second male port project (loan 1226-mld[sf])

7/31/2019 Second Male Port Project (Loan 1226-MLD[SF])

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ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK PPA: MLD 24342

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

ON THE

SECOND MAL PORT PROJECT(Loan 1226-MLD[SF])

IN


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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit Rufiyaa (Rf)

At Appraisal At Project Completion At Operations Evaluation(February 1993) (July 1998) (March 2000)

Rf1.00 = $0.096 $0.085 $0.086

$1.00 = Rf10.445 Rf11.77 Rf11.55

ABBREVIATIONS

ADB Asian Development BankEIRR economic internal rate of returnFIRR financial internal rate of returnGDP gross domestic productm meterMCPW Ministry of Construction and Public WorksMFA Ministry of Foreign AffairsMPA M ldi P t A th it


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(ii) (ii) In this report, $ refers to US dollars.

Operations Evaluation Office, PE-554


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CONTENTS

Page

BASIC DATA ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii

MAP v

I. BACKGROUND 1

A. Rationale 1B. Formulation 1C. Purpose and Outputs 1D. Cost, Financing, and Executing Arrangements 2E. Completion and Self-Evaluation 2F. Operations Evaluation 2

II. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE 3

A. Formulation and Design 3B. Cost and Scheduling 4C. Consultant Performance, Procurement, and Construction 4D. Organization and Management 5

III. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT PURPOSE 5

A. Operational Performance 5B. Performance of the Operating Entity 6C. Sustainability 8


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A. Key Issues for the Future 14B. Lessons Identified 14

C. Follow-Up Actions 15

APPENDIXES 16


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BASIC DATASecond Mal Port Project (Loan 1226-MLD[SF])

PROJECT PREPARATION/INSTITUTION BUILDING

TA No.TA Name

Type Amount Approval Date

1656 Second Mal Port PPTA $250,000 13 Jan 19921865 Institutional Strengthening of the

Ministry of Public Works and LaborA&O $200,000 1 Apr 1993

KEY PROJECT DATA ($ million equivalent)1As per ADB

Loan Documents ActualTotal Project Cost 10.41 10.20Foreign Exchange Cost 8.80 7.85Local Currency Cost 1.61 2.35ADB Financed 8.80 7.85Borrower Financed 1.61 2.35ADB Loan Amount/Utilization 7.85ADB Loan Amount/Cancellation 1.26

KEY DATES Expected ActualAppraisal Dec 1992 2-9 Dec 1992Loan Negotiations End Feb 1993 1-4 Mar 1993Board Approval End Mar 1993 1 Apr 1993Loan Agreement 6 May 1993Loan Effectiveness 4 Aug 1993 12 Aug 1993Project Completion 30 Apr 1996 30 Apr 1997Loan Closing 31 Oct 1996 12 Mar 1998

Months (effectiveness to completion) 33 45

KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (%)Appraisal

PCR PPAR


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Project Completion 1 36Operations Evaluation 1 7


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Project aimed to increase port capacity at Mal for foreign shipping, and wasincluded under the Governments Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) for sustaining economicgrowth. The project scope included (i) construction of an alongside berth to service vessels upto 6,000 deadweight tons; (ii) ancillary works covering pavement, pier reclamation, utilityextension, seawall rehabilitation, and construction of a marine workshop; (iii) provision of cargo-handling equipment, port service craft, workshop tools, and navigation aids; and (iv) consulting

services for detailed design, preparation of tender documents, implementation administration,institutional strengthening of the Maldives Ports Authority (MPA), construction supervision, anda planning study. In conjunction with the Asian Development Banks (ADB) loan, additionalconsulting services were included under technical assistance (TA) to strengthen projectmanagement capabilities of the Ministry of Construction and Public Works (MCPW).

ADBs Appraisal Mission was completed in December 1992, and ADBs loan ofSDR6.395 million ($8.8 million equivalent) and TA for the Project were approved on 1 April 1993. 2

The Borrower was the Republic of Maldives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the appointedExecuting Agency, and MCPW, with responsibility and experience in public works constructioncovering harbors, seawalls, and roadworks, was designated the Implementing Agency. MPA wasthe operating authority with responsibility and control over Mal Port operations.

The Project was implemented with an expansion in the project scope to extendconstruction of the alongside berth from 70 meters to 101 meters, and to purchase a 45-tonstacker and additional 25-ton forklift. The overall Project was completed in May 1997, nearly12 months later than envisaged at appraisal. The final project cost of $10.2 million was slightly

less than the appraisal estimate of $10.4 million. ADBs loan disbursements were $0.95 millionless than the amount approved. The attached TA financing amounted to $183,992 or 92 percentof the total amount approved. Overall financing by ADB represented 77 percent of the totalproject cost.


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The less than satisfactory efficacy aspects of the Project include implementation delays

in appointing consultants and awarding civil contracts, and the continuing weaknesses in MPAscapacity to (i) meet reporting covenants, (ii) provide timely annual reports, (iii) operate effectiveinformation and accounting systems, and (iv) take responsibility for planning future portoperations. ADBs covenanted time-bound action plan for MPA to carry out a review of privatizingoperations was also ineffective. These weaknesses detract from the overall effectiveness andachievements of the Projectwhich is rated successful.

The single key issue to arise from this operations evaluation concerns the need toovercome political constraints against the deeper privatization of MPAs operations.

The key lesson from the Project is the shortage of qualified and experienced staff inMPA to operate the computer-based accounting and information systems, and takeresponsibility for planning and identifying expansion requirements as intended under MPAsCharter. Staff requirements for institutional strengthening of MPA should have been morecomprehensively addressed under the Project.

Apart from loan administration, no follow-up action is recommended for ADB.

Follow-up actions aimed at addressing observed weakness in organization and planningfor port development requirements are recommended. The Government should, as soonas possible, (i) clarify and strengthen the organization responsible for planning and

identifying expansion requirements at Mal Port, (ii) develop a master transport plan thatidentifies port expansion requirements consistent with meeting least-cost developmentconsiderations for Mal Port and the outer islands, (iii) initiate an immediate feasibilitystudy to extend the wharf area at Mal Port to two berths, and (iv) initiate a study forprivatizing the management and cargo-handling operations of MPA by way of a lease.


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I. BACKGROUND

A. Rationale

1. The Project was included as a priority under the Governments Eighth Five-Year Plan(1991-1995) for sustaining economic growth. The Governments strategy was to continue toencourage expansion of the tourist and fishing industries, and remove congestion constraints for

the transfer of freight. The Asian Development Banks (ADB) strategy for developmentassistance to the Maldives at the time of appraisal was to continue assistance with infrastructureover the medium term. ADBs support for the Project was of particular relevance given the higheconomic growth of the 1980s, the lack of wharf facilities for foreign shipping, the increasingcost of freight as reflected in an average turnaround time of 18.5 days for the loading andunloading of vessels by lighter system, and the absence of foreign investment funding.

