Prepared for the Auditor General for Scotland

Scottish Prison Service Contract for the provision of prisoner escort and court custody services

September 2004

Auditor General for ScotlandThe Auditor General for Scotland is the Parliament’s watchdog forensuring propriety and value for money in the spending of public funds.

He is responsible for investigating whether public spending bodiesachieve the best possible value for money and adhere to the higheststandards of financial management.

He is independent and not subject to the control of any member of theScottish Executive or the Parliament.

The Auditor General is responsible for securing the audit of the ScottishExecutive and most other public sector bodies except local authoritiesand fire and police boards.

The following bodies fall within the remit of the Auditor General:

• departments of the Scottish Executive eg, the Health Department• executive agencies eg, the Prison Service, Historic Scotland• NHS boards• further education colleges• Scottish Water• NDPBs and others eg, Scottish Enterprise.

AcknowledgmentsWe gratefully acknowledge the Scottish Prison Service’s permission touse the photographs throughout this report.

Audit Scotland is a statutory body set up in April 2000under the Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act2000. It provides services to the Auditor General forScotland and the Accounts Commission. Together theyensure that the Scottish Executive and public sector bodiesin Scotland are held to account for the proper, efficient andeffective use of public funds.

Contents1

SummaryPage 2

Contract objectivesPreparing the contractPage 3

Managing the contractPage 4

Conclusions and recommendationsPage 6

Part 1. IntroductionRole of the Scottish Prison ServicePrisoner escort contractPage 7

Scope of the auditPage 8

Part 2. Preparing the contractStrategic aims and objectivesPage 9

Scoping the contractPage 10

Procurement processPage 11

Tender assessment and contract awardPage 12

Part 3. Managing the contractImplementation controlsPage 14

Contingency plansMonitoring arrangementsPage 15

Monitoring in practicePage 16

Appendix 1. Contract main termsPage 18

The Scottish Prison Service handled well many aspects of theaward of the contract for prisoner escort and custody servicesto Reliance.

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Summary

Summary 3

1. In November 2003, the ScottishPrison Service (SPS), an executiveagency of the Scottish ExecutiveJustice Department, signed acontract on behalf of the ScottishMinisters with Reliance Secure TaskManagement Ltd (Reliance) for theprovision of prisoner escort and courtcustody services throughout Scotland.The contract is worth an estimated£126 million over seven years andcovers the transport of prisonersbetween, for example, prisons andpolice stations to court, and the safecustody of prisoners while at court.In 2003/04, there were some140,000 prisoner escorts throughoutScotland. The main terms of thecontract are shown at Appendix 1.

2. The contract is based on a phasedprogramme of implementation, withthe first phase of the contract,covering prisoner escort and courtcustody services in the Glasgow andsurrounding area, beginning in earlyApril 2004. A further four stageswere planned, leading to fullimplementation across the whole of Scotland by October 2004.

3. From the start of the first phase inApril, the new service has been thesubject of significant media coverage.This included a high profile prisonerescape and a number of otherincidents of prisoners apparentlybeing released in error. As a result, I agreed to a request from theMinister for Justice to considerbringing forward audit work relatingto the procurement of the contract.My report, which I have preparedunder Section 23(1) of the PublicFinance and Accountability (Scotland)Act 2000, is based on a review byAudit Scotland and considers fourkey issues:

• Whether the SPS set clearobjectives for the contractconsistent with achieving value for money and whether it achieved these objectives.

• Whether the SPS properly specifiedand awarded the contract.

• Whether the SPS establishedrobust and clear arrangements for managing the contract as soon as the contract periodbegan, and for monitoring thecontractor’s performance.

• How well the SPS is implementingand monitoring the contract.

Contract objectives

4. Prior to the contract between SPS and Reliance, police forces werelargely responsible for managingprisoners under court custody and forescorting prisoners on remand to court.The SPS was responsible for escortingconvicted prisoners or those appealingagainst conviction or sentence.

5. There was widespread acceptancewithin the criminal justice system inScotland that the previous systeminvolved significant duplication ofresources with little coordinationbetween the organisations involved.Following a multi-agency review, inJanuary 2002 the SPS and partneragencies decided to contract-outprisoner escort and court custodyservices, with the SPS beingresponsible for procuring an alternativeservice provider.

6. The overall aim of contracting outwas to free up time for police andprison officers and to secure bettervalue for money. The main reasonsfor contracting out prisoner escortand court escort services were:

• As an opportunity to maximisethe effective use of resourcesthroughout the whole area ofprisoner escorting and courtcustody services.

• Existing arrangements did notprovide best value for money, inthat police officers and prison

officers were used to undertakeduties that did not require their fullrange of legislative powers or skills.

• Removing the duplication resultingfrom the previous arrangements.

• To enable the return of themaximum number of policeofficers to core duties within their communities, and SPSofficers to core duties within their establishments.

• To provide uniformity of servicedelivery throughout Scotland.

• To provide best value and enablebest practice within the prisonerescort service sector.

7. The contract has yet to beimplemented fully so it is too early to say whether these objectives havebeen achieved in practice. The SPS,however, estimates that usingReliance to provide prisoner escortand court custody services shouldgenerate savings of £20 million over the seven-year life of thecontract. It also intends to undertakea post-implementation review of theproject once the phased implementationprocess has been completed.

Preparing the contract

8. The scope of the contract wasbased on the approach alreadyadopted in England and Wales,where prison escort duties havebeen provided by private contractorsfor a number of years. The SPSmade efforts to learn lessons fromEngland and Wales and to produce a contract which was morecomprehensive and demanding.

9. The SPS provided a clearspecification of requirements in itstender documentation. In accordancewith good practice, the invitation totender and contract are based onwhat activities and services the

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service provider is expected toprovide (the outputs and deliverablesfrom the contract) rather than aspecification of the human and otherresources required to be input.

10. In general, sufficient clearinformation was provided to alltenders to enable high quality bids.The invitation to tender was acomprehensive document and allbidders had the opportunity to askquestions throughout the process to clarify points and to requestfurther information.

11. While the invitation to tenderoutlined indicative levels of activity on a monthly basis for each courtand custody unit in Scotland, onetenderer sought a more extensivebreakdown of police escort activity to identify peaks and troughs. TheSPS therefore provided to all biddersactivity data for Glasgow courts on a daily basis for the month ofSeptember 2002. This data clearlyindicated that activity increased onMondays and after public holidays.

12. The SPS handled the procurementprocess well. A comprehensive ProjectInitiation Document was drawn up to provide a strategic brief for theprocurement process. The SPS’s chiefexecutive had overall responsibilityfor the delivery of the project whileits day-to-day management restedwith an inter-agency Escort ProjectBoard headed by the SPS’s Directorof Strategy and Business Performance.A number of inter-agency teams with consultancy support were alsoestablished with specific responsibilitiesfor scoping the restructured serviceand preparing the tenderdocumentation, for the financialevaluation of bidders and their bidsand for preparing the contract. Theseproject teams were supported with aclear project plan.

