Searching for Peace in Afghanistan:Collaborative Possibilities for

Youth in Peacebuilding

Women in Security, Conflict Management and PeaceFoundation for Universal Responsibility

of His Holiness the Dalai Lama

Searching for Peace in Afghanistan:Collaborative Possibilitiesfor Youth in Peacebuilding

A Report

April 27, 2008New Delhi, India

Navanita SinhaSeema Kakran

Women in Security,Conflict Management and Peace

Foundation for Universal Responsibilityof His Holiness the Dalai Lama

New Delhi

2

Copyright ©WISCOMPFoundation for Universal ResponsibilityOf His Holiness the Dalai Lama, New Delhi, India, 2008.All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, storedin a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means,mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the priorwritten permission of the publisher.

Published byWISCOMPFoundation for Universal ResponsibilityCore 4A, UGF, India Habitat CentreLodhi Road, New Delhi 110 003, India

This initiative was made possible by a grantfrom the Government of Finland.

Cover Photograph Credits

Top (left to right)

1. “Kabul Kids” by Mark Knobil

2. “They can’t see me here” by Gianluca Di Santo,White Tara Productions

3. “Wounded children from Kabul”, available at<http://www.afghan-web.com/gallery/kabulwounded.jpg

Bottom (left to right)

1. “Little girls laughing”, available at<http://www.afghan-web.com/gallery/laughinggirls.jpg

2. “Trio” by Gianluca Di Santo, White Tara Productions

3. Massoud Hossaini, AFP Getty Images<http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2008/06/daily_life_in_afghanistan.html>

3

Contents

Acknowledgements .........................................................................5

List of Abbreviations ....................................................................... 6

Preface ..............................................................................................7

Background Note ............................................................................. 9

Proceedings ....................................................................................15

Discussion ......................................................................................47

Participants’ Feedback ...................................................................56

Annexures

I. Political Map of Afghanistan...................................................59

II. Map of Afghanistan-Pakistan Border ......................................60

III. Chronology of Major Events (1987-2006) ..............................61

IV. Excerpts from the Bonn Agreement .......................................63

V. Excerpts from the Afghanistan Compact ...............................71

VI. List of Youth Organizations in Afghanistan ...........................77

Resource Persons’ Profiles .............................................................82

Participants’ Profile .......................................................................85

Glimpses.........................................................................................93

5

Acknowledgements

WISCOMP acknowledges with deep gratitude the support received

from the Government of Finland and the Ford Foundation. We are

grateful to Mr. Rajiv Mehrotra and the Foundation for Universal

Responsibility of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for their sustained

support and encouragement; Dr. Meenakshi Gopinath for her

inspirational leadership, guidance and valuable inputs; Dr. Sumona

DasGupta for patiently guiding us through the writing process.

We also acknowledge the perseverance and dedication of Ms. Heela

Jilani in coordinating this roundtable discussion. Thanks also to

the WISCOMP Team of Ms. Manjrika Sewak, Ms. Priyanka Singh,

Mr. Harish Chandra Bhatt and Mr. Devender Kumar for their

support.

6

Abbreviations

ANBP Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme

AYCA Afghanistan Youth Coordination Agency

ANDS Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy

DDR Demilitarization Demobilization &Reintegration Program

ICRC International Committee for Red Cross

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSP National Solidarity Program

PRTs Provincial Reconstruction Teams

SSR Security Sector Reforms

9

Background Note

Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace (WISCOMP),an initiative of the Foundation for Universal Responsibility, is aSouth Asian research and training initiative which seeks toempower new voices and build synergy between the academia,the voluntary sector and policy makers. It positions its work at theinterface of gender with Security Studies, Conflict Transformationand Peacebuilding and uses critical and human security approachesto interrogate the parameters of the realist paradigm of InternationalRelations, by placing people and their concerns at the centre of thesecurity discourse. WISCOMP recognizes the importance oftransforming conflictual relationships in order to build sustainablepeace and consequently, dialogue projects lie at the heart of itspeacebuilding approach.

WISCOMP through its various roundtables and symposia, seeks toprovide a context where senior and mid career professionals alongwith younger entrants to the field can interact and dialogue on arange of non-violent, transformative responses to the endemicethnic, communitarian and political conflicts particularly in theSouth Asian context. The expectation is that various sections ofcivil society, recognizing that peacebuilding is too important a taskto be left to governments alone, will begin to fashion their owninterventions in this area. This would, in turn, generate a series ofimpulses which if sustained, may well pave the way for what isnow being accepted as a ‘public peace process.’ Some questionsthat foreground its engagements are:

• What kinds of values, relationships, capacities, roles andinstitutions need to be developed and nurtured in order toachieve sustainable peace and security?

• Which actors, if brought together have the ability because oftheir location and skills/expertise in a given setting to initiateand sustain constructive change processes?

South Asia has been the geographical area of focus for WISCOMP.Furthering its engagement with the region, the roundtable Searchingfor Peace in Afghanistan: Collaborative Possibilities for Youth inPeacebuilding was conceptualized as an important first step for

10

WISCOMP, to comprehend the complex ground realities incontemporary Afghanistan and the multiple actors engaged in whatis now characterized broadly as “the peacebuilding” processes.The purpose of the roundtable was to enable participants to identifythe current peacebuilding issues and the role of civil societyinitiatives, particularly initiatives by the youth in building peace.By bringing together diplomats, young Afghan and Indian studentsand members of international organizations and foundations whohave worked in Afghanistan, the roundtable was also expected toprovide a platform to share the lessons learnt from successful orthwarted peacebuilding processes in the country.

Afghanistan has been the site of protracted, violent conflict for overthirty years. Its socio economic fabric has been virtually destroyedby the long years of internecine violence. Post 9/11, it was the BonnAgreement1 which laid out the political blueprint for thereconstruction of Afghanistan. Signed in Germany in December2001, it brought together different Afghan factions to set out aschematic roadmap and timetable for establishing peace andsecurity, reconstructing the country, reestablishing key institutions,and protecting human rights. It also reiterated the need forinternational assistance in the reconstruction of the country.2

A defining moment in the reconstruction process was the formationof the National Assembly and Provincial Councils after electionsin 2005. The parliamentary election highlighted the significantstrides made by Afghanistan. A UN Report noted that “[c]ivil societyand the media participated actively at every step of the process,and there was a marked improvement in how governmentinstitutions managed the elections, particularly the military andthe police.”3

Despite these significant strides, there remain multiple challengesthat confront the people of Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Compact

1 See Annexure IV2 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The Afghanistan

Compact, 2006. Accessed on April 2, 2008.<http://www.ands.gov.af/admin/ands/ands_docs/upload/UploadFolder/The%20Afghnistan%20Compact%20-%20Final%20English.pdf>

3 United Nations, ‘Afghanistan Beyond the Bonn Agreement’, 2005, p 18.Accessed on April 10, 2008. <www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/pub/year_review05/PDFs/other_peace_operations.pdf>

11

of January 20064 recognizes that “security remains a fundamentalprerequisite for achieving stability and development” and that itcannot be “provided by military means alone but requires goodgovernance, justice and rule of law, reinforced by reconstructionand development.” It further highlights that “strong internationalengagement will continue to be required to address remainingchallenges.”5

In a recent speech at Washington DC, a US State Department officialspoke of 26 NATO allies and 14 partners contributing forces inAfghanistan to control violence so that reconstruction work canprogress.6 In addition to these forces, numerous internationalorganizations, international NGOs and humanitarian agencies areworking in the country. The focus of this reconstruction work is onre-building infrastructure such as roads, schools and hospitals aswell as capacity building of human resources in different sectorsincluding government institutions and civil society.

The building and nurturing of institutions that can provide goodgovernance, justice and rule of law has emerged as an importantpoint of engagement. As endorsed by the Afghanistan Compact,the emphasis is on strengthening socioeconomic foundations (suchas infrastructure and natural resources, education, health,agriculture and rural development) and political frameworks (suchas civil administration, rule of law, effective justice system). While‘Peacebuilding’ as well as one of its key components, ‘reconstruction’have become rallying points for national as well as internationalactors, multiple challenges have collated.

Several reports on the current situation in Afghanistan have pointedto the problems that emanate from a predominantly top-downpeacebuilding approach. The Oxfam International Research Reporthighlights three lacunae in these processes: one, they are mostlycarried out at the political level; two, they are target limited; andthree, the processes are primarily concerned with peace and

4 See Annexure V5 op.cit. p.36 State’s Volker’s Speech on Afghanistan, NATO—Why Both Matter, Feb 4, 2008.

Accessed on February 9, 2008, < http://turkey.usembassy.gov/statement_020408.html>

12

reconciliation at the national level and do not involve Afghancommunities in building and sustaining peace. They onlymarginally, indirectly, or partially concern the people ofAfghanistan. The capacity of Afghan communities to resolve theirown disputes, and build and sustain peace is largely neglected.

It further states that there have been attempts at a bottom-upapproach to peacebuilding and with sufficient resources andpolitical will, such initiatives have the potential to improve security.Thus an important dimension that is probably underemphasizedin this reconstruction framework is the ‘re’building of trust andhuman relationships across the myriad divisions of conflict.

7

John Paul Lederach, a pioneer of peacebuilding theory, placesrelationships at the centre of peacebuilding processes.He identifies the ‘interdependence gap’ as a major chasm inpeacebuilding practices that contributes to recurring cycles ofviolence in areas of protracted conflicts. Lederach stresses on theneed to work with counterparts and “enemies” across variousfaultlines to build and strengthen relationships.

8 Harold Saunders

who designed the conceptual framework of ‘sustained dialogue’avers that there are certain things that governments can do, andthere are others that citizens can. Recognizing the human dimensionof conflicts, Saunders emphasizes that only human beings cantransform conflictual relationships.9

The centrality of human relationships and the capacity of citizensto transform conflictual relationships open up creative spaces forengagement in peacebuilding processes. It is in this context thatwe seek to explore the possibilities of peacebuilding for the youthin Afghanistan.

Several youth organizations have emerged in Afghanistan over thelast three decades. However, not many have focused on the role ofyouth in the peacebuilding processes. In countries that are emerging

7 John Paul Lederach, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation, Intercourse,PA, Good Books, 2003.

8 John Paul Lederach, ‘Justpeace: The Challenge of the 21st Century’,People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World, Utrecht,The Netherlands: Europe Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999, pp 27-36.

9Harold Saunders, A Public Peace Process, New York, Palgrave, 1999.

13

from violent conflict/war, youth are often seen as a part of theproblem and not as a part of the solution. Lack of viable means ofparticipation in the political processes leads to loss of potentialthat the youth hold, and can sometimes lead to their diversion intoextremists groups. Uprooted, alienated and unemployed youth areseen as ready recruits for groups that have violent agendas.However, once relevant skills, training and motivation are provided,the youth can effectively and constructively engage in theircommunities and build relationships.10

The roundtable Searching for Peace in Afghanistan: CollaborativePossibilities for Youth in Peacebuilding, attempted to highlight thehitherto underemphasized possibilities of engaging the youth inpeacebuilding processes in Afghanistan and explored thepossibilities of initiating and sustaining multi-level dialoguesthrough which the goals of sustainable peace and security couldbe established.

The roundtable sought to:

• Understand the current ground realities in Afghanistan throughthe lens of human security.

• Explore possibilities for collaboration between the youth of Indiaand Afghanistan.

• Evaluate the challenges to the involvement of youth in thepeacebuilding process and explore ways of overcoming thesechallenges.

• Identify ways in which the youth could impact the processesof peacebuilding both within Afghanistan and outside, throughcountries that are providing aid and are engaged in the processesof reconstruction.

An important element of peacebuilding, relates to the ability ofhuman beings and states to take actions that address immediate

10 Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars: Project on Leadershipand Building State Capacity, Youth and Politics in Conflict Contexts, 2007.Accessed on February 25, 2008<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Final%20%20Youth%20and%20Politics.pdf>

14

security needs while focusing on long term goals. It involves aprocess where people explore options for responding to thechallenges of the present, while being guided by the possibilitiesand hopes for the future.11 It is WISCOMP’s hope that insightsgenerated at this Roundtable will illuminate many possibilitiesfor collaboration between youth that will not only invigorate theongoing processes but also create new partnerships forpeacebuilding in Afghanistan.

11 Manjrika Sewak, Multi- Track Diplomacy between India and Pakistan:A Conceptual Framework for Sustainable Security, RCSS Policy Studies 30,Colombo. Manohar, 2005.

15

Proceedings

The roundtable Searching for Peace in Afghanistan: CollaborativePossibilities for Youth in Peacebuilding, was conceptualized as animportant first step for WISCOMP to comprehend the complexground realities in contemporary Afghanistan and the multipleactors engaged in what is characterized broadly as peacebuildingprocesses.

Introducing the work of WISCOMP, Meenakshi Gopinath, HonoraryDirector, elaborated that under the aegis of the Foundation forUniversal Responsibility, WISCOMP was committed to providingthe intellectual, psychological and spiritual space to contribute tothe theory and practice of conflict transformation andpeacebuilding. Reiterating the commitment of WISCOMP, toengender reasoned dialogue, on issues impacting the civic sphere,Gopinath highlighted that the roundtable was an attempt to lookat visions of public peace processes

12, where genuine spaces for

dialogue between governments, academia and civil society groupscould open up the possibilities for meaningful collaborations.It was through such processes that one could mark the movementfrom formalistic, notional democracies to more substantiveparticipatory ones. Pointing to the contemporary conceptions ofdemocracy and justice that underscore the need for sustaining socialrelationships, governed by terms and conditions freely acceptableto people affected by those relationships, Gopinath asserted thatthe search for common ground by acknowledging differences andbuilding on commonalities was by no means a linear progression.It required a sustained focus on developing option generatingcapacities with the ability to imagine people in an inclusive andexpandable web of relationships. This required a fundamental faithin the generative act of engaging in redemptive rather than repetitivehistory making and above all courage and acceptance of the risksinvolved for practitioners of conflict transformation.

She asserted that Afghanistan had been part of the Indianconsciousness for centuries. Stories of the Kabuliwala and like,

12 op.cit.

16

recounting tales of a people of honor, dignity, rare courage, loyaltyand capable of friendship, had been narrated and passed on tochildren for generations. However, the presence of many Afghansin India in the recent past had not translated into deeper interactionand engagement at the social level. Gopinath hoped that insightsgenerated at the roundtable would illuminate possibilities forcollaboration between the youth. It would invigorate the ongoingprocesses and also create new partnerships, a new vocabulary forpeacebuilding, not only for Afghanistan but the South Asian regionas a whole.

Referring to the changing images of Afghanistan – from those ofhumanity and unconquered landscapes, to the present day imagesof violence, devastation, cruelty and desolation, she asserted thatthe complex realities of Afghanistan required that all in the regionacted and worked in concert. She flagged off the discussion byposing three important questions:

• What do the Afghan people owe to themselves?

• What do the countries of our region owe to Afghanistan?

• What can the world at large do to restore to a unique peoplethe legacy of a larger humanity, which really was their heritage?

Recounting the story of Mullah Nasruddin, who was looking forhis lost key; when asked by a passerby why he was looking for thekey outside when he had lost it inside his house, Nasruddinstoically replied, there was more light outside. Gopinath expressedhope that the youth would be pathfinders, lead the way – takingthat leap of faith – maybe a leap in the dark –for the reemergenceof Afghanistan.

Gopinath reiterated that an important element of peacebuildingrelayed the abilities of human beings and states, to take action, ina manner which addressed not only the immediate needs, but alsoenvisioned a future where the structural causes of conflict couldbe redressed. This initiative too reflected a belief that withoutconsistent and unfettered introspection and engagement, thecultures of militarism in our world may overpower and stifle voicesof dialogue and reconciliation. It was therefore important to initiateand sustain conversations that would yield a dialogic and

17

experiential mindfulness of non violent practices and norms. Sheaffirmed that one had to be “open to both synchronicity as well asserendipity with the motivation that would allow for severalunintended unfoldings” and concluded with the hope that a betterfuture awaited Afghanistan and that it would reemerge, markingwhat Toynbee labeled a “roundabout of history.”

18

I

Negotiating Peace: Identifying the Issues

We feel disfavor for all ideals that might lead one to feelat home in this fragile, broken time of transition….We ourselves who are homeless constitute a force that breaksopen ice and other all too thin “realities.”

