scientific research - commodities or commons, koen vermeir

Scientific Research: Commodities or Commons?

Koen Vermeir

Published online: 8 August 2012� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract Truth is for sale today, some critics claim. The increased commodification of

science corrupts it, scientific fraud is rampant and the age-old trust in science is shattered.

This cynical view, although gaining in prominence, does not explain very well the sur-

prising motivation and integrity that is still central to the scientific life. Although scientific

knowledge becomes more and more treated as a commodity or as a product that is for sale,

a central part of academic scientific practice is still organized according to different

principles. In this paper, I critically analyze alternative models for understanding the

organization of knowledge, such as the idea of the scientific commons and the gift

economy of science. After weighing the diverse positive and negative aspects of free

market economies of science and gift economies of science, a commons structured as a gift

economy seems best suited to preserve and take advantage of the specific character of

scientific knowledge. Furthermore, commons and gift economies promote the rich social

texture that is important for supporting central norms of science. Some of these basic

norms might break down if the gift character of science is lost. To conclude, I consider the

possibility and desirability of hybrid economies of academic science, which combine

aspects of gift economies and free market economies. The aim of this paper is to gain a

better understanding of these deeper structural challenges faced by science policy. Such

theoretical reflections should eventually assist us in formulating new policy guidelines.

1 Introduction

Public attention related to the commodification of science is usually directed towards high

profile cases of fraud and conflicts of interest. When I was doing research for this article, for

instance, the New York Times reported that a medical researcher, funded by Pfizer, wrote 21

K. Vermeir (&)Laboratoire SPHERE (UMR 7219), CNRS; Univ Paris Diderot; Sorbonne Paris Cite, 5 rue ThomasMann - Case 7093, 75205 Paris Cedex 13, Francee-mail: [email protected]

123

Sci & Educ (2013) 22:2485–2510DOI 10.1007/s11191-012-9524-y

articles on experiments that he had never even performed (Harris 2009).1 Conflicts of

interest are also highlighted in well known controversies. Take the controversies around the

health effects of smoking and the existence of human induced climate change, for example,

in which industry managers hired scientists to confound and attack research results that went

against their interests (Brandt 2009; Proctor 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2010). The dam-

aging effects on science and society of such cases of fraud and conflicts of interest cannot be

taken too lightly. Analyzing and publicizing the effects of money and business interests on

science is an important task of scholars studying the sciences at the interface with industry

and society (cf. also the work by Mirowski and Sent 2002; Krimsky 2003; Resnik 2007).

The commodification of science is far more wide-ranging than fraud, corruption or even

conflicts of interest, however. In recent years, commodification and free market reasoning

has advanced in all areas of higher education, science administration and research.2

Commodification includes issues related to commercialization, spin offs, technology

transfer, patenting, measuring accountability, bibliometry, research assessment exercises,

to name only a few, and it has become a central part of the organization and execution of

science in modern societies. In this article, I will address some of the negative effects of the

commodification of scientific research and I will explore other workable possibilities for

organizing academic science. One alternative organizational model is the idea of the

‘commons’. Because scientific knowledge is a very particular resource, this model might

be better and more efficient than the dominant free market model. In elaborating the

commons model, I will draw on anthropological theories of sharing and gift giving in order

to substantiate these claims. In this way, I argue, we can take seriously the special

cumulative character of scientific knowledge.

There is also a deeper and practical message behind this analysis. On the one hand, I do

not endorse the polarizing talk of the doom mongers that predict the end of the university or

the end of science (cf. Readings 1996). On the other hand, my analysis does suggest that

some basic norms of science might break down if the gift character of science is lost. Much

attention has been paid to isolated cases of fraud in science or to the detrimental influences

of corporate finance on scientific research, etc. In contrast, I see these cases as symptoms of

deeper structural problems, which I try to uncover. Understanding these deeper structural

challenges for science will eventually help us in formulating new policy guidelines that can

be used, amongst other things, for reform in the organization of higher education and

scientific research. We should not be blind to possible positive effects of commodification

and negative aspects of gift economies, however, and finding a balance might be desirable.

One prospect for academic research, despite the serious difficulties and challenges involved,

could be the development of hybrids between gift and market economies of science.

2 The Commodification of Scientific Research

Different definitions of commodification circulate in the recent literature. Jacob (2009,

p. 392) defines commodification as ‘those instances in which knowledge is exchanged for

money where the knowledge is packaged in a form that the buyer can use the knowledge

without the intervention of the producer.’ She treats commodification as a process, distinct

1 A later correction of March 24, 2009 in the New York Times softened the accusation somewhat, claimingthat ‘Reuben fabricated data in some or all of 21 journal articles’.2 See Gibbons et al. (1994), Bok (2003), Gould (2003), Slaughter and Rhoades (2004), Nowotny et al.(2005), Greenberg (2007), Tuchman (2009), Radder (2010), Berman (2012).

2486 K. Vermeir

123

from commercialization, for instance, where the selling of knowledge remains dependent

on the presence of the creator (e.g. training programs, tuition, etc.). In contrast, Radder

(2010) identifies commodification in the narrow sense with ‘commercialization, that is, the

pursuit of profit by academic institutions through selling the expertise of their researchers

and the results of their inquiries.’ Commodification in the broader sense refers to a social

development described as economic instrumentalization. In the case of science, this means

that science is predominantly interpreted and assessed on the basis of economic criteria.

Although both definitions make sense for particular purposes, they clearly delineate

commodification in different ways.

Aside from the literature discussing the commodification of science, there is a growing

body of literature describing science in economic terms. I do not mean some obvious

economic aspects of the scientific enterprise, such as wages or the demand and supply of

scientists (cf. Blank and Stigler 1957). Inspired by the sociology of science, economists

have recently started to study the practice of science itself in economic terms.3 This seems

to be a promising and interesting strand of research, studying the economic impact of

science, labor markets, but also funding structures and reward structures in the sciences.

Recently, more extreme proposals have also been made, however. According to Arthur

Diamond, increasing the ‘truth per dollar’ ratio is a long-term goal of the economics of

science (Diamond 1996) and another central goal is ‘to see how far science can be

understood as a market, and how far the market for science and scientists can be under-

stood as efficient. When inefficiency is found, a related goal is to propose changes in

resource levels or incentives, to increase the speed of scientific advance’ (Diamond 2008,

p. 328). Although such proposals can be valuable, the fundamental presupposition that

science is a market is of course not neutral. Furthermore, such studies, if not counter-

balanced by other perspectives, might come to promote and legitimize a one-sided com-

modification of science, without performing a necessary reflection on its long term impact.

In this paper, I will use a broader concept of commodification than the ones defined by

Jacob and Radder.4 Historically, the word ‘commodity’ was mainly used in market con-

texts and referred to profit, useful products, (often selfish) interest, objects of trade or

qualities of wares. The word has its roots in the Latin ‘commoditas’ (from ‘commodum’):

utility, due measure, just proportion; and it is related to ‘modus’ (measure). Measurability

is central to commodification, because quantification is a condition for free market

exchange.5 Today’s discussion about the commodification of science reflects these

meanings. On the one hand, it is claimed that scientific knowledge becomes more and more

like a commodity. It becomes part of a market system in which the influence of money and

3 Arrow (1962), Johnson (1972), Goldman and Shaked (1991), Kealey (1996), Stephan (1996), Wible(1998), Stephan and Audretsch (2000), Audretsch et al. (2002), Foray (2004). See also the related field (andjournal) of scientometrics, which deals with the mechanism of scientific research analyzed by means of (e.g.statistical) mathematical methods.4 Radder’s ‘Commodification in the broader sense’ is useful, but it is fruitful to expand it even more so thatit comes to include phenomena such as bibliometry, used e.g. to measure the value of scientists ‘objec-tively’. Such techniques, in themselves not directly aimed at increasing economic activity, are oftendeployed for the economic instrumentalization of science.5 For ‘commodity’ see the Oxford English Dictionary (OED). Commodification is ‘The action of turningsomething into, or treating something as, a (mere) commodity; commercialization of an activity, etc., that isnot by nature commercial.’ According to the Online Etymology Dictionary, ‘commodification’ (fromcommodity ? -fication) was first used in 1968, originally in Marxist political theory. It means ‘theassignment of a market value’ and is often used with a negative connotation. According to the OnlineEtymology Dictionary ‘commoditization’ (from commodity ? -ization) is the businessman’s form of theword, but the uses mentioned in the OED seem to contradict this.

Commodities or Commons 2487

123

other interests become dominant. On the other hand, universities and research institutes

become increasingly organized like a private company. Scientists are ever more judged

according to a manager model of cost, efficiency and production (cf. Willmott 1995).6 Also

the utility and accountability of the university is continuously in question. For both pro-

cesses, measurability is central: it is crucial for putting a monetary value upon something

as well as for modern managerial practice and the calculation of cost and efficiency.

In my characterization of the commodification of academic research, therefore, I want

to stress two aspects. First, because commodities are resources or products traded on the

market and their value is determined by market dynamics,7 the treatment of research output

as commodities implies some kind of market exchange, a measuring or price-setting

mechanism, which commonly results in profits, fees, etc. The price-setting mechanism is

usually in monetary terms, but this does not need to be the case (the advantage of money is

its status as a universal measure, facilitating exchange). A second characteristic of com-

modification is the new managerial structure of organization that is being applied to the

sciences (cf. Lock and Lorenz 2007). The implementation of these new management

structures aims at increasing the transparency of the organization of science as well as of

the research process. Better management is supposed to increase the efficiency of research

as well as the accountability to the stakeholders (investors or society). A central goal,

therefore, is to gain more control over research processes. This is effectuated e.g. through

new procedures of evaluation (e.g. research assessments, bibliometry, measuring economic

impact) and expanded control on directing research (e.g. increasing project-based research,

special funding, earmarked research areas) on all levels, from individuals to entire uni-

versities. The new management ideology promotes mechanical measuring techniques in

order to make objective and equitable decisions.8

The common thread between these two aspects of commodification is the increase of

control (aided by techniques of measurement) to the detriment of the autonomy of sci-

entists and scientific institutions. The commodification that we perceive in new manage-

ment policies, which ensue in an increased power by science administration and

governmental bodies, is often in service of the commodification of scientific results (cf.

