SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138862.  August 15, 2003]

DR. MANUEL CAMACHO, petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO GLORIA, DR. EDMUNDO PRANTILLA, DIR. SANTIAGO ENGINCO, As members of the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines; HON. RENO CAPINPIN, CESAR LIMBAGA, LEOVIGILDO ARELLANO, As members of the Special Investigation Committee; DR. THELMA LEDESMA, and HON. WENCESLAO IBABAO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Davao City, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioner Manuel Camacho seeks the review of the decision dated September 9, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42860 affirming the resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, which denied the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner against respondents.

Petitioner is the Dean of the College of Education of the University of Southeastern Philippines (USP). Sometime in June 1995, several doctorate students complained to petitioner of certain “ghost students” in the Ed. D. 317 class of Dr. Sixto Daleon during the first semester of school year 1994-1995 who were given passing grades despite their unjustified failure to attend classes.

Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the University President Edmundo Prantilla and to the Board of Regents (BOR) where Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Secretary Ricardo Gloria sat as chairman.  On December 23, 1995, the Board of Regents passed Resolution No. 2432 Series of 1995, upholding the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Aida Agulo.

Disgruntled, petitioner filed a complaint on January 25, 1996, against Dr. Daleon before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao for gross incompetence and insubordination.  The complaint, docketed as OMB-ADM-3-96-0132, was later amended to include the University Board of Regents chaired by then DECS Secretary Gloria, DECS Legal Officer Reno Capinpin, and the three students who received passing marks despite numerous absences, namely Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba and Norma Tecson.

On June 3, 1997, Graft Investigator Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., issued a resolution dismissing OMB-ADM-3-96-0132, which was approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.  On August 22, 2002, this Court rendered a decision affirming said resolution of the Ombudsman.

Meanwhile, on February 21, 1996, Dr. Thelma S. Ledesma, Secretary of the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines, filed a complaint against petitioner before the Office of the USP President for grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a dean and falsification of public documents.  Docketed as Administrative Case No. 001,  Ledesma’s complaint alleged that

petitioner rigged the results of the performance evaluation test taken by her students in order to justify petitioner in not giving her any teaching assignment.

Acting on Adm. Case No. 001, Secretary Gloria, in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of Regents of USP, created a Special Investigation Committee (SIC) composed of DECS Assistant Secretary Reno A. Capinpin as Chairman, with Leovigildo P. Arellano and Cesar M. Limbaga as members.  During the preliminary conference on August 1, 1996, petitioner moved for the inhibition of the committee members on the ground that the ones who formed the committee, namely DECS Secretary Gloria and the committee chairman, Atty. Capinpin, were both respondents in the Ombudsman case he filed.

In a resolution dated August 19, 1996, the Special Investigation Committee resolved to deny petitioner’s motion to inhibit, and scheduled the case for hearing on August 22, 1996.

On August 21, 1996, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 33 in Civil Case No. 24, 606-96, naming Secretary Gloria, and the chairman and members of the Special Investigation Committee as respondents.  Petitioner prayed that the Special Investigation Committee be restrained from hearing Admin. Case No. 001 as the creation of the committee violated his right to due process.

On August 21, 1996, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order.  Respondents seasonably filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, insufficiency of the petition in form and substance, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.  Petitioner opposed respondents’ motion while Dr. Thelma S. Ledesma filed her urgent motion for leave to intervene.

In a resolution dated October 14, 1996, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s petition for prohibition.  In the trial court’s rationale, petitioner should have first exhausted his administrative remedies by undergoing investigation by the committee, and if its ruling is adverse, to appeal the same to the Secretary of Education, and, thereafter, to the Office of the President.  The trial court likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its order dated November 14, 1996.

Forthwith, petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42860.  On September 9, 1997, the appellate court denied the petition as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Before us, petitioner raises now the following issues:

1.       WHETHER OR NOT EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO JUDICIAL RELIEF;

2.       WHETHER OR NOT THE PASSAGE OF B.P. BLG. 12 (AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES)

REPEALED PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE RULES AND OF THE MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS;

3.       WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7722 (AN ACT CREATING THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) DIVESTED THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) OF HIS JURISDICTION OVER TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS; AND

4.       WHETHER OR NOT THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 001.

Despite petitioner’s formulation, we find that the pertinent issues could be stated briefly as follows: (1) whether or not the Board of Regents of USP, through the Special Investigation Committee, has jurisdiction over Adm. Case No. 001 and (2) whether or not petitioner’s right to due process was violated by the Special Investigation Committee of the university.