Friedrich Nietzsche

The purpose of the roundtable was to enable participants to identifythe current challenges and opportunities for peacebuilding inAfghanistan and the role of civil society initiatives, particularlyinitiatives by the youth in this area. Like ‘women’ the term ‘youth’does not signify a monolithic block or an undifferentiated category.Evidently the ability and motivation of all sections of the youthcan not be uniform and their involvement with peacebuildinginitiatives will depend on a multitude of factors significant amongwhich are gender, class, ethnicity, urban-rural location, access toeducation and means of livelihood. The opening session of theroundtable, Perspectives from Afghanistan, sought to chart thepotentialities for peacebuilding for Afghan youth in the countryand share the initiatives for peace that the youth have been involvedin after the fall of the Taliban regime. It also aimed to focus onsome opportunities that could be explored to strengthen tiesbetween youth from India and Afghanistan as a step towardsgenerating collaborative ventures in the area of peacebuilding.

The first presentation by Abdul Ghafoor Liwal, Director, RegionalStudies Centre of Afghanistan explored the importance of thinkingabout peace and peacebuilding in Afghanistan. He began bymapping some of the major achievements made by the country inthe last few years. Significant among these were the strides in thefield of education.

More than 81,000 students completed their high school educationin the year 2007.13 However, Liwal stated that despite this success

13 For recent statistics on school education in Afghanistan See “1386 (2007)School Survey Summary Report” available at <http://www.moe.gov.af/EMIS/School%20Survey%201386%20Report%20v2.3_2.zip>

19

story at the level of elementary and secondary education, a similarsuccess had not been registered at the higher educational level.Only 31,000 of the 81,000 students who had completed high schoolwere able to join college. Referring to the inability of the existinghigher educational institutions to absorb these students, hehighlighted thus some of the problems emanating from such uneveninfrastructural developments at various levels.

He averred that students who were studying in other countrieslike India, did not have to face such problems. Outlining the broaderpossibilities for youth in higher educational institutions abroad,he argued that their relatively advantageous position left them betterequipped to deal with the challenges of reconstruction and workin the area of peacebuilding. He therefore stressed the need for theAfghan students to explore such opportunities. It was importantthat such students gain expertise not only in their specific subjectsbut also from the larger environment of the host country. Referringto certain similarities between Afghanistan and India, especiallydiversity of religion, ethnicity, language, he encouraged the Afghanyouth in India to take back home the culture of work that, he felt,was prevalent in the latter.

Further exalting the need for capacity building and specializedtraining as crucial to the peacebuilding processes, he argued thatit was imperative to translate capacities and specialized knowledge/skills into more concrete programs for action including delivery ofservices.14 The lack of specialized skills and knowledge washighlighted as one of the largest impediments in the reconstructionefforts. It was therefore important for the youth to return toAfghanistan and contribute to the country’s reconstruction throughtheir specializations and expertise in different areas of work.He further averred that meeting in a foreign land as Afghan studentsand not as members of different ethnic groups15 like, Hazara or

14 R Harisalo, J Stenvall, ‘Citizens’ Trust in Government’, EGPA, vol 15, no.3,2002.

15 Article four , Chapter One of the Afghan Constitution states that “The nationof Afghanistan shall be comprised of Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek,Turkman, Baluch, Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash,Gujur, Brahwui and other tribes.” Available at<http://www.president.gov.af/english/constitution.mspx>

20

Pashtun, could help in fostering and strengthening their nationalidentity. Such neutral spaces could be better used to develop theirskills and on returning to Afghanistan, he asserted that they shouldoptimally utilize their learnings by maximizing their contributionsto the reconstruction processes.

While it was important to learn from other countries, and benefitfrom the different approaches available in the region, Liwalcautioned that these approaches can not be transported to theAfghan region without being suitably modified and contextualizedto the specificities of Afghanistan. He pointed out that despite thepresence of many civil society and youth organizations inAfghanistan, there were certain roadblocks – predominant amongthem was the lack of an academic and practical approach towardsbringing the youth together. It was therefore important todistinguish between what was applicable and what was not.

Pointing to the strategic location of Afghanistan, he asserted thatthe challenges of reconstruction in the country were not challengesfor Afghanistan alone, but challenges for the entire region.If Afghanistan remained inflicted by violent conflict and war, theregion as a whole would remain affected. He stressed,“peacebuilding, ending conflict and bringing peace, was theresponsibility of each one of us in the world and not simply ofthose affected directly in Afghanistan”. Liwal asserted theimportance for all in the region as well as outside to act and workin concert.

Abas Baser, Second Secretary, Embassy of Afghanistan in New Delhiin his presentation shared the advances made by Afghanistan since2001, and also highlighted the major challenges like terrorism,corruption and narcotics that plagued the country.

October 2001 ushered in a new chapter in the history of the Afghanpeople. Post 2001, Afghanistan had witnessed remarkable featsin areas of state building, reconstruction and development.The presentation chalked out the efforts being made by theGovernment to strengthen the political and economic structuresand deepen democracy in the country. With active assistance fromthe international community and building on these partnerships,

21

Afghanistan had made commendable efforts towards theachievement and realization of the major goals of the BonnAgreement. A new constitution enshrining the values and ideas ofAfghans, Islam and democracy was adopted and signed by PresidentHamid Karzai in 2004. Presidential and parliamentary electionswere successfully held and Afghans were gradually taking boldsteps towards strengthening democracy.

Coming to terms with its history of various conflicts over the lasttwenty five years, the government was striving hard to rebuild notonly the political and social institutions of the state, but also workingon rebuilding the physical infrastructure and economic foundationof the country. The presentation highlighted that the governmentin Afghanistan was working diligently to strengthen the economyby creating an enabling environment for businesses to grow andfor farmers to produce and market their products. The progressmade was manifest in the steady growth of the national economy.Over the last four and half years, the country had enjoyed a totalGDP growth of 85%, while the rate of inflation was around 10%.Private sector investment was being solicited, as also Foreign DirectInvestment. One of the prime concerns for the government wasmacro economic stability and which was being sought through debtrelief from international creditors through the Paris ClubArrangement.

16

Despite the Taliban uprising, Afghanistan had enjoyed strongeconomic growth and trade with its neighbors. Baser pointed outthat there was tremendous increase in trade in the last few years.Trade with Iran for instance had increased from $ 10 million, a fewyears ago to nearly $500 million; trade with Pakistan had jumpedfrom $30 million a year during the Taliban era to $1.4 billionannually.

Further stressing on the importance of strengthening ties with othercountries, he averred that in continuation of its efforts towards

16 Paris Club Creditors Agree on Substantial Debt Relief for Afghanistan,Press Release, 19 July 2006<http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/services/communiques/afghanistan/downloadFile/PDF/PRAfgha190706.pdf?nocache=1175506474.25>Accessedon June 7, 2008.

22

regional and international economic cooperation, Afghanistanenjoyed the membership of Economic Cooperation Organization,Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation, ShanghaiCooperation Organization-Afghanistan Contact Group, South AsianAssociation for Regional Cooperation and had achieved the statusof Observer at the World Trade Organization.

On the social front, there had been substantial increase in thenumber of children going to school which was over 6 million; thenumber of people who had completed high school and registeredfor college was also escalating. Further the number of universitieshad increased from five in 2004 to twenty in 2008. Despite the lackof basic facilities in many schools across the country, Basercommended the commitment of the Afghan people towardseducation and their thirst for knowledge. Under the AfghanNational Solidarity Program (NSP), reconstruction projects hadbeen started in over 20,000 villages across Afghanistan. The averageper capita income had increased to $ 350 per person, and healthservices covered 80% of the population, resulting in better standardof living.

Significant strides had also been taken towards police and armedforces reforms, to build the capacity of the Afghan state to combatand counter security threats sans foreign support.

17

17 A general outline of the security sector reform agenda for Afghanistan wassketched at the Tokyo donor conference in January 2002. The Geneva donors’conferences (in April and May 2002) resulted in the establishment of amulti-sectoral donor support scheme, in which individual donors wereallocated responsibility for overseeing each of the five pillars of the SecuritySector Reform (SSR): the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration ofEx-combatants (led by Japan); Military Reform (led by the United States);Police Reform (led by Germany); Judicial Reform (led by Italy); andCounter-Narcotics (led by the United Kingdom). See “Security Sector Reformin Afghanistan”, available at:<http://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/afghanistan.pdf >

For Afghan Government’s targets for SSR under various programs on NationalDefense, Internal Security & Law Enforcement, Disbanding Illegal ArmedGroups and De-Mining, see<http://www.president.gov.af/english/np/security.mspx>

For some of the problems associated with the SSR see Crisis Group Report“Reforming Afghanistan’s Police” Asia Report No. 138, Kabul/Brussels,30 August 2007, available at:<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5052>

23

However, there were many challenges, which required sustainedcommitment, attention and resources from different actors. Baserhighlighted international terrorism, narcotics and corruption assome of the major challenges and despite police and armed forcesreforms, “security” remained one of the central concerns for thecountry.

Reiterating the need for sustained international assistance in thereconstruction of Afghanistan, Baser pointed out that incomparison to other countries/ regions like Kosovo, East Timorand Bosnia, the amount of international assistance toAfghanistan had been far less. Furthermore the channeling oflarge amounts of aid through NGOs resulted in duplication,mismanagement and in some cases, corruption on the ground.Referring to the London Conference where a large number ofparticipants had recognized the urgent need for channelingassistance via the Afghan government, Baser asserted the needfor better coordination amongst international partners as wellas the national government in optimally using international aid.He clarified that the Afghan government recognized the problemsof state control of economic activities and was conscious ofdelineating its engagement to policy making, regulating andmonitoring the economic activities rather than providing andmanaging them in entirety.

The thrust of the government’s work was economic development,building strong institutions like bureaucracy, extendingsocial services to the rural areas and capacity building todeepen democracy and good governance in the country. Givenits unique geographical location as the crossroad of differentregions, Baser pointed out that the government was keen toexploit the many untapped and untouched potential suchas mineral resources, agricultural products, tourism, amongothers. He avowed that the government of Afghanistan wascommitted and determined to convert the country’s latentpotential into “active sources for the country’s prosperity as wellas the region”.

The third presentation was made by Jawed Nader, a youth leaderfrom Afghanistan. Anchoring his presentation on a deeper

24

understanding of structural violence,18 Nader laid out some of themajor challenges and opportunities for youth in peacebuilding,both within and outside Afghanistan.

Nader began with the assertion that the role of youth in societaltransformation was an accredited fact. However in conflict areas,the potential of the youth in peacebuilding as well as its opposite– the possibility of driving nations back into warfare – had beenestablished.

19 In Afghanistan, he asserted, given their significant

numbers and energy, the youth could play one of the principalroles in the ongoing processes of reconstruction. 68% of the Afghanpopulation consisted of people under the age of 25, making theyouth the largest section of the Afghan population, outnumberingother groups drawn from linguistic, ethnic or even regionalaffiliations.

20 However, the long drawn conflict-the civil strife, the

Soviet invasion and the Taliban insurgency – had graveconsequences for the youth. The protracted conflict and theinduction of the youth into the war as soldiers, suicide attackers,had in a sense incapacitated the youth, preventing them fromproactively engaging in peacebuilding. Categorized as the lostgeneration in Afghanistan, the youth had for decades suffered not

18 Structural violence, a term which was first used in the 1970s and which hascommonly been ascribed to Johan Galtung, denotes a form of violence whichcorresponds with the systematic ways in which a given social structure orsocial institution kills people slowly by preventing them from meeting theirbasic needs. Institutionalized elitism, ethnocentrism, classism, racism,sexism, nationalism, heterosexism and ageism are just some examples ofstructural violence. Life spans are reduced when people are sociallydominated, politically oppressed, or economically exploited. Structuralviolence and direct violence are highly interdependent. Structural violenceinevitably produces conflict and often direct violence including familyviolence, racial violence, hate crimes, terrorism, genocide, and war. See JohanGaltung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, Journal of Peace Research,vol. 6, no. 3, 1969, pp. 167-191.

19 See H. Urdal, The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges onDomestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000, Social Development Papers: Conflictand Reconstruction Paper, 2004< www-wds.worldbank.org> Accessed on June 10, 2008.

20 UN classifies people in the age group of 15-24 years as youth. Jawed Naderpointed out in his presentation that the definition of youth in Afghanistandoes not conform to international standards. In Afghanistan, people in theage group of 12-18 years are referred to as the Naujawans, while people from18-30 years are referred to as the youth/ jawans.

25

only from the protracted conflict, but concurrently grappled withthe ramifications of conservative social bindings and the lack ofopportunity in educational as well as economic sectors.

Despite certain significant strides in the field of education,especially school education, numerous challenges remained. As aresult of the prevailing insecurity, particularly in the rural areas,many parents were discouraged from sending their children toschools. The curriculum in schools was outdated and even barenecessities like chalks, blackboards and well-trained teachers werelacking. Further, the low salaries acted as deterrent to good teacherswho sought better and productive jobs, with better salaries. Only34-5% of the youth were able to read and write and a mere 0.18%of the Afghan population had access to higher education.

21

Despite revocation of the ban on girls attending schools22, theinsecure environment made the girl child vulnerable to atrocitieslike kidnappings, attacks, forced marriages and rapes. Naderpointed out that UNICEF had declared the Afghan rural area as theworst for a girl child. Women in Afghanistan were born and raisedwith intrinsic discrimination – naming them Khatema, or Yagona,meaning the end or the only one, to stop the birth of other girls –was common practice. Their subordinate status in society wasreflected in the low rate of female literacy, which bordered around14%. Women’s health was also an area of concern. One out ofseven women died during childbirth. Pregnancy was the leadingcause of death among young teenage girls, resulting fromcomplications during childbirth or unsafe abortions. Afghanistanhad the highest rate of maternal mortality and the second highestrate of infant mortality. Barring a few urban centers like Herat,Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and some other cities, there was a completelack of sports and recreational facilities for girls. He remarked that

21 Martin Bell, Child Alert: Afghanistan, UNICEF Report, 2007<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/EGUA-78BLAJ-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf> Accessed on June 8,2008.

22 See Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement inAfghanistan. London, Pluto Press, 2001 pp6-11/159-165 and Nancy HatchDupree. ‘Afghan Women under the Taliban’ in William Maley (ed.),Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. London,Hurst and Company, 2001, pp145-166.

26

women were used as tools of “conflict resolution” in many villages.Sometimes given away to settle village disputes-the rate of self-immolation among the young girls was soaring, especially in thewestern provinces.

Poverty was on the incline with escalating unemployment,especially in the rural areas. Citing a report by the InternationalCommittee for Red Cross (ICRC), Nader stated that 26% of thepeople between 18-25 years were unemployed in Afghanistan.Asserting that the actual rate of unemployment in Afghanistan wasmuch higher, Nader highlighted that young people, stricken bypoverty were forced into labor intensive jobs like carpet weavingor opium production.23 50,000 worked as child laborers or beggarson the streets of the cities in Afghanistan, of which 37,000 werein Kabul alone. One out of four 13-14 year olds in Kabul was astreet kid.

Moreover, the youth were rarely positioned as significant actors inpeacebuilding processes, and mainly seen as possible recruits tovarious terrorist organizations. Poverty and unemploymentpropelled their induction into such activities. 70% of the mobilizedsoldiers in the Demilitarization, Demobilization & ReintegrationProgram (DDR)24 were below 26; 75,000 child soldiers were underthe age of 1825 , and the average age of a suicide bomber was 23years.26 Nader pointed out that one of the major reasons for theinduction of very young children into terrorist organizations wasthe difficulty security forces faced in establishing their identity.

Apart from grave violations like slavery, exploitation, kidnapping,domestic abuse, physical torture, trafficking, forced prostitution,

23 Opium trade accounts for nearly 60% of the Afghan economy, makingAfghanistan its largest producer in the world. See UN Office on Drugs andCrime. ‘Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007’ <www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf >Accessed on May 27, 2008.

24 The process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) ofarmed groups was initiated in 2003 through the Afghanistan’s NewBeginnings Programme (ANBP). This program has mainly focused on formersoldiers of the Afghan National Forces. See Afghanistan’s New BeginningsProgramme<http://www.undpanbp.org/>Accessed on June 4, 2008.

25 Bell, op.cit.26 Ibid.

27

forced marriages, the patriarchal and conservative social structuresperpetuated a certain culture of silence amongst the young,especially girls. Nader argued that these social, cultural mores of apatriarchal and hierarchical society drove the youth to selfcensorship, diffidence and psychological marginalization. Thesocially imposed silence incapacitated the youth from expressingthemselves, even in decisions directly impacting them like career,marriage, etc. This resulted in low political and social engagement,apathy, unproductive/destructive lifestyles and lack of criticalthinking. One of the fundamental challenges then was breakingthis silence and encouraging the youth to participate in the socialand political affairs of the country.