B. Formulation

2. The Project was formulated as a follow-on from Loan 911,1 which addressed congestionconstraints through rehabilitation improvements and construction of a separate harbor forinterisland vessels.2 Consideration for construction of an alongside berth under Loan 911 wasdeferred pending findings of a site selection study. Technical assistance (TA) for a feasibility studyof the Project, including site selection, was approved in January 1992.3 Fact-finding for the Projectwas carried out in May 1992, and the Appraisal Mission was completed in December 1992. ADBs

loan ofSDR6.395 million ($8.8 million equivalent) and TA for the Project were approved on 1 April1993.4 The Borrower was the Republic of Maldives.


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aids; and (iv) consulting services for detailed design, preparation of tender documents,implementation administration, institutional strengthening of the Maldives Ports Authority (MPA),

construction supervision, and a container storage and transportation planning study. Inconjunction with ADBs loan, TA (para. 2) was provided to strengthen the operation andmanagement capabilities of the Ministry of Public Works and Labor.6 This was to be achieved byproviding advice on organization, management of maintenance, and procurement includingpreparation of tender documents and bid evaluation, and overseas training for the Ministry ofConstruction and Public Works (MCPW) staff.7

4. The alongside berth was expected to reduce dependency on the existing lighter system forcargo loading and unloading, reduce ship turnaround time, and facilitate cargo transfers by

container. The cargo-handling equipment, port service craft, and other facilities were expected tosupplement MPAs working capital and improve the efficiency of cargo transfer from the wharf andbasin apron to storage areas. The institutional measures from consulting services specified underthe project scope and advisory TA were expected to strengthen project management capabilitiesof MPA and MCPW. Appendix 1 provides details of the project scope and targets.

D. Cost, Financing, and Executing Arrangements

5. Details of expected project costs, TA costs, and sources of financing at appraisal arepresented under basic data (page ii). ADBs loan of $8.8 million equivalent to the Governmentwas drawn from ADBs Special Funds resources to cover the entire foreign exchange cost of theProject, including service charges on ADBs loan during construction. The Ministry of Foreign

Affairs (MFA) was the Executing Agency; and MCPW, with responsibility and experience in publicworks construction covering harbors, seawalls, and roadworks, was designated the Implementing

Agency.

E. Completion and Self-Evaluation


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Other recommendations included making investments to augment service facilities for electricpower supply, telephone connection, and fresh water outlets; and publishing an annual report.

F. Operations Evaluation

7. This project performance audit report reviews the findings of the PCR and presents thefindings of the Operations Evaluation Mission (OEM) that visited the Project from 26-30 March2000. Special attention is given to assessing the Projects relevance, efficacy, efficiency, andsustainability.9 The report is based on the findings of the OEM after three years of operational

data; a review of the PCR, the appraisal report, and material in ADB files; discussions with ADBstaff, senior officials of MFA, other government agencies, and representatives of the shippingagencies; and interviews with beneficiaries. Copies of the draft project performance audit reportwere provided to the Government, MCPW, MFA, MPA, and ADB staff concerned for review.Their comments were considered in the preparation of this report.

II. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE

A. Formulation and Design

8. At appraisal, MPA was in the process of taking responsibility for operational managementof Mal Commercial Port.10 MCPW11 was responsible for all public works including harbors,

jetties, and seawalls. With the enactment of its Charter, MPA had the operational, administrative,and financial autonomy to operate on a commercial basis. However, as an institution, MPA waslacking operational experience and had no guidelines. For this purpose, in January 1993 ADBapproved an advisory TA, Second Maldives Ports Authority,12 to draft rules to regulate the


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9. TA for a feasibility study of the Project (para. 2) identified the need for an alongside berthas an alternative to expanding and improving the then existing lighter system for loading and

unloading foreign vessels. The study also verified the limitations on existing cargo equipmentand addressed detailed engineering requirements that ensured design parameters, equipment,and contract requirements were reasonably certain. Construction of the alongside berth wascompleted for the feasibility evaluation with no unaccounted for difficulties. No environmentalrisk was expected, and MPAs financial viability was expected to remain satisfactory withprojected traffic growth and tariff increases. Concern for possible delays in implementation wasallayed by extending the responsibilities of consulting services to cover both projectmanagement and supervision, and approving advance recruitment of the consultants.

10. Except for delays in project completion (paras. 12-14) and an extension in project scope(footnote 7), project design as envisaged at appraisal was closely followed. Efficacy forexpanding cargo throughput proved appropriate even if not part of an overall master plan fordevelopment.13 However, the project design elements for institutional strengthening of MPA andMCPW were implemented with significant delays in appointing consultants, and without serioussupport for following through on commitments to transfer autonomy responsibilities under MPAsCharter. There was also less than full compliance with the Projects covenanted time-boundaction plan to improve container handling efficiencies. The Projects financial covenants to

ensure MPAs financial viability was maintained proved inappropriate for ensuring an adjustmentof port charges and tariffs sufficient to meet long-term expansion requirements from self-generation sources. These weaknesses call into question the appropriateness of usingcovenants to achieve institutional strengthening objectives. Notwithstanding the ineffectivenessof some covenants, the overall formulation and design for the Project is considered to haveworked satisfactorily.

B. Cost and Scheduling

11. The actual project cost of $10.2 million equivalent was below the appraisal estimate of$10.4 million. The foreign exchange cost of $7.85 million equivalent, less $0.11 million for


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6). A comparison of the actual implementation schedule with the appraisal schedule is shown inAppendix 2.

C. Consultant Performance, Procurement, and Construction

13. Project implementation with respect to selection and performance of consultants,awarding of contracts, and management by MFA was satisfactory. The three-month delay inappointing consultants resulting from protracted contract negotiations contributed to the overallproject completion delay (para. 12).

14. The consultant's input to detailed design and services to the project management officeprovided a sound basis for satisfactory implementation and subsequent operation of the projectfacilities. Consulting services to the project management office included preparing biddocuments for the procurement and award of civil works contracts. Bid documents wereprepared according to ADBs Guidelines for Procurement, with procurement of the service craft(including tugboat) and cargo-handling equipment carried out on the basis of internationalcompetitive bidding and international shipping. No significant difficulties were encountered with

ADBs procurement procedures, and the quality of materials supplied and equipmentperformance were satisfactory. Because of clarifications required from the two lowest biddersregarding their construction methods, the contract awards were delayed by nearly five months.The quality of civil works, as finally completed, was satisfactory. Summary details of contractawards are provided in the PCR (Appendix 3).