13. The SPS identified risks to theachievement of the project anddeveloped controls and processes to mitigate them. High level risks,their severity, likelihood and possibleimpact, together with procedures tomanage them, were outlined in anOperational Risk Log. Project teamswere also required to identify risksassociated with their aspect of theproject and to refer them to theEscort Project Board. The SPS alsorequested further details andassurances from the service provideron the availability of resources todeliver the contract.

14. The tendering process wasundertaken in accordance with EC and SPS procurement regulations.Five companies initially expressed aninterest in the contract afteradvertisement in the Official Journalof the Economic Communities. TheEscort Project Board did not shortlistone company because it was judgednot to be wholly independent of oneof the other tenderers. A furthercompany withdrew from the processprior to submitting a tender.

15. The SPS subjected all threetenders received to a technical,financial and legal and commercialassessment. The technical evaluationcovered six categories and bids wereassessed against a series of questionswhich were allocated a pre-determinedweighting in order to prioritise theresponses and to build a total scorefor each bidder.

16. In terms of the financialevaluation, the Reliance bid was thecheapest and resulted in a contractvalue of £126 million over the sevenyears life of the contract. This was£20 million less than the ‘publicsector comparator’ developed tocompare the costs of the existingmethod of service provision to thatbid by the tenderers. Reliance’sproposed staff numbers were judged to be the closest to those

currently employed by the SPS andpolice on prisoner escort and courtcustody duties.

17. Reliance was ranked in thirdplace in respect of the technicalevaluation but its bid was stillassessed as offering a level ofservice that met the requirements ofthe business case. Taking allelements of the tender evaluationtogether, the SPS assessed thatReliance’s bid represented the bestvalue for money overall. OnceReliance was selected as thepreferred bidder, a comprehensivenegotiation process was entered intoprior to formalisation and finalisationof the contract. The contract wassigned in November 2003 andcommenced in April 2004.

Managing the contract

18. During the lead up to thecommencement of the contract,discussions took place between theSPS and Reliance personnel todiscuss the acceptability ofproposals, previous experience andissues arising. These discussionscovered process and models, andincluded challenges to therobustness of Reliance’s proposals,for example on the level of proposedresources, including staff numbers,and how these would be applied.

19. As a result of some of theproblems experienced in the earlystages of the contract, the timetablefor its phased implementation hasbeen revised. The implementation ofphase 2(a) of the contract in July2004 covering Dumfries & Gallowaywas preceded by a period of ‘workshadowing’ when Reliance staffaccompanied police and prisonofficers over a two and a half weekperiod. Prior to the start of thisphase, the Chief Executive of theSPS, SPS Directors, representativesfrom the courts and Reliance signedan assurance that they were satisfied

Summary 5

that roll-out was appropriate. Thepolice also signed their readiness tosupport the roll-out.

20. The SPS and agency partnershave still to finalise high-levelcontingency plans to ensure continuityof service in the event that Reliancewithdraws or is withdrawn from thecontract. There are however detailedoperational plans to deal with anumber of identified emergenciesand other events which may occur.Service level agreements betweenthe SPS and partner agencies arealso in the process of being finalisedto cover temporary arrangements inthe event of unplanned situationsoccurring, for example loss of thecontractor’s fleet of vehicles.

21. The contract includes acomprehensive set of clearly definedperformance measures, largely basedon the model already tried and testedin England and Wales (see Appendix 1).The areas covered by performancemeasures include delivery of service,prisoner care, the security of custodyand the maintenance of good order.Two performance measures (incidentsof death or suicide in custody andincidents of prisoners unlawfully at large, including release in error)result in a reduction in the sumspayable to Reliance for each incidenceof non-compliance when it isestablished it is at fault. Othermeasures can also attract a financialpenalty based on a weighting toreflect the relative importance of adefined performance failure.

22. In general, the Escort ProjectBoard approved the thresholds forperformance measures based on itsjudgement on the desired standardof performance. The Escort ProjectBoard considers that the performancestandards set are demanding butachievable. While the performancestandards took into account thoseset for prisoner escort and courtcustody services in England, the SPS

did not compare them with previousperformance in Scotland. This wasbecause, in its view, it was attemptingto set aspirational standards ofperformance rather then replicate theservice of the past, and becauserelevant, reliable historical performancedata was not readily available to it.

23. Reliance is required to submit tothe SPS a standard monitoring reporteach month indicating its performanceagainst the performance measuresstipulated in the contract. Adequatearrangements are in place forreviewing performance under thecontract, and are complemented byactivity and performance datagenerated by the SPS, the police andother partner agencies to calculatethe payments due to Reliance. Todate, the SPS has undertakenperformance monitoring, includingthe calculation of monthly paymentsand application of financial penalties,in line with the terms of the contract.

24. Initially, a number of difficultieswere experienced with theimplementation of phase 1 of thecontract resulting in releases ofprisoners in error and incidences oflate delivery of prisoners to court. Ona few occasions, police officers, whoremained available in Glasgow courtson a shadowing basis to assist in thetransfer of responsibility for serviceprovision, were required to carry outsome of the tasks that Reliance werecontracted to perform because itcould not deploy its staff as flexiblyas it had first planned. The contractcontains adequate provision to-recharge Reliance in the event that other agencies are required toundertake work which is properly theresponsibility of the service provider.Reliance was, however, not requiredto pay the cost of these policeofficers because it was alwaysintended that the police wouldprovide actual assistance if thatproved necessary during shadowing.

25. The SPS and other partner agencieshave worked with Reliance to resolveand minimise the impact of theseproblems. Reliance has also increasedits staffing levels at Glasgow courts atits own expense. While this may resultin reduced profits for Reliance,discussions between the SPS and thecontractor on lessons to be learnedfrom the implementation of phase 1have satisfied the SPS that there is nosignificant increase in risk to thecontract from a financial perspective.

26. In the period April to July 2004,23 prisoners had been judged tohave been released in error from theGlasgow courts system sinceReliance took up its duties. Reliancehas accepted it was responsible for12 of the 23 releases in error. Theremaining releases in error wereeither the responsibility of the SPS orpartner agencies or, in the opinion ofthe SPS, were due to a combinationof circumstances which were outsidethe reasonable control of the serviceprovider. A protocol has now beenagreed between the SPS and partneragencies setting out the process forreporting and investigating incidentsand events related to the contract,and for identifying what lessons canbe learned.

27. A number of measures havebeen taken to help prevent recurrenceof releases in error. These include theSPS recommending to Reliance thatit should develop a checklist or deskinstructions outlining the steps to betaken before a prisoner is released,and a review of Glasgow courtprocedures because the contractdetail did not reflect exactly customand practice. The Association ofChief Police Officers in Scotland hasalso commenced a review of thearrest warrant system with a view tosimplification and avoiding prisonersbeing transferred between courts toanswer different charges.