On one hand, petitioner avers that the Board of Regents has no jurisdiction over his case considering that as a teacher, original jurisdiction over the administrative case against him is vested with a committee whose composition must be in accordance with Republic Act No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that inasmuch as the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the university, it has the power to create investigating committees to act upon administrative complaints filed against its personnel pursuant to the USP Charter, Batas Pambansa Blg. 12.

We agree with the Solicitor General’s submission.  The Board of Regents where DECS Secretary Gloria sat as Chairman has jurisdiction over the administrative case filed by Dr. Ledesma against petitioner.  The BOR’s authority to create the investigating committee as its arm to probe into the charges against petitioner emanates from the law creating USP, its Charter, BP Blg. 12. Section 6 thereof provides that the governing body of the university shall be the Board of Regents.  In addition to its general powers of administration, the Charter also accords the Board the specific power to appoint the deans, directors, or heads of colleges, schools, institutes and other principal units of the university.  Consonant to its power to hire is the power to discipline its personnel.  It is, therefore, in line with the BOR’s power of governance to create a Special Investigation Committee to probe into administrative complaints filed against its officers.

Under its Charter, USP’s Board of Regents must be chaired by the Secretary of Education. Moreover, initially under Presidential Decree No. 1437, defining the composition and powers of the governing boards, as well as the appointment and term of office of the Presidents of chartered state universities and colleges, the Secretary of Education was Chairman of the Board of Regents in all state universities.

Later, Republic Act 7722, an Act Creating the Commission of Higher Education (CHED), divested the DECS Secretary of jurisdiction over tertiary institutions.  Specifically, Section 18 of

Rep. Act 7722 provides: “Jurisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and technical programs and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission.”  However, Rep. Act 7722 and its Implementing Rules merely replaced the DECS Secretary with the Chairman of the CHED as Chairman of all boards of regents of state universities. The power of the boards of regents to administer and govern chartered state universities was neither removed nor curtailed.  The legislative intent to preserve the administrative power of said governing boards, including the power to hire and fire school officials and personnel, is manifest even in the most recent law, Republic Act 8292, the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997. Thus, it is clear that the governing boards of the state universities have retained jurisdiction over administrative cases involving its officials and employees.

As a matter of fact, the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines has already undergone reorganization in light of Rep. Act 7722, this time with the Chairman of the CHED as its head. Accordingly, the BOR has reorganized the composition of the Special Investigation Committee.  But notwithstanding the changes in the composition of the board as well as in the investigation committee, in his bid to divest the BOR of jurisdiction over the case against him, petitioner still contends that the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, Rep. Act 4670 of 1966, is the law that should determine who shall compose the investigating committee.

On this score, we cannot agree with petitioner.  The definition of “teacher” in Section 2 of Rep. Act 4670 practically covers the entire gamut of the teaching profession including “all other persons performing supervisory and/or administrative functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the Government or its political subdivisions.” However, the Magna Carta has not been shown to be inconsistent with BP Blg. 12, or vice versa.  It is a rule in statutory construction that every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus petitioner’s submission, in our view, lacks sufficient legal basis.

The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers is a general law governing the conduct of administrative cases against public school teachers, whereas BP Blg. 12 is a special law governing the University of Southeastern Philippines.  It particularly defines the composition and powers of its Board of Regents and other officials of the university.  On a specific matter, a special statute prevails over a general law.  Lastly, Section 9 of the Magna Carta is silent as to the composition of the committee if the person administratively charged is a College Dean of a state university. Given its powers under BP Blg. 12, the USP Board of Regents may certainly create a committee to assist it in resolving administrative complaints filed against one of the university officials that it appointed.