The youth to some extent, had been able to overcome some of thesebarriers in the recent past to play a more active role. This waspalpable in the rise of the number of youth organizations in thecountry, which undertook the task of increasing awareness,promoting volunteerism for peace and development of the countryand exploiting the potential of the youth for reconstruction andpeacebuilding. One of the major initiatives which vitalized theprocess was the organization of the First Afghan Youth Civil SocietyConference in Kabul in the year 2002. It included not only seniorgovernment officials and representatives from the 34 provincesbut also young Afghans from the diaspora settled in countries likeGermany, Canada, Australia etc. This conference laid out theroadmap for youth activism in Afghanistan, which included theproposal for setting up the Afghanistan Youth Coordination Agency(AYCA) that could build networks amongst various youth groups

27.

Following this, regional conferences were organized in Herat andBamian in 2004-05. However the AYCA could not continue, asethnic/regional/linguistic divides impeded the youth from workingtogether under its umbrella.

National projects on the youth were a cross-cutting theme underthe current development framework. The Millennium DevelopmentGoals of Afghanistan (2005), Afghanistan Compact (2006) and

27 In 2003, Afghan Civil Society Foundation carried out a mapping of the youthorganizations in Afghanistan, the first and most comprehensive one of itstime. Of the 148 youth organizations surveyed, a vast majority of themprioritized the education sector. See Annexure VI.

28

Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy (2008) all endorsedthe predominant role of the youth. Another significant projectunderway in Afghanistan was one where eight ministries of thegovernment were working in collaboration with nine UN Agenciesto strengthen the capacity of governments to respond to the needsof the youth in the country, promote non formal education, engageyouth in governance and development and promote voluntarismfor peace and development.

However an unfortunate development, Nader pointed out, was thegradual de-prioritization of youth affairs within the government.While the government had started a Ministry for Youth affairs, inthe present day it was working as a Deputy Ministry under thetutelage of the Ministry of Culture and Information. The governmenthad also developed the National Youth Strategy at the 2002Conference, but lack of adequate resources constrained its efforts.They were now working on a possible Independent Commissionof Youth directly under the President.

Despite some success, the potential of the youth was not beingfully tapped. Nader asserted that there were varied ways in whichthe youth could participate, partake and contribute moreproductively. The foremost task was to bring the youth together inways to cull imaginings beyond regional, provincial, ethnic,linguistic lines and propel their energies towards a secure andvibrant future.

29

II

Building ‘Peace’: Security, Strategy, Sustainability

Whereas strategy is only concerned with the problem ofwinning military victory, grand strategy must take thelonger view – for its problem is the winning of the peace.Such an order of thought is not a matter of “putting the cartbefore the horse,” but of being clear where the horse and thecart are going.

B.H. Liddell Hart

As a follow up to the commitment made after the Bonn Agreement,the international community brought together different Afghanfactions to set out a roadmap and timetable for establishing peaceand security, reconstructing the country, reestablishing keyinstitutions and protecting human rights. Countries such as Indiawhich had long historical relations with Afghanistan wereinstrumental in extending assistance towards reconstruction andrebuilding of infrastructure and human capacity. The secondsession of the roundtable discussion titled Challenges andPossibilities for Peacebuilding in Afghanistan focused on the regionaland the international efforts especially India’s role in thereconstruction of Afghanistan.

Some of the central questions foregrounded in the session were:

• What was India’s role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan?

• What were the challenges of working in Afghanistan?

• What were the opportunities for future peacebuilding processes?

• What could be the role of youth from both countries in terms ofpeacebuilding?

I.P Khosla, Member of the Board of Directors, Indo-AfghanFoundation in his presentation sought an evaluation of thereconstruction processes in Afghanistan through the lens of the“strategic interests” of various international actors like India andUSA in furthering the “interests of Afghans in peace.”

30

Some of the questions that the presentation explored were:

• What were the possibilities of reconciling conflicting interestsof national as well as international actors in Afghanistan?

• What were the possibilities of peace in Afghanistan in thecontext of continuing foreign presence in the country?

Khosla underscored that analysis of the reconstruction processesmust not be limited to an evaluation of “successes” in Afghanistanin the last few years. It was important to measure these successes,by placing them within the larger violence marred socio-politicalcontext. He further cautioned that “facts” and “statistics” beingfiltered by the media from Afghanistan must not be endorsed asneutral indicators. Elucidating these dual and concurrent processesof opportunities and obstacles, Khosla pointed out that on one side,Afghanistan was witnessing tremendous progress in theeducational sector, especially with the proliferation of schools/universities; on the other side, the country was dealing withspiralling violence and escalating levels of narcotics production.It was thus important to assess the reconstruction processes throughthese varied and contradictory developments that were underwayin Afghanistan.

He drew attention to three different responses to elucidate theongoing reconstruction processes in Afghanistan – first, a solelyAfghan solution, second, the international solution and third,a regional solution.

Explicating the first response, Khosla argued that it was highlyimpractical to think in terms of a purely Afghan solution.In the last 25-30 years, the people of Afghanistan had been pushedinto strengthening their ethnic identities contra their nationalidentity. This had turned intra-Afghan relationships into conflictualones, where delineation of identities on ethnic lines had becomefundamental – it was one’s identity as Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara orUzbek that took precedence over the Afghan identity. Given suchinter group dynamics, it was very difficult to bring in the discourseof nation building, especially if one were to understand nationbuilding as precipitating the need to move beyond ethnic orregional identities to a national one.

31

As far as the second response, i.e. the international solution wasconcerned, Khosla argued that it was important to understand thevaried ‘interests’ international actors had in the ‘reconstruction’ ofAfghanistan. He avowed that neither did all these interestscorrespond, nor did all actors necessarily have an interest in ‘peace’.In the present day when the international community was beingled by the USA, Khosla argued, assessing the interests of other actorslike the EU, Germany etc in Afghanistan, if USA were to rescind,would be difficult.

The American intervention in Afghanistan itself was hinged ontwo distinctive and different interests. One was to build upPresident Karzai’s position – his political, military and other powers,while the other was its overarching concern apropos internationalterrorism and the search for Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar.The course taken to embolden these interests were evidentlydifferent and opposed. The United States’ effort to locate Bin Ladenand Omar was taking it in a direction away from that, which wouldbring in more stability/strength to the central government. Khoslaargued that in terms of its real focus, it was evident that locationand elimination of the Al Qaeda was crucial to the success of USA’swar against international terrorism. He thus prodded theparticipants to evaluate and assess the possibilities of establishing‘peace’ in Afghanistan in this context.

Expounding the third response, i.e. the feasibility of harnessing aregional solution, he highlighted that it would require the threeCentral Asian states neighbouring Afghanistan in the north plusIran, Pakistan, and India to work in concert. An important questionthat would guide the viability of a regional solution was what‘interests’ each regional actor had in Afghanistan. He argued thatPakistan had a very specific type of interest in Afghanistan,acknowledged and endorsed by both the political as well as themilitary leadership in the language of strategic depth.

28 India too

was crucial to this ‘regional effort’, given its involvement in theregion as a whole. The viability of such a response would also bedetermined to a great extent by the possibility of India and Pakistan

28 Strategic depth is a term in military literature that refers, broadly speaking, tothe distances between the front lines or battle sectors and the combatants’industrial core areas, capital cities, heartlands, and other key centers ofpopulation or military production.

32

working ‘together’. Citing the example of Africa, where differentAfrican nations came together to fathom a regional solution for WestAfrica,

29 he expressed hope in the possibility of carting out a regional

solution in South Asia, as well. Despite the West African responsebeing a moderately effective and temporary one, it was a goodprecedent to follow to devise a response from the regional actorssans the influence of the non regional ones. However, he remindedthat a regional solution would take time to develop, as even talkingabout ‘peace’ in the coming five-six years might be premature giventhe persistence of violence in Afghanistan.

As far as the possibilities for youth in peacebuilding wereconcerned, Khosla averred that these possibilities were limited ina certain sense but it was important to strengthen the collaborativeties between the youth of these countries. Given that there wereimmense similarities in social and cultural mores of India andAfghanistan, he stressed on the need to encourage more and moreAfghan students to come to India and foster and develop thecollaborative potential.

The second presentation by T.C.A Raghavan, Joint Secretary(Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) Ministry of External Affairs,Government of India, explored the following questions:

• What was India’s reconstruction program in Afghanistan?

• Was there an Indian perspective on Afghanistan?

• What was the role of Afghan students in India and what werethe contributions they could make to the peacebuilding process?

Raghavan expounded that the needs in Afghanistan were very large.However, India’s contribution to the reconstruction process wasnot commensurate with such large requirements and its efforts werelimited to four or five principal areas.

29 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regionalgroup of fifteen West African countries, founded on May 28, 1975 with thesigning of the Treaty of Lagos. Its mission is to promote economic integration.It was founded to achieve “collective self-sufficiency” for the member statesby means of economic and monetary union creating a single large tradingbloc. See E. Aryeetey, Regional Integration in West Africa, OECDDevelopment Centre Technical Paperno. 170, 2001.

33

Terming India’s contribution as modest yet significant, he pointedout that the main areas of focus were:

• firstly, the power sector, where programs for buildingtransmission lines, hydro-electric projects had been initiated;

• secondly, infrastructure, especially the construction of roadsand buildings including the Parliament building in Kabul;

• thirdly, health sector and;

• fourthly, education and capacity building.

The Indian assistance program also included buildinginfrastructure for agriculture and commerce. Raghavan pointedout that in a very successful program, the Indian governmentcompleted work on a cold storage in Kandahar, which facilitatedthe export of pomegranates to Pakistan and Dubai, abating the crisisthat farmers in the region faced the year round.

India also had medical missions in five parts of Afghanistan. Whilethe primary work was being done in collaboration with the CentralGovernment, the Indian government was involved in certain othersmaller district level and provincial level health clinics.

Another area where India was making significant contribution wasthe large sector of education and capacity building. Asserting thatthis was the most important area of engagement, the Indiangovernment made available approximately five hundredscholarships for Afghan students annually for graduate level studiesin India; in addition, another five hundred scholarships forspecialized courses ranging from 3-4 months up to about 2-3 yearswere extended. The Indian Government was also involved inbuilding schools in different provinces. To ensure higher levels ofparticipation and attendance in schools, programs on ‘schoolfeedings’ had been started in collaboration with the World FoodProgram, through which protein-enriched biscuits were distributedto every school-going child in Afghanistan. Most of Afghanistanbarring a few provinces around Kabul was covered through thisprogram.

Drawing out the distinctive features of India’s assistance programin Afghanistan, Raghavan averred that it was spread all over

34

Afghanistan and not concentrated in any one particular region.Despite facing some problems in the South and the East due to aperilous security situation, projects continued. India was alsoengaged in small development projects through which provincialgovernments were extended budgetary support for specific projectsthat needed to be initiated at the local levels like veterinary clinics,polyclinics, girls’ schools, hostels, orphanages, etc. A significantflagship project that was underway (set up with the help of anIndian organization called SEWA from Ahmedabad, Gujarat)involved training Afghan women to become trainers for developingcertain household and cottage industries in Afghanistan.30

The gestation period of these smaller development projects wasshorter as compared to the larger infrastructure related projectsand therefore it yielded quicker as well as more cost effectiveresults.

Another distinctive feature of the Indian assistance program wasits concurrence with the priorities of the Afghan government itself-projects were designed in sync with the priorities set by the variousministries and departments, or different political-levels. Raghavanasserted that the design of the assistance program was not basedon prescriptive suggestions or solutions offered by the Indiangovernment but was devised to strengthen the priorities of theAfghan government itself. He pointed out that the Indianreconstruction program in Afghanistan was therefore not reflectiveof ‘a’ perspective that the Indian government had vis-à-visAfghanistan.

In terms of challenges, Raghavan pointed that apart from security,a major challenge was the lack of transit. The lack of transit throughPakistan compelled the Indian government to take a morecumbersome route via Iran. This was a major hold-up especiallyfor the infrastructural projects, for which equipment had to be

30 During the discussion, Mondira Dutta, Professor, JNU pointed out that inaddition to SEWA, an NGO headed by Bunker Roy called Barefoot College inTilonia, Rajasthan, was engaged in training Afghan women to become solarengineers. These Afghan women returned to their provinces in Afghanistanto practise the implementation and utilization of solar energy for their dailyrequirements and they were also further training people from their villagecommunities.

35

shipped to Bander Abbas in Iran, from where it was transportedby road to the Afghanistan border and then distributed further.Deterioration in the security situation in some parts of eastern andsouthern Afghanistan further impeded the transference.Highlighting these problems, Raghavan said that a transmissionline, for which heavy equipment could not be sent by road, theIndian government proposed to carry out one of the largest airliftsin history whereby an entire power station would be airlifted toAfghanistan.

Further, the difference between the Indian perspective and theWestern perspective emanated from the similarities in the natureof problems plaguing both the countries. Raghavan highlightedthat India’s own problems enabled a greater understanding of thecomplexity of the situation in Afghanistan especially thoseemanating from differences of culture, language and ethnicityamongst people.

Raghavan further stressed on the need for international actorsinvolved in the reconstruction processes in Afghanistan to belenient in their measurement of the successes as well as patient intheir assessment of time-frames to garner tangible results. Giventhe range of problems that persisted in the country from genderissues, education, health, to insurgencies, terrorism, corruption,and drugs, the reconstruction process required a long termcommitment from the international community.

Further the grave security situation that prevailed, elicited the needto accentuate the positive developments that had taken place overthe last few years. Raghavan pointed out that given that theseachievements had been compressed into a time-frame of only fouror five years, the efforts were quite commendable and laudatory,especially the expansions in the educational sector and the primaryhealth care system.

While he cautioned the international community to be chary ofoverloading the agenda with prescriptive solutions, he acceptedthat it was important that the international actors engaged inAfghanistan delineated their role as supportive. The importantquestion in this context was whether the direction the Afghanistangovernment was taking was the right one or not? The complex

36

situation and the multiplicity of problems like corruption, nepotism,drugs, and human rights violations further endorsed the need forstrong institution building in Afghanistan. Raghavan stated thatthe central concern was ensuring that tangential issues did notover-determine the overall direction of the political process. It wasimportant to ascertain that the internal political process andinstitutions were in place and these institutions had the flexibilityto accommodate different often conflicting interests.

Some of the central concerns that emerged from the presentationwere:

• Reconstruction was a time taking process and the internationalcommunity must not expect quick results.

• Solutions from the international community must not beimposed; they have to emanate from the people of Afghanistan.

• It was important to assess whether the direction in which thepolitical process was going was the right one or not.

In the reconstruction process in Afghanistan, the ProvincialReconstruction Teams (PRTs) played an important role inpenetrating the local structures for reconstruction of provinces. Itwas therefore important to understand the mechanism of theiroperations, and measures these institutions had taken in order tobe successful. Germany was one of the significant actors in theseprocesses. The third presentation by Philipp Ackermann, MinisterCouncillor at the German Embassy in New Delhi sought to extendthe focus on the international involvement in Afghanistan,especially the role of PRTs in peacebuilding as well as the impactof these PRTs in Afghanistan.

Countering the argument that reconstruction of Afghanistan wasan American project, Ackermann asserted that the perceptionof Afghanistan being a western exercise was misplaced.The reconstruction processes underway in Afghanistan weresustained by the international community as a whole. While thesecurity question was dominated by NATO, the reconstruction effortwas an international affair. Ackermann underscored that never inhistory had the international community engaged so decisively andprofoundly in one country with the intent of “getting it back ontrack.” As a world project, Afghanistan was infact the first of itskind.

37

Reiterating that the reconstruction of Afghanistan was indubitablyan international community effort, Ackermann highlighted theremarkable achievements made in Afghanistan over the last 5 years.It was important to recognize that the commitment towardsreconstruction and peacebuilding was a long term one. He arguedthat the international presence in Afghanistan was of utmostimportance, especially in the security sector and it was crucial forthe different countries involved in reconstruction to validate theneed for a sustained and enduring engagement that may range fromfifteen to twenty years.

It was imperative within democratic contexts to consistently andperiodically justify to its electorate, prolonged engagement incountries like Afghanistan. Reflecting on the situation in Germany,Ackermann stated that in Germany, Afghanistan was not a simpleforeign policy issue concerning only the diplomatic and politicalentourage. It had become a weighty topic in public debates anddiscussion, as “every German had an opinion on Afghanistan – acountry 6000km away from home had become a predominantconcern for the entire nation.” He remarked that the situation wassimilar in countries like Holland and Canada where a lively publicdebate on Afghanistan was on.