Jacob 2009). These are not really two sides of the same coin, but they closely related. One

example: accountability towards society could be framed in terms of Bildung, civilization,

and a generalized education of society, but instead, the new management ideology focuses

almost exclusively on the measurable impact of technology transfer, spinoffs, and the

6 I should add the caveat that there exist many different kinds of management models, some of which arebetter adapted to fostering creativity and invention (see also the discussion below). See e.g. the CompetingValues Framework by Quinn and Rohrbauch, as well as new calls for leadership at companies instead ofmanagement. Historically, however, management was first developed in the factory, where managementassured control of the many ‘workers’ needed to perform their task. (Etymologically, management originallymeant handling horses and later came to stand for controlling persons.) Without the strict rules defined bymanagement, it was thought that chaos would reign. When knowledge work became more important,management was still the solution for keeping people in line. It is to this original idea of management,aiming at controlling workers by standardization, focussing on efficiency and production, etc., that I will bereferring to in this article.7 Cf. ‘commodification is the process by which goods or services formerly outside a market enter a market,acquire exchange value, and are subsequently produced for profit’ (Nelson and Barley 1995, p. 623).8 This characterization of commodification is different but compatible with the two components of com-modification mentioned in Connelly and Gallagher (2007, p. 104): ‘the commodification of academicresearch has two components: the treatment of research products as interchangeable, and the assignment of amarket value to these outputs. That which was once viewed as a ‘craft’ becomes a standardized product.’

2488 K. Vermeir

123

economic benefits of scientific research.9 A second example: evaluation at all levels can be

firmly based on a peer-to-peer process. Instead, evaluation procedures are increasingly

mechanized, e.g. into counting A ranked journal publications. At the same time, com-

modified science in the form of patents and grant money assume more and more impor-

tance in evaluations.10 Central to this process of commodification is the reduction of

research to 1-dimensional values (prices, rankings, …), in order to make transparency,

market exchange and increased control possible.11

One could make some general observations about the sources of research funding and

their relation to commodification. Despite the recent tendency towards commodification,

academic research is still distinct from most research executed in the corporate world. The

autonomy of the researchers remains considerable and control as well as decisions about

research directions mostly remains in the hand of the researchers. Conflicts of interest are

more likely to occur in corporate research, because in addition to the personal interests of

the researcher (e.g. good job, money, power, fame), there are important corporate interests

in play that may guide and influence the whole research process (Resnik 2007). Of course,

privately funded research does not necessarily lead to conflicts of interests. Most of the time,

it is in a company’s interest to effectuate good research, and even if it is not, making profit

does not need to trump other values.12 Indeed, many people from industry regard themselves

as positively idealistic, and many investors aim at improving the world by funding projects

so that they can be realized (cf. Shapin 2008, pp. 269–303). Finally, conflicts of interest

should be distinguished from outright corruption and fraud. These turn out to be very rare, in

both public as privately funded research. It has been calculated that 99 % of scientific

activity is free of even minor fraud. Compared to other professions, scientists are surpris-

ingly honest. This, even more than fraudulent behavior, is something to be explained.13

The topic of this paper, however, is the increasing commodification in academic

research. This process implies that some of the differences between corporate and aca-

demic research are becoming smaller or are disappearing. Simple oppositions are starting

to break down, and there is a wide diversity in enterprises, management models and

research structures that belie easy generalizations. There are thus a number of caveats that

have to be made. Firstly, in respect to commodification and the autonomy of scientific

9 Cf. the talk by Sir Tim Wilson, former vice-chancellor and ‘CEO’ of the University of Hertfordshire (andHEFCE board member) at the at the Conference Humboldt’s Model. The Future of Universities in the Worldof Research. Humboldt-Universitat Berlin. 7–9 October 2010.10 Although these journals work by means of peer-review, peer-to-peer evaluation is more and more underpressure because reviewers are also scientists under pressure to produce scientific results, and a criticalengagement with their colleagues work is hardly valorized. Because almost no credit goes to peer-reviewers,more and more scholars refuse to do the work or they do it less thoroughly. Furthermore, counting discreteevaluations (e.g. acceptance by journals) does not necessarily lead to a good general evaluation (one evidentexample is self-plagiarism, in which each contribution might be good but the aggregate subpar.).11 For market exchange, the parties do not need to agree on the same ‘value’ of the commodity, but theyneed to agree on a price-setting which is a reduction to a one-dimensional value. Accurate measurement orestimation procedures are crucial for this process. When it is difficult to estimate the value of the assets (e.g.financial assets that are very sensitive to economic conditions, which might be very uncertain in specificperiods as in 2007–2008), price-setting breaks down and the markets freeze (cf. the recent market crisis incollateral debt obligations).12 Good science usually leads to good effective products, but sometimes false science or pseudo-science isless expensive and a better sales strategy, especially in cases of uncertainty, when clients have no means ofassessing the quality of the product (cf. in medicine or the nutrients industry).13 Resnik (2007, pp. 91–92), Steneck (2002), Shapin (2008, pp. 86–89). On scientific fraud, see also Judson(2004).


123

research, a simple opposition between private funding and public funding cannot be

maintained. Some of the best universities and research institutes are private institutions,

and private funding of research fellowships and professorial chairs is widely accepted.

More important is the actual demands and the strings attached to private funding, and

whether the private interests constitute a harmful bias or not.14 Secondly, one should be

aware of the diversity of for profit and non-profit enterprises.15 Research funding by a for-

profit company is not necessarily more problematic than non-profit funding, and one

should analyze examples on a case-by-case basis. Shapin (2008), for instance, has argued

that the creative industry might be a more congenial place to do research than a highly

commodified public university. In exceptional cases, researchers at such firms may even

have more time, freedom and autonomy than junior researchers in academia.16 Finally,

there is a great diversity in strategies, constantly changing, in the policies of the public

funding of research. While the US National Science Foundation has recently shifted gears

from bottom-up initiatives to the definition of large state-directed research directions, the

European Science Foundation is moving in the opposite direction. The ESF now values

individual creativity and research proposals more and it is scaling down its top-down

funneling of research directions.17 The diversity of approaches and institutions prohibits

easy generalizations about the commodification of scientific research in terms of private/

public or even profit/non-profit distinctions.

A careful general theoretical analysis of the commodification of academic research is

nevertheless important, because of the many negative effects that are perceived to

accompany commodification in academia. In the next paragraphs, I will focus on one effect

in particular, viz the effect of commodification on the motivation of the academic

researcher, and I will only touch briefly on other effects. New incentives for making profit

(e.g. by patents, spinoffs), monetary incentives (e.g. excellence bonuses) or incentives for

prestige and power (e.g. promotions, moving up in rankings), for instance, all create

extrinsic motivations for doing research, but these may crowd-out the original strong

intrinsic motivations with which scientists usually started their research. There is a growing

literature on how motivations are influenced by (monetary) incentives, initiated by Richard

Titmuss (1971). Titmuss compared a system of blood donors compensated by monetary

rewards with a system of voluntary blood donors. He found that a donor system based on

altruism resulted in much better blood (less contaminated by the hepatitis virus) and was

also much more efficient than a market system. Furthermore, he argued that monetary

incentives and a market system significantly reduced altruism and voluntary donations. His

14 Later in this article I will characterize funding without strings attached as part of a gift economy.Charitable private funding of cancer research obviously presents few problems, but professorial chairs inastrology (cf. the Sophia Project at Bath Spa University) and para-psychology (cf. the chair of parapsy-chology at Utrecht) funded by interested benefactors or societies are another matter. The creation of thePolanyi Center for fostering Intelligent Design research at Baylor University is also an interesting case. Yeteven the charitable private funding of cancer research might generate bias in research topics (cf. Resnik2007).15 For the nonprofit economy, see e.g. Weisbrod (1988), Rose-Ackerman (1986).16 Management at some industrial research laboratories and in some creative industries is aware thatresearch results cannot be judged according to the normal standards of efficiency. In a specific set ofexamples, Shapin (2008, pp. 127–164) estimated that less than a quarter of the companies had formalmethods to evaluate the scientific output, and even less calculated whether the benefits outweighed the costs.In these cases, although some of the research products were commodified and sold for profit, the man-agement structure was not.17 Personal discussion with Helga Nowotny and discussions at the Conference Humboldt’s Model (seenote 9).

2490 K. Vermeir

123

work was criticized (Arrow 1972) and defended (Singer 1973; McLean and Poulton 1986)

by important economists, and his main theses have more recently been confirmed, e.g. in

the work of Bruno Frey (1997, 2001 and Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997).

Frey has shown that introducing extrinsic motivations for an activity may reduce

intrinsic motivation and might ‘crowd-out’ this activity.18 If you are offered money for

something you ought to do as a well-adjusted member of a (sub)society, this may imply

that whoever is offering believes that you are not a respectable member of this

(sub)society, or that you are not trusted to do the right thing (Benkler 2004a, p. 324). Such

incentives may therefore contribute to the breakdown of core values of this (sub)society

(the ‘oughts’) and diminish the trust between its members. The increased external incen-

tives will also increase suspicions of fraud, free-wheeling and corruption, and it will

probably increase the actual abuses as well. Furthermore, instead of collaboration, mon-

etary incentives might also increase non-collaborative competition, with increased secrecy

and individualism as a result (on openness and secrecy, see Dasgupta and David 1994).19

Other aspects of the commodification of science will also have a negative effect on the

motivation of scientists. The loss of autonomy, already discussed above, will have an

impact on motivation and on the way science is practiced. Commodification also involves

an increased focus on ‘selling’ research. The ‘advertising’ and ‘selling’ of research (with a

loss of attention for the content because of increased concentration on the packaging) not

only happens in the science-technology interface (e.g. spinoffs, presentations for inves-

tors), but also in applying for project funding, for instance. Furthermore, if evaluations and

control are taken beyond a certain limit, it will also create the feeling that one is not

considered a respectable member of the scientific community, diminishing trust between

scientists. With a focus on profit and competition, incentives to produce scientific results

increase, but the self-regulation of intrinsic quality by the scientists themselves may

decrease. There are no simple metrics for scientific quality, and practices of abusing the

mechanical and objectifying evaluation systems, e.g. by producing only ‘least-publishable-

units’, are already perceived to be widespread.

