is therefore that other's representation, and yet I know knowledge was thc aim ofthe above objection.

certainly that I should exist even without that other representing me However, it is evident that the existence conditioned through a

in his mind. But all other objects also stand in the same relation to knowing being is simply and solely existence in space, and hencehis inteffect as I stand; consequently, they too would exist without that of a thing extended and acting. This alone is always a known

his representing them in his mind. Thc answer to this is as follows: thing, and consequently an existence for another being. At the same

That other being, whose object I am now considering my person to time, everything that exists in this way may stiU have anexistencebe, is not absolutely the subject, but is in thc Urst instance a knowing for itself, for which it requires no subject. This existence by itself,individual. Therefore, if hc too did nor exist, in fact, even if there however, cannot bc extension and activity (together space-occupa

existed in general no other knowing being except mysel, this would tion), but is necessarily another kind of being, namely that of astill by no means be thc eliminationofthcsubjec!in whose represen thing-in-Use(j, which, purely as such, can never be objecnThis ,

tation alone aU objects cast. For I myself am in fact that subject, therefore, is the answer to the principal objection stated above, and

just as is every knowing being. Consequently, in the case here as accordingly thisobjection docs not overthrow the f undamental truthsumed, my person would certainly still exist, but again as representa that the objectively present and existing world can exist only in thetion, namely in my own knowledge. For even by myself it is always representation, and so only for a subject.known only indirectly, never directly, since aff existcncc as repre It is also to bc noted herc that even Kant, at any rate so long assentation is an indirect existence. Thus as object. in other words he remained consistent, cannot have thought of any objectsamongas extended, filling space, and acting, I know my body only in thc his things-in-themselves. For this follows already from the fact that

perception of my brain. This perception is brought about through thc he proved space as well as time to be a mere form of our intuition

senses, and on their data thc perceiving understanding carries out i ts or perception, which in consequence docs not belong to thc things-infuncuon of passing from thc elfcct to thc cause. In this way, by the themselvcs. What is not in space or in time cannot be object;thereeye seeing thc body, or the hands touching it, the understanding con fore the being or cxistcnce of things-in-themselvescan no longer bcstructs the spatial Ugure that presents itself in space as my body. objecffve, but only of quite a different kind, namely a metaphysicalIn no way, however, are there given to me directly, in some general being or existence. Consequently, there is already to be found infeeling of the body or in i nner selfwonsciousncss, any extension, that Kantian principle also the proposit ion that the objecriveworld

shape. and activity that would coincide with my inner being itself, exists only as representarion.and t hat i nner being accordingl y r equires n o o the r b eing i n w hose ln s pi te o f a ff that may be said, nothing is so persistently and

knowledge it would manifest itself, in order so to exist. On the con constantly misunderstood asidealism, since it is interpreted as meantrary, that general feeling, just like sclfwonsciousncss, exists directly ing that th enipiricalreality of the external world is denied. On thisonly in relation to thc will, namely as comfortable or uncomfortable, rests the constant return of the appeal to common sense, which apand as active in thc acts of wil l, which exhibi t thcmsclves for external pears in many di fferen turns and guises, for example, as "funda

perception as actions of thc body. It follows from this that the exist mental conviction" in the Scottish school, or as Jacobi'sfaith or beence of my person or of my body as an extended and acting thing lief in the reality ol the external world. The external world by noalways presupposes a knowing beingdifferent from it, since it is means gives itself, as Jacobi explains, merely on credit; nor is itcssentiaffy an existence in the apprehension, in the representation, accepted by us on faith and trust. It gives itself as what it is, andand hcncc an existence for another being. In fact, it is a phenomenon performs directly what it pr omises. It must be remembered thatof the brain, no matter whetherthe brain in which it exhibits itself Jacobi set up such a credit system of the world, and was luckybelongs to my own person or to another' s. In the Urst case, onc's enough to impose it on a few professors of phffosophy, who forown person is then split up into the knowmg and thc known, into thirty years went on philosophizing about it extensively and at theirobject and subject, and here, as cvcrywhcre, these two face each case; and that it was this same Jacobi who once denounced Lessingother inseparable and irn:concilablc. Therefore, i f my own person, as a Spinozist, and later Schelling as anatheist, and received from thein order to exist as such, always requires a knower, this will apply latter the well-known and weff-merited reprimand, In accordanceat any rate just as much to aff other objects; and to vindicate for with such zeal, by reducing the external world to a matter of faith,


