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Page 1: Searchable encryption allows a
Page 2: Searchable encryption allows a

Searchable encryption allows auser to send her encrypteddatabase to a server while stillbeing able to perform securesearches over it.

Page 3: Searchable encryption allows a

Efficient searchable encryptionschemes leak the search pattern(which can be used to compute thefrequency of each query token) andthe access pattern (which revealshow many documents match thequery).

Page 4: Searchable encryption allows a

We propose a new attack (SAP)that uses both search and accesspattern leakage, as well asauxiliary information (which isnot necessarily ground-truthinformation).

Page 5: Searchable encryption allows a

To derive the attack, we build amathematical model of theresponse volume and frequencyof each query, based on theauxiliary information.

Page 6: Searchable encryption allows a

The attack finds the maximumlikelihood matching of keywordsto query tokens given theprevious mathematical model. Ituses the Hungarian Algorithm tofind the optimal matching.

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CLRZ: Chen et al. “Differentially private access patterns for searchable symmetric encryption”. INFOCOM’18PPYY: Patel et al. “Mitigating leakage in secure cloud-hosted data structures”. CCS’19SEAL: Demertzis et al. “SEAL: Attack mitigation for encrypted databases via adjustable leakage”. USENIX’20

SAP is easy to adapt againstdifferent volume-hiding defenses(padding) by just taking thedefense into account in themathematical model.

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We evaluate SAP using realdatasets (Enron and Lucene) anduse query frequencies grabbedfrom Google Trends. We give theadversary imperfect auxiliaryinformation to run the attack.

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freq: Liu et al. “Search pattern leakage in searchable encryption: Attacks and new construction”. Information Sciences, 2014.graphm: Pouliot and Wright. “The shadow nemesis: Inference attacks on efficiently deployable, efficiently searchable encryption”. CCS’16

By combining both volume andfrequency information, SAPachieves high query recovery(left).SAP outperforms current state-of-the-art attacks (right).

Page 10: Searchable encryption allows a

By adapting SAP against previousdefenses, we are able topractically bypass two of them(CLRZ and PPYY) and we stillachieve non-trivial recovery ratesfor the third one (SEAL).

Page 11: Searchable encryption allows a

Our results show the importanceof hiding search patterns and/orfrequency leakage. Recent worksthat are moving in this directionseem promising.