With the commodification of science, values extrinsic to scientific practice might come

to dominate (profit, utility, personal interests in contrast with truth, accuracy, intrinsic

scientific interest, etc.).20 Take for instance social and economic utility: as Resnik (2007,

pp. 79–85) explains, one of the most serious problems with external funding is the bias in

problem selection. To a large extent, science depends on government and private industry

grants, and both determine the direction of research, often in the interest of dominant

groups in society.21 Also the publishing record is skewed by biases. When publishing is

seen as a form of marketing rather than the communication of research results, negative

results are systematically repressed. Furthermore, recent studies have established that there

is a strong correlation between the content of published scientific results and the source of

18 For a survey of the evidence and literature, see Frey and Jegen (2001); see also Benkler (2004a).19 For the negative effect of managerial culture and the introduction of evaluations, educational testing andextrinsic motivation for education, see e.g. Sahlberg (2011) and Ravitch (2012).20 This is not to deny that individual scientists may have all kinds of motives for doing their research. Thesemotives are, however, not institutionalized. For an integrative theory about individual open source softwaredeveloper motivation, integrating intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, see Krishnamurthy (2006).21 Resnik explains that 90 % of biomedical funds are spent on the research of 10 % of the known diseases.These 10 % include the most common diseases but also the (often not live threatening) diseases that affectthe wealthy and the diseases typical for the developed world. Money determines which research is executedand which is left aside. See also Carrier (1995) and concretely on biomedical funds, Benatar (2000).


123

funding.22 Finally, if the direction of scientific research is subject to economic interests or

political agendas, science will be constrained by typical short-term thinking, determined by

measurable utility, economic impact and immediate political or economic effect.23

3 Scientific Commons

Given the many negative effects of the commodification of science, of which I have listed

some above, it is important to search for alternative science policies. One promising

perspective on the organization of science is the idea of the ‘commons’. This view has

recently gained prominence since one if its exponents, Elinor Ostrom, won the 2009 Nobel

Prize for Economics. The idea of the commons is old, and it refers to a piece of land of

which the use was common to all, and where herdsmen let their cattle graze. The system of

common goods works well as long as the resources are plentiful. When the resources get

scarce, however, it might all end with a ‘tragedy of the commons’. Garret Hardin has

described this tragedy as a rational and inevitable outcome. ‘As a rational being, each

herdsman seeks to maximize his gain’, Hardin writes. This means that people will start

overusing the commons for their personal gain.

‘Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herdwithout limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, eachpursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in acommons brings ruin to all.’ (Hardin 1968, p. 1244)

This is of course also the ecological tragedy of our time, of climate change and the

increasing scarcity of vital resources such as clean water and air. According to Hardin, the

solution is to make the resource into property—private property or the property of the

government—so that someone or some institution has an incentive to control, regulate and

take care of it (for an example, see Smith 1981).

Elinore Ostrom has shown that Hardin was wrong. On a theoretical level, she has argued

that Hardin’s sketch is not realistic, because he does not take into account communication

between the actors.24 The strong market ideology presupposed in Hardin’s reasoning

ignores social and moral aspects. In contrast, Ostrom and her collaborators have proposed a

set of design principles to construct a sustainable commons. She has also garnered

empirical proof that sustainable commons can and do exist. With examples ranging from

lobster fisheries in Maine to irrigation systems in Nepal, she has explored the structure of

existing commons that function in practice and are even more efficient than competing

market systems.25 Ostrom and others have applied the concept of the commons to science

and elaborated the idea of a ‘knowledge commons’ as a shared resource.26 Ostrom usually

analyses the use of resources, however, especially scarce resources, to counter the

22 This is not totally surprising, since a lot of research is specifically commissioned to answer specificquestions, but the trend is worrying nonetheless (Resnik 2007; Krimsky 2003).23 Even if the corporate world, in rare cases, needs to take a longer term view (e.g. the building of a nuclearpower plant takes almost a decade), the sciences are one of the few areas were long-term phenomena arestudied, from climate change to cosmic time.24 Hardin also describes an open access system rather than a commons. The latter is a resource sharedbetween a particular set of people, with boundaries and rules of access in place.25 See Ostrom (1990) and case studies in Ostrom and Shivakoti (2002), Ostrom (1992), Bromley et al.(1992).26 See Hess and Ostrom (2007) where examples such as the internet, an archive or a library are discussed.See also Brown (2000). For another approach, see Benkler (2004b)

2492 K. Vermeir

123

dominant idea of a ‘tragedy’ of the commons. Science, in contrast, has a number of special

characteristics that demand a different kind of approach.

In order to see the special characteristics of science, it is instructive to reformulate the

tragedy of the commons in terms of externalities. ‘Negative externalities’ refer to a general

dynamic in market capitalism in which profits are privatized and costs socialized. A factory,

for instance, processes resources, produces goods and sells these goods to customers, pro-

cedures that play a role in its cost-benefit analysis. Pollution, however, usually does not enter

this calculation and its cost is borne by elements external to the economic system, such as the

village around the factory, or the environment more generally. Economic rationality there-

fore maximizes negative externalities, because these are costs that need not be paid for by the

company. This is exactly what is at stake in the tragedy of the commons, where the common

resources include clean air, water and the environment in general.27 In contrast to these

examples, using scientific knowledge does not consume it: if a scientist acquires and uses

knowledge, this knowledge does not disappear (unlike natural resources). This is why

economists call knowledge a public good: it is nonrivalrous and almost nonexcludabe: it

costs nothing for someone to use knowledge, even infinitely, and it is difficult to exclude

others from using it (Stiglitz 1999).28 Furthermore, the use of knowledge will generate new

ideas leading to new knowledge. Scientific knowledge is therefore not only nonrivalrous and

nonexcludable, it is also cumulative; or to put it differently, it has positive externalities.29

Arthur Pigou (1920) has argued that positive externalities create harmful economic

inefficiencies similar to negative externalities, and both are considered to create a ‘market

failure’. In the case of knowledge: it first has to be produced before it can be used and

distributed in commons, of course, yet the incentives for producing it are lacking. When

the benefits are socialized and the cost is privatized, the market will underinvest in the

production of knowledge. The privatization or commodification of knowledge, by intro-

ducing intellectual property, patents and copyright regimes, is the standard proposal to

change the nonexcludability of knowledge. These barriers prohibiting the free use of

knowledge are social innovations designed to create artificial scarcities where none exist

naturally. This will create incentives for producing and acquiring knowledge (Arrow 1996,

p. 125), or so the theory goes.30 For both positive and negative externalities, privatization

and commodification are presented as the solution for the perceived ‘market failure’. When

knowledge is not amenable to a market exchange system, however, it seems misguided to

try to alter the fundamental properties of knowledge by social engineering. It would seem

to make more sense to develop an alternative system to market exchange instead.31 Indeed,

27 Coase (1960) has argued that externalities can be thought of in terms of the costs of transacting overrights to undertake actions that affect other people. Demsetz (2003) has objected, however that externalitieswould still exist when transaction costs are zero. For a discussion, see McChesney (2006).28 Callon (1994), in contrast, has argued that science is not a public good because of its intrinsic properties,but because being a source of diversity and flexibility.29 There are different kinds of knowledge, some more fundamental, applied, technical or practical, etc. Inprinciple, nonrivalrousness and almost nonexcludability hold for most kinds of knowledge (even top secretintelligence knowledge is spread worldwide by Wikileaks, showing that it is nonexcludable) while otherproperties are more specific for scientific knowledge.30 Intellectual property protection allows circulation by prohibiting fee use, and is preferred to tradesecrecy, which is a more extreme case of privatization of knowledge. On the tension between knowledgeproduction and circulation, see Foray (2004, pp. 113–118).31 For an analysis determining whether commons or market systems are best, depending on the nature of theresources, see Benkler (2003, 2004a). For new research critical of intellectual property rights, see Boldrinand Levine (2002, 2008).


123

positive externalities are in fact the most powerful positive force of knowledge: they allow

for knowledge to increase exponentially, if it is well distributed. This positive force will be

lost in commodification.

A further special characteristic that differentiates scientific knowledge from many other

kinds of knowledge is the uncertainty involved in its production. Scientific research is

characterized by an intrinsic uncertainty, because there exist no fixed procedures of how to

arrive at fruitful scientific results. Furthermore, one cannot yet know in advance what the

results of scientific inquiry will be; otherwise one would not be doing science. This

fundamental uncertainty at the core of scientific practice also translates into a normative

uncertainty on how best to manage a group of scientists (Shapin 2008, pp. 127–164). The

management of science can therefore not be compared to managing a production plant, and

this is even recognized in the creative industry. ‘You can’t keep books on research’ was

accepted wisdom even in corporations, and research was spared the commodification that

characterized other aspects of the company. Science was treated as a kind of insurance

polis for an uncertain future. Instead of the stereotypes of efficiency and productivity,

Shapin explains that even the big industrial research labs of the 1950s promoted dedication

and integrity. Instead of trying to impose production goals, to introduce stringent controls

or to offer monetary rewards, charismatic managers tried to intrinsically motivate their

researchers.32

Markets as well as managerial hierarchies require accurate specification of behaviors

and outcomes. This implies costly procedures of measurement and control, which are

especially difficult to effectuate in situations of uncertainty. Because the result of scientific

experiments is unforeseeable, and the potential utility of fundamental research unknown,

normal cost-benefit analyses, production targets or accountability measures are virtually

impossible. In contrast, the rich social relations characterizing the commons ‘rely on

fuzzier definitions of actions required and performed, of inputs and outputs, and of obli-

gations’, Benkler (2004a, p. 277) has pointed out, and they ‘can provide better reasons for

action than the persistent (though futile) search for crisply computable courses of action

represented by pricing or managerial commands.’33 These social relations can also gen-

erate social and psychological motivations that are central to the scientific enterprise.

Arrow (1972) already noticed that markets break down in the presence of high uncertainty,

and finding a better exchange and organizational system for such situations is imperative.

Embedding uncertain transactions in social exchange introduces additional texture that

cannot be captured in objective measuring procedures.

Instead of a market system, implementing a commons perspective seems to be the right

approach for science. Indeed, according to economic theory, the special characteristics of

science, i.e. nonrivalrousness, nonexcludability, cumulativeness and radical uncertainty,

would cause a ‘market failure’. The model of the commons provides us with a perspective

for organizing science that recognizes the specificity of scientific research and harnesses its

positive powers. New work on knowledge-related commons has focused on recent

developments, such as peer production practices in new technologies, including open

32 Shapin (2008, pp. 127–164).33 Cf. also Shapin (2008, pp. 269–303), who argues that even venture capitalists, often regarded as thewolves or vultures of the capitalist system, know that objective measures do not work for assessing thecreative industry. Before they decide to invest, they do not run mathematical models and crunch numbersabout efficiency and output; they rather judge the characters of the investigators, their motivations and ideason a direct and personal basis.

2494 K. Vermeir

123

source software, Wikipedia and web-based learning (Benkler 1998, 2005, 2006; Bergquist

and Ljungberg 2001; Lessig 2008a; Skageby 2010; Berdou 2011).34 It is clear from these

detailed studies of the relations, structures and institutions of such knowledge commons,

that modes of sharing are central to how these commons actually function. In order to study

the actual functioning of the scientific commons, therefore, and in order to get more insight

in the ways of sharing implicated, I will ground my analysis in the literature on sharing and

gift giving.