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D. Organization and Management

15. Organization and management of the Project was consistent with arrangementsenvisaged at appraisal and proved satisfactory notwithstanding the delay in appointment ofconsultants (para. 13). The project management office established under Loan 911 (footnote 1)was retained, and the MFA director of external resources was the appointed project coordinator toact as the liaison between the Government and ADB.

16. ADB provided adequate monitoring during project implementation with three reviewmissions and one project completion review mission. Coordination meetings were held duringreview missions with MCPW, MFA, MPA, and consultants to solve problems and minimizedelays. The decision to appoint consultants with responsibility for full implementation servicesincluding preparing tender documents, overseeing bid evaluations, and awarding contracts, inaddition to attending to technical aspects of implementation and supervision, was consideredappropriate and helpful by MCPW.

17. The Government, MCPW, and MPAs compliance with loan covenants was satisfactoryexcept for the transfer of powers and duties to MPA arising from provisions of the MPA Charterapproved by the Government in March 1994. These include specific responsibilities relating todefining the limits of port and port load areas.14 Noncompliance with this covenant prevented MPAfrom proceeding with the consultants recommended plan under TA 1656 (footnote 3) for relievingcongestion of container movements and storage. Important operational covenants for MPArelating to the appointment of key staff, management systems, tariff structure, and achievementof financial targets were complied with.

III. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT PURPOSE


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19. Before the Project in 1991, the average turnaround time for foreign cargo vessels was

18.5 days. With completion of the Project in 1997, the average turnaround time was 11.5 daysagainst an expected 13.5 days.

20. Total cargo throughput was 273,000 freight tons in 1991 and was projected, at appraisal,to increase by 7.5 percent per annum to 420,000 freight tons in year 2000, and thereafter at aslower rate of increase to 765,000 tons in 2010.17 Actual cargo throughput reached855,000 freight tons in 1999, which was more than double the forecast. The increase onprojected cargo volumes was significant for both imports and exports. Exports, which were notexpected to be more than 5,000 freight tons, reached 173,000 freight tons in 1997. The increase

was due to the enhanced competitiveness of fish exports and the advantages of the projectberth facility, which ensured temperatures in reefer containers for chilled and frozen fish werekept within allowable limits.18

21. On completion of the Project, the number of berths available for lighterage were reducedfrom 8 to 5. With cargo growth, maximum handling capacity of the lighter system of around320,000 freight tons was expected to be reached by the end of 1997. Actual cargo handled bylighter was consistent with the appraised forecasts and equivalent to 312,000 freight tons. The

increase in cargo throughput over the projected capacity limit was made possible by increasingthe number of stevedore gangs and utilizing the advantages of additional lifting equipmentprovided under the Project.

22. Containerized cargo as a proportion of total cargo throughput increased from 12 percentin 1991 to 27 percent in 1997. Actual container traffic in terms of twenty-foot equivalent units(teu) grew from 2,690 teu in 1991 to 16,230 teu in 1999, and represented an increase of29 percent per annum. The increase was due to the inherent advantages of freighting cargo-using containers, and improved handling operations attributable to the Project. Associated with

the increased trend to containerization, there was an increase in the number of ship calls andslight trend to larger vessels. There were 202 ship calls before the Project in 1991 and 438 shipcalls in 1999.


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24. Table 1 summarizes the financial statements of MPA from 1991 to 1997.20 Appendix 4provides additional details. At appraisal, MPAs financial performance as reflected in the audited

accounts for 1989 to 1991 were considered satisfactory. Financial revenues were observed to beincreasing at around 20 percent per annum. Profit performance was strong, and the projectedfinancial statements for 1993-2001 indicated the financial viability of MPA would likely continue.

25. The actual financial performance of MPA to the end of 1997 is better than forecast.Operating revenues increased by an average of 26 percent per annum, total assets by16 percent per annum, and net surplus (profit) after depreciation and loan service charges by18 percent per annum. Profit performance relative to operating revenue and return on equitywas strong, and ADBs financial loan requirement to maintain an operating ratio of not less than

70 percent was comfortably exceeded. MPAs audited financial accounts do not enable a strictcomparative measure of performance in relation to (i) maintaining a rate of return on averagerevalued net fixed assets of 6 percent; and (ii) a debt service ratio of not less than 1.3. Proxyindicators for these performance covenants imply they were nevertheless comfortably compliedwith. Accounts receivable, which represented approximately 4 months of revenues in 1991,were reduced to 1.7 months in 1997. Since year-end 1997, cargo throughput increased to theend of 1999 by 29 percent, while operating expenditures increased by an estimated 15 percent.This widening operating margin together with increased loan servicing requirements suggest the

profit performance of MPA was sustained.

Table 1: Summary of Financial Performance of Maldives Ports Authority(Rf million)

Fiscal Year Ending 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Operating Revenue 24.4 27.0 31.2 48.3 59.9 74.5 87.8Operating Expenditure 11.5 13.7 14.7 16.7 25.0 24.3 30.6Operating Surplus/(Loss)a 12.9 13.3 16.5 31.6 34.9 50.2 57.2

Net Surplus/(Loss) Before Tax 9.7 2.3 3.6 19.4 23.2 30.5 30.0Dividend Provisionb 6 3 7 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 15 0 20 0


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Fiscal Year Ending 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

a

Before depreciation and loan service costs.bTo Ministry of Finance.

cRatio of current assets to current liabilities.

dNet surplus before tax/interest expenditure.

eNet surplus before tax/operating revenue.

26. Estimates at appraisal for the project financial internal rate of return (FIRR) and economicinternal rate of return (EIRR) were calculated based on the expected incremental increases incargo throughput and maintenance of an average tariff rate of Rf104.5 per ton. The base case

benefits were conservative in terms of pricing and incremental output, and implementationarrangements were considered sufficient to enable completion of the Project as scheduled.Sensitivity tests showed the results were robust against increases in capital costs, operationalexpenses, and reduced cargo traffic. The FIRR and EIRR appraisal estimates are compared withthe reestimates at project completion and for this PPAR in Table 2.