Explicating the concept of the PRTs in Afghanistan and its history31

,Ackermann pointed out that the idea of PRTs was principally anAmerican one. Building on a more nuanced understanding ofreconstruction and peacebuilding, where reconstruction work didnot commence post the establishment of peace and security, thestrain to organize PRTs followed an understanding thatreconstruction and security must be parallel exercises. There wasan endorsement of the need to have military dispatches alongsideefforts for reconstruction involving civilians.

The western partners especially the NATO members furthered theneed to confer a national stamp to these PRTs. Eighteen countrieshad PRTs in Afghanistan and each of these countries designed andconceptualized the PRTs differently. All PRTs therefore had adistinctive design, making it a tailor made exercise for the particularprovince it covered.

31 ‘See Touko Piiparinen, Clash of Mindsets? An Insider’s Account of ProvincialReconstruction Teams’, International Peacekeeping, Volume 14, Number 1,February 2007 , pp. 143-157.

38

Ackermann argued that the idea of PRTs bearing a national stamphad its own share of disadvantages; primary among them was thelack of coordination. For e.g. in Mazar-i-Sharif there were fivedifferent PRTs – one Swedish, one Norwegian, one Hungarian andtwo German – and they were all working in different ways. Thisworld project character thus threw up major problems, primarilyin terms of coordination amongst the different international actors.Ackermann pointed out that it was important for the internationalactors to coordinate with each other, travel to each other’s countrieswith their Afghan partners to facilitate better understanding of theissues compounding in Afghanistan.

Elaborating the nature of Germany’s involvement in thereconstruction process at both military and financial levels,Ackermann stated that the government was committed to aprolonged involvement in Afghanistan. He affirmed that for theProvincial Reconstruction Teams, the word reconstruction wasextremely vital. There was one military leader and one civilianleader. The military leader was responsible for the military staffand the maintenance of stability and peace in the province. Thecivilian leader was responsible for the civilian reconstruction effortsin the province and also acted as the link between the Afghanprovincial government and the military as well as the foreignmilitary and administration. He highlighted that this design wasnovel in its coalescing of military and civilian efforts as against thetraditional and staunch separation of the two, where military taskslike establishing security were separate from civilian tasks likereconstruction and development.

Reconstruction efforts covered almost every aspect from long termaid for power and electricity, infrastructure and roads to buildingbridges, water supply etc. The focus was on three fields- securitysector, state administration and rule of law.

The largest German PRT was in Kunduz. Two very short termprojects the German government had initiated were projects onwomen’s empowerment in the economic field and in the educationsector. Comparing the situation in Kunduz under the German PRTs,with the earlier work done by the Americans till 2002, Ackermannhighlighted that the number of school-going children had drasticallygone up-from fourteen thousand in 2002 to two hundred and fiftythousand children, of which 40% were girls in the present day.

39

This was a major exercise as it involved not only enrolling childreninto schools, but establishing or resurrecting the infrastructure fromschool buildings to training teachers. Ackermann further pointedout that the success in the educational sector as compared to othersectors was much more as people from the most conservativesettings were more likely to endorse the need for school educationover other areas of development, where there was deep distrustapropos the involvement of foreign actors.

Adverting to the success of the German PRTs in Kunduz and Takhar,Ackermann stated that the level of success of the various PRTs waslargely contingent on the prevailing security situation in thatparticular province. Despite relatively better security situations inKunduz and Takhar, even the German PRTs had suffered casualtiesand set backs, as security remained a major challenge for the entirecountry. Therefore one of the fundamental tasks was to strengthenpolitical institutions that would be able to address these concerns.

Referring to the PRTs, Ackermann noted that the process was anendorsement of the need for state building. Highlighting thedistinction between the processes of nation building and statebuilding, he asserted that the populace in Afghanistan was awareof their identity as Afghans and that Afghanistan was their nation.Nobody said that “I want to be part of Uzbekistan because I’mUzbek” or “I want to be part of Tajikistan because I’m Tajik”.However, there was a lack of trust in the state. Pointing to his ownwork in the Kunduz province, Ackermann averred that after 25years of war, people had more or less lost confidence in stateinstitutions. There was no trust in the veracity and commitment oflaw enforcing agencies and officials, whether the judiciary or thepolice, towards the establishment of the rule of law in Afghanistan.He highlighted the impact of PRTs in refurbishing the trust deficitof the citizenry in their state mechanisms and institutions and intrying to convince people that the state was not working againstthem but for them.

Another lingering problem in Afghanistan was that people fromdifferent provinces expressed an analogous sense ofdiscrimination. The people ‘felt’ like a nation but when spoken toit was their ethnic or regional/provincial identities that becamemanifest. Drawing from his own experience, Ackermann pointed

40

32 See also B. Glatzer, ‘Centre and Periphery in Afghanistan: New identities in aBroken State’, Sociologus, Vol 4 (1), 2002

out that one heard the Pashtuns of Kunduz say “we arediscriminated”, while those in Takhar complained that Kunduzgot preference, while in Kabul, there were reverberations that theentire north east was neglected. Despite an overarching desire forpeace, and a feeling of optimism about the present state of affairs,in terms of the relative stability that Afghanistan was experiencingafter twenty five years of conflict – there was no expressed senseof solidarity and articulation of togetherness in their efforts torebuild the nation. After 25 years of war, Afghans had revertedback to their tribal, familial and clan identities, hence flounderingin their efforts of conflict management.

32

Referring to the youth in provincial Afghanistan, Ackermannavowed that the youth were perhaps one of the biggest problemsin the provinces. Despite a commendable increase in the numberof school-going children and a deeper craving for knowledge, thesituation apropos of the youth remained grim. The situation wasgraver as far as the boys and young men were concerned, amongstwhom developing martial skills and training was extolled. One ofthe biggest problems that the Afghan youth faced was the dearthof engaging spaces, to harness their creative potential. Referring tothe German efforts, Ackermann pointed out that bringing togetherof Afghan exiles in Germany to form a cultural institution calledMediothek was an interesting experiment, offering cultural activitiesto young people like music, dance, theatre and films. Thisinstitution was replicated by the German PRT as a platform foryoung people to explore their creativity and to develop their ideas.The institution also published a newspaper called AfghanistanMarroz, which was well received in Northern Afghanistan.

Explicating the reasons for the success of this initiative, Ackermannhighlighted the complex social and political relations that exist inAfghanistan. He educed an understanding of these complexitiesin provincial Afghanistan, and the interplay of seemingly disparatebut evidently concomitant processes of tradition and modernitythat were at play in the country. A modern initiative worked in aconservative setting because of the presence of a warlord whoconsented to it and his sheer presence as the President of this Centre

41

protected the entire exercise. This illustrated the ways in whichthe political centre and periphery, and non-state social and localstructures intertwined – particularly the remarkable stability andresilience of certain tribal systems that had survived political/ socialchaos and continued despite emerging democratic structures at thecentre. It was therefore imperative for the international actors tounderstand and grapple with these complexities in order to workwell in Afghanistan – at the provincial level deal with the presenceof conservative feudal forces and at the centre concur with thenascent democratization of political institutions.

Given these complex ground realities, it was important to draw onand exploit the potential of the youth. He asserted that variousactors engaged in peacebuilding and reconstruction had toconsciously build on the potential of the youth by providing themwith safe spaces for expression, articulation and participationespecially women who had smothered for decades under patriarchaland patronizing structures. He stressed the importance of peaceeducation in this context and how it must be expanded to “teachpeople to speak up in Afghanistan” and “to assure a young Afghanwoman that her opinion was as valuable as that of a Governor”.Ackermann encouraged the youth to work proactively in these areasand argued that it was the Afghan people themselves who had toenthuse and inspire each other, and that it was imperative to placethe youth in the forefront of reconstruction and peacebuildingefforts.

42

III

Securing Peace: Understanding the Dynamics ofthe Conflict and its Resolution

It is great to have roots, as long as you can take themwith you.

Gertrude Stein

The third session focused on the causes of the ongoing conflict inAfghanistan and the problems it posed for reconstruction andpeacebuilding. It also touched upon the ways in which the youthcould impact the processes of peacebuilding and reconstructionboth within Afghanistan and outside, through countries providingaid and engaging in processes of reconstruction. Radha Kumar,Director of the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and ConflictResolution at Jamia Milia Islamia through her presentationfurthered an understanding of the nature of the ongoing conflictin Afghanistan and the ways in which it impacted thereconstruction and peacebuilding efforts in the country.

Tracing the complex trajectory of the conflict in Afghanistan, Kumarlocated the genesis of the conflict to the Cold War period. Sheargued that at its inception the conflict was an ideological one andnot ethnic. However, the subsequent infusion of the ethniccomponent into this ideological war further complicated the natureof the conflict. She argued that it was the American-Pakistanisupport to ethnic warlords during the Cold War period (to counterSoviet dominance in the region) that had created localizedstructures of power in Afghanistan. The strengthening of thesestructures made ethnic fragmentation, the defining characteristicof the conflict in the country. It was this ethnic fragmentation andnot its ideological underpinnings, which had become the perceivedreality of the Afghan conflict.

Over these three decades, the nature of the ideological war hadundergone change. While it was an upshot of the Cold war policies,in the present context it was the tension between the establishmentof a liberal democratic state on the one side and the establishmentof an Islamic state on the other that defined the ideological crisisin Afghanistan. She averred that despite its changing nature, theideological war remained “a conflict that has not yet been addressedfully, but might need addressing at some stage”.

43

33 Radha Kumar, ‘The Troubled History of Partition’, Foreign Affairs,January/ February, 1997.

Reiterating the ideological underpinnings of the conflict, and itsmanifest ethnic dimension, Kumar argued that the ongoingpeacebuilding efforts lacked a holistic understanding of the conflict.There was a certain ambiguity that informed these peacebuildingefforts, making the ’solutions’ relatively less effective. Citing theexamples of the Bonn Agreement and the Afghanistan Constitution,Kumar pointed out that it was this underlying ambiguity thattranslated into the constant “push-pull struggles on what kind ofShariat laws to introduce or not to introduce, what to permit andwhat not to permit.”

This ambiguity also informed, processes of institution building inAfghanistan. She referred to the experiment in Bosnia andHerzegovina where the issue of territorial-ethnic diversities wasaddressed by introducing a federal system with crosscuttingminority representation.33 However, in Afghanistan this federalmodel was not considered suitable and therefore a “unitary centrewith a great deal of local devolution” was established, furthercomplicating the peacebuilding efforts. She further argued that thisinstitutional model assumed a level of post conflict capabilityat the local levels of governance that was lacking in Afghanistan.She pointed out that the limited capabilities of these localgovernance structures were a major impediment in the process ofpolitical reconstruction. While certain gains had been made ininfrastructure building or economic reconstruction, serious effortstowards political reconstruction were lacking.

She asserted that complexities on the ground further dampenedthe reconstruction efforts. One of the major challenges inAfghanistan was security and often military imperatives overruledand gained priority over reconstruction. This complicated andstalled reconstruction efforts to restore normalcy into people’s livesand secure peace in the country. In this context, she highlightedthe unique situation in Afghanistan where reconstruction startedbefore cessation of open hostilities and therefore peacebuildingwas contemporaneous with ongoing war, in contrast to other areasof conflict, like Bosnia and Herzegovina.

44

Elucidating the ongoing reconstruction efforts, Kumar assessed therole of various international and regional actors in Afghanistan. Ina riposte, to an earlier argument that raised the issue of regionalintervention in the conflict and expressed skepticism aboutPakistan’s inclination to cooperate with the Afghan Government,Kumar cited examples from Northern Ireland, the Balkans andIndonesia to articulate that the inclusion of the neighbouringcountries was critical to the success of the peace process. Expressinghope that the recent developments in Pakistan – the establishmentof a democratically elected government at the centre and of asympathetic Awami National Party led state government in NorthWest Frontier Province (NWFP) – would contribute positively tothe peace process in Afghanistan. These were clear indications thatthe NWFP state government was devising a peace plan to addressinsurgency in Afghanistan. Nevertheless she cautioned againstcomplacency and reiterated the importance of active engagementby civil society groups and citizens both in Afghanistan and Pakistanas well as the international community to put pressure on theirgovernments and ensure the implementation of these plans.

In addition, Kumar focused on certain developments in the Afghancontext that provided hope to the peacebuilding community.Referring to successful peace settlements and peace processes bothin the region (Jammu and Kashmir) and across the globe (Balkans),she suggested that some concrete steps like the pursuit of economicties, free movement of people, goods and services, people to peoplecontact and regional cooperation under SAARC must be explored.She asserted that these steps could “stabilize the region and mov[e]it away from being an area of arms, drugs and black economy”.

Within Afghanistan, she extolled the role of the youth inreconstruction and peacebuilding. Contrasting the situation inAfghanistan to other conflict situations, Kumar highlighted that inmany areas, protracted conflict debilitates the youth, leaving themwith an overwhelming feeling of despondency and hopelessness.In such contexts, the youth often respond to the support frominternational agencies with great suspicion. The youth inAfghanistan had, however, responded differently and positively tointerventions by international NGOs and perceived theseengagements as having “opened the doors to the world.” Sheasserted the need to build on this positive development and engagethe youth proactively in the peacebuilding efforts.

45

She further underscored the importance of devising more localizedresponses to conflicts. Countering the enforcement of an essentiallywestern model of peacebuilding to most conflict areas, Kumarasserted the need to explore certain “traditionally and culturallyaccepted methods of peacebuilding in the South Asian context”,especially in areas of people to people contact and culturalexchanges. Reflecting the recent shift in approaches to buildingpeace, she stressed on the need to move beyond political andeconomic reconstruction to incorporate innovative ways of buildingpeace through collectively held ideas of mutual support andsharing. She noted that in diverse societies where different groupsfelt disadvantaged and suffered from a sense of victimhood, peoplecould be brought together to find shared and mutually consensualset of institutions – their common experiences of “victimhood”acting as the plank for underlying commonalities to surface –invigorating, in turn, processes of peacebuilding.

In the second presentation of the session Khalique Rashid fromthe Centre of Persian and Central Asian Studies at the JawaharlalNehru University, argued for a critical engagement with the notionsof democracy and security in the context of Afghanistan.

Furthering the explication of the Afghan conflict as a product ofCold War politics, Rashid pointed out that Afghanistan had alwaysexisted as a nation and the Afghan people took pride in their sharedhistory and national identity. It was the Soviet invasion and thesubsequent American intervention that had dented the strongfraternal relations and shared history. However, the violence marredpresent was a glaring contrast to the country’s glorious past and itwas this disconnect that the youth had to address and resurrectthe glory of the bygone era.

He referred to the long shared history of the people of Afghanistanand averred that the differences between the ethnic communitieswere small, compared to this shared history. Rashid made anaffective appeal to the Afghan youth to resurrect the identity thatthey had lost during years of war and conflict. In this context hestressed on the idea of strengthening the long standing culturalties between the South Asian countries to bolster the reconstructionefforts in Afghanistan and appealed to the participants to supportAfghanistan in its difficult times.

46

34 See also J. Koehler and C. Zuercher, ‘Statebuilding, Conflict and Narcotics inAfghanistan: The View from Below’, International Peacekeeping, Volume14, Number 1, February 2007 , pp. 62-74.

Assessing the ongoing reconstruction efforts in the country, Rashidclassified the international engagements into two broad categories.The first referred to international actors propelling militaryinitiatives and second, those engaged in peacebuilding andreconstruction. Rashid argued that in the present situation inAfghanistan, it was important to prioritize the latter. He felt thatmore than armies and weaponry Afghanistan needed internationalassistance to rebuild its human resources. He brought into focus amajor cause of concern for researchers in the area of peacebuilding,namely the overemphasis on military security to the neglect ofnormative integrity of individuals, groups and communities.Reflecting the need to redefine ‘security’ in a holistic manner, heemphasized the importance of creating enabling conditions for theAfghan people to optimize their potential.

He further argued that in this context, it was important to criticallyreflect on the nascent democratic processes underway inAfghanistan. One of the major lacunae in deepening the democraticprocesses was the lack of trust in the political leadership. He gaveexamples of incompetence and corruption among the high-rankingpolitical officials, as one of the major impediments.

34 Arguing for a

deeper and more substantive democratic experience, Rashidcautioned against restricting democracy to mere symbols.He illustrated that the recent parliamentary elections inAfghanistan, while at one level indicated the institutionalizationof democracy; a closer analysis revealed that these apparentlydemocratic institutions continued to mirror the ideology of theTaliban regime. Referring to the recent government ban on Indiantelevision serials-on the pretext that these serials being un-Islamic,Rashid highlighted that in Afghanistan there was only a symbolicand superficial engagement with democracy at present.