4 Scientific Research as a Gift Economy

We know about gift economies mainly from anthropological studies, written by Mauss,

Malinowski and others.35 We associate the notion of a gift economy with an alien world,

far away in time or space. At first sight, it seems preposterous to think that gift economies

could work in modern capitalist societies. Nevertheless, many aspects of our lives are

structured according to the principles of a gift economy. Typical examples are family life,

love, religion, friendship, collegiality as well as other central elements of our personal

social life, which are infused with exchanges not subject to the cost-benefit reasoning of

the market. Also impersonal exchanges can be part of a gift system. Donations of blood

and organs are usually gifts, and they should not be subject to a market pricing that reflects

the dynamics of supply and demand (Titmuss 1971). Other impersonal sharing practices,

such as carpooling, the sharing of computer time for supercomputing, the sharing of

wireless network spectrum, or the working on open source software, to name only a few,

are more prevalent than we might think (Benkler 2004a).

‘Gift economy’ is not an oxymoron: free market economies, barter economies, gift

economies as well as socialist plan-based economies are all particular forms of a more

general notion of ‘economy’ (in the sense of activities related to the production and

exchange of goods). A gift exchange is clearly different from a free market system,

however, as the latter works on the assumption that market forces, such as supply and

demand, determine price setting and exchange of goods. Gift exchange cannot even be

framed in terms of a broad definition of a market, i.e. as a general and explicit system of

calculated exchange, as markets allow any tradable item to be evaluated and priced. Even

when parties exchange goods and services by barter, they agree to exchange one item for

another, which fixes the price of the transaction. In contrast, the value of a gift cannot and

should not be determined in the exchange. In an exchange of gifts, one gift is never

exchanged in return for another. Of course, one can expect some kind of vague reciprocity

in gift giving. The point is that these expectations should not enter the specific delibera-

tions of the gift-giving practice. A gift cannot be presented as given for this or that purpose

or reward. It is an intrinsic act that receives its meaning from the practice of gift-giving

itself.

Gift economies are often structured around very specific sets of rules that are not

explicitly articulated. These rules might differ depending on culture and context. One kind

of gift is an altruistic gift. This is most clearly the case in impersonal gift giving, when the

34 Ironically, many current writers on the commons model their topic on the scientific commons, ignoringthe increasing commodification of science.35 See Mauss (1924), Malinowski (1932), Sahlins (1972), Macherel (1983), Cheal (1988), Godbout (1992),Godelier (1999); for a historical perspective, see Carrier (1995) and Davis (2000); for the gift in the arts, seeHyde (2007). See also my chapter in Krijnen et al. (2011) on which the following paragraphs are based.


123

recipient is not known (e.g. most blood donorship, charity). In contrast, many gifts imply a

return gift or another kind of obligation, even if this is not made explicit or bartered for.

These gifts instill a system of circulations and exchanges that constitute a functional social

system, studied most notably in the anthropological literature, and it is on these gifts that I

will mainly focus in this section. Gifts need to be in circulation—and they are often kept in

circulation for a long time—to fulfill their function. Someone who hoards gifts and does

not give return gifts undermines the proper functioning of this gift economy. Academic

research is one domain in our culture that resembles a gift economy, I will argue, although

it is changing rapidly towards a more market-oriented approach. In the following, I will

indicate some aspects of scientific research that are structured according to the rules of a

gift economy (cf. Hagstrom 1982).

Scientific articles and books are called ‘contributions’. Scientific authors usually do not

get paid for writing a text, they do not receive honoraria for conference talks at scientific

meetings, and they do not charge fees for essential scientific services such as peer review,

editorial work or advisory functions. The production of knowledge and the work needed

for the maintenance of the knowledge production system are all gifts to the academic

community.36 In a gift economy, according to Mauss, a return gift is expected, even if this

is never stated as an explicit requirement. If the requisite return gift does not materialize or

is too meager, problems arise and social tensions crop up. The return gift often takes the

form of recognition and esteem. That is also the case in science.37 A researcher

acknowledges the institution that provided funding and supported his research, as well as

the ideas of scholars he draws on, in footnotes or acknowledgements. The academic

community, for its part, bestows a good researcher with esteem and sometimes even fame.

In this way the gifts keep circulating: from funding to scientific results and from idea to

idea, with acknowledgement, esteem and recognition circulating in the opposite way. It is

only through gift giving that this reciprocal system works, and not through market inter-

actions. If someone wants to sell his ideas, he receives money, but only little esteem in

return.38

The funding of academic research can also be understood as a gift system. This should

not be understood as a gratuitous gift or as charity. A return gift in the form of publications

and other research results is expected, but the point is that this cannot be extorted or

bartered for. The intrinsic uncertainty of science makes the enforcement of research results

impossible. The transformation will happen according to the field, capacities and position

of the scientists: funding given to a biologist will be translated into biological research, for

instance, while funding for a physics tutor will be handed on to students in a transformed

way as physics education. Often, the origin of funding is a gift, e.g. in the form of

36 On 18 February 2009, the Dutch philosopher Hans Radder was asked by the Dutch Science Foundation toreferee a grant application. In his reply, he states that according to market rates, this kind of consultingwould cost 2700 euro for the referee report. In an e-mailed circular, he argued that he wanted to take a stanceagainst the managerial university and the valorization of research, by extrapolating the market reasoning ofcurrent research policy, showing that it leads to a reductio at absurdum. In a reaction to the circular,Radder’s colleague Christian Krijnen calculated that at this rate, one funding program of the Dutch ScienceFoundation would cost 700.000 euro on referee costs only—which would mean an unsustainable cost.37 As many social forms, the gift system can of course be cynically manipulated, but if this is publiclyexpressed or exposed, the exchange of gifts ceases and the manipulator becomes excluded from the giftsystem.38 This is clearly not the case in all professions and there are also big differences within a profession. Withinthe law, for instance, practicing attorneys receiving high fees for writing papers have a high standing in theprofession. For a judge, on the other hand, taking money for writing an opinion is a subversion of his socialrole and a sign of corruption (Benkler 2004a, p. 327).

2496 K. Vermeir

123

donations by rich alumni, which constitute a large portion of the wealth of many Anglo-

Saxon universities. Government funding can also be interpreted as a gift so long as it

comes as a general funding package, that is, so long as it does not rigidly determine the

topic and course of research. Currently, many governments are attempting to gain more

control over research by changing general funding into precise project funding with pre-

determined topics and goals. To some extent, this sort of government activity affects the

autonomy of researchers and undermines the gift character of academic funding.

In a gift economy, in which the only claim to intellectual ‘property’ is limited to

recognition and esteem, priority disputes become a normal response, as Merton (1979,

p. 273) pointed out. In priority disputes, scientists who feel passed by without recognition

by competitors are in fact making a claim on an appropriate return gift. Nevertheless,

scientists do not publish in return for fame. Acknowledgement by peers cannot be bartered

for. On the one hand, scientists, as well as artists, often describe their talents, inspiration

and insights as ‘gifts’ when they made very significant discoveries, moments which are

formulated in semi-mythical terms. In this way, they acknowledge that these discoveries

resulted from processes not fully in their control and that they do not claim property of

these results. On the other hand, a gift remains in some way part of the giver. It embodies a

memory of its source and the moment of giving. People also appreciate it if their gifts are

remembered, and this continuing acknowledgement creates a social bond. Something

similar happens in science. The scientist is not alienated from the research product, as is

the worker in the capitalist system. The scientist’s name remains connected to her

invention or discovery. Her research is a gift to society and people continue to honor her

for this particular contribution.

Gifts need circulation in order to be gifts and to function as such. The more a gift is

circulated, the more value it accrues. A gift embodies all the previous acts of giving, and

the different worlds it has been part of. In this way, a gift creates a social fabric, a bond and

trust. If a gift circulates within a community, it co-constitutes that community and it also

marks its boundaries. All this holds also for academic knowledge production. The more

knowledge circulates, the more value it accrues and the more knowledge it generates. The

cumulative nature of science is thus similar to the cumulative nature of gifts. Writing

‘contributions’ for the academic community creates the social identity of the scholar.

These scientific gifts help creating the social texture of science. Colleagues exchange

results and articles, and there is a default attitude of trust between them. Within the

scientific community, these gifts are circulated, but for relations outside academia (such as

expert advice to companies, etc.), a market reasoning takes its place and payment is

expected. Gift giving thus reinforces the shared values of the group. Indeed, gift giving

systems usually occur in institutions concerned with the transmission of common values,

such as the family, religious groups and closely knit communities. Values are also central

to scientific research, and in the practice of science these values are continuously validated

by the practices of the gift economy. These values can be general epistemic values such as

accuracy, objectivity, social and moral values such as openness and honesty; or they can be

values particular to specific scientific practices. In the next section, I will look more closely

at the classical Mertonian norms of science, and how they are reinforced by a gift economy

and scientific commons.

If there is a return gift, it is important that it is appropriate and that it is part of the gift

giving system. A return gift should not come from outside the relevant practice. In the case

of science, the return gift can be scientific fame but should not be political favors or

financial profit. This gift too should circulate, and famous scientists are expected to use

their reputation (and often their prize money) for furthering science. In any case, the return


123

gift should also be part of the gift economy and should not be calculated according to the

system of market transactions. In accepting a gift, one recognizes the status of the donor

and one acknowledges some reciprocal rights (such as a return gift, appropriate sentiments

of gratitude, esteem and respect, the constitution of a specific identity, the belonging to a

group). The status of being a researcher, and the establishment of a reputation in science,

can only be obtained through such gift-giving (cf. publishing in scientific journals). If a gift

is too low in value, or if it is not appropriate, it might be perceived as an insult and may be

refused. Indeed, scientific journals may reject contributions, when they are judged as

mediocre or bad scholarship, because these gifts are inappropriate, they do not meet the

journal’s standards or are deemed of too low value for the scientific community. Also

donations from funding bodies or private companies aimed exclusively at promoting their

interests are not genuine gifts. They are inappropriate and should be refused.