27. The PCR repeated the approach adopted at appraisal, taking into account the actualinvestment costs, completion date, incremental revenues, and operation and maintenance coststo FY1996. The PCRs higher FIRR of 18 percent mainly reflects the higher volume of cargo

throughput. The slightly lower EIRR of 22 percent reflects the higher volume of cargothroughput, and a decision to apportion 50 percent (as against the appraisal approach of100 percent) of the assessed value of service and waiting time savings due to the Project. 21

28. Differences between the OEM and appraisal reestimates are explained by the samefactors as for the PCR. The FIRR of 23 percent is higher than the weighted average cost ofcapital and confirms the Projects financial viability.22 The EIRR is a highly satisfactory26.8 percent and confirms the Projects economic viability. Both results are robust and relatively

insensitive to changes in projection assumptions (after 1999) concerning cargo throughput, porttariffs, and congestion impacts. Forecast cargo throughput would have to fall below the1998 level of 823,000 freight tons for the EIRR to fall below 10 percent or 84 percent of thecurrent throughput. Appendix 5 provides details of the methodology, assumptions, sensitivity,

d ki d l i th FIRR d EIRR ti t


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C. Sustainability

29. Having been well maintained, the ports project facilities are in good condition and withnormal maintenance should be usable for many years to come. Although actual cargothroughput has been much higher than forecast, the engineering design was made bearing inmind technical expansion requirements and the need for future heavier loads. The higher cargothroughput has served to bring forward the need for further expansion of the port, and there areno serious engineering or underdesign issues. The continued sustainability of project benefits islinked to (i) handling capacity of the port in the face of increasing congestion, and (ii) autonomy ofMPA management.

30. Capacity-handling limits of the lighter berth system have been reached, and berthoccupancy at the alongside berth is a high average 87 percent (Appendix 3). Maximum handlingcapacity at the alongside berth will be reached by 2002. The FIRR and EIRR reestimates takeinto account the ports capacity-handling limits and likely deterioration of handling efficiency asstorage and transfer areas on the wharf area become fully utilized. Port handling capacity canbe increased by constructing a second alongside berth, and expanding the wharf and storageareas over the commercial harbor basin.23

31. There are presently no plans to provide for further capacity expansion. Although vestedunder its charter with the autonomy and responsibility for planning, MPA is without theorganization and qualified staff to carry out this function (paras. 37-38), and is mainly concernedwith managing day-to-day port operations. Notwithstanding the limited autonomy and capacityof MPA to meet planning considerations, and taking into account the (i) acceptablemanagement and maintenance history of the ports facilities, (ii) likely positive response of theGovernment to increase the ports handling capacity with appropriate study and justification, and(iii) demonstrated financial viability of the ports operations (para. 24) with ample capacity to

increase tariffs given there has been no adjustment since 1992, future benefits from the Projectare unlikely to be seriously eroded.


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33. The socioeconomic benefits attributable to the Project include improved workingconditions for port labor, improved cargo-handling productivity, and institutional strengthening ofMPAs operations. These factors required increased skill levels and resulted in increasedopportunities for higher paid employment.24 Indirectly, productivity improvements have helpedattract investment to the Maldives, which in turn has generated spin-off benefits for gainfulemployment.

34. Coinciding with the achievement of objectives, the Maldives gross domestic product(GDP) increased from Rf1.69 billion in 1991 to Rf4.3 billion in 1998, and reflected an averagegrowth of 14.4 percent per annum or 6.3 percent in real terms. GDP per capita doubled fromRf7,553 to Rf16,203. There was strong growth in the tourism and construction sectors, which

together account for around 45 percent of the domestic labor force. The number of touristarrivals in 1999 was 380,000 persons or nearly 40 percent more than the resident population.Significant in the growth and number of tourists is the dependence of the tourist sector onimporting food requirements, which account for approximately 22 percent of the value of totalimports, and require port facilities that offer minimum transfer times and reefer facilities to keepperishables fresh.


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35. The Project was gender-neutral, yielding no particular social or economic benefit towomen through its implementation.25

B. Environmental Impacts

36. No environmental concerns were visualized at appraisal, and there were no projectimprovements that changed the natural environment of marine life. The Project, together withother initiatives of the Government to improve the northern harbor area, resulted in the

elimination of at least all visible pollution, diesel, and other fuel discharges.26

Althoughprocedures exist for emergencies to attend oil spillages and fire, there have been no events ofthis nature, and training in awareness and procedures have become lax. Follow-up actions forMPA are recommended in this regard (para. 48).

C. Impacts on Institutions and Policy

37. Section 39 of MPAs Charter (para. 8 and footnote 10) transferred, from MCPW and theMinistry of Customs to MPA, responsibility, duties, and powers in relation to (i) planning and civilworks, covering ports and port land area; (ii) collections on cargo freight; and (iii) licensing and theissue of permits for use of the harbor area and facilities. Although MPA has full autonomy over themanagement of freight transfers at the port, responsibilities covering port planning, utilization ofthe port land area, and award of civil contracts have remained with MCPW. The requirement forGovernment approval of all senior management positions also undermines the hoped-for benefitsfrom shifting autonomy powers to MPA. MCPW retains responsibility for planning, civil works, and

rights to land areas for port development. The most disquieting feature of the situation is thatconcerns for meeting future growth requirements are lacking in urgency despite increasinglyevident ship queuing and congestion problems.


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maintenance workshop methods and skills. ADBs terms of reference adequately reflected theseobjectives and provided for 6 person-months27 of consulting services from a ports operation andmaintenance specialist. Advice provided for project management (preparation of tenderdocuments, procurement, and contracts) was considered by MCPW to be of direct benefit, aswas advice on how to monitor project implementation. The consultants recommendationsincluded (i) establishing a mechanical workshop equipped with spare parts and responsible forplant, equipment, and vehicles; (ii) engaging a specialist trainer in maintenance operations fortwo years; and (iii) developing a staff training program on management, accounting, andengineering including on-the-job training. Manuals prepared on project management andmaintenance were usefully applied, and the recommendations of the consultant were taken upbeginning mid-1996. On the basis of the satisfactory reports of MCPW and discussions with two

persons who benefited from the training programs developed, and the resulting in-housetraining programs for staff development, OEO rates this TA successful.28

40. The recommendations of the studys implementation consultants for improving containerstorage and cargo-handling operations include (i) reduce the free-parking period for containersfrom 10 days to 7 days, (ii) convert the existing transit shed into a container freight station, and(iii) make pilotage compulsory to ensure the safe passage of vessels in the port. Otherrecommendations included making investments to augment service facilities for electric powersupply, telephone connection, and fresh water outlets; and publishing an annual report. MPAreported that the consultants recommendations were accepted by the Government and weregradually being put into effect.

41. As part of a time-bound action plan, the Project included support for MPA to carry out anoperational review to consider privatizing its operations. Although a more commercial approachto the contracting of stevedores was introduced, the fuller concept of privatizing all stevedoring,cargo-handling operations, and supply of port services is without strong Government support.

