secret talks for the submission of haile selassie and prince asfaw wassen, 1936-1939

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Board of Trustees, Boston University Secret Talks for the Submission of Haile Selassie and Prince Asfaw Wassen, 1936-1939 Author(s): Alberto Sbacchi Source: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1974), pp. 668- 680 Published by: Boston University African Studies Center Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/216600 . Accessed: 08/05/2014 19:07 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Boston University African Studies Center and Board of Trustees, Boston University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The International Journal of African Historical Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Thu, 8 May 2014 19:07:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Page 1: Secret Talks for the Submission of Haile Selassie and Prince Asfaw Wassen, 1936-1939

Board of Trustees, Boston University

Secret Talks for the Submission of Haile Selassie and Prince Asfaw Wassen, 1936-1939Author(s): Alberto SbacchiSource: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1974), pp. 668-680Published by: Boston University African Studies CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/216600 .

Accessed: 08/05/2014 19:07

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Boston University African Studies Center and Board of Trustees, Boston University are collaborating withJSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The International Journal of African Historical Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Thu, 8 May 2014 19:07:11 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: Secret Talks for the Submission of Haile Selassie and Prince Asfaw Wassen, 1936-1939

SECRET TALKS FOR THE SUBMISSION OF HAILE SELASSIE AND PRINCE ASFAW WASSEN, 1936-19391

Alberto Sbacchi

In the wake of their occupation of Ethiopia in May 1936, the Italians faced the opposition of the Ethiopian people, who prepared them- selves for a general uprising against the invading army to be timed with the return from exile of Haile Selassie, who would lead them to victory. During the five years of Italian occupation Ethiopian pa- triots kept alive this hope, and Italy's interest lay in convincing them of the impossibility of their emperor's comeback. In an attempt to dis-

courage and disperse the resisters and make them more willing to

accept Italian rule, Italy entered into indirect negotiations with the

Ethiopian royal family in England, seeking the formal submission of Haile Selassie or his son, Asfaw Wassen, and the recognition of either of the Italian empire. In addition to the political advantages, a suc- cessful agreement would have had a great psychological bearing on

Ethiopia's attitude toward its conquerors. With the emperor on their side, the Italians would have been able to exploit the colonial situation

easily, and coexist with the Ethiopians in peace. The events leading to secret talks between emissaries of Haile

Selassie and the Italian government are of great importance for the

study of Italo-Ethiopian relations, for they reveal the uncertainty of Italian authorities in political matters. In 1936 the conquest of Ethiopia was far from complete. The Italians had no plans to organize and ex-

1 Research for this article was conducted in Italy using the archival resources of the Central State Archives and the archives of the former Ministry of Italian Africa in Rome. Permission to use those archives was granted on condition that the archival positions not be cited. The following references, therefore, include only the sender and the receiver of the communication and its date. I would like to acknowledge the support given me by the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, the assistance of my Ph.D. dissertation superviser, Robert L. Hess, that of R. Friedman, and of Carlo Giglio of the University of Pavia.

The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vii, 4 (1974) 668

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ploit the country, in spite of the fact that by 1935 they had established about a dozen consular agencies in the main centers of Ethiopia. But

they lacked knowledge of the regions they occupied, of the traditions of the Ethiopian people, and of the country's political, economic, and

physical environment. The vastness of the territory, the lack of good communications, and the incompetence of Italian agents all contributed to their ignorance. Eleven days after the Italians entered Addis Ababa on 5 May 1936, the capital was attacked and the railway practically neutralized by rebel Ethiopian troops; in 1937, after a year of occu- pation, the rebellion had spread to great areas of central Ethiopia. Under those uncertain conditions, Italy decided to approach Haile Selassie, although opinions differ on whether the Italian government through the Vatican or the emperor himself actually made the first move.

From 3 June 1936, when he first arrived in London, Haile Selassie was surrounded by three parties. The first proposed his abdication with financial compensation, and was composed of financiers and business- men, including the agent of the Societe des Salines de Djibouti, which was controlled by the Bank of Indochina. Professor Gaston Jeze, legal adviser to Haile Selassie, also belonged to this group. The second party, which consisted of Ras Nasibu, Workeneh Martin, the Ethiopian min- ister in London, former aviation adviser to the emperor Rene Drouillet, and many members of the imperial family, wanted Haile Selassie to lead the patriots against the Italians. The third group advised a wait- and-see policy. Among its supporters were the emperor's daughter, Princess Tshai, English political personalities, and members of the British intelligence service.

When Ethiopians massacred several Italian airmen at Lekempt in an attempt to conquer western Ethiopia, the second pressure group proposed that Haile Selassie fly to Ethiopia to lead the revolt. But the tense situation soon cooled down, and the financiers pressed for abdication, while the third party, which had no immediate plans, hoped that the future would provide some solution to the problem. Of the three groups, the financiers initially had the greatest influence, and the Italians used these French concerns and Professor Jeze in their

attempts to persuade Haile Selassie to renounce his claim to the throne.2 By mid-1936, however, Alessandro Lessona, Italian minister of

2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs [hereafter MFA] to Ministry of Colonies [hereafter MC], 24 July 1936. See note 1 for further comment on the archival documentation used in this article.