Eloquently summarizing his argument, Gopinath averred that in ademocracy, diversity should be handled in a manner that “issuesof justice and access are addressed and people can be comfortablewith multiple identities and yet have an overarching sense ofbelonging to the country”.

47

Discussion

Muzdah-e-dil ki mashiha nafse mi ayadi!Kei ze anfas khushah boo-ke-kase mi ayad

[Rejoice, o heart, for the savior comes to these,nectar in hand Behold a sweet fragrance comes from

the breath of the people]

The roundtable was envisioned as a space to bring the voices ofyouth from Afghanistan to impact the broader discourse on Indo-Afghan relations, to explore possibilities for collaboration betweenthe youth of India and the young people from Afghanistan, andidentify ways in which voices of the youth could impact theprocesses of peacebuilding. The last session titled Looking Aheadengaged the multi level actors in a vibrant discussion on the broaderthemes of reconstruction and peacebuilding and elicited variedresponses around themes of democracy, invigorating the economy,ensuring advancement in education, rebuilding fracturedrelationships and ascertaining the role of youth in these processes.

Reflecting on the ongoing processes of democratization inAfghanistan, R. Ramasubramanian from Jawaharlal NehruUniversity cautioned that democracy as institutionalized inAfghanistan was not substantive, and perpetuated western liberalvalues at the expense of Afghan values. He argued that the locallevel leadership in Afghanistan which had traditionally been verystrong had not found adequate representation in the current model,creating roadblocks in Afghanistan’s efforts at deepeningdemocracy. He argued that a more suitable alternative could befound in deliberative democracy like the one Jai Prakash Narainhad envisioned for India. He stressed on the need to augment therole of women, youth, non governmental organizations, free mediaand the private sector in Afghanistan to devise the framework forthe implementation of this model of democracy.

Explicating the complex situation in the country, PhillippAckermann highlighted the influence of those sections of theAfghan populace whose interests were incompatible with thecountry’s larger interests in peace but who had come to acquireenormous amount of wealth and influence in the political

48

institutions and social structures. Ackermann in his interventionpointed out that while eradicating corruption and illiteracy wasdesirable and one must strive towards it, in a democracy refusingto accept legitimately elected representatives merely on the pretextthat they had not achieved a level of education considered desirable,would be inappropriate. He argued that, “we have to not onlyaccommodate them but also accept their authority as electedrepresentatives even if they are illiterate.” One of the anomalies ofdemocracy, Ackermann pointed out, was that one had to accepteven those actors who had come to power in the country due toexternal pressure. While it was far less complicated to marginalizethese sections and keep them out of the process, it was extremelydifficult to fill the vacuum with legitimate actors once these forceshad been marginalized. Ackermann gave the example of the timewhen this vacuum of power was filled by the Taliban in someregions. Demilitarization was important but he asserted that it wasequally important to ensure that the warlords be replaced bylegitimate actors and ascertain that one set of unlawful actors wasnot replaced by another.

WISCOMP Fellow, Swapna Kona Nayadu argued that reconstructionmust not be defined in terms of institution building alone. For theinstitutions to work and garner legitimacy, it was imperative towork fervently towards trust building. It was only by re/establishingtrust, both between people as well as at the level of institutionsthat one could truly invigorate the reconstruction and peacebuildingprocesses, and enable passive citizens to re-imagine themselves aspolitical actors. In this context, she asserted, peace education couldbe employed as an important tool to initiate the youth intodeliberating/ debating the ‘need for peace’ in the region.

Heela Jilani, WISCOMP Consultant, pointed out that another majorchallenge impeding the deepening of democracy was that level oftrust apropos the social structure, especially relationships betweengroups had been tarnished in the many years of conflict. Whileone could not ignore the differences that divided people – therewere Pashtuns, Hazara, Uzbeks, and Tajiks but at the same timethey were all Afghans – it was thus important to build on thecommonalities, to strengthen the reconstruction efforts in thecountry. She endorsed the need to work on the commonalities thatthey were all Afghans, they had all suffered and affected by painand war. The important concern was to ensure that they were

49

brought together, on the basis of their commonalities. She endorsedthe need to channel resources to bring people together, “whetherthrough education, or through spirituality” in a manner where theyunderstood and accepted themselves and each other. Trust infloundering relationships could be resurrected only through suchengagements with one’s self as well as the ‘other’.

A young afghan student Yahya Amiry surmised that, “barriers breakwhen people communicate, which leads to success in interpersonalrelationships….more communication we have with each other, themore we see the commonality, then we can also realize and enjoythe diversity of each other.”

Several suggestions were made by the participants to explorepossibilities of using culture and media as they might provecathartic and help create conditions for rebuilding trust betweencommunities divided along different faultlines during war andprotracted conflict. Meenakshi Gopinath suggested that alternativemedia, documentaries, soap operas could be used. In order to beginthe process of rebuilding trust, Liwal pointed out that culturalassociations of university students had been very successful inAfghanistan and similar associations could be replicated amongthe Afghan and Indian students in India. These activities could“build bridges between Afghans” he felt. In response to hissuggestion Gopinath illustrated the work of WISCOMP in Kashmirthrough it’s Athwaas initiative, that had over the years used writers’workshops to provide spaces for creative articulation.

Sharing her experiences from Athwaas, Ashima Kaul, WISCOMPConsultant on Kashmir, narrated the transformative journey of thewomen who constituted the Athwaas core group. The parallels toAfghanistan were clearly visible. She made references to theregional and ethnic differences between the Kashmiris and thedifferences in the way the conflict was experienced by each group.She ended on an optimistic note by highlighting the possibilitiesof working together if people recognized that pain was shared byall communities despite the differences and that all harbored thedesire to work collectively towards a brighter future.

Articulating the need for sustained efforts in other areas like theeconomy, Roya Saqib, a student from Jamia Millia, reinstated that

50

only a strong economy could expedite the reconstruction process.Asserting the need for the youth to engage more ardently in thesereconstruction processes, she said it was important that the youthstem the lure of monetary benefits and individually contributetowards strengthening the economic base of the country.

Another area which needed sustained effort was the educationsector. Khalique Rashid stated that lack of education was one ofbiggest problems in the country. At the educational and culturallevels, Saqib further affirmed the need for the youth to work towardsnational reconstruction, by not only pooling in their specializedskills and trainings, but consciously working towards securing theirnational identity – moving beyond the fetters of their narrowprovincial, ethnic, regional, racial and linguistic loyalties.Stimulating her peers to be ardent nationalists, she endorsed theneed to work collectively to secure the future of the country.

Nazir Ahmad Yosufzai, from JIIMS, Indraprastha University,highlighted the differential developments in the various provinces.Referring to his home province of Nimroz, Yosufzai pointed out thatdespite significant strides in the educational sector, the Afghangovernment lacked a stringent focus on education and it was importantfor the government to reassess its commitment towards strengtheningthe educational infrastructure in provinces like Nimroz.

Drawing parallels from her own experiences in Kashmir, MondiraDutta of Jawaharlal Nehru University reiterated the importance ofeducation and that of reintegrating the disarmed youth into society.She cautioned that the marginalization of the youth in thedevelopmental and decision making processes had direconsequences in some parts of India and Afghanistan must not movein that direction. “Channels of dialogue must be kept open andthese youth must be involved in the decision making processes”,she avowed.

Radha Kumar asserted the need to be vigilant of a unidimensionalfocus on education divorced from a concurrent process ofemployment generation to absorb the “educated”. She argued thatthe inability to do so may lead to an explosive situation – there wasa threshold of educated unemployed that could not be crossedwithout increasing the risks of violent outbursts in society.

51

A recurring theme during the deliberations was the need torecognize the transitory nature of international engagement inAfghanistan. While most acknowledged that internationalassistance in the reconstruction efforts was crucial to theestablishment of sustainable peace in Afghanistan, one had to bewary of the long term presence of international forces in the country.Radha Kumar pointed out that “if more and more and more peoplein Afghanistan are saying that ...the international military role ismore of a problem than of a help then we have to come back to thequestion of exit policies”.

Phillipp Ackermann too reiterated that it was important for theAfghans to collectively take responsibility for postwar relationships.During the transitional phase the decision to rely on the PRTs orinternational forces to provide protection was not doubted but inthe long term the Afghan people would have to be motivated andempowered to resist the illegitimate actors, like warlords and militiaon their own.

Responding to this, Yahya Amiry, a student from the University ofDelhi pointed out that Afghans were making attempts at conflictresolution both through the traditional Jirga structures andnegotiations with the neighboring countries. He asserted thattraditional mechanisms of conflict resolution were part of theAfghan society and therefore it would not be difficult to build onsuch social practices and vitalize efforts towards peacebuilding inthe region.

While assessing the role of the youth in peacebuilding andreconstruction, the term ‘youth’ came under the scanner. MoscaNajib, Producer/Researcher, BBC, reiterated the need to delineatewho the Afghan youth were, whether the Afghan youth amongstthe diaspora could be considered a part of this group and whatrole they could play in the process of peacebuilding?

Responding to a question posed by Monica Wahi, Founder/Director,Himmat, Gujarat, apropos the “mood of the Afghan youth” andtheir “political consciousness”, Jawed Nader asserted it was difficultto condense or classify the mood of the youth, given the fact thatthe youth were a heterogeneous and diverse cluster, with differentregional, ethnic, linguistic, provincial affiliations. While the youth

52

in Afghanistan was largely hopeful and optimistic about a betterand secure future, there was one section of the youth, which hadbeen involved in the war, and was therefore dealing with post-conflict trauma.

In this context, Phillipp Ackermann, acknowledged that people inAfghanistan were grappling with the psychological impact of thelong years of conflict. He pointed out that the PRTs had so far failedto provide any psychological service to the young people andtherefore stressed on the need for the PRTs to work in concert withthe Afghan civil society and equip themselves better to deal withsuch situations. Meenakshi Gopinath reminded the participantsthat trauma healing was an integral part of conflict transformationprocesses that aided in bridging relationships and moving from adivided past to a shared future.

Reiterating Jawed Nader’s views, Shamroz Khan, an Afghan studentfrom Delhi University brought to the fore the plight of thedemilitarized and disarmed young people who were perceived asthe cause of the conflict.

Focusing on the role that Afghan Youth could play in thepeacebuilding and conflict transformation processes inAfghanistan, Ishita Chaudhry, Founder and Managing Trustee, YPFoundation, pointed out that the four qualities, essential forstimulating this process were already present among the Afghanyouth- energy, readiness to listen, thirst for knowledge andwillingness to share experiences.

Elaborating on the varied challenges that Afghan students faced inIndia, Hamdia Hamdard, a young student at Jamia Millia Islamia,highlighted that lack of information about the Indian educationsystem, universities, different educational programs and theexamination system was perhaps the central problem. Given thedifferences between the Indian and Afghanistan’s educationalsystems, Afghan students who came to India with the intent ofpursuing their studies, often faced difficulties in understandingthe nature of the educational system in India. Often seeminglyminor issues like changing courses in colleges, compounded intomajor challenges, as they were unaware of the procedures in Indiancolleges and universities. The assistance provided at the IndianConsulate and Embassy often proved insufficient.

53

Another source of discomfort for the Afghan students emanatedfrom their lack of awareness about the cultures, regions, andlanguages of India. For some students the unfamiliar social-culturalcontexts in India became too alienating and thus they were unableto continue studying in India. Communication too was a hugeproblem, especially for students not comfortable with the Englishlanguage.

Portrayal of Afghans in popular media and the images it createdabout the Afghans were also an area of concern in the minds ofmany young Afghans. Several young students highlighted themisinformation and misconceptions about Afghans that werecirculated through media images and the urgency of fighting them.Post 9/11, the growing suspicion about people from Afghanistan,exacerbated the problems of finding suitable accommodation inIndia.

Jawed Nader further pointed out that the source of this mistrustcould be traced to a wider lack of knowledge about Afghanistanand its people. The branding and labeling of people fromAfghanistan as untrustworthy, hostile and bellicose was commonpractice both in the West as well as within the region. He alsohighlighted the importance of speaking meaningfully, of havingdiscussions and dialogue, and designing roadmaps for action. Naderargued that there was need for sustained dialogue not only betweenIndian and Afghan youth but also between the youth from differentethnic communities in Afghanistan. Recognizing that differencesexisted amongst the youth, Nader asserted that it was importantfor those studying in countries like India, to use this opportunityto bridge differences and carry these conversations back home.

Some of the recommendations that emerged from the discussionwere that in order to familiarize Afghan students about theeducational system in India, orientation programs could beorganized in Afghanistan to disseminate information about theIndian educational system. Such programs could also be used tofamiliarize the Afghan students about the social and culturaldiversity of India. Radha Kumar suggested that an autonomous bodycould be created to take care of scholarships etc. Hamdia Hamdardasserted the need for increased interaction between Indian andAfghan students. She suggested a joint committee of Afghan andIndian students be formed to organize cultural events, initiate

54

academic and cultural travels involving youth from both thecountries.

Ishita Chaudhry suggested several ways in which organizations inIndia like the YP Foundation could collaborate with Afghan youthorganizations to work on issues of common concern. Since theIndian youth grappled with gender bias and discrimination atmultiple levels and the Afghan women were positioned similarly,this could, in her view, be one area where the youth from the twocountries could share learnings. Many participants asserted thatAfghan Youth studying in India could explore the differentmechanisms to engage with the youth in the country. They couldhelp in organizing information sharing sessions with Afghanuniversity students, by providing them information about theeducational system in India.

Heela Jilani too stressed on the need to exploit the potential of theyouth, not only in Afghanistan, but also in India and Pakistan tobolster efforts towards securing and stabilizing the region as a whole.

Phillipp Ackermann asserted that the youth settled outsideAfghanistan must return to their country and pool in their effortsinto the reconstruction process. Responding to this, Nazir Yosufzaiavowed that it was not enough to prod the youth to return home.It was imperative to first work on creating enabling conditionswithin the country to beckon these youth to return. Endorsing thisMoska Najib in an impassioned intervention argued, “it is very easyto say Afghans need to go back to the country and give back tocountry. It’s also not fair to say to Afghans who are stuck inAfghanistan to continue to try and make the country work. Buthow can you convince Afghans abroad to go back when they havegone through a progression of insecurity, instability, identity crisis,displacement to the extent that they fear going back, they don’twant to go back. They don’t want to loose their years, youth yearsor generations. My parents went through hell I don’t want to gothrough that, I want to have a normal life, I want to have a child, Iwant my child to have food, why should I go back?”

Acknowledging these concerns, Meenakshi Gopinath remarked thatone needed a sustained engagement with issues of identity- of roots,of belonging, of multiple identities. There was need for incessant

55

dialoguing with one’s self as well as others – on questions ofmultiple identities and whether these identities could coexist?While recognizing that these questions were salient for one andall, Gopinath expressed hope that the Afghan youth would continuewith such engagements. She concluded that it was important tobuild on and recover the faith that “Afghanistan is not a spaceforsaken by God; that it has a future – a beautiful future and it hasthe tremendous potential of young people to contribute to thatfuture. It is important to reiterate not only what the world canoffer Afghanistan but what Afghanistan can offer the world. It isimportant to make that shift in consciousness, to develop a sort ofself confidence and move from the notion of being victims, to beingactors of our history and our own destiny.”

56

Participants’ Feedback

A set of five questions was distributed to the participants, to elicitresponses on possibilities of ‘peace’ and ‘peacebuilding’ inAfghanistan. The questions were:

1. Peace in Afghanistan requires / means…

2. What are the key difficulties of bringing peace inAfghanistan?

3. What do you think you can do?

4. What first steps would you like to take?

5. I envision an Afghanistan where…

Responses:

Peace in Afghanistan requires / means…

• There had to be a holistic approach towards peace anddevelopment in Afghanistan, with security and peace as pre-requisites.

• International intervention must be seen as a necessary evil underthe present circumstances. But it was important that theinternational agencies train the indigenous people so as toempower them. They must be included in the ongoingdevelopment processes.

• As far as troop deployment was concerned, the internationalactors must devise a gradual phasing out process and implementit diligently.

• A bottom–up approach to peacebuilding was required so thatcommunity members including the youth could proactivelyparticipate in the process.

• Education was a crucial component of bringing peace inAfghanistan as it was an important means for changing themindset of people, reducing gender discrimination and childexploitation. Since 68% of the population was below 25 yearsand about 7500 were child soldiers, both education andemployment generation must not be neglected.