ADBs TA 3099,29 completed in February 2000, was mandated to identify opportunities in MPA

for private sector participation. This study verified the lack of commercialization that exists inMPAs operations,30 but offered no new insights or enthusiasm for fuller privatization of MPAsoperations.


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A. Relevance

42. The project rationale to relieve freight congestion constraints, premised on the basis ofsustaining economic growth, proved particularly relevant given that the overall growth in cargothroughput was twice the appraisal target. Without the Project, port-handling capacity wouldhave been insufficient and resulted in unacceptable ship turnaround times, increased freight andcargo-handling costs, and foreign investment would have been likely deterred. Without thebenefit of consulting services for the preparation of tender documents and administration ofcontract awards, the inexperience of local project staff would have led to unacceptablecompletion delays. Without the benefit of TA for MCPW, the general operation and maintenance

capabilities of MCPW would have remained undeveloped and limited the effectiveness ofMCPW services.

B. Efficacy

43. The Project benefited from competent consultants, an effective project managementteam, and the experience gained from ADBs first Mal Port Development Project under Loan911 (footnote 1). The decision to include a feasibility study for the Project brought intoperspective the need for an alongside berth as an alternative to expanding and improving thelighter system, and ensured that important technical considerations were addressed and theleast-cost expansion option was applied. Procurement and construction was satisfactorilyexecuted and the overall project cost of $10.4 million was within the appraised estimate of $10.8million. The overall financial performance of MPA, as measured against the appraised projectforecasts and ADBs loan covenants, proved significantly stronger than projected. The overallproject completion delay of 12 months is largely explained by the approved change in scope to

extend construction of the alongside wharf from 70 m to 101 m. Institutional strengthening ofMPA and MCPW associated with the time-bound action plan and attached TA were largelyachieved. The less than satisfactory efficacy aspects include implementation delays inappointing consultants and continued weaknesses in MPAs capacity to (i) meet reporting


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to. The project FIRR and EIRR reestimates of 23 percent (financial) and 27 percent (economic)confirm the financial and economic viability of the Project.

D. Sustainability

45. The quality of civil works appears to be sound after four years of operation and isexpected to long outlast the projected economic life of 2017. The cargo-lifting equipment andtugboats are well maintained, and navigation aids are kept in serviced order. The FIRR andEIRR reestimates take into account the ports capacity handling limits and likely deterioration in

handling efficiency as storage and transfer areas on the wharf area become fully utilized.31

Institutional strengthening benefits require continuing focus to ensure management informationsystems are utilized in an effective manner.


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E. Institutional Development and Other Impacts

46. Hoped-for development impacts for institutional strengthening of MPA and MCPWenhanced management operations, but continue to reveal weaknesses associated with theincomplete transfer of responsibilities under MPAs Charter, and insufficient accounting andcomputer-trained personnel. The socioeconomic benefits from the Project were largely in theform of avoided congestion costs that would deter investment into the Maldives and lessenemployment opportunities. The Project also set standards for improved working conditions forport labor, and opened opportunities for increased accounting, computer, and managerial skill

levels, and as a result opportunities for higher paid employment. To the extent that the Projectfacilitated economic growth and investment, spin-off benefits for gainful employment in thetourism, fisheries, and service industries were generated. ADBs project loan, while notdesigned with a specific environmental objective included covenants to ensure designrequirements, and met international environmental safeguards. Since project approval, visibleimprovements associated with eliminating fuel discharges and garbage into the north harborarea have occurred.

F. Overall Project Rating

47. Overall, the Project is rated successful as concluded after taking into account ADBsevaluation criteria for project relevance, efficacy, efficiency, sustainability, and developmentimpact.32 Table 3 summarizes the project assessment rating.

Table 3: Assessment of Overall Project Performance

Criteria Assessment Rating (0-3) Weight (%) Weighted Rating

1 Relevance HS 3 20 0 60


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G. Assessment of ADB and Borrower Performance

48. ADBs performance is assessed satisfactory taking into account ADBs involvement inthe overall project design and implementation elements including ensuring the (i) technicalfeasibility of the Project was correctly evaluated, and project design was consistent with theleast-cost development considerations; (ii) general effectiveness of implementation and loanadministration relating to procurement and contracting were carried out in accord withcompetitive bidding procedures and with appropriate supervision; and (iii) effectiveness ofattendance to monitoring through timely review missions. Detracting from a higher assessmentare (i) the underdesign features of the Project as reflected in the low projections for cargo

throughput and need for additional cargo-handling equipment (paras. 20-21); and(ii) weaknesses in the TA design associated with developing MCPWs operation andmanagement (footnote 28).

49. The Borrowers performance is assessed less than satisfactory. Detracting from a higherassessment are (i) the delays in completion, which can be attributed to unacceptable slownessin the appointment of consultants (para. 13); (ii) slowness in addressing expansion requirementsto ensure the project benefits are sustained (para. 31); and (iii) failure to fully follow through oncommitments relating to the Projects time-bound action plan (para. 10) and enactment ofMPAs Charter (para. 37).

VI. ISSUES, LESSONS, AND FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS

A. Key Issues for the Future

50. Privatization of MPA Activities. The operations of MPA are a monopoly that cannot


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of how port operations at Mal (or part thereof) might be successfully privatized as a leaseoperation (para. 49).35

B. Lessons Identified

52. Although Section 39 of MPAs Charter approved in March 1994 mandates MPA withresponsibility for port planning, the transfer of responsibility was rendered ineffective without theappointment of qualified staff. The shortage of qualified and sufficiently experienced staff to takeresponsibility for planning and developing proposals to meet expansion and development

requirements should have been addressed under the Project (para. 10). Staffing requirementsand training to operate the computerized accounting and management information systemsshould also have been part of the Project (paras. 37-38).

C. Follow-Up Actions

53. Apart from administration of the loan, no follow-up action is recommended for ADB.

54. OEM observed significant weaknesses in organization and planning for portdevelopment requirements. The following follow-up measures (Table 4) are recommended forGovernment and MPA to overcome these weaknesses:

Table 4: Recommendations for Government and MPA Follow-Up

Follow-Up Actions Unit Responsible Timing

Action Monitoring


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19

(iv) Initiate a study for privatizing the managementand cargo-handling operations of MPA by wayof a lease (para. 51).

MOFT MOFT Within one year

MCPW = Ministry of Construction and Public Works, MOFT = Ministry of Finance and Treasury, MPA = Maldives PortsAuthority.a

Although cargo transfers to any one outer island are small, the number of outer islands is large, and transshipmentfrom ships at anchor to awaiting barges appears more cost- and time-effective than from Mal Port. Fresh produceitems for delivery to tourist resorts present another unique but significant circumstance.