4/9

Ig ) The World As Will and Representation Thc World Ae Will and Representation [91

hc wanted merely to open a little door for faith in general, and to ever, I have demonstrated thc failure of the attempt. On thc other

prepare the credit for th at whic h was aftcrwariis actually to be hand, the Kantian teaching, even without thc antinomies, leads to

offered on credit; just as if , to int ro duce paper money, wc tr ied to the insight that things and their whole mode and manner of cxistcnce

appeal to the fact that the value of thc ringing coin depended merely are inseparably associated with our consciousness of them. Therefore

on the stamp the State put on it. In his philosopheme on thc reality be who has clearly grasped this soon reaches the conviction tha t t he

of the external world assumed on fa ith, Jacobi is pr ecisely thc assumption that things exist as such, even outside and independently

"transcendental realist playing the part of the empirical idealist," of our consciousness, is real)> absurd. Thus are we so deeply im

whom Kant censured in the Critique of Pure Reason, first edition, mcrscd in time, space, causality, and in the whole regularcourse ofp. 369. experience resting on thcsc; we (and in fact cvcn thc animals) arc

True idea)ism. on thc other hand, is not the empirical, but the so completely at home. and know how to find our way in cxpcricncc

transccndcntal. It )caves thc empiricalreality of thc world untouched, from the very beginning. This would not bc possible if our mtcficct

but adhcrcs to thc fact that aII object, and hence thc empirically real were one thing and things another, but it can be explained on)y from

in general, is conditioned by the subjectin a twofold manner. In the the fact that the two constitute a whole; that the intellect itsc)f creates

first place it is conditioned materially, or as objectin general, since that order, and exists only for things, but that things also exist only

an objective existence is conceivable only in face of a subject and for it.

as the representation of this subject. In thc second place, it is con But even apart from thc deep insight and discernmcnt revcalcd

ditioned formally, since the mode and manner of thc object's exist only by the Kantian philosophy, thc inadmissible character of the

cncc, in other woreis, of its being represented (space, time, causal assumption of absolute realism, clung to so obstinately, can indccd

ity), proceed from thc subject, and are predisposed in thc subject. be directly demonstrated, or at any rate felt, by the mere elucidation

Therefore immediately connected with simple or Berkeleianidealism, of its meaning through considerations such as the following. Acwhich concerns the obiecr in general, is Kantianidealism, which con cording to realisru, the world is supposed to exist, as we know it,

cerns the specially given mode and mannerof objective existcncc. independently of this knowledge. Now let us once remove from it

This proves that the whole of the material world with its bodies in all knowing beings, and thus leave behind only inorganic and vege

space, extended and, by means of t ime, havmg causal relations with table nature. Rock, tree, and brook arc there, and the blue sky; sun,

one another, and everything attached to this all this is not some moon, and starsilluminate this world, as before, on)y of course to

thing existing independentlyof our inind, but something that has its no purpose, since thcrcexists no cyc to scc such things. But then

fundamental presuppositions in ou r b ra in-functions, by means oj let us subsequently put into the world a knowing heing. That world

which and in which alone is suchan objective order of things possi then presents itself once morein his brain, and repeats itself inside

ble. For time, space, and causality, on which al l those real and ob that brain exactly as it was previously outside it. Thus to the first

jective events rest , are th cmselvcs nothing more than fu nct ions of world a secondhas bccn added, which, although completely separated

thc brain; so that. therefore, this unchangeable order of things, af from the first, resembles it to a nicety. Now the subjectiveworld of

fording the criterion and the clue to thei r empirical reality, itself this perception is constituted in subjective, known space exactly ascomes tint from the brain, and has its credentials from that alone. thc objectiveworld is in obircrivc, infinit s pace. Rut thc subjective