57

• If unemployment remained unchecked, it could lead to theexacerbation of violence and conflict.

What are the key difficulties of bringing peace in Afghanistan?

• Youth apathy or lack of enthusiasm among the youth to takepart in peacebuilding efforts

• Efforts made by International Community and Afghans(including the Afghan government) were not sufficient and therewas a need for implementation of more projects.

• Lack of communication and freedom of speech

• Lack of skills and lack of technical & professional knowledgeamong government employees and others involved inpeacebuilding activities.

• Unfavorable economic condition of Afghan families whichultimately lead to the employment of Afghan youth byinternational terrorist organizations and political actors.

• Illiteracy

• Interference by other countries

• Lack of interaction/communication between youth fromdifferent ethnicities

What do you think you can do?

• Take greater responsibility to bring about peace in Afghanistanand reduce the involvement of “foreign people”.

• Work together as a nation and participate as equals along sidethe international community in the reconstruction process.

• Garner support from “Indian friends”

• Assist Afghan women in accessing education

What first steps would you like to take?

• Identify like-minded Afghan students & Indian individuals andorganizations that stand for peace and strengthen the academicand professional ties with them.

• Continue strengthening networks and activities in Afghanistan

• Establish community-based peacebuilding initiatives with theAfghan youth

58

• Liaison with Indian and international organizations to drawupon their expertise

• Increase interaction among Afghan youth from differentethnicities.

• Increase interaction among Indian and Afghan youths“to educate our selves about each other so that we can sharethe commonalities and appreciate diversity”.

I envision an Afghanistan where…

• Everyone feels safe and happy

• Women are educated and know about their rights and workalongside men as seen in other countries

• Everyone is united and working for the nation

• The youth are a primary component of reconstruction processes

• There is sustained peace, brought about not only by militaryintervention but by upholding justice and rule of law. Thischange could be brought about when the sections of Afghansociety who have long been marginalized and abused i.e. womenand the youth are mobilized.

• Oppressed come forward and speak out

• Eventual withdrawal of the foreign troops in order for theAfghans to build their nation with independence and a freespirit.

59

Annexure-I∗

Po

litic

al M

ap o

f Afg

han

ista

n

∗Source: < http://www.placesonline.com/asia/afghanistan/map.asp>

60

Map

of

Afg

han

ista

n-P

akis

tan

Bor

der

Annexure -II∗

∗Source: <http://www.atlapedia.com/online/maps/political Afghan_etc.htm>

61

Annexure-III

Chronology of Major Events (1987-2006)

December 27, 1979 Commencement of Soviet Militaryintervention in Afghanistan

November 30, 1987 Mohammad Najibullah appointedPresident after Soviet withdrawal

February 15, 1989 Soviet troops pull out

April 25, 1992 President Najibullah resigns to form abroad-based government according to theUN agreement

1992-1994 Afghan Civil War continues

May, 1997 Taliban seizes Kabul & ousts PresidentBurhanuddin Rabbani

June, 1997 Taliban captures Mazar-i-Sharif

August, 1998 Taliban begins attack on northernprovinces of Afghanistan

August 20, 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya.In response, US carries out air strikes inKhowst, Afghanistan targetingAl Qaeda camps

August, 2001 The first consultative conference ofAfghans is held in London to discuss thepossibility of future activities of peace inAfghanistan

September 9, 2001 Leader of opposition Northern Alliance,Ahmad Shah Massoud, critically injuredin Panjshir

September 12, 2001 Under a new US Policy AmericanPresident George Bush makes a broaddeclaration of war against terrorists andthe states which harbor them

62

September 15, 2001 Ahmad Shah Massoud succumbs toinjuries

September 20, 2001 US demands that the Taliban regimehand over suspected terrorists

October 7, 2001 US begins air raids in Afghanistan

October 18, 2001 Troops of the US Special Force deployedin Afghanistan

November 17, 2001 Taliban officially ousted from power

December, 2001 Bonn Agreement signed in Germany

July 13, 2002 Hamid Karzai appointed as President ofthe Afghan Transitional Administration

December, 2004 Hamid Karzai elected as President of theIslamic Republic of Afghanistan

January – Adoption of the Afghanistan Compact,February, 2006 following the London Conference

63

Annexure-IV∗

Excerpts from the Bonn Agreement

Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in AfghanistanPending the Re-Establishment of Permanent

Government Institutions

December 2001Bonn, Germany

The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan,

In the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan,

Determined to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promotenational reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect forhuman rights in the country,

Reaffirming the independence, national sovereignty and territorialintegrity of Afghanistan,

Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freelydetermine their own political future in accordance with theprinciples of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice,

Expressing their appreciation to the Afghan mujahidin who, overthe years, have defended the independence, territorial integrity andnational unity of the country and have played a major role in thestruggle against terrorism and oppression, and whose sacrifice hasnow made them both heroes of jihad and champions of peace,stability and reconstruction of their beloved homeland,Afghanistan,

Aware that the unstable situation in Afghanistan requires theimplementation of emergency interim arrangements and expressingtheir deep appreciation to His Excellency Professor BurhanuddinRabbani for his readiness to transfer power to an interim authoritywhich is to be established pursuant to this agreement,

∗Excerpts from the original document of the Bonn Agreement<http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm>

64

Recognizing the need to ensure broad representation in theseinterim arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population,including groups that have not been adequately represented at theUN Talks on Afghanistan,

Noting that these interim arrangements are intended as a first steptoward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, and are not intendedto remain in place beyond the specified period of time,

Recognizing that some time may be required for a new Afghansecurity force to be fully constituted and functional and thattherefore other security provisions detailed in Annex I to thisagreement must meanwhile be put in place,

Considering that the United Nations, as the internationallyrecognized impartial institution, has a particularly important roleto play, detailed in Annex II to this agreement, in the period priorto the establishment of permanent institutions in Afghanistan,

Have agreed as follows:

THE INTERIM AUTHORITY

I. General provisions

1) An Interim Authority shall be established upon the officialtransfer of power on 22 December 2001.

2) The Interim Authority shall consist of an Interim Administrationpresided over by a Chairman, a Special IndependentCommission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga,and a Supreme Court of Afghanistan, as well as such other courtsas may be established by the Interim Administration.The composition, functions and governing procedures for theInterim Administration and the Special IndependentCommission are set forth in this agreement.

3) Upon the official transfer of power, the Interim Authority shallbe the repository of Afghan sovereignty, with immediate effect.As such, it shall, throughout the interim period, representAfghanistan in its external relations and shall occupy the seatof Afghanistan at the United Nations and in its specializedagencies, as well as in other international institutions andconferences.

65

4) An Emergency Loya Jirga shall be convened within six monthsof the establishment of the Interim Authority. The EmergencyLoya Jirga will be opened by His Majesty Mohammed Zaher,the former King of Afghanistan. The Emergency Loya Jirga shalldecide on a Transitional Authority, including a broad-basedtransitional administration, to lead Afghanistan until such timeas a fully representative government can be elected throughfree and fair elections to be held no later than two years fromthe date of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga.

5) The Interim Authority shall cease to exist once the TransitionalAuthority has been established by the Emergency Loya Jirga.

6) A Constitutional Loya Jirga shall be convened within eighteenmonths of the establishment of the Transitional Authority, inorder to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan. In order toassist the Constitutional Loya Jirga prepare the proposedConstitution, the Transitional Administration shall, within twomonths of its commencement and with the assistance of theUnited Nations, establish a Constitutional Commission.

II. Legal framework and judicial system

1) The following legal framework shall be applicable on an interimbasis until the adoption of the new Constitution referred toabove:

i) The Constitution of 1964, a/ to the extent that its provisionsare not inconsistent with those contained in this agreement,and b/ with the exception of those provisions relating to themonarchy and to the executive and legislative bodiesprovided in the Constitution; and

ii) existing laws and regulations, to the extent that they are notinconsistent with this agreement or with international legalobligations to which Afghanistan is a party, or with thoseapplicable provisions contained in the Constitution of 1964,provided that the Interim Authority shall have the power torepeal or amend those laws and regulations.

2) The judicial power of Afghanistan shall be independent andshall be vested in a Supreme Court of Afghanistan, and suchother courts as may be established by the Interim

66

Administration. The Interim Administration shall establish,with the assistance of the United Nations, a JudicialCommission to rebuild the domestic justice system inaccordance with Islamic principles, international standards,the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions.

III. Interim Administration

A. Composition

1) The Interim Administration shall be composed of a Chairman,five Vice Chairmen and 24 other members. Each member, exceptthe Chairman, may head a department of the InterimAdministration.

2) The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan have invitedHis Majesty Mohammed Zaher, the former King of Afghanistan,to chair the Interim Administration. His Majesty has indicatedthat he would prefer that a suitable candidate acceptable tothe participants be selected as the Chair of the InterimAdministration.

3) The Chairman, the Vice Chairmen and other members of theInterim Administration have been selected by the participantsin the UN Talks on Afghanistan, as listed in Annex IV to thisagreement. The selection has been made on the basis ofprofessional competence and personal integrity from listssubmitted by the participants in the UN Talks, with due regardto the ethnic, geographic and religious composition ofAfghanistan and to the importance of the participation ofwomen.

4) No person serving as a member of the Interim Administrationmay simultaneously hold membership of the SpecialIndependent Commission for the Convening of the EmergencyLoya Jirga.

B. Procedures

1) The Chairman of the Interim Administration, or in his/herabsence one of the Vice Chairmen, shall call and chair meetingsand propose the agenda for these meetings.

2) The Interim Administration shall endeavour to reach itsdecisions by consensus. In order for any decision to be taken,

67

at least 22 members must be in attendance. If a vote becomesnecessary, decisions shall be taken by a majority of themembers present and voting, unless otherwise stipulated inthis agreement. The Chairman shall cast the deciding vote inthe event that the members are divided equally.

C. Functions

1) The Interim Administration shall be entrusted with the day-to-day conduct of the affairs of state, and shall have the rightto issue decrees for the peace, order and good government ofAfghanistan.

2) The Chairman of the Interim Administration or, in his/herabsence, one of the Vice Chairmen, shall represent the InterimAdministration as appropriate.

3) Those members responsible for the administration ofindividual departments shall also be responsible forimplementing the policies of the Interim Administrationwithin their areas of responsibility.

4) Upon the official transfer of power, the Interim Administrationshall have full jurisdiction over the printing and delivery ofthe national currency and special drawing rights frominternational financial institutions. The InterimAdministration shall establish, with the assistance of theUnited Nations, a Central Bank of Afghanistan that willregulate the money supply of the country through transparentand accountable procedures.

5) The Interim Administration shall establish, with the assistanceof the United Nations, an independent Civil ServiceCommission to provide the Interim Authority and the futureTransitional Authority with shortlists of candidates for keyposts in the administrative departments, as well as those ofgovernors and uluswals, in order to ensure their competenceand integrity.

6) The Interim Administration shall, with the assistance of theUnited Nations, establish an independent Human RightsCommission, whose responsibilities will include human rightsmonitoring, investigation of violations of human rights, anddevelopment of domestic human rights institutions. The Interim

68

Administration may, with the assistance of the United Nations,also establish any other commissions to review matters notcovered in this agreement.

7) The members of the Interim Administration shall abide by aCode of Conduct elaborated in accordance with internationalstandards.

8) Failure by a member of the Interim Administration to abide bythe provisions of the Code of Conduct shall lead to his/hersuspension from that body. The decision to suspend a membershall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the membership ofthe Interim Administration on the proposal of its Chairman orany of its Vice Chairmen.

9) The functions and powers of members of the InterimAdministration will be further elaborated, as appropriate, withthe assistance of the United Nations.

IV. The Special Independent Commission for the Convening ofthe Emergency Loya Jirga

1) The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of theEmergency Loya Jirga shall be established within one month ofthe establishment of the Interim Authority. The SpecialIndependent Commission will consist of twenty-one members,a number of whom should have expertise in constitutional orcustomary law. The members will be selected from lists ofcandidates submitted by participants in the UN Talks onAfghanistan as well as Afghan professional and civil societygroups. The United Nations will assist with the establishmentand functioning of the commission and of a substantialsecretariat.

2) The Special Independent Commission will have the finalauthority for determining the procedures for and the numberof people who will participate in the Emergency Loya Jirga. TheSpecial Independent Commission will draft rules andprocedures specifying (i) criteria for allocation of seats to thesettled and nomadic population residing in the country; (ii)criteria for allocation of seats to the Afghan refugees living inIran, Pakistan, and elsewhere, and Afghans from the diaspora;(iii) criteria for inclusion of civil society organizations and

69

prominent individuals, including Islamic scholars, intellectuals,and traders, both within the country and in the diaspora.The Special Independent Commission will ensure that dueattention is paid to the representation in the Emergency LoyaJirga of a significant number of women as well as all othersegments of the Afghan population.

3) The Special Independent Commission will publish anddisseminate the rules and procedures for the convening of theEmergency Loya Jirga at least ten weeks before the EmergencyLoya Jirga convenes, together with the date for itscommencement and its suggested location and duration.

4) The Special Independent Commission will adopt andimplement procedures for monitoring the process of nominationof individuals to the Emergency Loya Jirga to ensure that theprocess of indirect election or selection is transparent and fair.To pre-empt conflict over nominations, the Special IndependentCommission will specify mechanisms for filing of grievancesand rules for arbitration of disputes.

5) The Emergency Loya Jirga will elect a Head of the State for theTransitional Administration and will approve proposals for thestructure and key personnel of the Transitional Administration.

V. Final provisions

1) Upon the official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armedforces and armed groups in the country shall come under thecommand and control of the Interim Authority, and bereorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghansecurity and armed forces.

2) The Interim Authority and the Emergency Loya Jirga shall actin accordance with basic principles and provisions containedin international instruments on human rights and internationalhumanitarian law to which Afghanistan is a party.

3) The Interim Authority shall cooperate with the internationalcommunity in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organizedcrime. It shall commit itself to respect international law andmaintain peaceful and friendly relations with neighbouringcountries and the rest of the international community.

70

4) The Interim Authority and the Special Independent Commissionfor the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga will ensure theparticipation of women as well as the equitable representationof all ethnic and religious communities in the InterimAdministration and the Emergency Loya Jirga.

5) All actions taken by the Interim Authority shall be consistentwith Security Council resolution 1378 (14 November 2001) andother relevant Security Council resolutions relating toAfghanistan.

6) Rules of procedure for the organs established under the InterimAuthority will be elaborated as appropriate with the assistanceof the United Nations.

This agreement, of which the annexes constitute an integralpart, done in Bonn on this 5th day of December 2001 in theEnglish language, shall be the authentic text, in a single copywhich shall remain deposited in the archives of the UnitedNations. Official texts shall be provided in Dari and Pashto,and such other languages as the Special Representative of theSecretary-General may designate. The Special Representativeof the Secretary-General shall send certified copies in English,Dari and Pashto to each of the participants.

71

Annexure-V∗

Excerpts from the Afghanistan Compact

The Afghanistan CompactThe London Conference on Afghanistan

31 January – 1 February 2006

THE AFGHANISTAN COMPACT

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the internationalcommunity:

Determined to strengthen their partnership to improve the lives ofAfghan people, and to contribute to national, regional, and globalpeace and security;

Affirming their shared commitment to continue, in the spirit ofthe Bonn, Tokyo and Berlin conferences, to work toward a stableand prosperous Afghanistan, with good governance and humanrights protection for all under the rule of law, and to maintain andstrengthen that commitment over the term of this Compact andbeyond;

Recognising the courage and determination of Afghans who, bydefying violent extremism and hardship, have laid the foundationsfor a democratic, peaceful, pluralistic and prosperous state basedon the principles of Islam;

Noting the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement throughthe adoption of a new constitution in January 2004, and the holdingof presidential elections in October 2004 and National Assemblyand Provincial Council elections in September 2005, which haveenabled Afghanistan to regain its rightful place in the internationalcommunity;

Mindful that Afghanistan’s transition to peace and stability is notyet assured, and that strong international engagement will continueto be required to address remaining challenges;

∗Excerpts from the original document of the Afghanistan Compact<http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_londonConf/_docs/06jan30-AfghanistanCompact-Final.pdf>

72

Resolved to overcome the legacy of conflict in Afghanistan by settingconditions for sustainable economic growth and development;strengthening state institutions and civil society; removingremaining terrorist threats; meeting the challenge of counter-narcotics; rebuilding capacity and infrastructure; reducing poverty;and meeting basic human needs;

Have agreed to this Afghanistan Compact.