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20

APPENDIXES

Number Title Page Cited on(page, para.)

1 Goals, Targets, Inputs, and Results 17 2, 4

2 Appraisal and Actual Implementation Schedules 19 4, 12

3 Cargo-Handling Performance 20 4, 14

4 Financial Statements 22 6, 24

5 Financial and Economic Analysis 24 8, 28


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GOALS, TARGETS, INPUTS, AND RESULTSa

Objective Target Result

Project Project Project ProjecTo improve foreign cargo-handling productivity at MalPort

(i) To construct a 70-meter alongside berth forforeign shipping; (ii) provide operationalequipment in the form of forklifts, tugboat,wharf tractors, and navigational aids; and(iii) complete transportation study andimplement plan for container storage by31 December 1994

Berth of 101 meters constructed;

Equipment supplied as detailed forappraisal plus 45-ton reach stackerand one additional 25-ton forklift;

Transportation study completed, andplan for container storage partly

implemented.

Enhancproducfor highhandlin

Operations Operations Operations OperatTo meet cargo forecasts to 2010

To provide serviced berthing

To provide berth moorings

To reduce the ports operationaldependency on lighterage

To reduce ship turnaround time

With maximum lighterage of 320,000 freighttons by 1997; with forecast overall throughputof 765,000 freight tons by 2010

To service vessels up to 6,000 dwt

For vessels up to 15,000 dwt

Limit the need to increase the number oflighterage berths until after 2010

From an average 18.5 to 13.5 days/ship

Lighterage was 312,000 freight tons in1997. Overall throughput was 855,000freight tons in 1999.

Achieved

Achieved

The number of lighterage berths wasreduced from 8 to 5.

Reduced to 11.5 days/ship

Addresand red

Extend350 day

Extenddoubled

Efficienmaintacapacit

Enableto doub

To reduce cargo damage By 0.1 percent of cargo value Not monitored Increasshippin


31/43

Objective Target Result

dwt = deadweight ton, EIRR = economic internal rate of return, FIRR = financial internal rate of return.a

Although some similarity in format exists, this comparison is not intended to represent a logical framework. A logical framework was not prepared f

InputsProject cost

Project funding ADB Government

Consulting services Implementation

Technical assistance Container storage study

Inputs$10.4 million

$8.8 million$1.6 million

60 person-months

3.5 person-months

Inputs$10.2 million

$7.8 million$2.4 million

60 person-months

3.5 person-months

Least-c

Met forParticip

Provide

Rationarecomm

ADB = Asian Development Bank.

Source: Operations Evaluation Mission.


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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Implementation Task Q2 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q3

A. Consulting Services

B. Procurement of Equipment

C. Civil Works

At appraisal.

Actual.

Source: Project Completion Review Mission.

Q1 Q1Q4 Q3 Q3

APPRAISAL AND ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULES

Q2 Q4Q3 Q2Q3 Q2 Q4 Q4

Project was deemed completed by end of May 1997

19

Appendix2


33/43

Table 4EVALUATION STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN

PROJECT PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATIONCost Schedule

Stage/ International Per Diems, NGO Case Study Others Contingencies 7/ TotalCon sul tanc y In pu ts 1 / Co nsul tants Airfares, co ntracts Operati onal costs 6 /

Remuneration 1/ etc., 2/ Costs 5/

A. Selection of Countries, Projects & 14

International NGO groupSelection of PPTAs/Projects PHI 7Identification of international NGOs PHI 7

& discussion of TOR

International Consultant Input (1) 15 9,000 4,250 13,265

B. Contracting of International NGO group 45Prepara ti on o f p roposa ls by P HI 21

international NGO groupsEvaluation of proposals PHI 5Contracting of international NGO PHI 7

groupPreliminary discussions with local Country 1 3

NGOs in the selected countries Country 2 3Country 3 3Country 4 3

International Consultant Input (2) various 25 15,000 5,750 20,775

C. Case Studies 175Preparatory Work Country 1 21 6,300 2,000 830 9,151Preparatory Work Country 2 21 6,300 2,000 830 9,151

Preparatory Work Country 3 21 6,300 2,000 830 9,151

Preparatory Work Country 4 21 6,300 2,000 830 9,151

Field Work Country 1 35 10,500 5,000 500 1,600 17,635Field Work Country 2 35 10,500 5,000 500 1,600 17,635Field Work Country 3 35 10,500 5,000 500 1,600 17,635Field Work Country 4 35 10,500 5,000 500 1,600 17,635Final Workshop Country 1 2 600 3,000 360 3,962Final Workshop Country 2 2 600 3,000 360 3,962Final Workshop Country 3 2 600 3,000 360 3,962Final Workshop Country 4 2 600 3,000 360 3,962Report preparation Country 1 7 1,400 500 190 2,097Report preparation Country 2 7 1,400 500 190 2,097Report preparation Country 3 7 1,400 500 190 2,097Report preparation Country 4 7 1,400 500 190 2,097


D. Process Documentation 35Final report preparation PHI 35


Total 130,800 52,700 75,200 42,000 2,000 11,920 315,098

Notes:1/ International Consultants Remuneration assumed $600 per day.2/ Airfares for International Consultants estimated at $2,000 for each input together with $5,000 for preliminary country visits and $10,000 for Case Study travel.

Per diems estimated at $150.3/ NGO contracts costed at $300 per day together with additional amount of $2,000 for travel during Preparatory Work and $4,000 during Cast Studies.4/ Costed at $200 per day plus $500 for report production costs.5/ Case Study Operational Costs estimated at $1000 for each project.6/ Other costs mainly for communications estimated at $500 per country together with $3,000 for the final workshop in each country.7/ Contingencies estimated at 10 percent of cost.


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Item Unit

ShipsShip calls (cargo vessels) no. 212 245 268 334 356 309 356 419 438Size of vessels GRT 1,007 1,373 1,464 2,139 2,554 2,367 2,492

Cargo ThroughputContainers in/out teu 2,690 3,967 5,024 6,550 7,760 9,554 11,177 14,304 16,230Total cargo FT 273,000 322,532 345,466 419,315 490,985 591,275 660,765 822,762 854,590

Operating Times/CallWaiting time days 1.5 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8

Service time days 7.5 7.6 6.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.2 4.3 4.3

Ship turnaround time

b

days 18.5 18.5 16.8 14.6 14.6 12.2 11.5 11.6 11.6Berth occupancy % 60.4 67.6 84.1 87.4

Handling PerformanceCargo handling FT/day 803 948 1,016 1,233 1,444 1,739 1,943 2,420 2,513

Containers nos./shipday 45 44 53 77 101 146 180 Breakbulk FT/shipday 123 113 114 115 110 106 102

= not available, FT = freight ton, GRT = gross registered tonnage, no. = number, teu = twenty-foot equivalent unit.a

Of which export cargo was 34 percent.b

Ship turnaround times under the lighterage system averaged 18.5 days. With the Project, the average turnaround savings per ship was expected to be a minimum of 5 days.