Describing the rules of a gift economy and pointing out its positive effects does not

mean that gift giving cannot be abused, of course. Scholarly accounts of gift economies

usually only focus on the positive effects of gift giving. Bad, feigned and interested ‘gifts’

are violations of the rules of the gift system that may occur in any gift economy. Lessig

(2011) has argued, for instance, that lobbyists gain influence with US congressmen by

means of gifts. Legislators believe themselves to be decent, honorable persons and they are

convinced that money does not buy their vote. Lobbyists influence them by become their

friends (or by hiring their friends), slowly gaining trust and entering into a gift relation-

ship.39 This is, however, interested and calculated gift-giving and an abuse of the special

reciprocity implied in gift economies. Lobbyists insert aspects that should be kept separate

from the gift economy (manipulating and calculating, hiring legislators’ friends for money,

promoting interests that are external to the relationship). Gifts are like friendships, how-

ever: the fact that some of them are bad, interested or being abused does not mean that this

is usually the case.

Abuses of the gift economy of science may happen at the interface between industry and

the sciences. Companies try to influence the judgment of scientists and professionals by

gifts and other incentives, for instance. Marcia Angell, former editor of the New England

Journal of Medicine, told me that the pharmaceutical industry now provides lunches for

students at the medical school of Ivy League universities. In this way, they implicitly

influence, unconsciously, the judgment of these promising future medical scholars and

practitioners. Gift giving between corporate and public sectors can thus be problematic,

also in academia.40 Another example: Hicks (1995) has argued that scientists working in

corporate contexts publish and present at conferences in order to get credibility in the

academic gift economy. These contributions are not really gifts but they are used to barter

and exchange important (often tacit) scientific knowledge. The fact that they publish can

only be applauded, but also here the exchange of gifts between market and gift economies

can lead to abuses, for instance, when corporate scientists appropriate (e.g. by patenting)

the yet unpublished ideas and results of academic scientists.

Abuse is not only possible at the profit/non-profit interface, but also within academia.

Not only corporate scientists but also academic researchers can violate the rules of the gift

system, e.g. by appropriating ideas of other scholars or by refusing to give credit. Fur-

thermore, there are aspects intrinsic to the gift economy that we consider negative. I have

39 Klein (2012): ‘Campaign contributions are part of the cash economy. Lobbyists are hired because theyunderstand how to participate in the gift economy.’40 On student lunches, personal discussion with Marcia Angell in 2006; see also Angell (2004) and Lakoff(2004) for other abusive gift giving.

2498 K. Vermeir

123

shown that gift exchange creates and sustains tight social structures. Within a system of

personal gift exchange, the resulting relations can become too tight and even suffocating.

Gifts bind people to one another and create webs of personal ties and mutual obligations

that are often vague and implicit, which installs biases, interests as well as imbalanced

power relations. Gift-giving often leads to patronage systems and this may degenerate in

dependencies and even cronyism. As a result, decisions become opaque and are more

determined by the local social texture than by scientific reasons. Indeed, scientific relations

sometimes become too much embedded in a local social setting, and this might become

unhealthy, as when assistants or colleagues render all kinds of services to their director in

order to get ‘preferment’. Furthermore, there is much implicit binding and unconscious

influencing going on, which may explain why in academic settings ‘schools of thought’ are

so easily formed. The abuses as well as the negative aspects of the gift economy of science

cannot be denied, but we should try to find constructive solutions for remedying them.

5 The Norms of Science

The scientific commons and the scientific gift economy go hand in hand. In the previous

section, I have argued that scientific practice is structured like a gift economy. In Sect. 3, I

have shown that some of the essential characteristics of scientific knowledge might be lost

in the face of extreme commodification. At stake are the basic characteristics of knowl-

edge, such as nonrivalrousness, nonexcludability and cumulativeness (affected e.g. by

installing intellectual property regimes) as well as the intrinsic motivation and the

autonomy of scientists (affected e.g. by introducing profit motives, corporate influence and

hierarchical managerial control). I have argued that science can best be organized as a

scientific commons, and developing a gift economy is one way to make this idea more

concrete. In the following, I will briefly show how a gift economy respects the special

characteristics of science as described in Sect. 3. Furthermore, I will argue that com-

modification does not only negatively affect the essential characteristics of science but also

its basic norms. In contrast, as I will show, the commons model and the gift economy

reinforce the Mertonian norms of science. For these reasons, I will argue, the commons and

the gift economy are particularly fitting for scientific practice. Nevertheless, scientists do

not live in an ivory tower and science is not isolated from society, i.e. a society currently

dominated by market reasoning. If my arguments are accepted, we should start reflection

on how market and gift economies of science can interact and if a hybrid model is possible

and desirable. I will therefore point out some lines of inquiry at the end of the article.

Scientific knowledge is a nonrival and almost nonexclusive good. With the rise of new

communication media and networking tools, the transaction costs of knowledge are more

and more approaching zero. In such a situation, sharing becomes increasingly evident.

(This is clear from new practices of electronic sharing between peers and sharing networks,

such as youtube, facebook, web-based piracy, etc.)41 This is also the case for science. If

dissemination, communication and utilizing science cost next to nothing, and if it is

increasingly difficult to exclude people from access to information, then gift exchange,

sharing and even open access are the most efficient options. There is almost no cost and

there are huge benefits. In the case of modern science, I should add that production

41 Lessig (2008b) has argued that our youth becomes more and more criminalized by current law, when70 % of young people obtain digital information from ‘illegal’ sources. Lessig concludes that the law shouldbe changed.


123

capacity is globally dispersed: specialists and scientific talent are widely distributed over

the whole world, and they are in contact through new network technologies. This is an

argument against the centralized and hierarchical managerial structure that, as I have

argued, is a form of commodification of science. In such a case, bottom-up organization

and self-regulation of science is the most efficient option and, furthermore, the resulting

autonomy of the participants stimulates inventiveness.42

Scientific knowledge is also cumulative: the more it is shared and used, the more it is

created and multiplied. Organizing science as a gift economy thus creates maximal pro-

ductivity. Add to this the special uncertainty of scientific research, which makes its inte-

gration in a free market system difficult and inefficient, and a gift economy of scientific

research becomes the most appealing solution. A gift economy ensures the autonomy of the

scientists and rejects the enforcement of results, which in its turn encourages the taking of

intellectual risks and promotes innovation. I have argued that the specific nature of sci-

entific research causes a ‘market failure’, and therefore science is best organized as a

commons or as a gift economy. Because private funding will underinvest in a scientific

commons, governments have an important task in funding the sciences as well as pro-

tecting their basic institutions.

A gift economy is particularly effective for social systems in which well socialized

persons operate independently of controls. This is because the gift exchanges and the social

reciprocity involved reinforce the internalization of the norms that govern and characterize

the system. This is especially the case for academic research, for which a long education

and socialization process is so important. The rich social texture, fortified by apprentice-

ship and exchanges of tacit knowledge necessary for technical knowledge transfer, is

responsible for continuous internal evaluation and control, in informal (reputation) as well

as formal ways (peer-review, hiring committees). As a result, the scholarly gift economy

produces researchers that are strongly committed to the values and norms of academic

science. This means that intrinsic motivation takes an important place in scientific research,

and these motivations tend to take precedence over motivations extrinsic to the scientific

enterprise. This also implies a commitment to the Mertonian norms, including sharing and

openness (not only in publications but on all levels of scientific practice), as well as to

truthfulness, objectivity, trust, accuracy, respect for expertise, etc.43

Values and norms are central to scientific practice. The classical Mertonian norms of

science (Merton 1979) come under pressure, however, when science is commodified In

contrast, it is striking that these norms are intrinsic to the gift giving process and the

commons, or these norms are at least reinforced by them. Merton did not intend his account

of these norms to be a faithful description of the specific motives of particular protagonists,

of course, but he believed that these norms are embodied in the social structure of science.

42 As Benkler (2004a) argues, new technologies can make sharing more efficient than traditional markets,and decentralized social sharing can be an economically attractive modality of production.43 Indeed, understanding science as a gift economy can help explaining why academic researchers ingeneral are so surprisingly honest—especially when compared to other domains of society. (See alsoBenkler and Nissenbaum (2006), who argue that commons-based peer production is conductive to virtuousbehavior, and that a society providing opportunities for virtuous behavior will be more conducive to virtuousindividuals.) Truthfulness is one of the central values that constitute science socially as well as epistemi-cally. Scientific fraud is at variance with the core norms of academic science, and it is therefore severelypunished and perpetrators are ostracized from the scientific community. A gift culture also explains whyacademic researchers work so hard for a remuneration that is hardly comparable to other jobs of similarqualification. They do not value their contributions according to the standards of the market. Scientistsreceive a gift from society—the gift of time and resources they can devote to the problems that they arepassionate about—and they return this gift in the form of scientific contributions.

2500 K. Vermeir

123

Interestingly, they are also embodied in the social structure of gift-giving and the com-

mons. First, it seems evident that the disinterestedness of science is harmed by com-

modification, whether by profit incentives or by introducing other career incentives aimed

at increasing scientific production. At the interface between academic science and industry,

conflicts of interest also pose a major problem. In contrast, disinterestedness is embodied in

the gift nature of science. Merton’s norm expresses the idea that scientists should seek

knowledge for the sake of knowledge, not for a certain gain or for the promotion of other

(political, economic, ideological, …) ideas. There should not be a direct interest that

influences their research or that their results are expected to promote. This corresponds to

the idea that for a gift a direct return cannot be expected. A real gift is not calculated but is

disinterested.44

Merton’s norm of ‘communism’ (now usually called communalism) or the common

property of science, expressed also in the promotion of openness and circulation, is also

central to commons and gift exchange. It is evident that common ownership of science is

best assured in a commons. According to Merton, scientific findings are the product of

social collaboration and belong to the scientific community. Similarly, gifts can never

really be ‘possessed’ by an individual, but they belong to the society in which they

circulate. Furthermore, commons and gift cultures also promote openness. In contrast,

privatization of science and profit incentives lead to more trade secrecy, and intellectual

property regimes such as copyright and patenting prevent informal exchange, and pre-print

sharing.45 If Hicks (1995) is right that corporate scientists publish mainly to be accepted by

the academic gift culture, increasing commodification of academic science will decrease

this gift culture and this may in turn lead to decreasing publication by corporate scientists.

Finally, the publish-or-perish culture imposed by managerial science governance strongly

reduces the actual sharing by scientists. Plausibly, exchange will be limited to formal

publication in journals, and important sharing practices such as conference talks describing

work in progress, inviting visiting researchers, circulation of pre-prints and many other

informal exchanges, often crucial for acquiring tacit knowledge and up to date information,

might be crowded out.