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28. According to performance returns,when Reliance first commencedproviding prisoner escort and courtcustody services around 78% ofprisoners were delivered to court ontime. During May and June 2004,however, this improved to 91% and93% respectively. The latest figures,for July 2004, indicate that 98% ofprisoners were delivered to court on time.

Conclusions and

recommendations

Contract objectives

29. The SPS set clear objectivesfor the project, based on perceiveddifficulties with the existing systemand consistent with achievingvalue for money but it is too earlyto say whether these objectiveshave been achieved. It is thereforeimportant that SPS’s post-implementation review considersthe extent to which the originalaims of the project have beenachieved, and in particular thesuccess of the new arrangementsin releasing police and prison officersto undertake their core duties.

30. Key to the success of theproject is that performancestandards should be demandingand achievable and that Relianceshould meet them. The lack ofrelevant and reliable historical datameans that the performancestandards and Reliance’s actualperformance cannot be assessedagainst previous arrangementswhen the services were undertakenby police and prison officers.

Preparing the contract

31. The SPS’s specification andaward of the contract to Reliancewas handled well. The procurementprocess was well-controlled and there were good risk managementprocesses in place. The SPSundertook the tendering processin accordance with EC and its own

procurement regulations, and itestablished clear criteria forevaluating tenders. While therewas scope to improve the level ofindicative activity data included inthe invitation to tender, the SPSand partner agencies havesubsequently provided Reliancewith activity data and discussedproposed staffing numbers foreach phase of contractimplementation. It is importantthat, to ensure a seamless transferof duties, similar exchanges takeplace in the remaining courtswhere the contract is still to berolled-out.

Managing the contract

32. The SPS discussed withReliance the resources required todeliver prisoner escort and courtcustody services during the run-upto Reliance starting operations. It has also taken steps to ensurethat Reliance can deliver the servicesrequired prior to the furtherimplementation of the contract.However the SPS should finaliseas soon as possible its high-levelcontingency plans to ensurecontinuity of service should there be a default in the contract.There is also a need to finalisethose service level agreementsdocumenting the relationshipbetween the SPS and otheragency partners which are stilloutstanding.

33. A key strength of the newarrangements is that Reliance isrequired to report regularly on arange of performance informationto the SPS. The performancemeasures are clearly defined in the contract and are used to levyfinancial penalties on the contractorwhen it is established that it is atfault resulting, for example, in aprisoner being released in error. 12 out of the 23 prisoners releasedin error since April 2004 in the

Glasgow area have been attributedto Reliance. In accordance withthe agreed protocol, it is importantthat the SPS and partner agenciesidentify clearly the reasons for theother incidents of releases in errorin order to prevent recurrence.

34. Despite the releases in errorfor which it was responsible, thereare signs that the performance ofReliance is improving. The appointedauditors will continue to reviewhow SPS monitor and report onthe performance of Reliance.

Role of the Scottish Prison Service

1.1 The Scottish Prison Service (SPS)is an executive agency of the ScottishExecutive Justice Department. The Scottish Ministers have overallresponsibility for the SPS anddetermine the strategic, policy andfinancial framework within which itoperates. Scottish Ministers also setthe public expenditure provision forthe SPS and the key targets for thedelivery of objectives. The chiefexecutive of the SPS is responsibleand accountable for operational andcontractual matters involving theagency and is directly answerable to Scottish Ministers.

1.2 The SPS operates under thePrisons (Scotland) Act 1989 and thePrisons and Young OffendersInstitutions (Scotland) Rules 1994and is obliged to accommodate allprisoners sent by the courts,whether on remand or conviction. InScotland there are currently 15 prisonestablishments, including HMPKilmarnock which is privately managedby Kilmarnock Prison Services Ltdunder contract to the SPS.

1.3 The aims of the SPS are to:

• keep in custody those committedby the courts

• maintain good order in each prison

• care for prisoners with humanity

• provide prisoners with a range of opportunities to exercisepersonal responsibility and toprepare for release.

1.4 The cost of the SPS in 2003/04totalled £259 million. The averagecost per prisoner place was £33,244compared to a target of £33,800.

Prisoner escort contract

1.5 In November 2003 the SPS,representing Scottish Ministers, andReliance Secure Task Management LtdReliance signed a contract worth£126 million over seven years for theprovision of prisoner escort and courtcustody services. The contract coversthe transport of prisoners between,for example, prisons and police stationsto court, and the safe custody ofprisoners while at court. In 2003/04,

there were some 140,000 prisonerescorts throughout Scotland. The mainterms of the contract are shown atAppendix 1.

1.6 Although the SPS is the ‘contractingauthority’ on behalf of the ScottishMinisters and the ‘lead’ authority forother partner bodies, the contractalso includes services provided to:

• The Scottish Court Service whichadministers and manages theSupreme, High and Sheriff Courtpremises throughout Scotland.

• District courts managed by local authorities.

• All eight Scottish police forceswith custody unit premisesthroughout Scotland.

1.7 The contract is based on a phasedprogramme of implementation, withthe first phase of the contract coveringescorts to and from courts in Glasgowand the surrounding area beginningon 5 April 2004. A further four stagesare planned, leading to fullimplementation across the whole of Scotland on 11 October 2004.

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Part 1. Introduction

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1.8 From the start of the first phasein April 2004 the new service hasbeen the subject of significant mediacoverage, particularly with regard to anumber of prisoners being releasedin error and a high profile prisonerescape. As a result of some of theproblems experienced in the earlystages of the contract, further roll-outis on a revised timetable and subjectto an assessment of the company’sreadiness to provide the service.Phase 2(a) of the contract, coveringDumfries & Galloway, commencedon 22 July 2004.

Scope of the audit

1.9 In light of the concernsexpressed about the performance ofReliance, in May 2004 the Ministerfor Justice requested that I bringforward audit work relating to theprocurement of the contract. I agreedto do so and asked Audit Scotland

1to

review four key issues:

• Whether the SPS set clearobjectives for the contractconsistent with achieving valuefor money and whether itachieved these objectives?

• Whether the SPS properlyspecified and awarded thecontract?

• Whether the SPS establishedrobust and clear arrangements formanaging the contract as soon asthe contract period began, and formonitoring the contractor’sperformance?

• How well the SPS is implementingand monitoring the contract?

1 Audit Scotland is the appointed auditor of the Scottish Prison Service under Section 21(4) of the Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000. The Auditor General for Scotland appointed Audit Scotland to undertake the review under Section 23(8) of the 2000 Act. The auditors reported the results of their examination to the AGS under Section 23(9) of the 2000 Act.