Sources: Maldives Ports Authority and mission estimates.

CARGO-HANDLING PERFORMANCE

19991995 1996 1997 19981991 1992 1993 1994

20

Appendix3,page

1


35/43

Item

Total Revenue 24.38 27.00 31.16 48.32 60.53 75.17 88.77 26.1

Operating Revenue 24.38 27.00 31.16 48.32 59.87 74.47 87.85 25.9Operating Expenditure 11.52 13.66 14.67 16.74 25.00 24.33 30.63 16.9

Gross Operating Profit 12.86 13.30 16.49 31.58 34.87 50.14 51.22 31.1Less:

Finance Interest 1.09 8.36 7.76 7.03 6.64 12.44 16.67 25.2Depreciation 2.06 2.65 5.16 5.20 5.06 7.25 10.60 31.1

Net Operating Profit 9.71 2.33 3.57 19.35 23.17 30.45 29.95 38.1Less:

Project Development 0.00 0.00 2.04 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 0.0Assets Written Off 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.0Extraordinary Expenses 0.12 0.07 0.35 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.0

Year End Net Surplus 9.59 2.26 1.18 17.20 21.62 29.03 28.82 37.3

Prior Year Adjustment 1.85 0.56 (0.07) .. (0.12) 1.32 0.00 0.0To Finance Ministry (6.27) (7.19) 0.00 0.00 (2.00) (15.00) (20.00) 0.0

Surplus Carried Forward 5.17 (4.37) 1.24 17.20 19.50 15.35 8.82 73.2

Performance Indicators (%)Net Operating Profit/Total Revenue 39.83 8.63 11.46 40.05 38.28 40.51 33.74Net Operating Profit/Equity 31.43 9.18 13.47 44.27 36.66 38.76 34.28Net Operating Profit/Total Assets 23.81 2.15 3.00 16.02 17.64 19.73 11.89

.. = less than $0.005 million.

Source: Maldives Ports Authority's audited accounts.

1994 1995

Percent per Year

FINANCIAL STATEMENTSTable A4.1: Summary Income Statement, 1991-1997

1996 1997 Growth Rate

(Rf million)

1991 1992 1993

22

1


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Item

Fixed Assets 24.73 67.89 69.56 69.96 66.05 89.91 167.42

Work in Progress 0.47 4.24 7.38 6.37 10.45 2.32 2.42

Project Development 0.00 19.48 18.36 16.38 14.33 12.28 26.76

Investments 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.72

Current Assets 15.58 16.63 23.57 28.09 40.55 49.82 43.56

Stocks 0.54 2.00 5.04 7.25 6.14 8.25 7.04

Debtors 8.00 11.57 12.19 12.45 10.83 11.45 12.24

Cash 7.04 3.06 6.34 8.39 23.58 30.12 24.18

Total Assets 40.78 108.24 118.87 120.80 131.38 154.33 251.88

Equity 30.89 25.39 26.51 43.71 63.21 78.56 87.38

Current Liabilities 3.61 5.47 23.48 14.90 12.00 18.40 23.59

Term Loans 6.28 77.38 68.88 62.19 56.17 57.37 140.91

Total Liabilities 40.78 108.24 118.87 120.80 131.38 154.33 251.88

Performance IndicatorsCurrent Operating Ratio 4.32 3.04 1.00 1.89 3.38 2.71 1.85

Debt-Service Ratio 5.88 (0.40) 0.13 1.98 2.48 1.91 0.45Equity/Total Assets (%) 75.75 23.46 22.30 36.18 48.11 50.90 34.69

Term Loans/Total Assets (%) 8.85 5.05 19.75 12.33 9.13 11.92 9.37

Source: Maldives Ports Authority's audited accounts.

Table A4.2: Summary Balance Sheet Statement, 1991-1997(Rf million)

1996 19971991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Appendix4,page2

23


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Appendix 5, page 1

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

1. The reestimated financial internal rate of return (FIRR) and economic internal rate ofreturn (EIRR) are calculated following the same approach as for appraisal and the projectcompletion report (PCR), and take into account the overall net incremental stream of benefitsand costs for the with- and without-project cases. Differences between the project performanceaudit report (PPAR), appraisal, and PCR estimates are largely differences associated withscheduling, the size of revenue benefits, and associated operating costs. Further details ofdifferences are discussed in para. 6.

2. Principal assumptions relating to the PPAR analyses are

(i) All costs and revenues are converted into year 2000 constant prices. The WorldBanks manufacturing unit value index is used for inflating actual foreign currencycosts to year 2000 constant prices and converted to the Maldives currency usingthe exchange rate of Rf11.770 per dollar. Actual local currency costs are inflatedusing the implicit gross domestic product deflator for the Maldives.

(ii) The operating life of the Project is projected to 2017 (same as for appraisal andPCR). No residual value for the Project is assumed.

(iii) The capital investment costs are based on the project record of payments asprepared for the PCR. No taxes are included in the financial expenditures and acapital conversion factor of 0.9 is applied to the financial investment costs toarrive at economic investment costs.

(iv) Cargo throughput is projected after 1999 at 11 percent per annum to 2002 whenmaximum handling capacity is reached.

(v) Incremental financial operating costs are computed from figures for actualoperating costs for 1991-1997 (last year of reported accounts), and projectedafter 1997 based on operating costs for 1997 (adjusted to 2000 prices) and

24


38/43

Appendix 5, page 2

4. The aggregate savings in waiting times for ships was calculated based on the knownaverage waiting times that applied between 1992 and 1999. Improvements in cargo handlingusing the lighter system reduced the average waiting time from 1-4 days to 0.8 days up to 1996.There was a marginal improvement with commissioning of the alongside berth to 0.7 days; butwith berth occupancy in 1999 more than 85 percent, the waiting time for ships before servicehas increased to 0.8 days.1

5. The aggregate savings in service times were calculated based on the difference incargo-handling rates before and after the alongside berth was completed. Before the alongsideberth was completed, the average cargo-handling rate was 1,943 freight tons per day. After thealongside berth was commissioned, the average cargo-handling rate improved to 2,420 freight

tons per day and the next two years to 2,600 freight tons per day.