The other Mertonian norms will suffer too. Universalism refers to a kind of egalitari-

anism in science that again seems best preserved by the scientific commons. A comparison

with the egalitarian ethos in open source programming is instructive. Newcomers to open

source are advised to ignore power play by established contributors and are invited to listen

only to real contributions. To quote one instance: ‘Don’t _ever_ listen to anything from

anyone you don’t respect. The only way to have your code get really good is peer review. If

they flame [abusive criticism] it, they flame it. So what? I’ve never seen this happen

myself, though. Ignore the flames and listen to the REAL comments on your code.’46 Very

similar advice is given to beginning scientists. This egalitarian spirit of science is

diminished by commodification, however, in the guise of the decreasing autonomy of

scientists and by the introduction of new power structures (e.g. by excellence initiatives,

44 The notion of disinterestedness is somewhat fluid in the definition of gifts as well as in science, and itsexact meaning depends on the particular situation, the context and the culture. See e.g. the historicalexamples in Davis (2000).45 For an overview of the discussion on secrecy and science, see Vermeir and Margocsy (2012). On openaccess publishing, e.g. Willetts (2012). Open access databases specifically warn for putting online patentablematerial.46 Quote of an open source contributor, cited in Bergquist and Ljungberg (2001, p. 315). See also Goldmanand Gabriel (2005, chapters 8 and 9) for practical advice for companies about the special social norms ofopen source.


123

the concentration of power by administrators, the introduction of all kinds of incentives and

special rewards, and the influence of money and resources).47

Organized skepticism, Merton’s fourth norm, works best when everyone feels respon-

sible for the common result, and when the community of science as a whole gets credit for

these results. The inverse dynamic of the tragedy of the commons is at work here: if

scientific results are the property of the author only, no-one will feel called upon to invest

time and effort criticizing and improving these results. The author might be self-critical,

but this will not lead to the communal and organized skepticism Merton calls for. In that

case, people will only be skeptical of the work of colleagues when it serves their self-

interest, e.g. to harm competing colleagues, but such criticism is biased, interested and not

constructive, and it is not sufficient for building a critical body of research. Furthermore,

organized skepticism is seriously hampered when interests external to science are involved

or when results are kept secret, both effects of commodification. Scientific gift-giving, in

the form of sharing remarks and ideas at conferences, at workshops or during teaching, or

in the form of refereeing and editorial work, makes the results of science really into

communal property.48 Researchers should feel responsible and accountable for the com-

mon good and the quality of research in their discipline.

Originality is not a Mertonian norm, but it is often included among the norms of

science. Both commons and market economies can foster originality and inventiveness.

The nature of this originality will differ, however. In market economies, short term views,

short term success and the need for accountability and productivity targets dominate.

Commodified science is also focused on the selling of research products. It is therefore

more marketing focused, and its commercial success often depends more on marketing

excellence than on significant scientific advances. This is not the radical, daring and risky

intellectual originality that we associate with important scientific progress, and that makes

science such an uncertain enterprise. In contrast, a gift economy better tolerates this

uncertainty, resulting from big intellectual bets, radical ideas and long term projects

without the prospect of immediate benefits, because a lack of immediate results is usually

not penalized (this is changing with the introduction of short term contacts). In previous

sections, I have also argued that a gift economy promotes intrinsic motivation, which is

very important for making intellectual bets and for developing radically new ideas.

Finally, I have argued that gift economies create a tight social structure, which is

especially important in uncertain contexts. Science is in many ways uncertain. Firstly, the

potential results of scientific practice are uncertain. Secondly, scientists are experts, and it

is rare to find someone who is more expert about the particular questions they work on.

Evaluation is therefore difficult and experiments are seldom replicated in identical fashion.

Scientific practice is thus to a large extent based on trust in the expertise, honesty and

accuracy of colleagues. This makes fraud eminently possible, but at the same time

exceptional, because the implicit trust incites the appropriate behavior.49 If

47 Note, however, that as I have shown above, imbalances and abuse of power exist also in gift economies,especially if they are local and personalized. See also Bergquist and Ljungberg (2001, p. 315) for aninteresting case for power abuse in impersonal gift economies, although the actual impact of such powerabuse is forcefully put into question by the practitioners themselves. Gift exchange normally confirms theexisting social relations, hierarchical or egalitarian, and if a community is based on egalitarian principles,gift exchange will usually not change this.48 Note that scientists are not alienated from the results of their work, but this does not mean that theseresults cannot be common property.49 If fraud occurs, it is usually discovered after a while, however, because of the interconnectedness oftopics and projects, but this may take a considerable time, as in the story in the introduction of this paper.

2502 K. Vermeir

123

commodification gains the upper hand, this basic trust breaks down. Conflicts of interest

arouse suspicion by colleagues as well as by the general public, and extreme competition

and career incentives incite social behavior that threatens the social texture of science (cf.

Friedman 2002; Haerlin and Parr 1999; Sztompka 2007).

6 Commons, Commodities or Hybrids?

Increasing commodification, in its different guises—e.g. excessive managerial control,

imposed research projects, bibliometry, the market valuation of scientific ideas, a single

minded focus on technology transfer, the mechanical measuring and objectifying of aca-

demic production (e.g. counting articles, patents, grant money)—indicates that academic

science is less and less recognized and accepted as a gift. It is the gift nature of science that

reinforces the norms of science, however. As a result of commodification, therefore, the

values that once characterized academic science are being threatened by erosion, leading to

increased secrecy, a drive for profit, scientific fraud, lack of socialization, loss of the

specific identity of the academic scientist, lack of trust, and potentially the loss of scientific

community and of the moral authority of science.

Despite these potentially disastrous effects, we need not necessarily presuppose a

conspiracy or attribute bad intentions to governments, industry leaders and science

administrators who promote the commodification of science. Although their concerns are

more with economy and industry than with science proper, they may also be genuinely

interested in the good of science. As we have shown in Sect. 4, gift economies are

sometimes abused, and some intrinsic aspects of gift economies can have negative side

effects. In gift systems, social relations are sometimes oppressing: obligations can be

opaque, relations fuzzier and decisions more subjective, for instance. Some of these effects

of the gift economy may have negative consequences that can indeed be perceived in some

quarters of academic science. One reason why science administrators promote the com-

modification of science is that they are expected to solve these problems. This strategy has

been successful in various industries, and it is assumed that it will be successful for science

too. In particular, commodification is supposed to promote equitable decisions and values

such as transparency, quality, utility, efficiency, demonstrable accountability, evaluation,

objectivity, control and clear rules.50

I have argued above, however, that this line of reasoning does not take into account the

special characteristics and norms of science. First, commodification of science will not

achieve the values listed in the previous paragraph, because it presupposes measurement of

variables that are not measurable. Research quality, utility, accountability, etc., cannot be

objectively measured. They can only be approximated to a very limited extent by bibli-

ometry and other tools.51 I have also indicated in the previous sections that it is a mistake

to presuppose that market systems will always be more efficient than gift economies, and I

have argued that a gift economy is most efficient for science. Furthermore, excessive

50 Accountability has also a good side, of course: society may expect something back, even in a gifteconomy. It is only not measurable by a cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, it is not only economic interest,but also immeasurable benefits such as increase in civilization, culture, knowledge, tolerance, Bildung, etc.that should be accounted for in discussions of accountability.51 The much vaunted transparency, objectivity and accountability can just as well become a cover up forbias and abuse of executive power. For discussions about rankings, see e.g. Connelly and Gallagher (2007);about the danger of rankings: the interested parties and the public easily accept rankings because theyprovide simple information, ready to be consumed (AUBR 2010).


123

control and the establishing of rigid rules go against the uncertainty and intellectual risk

necessary for scientific research. Second, even if commodification were able, to some

extent, to achieve the values listed in the previous paragraph, its positive effects would be

far outweighed by its detrimental effects on the core of science, i.e. on the basic charac-

teristics of scientific knowledge (nonrivalrousness, nonexcludability, cumulativeness,

uncertainty) and on the basic norms of scientific practice (disinterestedness, communalism,

universalism, organized skepticism, originality). The commodification of science is

therefore like a medicine that threatens to kill the patient in trying to cure a minor disease.

There are other ways of solving the problems inherent in a gift system. The problems

described in Sect. 4 occur mostly in personal gift exchange, for instance. Things are

usually different in the case of impersonal giving, when the benefactor or the recipient is

not preselected or known. One way to go about solving the abuse of relationships is,

therefore, to diminish hierarchical dependencies and to reinforce the egalitarianism that

Merton promoted. Another way would be to depersonalize and uproot excessively pro-

vincial scientific practice. This does not mean that science should become an impersonal

practice void of social texture.52 To the contrary, it means breaking open local contexts that

are too self-absorbed, e.g., by internationalizing research and by fostering more variety in

research relations and collaborations. Furthermore, scientific researchers should not see

their work as a gift to a particular person or institution, but they should come to see it as a

universal gift to the scientific community, as well as to society in general.53 In this way,

some of the negative effects of the gift economy may be countered without recourse to

commodification.

It is of course possible that adjusting a gift economy by adding a minimal amount of

‘commodification’ may have positive effects by increasing transparency, objectivity and

accountability, without negatively affecting science’s gift character. Taking some mea-

surable quantities (like the number of publications) into account when making decisions

(e.g. a new hire), for instance, will of course not drastically alter the gift character of

science. To what extent can one increase commodification without imperiling the com-

mons of science? This raises the question of the possibility of a hybrid form between gift

and market economies. Would it be possible to find the right balance and to keep the best

of two worlds, i.e. of a gift economy and of a market economy of science? This is an

important question for another reason too. Indeed, we cannot deny that science is part of a

broader world and that there are plenty of contact zones between the gift economy of

science and the market economy. The historical and anthropological literature (Caille

1994; Gregory 1982; Thomas 1991; Davis 2000) has begun to study interaction between

gifts and commodities, analyzing how they are transformed into one another and how they

are sometimes combined. (Important sales contracts are often accompanied by a present,

for instance, in order to iron out possible difficulties and to confirm the good professional

relationship.) Nevertheless, even if combined, the distinction between gift modes and sales

52 As I have argued, much of science is about the exchange of tacit knowledge, and the positive effects ofgift exchange do require a rich social texture, but this social texture should not become too personal andshould not be confined to the local level only.53 On the one hand, there is the commons of the scientific community, determined by the gift economy thatI described above. This gift economy is partly personal (close colleagues), partly impersonal (unknowncolleagues, blind review), and exchanges of goods (ideas, drafts, results, sometimes funding) are betweenpeers. On the other hand, there is also the public commons of science, in which scientific research isavailable to all. This gift economy is impersonal, and involves translations of public funding in scientificresults, which should be accessible to the public.