Kant has discussed this thoroughly and in detail; though hc docs not world stiU has an advantage over the objective, namely the knowl

mention thc brain, but says "thc faculty of knowledge." Hc has even edge that that external space is infinite; in fact, it can state before

attcmptcd to prove that that objective order in time, space, causality, hand mostminutely and accurately the full conformity to law of all

matter, and so on, on which all thc event~ o( the real world ult imately the relations in that space which are possible and not yct actual,

rest, cannot even be conceived, when closely considered, as a self and it does not need to examine them first. It can state just as

cxisting order, i.e., an order of things-in-themselves, or as something much about the course of time, as a)so about thc relation of cause

absolutely objective and positively existing; for if wc attempt to think and effect which governs the changes in outcr space. I th ink that .

it out to thc end, it leads to contradictions. To dcmonstratc this was on closer consideration. all this proves absurd cnoueh. and thus leads

the purpose of thc antinomies; in the appendix to my work,' how to the conviction that that absolutely objectiveworld outside thehead, indcpcndcnt of it and prior to a ll kn owledge, which we at first

e"criticism of thc Kantian Phitccopby" at tteccna of votomc t. ITe.)


5/9

[ IO] The World As Will and Rrprrsen(affon The World As Will and R


6/9

[12) The World As Will and Representation The World Ai Will and Representation [ 13 I

to add the result of Berkeley, which has been revised by mc, namely method had been applied by Schelling, it reached its height, as isthat every object, whatever its origin, is, as object, already con well known, in Hcgel, with whom it ripened into real charlatanism.

ditioned by the subject, and thus is essentially only the subject's But whoever in all seriousness even mentions that Fichte along with

representation. Thc aim of realism is just the object without subject; Kant shows that he has no notion of what Kant is. On thc other

but it is impossible even to conceive such an object clearly. hand, materialism also has its justification. It i s ju st as true th atFrom the whole of this discussion it follows with certainty and the knower is a product of matter as that matter is a mere repre

distinctness that it is absolutely impossible to arrive at a comprehen sentation of the knower ; but i t i s also just as one-sided, For material

sion of the inner narureof things on the path of mere knowledgeand ism is the philosophy of thc subject who forgets to take account ofrepresenrarinn, since this knowledge always comes to things from himself. Therefore, against the assertion that I am a mere modifica

without, and must therefore remain eternally outsidethein. This pur tion of matter, it must also be asserted that all matter exists merelypose could hc attained only by our finding ourselvesin the inside of in my representation, and this assertion is no less right. An as yet

things, so that this inside would bc known to us directly.!vly second obscure knowledge of these relations appears to have evoked the

book considers to what extent this is actually the case. Hoever, so Platonic saying vhv, akrl}wrrr gugr; (materia mendacium veras).s

long as we stop, as in this first book we do, at objective compre Realism, as I have said, necessarily leads to marenolr'sm.For

hension, and hence at knowledge, the world is and remains for us while empirical perception gives us things-in-themsclvcs, as they exist

a mere represenroriun, since no path is here possible which leads be independently of o w kno v ledge, cxpcriencc also gives us thc order

yond this. of things-in-themselves, in other word~, thc true and only world

But in addition to this. adherence to the ldeolisricpoint of view is order. But tins way leads to the assumption that there is only on e

a ncccssary countcrpoisc io thc marerialisric. Thus the controversy thing-in-itself, namely matter, of which cvcrything else is a modifi

over thc real and thc ideal can also bc regarded as one concerning cation; for the course of nature is the absolute and only worldwrdcr.thc existence of marrer. I'or it is ultimately thc reality or ideality of To avoid these conscqucnccs, spiriruafismwas set up along with

matter which is th e point in qu estion. Is ma tter as such present realism, so long as thc latter was in undisputed authority; thus thc

nierely in our re presentation, or i s it a lso independent thcreol? In assumption was made of a se cond substance, outside and al ong

thc latter case, it would be the thing-in-itself; and he who assumes a with matter, namely an imm arenaf subsrance. This dualism and

matter existing in it self must also consistently be a ma terialist, in spiritualism, devoid equally of experience, proofs, and comprehen

other words, must make matter the principle of explanation of all sibility, was denied by Spinoza, and shoum tobe false by Kant, who