Further, petitioner contends that the creation of the committee by the respondent Secretary, as Chairman of the USP Board of Regents, was contrary to the Civil Service Rules.  However, he cites no specific provision of the Civil Service Law which was violated by the respondents in forming the investigating committee.  The Civil Service Rules embodied in Executive Order 292 recognize the power of the Secretary and the university, through its governing board, to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction.  Of course under EO 292, a complaint against a state university official may be

filed either with the university’s Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission, although the CSC may delegate the investigation of a complaint and for that purpose, may deputize any department, agency, official or group of officials to conduct such investigation.

On the second issue, petitioner contends that he was not accorded his right to due process when respondent Secretary Gloria formed the Special Investigation Committee.  Petitioner laments that he could not expect the cold neutrality of an impartial judge from the Special Investigation Committee considering that Secretary Gloria was one of the respondents in OMB-ADM-3-96-0132.  He adds that neither can he expect fair treatment from the Committee Chairman, Atty. Reno Capinpin, who was also one of the co-respondents therein.  Petitioner also claims that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that petitioner should have first exhausted his administrative remedies by undergoing investigation by the committee, with possible appeal to the Secretary of Education and thereafter the Office of the President.  The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, according to petitioner, rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, would decide the matter correctly, unlike in his case, he said, where a fair trial is a remote possibility given the composition of the investigating committee.

Petitioner’s allegations that Secretary Gloria and the Special Investigation Committee members were biased and partial are merely speculative.  There is no showing that the Education Secretary and the Committee members had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case against petitioner.  Absent persuasive proof of bias and partiality, Secretary Gloria and the committee could not be presumed to be incapable of acting regularly in the performance of official functions.  They must be accorded the benefit of the presumption that they would act in a manner befitting their sworn duties, particularly, with “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” implicit in the guarantee of due process.

Lastly, we must stress that generally a party must explore all remedies available in the administrative arena before seeking judicial relief.  This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal reasons.  For one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.  The administrative authority must be given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.  In this case, petitioner has no valid reason to block at the very outset the Board of Regents and the Special Investigation Committee from performing their functions.  Only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.

To conclude, the Court finds: (a) that the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint against petitioner, and (b) that petitioner’s right to due process was not infringed by the BOR’s formation of the Special Investigation Committee.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  The decision dated September 9, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42860 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Callejo, Sr., on leave.

Rollo, pp. 12-17.

CA Rollo, pp. 18-27.

Id. at 33-34.

Camacho v. Coresis, Jr., G.R. No. 134372 , 22 August 2002, p. 12.

CA Rollo, pp. 68-70.

Id. at 92-93.

Id. at 93.

Id. at 94-103.

Id. at 86-87.

Id. at 130-135.

Id. at 140.

Id. at 141-161.

Supra, note 2.

CA Rollo, p. 28.

Id. at 5-16.

Supra, note 1.

Rollo, p. 4.

Enacted without Executive approval, 15 December 1978.

SEC. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the composition of the governing boards of chartered state universities and colleges is hereby modified and reconstituted as follows:

Secretary of Education and Culture, Chairman

President of the University or College, Vice-Chairman

Representative of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Member

Two (2) prominent citizens who have distinguished themselves in the professions or fields of specialization of the institutions concerned, one representing the alumni of the institution concerned, the other chosen from prominent citizens in the city or province where the school is located, to be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of Education and Culture, Member  (Emphasis supplied.)

x  x  x

Approved, 18 May 1994.

SEC. 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards. – The governing board shall have the following specific powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines:

x  x  x

g)  to appoint, upon the recommendation of the president of the university or college, vice presidents, deans, directors, heads of departments, faculty members and other officials and employees;

x  x  x

RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING R.A. 7722 AS AMENDED, Chapter I dated September 13, 1994.

x  x  x

                        Article 5.  Definition of Terms. – For purposes of these Rules, the following definitions will apply:

x  x  x

“The Chairman of the Commission shall serve as Chairman of the Governing Boards of SCUs until such time as their existing charters are revised.”  (Emphasis in the original.)

x  x  x

Rollo, p. 89.

SEC. 2. Title-Definition. – This Act shall be known as the “Magna Carta for Public School Teachers” and shall apply to all public school teachers except those in the professional staff of state colleges and universities.

As used in this Act, the term “teacher” shall mean all persons engaged in classroom teaching, in any level of instruction, on full-time basis, including guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial arts or vocational instructors, and all other persons performing supervisory and/or administrative functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the Government or its political subdivisions; but shall not include school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other school employees.  (Emphasis Supplied.)