2504 K. Vermeir

123

modes persists.54 Furthermore, even if market and gift exchanges remain distinct, they do

not always coexist peacefully next to each other, and the one may crowd out the other,

especially when they start encroaching on each other’s domains.

Some authors on open source programming have recently suggested the existence of

hybrid economies (Lessig 2008a; Berdou 2011). Companies have been impressed by the

success of open source and have tried to become involved. Sometimes they even co-

produce or initiate community governed projects. These contributions are usually not

disinterested, which locates them in the grey zones of a gift dominated system. Indeed,

there are inherent ambiguities in a gift system, because there is some fluidity in the implicit

and explicit interests and obligations that are allowed. The boundaries between gifts,

barters and sales are culturally specific and not always clearly demarcated, and the interests

involved can be more or less direct (cf. Davis 2000). In running annual competitions for

students with prizes for successful open source developments (arguably part of a gift

system), for instance, the PR department creates goodwill towards the company and at the

same time the HR department can prospect for potential hires (corporate interests).

Creating a stable and workable hybrid between a gift and market economy is very

challenging. I will address here only one major issue: the free-riding problem. If a com-

munity circulates gifts, and one person starts to sell them for his own profit, this is not only

unfair, but the whole gift economy may break down. (This is, of course, again a variant of

the tragedy of the commons). To some extent, combined or hybrid economies already exist

at the interface between academic science and industry. Take the current Western patent

system as an example. Patents are one way the market economy free-rides on the gift

economy of science. It is widely agreed upon that the market value of scientific ideas is

impossible to estimate, and therefore it is impossible to take a patent on theoretical scientific

results (to calculate the value of the Pythagorean Theorem for society would be an absurd

task). It is only when science can be applied in a technology that a patent can be granted.

More and more, these technical developments are to a large extent based on the insights

developed in the scientific commons. One person can appropriate this ‘gift’ by science,

think of a technical application, take a patent and keep all the profit for himself. This shift

from a gift economy to a market economy involves specific problems that have to be

regulated and resolved. It seems that fairness demands that part of the proceeds from the

patent should flow back to the gift economy from which it derived so much knowledge (cf.

Stiglitz 1989, 1999). Recent US law took the other direction, however, facilitating tech-

nology transfer and granting universities and faculty the right to take patents without the

obligation to give back to the gift economy.55 At least in the case of university researchers

who take patents for publicly funded research, it seems clear that the rewards of the patent

should remain part of the gift system. Most of the profits should flow back to public funding

agencies, to the university, and to the laboratory of the scientists as well, without restrictions

on use. (This does not mean that the scientist cannot be rewarded, of course.) In this way, the

gift nature of the original research funding would be recognized and respected.

This example should make clear the difficulty of creating fair and workable hybrid

economies of science. At the boundary between market and gift exchange, it is important to

stand guard and prevent free-riding that privatizes the scientific commons. Technology

54 This distinction is also clear in the difference in remuneration between academic service and externalconsultancy service given by academic scientists (see Sect. 4, and the problems with full commodification,cf. note 36).55 The Bayh-Dole Act (1980), the Stevenson-Wydler Act (1980), and the Federal Technology Transfer Act(1986) allow the commodification of scientific products (Cf. Rhoades and Slaughter 2004).


123

transfer, the creation of spinoffs, the profits that academic publishers make on the backs of

scientists, and many other examples are currently located at the murky borderline of gift

and market economies. It should be analyzed on a case by case basis whether a knowledge

commons, a market approach or a sustainable hybrid is the best solution.56 Creative

solutions might of course be forthcoming: there are after all many different forms of

science, of funding, of commodification, of management, and all should not be lumped

together. Some of these may be combined in promising ways, and legislators and academic

administrators may take some inspiration from recent developments in other knowledge

commons, such as open source programming.57

7 Conclusion

In this paper, I have aimed at describing some general tendencies, evolutions and problems

related to the commodification of academic research. My aim was to create a theoretical

framework that can inspire debate on more concrete issues. I have argued that the com-

modification of science does not just involve the influence of money on science. Neither

does it only concern conflicts of interest and scientific fraud. It is a broader phenomenon,

referring to processes that mold scientific practice according to free market ideology and

that implement new managerial structures, aiming at increasing the standardization, control

and efficiency of science. I have discussed some of the most evident negative effects of

these processes. I have argued that commodification crowds out intrinsic motivation,

causes loss of autonomy for scientists, leads to less focus on content and more on mar-

keting, diminishes trust, decreases self-regulation of quality, and favors a short time focus

(which leads to less innovatory science and more problem-solving with perceived imme-

diate utility).

Commodification is also detrimental to the sciences because it undermines the special

qualities of science, notably the nonrivalrousness, nonexcludability, uncertainty, positive

externalities and cumulativeness of scientific knowledge. The development of science is

best served if it is organized as a commons based on gift exchange, which preserves and

even promotes these qualities. A gift economy is particularly suited to deal with the

fundamental uncertainties that characterize scientific research; it supports the freedom and

autonomy needed for creativity and invention, as well as the idealism and curiosity that

drive many scientists; and it is responsible for the constitution of trust and of a closely knit

community necessary for scientific exchange. Finally, the scientific gift economy supports

the shared values and central norms of science (cf. the Mertonian norms).

These basic characteristics and norms of science may be lost with increasing com-

modification. Current science policy sees some of the positive and constitutive properties

of science as obstacles, because they hinder the commodification and market adaptation of

science. Legislation and policy try to remedy these perceived ‘obstacles’ by social engi-

neering: the nonexcludability, positive externalities and cumulativeness of scientific

knowledge are reduced by intellectual property regimes, for instance; the importance of

trust and values are replaced by standardization; expert judgment and peer-to-peer self-

56 Foray (2004) suggests that different types of knowledge production are useful and a diversity of systemsseems to promote productive synergies.57 In the past, publishers were paid for the service of distributing scientific knowledge. Recent technologicaladvances seem to suggest that open access is the best way to disseminate scientific knowledge, for instance,and science publishers will have to adapt (Cf. Willetts 2012).

2506 K. Vermeir

123

regulation are replaced by techniques of mechanical objectivity.58 Also, the intrinsic

uncertainty of the sciences is tamed and transformed into the predictability of useful results

determined by a short-term vision. Furthermore, the global distribution of expertise is

‘remedied’ by the concentration of specialists in excellence initiatives, which allows for

centralized control of research dynamics and projects. As a result, the specific significance

of scientific knowledge founders and the social texture essential for scientific practice is

undermined. We do not deny that there may be positive aspects to commodification, such

as transparence and clearer accountability, in some industries. The effects on science are

different, however, because of its special properties.

On the other hand, it would be unwise to ignore that some gift economies may have

negative aspects. These may include opacity of decisions, social ties that become suffo-

cating, the existence of implicit obligations and the flourishing of unhealthy patronage

systems. Nevertheless, these considerations nuance and qualify my above analysis, at the

very most. It remains the case that the crucial characteristics and norms of science are best

guaranteed by a commons or gift economy. A commons or gift economy will also con-

stitute the most efficient solution. However, we should, not forget to take into account the

possibility of hybrid forms combining aspects of market and gift approaches. Research on

hybrid economies of science is virtually nonexistent and basic questions still have to be

answered. Is a sustained hybrid economy of science possible and desirable? Or should we

rather aim at finding local adaptations between gift and market economies at the interfaces

between science and industry? Does a hybrid model of science solve the problems of

science as a gift economy? Would a hybrid model of science combine the best of two

worlds, or rather the worst? Indeed, we should be aware of serious dangers involved in

hybrid systems, such as the free-riding problem. At the least, we should be careful not to

destroy unthinkingly the subtle balance and rich social texture that make scientific practice

possible by imposing free market reasoning or unsuitable managerial models. These

questions should be the focus of more theoretical and empirical interdisciplinary research

in the years to come. For now, there is still hope that science can eat its cake and have it

too.

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Michael Matthews, the general journal editor, Gurol Irzik, theeditor of this special issue, and the three anonymous referees for their incisive comments which greatlyimproved this article. Acknowledgments are also due to the CNRS for the financial and institutional supportof this research.

References

Angell, M. (2004). The truth about drug companies. New York: Random House.Arrow, K. J. (1962). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for inventions. In R. Nelson (Ed.),

The rate and direction of inventive activity: Economic and social factors (pp. 609–625). Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Arrow, K. J. (1972). Gifts and exchanges. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(4), 343–362.Arrow, K. J. (1996). The economics of information: An exposition. Empirica, 23(2), 119–128.AUBR. (2010). Assessing Europe’s university-based research. K1-NA-24187-EN-N (p. 151). Brussels.Audretsch, D. B., Bozeman, B., Combs, K. L., Feldman, M., Link, A. N., Stephan, P., et al. (2002). The

economics of science and technology. Journal of Technology Transfer, 27, 155–203.Benatar, S. (2000). Avoiding exploitation in clinical research. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 9,

562–565.

58 For mechanical objectivity and expert judgment as different regimes of objectivity, see Daston andGalison (2007).


123

Benkler, Y. (1998). Overcoming agoraphobia: Building the commons of the digitally networked environ-ment. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 11, 287–360.