things. On the other hand, hc who denies it to b c a th ing-in-itself ventured to do this because at thc same time he established idea(i.sm

is err ipso an idealist. Aniong the moderns only Locke has asserted in its rights. For with realism, materialism, as thc counterpoise to

positively and straightforwardly the reality of ma tter; therefore his which spiritualismhad been dcviscd, falls to the ground of its own

teaching, through thc instrumentality of Co ndil lac. lcd to th c sen accord, since matter and thc course of nature then become merc

sualism and materialism of thc French. Berkeley alone has dcnicd phenomenon, conditioned by the intellect; for the phenomenon has

matter positively and without modifications. Therefore thc complete its existcncc only in the representationof the intellect. Accordingly,antithesis is that of idealism and materialism, represented in its ex spiritualism is the specious and false safeguard against moreriafr'sml

tremes by Berkeley and the French matcrialists (Hnlbach). Fichte but the real and true safeguard is idealism. By making the objective

is not to be mcniioned here; he deserves no place among real philoso world dependent on us, idealism gives the necessary counterpoise to

phers, those clcct of mankind who with deep earncstncss seek not the dcpcndcncc on the objcctivc world in which we arc placed by

their own affairs. but thc truth. They must therefore not bc confused the courseof nature. The world, from which I part at death. is, on the

with those who under this pretext have only their personal advancc other hand. only my reprcscntation. Thc centre of gravity of exist

rncnt in view. Fichtc is the father of sham phrlr isnphy, of the rrnder ence falls back into the subject. What is proved is not, as in spiritual

hand method that hy ambiguity in thc use of words, incomprehensi ism. the knower's independence of matter, but the dependence of all

ble talk, and sophisms, tries to deceive, to im press by an air olimportance, and thu s to bef ool those eager to le arn. Af ter th is ' "Moner is a lie, aao yet true." ITr.]


7/9

[14] Thr World As Will and Representation The World As Will and Representation [15 I

matter on the knower. Of course, this is not so easy to understand ing to the effec that "the world, the object, would still exist, even if

and so convcnicnt to handle as is spiritualism with i ts tw o sub there were no subject." A consciousness without object is no con

stances', but xa)sea si xska.' sciousness at all . A t hi nk ing subject hasconceptsfor its object; a

In opposition to thc subjectivestarting-point, namely "the world sensuously perceiving subject has objects with the qualities corrc

is my representation," there certainly is at the moment with equal spending to its organization. Now if wc deprive thc subjectof all

justif ication t he objectivestarting-point, namely "the world is rnat theparticular determinations and forms of its knowing, all thc prop

ter," or "matter alone positively exists" (as it alone is not liable to erties in the objecralso disappear, and nothing but matter wirhour

becoming and to passing away), or "al l that exists is matter." This form and quality is left. This matter can occur in experience as littleis thc starting-point of D emocritus, Lcucippus, and Epicurus. Mor e as can thc subject without the forms of its knowledge, yet it remains

closely considered, however, starting from thc subjectretains a real opposed to the bare subject as such, as its refiex, which can only

advantage; it has t he advantage of on c perfectly justified step, fo r disappear simultaneously with it. Although materialism imagines that

consciousness alone is what is imnudiare. We skip this, however, it postulates nothing more than this matter atoms for instancc

when we go straight to matter and make that our starting-point. On yct it unconsciously adds not only thc subject, but also space, time,

the other hand, it would be possible to construct the world from mat and causality, which depend on special dctcrminations of tbc sub

ter and its propcrtics, if thcsc werc correctly, completely, and ex ject.

haustively known (and many of them we still lack). For everything The world as representation, thc objcctivc world, has thus, so to

that has come into cxistcncc has become actual through causes, that speak, two pales, namely thc knowing subject plain and simple withwere able to opcratc and come together only in consequence of thc out the forms of its knowing, and crude matter without form and

fundamental forces of mauer. But these must be capable of com quality. Both are absolutely unknowabk; the subject, because it is

plete demonstration at leastobienivefy, even if we shall never gct to that which knows; matter, because without form and quality it canknow tltcm subjectively. But such an explanation and construction not bc pcrccived. Yet both are the fundamental conditions of all

of the world would always have as its foundation not only the as empirical pcrccption. Thus the knowing subject, mcrcly as such,

sumption of an existence-in-itself of matter (whcreas in truth such which is likewise a presupposition of all cxpcriencc, standsin opposi

existencc is conditioned by the subject), but it would also have to tion, as its clear counterpart, to crude, formkss, quite dead (i.e.,

let all the original propertiesin this matter remain in force, and yct will-less) matter. This matter is not given in any experience, but is

hc absolutely incxplicablc, that is, be qualitares oreultae, (Scc ssti 26, presupposed in every experience. This subject is not i n ti me, f or