PURPOSE

The Afghan Government has articulated its overarching goals forthe well-being of its people in the Afghanistan MillenniumDevelopment Goals Country Report 2005 – Vision 2020. Consistentwith those goals, this Compact identifies three critical andinterdependent areas or pillars of activity for the five years fromthe adoption of this Compact:

1. Security;2. Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and3. Economic and Social Development.

A further vital and cross-cutting area of work is eliminating thenarcotics industry, which remains a formidable threat to the peopleand state of Afghanistan, the region and beyond.

The Afghan Government hereby commits itself to realising thisshared vision of the future; the international community, in turn,commits itself to provide resources and support to realise thatvision. Annex I of this Compact sets out detailed outcomes,benchmarks and timelines for delivery, consistent with the high-level goals set by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy(ANDS). The Government and international community alsocommit themselves to improve the effectiveness and accountabilityof international assistance as set forth in Annex II.

PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION

As the Afghan Government and the international communityembark on the implementation of this Compact, they will:

1. Respect the pluralistic culture, values and history ofAfghanistan, based on Islam;

73

2. Work on the basis of partnership between the AfghanGovernment, with its sovereign responsibilities, and theinternational community, with a central and impartialcoordinating role for the United Nations;

3. Engage further the deep-seated traditions of participation andaspiration to ownership of the Afghan people;

4. Pursue fiscal, institutional and environmental sustainability;

5. Build lasting Afghan capacity and effective state and civil societyinstitutions, with particular emphasis on building up humancapacities of men and women alike;

6. Ensure balanced and fair allocation of domestic andinternational resources in order to offer all parts of the countrytangible prospects of well-being;

7. Recognise in all policies and programs that men and womenhave equal rights and responsibilities;

8. Promote regional cooperation; and

9. Combat corruption and ensure public transparency andaccountability.

SECURITY

Genuine security remains a fundamental prerequisite for achievingstability and development in Afghanistan. Security cannot beprovided by military means alone. It requires good governance,justice and the rule of law, reinforced by reconstruction anddevelopment. With the support of the international community,the Afghan Government will consolidate peace by disbanding allillegal armed groups. The Afghan Government and the internationalcommunity will create a secure environment by strengtheningAfghan institutions to meet the security needs of the country in afiscally sustainable manner.

To that end, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force(ISAF), the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and partnernations involved in security sector reform will continue to providestrong support to the Afghan Government in establishing andsustaining security and stability in Afghanistan, subject toparticipating states’ national approval procedures. They willcontinue to strengthen and develop the capacity of the nationalsecurity forces to ensure that they become fully functional.

74

All OEF counter-terrorism operations will be conducted in closecoordination with the Afghan Government and ISAF. ISAF willcontinue to expand its presence throughout Afghanistan, includingthrough Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and will continueto promote stability and support security sector reforms in its areasof operation.

Full respect for Afghanistan’s sovereignty and strengtheningdialogue and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighboursconstitute an essential guarantee of stability in Afghanistan andthe region. The international community will support concreteconfidence-building measures to this end.

GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Democratic governance and the protection of human rightsconstitute the cornerstone of sustainable political progress inAfghanistan. The Afghan Government will rapidly expand itscapacity to provide basic services to the population throughoutthe country. It will recruit competent and credible professionals topublic service on the basis of merit; establish a more effective,accountable and transparent administration at all levels ofGovernment; and implement measurable improvements in fightingcorruption, upholding justice and the rule of law and promotingrespect for the human rights of all Afghans.

The Afghan Government will give priority to the coordinatedestablishment in each province of functional institutions –including civil administration, police, prisons and judiciary. Theseinstitutions will have appropriate legal frameworks andappointment procedures; trained staff; and adequate remuneration,infrastructure and auditing capacity. The Government will establisha fiscally and institutionally sustainable administration for futureelections under the supervision of the Afghanistan IndependentElectoral Commission.

Reforming the justice system will be a priority for the AfghanGovernment and the international community. The aim will be toensure equal, fair and transparent access to justice for all basedupon written codes with fair trials and enforceable verdicts.Measures will include: completing legislative reforms for the publicas well as the private sector; building the capacity of judicial

75

institutions and personnel; promoting human rights and legalawareness; and rehabilitating judicial infrastructure.

The Afghan Government and the international community reaffirmtheir commitment to the protection and promotion of rightsprovided for in the Afghan constitution and under applicableinternational law, including the international human rightscovenants and other instruments to which Afghanistan is party.With a view to rebuilding trust among those whose lives wereshattered by war, reinforcing a shared sense of citizenship and aculture of tolerance, pluralism and observance of the rule of law,the Afghan Government with the support of the internationalcommunity will implement the Action Plan on Peace, Justice andReconciliation.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The Afghan Government with the support of the internationalcommunity will pursue high rates of sustainable economic growthwith the aim of reducing hunger, poverty and unemployment.It will promote the role and potential of the private sector, alongsidethose of the public and non-profit sectors; curb the narcoticsindustry; ensure macroeconomic stability; restore and promote thedevelopment of the country’s human, social and physical capital,thereby establishing a sound basis for a new generation of leadersand professionals; strengthen civil society; and complete thereintegration of returnees, internally displaced persons andex-combatants.

Public investments will be structured around the six sectors of thepillar on economic and social development of the AfghanistanNational Development Strategy:

1. Infrastructure and natural resources;

2. Education;

3. Health;

4. Agriculture and rural development;

5. Social protection; and

6. Economic governance and private sector development.

76

In each of these areas, the objective will be to achieve measurableresults towards the goal of equitable economic growth that reducespoverty, expands employment and enterprise creation, enhancesopportunities in the region and improves the well-being of allAfghans.

COUNTER-NARCOTICS –A CROSS-CUTTING PRIORITY

Meeting the threat that the narcotics industry poses to national,regional and international security as well as the development andgovernance of the country and the well-being of Afghans will be apriority for the Government and the international community.The aim will be to achieve a sustained and significant reductionin the production and trafficking of narcotics with a view tocomplete elimination. Essential elements include improvedinterdiction, law enforcement and judicial capacity building;enhanced cooperation among Afghanistan, neighbouring countriesand the international community on disrupting the drugs trade;wider provision of economic alternatives for farmers and labourersin the context of comprehensive rural development; and buildingnational and provincial counter-narcotics institutions. It will alsobe crucial to enforce a zero-tolerance policy towards officialcorruption; to pursue eradication as appropriate; to reinforce themessage that producing or trading opiates is both immoral and aviolation of Islamic law; and to reduce the demand for the illicituse of opiates.

COORDINATION AND MONITORING

The Afghan Government and the international community areestablishing a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board for theimplementation of the political commitments that comprise thisCompact. As detailed in Annex III, this Board will be co-chairedby the Afghan Government and the United Nations and will besupported by a small secretariat. It will ensure greater coherenceof efforts by the Afghan Government and international communityto implement the Compact and provide regular and timely publicreports on its execution.

77

* We acknowledge the generosity of Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF) forpermitting us to reprint the names of youth organizations in Afghanistancollected as a part of the study conducted by them. See T. Murer, J. Nader,S. Schmeidl, Mapping Youth Organizations in Afghanistan, ACSF, 2005.

Name of Street City ProvinceOrganization

Afghanistan Youth Bagh e Bala, Kabul KabulAssociation Next to Peace

Guest House

Afghanistan Youth Khushahl Khan Kabul KabulAssociation Meena, Opp. to

Poly Tec.

Afghanistan Youth Maihan Sports ClubKhair Khana Part 1 Kabul Kabul

Afghanistan YouthAssociation Chamkanai Peshawar NWFP

Afghanistan Youth Mazar-i-Sharif BalkhAssociation

Afghanistan Red Nassaji Ghulbahar Kapisa Kapisacross VolunteersCulturalAssociation

Parwan Training Ariana CourseAssociation Parwan Parwan Parwan Parwan

Subat Cultural Kate Parwan, Opp. Kabul KabulInstitute TolmamAzam Mosque

Afghanistan Youth Kolola Poshta, St.#3 Kabul KabulCenter House #13

Bamian YouthCultural Foundation

Bamian Youth Bamian BamianDevelopmentProgram

Annexure-VI∗

List of Youth Organizations in Afghanistan

78

Name of Street City ProvinceOrganization

Afghanistan YouthCenter

Democratic Students Karte Parwan,Movement Behind Baharistan Kabul Kabul

Cinema

Afghan Youth Taimani Project Kabul KabulSociety 1st Road, 1st St.

Afghan Youth Hazart Gul Market Paktia PaktiaSociety 2nd Floor

Afghan Youth Haji AIji Market Jalalabad NangarharSociety 3rd Floor

Afghan Jadaye Maiwand Kabul KabulCultural Opp. to MaiwandAssociation Hospital, 4th Floor

I RTEBAT

National Youth Wazir Akbar Khan Kabul KabulSociety

The Union of Baraki Barak, Sarkh Khoshi LogarLogar Youth

The Union of Opposite to Kabul Kabul KabulAfghanistan Nandari, Next toYouth Charnan-e-Huzuri

Gorbat Cultural Chek province Chek WardakAssociation Barn baye Village

Arnanullahlmrans House

Gorbat Cultural Tairnani, St.# 6Association House# 9 Kabul Kabul

Gorbat Cultural GPO Box # 388 Peshawar PakistanAssociation

Gorbat Cultural Haupst 1 19d/ 41372 Niederkrucketen GermanyAssociation Niederkruchten

Cultural Haji Toryalai Chek Wardak

Organization of Wardaks HousePashtoon Sisters Brishnakot

Cultural Peshawar PakistanOrganization ofPashtoon Sisters

79

Name of Street City ProvinceOrganization

Youth and Children Opposite to Blocks Kabul KabulDevelopment Tahia MaskanProgram

Youth and Children Herat HeratDevelopmentProgram

Youth and Children Kandahar KandaharDevelopmentProgram

Youth and Children Jalalabad NangarharDevelopmentProgram

Youth and Children Panjsher PanjsherDevelopmentProgram

Afghanistan Youth Kart-e-Parwan Kabul KabulUnity Association 2nd Part, House # 7

Afghanistan Youth Al-Beroni University KapisaUnity AssociationAssociation

Afghanistan Youth KunduzUnity AssociationAssociation

Afghanistan Youth Mazar-i-Sharif BalkhUnity Association

Afghanistan Youth Ghazni GhazniUnity Association

Afghanistan Youth Khair Khana Kabul KabulSolidarity 3rd St.Organization Sarwar Kayenat

Afghanistan Youth Kabul University’s Kabul KabulCultural Center Last Bus Station

Olgo Monthlys Office

Afghanistan YouthCultural Center

Afghanistan Youth KabulFoundationfor Unity

80

Laghman Cultural Laghman Laghman LaghmanFoundation

Laghman Youth Laghman LaghmanFoundation

Ultat Cultural Laghman LaghmanSociety

Sahel Cultural Paron Noristan NoristanCommittee

Sahel Cultural Wargal Waras NoristanCommittee

Sahel Cultural Bargarntal Bargarntal NoristanCommittee

Sahel Cultural Mandol Mandol NoristanCommittee

Noor Cultural Doab Noristan NoristanCommittee

Noor Cultural Walt Waigal NoristanCommittee

Noor Cultural Nangrach Nangrach NoristanCommittee

Noor Cultural Mandol Mandol NoristanCommittee

Rasta Social and Karhala Bazar Asad Abad KunarCultural Society Shuhada market

Youth Independent Asad Abad KunarCulturalFoundation

Rana Literary Khas Kunar KunarMovernent

Youth National Nale KunarHopes Foundation

Sayed Bahuddin Band-e-Barq Str. Asad Abad KunarMajroh Cultural Dowshakhilo MarketAssociation

Shinwar Literary Maski Meena Bazar Nangarharand Cultural Society

Sayed Jamaluddin Next to Asad Asad Abad KunarAfghani Association Abad Gen

Name of Street City ProvinceOrganization

81

Afghanistan Next to Public Jalalabad NangarharYouth Center Health Office(Nangarhar)

Eastern Zone Afghan Cable Center Jalalabad NangarharIndependent Writersand JournalistsAssociation

Speenghar Literary Next to Jihadi Jalalabad NangarharOrganization and Wazir High School

Abdul Hamid Jalalabad NangarharMom and LiteraryFoundation

Speenghar Jalalabad NangarharArts Center

Tawakol Baba Deyalee Village Khewa NangarharCulturalFoundation

Toor Ghar Hejrat Village Sorkhroad NangarharEducational and DorontaCultural Foundation

Toor Ghar Mia Aslam Plaza Jalalabad NangarharEducational andCultural Foundation

Cultural Unity of Kellid Office Jalalabad NangarharYouth Society Next to Public Health

GeneralDepartment

Association for Qwaye Markaz Kabul KabulAdvocacy of Baharistan RoadYouth Rights Opposite to Cinema

Nazarabad Next to Nangarhar Sorkhroad NangarharEducational and UniversityCultural Society Nazarabad Village

Afghan Women 3th Zone Jalalabad NangarharProsperity Next to PakistanAssociation Consulate

Afghan Peace loving Behind Pakistan Jalalabad NangarharWomen Commission Consulate

40 Manzila St.

Name of Street City ProvinceOrganization

82

Resource Persons’ Profile

Abas Baser is First Secretary, Embassy of Afghanistan inNew Delhi. He represented Ghazni province in Emergency LoyaJirga and also acted as Deputy to the Office of AfghanistanConstituent Commission in Tehran for four months. Later, he joinedthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Deputy Director in CulturalRelationship Department. He is a prolific writer and has writtenmore than one hundred political and legal articles which have beenpublished in various Afghan newspapers and magazines. He hasan M. Phil in International Legal Studies.

Abdul Ghafoor Liwal is currently the Director, Regional StudiesCentre of Afghanistan. He has been the Director of Department ofCultural and Social Affairs and media Consultant with the Officeof the Administrative Affairs from 2005-06. A recipient of theHumphrey Fellowship in Journalism, Mr. Liwal has been aconsultant for the Centre for the Languages of the Central AsianRegion in Indiana University, USA. He has been a spokesman andpress officer for the Secretariat of Constitutional Commission ofAfghanistan. He was Editor at the Institute of War and Peace andthe Chief Editor and reporter of the Pashto service (Kabul Bureau)of Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. Mr. Liwal is an alumnus of theUniversity of Maryland (College Park) College of Journalism, USA,with eight books to his credit.

A.K. Rashid is currently Visiting Professor at the Centre of Persianand Central Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhiwherein he has developed the Pashto Program of study uptoAdvanced Diploma Level. He has authored several books andarticles pertaining to Pashto and Dari Studies. His works include;Criticism in Pashto and Dari, Resistance Literature in Pashto, Historyof Pashto Criticism. He has also translated Meghdootam and VikramUrwasiya of Kalidasa into Pashto and Dari. He has penned fourcollections of short stories in Pashto. Prof. Rashid was awarded hisPh.D degree by the Department of Persian, Jamia Millia Islamia,New Delhi.

I.P. Khosla is presently on the Board of Directors, Indo-AfghanFoundation. He completed his education from St. Stephens College,University of Delhi and Emmanuel College, Cambridge, UK.

83

Mr. Khosla joined the Indian Foreign Service, and served initiallyin Vienna and Algiers, where he helped to establish the Embassy.He has also served as Counsellor (POL) in London. Thereafter, heserved as India’s Ambassador to Bhutan, Bangladesh (as HighCommissioner), and as Ambassador to Afghanistan and TheNetherlands. He also served as Secretary to the Indian Governmentin the Ministry of External Affairs. He has written extensively onsecurity issues including non-traditional security, as well as onother matters relating to India’s external interests, particularlyIndia’s relations with South Asian neighbors and SAARC countries.

Jawed Nader is a student of Management Sciences at BangaloreUniversity, India. Born in Ghazni, Afghanistan, Jawed Nadermigrated to Peshawar, Pakistan at the age of five. Upon returningto Afghanistan in 2002, he worked with Swisspeace Foundation,and Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF) to strengthen the role ofdifferent segments of Afghan civil society, particularly the youthin the peace and reconstruction processes of Afghanistan. He hasbeen associated with student initiatives like Young Leaders Forumand Agahi Foundation in Kabul. Mr. Nader has briefly worked forthe Government of Afghanistan as part of the Afghanistan-PakistanJoint Peace Jirga’s organization team. He has represented AfghanYouth in the first Pan-Asian Youth Leadership Summit, 2004,in Hiroshima, Japan and participated in Afghan and German youthdialogue in Berlin, Germany in 2005.