2.1 The SPS issued the invitation totender for the contract in September2002, with tender evaluation betweenDecember 2002 and April 2003.Negotiations with the preferredbidder, Reliance Secure TaskManagement Ltd, took place betweenMay and October 2003 resulting inthe signing of the contract inNovember 2003. The audit reviewconsidered the extent to which:

• clear objectives for the contractwere established, consistent withpromoting and achieving value for money

• the contract was adequatelyscoped to reflect those objectivesand provide tenders with clear information to enable highquality bids

• a robust strategic brief for theprocurement process was drawn up

• the competition was well planned

• the contractor selection processwas conducted fairly and inaccordance with good practice

• the award of the contract wasconducted fairly and in accordancewith good practice.

Strategic aims and objectives

Clear objectives were set for

the project, based on perceived

deficiencies with the existing system

2.2 Under the previous system, therespective police force largelyundertook the work of managingprisoners within court custody suites.The SPS was responsible forescorting convicted prisoners orthose appealing against conviction orsentence. The police assisted in thiswork under various local arrangementsaround Scotland. The police werealso responsible for escortingprisoners on remand to court.

2.3 There was widespread acceptancewithin the criminal justice system inScotland that the existing systeminvolved a significant duplication ofresources with little coordinationbetween the organisations involved.There was a perceived failure to coordinate services between thepolice, prisons, courts and individuallocations to and from which prisoners

were being escorted. As a result,vehicles could pass each other en route to their respectivedestinations although they had sparecapacity and were serving the samecourt. A review began in 2001,involving the eight Scottish policeforces, the SPS, the Scottish CourtService, district courts and the CrownOffice and Procurator Fiscal Service.It was intended to provide eachagency with an opportunity toexamine their working practices andinter-dependencies.

2.4 The multi-agency review teamdeveloped a series of options forconsideration, ranging from thestatus quo to contracting out thework to private sector providers. On the basis of the review team’sfindings, in January 2002 the SPSand its partner agencies decided tocontract-out prisoner escort and courtcustody services. Having obtainedMinisters’ approval, the SPS thenproceeded with the necessarypreparations and procurement of therestructured service.

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Part 2. Preparing the contract

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2.5 The overall aim of project was to‘free up police and prison officers, to secure better value for moneythrough a phased implementation ofa contracted out prisoner escort andcourt custody service throughoutScotland’. The reasons for contractingout prisoner escort and court escortservices included:

• It represented an opportunity torealise and maximise effectiveuse of resources throughout thewhole area of prisoner escortingand court custody requirements.

• The existing service provision didnot provide best value for money,in that police officers and prisonofficers were used to undertakeduties that did not require their fullrange of legislative powers or skills.

• It removed the duplication thatexisted within the current provision.

• It enabled the return of themaximum number of policeofficers to core duties within their communities, and SPSofficers to core duties within their establishments.

• It provided uniformity of servicedelivery throughout Scotland.

• It provided best value and madeuse of best practice within theprisoner escort service sector.

The potential cost of the contract

was compared to the costs

currently being incurred

2.6 The SPS prepared a ‘public sector comparator’ to compare thecosts of the existing method ofservice provision to that bid by thetenders. This was based on detailedcost calculations for activity levels inboth 2001 and 2002 for the SPS andpolice. The cost data andassumptions used in the publicsector comparator were checked byconsultants. The SPS estimated that,based on a comparison of the ‘net present value’ of the charges

proposed by Reliance with anestimate of the cost of currentservice provision, the service providedby Reliance would cost £20 millionless over a period of seven years.

Proper consideration was given to

the most appropriate duration for

the contract

2.7 Prior to the invitation to tender,the SPS’s consultants evaluatedvarious contract lives (for example,three, five, seven and ten years) basedon their knowledge of the market.The analysis covered the key costelements of staffing, vehicles, ICTinvestment and other costs, andassessed the risks attached to eachof these over time. The consultantsconcluded that, overall, a seven-yearcontract generated a larger transferof risk to the contractor but alsoattracted a larger risk premium. A contract term of between five and seven years was expected tohave the advantages of matchingboth the anticipated period forvehicle leases and the estimatedtime horizon for other changes in the criminal justice system.

2.8 Based on the consultant’s findings,the invitation to tender requestedbids on the basis of both a five-yearand a seven-year contract. The SPS’stender evaluation subsequentlyconcluded that a seven-year termproduced the best value for money.

Scoping the contract

The scope of the contract built on

the approach and issues identified

from a similar exercise in England

and Wales

2.9 The scope of the contract wasbased on the approach previouslyadopted in England and Wales, whereprison escort duties have been providedby private contractors for a numberof years. The SPS made efforts to takeon board the lessons learned inEngland and Wales to result in acontract which is more comprehensiveand demanding.

There was a clear specification of

requirements

2.10 The invitation to tender clearlyspecified a range of activities includedwithin the overall heading of prisonerescort and court custody (for example,police station to court escorts, prisonto court, custody at court, transfersbetween courts, return to custody,transfers between prisons, hospitalvisits, etc).

2.11 In accordance with good practice,the invitation to tender and contractis based on outputs and deliverablesrather than a specification of inputs. Theservice provider is required to ensure that staffing levels are appropriate forthe full range of duties required. Theinvitation to tender, however, did outlineindicative levels of activity, on a monthlybasis, for each court and custody unitin Scotland. Both documents alsooutlined ‘quality’ requirements in termsof prisoner care, security, maintenanceof good order and general contributionto the justice system.

In general, sufficient and clear

information was provided to

all tenders to enable high

quality bids

2.12 Although the invitation to tenderwas a comprehensive document, all bidders had the opportunity to askquestions throughout the process.Bidders used this opportunity to clarifyambiguous points and to requestfurther information. On a periodicbasis, the SPS issued to all biddersits responses to questions asked.

2.13 One bidder asked about theavailability of a more extensivebreakdown of police escorts activityto identify peaks and troughs.The SPS’s response indicated that‘Mondays and days following publicholidays would be particularly busydays’. It also supplied bidders withactivity data on a daily basis forGlasgow courts for the month ofSeptember 2002. This period covered a public holiday and clearly indicatedthat activity increased on Mondaysand after public holidays (Exhibit 1).

Part 2. Preparing the contract

Source: Scottish Prison Service

Pris

oner

esc

orts

Mon

2 S

ept

Tue

3 Se

pt

Wed

4 S

ept

Thu

5 Se

pt

Fri 6

Sep

t

Mon

9 S

ept

Tue

10 S

ept

Wed

11

Sept

Thu

12 S

ept

Fri 1

3 Se

pt

Mon

16

Sept

Tue

17 S

ept

Wed

18

Sept

Thu

19 S

ept

Fri 2

0 Se

pt

Mon

23

Sept

Tue

24 S

ept

Wed

25

Sept

Thu

26 S

ept

Fri 2

7 Se

pt

Mon

30

Sept

Tue

1 O

ct

Wed

2 O

ct

This exhibit shows that prisoner escort activity is highest on Mondays and after public holidays(Monday 30 September 2002 was a public holiday in Glasgow)

0

50

100

150

200

250

Exhibit 1The number of prisoner escorts at Glasgow courts during September 2002

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Procurement process

A comprehensive Project Initiation

Document was drawn up to

provide a strategic brief for the

procurement process

2.14 The SPS prepared acomprehensive Project InitiationDocument (PID) at the start of theprocess to define:

• what the project was aiming to achieve

• why it was important to achieve it

• who would be involved inmanaging the process and whattheir responsibilities would be

• how and when the project would be progressed and theoutcomes monitored.