27 of thc first volume.) For matter is only the bearer of (hcsc forces, time is only the morc di rect form of all it s representing. Matter,

just as the law of causality is ordy the regulator of their phenomena. standing in opposition to the subject, is accordingly eternal, imConscqucntly, such an cxplnation of the world would stil l bc only perishabk, endures through all time; but properly speaktng it is notrelative and conditioned, rally the work of a physical sciencethat extended, since extension gives form, and hence it is not spatial.

at cvcry step longed for a metaphysic. On the other hand, even thc Everything c(seis involved in a constant arising and passing away,

subjective starting-point and axiom, " thc world i s my representation,' whereas these two constitute thc static poles of thc world as reprehas something inadequate about it, f ir stly i nasmuch as it i s on e sentation. We can therefore regard thc permanence of matter as the

sided, for the world is much more bcsidcs this (namely thing-in rellex of the timelessness of the pure subject, that is simply taken to

itself, will); in fact, being representation is to a certain cxtcnt acci be the condition of every object. Both belong to the phenomenon,dental to it; secondlyalso inasmuch as it cxprcsscs merely thc ob not to the thing-in-itself; but they are the framework of thc pheject's being condi tioned by the subjec t wi thout at the sam e ti me nomenon. Both are discovered only through abstraction; they arestating that the subject as such is also conditionedby thc object, not given immediately, pure and by themselves.For thc proposition that -thc subject would nevertheless be a know The fundamental mistake of all systems is the failure to recognize

ing being, cvcn if it had no object, in other words, no representation this truth, namely that the inrellerr and mauer are eorrelarives, in

at all" is just as false as is thc proposition of the crude understand other words, the one exists only for the other', both stand and falltogether; the one is only thc other's reflex. They are in fact really

' "What is noble is difficult." (Tr.l one and the same thing, considered from two opposite points of


8/9

I 161 The World As Will and RepresentationThe World As Will and Representation I l 7 1

view; and this one thing here I am anticipating is the phenomenon them into a dialogue, after thc manner of Prabodha Chandro Daya.s

of thc will or of the thing-in-itself, Consequently, both are second Wc may also compare it with a similar dialogue between matter and

ary, and therefore the origin of the world is not to be looked for in form in Raymond Lull's Duodeeitn Principia Philosophiae, c. 1 and

either of them. But in consequence of their failure to recognize this, 2.

aU systems (with thc possible exception of Spinoza's) have sought The Subject.the origin of aU things in one of those two. f hu s some of themsuppose an inteffcct, vos;, as positively the first thing and the I am, and besides me there is nothing. For the world is my rcp

ftxtstcup,og; and accordmgly they allow a representationin this ot ' rescntation.things and of the world to prccedc their real existence; consequently Matter.they distinguish the real wo rld f rom th c worl d as representation,which is false. Therefore, matternow appears as that by which thc

presumptuous foffyl I am, and besides me thcrc is nothing.' For

two are distinguished, namely as a thing-in-itself. Hence arises thethe world is my fieeting form. You are a mere result of a partof

difticulty of producing this matter, the u).st, so that, when added tothis form, and quite accidental.

the merc representation of the world, it may impart reality thereto. The Subject.That original inteffcct must either lind it already in cxistcncc; matteris then an absolutely first thing just as much as that intcficct is, and

What siffy conceit! Neither >ou nor your formwould exist without

we then gc:t two absolutely first things, the Esttssoupyftc and the u>.st. mc; >ou are conditioned through me. Whoever thinks me away, and