6. Comparison with Appraisal and PCR Estimates. Table A5.1 compares the estimatesobtained for appraisal, PCR, and PPAR.

Table A5.1: FIRR/EIRR Estimates

Item Appraisal PCR PPAR

FIRR 12.3 18.0 23.3EIRR 24.6 22.0 26.8

EIRR = economic internal rate of return, FIRR = financial internal rate of return, PCR = project completionreport, PPAR = project performance audit report.

7. Although the approach to calculating the estimates for each evaluation was essentially

the same, the data applied in terms of scheduling revenue benefits and real operating costsproved to be significantly different. The increasing FIRR results are largely a reflection of thesefactors. The EIRR results (as also for the PCR) are influenced by the assumption to halve theestimated savings in ship service and waiting times (in recognition that not all the benefit from

25


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Appendix 5, page 3

Table A5.2: FIRR and EIRR Sensitivity to Parameter Changes

(percent)

Item FIRR EIRR

A. Base Case (Incremental) 23.3 26.8

B. With the Following Charges

1. 10 percent increase in incremental cargorevenues after 2000

26.3 30.0

2. 10 percent increase in incrementaloperating costs after 2000

22.3 25.8

3. 20 percent increase in service and waitingtime savings after 2000

30.2

C. Switch Value

Yearly decrease in economic benefits after1999 required to reduce EIRR to 10 percent a

50.0 b

EIRR = economic internal rate of return, FIRR = financial internal rate of return.a

Maximum cargo throughput of 1,266 freight tons is forecast to be achieved in 2003.b

This would be equivalent to maintaining cargo throughput at the port to around the 1998 volume of 823,000 freighttons or 84 percent of the current (2000) throughput.

26


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27Appendix 5, page 4

FiscalYear

1992 2.605 20.720 40.957 20.720 40.957 (2.605)1993 8.015 20.139 42.777 20.139 42.777 (8.015)1994 9.767 20.899 60.331 20.899 60.331 (9.767)1995 29.860 29.246 70.038 29.246 70.038 (29.860)1996 47.096 27.098 82.914 27.835 82.914 (46.359)1997 21.842 32.302 92.097 26.209 92.097 (27.935)1998 3.437 35.583 114.249 26.010 91.399 9.840

1999 38.723 123.658 25.500 89.607 20.8282000 42.139 139.418 25.000 87.850 34.4292001 48.039 158.936 25.000 87.850 48.0472002 54.764 181.188 25.000 87.850 63.5732003 54.764 181.188 25.000 87.850 63.5732004 54.764 181.188 25.000 87.850 63.5732005 54.764 181.188 25.000 87.850 63.5732006 54.764 181.188 25.000 87.850 63.5732007 54.764 181.188 25.000 87.850 63.573

2008 54.764 181.188 25.000 87.850 63.5732009 54.764 181.188 25.000 87.850 63.5732010 54.764 181.188 25.000 87.850 63.5732011 54 764 181 188 25 000 87 850 63 573

Table A5.3: Benefit Cost Streams for Evaluating FIRR(Rf million-2000 Prices)

With-Project CaseProject

Without-Project CaseOperating and

InvestmentCost

A

Operating andMaintenance

CostB D

NetRevenueBenefit

F

OperatingRevenue

E

OperatingRevenue

C

MaintenanceCost


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28Appendix 5, page 5

FiscalYear

2.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 (2.34)

7.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 (7.21)8.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 (8.79)

26.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 (26.87)42.39 (0.66) 0.00 0.00 (41.72)19.66 5.48 0.00 0.00 (25.14)

161,997 3.09 8.62 28.98 10.21 27.49193,827 11.90 29.02 11.59 28.70313,470 15.43 40.71 11.33 36.62449,863 20.74 58.43 12.82 50.51605,351 26.79 78.62 12.82 64.66605,351 26.79 78.62 10.68 62.52605,351 26.79 78.62 10.68 62.52605,351 26.79 78.62 10.68 62.52605,351 26.79 78.62 10.68 62.52605,351 26.79 78.62 10.68 62.52605,351 26.79 78.62 10.68 62.52605,351 26.79 78.62 10.68 62.52

605,351 26.79 78.62 10.68 62.52605,351 26.79 78.62 10.68 62.52605,351 26.79 78.62 10.68 62.52605,351 26.79 78.62 10.68 62.52

IncrementalOperating

Costc

CargoHandling

Cost

Table A5.4: Benefit Cost Streams for Evaluating EIRR(Rf million-2000 Prices)

Savingd

ShipWaiting

CostSavinge(freight ton)

ProjectInvestment

1992

19931994

Net

BenefitCost

Actual/ProjectedIncremental Cargo

Volumeb

199519961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009

2010201120122013


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FiscalYear

322,532 322,532345,466 345,466419,315 419,315490,985 490,985591,275 591,275660,765 660,765822,762 660,765 340 120 28,980 10,214 39,195854,592 660,765 340 136 29,017 11,588 40,605974,235 660,765 477 133 40,714 11,330 52,045

1,110,628 660,765 685 150 58,429 12,819 71,2481,266,116 660,765 921 150 78,624 12,819 91,4431,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,307

1,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,3071,266,116 660,765 921 125 78,624 10,683 89,307

aIncremental cargo volume divided by the improvement in gross cargo handling rates.

bIncremental number of ship calls multiplied by the average saving in waiting time before servicing.

cTime savings in hours multiplied by average ship costs.

(freight ton)

Without-ProjectActual/ProjectedCargo Volume

(freight ton)

With-ProjectActual/ProjectedCargo Volume

Incremental SavingsWaiting

Time Savingb

(day)

ServiceTime Savinga

199219931994199519961997199819992000200120022003

200920102011

2004200520062007

20162017

ServiceTime Savingc

(Rf'000)

2012

201320142015

2008

Table A5.5: Workings for Estimated Waiting and Service Time Savings(Rf million-2000 Prices)

WaitingTime Savingc

(Rf'000)

TotalTime Saving

(Rf'000)(day)

29

Appen

dix5,pa

e6


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ADDITIONAL WORKINGS

WITH Project W/OUT Project Incrementall Year Actual/Projected Actual/Projected Actual/Projected

Cargo Cargo CargoVolume Volume Volume

(Freight Tonnes) (Freight Tonnes)a/

# 322,532 322,532 -# 345,466 345,466 -# 419,315 419,315 -# 490,985 490,985 -# 591,275 591,275 -# 660,765 660,765 -# 822,762 660,765 161,997# 854,592 660,765 193,827

# 974,235 660,765 313,470# 1,110,628 660,765 449,863# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351

# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351# 1,266,116 660,765 605,351