City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella, G.R. No. 141211 , 31 August 2001, 364 SCRA 257, 278.

SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. – Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools.  The committee shall submit its findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings:  Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Executive Order No. 292, Book IV The Executive Branch, Subtitle A, Chapter 6.

SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.-

x  x  x

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction.  Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days', salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.  (Emphasis supplied.)

x  x  x

Id.

SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.-

(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.  A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation.  The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken. (Emphasis supplied.)

x  x  x

Rollo, p. 7.

See Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 143398 , 25 October 2000, 344 SCRA 358, 372.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 134372.  August 22, 2002]

MANUEL CAMACHO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JOVITO A. CORESIS, JR., Graft Investigation Officer I and/or OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN - MINDANAO, SIXTO O. DALEON, AIDA AGULO, DESIDERIO ALABA, NORMA TECSON, and the BOARD OF REGENTS of the UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES; SECRETARY RICARDO GLORIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY RENO CAPINPIN – of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), DR. EDMUNDO B. PRANTILLA, and NEDA REGIONAL DIRECTOR SANTIAGO ENGINCO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

Subject of the present petition for certiorari is the Resolution dated June 3, 1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, hereafter simply the Office, which dismissed the administrative and criminal complaints against respondents Sixto O. Daleon, Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba, Norma Tecson and the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines (USP), Davao City, for violation of Section 3 [a], [e] and [j] of Republic Act 3019 also known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” Also sought to be nullified is the Order of the Office dated September 10, 1997, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The pertinent facts as culled from the records are as follows:

Petitioner is the Dean of the College of Education of said university, since January 1994 to the present.  He has served the university as faculty member and as administrator for almost 13 years.

Respondent, Dr. Sixto O. Daleon, is a Professor 6 and officer-in-charge of the Graduate School of USP, with a salary grade of CS 29.  The other respondents, Agulo, Tecson and Alaba, are faculty members of said university.  They enrolled under Dr. Daleon in the subject Ed.D. 317, which is a Seminar in Curriculum Development, during the first semester of 1994-1995.  At the end of the semester, Dr. Daleon gave the three final passing grades of 1.0, 1.25 and 1.5, respectively. They were graded without requiring them to attend regular classes.  Instead, Dr. Daleon gave them a special program of self-study with reading materials, once a week tutorial meetings, quizzes, and term papers.

Sometime in June 1995, several doctoral students complained to petitioner that during the first semester of school year 1994-1995, there were “ghost students” in the Ed.D. 317 class of Dr. Daleon.  According to them, these “ghost students”, namely Agulo, Alaba and Tecson were given passing grades despite their failure to attend classes.

On June 13, 1995, petitioner informed Dr. Daleon of the complaint.  Petitioner requested the latter to furnish him with photocopies of exams, term papers, and record of attendance of the students involved.  Dr. Daleon ignored the request.

On July 28, 1995, the matter was raised in a university council meeting where it was agreed that the University President, Dr. Edmundo Prantilla, would create a committee to investigate the complaint.

In a letter dated August 10, 1995, Dr. Daleon apologized for the delay in responding to petitioner’s letter-request dated June 15, 1995.  Dr. Daleon admitted that he made special arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding their course  without petitioner’s approval.

Thereafter, petitioner wrote Dr. Prantilla recommending that Agulo, Tecson and Alaba be required to attend regular classes in school year 1995-1996 and comply with the course requirements in Ed.D. 317.  Dr. Prantilla approved the recommendations.  However, on December 1, 1995, Dr. Prantilla entertained the appeal of Agulo for the validation of the grades given by Dr. Daleon to the three of them.  On December 23, 1995, the Board of Regents passed its Resolution No. 2432 Series of 1995, upholding the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo.

Consequently, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Daleon before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.  The complaint for gross incompetence, insubordination and violation of R.A. 6770 was docketed as OMB-ADM-3-96-0132.