2.15 The PID identified key stakeholdersand indicated the responsibilities ofthose charged with ensuring theproject fulfilled the needs andexpectations of all related parties.

Inter-agency project teams

were established to provide

effective control over the

procurement process

2.16 The management of the projectwas clearly defined. The chiefexecutive of the SPS was designated as the project sponsor.The SPS’s director of Strategy andBusiness Performance wasdesignated as the project executiveand headed an inter-agency EscortProject Board with the role ofensuring that the overall strategy ofthe project and timescales werefulfilled. The Escort Project Boardalso comprised other representativesfrom the SPS, the Association ofChief Police Officers in Scotland(ACPOS), the Scottish Court Service,the Crown Office and ProcuratorFiscal Service and the ScottishExecutive Justice Department.

2.17 The SPS also established furtherinter-agency teams which weresupported by consultants:

• An operational team wasresponsible for scoping therestructured service, shaping thetender documentation, resolvingsecurity related matters, developingproposals for the evaluation ofbids and outlining proposals forperformance management.

• A finance team was responsiblefor evaluating the most economiccontract duration and the longterm financial viability of bidders,assessing the financial element of bids and providing an analysis ofthe commercial sector costcomparisons against the cost of the existing provision.

• A legal team developed,negotiated and prepared theconditions of contract.

• An administration team coordinated communications toensure confidentiality, control ofdata systems and scheduling ofbusiness performance dates.

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A clear project plan was in place,

including arrangements for

monitoring progress

2.18 The SPS developed acomprehensive project plan whichhighlighted key tasks at all stages ofthe project timeline, monitoring andreview times and objectives. ThePrince2 methodology, a highlyregarded project management tool,was used to manage the project.

Risks to the achievement of

the project were identified, with

the controls and processes to

mitigate them

2.19 The PID included an OperationalRisk Log which outlined a number ofhigh level risks to the achievement ofthe project, the severity and likelihoodof the event occurring, the impact ofthe event occurring and the proceduresin place to manage the risk. Projectteams were also required to outlinethe risks associated with their aspectof the project. Risks emerging duringthe development of the project werereferred to the Escort Project Board.The SPS also maintained a detailedFailure Log, listing all potential projectfailures, their warning signs andeffects, together with contingencyplans and processes to mitigate therisks of these occurring.

2.20 In some cases, meetings wereheld with tenders to clarify issues orpotential risks. For example, a riskwas identified that Reliance mayoverstretch beyond its capacity todeliver. Reliance subsequentlyprovided further details on theirresources and assurances that it wasnot currently pursuing other contractsin England and Wales and would beconcentrating solely on the Scottishprisoner escort project.

Tender assessment and

contract award

The tendering process was

undertaken in accordance with EC

and SPS procurement regulations

2.21 The value of the prisoner escortcontract exceeded the threshold for a number of EC directives andregulations requiring, for example,advertisement of the contract in theOfficial Journal of the EuropeanCommunities (OJEC). The auditors’review of tendering documentationindicated that the process wasundertaken in accordance withrelevant EC regulations and alsointernal regulations as outlined in the SPS Procurement Manual.

Shortlisting of bidders was based

on clear, pre-determined criteria

2.22 Prior to invitation to tender,interested parties were required tocomplete a pre-qualificationquestionnaire covering financial,economic and technical capacity. Five companies initially expressed an interest in the contract afteradvertisement in OJEC. The EscortProject Board did not shortlist onecompany as it was judged not to bewholly independent of one of theother tenderers. A further companywithdrew from the process for theirown strategic reasons prior tosubmitting a tender. Three companies,therefore, ultimately submitted atender. Given the specialist nature ofthe service being tendered, the SPSconsiders that three biddersrepresented a good competition.

There were clear criteria

for evaluating tenders,

including consideration of

both cost and quality

2.23 The SPS subjected all threetenders received to a technical,financial and legal and commercialassessment. The technical evaluationcovered six categories: service delivery,prisoner care, secure custody, maintaingood order, contribute effectively andmanagement/human resources.Each category included a number of questions which were allocated apre-determined weighting in order toprioritise the responses and to build a total score for each bidder.

Part 2. Preparing the contract 13

2.24 In terms of the financial evaluation,Reliance’s bid was the cheapest and resulted in a contract value of£126 million, some £20 million belowthe ‘public sector comparator’. In somecircumstances, a bid of this magnitudebelow the cost of the ‘public sectorcomparator’ could call into questionthe planned quality of service. TheSPS, however, considered the balancebetween cost and quality as part ofthe tender evaluation process. Itscomparison of charges for similarservices in England and Wales alsoshowed that the prices being offeredwere within an acceptable range.

2.25 Reliance’s proposed staffnumbers were assessed to be theclosest to those currently employedby the SPS and police on prisonerescort and court custody duties.Proposed staff numbers were thesubject of discussion between the SPS and Reliance during thesubsequent post-tender negotiationand pre-contract implementationstages (paragraphs 2.27 and 3.3-3.4).

2.26 The SPS ranked Reliance third interms of the technical evaluation,although it was still assessed to offera level of service that fully met therequirements of the servicesrequested in the business case. A report to the Escort Project Boardconcluded that, although there weresome weaknesses in the Relianceproposal, it was basically sound andcapable of correction without toomuch difficulty. Taking all elements ofthe tender evaluation together, theSPS assessed that Reliance’s bidrepresented the best value formoney overall.

Extensive post-tender

negotiations took place between

the SPS and Reliance prior to

finalisation of the contract

2.27 Immediately after thesubmission of tenders, the SPScommunicated with all bidders toclarify issues arising from review ofthe submissions. Once Reliance wasselected as the preferred bidder, acomprehensive negotiation processwas entered into prior to formalisationand finalisation of the contract. Thesediscussions took place between Mayand October 2003 and included awide range of issues concerningimplementation plans.

• the SPS established adequateprocedures for monitoring boththe cost and quality of theservices delivered

• the SPS implemented in practicemonitoring procedures in the earlymonths of operation.

Implementation controls

Detailed discussions took place

with Reliance prior to the start

of phase 1

3.3 The SPS maintained acomprehensive file history of thediscussions and work that took placein the lead up to the commencementof the contract. Face-to-facediscussions took place between SPS and Reliance personnel andoperational team meetings were held to discuss the acceptability ofproposals, previous experience andissues arising. These discussionscovered process and models, andincluded challenges to the robustnessof Reliance’s proposals.