Philipp Ackermann is working as Minister Counsellor (Headof Political Department) in the German Embassy to India inNew Delhi. He received a Ph.D in Art History from Bonn Universityand subsequently, joined the German Foreign Service. Among otherappointments, Mr. Ackermann has served as an exchange diplomatin the Foreign Office of the Netherlands. Eventually, he wasassigned to the German Embassy in Morocco and served as FirstSecretary at the Permanent Mission of Germany to the UnitedNations in New York before becoming first the principalspeechwriter to former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer andthen a member of the inner cabinet of Foreign Minister, FrankWalter Steinmeier. In 2006, he was assigned to be the civilian headof the German Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kunduz,Afghanistan.

84

Radha Kumar is the Director of the Mandela Centre for Peace andConflict Resolution at Jamia Millia Islamia University, and trusteeof the Delhi Policy Group, is a specialist on ethnic conflicts andpeace processes. Her books include Making Peace with Partition(Penguin: 2005), Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition(Verso: 1997), A History of Doing: Movements for Women’s Rightsand Feminism in India, 1900-1990 (Kali for Women and Verso: 1993).She had edited or authored roughly 30 reports, of which the mostrecent are Delhi Policy Group publications, Frameworks for aKashmir Settlement (2007, 2006), Peace-Building: European andIndian Views (2007), Peace Agreements and After (2006), and WhatMakes a Peace Process Irreversible? (2005).

T.C.A. Raghavan is currently Joint Secretary dealing with Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran in the Ministry of External Affairs, Governmentof India. He holds a Masters degree in Modern Indian History anda Ph.D in Modern History from Jawaharlal Nehru University,New Delhi. A member of the Indian Foreign Service since 1982, hehas served in Kuwait, Bhutan and the UK interspersed with postingsin New Delhi in the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministryof Commerce. From February 2003 till March 2007, Dr. Raghavanwas posted in Pakistan as Deputy High Commissioner of India.

85

Participants’ Profile

Adrian Norfolg is currently Political Counselor at the CanadianHigh Commission, New Delhi. Before joining the Foreign Service,he was involved in development work in Africa and Asia,including for 5 years (1988-93) as Field Director in Sri Lanka forthe World University Service of Canada, an NGO involvedin providing vocational training programs and employmentopportunities to youth affected by the civil wars in that country.

Alexis Ringwold is a Fulbright Scholar to India based at The Energyand Resources Institute. Her research is focused on climate change,clean energy technologies and the appropriate business modelsfor scale and replication to help India pursue a more sustainableenergy path; she is currently publishing a paper on “IndiaRenewable Energy Trends.” Alexis’ previous work experienceincludes the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, Ecologic-The Institute for International and Environmental Policy in Berlin,and independent research on international renewable energypolicies at the German Parliament with the EnvironmentCommittee. She is a graduate from Yale University with a Masterof Environmental Management and a B.A. in Political Science.

Amad Ghani Khosrawi is presently a guest lecturer at Jamia MilliaIslamia, New Delhi. He completed his M.A and B.A in Persianliterature from Jamia Millia Islamia and Herat University ofAfghanistan. He has earlier worked as lecturer in the literatureand humanities faculty of Herat University and also served as theHead of the Persian Department

Anna-Kaisa Heikkinen is Second Secretary at the Embassy ofFinland, New Delhi. Her duties at the Embassy include the follow-up of Indian political affairs, development questions, press andcultural affairs as well as the follow-up of Nepal, Bhutan andBangladesh. Ms. Heikkinen holds a Master’s degree in SocialScience (major in International Relations) from the TampereUniversity, Finland. Prior to joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairsin 2003, Ms. Heikkinen worked in the field of public relations andcommunications.

Anita Inder Singh is Visiting Professor at the Centre for Peace andConflict Resolution at the Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, where

86

her special task is to frame a graduate course on Development andSecurity. She has previously taught International Relations atOxford University and the London School of Economics andPolitical Science (as Leverhulme Fellow in the Department ofInternational Relations), and has been a Fellow at the Centre forSocio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College, Oxford. She received herD.Phil. from Oxford University, UK. Her doctoral thesis The Originsof the Partition of India, 1936-1947 was first published in 1987.Her other books are The Limits of British Influence: South Asia andthe Anglo-American Relationship 1947-56 (1993), and Democracy,Ethnic Diversity and Security in Post-Communist Europe (2001).

Aryaman Bhatnagar has been working with The YP Foundation(TYPF) since early 2007. He is currently working as theAdministrative Head of Blending Spectrum, an initiative by TheYP Foundation that engages young people in the community toempower children living in the streets and slums of Delhi whilstsupporting other organizations working in the field. Aryaman isalso a Peer Educator on issues of Child Rights, Child Labour andChild Domestic Labour, where he has worked with TYPF andUNICEF with 1000 school children, conducting over 20 workshopsacross 10 schools in New Delhi. A History Honours student ofHansraj College, University of Delhi, Aryaman is also an activeDebater in his college Debating Society and a member of the QuizSociety at Hanraj. Aryaman is also a member of the Eco Symposiumof his college.

Aziz Ahmed Khalid is a second year student of the B.A (Pass) courseat Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. He is also the AdministrativeOfficer at a Language Centre and has earlier taught for f our yearsat Kandahar, Afghanistan.

Barai Mangal is pursuing his Bachelors in Economics from JamiaMillia Islamia, New Delhi. He hails from Paktia in SouthAfghanistan and finished his schooling from Amani High School.He is a member of the Afghan Students Union in New Delhi.

Franz Gastler is a Consultant with the Social DevelopmentInitiatives of the Confederation of Indian Industries. Franz Gastlergrew up in Minneapolis, Minnesota (USA). He has a Masters ininternational political economy from Boston University’s UniversityProfessors Program and a specialization in negotiation and

87

mediation from Harvard Law School’s Program on Negotiation. Before coming to India to work with the Confederation of IndianIndustry’s (CII) Social Development Initiatives, he worked inBuenos Aires, Argentina and at the Ministry of Finance in Bogota,Colombia. He is currently working with the Government ofJharkhand, private companies and local NGOs to create manageablepartnerships.

Ghulam Sakhi Mohammedi was born in Herat and graduated fromInghalab High School, Herat t. He has earlier worked as a freelancejournalist with IWPR, Afghanistan. He completed his Bachelors inJournalism from Kabul. He was awarded an ICCR Scholarship in2003, through which he obtained a second Bachelors degree inPolitical Science from Delhi University. He also has a Mastersdegree in Political Science from Jamia Millia Islamia and in MassCommunication and Journalism from S.M.U University. He hasworked as the Editor of Andisha e Jawan Magazine published inEnglish and Persian.

Hamasa Ebady is a doing her B.A. in Political Science (H) fromJamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi. Born in KabulAfghanistan in 1987, she started her schooling at Laiseh Dosti,Alfatha High School in Kabul. With intensification of the conflictin Kabul, she shifted with her family to Mazar-i-Sharif, from whereshe completed her high school from Tajrobawe High School.

Hamdia Hamdard is a second year student of the B.A (Pass) courseat Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. She was born in Urozgon,Afghanistan and graduated from Nursing High school in 2004. Shehas worked with Cooperazioni Interzionali (COOPI) as anAdministrator assistant in Kandahar and Kabul.

Hedayatullah Rahmati is a student at Jamia Millia Islamia,New Delhi.

Ishita Chaudhry is an alumnus of The Shri Ram School and didher BA Honours in English Literature from Lady Shri Ram College,Delhi University. She has worked with the Consultancy Divisionof Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) India and is currently theConsulting Editor of Kalyani, a health communication magazineproduced by the Development Communication Division ofDoordarshan. Ishita is the Founder and Managing Trustee of The

88

YP Foundation (formerly known as The Youth Parliament) in 2002in association with the India Habitat Centre, a non profitorganization that supports and develops young people’s initiativesin New Delhi.

Khalid Hashimi is pursuing his Bachelors degree in PoliticalScience from the University of Delhi, Delhi. He completed hisschooling from Rahman Baba, Kabul. He is a member of the AfghanStudent Union in New Delhi.

Khushal Khattak is pursuing his masters in Sociology fromJawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is from Peshawar,Pakistan and is a member of the Pakistan India People’s Forum forPeace and Democracy. He has represented the Pakhtoon StudentsFederation (the student wing of the Awami National Party) on severaloccasions in various international forums. He has also participatedin several conferences organized by the Human Rights Commissionof Pakistan, South Asians for Human Rights etc.

Klaus Julian Voll is a specialist on India’s foreign, security, domesticand social politics. He has been living in New Delhi for the last 25years and has formerly served as representative of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and as a diplomat at the German Embassy. He isalso an honorary consultant to the UN-World Food Program in India.He is an accredited journalist and a prolific writer who combines amultidisciplinary, methodological approach through several booksas well as articles in various journals, newspapers and websitestowards a wider understanding of India.

Mahjabin Omar is pursuing his Masters in Persian literature fromJamia Millia Islamia University. He completed his B.A in Persianliterature from Herat University Afghanistan. He has earlier workedas a lecturer in Literature and Humanities at Heart University.

Mansoor Jalal is currently pursuing his Bachelors degree fromJamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. He has worked as Deputy SecurityManager, USAID (United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment), Alternative livelihoods Program EasternAfghanistan, Security officer USAID, Afghanistan immediate NeedsProgram. Jalalabad and as Field Security Assistant, ANSO(Afghanistan NGOs Safety Office) EU Funded Program, Jalalabad.

89

Manouchiher Roshangar is currently pursuing his Bachelors inEconomics from Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi after completinghis schooling in Afghanistan. He has also worked at AGEF, a Germangovt. organization and UNOPS in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Mohd. Ilyas Noor is pursuing his B. Com from the University ofDelhi.

Mondira Dutta is Professor, Central Asian Studies Division at theCentre for South, Central, Southeast Asia and Southwest PacificStudies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She is at presentengaged in a research project entitled “Capacity Building for PovertyEradication” sponsored by the Dept. of Administrative Reforms &Public Grievances, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances andPensions, Govt. of India. Her forthcoming books are on Womenand Work: Asian Perspective and Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation:A Situational Analysis.

Monica Wahi is the Founder of Himmat which was set up after thecommunal riots in Gujarat to rehabilitate widows. She started hercareer by assisting Anand Patwardhan on the epic award winningfilm “War and Peace”. She was freelancing as a documentary filmeditor when she visited Ahmedabad in 2002 to volunteer in therelief camps for carnage survivors and decided to stay back. Sheorganized women who were widowed in the carnage to formHimmat – a self sustaining collective. Now Ms. Wahi lives betweentwo cities – Ahmedabad and Delhi where she continues herengagement with Indo-Pak peace initiatives along with her interestsin creating educational resources and media. She is the CreativeDirector of a non profit media trust ‘Going to School’ which createsfilms, books, radio to make education fun and relevant to children’slives.

Moska Najib is currently residing and working in New Delhi as aProducer with BBC News. Born in Kabul, Afghanistan,Ms. Najib is primarily involved in the production of daily newscoverage from South Asia, both for TV and Radio. From time totime she contributes to the BBC News online website, with a keeninterest to cover Afghan-related issues from the region. Shecompleted her secondary education in India, and pursuedher further studies in Europe where she graduated with a B.A. inInternational Communications and Double Minors in History and

90

Art History. She has traveled extensively within Europe, Africa,South Asia and Cuba.

Nazir Ahmad Yosufzai has completed his BBA from JagannathInternational Management School ,GGSIP University, New Delhiand a course on India International Business from AmericanInternational University of Management & Technology. He has heldManagerial positions at Sistaan Company in Nimrouz Afghanistanand at N.N.F ltdIn Kabul, Afghanistan.

R. Ramasubramanian is pursuing a Ph.D in South Asian Studiesat the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His academicinterests include peace studies, conflict resolution, security andhumanitarian issues. He has been selected as Hansen Fellow ofLeadership and International Cooperation, and is a recipient of theWISCOMP Scholar of Peace Fellowship to work on a project titled“Women in Post-Conflict Politybuilding: Lessons from Afghanistan.”He is a recipient of the University Gold Medal for the M.A. programin International Relations at Pondicherry University, India, and theInternational Award for Young People from Duke of Edinburgh,UK.

Ratna Menon is currently a Scholar of Peace Fellow at WISCOMP.Her research is in the field of border studies and examines narrativesof state territoriality and national security by focusing on the fencedIndia-Pakistan border in Punjab. She received her M.A. inAnthropology from The New School for Social Research (New York)in 2007.

Roya Saqib is currently a second year student of B.A. (Pass) at JamiaMillia Islamia, New Delhi. She completed her schooling from AbulQasem Ferdausee High School in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Shamroz Khan Masjidi is currently pursuing his Bachelors degreefrom Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi after completing his schoolingfrom Hakim Nasir Khosraw Balkhi High School, Kabul, Afghanistan.He has also taught English as a second language at many centres inKabul.

Stella Kloth is the Political Officer at the Canadian Embassy inKabul, Afghanistan.

Swapna Kona Nayudu is a student of politics and history. She is

91

currently working on demystifying the politics of identity in Indiaand in Afghanistan. She is a WISCOMP Scholar of Peace Fellow,and her project deals with the politics of minority representationwith respect to gender in Afghanistan’s National Parliament.She is increasingly interested in the praxis of power equations.Her doctoral thesis will look at the loss of political ideology inIndia’s evolving democracy. The tangents of International Relationstheory, with a particular emphasis on Constructivist thought, driveher research. She holds a Masters degree in International Relationsfrom the University of Bristol, UK, and degrees in History, MiddleEastern Studies, and Gender from the Universities of Westminster,UK and Pune, India.

Swati Sahani works as a Teacher Trainer with PRAVAH,New Delhi. She completed her Bachelors in Elementary Educationfrom Lady Shri Ram College, University of Delhi and Masters inElementary Education from Tata Institute of Social Sciences,Mumbai. She is currently pursuing a course in ConflictTransformation and Peace Building from Lady Shri Ram College,New Delhi.

Tanvi Rao has been working with The YP Foundation (TYPF) sinceearly 2007. She is a Location Head Coordinator at BlendingSpectrum, an initiative by The YP Foundation that engages youngpeople in the community to empower children living in the streetsand slums of Delhi whilst supporting other organizations workingin the field. Tanvi oversees the Blending Spectrum project run atSarai Hostel, in partnership with the NGO Aman Biradiri. She isalso a Peer Educator on issues of Child Rights, Child Labour andChild Domestic Labour.

Udit Rastogi has been working with The YP Foundation since 2007as a Peer Facilitator and Project Rapporteur of Project 19:Understanding HIV/AIDS, where he is part of a Project Team thattrains and coordinates a team of over 25 young people to execute acomprehensive campaign aimed at creating understanding andsensitivity amongst young people in Delhi on various aspects ofHIV/AIDS. Udit is also a member of the Editorial Board, theEconomics Society and the Debating Society at his college. Udithas participated in the Model United Nations. He is currentlystudying Economics at Hansraj College, University of Delhi.

92

Vincent Nicod is South Asian Head of ICRC. He joined the ICRC in1981 as a Field delegate in Thailand. As a Regional Delegate of theICRC, he is the senior resource person for the various disseminationsessions related to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) such asviolations of IHL (Terrorism, Genocide, War Crimes), theMechanisms of Repression (International Criminal Tribunals ofThe Hague and Arusha, the International Criminal Court) and also‘Woman and War’ (the special need for the protection of women intime of conflict). These IHL sessions are imparted to the ArmedForces, Navy, and Police and also to Universities and students allover India. His academic background is International HumanitarianLaw, Diplomacy and Management.

Yahya Amiry is pursuing his Bachelors from Jamia Millia Islamia,New Delhi. Born in Kabul, he moved with his family to Mazar whenthe civil war erupted. He has taught English language in privateschools of northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif and conductedhigher intermediate classes and LTM [language teachingmethodology] classes. He also has the experience of conductingclasses of English language for ZOA Refugee Care (i.e. an INGO)national staff and UNDP/ANBP (Afghanistan’s New BeginningProgram). He has also worked as Training Assistant at the UNAMAMZR Regional Office and Language Assistant at the political unitof UNAMA.

Zalla Khattak is currently doing her Masters in Politics, withspecialization in International Relations from Jawaharlal NehruUniversity, New Delhi. A Pathan by origin, Ms. Khattak hails fromPeshawar, North West Frontier Province. She has a background inhuman rights activism and is an active member of the HumanRights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), South Asians for HumanRights (SAHR), Pakistan-India People’s Forum for Peace andDemocracy (PIPFPD). She has earlier worked as the chapter co-coordinator of the Youth Forum, formed under the umbrella of thePIPFPD aimed at mobilizing the youth in the peace movementin Pakistan and India.

93

94