On May 28, 1996, petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Prayer, with a Supplement to Complaint-Affidavit for Violation of R.A. 3019 and/or such other penal laws against Dr. Daleon, Agulo, Alaba, Tecson and members of the USP Board of Regents, including Dr. Prantilla.  On July 24, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order directing respondent

members of the Board of Regents and the committee created to hear Administrative Case No. 96-602 to desist from conducting further proceedings thereon and to have the entire records of said criminal complaint forwarded to the Office for possible consolidation with the administrative complaint.

On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., graft investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, dismissing the administrative and criminal complaints against respondents.  Approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, the resolution in its dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding insufficient evidence to hold respondent Dr. Daleon liable for the administrative charges of incompetence, insubordination and favoritism or unjust discrimination, or of any other laws, let the instant case be ordered DISMISSED.

Likewise, finding no prima facie case of violation of Section 3(a), (e) and (j), the criminal complaint filed by Dr. Camacho against Professor Daleon, Mr. Desiderio Alaba, Misses Aida Agulo, Norma Tecson, and the Members of the Board of Regents of USP is hereby DISMISSED outright for want of palpable merit.

AS RESOLVED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated September 10, 1997.

Before us, petitioner now anchors the present petition on the following grounds:

1. THE SAID QUESTIONED DISPOSITIONS FAILED TO FIND THE ACTS OF RESPONDENTS DALEON AND HIS RESPONDENTS-STUDENTS-AGULO, ALABA AND TECSON TO BE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY – THE UNIVERSITY CODE, PARTICULARLY THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 128, 140, 141, 152 (LAST PARAGRAPH) THEREIN; AND OF THE ACTS OF RESPONDENT BOARD OF REGENTS AS “ULTRA VIRES” AND CONTRARY TO THE SAID LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY WHEN IT PASSED BOARD OF REGENTS (BOR) RESOLUTIONS NO. 2432 S. OF 1995 ON DECEMBER 23, 1995 AND NO. 2449 S. 1996, RESPECTIVELY;

2.  THERE WAS OBVIOUS ABUSE AND GRAVE ERROR IN MISAPPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF “ACADEMIC FREEDOM” TO ABSOLVE RESPONDENT DALEON OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT; AND THE RESPONDENTS-STUDENTS AND THE BOARD OF REGENTS (ALONG WITH SAID RESPONDENT DALEON) OF THE ANTI-GRAFT CHARGES;

3.  THE SAID RESOLUTION AND ORDER OF RESPONDENT GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER AND/OR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO WERE ATTENDED BY PATENT “DUE PROCESS” VIOLATIONS AS THEIR FINDINGS AND

CONCLUSIONS EMANATED FROM SELF-SERVING, INCREDIBLE AND HEARSAY PROFFERS; AND DID NOT CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER.

In issue is whether or not public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in exonerating Dr. Daleon from administrative as well as criminal liability arising from his giving passing grades to Agulo, Tecson and Alaba without requiring them to attend classes.

Petitioner avers that public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the impugned BOR resolution as it is contrary to the University Code, violates due process and is based on self-serving hearsays.  He argues that the BOR resolution is based on a wrong interpretation of the constitutional provision on “academic freedom”.

In its Comment, the Office of Solicitor General posits a contrary view.  The OSG argues that public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion. According to the OSG, there is no provision in the University Code of USP which prohibits a professor or teacher from giving a special program or arrangement tailored to meet the requirements of a particular course.

We are in agreement with the position taken by the respondents through the OSG.  The petition lacks merit and ought to dismissed.

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the Court’s power of judicial review under this Rule, it must first be shown that respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi- judicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Conversely, absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents may not be subjected to our review under Rule 65.

From the records, we find no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold that the respondent Office had gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution dated June 3, 1997.  We note that the conclusions in said resolution are based on substantial evidence easily verifiable from the records. Well established is the principle that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, provided such findings are supported by substantial evidence, as in this case.  Graft Investigation Officer I Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., of said Office gave weight to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Daleon as corroborated by the affidavit of Prof. Concesa  P. Lagare, Professor 2 of the College of Education, USP.  These affidavits averred that during the graduate school orientation program sometime in July 1995, the university’s Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. Luz D. Ancheta, declared that special arrangements between a professor and a graduate student may be allowed on a case-to-case basis.  Dr. Ancheta made this statement in reply to Dr. Daleon’s query on the policy of USP on attendance of graduate school students and whether Dr. Daleon could give grades to students who do not attend classes.  In her reply to Dr. Daleon’s query, the VPAA even cited her experience when she pursued her doctoral course at UP Los Baños.  According to Dr. Ancheta,

she was given a special arrangement by one of her professors.  She added that she, too, had allowed the same special arrangement for her students at the USP Graduate School.