3.4 In common with output-basedcontracts, questions were askedabout the level of proposed

resources and how these would beapplied, but the Escort Project Boarddid not make directions about thelevel of resources which should beapplied. Each tenderer was requiredto submit indicative staffing numbersand an explanation of the reasoningin determining these, so the SPScould make a judgement on thereasonableness of each tenderer’sproposals. As outlined at paragraph2.25, Reliance’s proposed staffnumbers were closest to thosepresently employed by the SPS andpolice on prisoner escort and courtcustody duties.

3.5 As a result of the teethingproblems experienced in the earlydays of phase 1 of the contract, theSPS are now developing a moreformal approach prior to theimplementation of future phases toensure a seamless transfer. Theimplementation of phase 2(a) of thecontract on 22 July coveringDumfries & Galloway was precededby a period of ‘work shadowing’when Reliance staff accompaniedpolice and prison officers for a periodof two and a half weeks. Prior to the start of this phase, the chief

3.1 After signing of the contract inNovember 2003, phase 1 commencedin April 2004 covering courts inGlasgow and the surrounding area.Thereafter, the contract required aphased roll-out leading to fullimplementation on 11 October 2004.As a result of some of the problemsexperienced in the early stages ofthe contract, the timetable for roll-outhas been revised and is now subjectto an assessment of Reliance’sreadiness to provide the service. All partner agencies are now requiredto sign an assurance that further roll-out is appropriate.

3.2 The audit examination coveredthe extent to which:

• the SPS obtained assurances thatadequate arrangements were inplace to enable a smooth andseamless transfer of responsibilityfor service delivery prior to Reliancestarting to provide prisoner escortand court custody services

• the SPS established clearcontingency plans in the event of contractor default or qualitystandards not being achieved

14

Part 3. Managing the contract

Part 3. Managing the contract 15

executive of the SPS, SPS directors,representatives from partneragencies and Reliance signed anassurance that they were satisfiedthat roll-out was appropriate.

Contingency plans

Contingency arrangements in the

event that Reliance withdraws or

is withdrawn from the contract

have yet to be finalised

3.6 The SPS and partner agencieshave still to finalise high-levelcontingency plans to ensurecontinuity of service in the event thatReliance withdraws or is withdrawnfrom the contract. A ‘contingencyplanning cell’, including representationfrom other agency partners, is currentlyconsidering high-level contingencyplans to ensure continuity of servicein the event that Reliance withdrawsor is withdrawn from the contract. Thisgroup intends to cover all majoreventualities and will cover the contractto its conclusion or further continuation.

3.7 There are, however, detailedoperational plans in place to allow the SPS to deal with a range ofemergencies and other events. The SPS is also in the process offinalising service level agreementswith partner agencies setting out their respective responsibilities andtemporary arrangements in the event of:

• loss of prison establishments or loss of access to them

• temporary loss of the contractor’s operating base and/or fleet of vehicles

• prisoners giving concern in relationto mental health or requiring theservices of an interpreter.

3.8 The SPS has now finalised theseservice level agreements withindividual prison establishments, theScottish Courts Service, the CrownOffice and Procurator Fiscal Serviceand four local authorities. It has stillto agree service level agreementswith other local authorities and alleight police forces. A Criminal JusticeInter-Agency Working Group has alsorecently been formed to develop aformal reporting protocol for otherpartners to inform the SPS ofincidents or problems.

Monitoring arrangements

The contract includes a clear

set of performance indicators

against which actual performance

can be measured

3.9 The contract includes acomprehensive set of clearly definedperformance measures, largelybased on the model already tried andtested in England and Wales (seeAppendix 1). Two performancemeasures (incidents of death or suicidein custody and incidents of prisonersunlawfully at large, including releasein error) attract a financial penalty foreach and every incidence of non-compliance when it is establishedthat Reliance is at fault.

2 Other

indicators attract a penalty based ona weighting to reflect the relativeimportance of the indicator and aftera pre-determined performancethreshold has been breached. Theseother performance measures cover:

• Service delivery: late or non-collection of prisoners; late delivery of prisoners; latereturn of prisoners and; use of inappropriate vehicles totransport prisoners.

• Prisoner care: self-harm byprisoners; substantiated complaintsby prisoners; failure to providefood or water to prisoners and;failure to provide a prisoner withmedical services.

• The security of custody: loss ofkeys, failure to follow definedsecurity procedures; failure tocarry out an effective security risk assessment and; failure togather and/or disseminateintelligence received.

• The maintenance of good order:prisoner disorder; failure todischarge responsibilities inrelation to safe custody; assaults;prisoners in possession ofunauthorised articles and; damageto premises.

• The effectiveness of Reliance’scontribution: includingsubstantiated complaints fromofficials; use of non-certificatedstaff; failures in performancereporting; failures to recordtransfers of responsibility; failuresto carry authorising certificates;failure to comply with operatingprocedures and prison rules;failure to respond to prisonercomplaints and; failure to maintainup to date contingency plans.

2 Under the terms of the contract between the SPS and Reliance, the SPS is permitted to publish the contract. However, Reliance has the right to require the SPS to remove any sections of the contract prior to publication if it feels such sections contain operationally or commercially sensitive information. The SPS published the contract in May 2004 minus detailed information on charges and financial penalties payable. In June 2004, the Justice 2 Committee of the Scottish Parliament took evidence from the SPS and Reliance on prisoner escort and court custody operations in the Glasgow area. In its written evidence to the Committee, the SPS explained that it had acted in line with the Scottish Executive’s ‘Code of Practice on Access to Scottish Executive Information’ published in July 1999 which exempts information from publication where to do so would cause prejudice or harm to, among other things, law enforcement and legal proceedings, the effective management and operations of the public sector and a third party’s commercial confidences. As required by the code, the SPS considered whether any harm or prejudice arising from disclosure of the complete contract would be outweighed by the public interest in making the information available. It concluded that the public interest did not justify disclosure of information which would be in breach of the Reliance contract and which would cause harm or prejudice of the kinds which exemptions in the Code seek to prevent.

16

The SPS considers that the

performance standards set are

demanding but achievable

although it did not compare them

with historical performance data

3.10 In general, the Escort ProjectBoard approved the thresholds forperformance measures based on itsjudgement on the desired standardof performance. The Escort ProjectBoard considers that the performancestandards set are demanding butachievable. While the performancestandards took into account thoseset for prisoner escort and courtcustody services in England, the SPSdid not compare them with previousperformance in Scotland. This wasbecause, in its view, it was attemptingto set aspirational standards ofperformance rather then replicate theservice of the past, and becauserelevant, reliable historical performancedata was not readily available to it.