Or the intcUcct produces matter out of nothing, an assumption thatthen believes he can still think of vou, is involved in a gross delusion;

our understanding combats, for this understanding is capable offor your existencc outside my representation is a direct contradiction,

grasping only changes in matter, not an arising or passing away of a wooden-iron. You are, simply means you are represented by me.that matter. At bot tom, this rests on the very fact that matter is

My representationis the locality of your existence; I am thereforeitsfirstcondiuon.

the essential correlative of the understanding. Thc systems opposedto these, which make the other of the two corrclatives, namely mat Matter.ter, the absolutely first thing, suppose a matter that exists withoutbeing represented by a subject; and, as is sufficiently clear from all

Fortunately thc boldncss of your assertion will soon bc refuted in

that has bccn said above, this is a direct contradiction, for in th ea real way, and not by mere words. A fcw morc moments, and

existence of matter we alwaysthink only of its being represcntcd byyou actually are no more; with aU your boasting and bragging,

a subject. But then there arises for them thc di flicult y of br ingingyou have sunk into nothing, floated past like a shadow, and suffcrcd

to this matter, which alone is their absolutely first thing, the intellectthe fate of every one of my fleeting forms. But I, I remain intact andundiminished from millennium to millennium, throughout endless

that is ulti mately to kno w it fr om expcricnce. In t1 7 of the fi rstvolume I have spoken nf this weak side of materialism. With me,

time, and behold unmoved the play of my changing forms.

on the other hand, rnatter and intellect are inseparable correlatives, The Subject.existing for each other. and therefore only relatively. hfattcr is the

This endless time, to live through which is your boast, is, like therepresentation of the intcficct; thc intellect is that in the representation of which alone matter exists. Both together constitute the world

endless space you fill, present merely in my representation; in fact,

as representatitm, which is precisely Kant's phenomenon, and conit is thc merc form of my re presentation which I car ry al ready prepared withi n mc, and in wh ich you manifest yourself. It receives

sequently sonscthing secondary. What is primary is that which ap

pears, namely thc thing-in-itself, which we shall afterwards learnyou, and in this way do you first of aU exist. But thc annihilationwith which you threaten me does not touch me, otherwise >ou also

to recognize as thc will. In itseif this is neither the rcprcsenter northe represented, but is quite diFerent from its mode of appearance. ' More correctly Prubodhu~undru-uduya,"the rising o( the moon of isnowt

As an impressive conclusion to this important and difficult dis edge." an allegorical drama in ssx actsby Krishna hlista taboos tzott A.D.)

cussion, I ssiU now personify those two abstractions, and introducein whic h ph ilosophical concepts appear as persons. [Tt.]


9/9

[18] Thc World As Will and Representation

would be annihilated. On the contrary, it concerns merely thc individual which for a short time is my bearer, and which, like everything else, is my representation.

Matter.

Even if I grant you this, and go so far as to regard your existence,which is inseparably linked to that of these fketing individuals, as

something existing by itself, it nevertheless remains dependent onmine. For you are subject only in so far as you have an object; andthat objectis I. I am its kernel and content, that which is permanentin it, that which holds it together, without which it wtndd be as incoherent and as wavering and unsubstantial as the dreams and fanciesof your individuals, that have borrowed even their fictitious contentfrom me.

The Subiert.

You do well to refrain frotn disputing my existencc on accountof its being linked to individuals; for just as inseparably as I am

tied to these, so are you tied to form, your sister, and you hav

never yet appeared without her. No cyc has yet scen either you orme naked and isolated; for we are both only abstractions. At bottomit is one entity that perceives itself and is perceived by itself, butits being-in-itself cannot consist either in perceiving or in being pcrccivcd, as thcsc are divided between us.

Both.

So w arc inseparably connected as necessary parts of one whole,which includes us both and exists through us both. Only a nusunderstanding can sct up the two of us as enemies in opposition to eachother, and lead to th e fals e conclusion that th e one contests theexistence of the other, with which its own existence stands and falls.

This whole, including both, i the world as representation, or thephenomenon. After this is taken away, there remains only the purelymetaphysical, thc thing-in-itself, which in the second book we shallrecognize as the wM

schopenhauer - the world as will and representaion - theory of intuitive representation

Documents