Public respondent also anchored his decision on Article 140 of the University Code, which provides that the rules on attendance of students shall be enforced in all classes subject to the modification by the Dean in the case of graduate students and other courses. It is undisputed that at the time that Dr. Daleon handled the graduate class in Ed.D. 317, he had already been duly designated Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the Graduate School by the President of USP and was even entitled to the emoluments inherent to the Office of the Dean of the Graduate School. Accordingly, as OIC, performing the functions of the Dean of the Graduate School, Dr. Daleon had the authority to modify the rule on attendance without seeking permission of petitioner.

Further, Dr. Daleon’s teaching style had the support of the members of the Board of Regents, the body with the authority to formulate university policies, fully knowing the policy on attendance of students in the graduate school.  In passing Resolution No. 2432, S. 1995, not only did they validate the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo, but they also gave an imprimatur on the propriety, regularity and acceptability of Dr. Daleon’s instructional approach.  In said resolution, the BOR cited Article 155 and Article 3 of the University Code, thus:

The Board upheld the first grading sheet submitted by Dr. S. Daleon in the light of the following provisions of the University Code: (1) Article 155 which states that “no grade shall be changed after the report has been submitted” and (2) Article 3 which states that “Every member of the faculty shall enjoy academic freedom, which is the right of the professor to teach the subject of his specialization according to his best lights… nor shall any restraint be placed upon him in the choice of subjects for research and investigation.”

The Dean must promote unity in his unit and must ensure that the dignity of every professor in his unit is respected.

As held by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the Resolution of the Board of Regents is clearly an exercise of its sound discretion as the final arbiter of issues affecting the internal operations of the university and as interpreter of the policies of the school.

Finally, we agree with respondents’ position on the primacy of academic freedom in regard to higher institutions of learning.  Dr. Daleon’s teaching style, validated by the action of the USP Board of Regents, is bolstered by the constitutional guarantee on academic freedom. Academic freedom is two-tiered – that of the academic institution and the teacher’s.

Institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives and the methods on how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” The right of the school to confirm and validate the teaching method of Dr. Daleon is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., “how it shall be taught.”

Academic freedom also accords a faculty member the right to pursue his studies in his particular specialty. It is defined as a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalty because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution. As applied to the case at bar, academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the widest latitude to innovate and experiment on the method of teaching which is most fitting to his students (graduate students at that), subject only to the rules and policies of the university.  Considering that the Board of Regents, whose task is to lay down school rules and policies of the University of Southeastern Philippines, has validated his teaching style, we see no reason for petitioner to complain before us simply because he holds a contrary opinion on the matter.

In our view, petitioner failed to establish that Dr. Daleon and the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines acted in evident bad faith or with manifest partiality in the performance of their official duties.  Hence, there is no basis to hold that the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao committed any grave abuse of discretion in exonerating respondents below from both administrative and criminal charges.  The resolution of that Office is in order for it accords with the facts and the law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated June 3, 1997, of the Office of the Ombudsman- Mindanao is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a)  Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxx

(e)  Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.  This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

xxx

(j)    Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled. xxx

Rollo, p. 184.

Records, p. 8.

Supra, note 2.

Id. at 185.

Ibid.

Id. at 186.

Id. at 41.

Id. at 16-17.

Id. at 188.

Id. at 193.

Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 1.

       Litonjua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120294, 286 SCRA 136, 149 (1998).

Records, p. 38, Item 7.

Id. at 111, Annex “19”.

Id. at 11.

Id. at 68.

Id. at 15.

Ibid.

Rollo, p. 39.

Sec.  5., Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution-

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(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

xxx

       Miriam College vs. CA, G.R. No. 127930 , 348 SCRA 265, 284-285 (2000).

Id. at 285.

       Montemayor vs. Araneta University Foundation  et. al., No. L-44251, 77 SCRA 321, 327 (1977); citing Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, No. L-40779, 68 SCRA 277 (1975).

Ibid.