Adequate arrangements are in

place for reporting and reviewing

performance under the contract

and for making payments

to Reliance

3.11 The contract clearly specifiesReliance’s responsibilities to reportperformance. Reliance is required to send a standard monthlyperformance monitoring report to the SPS indicating its performanceagainst the performance measuresstipulated in the contract. Thisinformation is then used to applycontract penalties, where applicable.

3.12 The SPS also generates its own daily activity data, and monthlyactivity data from the police, tocompare against the overall activitylevel for setting charges under thecontract. Reliance’s payments under the contract are based on pre-determined activity bandings and are set annually based on theprevious year’s figures. In addition,the SPS receives reports frompartner agencies on Reliance’s

performance which are then used tocompare with the monthly performancedata submitted by the company.

3.13 The SPS also plans to undertakea range of operational audits to reviewReliance’s performance. To datethese operational audits haveidentified some weaknesses inprocedures and some performancefailings, such as a lack of evidence tosupport the fact that prisoners havebeen provided with meals.

3.14 In addition to financial penaltiesfor failure to achieve pre-determinedstandards of performance, the contractalso contains adequate provision tore-charge Reliance in the event offailure to provide the contractedservices which has required otheragencies to undertake the work. Thisoccurred during the first two monthsof the contract when the police hadto provide the company withassistance in the Glasgow courts.

Monitoring in practice

Performance monitoring has been

undertaken in accordance with the

terms of the contract, including

the calculation and application

of financial penalties

3.15 Between the start of phase 1 of the contract in April 2004 and thecompletion of the auditors’ reviewthe SPS has undertaken performancemonitoring, including the calculationand application of financial penalties,in accordance with the terms of the contract.

Difficulties were experienced in

the early stages of the contract

3.16 There were a number of wellpublicised initial difficulties in theimplementation of phase 1 of thecontract resulting in the release ofprisoners in error and incidences oflate delivery of prisoners to court. Ona few occasions, police officers, whoremained available in Glasgow courts

on a shadowing basis to assist in thetransfer of responsibility for serviceprovision, were required to carry outsome of the tasks that Reliance werecontracted to perform because it wasnot able to deploy its staff as flexiblyas it had originally planned. Reliancewas, however, not required to paythe costs of these police officersbecause it was always intended thatthe police would provide actualassistance if that proved necessaryduring shadowing.

3.17 The SPS and other partneragencies have worked with Relianceto resolve and minimise the impactof these problems. There has beenfrequent contact with senior managersof Reliance to ensure timely action istaken on issues identified. Reliancealso increased their staffing levels inthe Glasgow courts, at their own cost,to address the problems experienced.These extra costs may reduce thelevel of profit which Reliance expectsto make under the contract. However,subsequent discussions between theSPS and the contractor on lessons tobe learned from the implementationof phase 1 have satisfied the SPSthat there is no significant increasedrisk to the contract from a financialperspective.

52% of releases in error, to date,

have been attributed to Reliance

3.18 At the time of the audit review,23 prisoners had been judged tohave been released in error from the Glasgow courtssystem since Reliance took overescort and court custody duties.Reliance has accepted it wasresponsible for 12 of the 23 releasesin error. The remaining releases inerror were either the responsibility ofthe SPS or partner agencies or, in theopinion of the SPS, were due to acombination of circumstances whichwere outside the reasonable controlof the service provider.

Part 3. Managing the contract 17

3.19 In July 2004, the SPS agreed aprotocol with partner agenciessetting out the process for identifyingresponsibility for reporting andinvestigating incidents and eventsrelating to the contract and theprocess to be followed for identifyingwho is responsible. Where initialinvestigations suggest that anincident is the responsibility of apartner agency or that there hasbeen a failure on behalf of a partneragency as part of an incident, theprotocol requires that the partneragency conducts its own internalinvestigation so that lessons can be learned.

3.20 Releases in error have arisendue to a number of factors, onlysome of which are attributable toReliance. These factors include:

• Poor completion/interpretation ofpersonal escort records. In somecases a prisoner has been releasedif the ‘not to be released’ box inthe document was left blank,even although there were otherindications on the form that theprisoner should not be released.

• Failure to record all warrants on the police national computer system.

• Custom and practice relating tocourt procedures which had notbeen formally recognised.

• Complexities inherent in theScottish criminal justice system.

3.21 A number of steps have alreadybeen taken to improve the situation:

• The SPS has recommended thatReliance introduce a checklist ordesk instructions to outline thesteps which should be taken priorto the release of a prisoner.

• ACPOS has begun a review ofthe warrant system includingconsideration of the process ofgranting and executing warrants,the volume of warrants issued,the variety of processes that cangenerate warrants, and situationswhere warrants are not passedon by the Crown Office andProcurator Fiscal Service. Thereview will include considerationof options to simplify the systemto avoid prisoners beingtransferred between courts fordifferent warrants.

• Glasgow court procedures areunder review as the newarrangements have highlightedthat custom and practice has notbeen fully considered in thecontract detail.

• The implementation of phase 2 ofthe contract was preceded by aperiod of ‘work shadowing’ whenReliance staff accompanied policeand prison officers in theDumfries & Galloway area.

Performance on the timely

delivery of prisoners to courts has

been improving

3.22 At the start of the contractaround 78% of prisoners weredelivered to court on time. DuringMay and June 2004, however, thisimproved to 91% and 93%respectively. The latest figures, forJuly 2004, indicate that 98% ofprisoners were delivered to court on time. Due to the absence ofcomprehensive historical data,Reliance’s performance cannot becompared to that achieved under the previous system. According toanalysis carried out by HM ChiefInspector of Prisons for England and Wales

3however, Reliance’s

current performance appears tocompare well to the situation inEngland and Wales.

A post-implementation review is

planned

3.23 In accordance with goodpractice, the SPS intend to undertakea post-implementation review of theproject to ensure that lessons arelearned for any similar projects in thefuture. The post-implementationreview is to be planned and executedafter completion of the phasedimplementation of the contract. InJanuary 2004, after signing of thecontract, the Escort Project Boardand project teams also completed‘lessons learned’ reports which wereshared with partner agencies.

3 HM Inspector of Prisons in England and Wales ‘Treatment and Conditions for Unsentenced Prisoners’ December 2000. This report identified that 76% of prisoners arrived on time at Magistrates Courts and 80% at Crown Courts.

18

Schedule 1: Service specification

This schedule provides informationon the services to be provided andhow prisoner escort and courtcustody operations are to beconducted. It includes Reliance’sresponsibilities for the securecustody and well-being of thosepersons transferred to its care,requirements for the recruitment and training of Reliance staff, and the management of court facilities. It defines Reliance’s core court escortand custody tasks (most forms ofprisoner escort and court custody) andits non-core services (mainly ad hocprisoner escort duties, for examplefuneral escorts). It also sets out therights of prisoners, for example theright of access to toilet and sanitationfacilities, the availability of drinkingwater, and the management ofprisoner healthcare.