Benkler, Y. (2003). The political economy of commons. Upgrade, IV(3), 6–9.Benkler, Y. (2004a). Sharing nicely: On shareable goods and the emergence of sharing as a modality of

economic production. The Yale Law Journal, 114, 273–358.Benkler, Y. (2004b). Commons-based strategies and the problems of patents. Science, 305, 1110–1111.Benkler, Y. (2005). Common wisdom: Peer production of educational materials. San Francisco: COSL

Press.Benkler, Y. (2006). The wealth of networks. How social production transforms markets and freedom. New

Haven: Yale University Press.Benkler, Y., & Nissenbaum, H. (2006). Commons-based peer production and virtue. The Journal of Political

Philosophy, 14(4), 394–419.Berdou, E. (2011). Organization in open source communities. New York: Routledge.Bergquist, M., & Ljungberg, J. (2001). The power of gifts: Organizing social relationships in open source

communities. Information Systems Journal, 11(4), 305–320.Berman, E. P. (2012). Creating the market university. How academic science became an economic engine.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.Blank, D. M., & Stigler, G. J. (1957). The demand and supply of scientific personnel. New York: National

Bureau of Economic Research.Bok, D. (2003). Universities in the marketplace: The commercialization of higher education. Princeton:

Princeton University Press.Boldrin, M., & Levine, D. K. (2002). The case against intellectual property. The American Economic

Review, 92(2), 209–212.Boldrin, M., & Levine, D. K. (2008). Perfectly competitive innovation. Journal of Monetary Economics,

55(3), 435–453.Brandt, A. (2009). The cigarette century: The rise, fall, and deadly persistence of the product that defined

America. New York: Basic Books.Bromley, D. W., et al. (Eds.). (1992). Making the commons work: Theory, practice, and policy. San

Francisco: ICS Press.Brown, J. (2000). Privatizing the university: The new tragedy of the commons. Science, 290, 1701–1702.Caille, A. (1994). Don, interet et desinteressement. Paris: La Decouverte.Callon, M. (1994). Is science a public good? Science, Technology, & Human Values, 19(4), 395–424.Carrier, J. (1995). Gifts and commodities: Exchange and western capitalism since 1700. London: Routledge.Cheal, D. (1988). The gift economy. London: Routledge.Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3(1), 1–44.Connelly, C. E., & Gallagher, D. G. (2007). Making ‘‘The List’’: Business school rankings and the com-

modification of business research. Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, 23, 103–116.Dasgupta, P., & David, P. A. (1994). Toward a new economics of science. Policy Research, 23, 487–521.Daston, L., & Galison, P. (2007). Objectivity. New York: Zone Books.Davis, N. Z. (2000). The gift in sixteenth-century France. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.Demsetz, H. (2003). Ownership and the externality problem. In T. L. Anderson & F. S. McChesney (Eds.),

Property rights: Cooperation, conflict, and law. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Diamond, A. M., Jr. (1996). The economics of science. Knowledge and Policy, 9(2&3), 6–49.Diamond, A. M., Jr. (2008). Economics of science. In S. Durlauf and L. Blume (Eds.), The new palgrave

dictionary of economics. Palgrave Macmillan.Foray, D. (2004). The economics of knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Frey, B. S. (1997). Not just for money. An economic theory of personal motivation. Cheltenham: Edward

Elgar.Frey, B. S. (2001). Inspiring economics. Human motivation in political economy. Cheltenham: Edward

Elgar.Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2001). Motivation crowding theory. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(5), 589–611.Frey, B. S., & Oberholzer-Gee, F. (1997). The cost of price incentives: An empirical analysis of motivation

crowding-out. The American Economic Review, 87(4), 746–755.Friedman, P. J. (2002). The impact of conflict of interest on trust in science. Science and Engineering Ethics,

8(3), 413–420.Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M. (1994). The new pro-

duction of knowledge: The dynamics of science and research in contemporary societies. London: SagePublications.

Godbout, J. T. (1992). L’esprit du don. Paris: Editions La decouverte.Godelier, M. (1999). The Enigma of the gift. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

2508 K. Vermeir

123

Goldman, R., & Gabriel, R. (2005). Innovation happens elsewhere. Open source as business strategy. SanFrancisco: Morgan Kaufmann publications.

Goldman, A., & Shaked, M. (1991). An economic model of scientific activity and truth acquisition.Philosophical Studies, 63, 31–55.

Gould, E. (2003). The university in a corporate culture. New Haven: Yale University Press.Greenberg, D. S. (2007). Science for sale. The Perils, rewards, and delusions of campus capitalism.

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Gregory, C. A. (1982). Gifts and commodities. London: Academic Press.Haerlin, B., & Parr, D. (1999). How to restore public trust in science. Nature, 400(5 August), 499.Hagstrom, W. O. (1982). Gift giving as an organisational principle in science. In B. Barnes & D. Edge

(Eds.), Science in context: Readings in the sociology of science (pp. 21–34). Milton Keynes: The OpenUniversity.

Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162(13 December), 1243–1248.Harris, G. (2009). Doctor’s pain studies were fabricated, hospital says. New York Times, (March 10), A22.Hess, C., & Ostrom, E. (2007). Understanding knowledge as a commons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Hicks, D. (1995). Published papers, tacit competencies and corporate management of the public/private

character of knowledge. Industrial and Corporate Change, 4(January), 401–424.Hyde, L. (2007). The gift: Creativity and the artist in the modern world. New York: Random House.Jacob, M. (2009). On commodification and the governance of academic research. Minerva, 47(4), 391–405.Johnson, H. G. (1972). Some economic aspects of science. Minerva, 10(1), 10–18.Judson, H. F. (2004). The great betrayal: Fraud in science. New York: Harcourt.Kealey, T. (1996). The economic laws of scientific research. New York: St. Martin’s Press.Klein, E. (2012). Corrupt politics: It’s not all money. March: New York Review of Books. 22.Krijnen, C., Lorenz, C., & Umlauf, J. (Eds.). (2011). Wahrheit oder Gewinn?: Uber die Okonomisierung von

Universitat und Wissenschaft. Wurzburg: Konigshausen & Neumann.Krimsky, S. (2003). Science in the private interest. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.Krishnamurthy, S. (2006). On the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of free/libre/open source (FLOSS)

developers. Knowledge, Technology, & Policy, 18(4), 17–39.Lakoff, A. (2004). The anxieties of globalization: Antidepressant sales and economic crisis in Argentina.

Social Studies of Science, 34(2), 247–269.Lessig, L. (2008a). Remix. Making art and commerce thrive in the hybrid economy. London: Bloomsbury

Press.Lessig, L. (2008b). In defense of piracy. Wall Street Journal, (Oct. 11), W3.Lessig, L. (2011). Republic, lost: How money corrupts congress—and a plan to stop it. New York: Twelve.Lock, G., & Lorenz, C. (2007). Revisiting the university front. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 26(5),

405–418.Macherel, C. (1983). Don et reciprocite en Europe. Archives europeennes de sociologie, 24, 151–166.Malinowski, B. (1932). Argonouts of the Western Pacific. New York: Routledge.Mauss, M. (1924). Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l’echange dans les societes archaıques. l’Annee

Sociologique, seconde serie, 1, 30–186.McChesney, F. S. (2006). Coase, Demsetz, and the unending externality debate. Cato Journal, 1, 179–200.McLean, I., & Poulton, J. (1986). Good blood, bad blood, and the market: The gift relationship revisited.

Journal of Public Policy, 6(4), 431–445.Merton, R. K. (1979). The normative structure of science. In R. K. Merton (Ed.), The sociology of science:

Theoretical and empirical investigations (pp. 267–278). Chicago: Chicago University Press.Mirowski, P., & Sent, E. M. (Eds.). (2002). Science bought and sold: Essays in the economics of science.

Chicago: Chicago University Press.Nowotny, H., Pestre, D., Schmidt-Aßmann, E., Schultze-Fielitz, H., & Trute, H.-H. (Eds.). (2005). The

public nature of science under assault: Politics, markets, science and the law. Dordrecht: Springer.Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2010). Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth

on issues from tobacco to global warming. New York: Bloomsbury Press.Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.Ostrom, E. (1992). Crafting institutions for self-governing irrigation systems. San Francisco: ICS Press.Ostrom, E., & Shivakoti, G. (Eds.). (2002). Improving irrigation governance and management in Nepal.

Oakland, CA: ICS Press.Pigou, A. C. (1920). The economics of welfare. London: MacMillan.Proctor, R. (2008). Agnotology: The making and unmaking of ignorance. Stanford: Stanford University

Press.Radder, H. (2010). The commodification of academic research. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.


123

Ravitch, D. (2012). Schools we can envy. New York: The New York Review of Books.Readings, W. (1996). The University in ruins. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Resnik, D. B. (2007). The price of truth: How money affects the norms of science. Oxford: Oxford Uni-

versity Press.Rhoades, G., & Slaughter, S. (2004). Academic capitalism in the new economy: Challenges and choices.

American Academic, 1(1), 37–60.Rose-Ackerman, S. (Ed.). (1986). The economics of nonprofit institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Sahlberg, P. (2011). Finnish lessons: What can the world learn from educational change in Finland? New

York: Teachers College Press.Sahlins, M. (1972). Stone age economics. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.Shapin, S. (2008). The scientific life: A moral history of a late modern vocation. Chicago: The University of

Chicago Press.Singer, P. (1973). Altruism and commerce: A Defense of Titmuss against Arrow. Philosophy and Public

Affairs 1, 2(3), 312–320.Slaughter, S., & Rhoades, G. (2004). Academic capitalism in the new economy. Baltimore: The Johns

Hopkins University Press.Smith, R. J. (1981). Resolving the tragedy of the commons by creating private property rights in wildlife.

Cato Journal, 1(2), 439–468.Steneck, N. (2002). Assessing the integrity of publicly funded research. In N. Steneck & M. Scheetz (Eds.),

Proceedings for the Office of Research Integrity’s conference on research on research integrity (pp.1–16). Washington, D. C.: Office of Research Integrity.

Stephan, P. E. (1996). The economics of science. Journal of Economic Literature, 34(3), 1199–1235.Stephan, P. E., & Audretsch, D. B. (Eds.). (2000). The economics of science and innovation. Cheltenham:

Edward Elgar.Stiglitz, J. (1989). On the economic role of the state. In A. Heertje (Ed.), The economic role of the state.

Oxford: Blackwell.Stiglitz, J. (1999). Knowledge as a global public good. In I. Kaul, I. Grunberg, & M. A. Stern (Eds.), Global

public goods (pp. 308–325). New York: Oxford University Press.Sztompka, P. (2007). Trust in Science: Robert K. Merton’s inspirations. Journal of Classical Sociology,

7(2), 211–220.Thomas, N. (1991). Entangled objects: Exchange, material culture, and colonialism in the pacific. Cam-

bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Titmuss, R. M. (1971). The gift relationship. From human blood to social policy. New York: Pantheon

Books.Tuchman, G. (2009). Wannabe U: Inside the corporate university. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Vermeir, K., & Margocsy, D. (2012). States of secrecy. British Journal for the History of Science, 45(2),

153–164.Weisbrod, B. A. (1988). The nonprofit economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Wible, J. R. (1998). The economics of science: Methodology and epistemology as if economics really

mattered. London: Routledge.Willetts, D. (2012). Public access to publicly-funded research. 2 May 2012, Publishers Association annual

general meeting, London. http://www.bis.gov.uk/news/speeches/david-willetts-public-access-to-research.Willmott, H. (1995). Managing the academics: Commodification and control in the development of uni-

versity education in the UK. Human Relations, 48(9), 993–1028.

2510 K. Vermeir

123

http://www.bis.gov.uk/news/speeches/david-willetts-public-access-to-research

scientific research - commodities or commons, koen vermeir

Documents

commodification of science

gift economies of science

science policy

gifteconomy of science

gift character of science

central norms of science

scientific commons

scientific fraud