Schedule 2: Performance

management

This schedule details the basis onwhich Reliance is to monitor andreport its performance against thecontract to the SPS and the methodby which financial penalties in theevent of non-compliance are to be calculated.

Reliance is to monitor and report its performance against a series of33 performance measures shown onpages 20 and 21. In the case of twoperformance measures, incident ofdeath or suicide in custody and incidentof a prisoner unlawfully at largeincluding release of a prisoner in error,a direct financial penalty is payableupon each and every incident. For allother performance measures a targetstandard and a minimum thresholdstandard is set. If Reliance’sperformance in any month breachesthe target standard, further financialpenalties are payable for each incidentof failure thereafter until the minimumthreshold standard is reached.

The value of the financial penalty per incident is calculated by firstapportioning a fixed percentage ofthe total monthly contract chargeacross each performance measureaccording to their relative weightings.The fixed percentage of the totalmonthly contract charge representsthe maximum financial penalty whichmay be payable for poor serviceprovision. The financial penalty perincident for each performancemeasure is then calculated bydividing the amount at risk for eachperformance measure by the differencebetween the target standard numberof incidents and the minimum thresholdstandard number of incidents.

4

The SPS and Reliance regard thefixed percentage of the total monthlycontract charge, the target standardand the minimum threshold standardas commercially sensitive information.See the footnote to paragraph 3.9 onpage 15 for further details.

Appendix 1. Contract main termsThe contract between the SPS and Reliance is divided into six schedules.

4 In other words, for illustrative purposes only, if the total monthly contract charge is £150,000 and the fixed percentage is 8% then the total amount at risk is£12,000. If a performance measure has a weighting of 9, then the amount at risk for that performance measure is 9/102 (the sum of all weightings) x £12,000 = £1,058.82. If the target standard for that performance measure is 4 incidents and the minimum threshold standard is 7 incidents, the financialpenalty for each incident above the target standard is £1,058.82/(7-4) = £352.94.

Appendix 1. Contract main terms 19

Schedule 3: Contract conditions

This schedule provides details on the application of the terms of thecontract. It includes definitions andinterpretation of the contract terms,details the period of the contract(seven years but with scope for theSPS to request an extension for afurther three years) and arrangementsfor agreeing variation of contractcharges, making payments and theresolution of disputes. It also placescertain obligations on Reliance regardingthe employment of staff, the provisionof equipment and transport, securityarrangements, access to and ownershipof records and the observance ofother legal requirements such ashealth and safety regulations and theOfficial Secrets Acts 1911 to 1989.The schedule also contains provisionsto enable the SPS to terminate the contract.

Schedule 4: Charges

This schedule sets out arrangementsfor the SPS to pay Reliance on amonthly basis for services provided.Charges are made payable in respectof core and non-core services basedon a baseline volume of prisonermovements. The actual charge payableuses a banding system dependenton the percentage of actual prisonermovements above or below thebaseline figure. These charges are tobe updated annually, taking into accountthe Retail Price Index, earningsindices and fuel cost indices. Volumebands are also to be reviewed annuallybetween the SPS and Reliance usingthe actual volume of prisonermovements in the previous year asthe new baseline figure. Separatefixed payments are payable duringeach month that Reliance rolls-out itsoperations to a new area (ie, duringthe implementation phase).

The SPS and Reliance consider thatthe charges payable under eachvolume band, the baseline number ofprisoner movements, the detailedmethod by which charges are to beupdated annually, and the fixedimplementation charges are allcommercially sensitive information.

Schedule 5: Premises

This schedule details all the policecustody units, courts, prisons, youngoffender institutions, hospitals andother locations where the service isto be provided. Over 250 premisesare listed.

Schedule 6: Implementation

schedule

This schedule details the basis bywhich Reliance is to take overresponsibility for prisoner escort and court custody services. It alsoprovides for the SPS to receiveliquidated damages in the event that Reliance does not assumeresponsibility for service delivery inaccordance with the implementationprogramme. The implementationprogramme is to take place over five phases (see table overleaf).

20

Contract element Performance measure Weighting

Service delivery Incident of late or non-collection of a prisoner from any premise 3

Incident of late delivery of a prisoner to any premise 10

Incident of late return of a prisoner from any premise 9

Incident of use of a vehicle which the SPS deems inappropriate 1

Prisoner care Incident of death or suicide in custody Money amount

Incident of self-harm by a prisoner 3

Incident of substantiated complaint by a prisoner 2

Incident of failure to provide food or water to a prisoner 1

Incident of failure to provide a prisoner with medical services oraccess to a medical officer

2

Secure custody Incident of a prisoner unlawfully at large including release of a prisoner in error

Money amount

Incident of loss of key or key/lock compromise 5

Incident of failure to follow defined security procedures 2

Incident of failure to carry out an effective Security Risk Assessment 2

Incident of failure to gather and or disseminate intelligence received 2

Maintain good order Incident of concerted prisoner disorder 6

Incident of failure to discharge responsibilities in relation to the safecustody of prisoners

3

Incident of assault against Reliance staff or others (serious) 6

Incident of assault against Reliance staff or others (minor) 2

Incident of assault against a prisoner (serious) 6

Incident of assault against a prisoner (minor) 2

Incident of a prisoner found in possession of an unauthorised article 2

Incident of damage to any premises 1

Appendix 1. Contract main terms 21

Contract element Performance measure Weighting

Contributeeffectively

Incident of an official complaint substantiated by the SPS2

Incident of non-certificated staff undertaking prisoner custody officer duties 7

Incident of inaccurate, incorrect, late or failure to report anyperformance measure to the SPS 10

Incident of Reliance failure to ensure that a prisoner custody officer iscleared by Disclosure Scotland and the SPS 4

Incident of a member of Reliance’s staff found to be in breach of duty 3

Incident of failure to ensure accurate recording of transfer of responsibilities 1

Incident of a prisoner custody officer not carrying authorised certificate 1

Incident of failure to comply with operating procedures (includingH&S, fire, hygiene etc) 1

Incident of failure to comply with any prison rules 1

Incident of failure to respond to a prisoner complaint within theprescribed timescales 1

Incident of failure to maintain up-to-date contingency plans 1

Phase Area Specified

start date

1 All core escorts within Glasgow & district 5 April 2004

2 All core escorts within West Scotland 24 May 2004

3 Core escorts within East Scotland plus all escorts between relevantpremises in Glasgow & district and West Scotland to and from allpremises in East Scotland

12 July 2004

4 All non-core escorts and police force transfers within Glasgow &district and West Scotland 23 August 2004

5 All core and non-core escorts within North Scotland 11 October 2004

Audit Scotland110 George StreetEdinburgh EH2 4LH

Telephone0131 477 1234Fax0131 477 4567

www.audit-scotland.gov.uk ISBN 1 904651 52 6 AGS/2004/10

Scottish Prison Service Contract for the provision of prisoner escort and court custody services