669

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colonies, revealed that his country would no longer consider abdica-

tion, since abdication had no judicial or political value after 18 May 1936, when the Italian government proclaimed the Italian Empire of

Ethiopia with the king of Italy as emperor. Once it had denied Haile Selassie's right to rule, the only act Italy could recognize was his

complete and formal submission.3

Publicly Haile Selassie declared that he would not remain in Eng- land forever. He claimed that he wanted to return to Ethiopia as soon as conditions permitted.4 He was disappointed at the League of Na- tions' lack of support, even after his personal appearance before the

assembly at Geneva, and he was equally disillusioned when the British and French governments ignored his requests for aid. Regretfully he admitted that if he had known earlier that his allies would desert him he would have accepted Mussolini's offer of a protectorate.5

On 23 July 1936 the party in favor of abdication went so far as to draft a letter promising that the emperor would give up his plans to

reeonquer Ethiopia, and Haile Selassie considered signing it. The letter had been discussed in the presence of Jeze, Ras Kassa, Martin, the emperor, and Princess Tshai, as well as the director of the Societe des Salines de Djibouti and the representative of both the Bank of Indochina and the Djibouti Railway, M. Thion de la Chaume. French investors feared that the Italian conquest of Ethiopia would end their salt monopoly, railway traffic, and trade monopolies in Ethiopia, espe- cially since Haile Selassie remained the main shareholder.6 Moreover, the Bank of Indochina and the negus had so many financial interests in common7 that the French government pressured him to abdicate lest Italy confiscate their assets. The representative of the Bank of Indochina in London urged Haile Selassie to recognize the Italian

conquest. On August 5 Vittorio Cerruti, the Italian ambassador in

Paris, alleged that the letter of abdication had been signed.8 Jeze also

reported the news on 1 August 1936. The letter had been revised and rewritten in English, French, and Omharic, and Jeze was delegated to

3 Lessona to MFA, 1 Aug. 1936. 4 La Gazette de Liege, 16 Aug. 1936. 5 MFA to MC, July 1936, discussing an interview by Bertrand De Jouvenel of

the Iatransigeant with Haile Selassie; MFA to Ministry of Italian Africa [hereafter MIA], 17 April 1937.

6 MFA to MC, 6 Aug. 1936. 7 MFA to MC, 8 Aug. 1936. 8 Cerruti to MFA, 5 Aug. 1936. The news was received through an informant

but was not confirmed.

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bring the letter to the League of Nations. After depositing it with the General Secretariat he was to communicate the text to the press and

provide a commentary for it.9 But when the letter reached the secre-

tary general of the league, Sir Joseph Avenol, he refused to accept it because it had been signed not by Haile Selassie but by the Ethiopian representative at the League of Nations.

Why Haile Selassie did not sign the letter at the last moment is not clear. Perhaps he resented the fact that it had been forced on him

by his advisers. Perhaps he hoped that in case the international situation changed in his favor, his abdication could not be upheld without his signature. If Great Britain went to war against Italy, he could claim that he was still the legal emperor of his country. What- ever the causes, Avenol apparently indicated to the Italians that if the letter of abdication were made public, they should at once request the de jure recognition of their empire by league members.10

Emissaries of the Italian embassy in contact with Professor Jeze again pressured Haile Selassie to renounce the throne and the recon- quest of Ethiopia for himself and his heirs. These agents even con- vinced Jeze and his associates that a nonexistent Anglo-American group would invest capital in Ethiopia once the country was pacified and Haile Selassie had given up his claims. The Italians promised that if Haile Selassie signed a declaration he could rely upon Italian

generosity to alleviate the rigors of exile. It was most important to Lessona that Italy's role in the negotiations remain secret, as well as that Haile Selassie surrender all claim to his throne. He was willing to offer the negus monetary compensation rather than have Haile Selassie sign an act of submission which might leave the door open to possible future claims."1

The British Foreign Office soon heard of the secret negotiations. Godfrey Thompson, a specialist in Egyptian affairs, asked Dino Grandi, the Italian ambassador in London, about them, but Grandi, who knew about the discussions, denied the possibility of any compromise.

9 MFA to MC, 8 Aug. 1936. This is a letter written by Jeze to a friend who would accompany him to Geneva. It was shown to the man in charge of the Press Bureau of the Italian Embassy in Paris.

10 MFA to MC, 10 Aug. 1936. Italian authorities were suspicious that Jeze's secret diplomatic dealings concerned Italo-French financial affairs. The French had

large investments in Ethiopia, which they had negotiated with the former Ethio-

pian government. The Italians refused to recognize any financial agreements between Ethiopia and French concerns.

11 MFA to MC, 31 Aug. 1936, enclosing a letter from Cerruti to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated Paris, 19 Aug. 1936.

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Crandi believed that Martin deliberately wanted to give the Foreign Office the impression that Italy was seeking a settlement with Haile Selassie.12 This impression was reinforced when Ambassador to Italy Erie Drummond spoke with Galeazzo Ciano, Italian foreign minister, in Rome on 11 January 1937, and referred to a conversation with the duce in which Mussolini allegedly promised Haile Selassie a generous reward in return for his abdication. Responding to the rumor at face

value, Drummond asked the Italian government to allow the British

legation in Addis Ababa to send Haile Selassie five cases of precious metals valued at ?6000 which the emperor had deposited with them before he left his capital. Ciano, however, claimed that all possessions of the ruling family now belonged to Italy.13

Officially, then, Italy denied any compromise, while indirect nego- tiations continued. During the month of December 1936, an Egyptian prince named Mohammed Ekrem Riza approached the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs on behalf of Haile Selassie. He proposed the abdi- cation of Haile Selassie in favor of his eldest son, Asfaw Wassen, to whom Italy would give a small territory in Ethiopia to govern.14 Haile Selassie would be offered a large sum of money as compensa- tion.15 Despite Italy's rejection of the proposal, the Italian govern- ment apparently was willing to discuss the suggested terms contingent

upon Haile Selassie's outright submission.16 The Vatican also took

part in the negotiations, although on which side is not clear. Ciano denied its participation, but Father Cyril C. Martindale, the Jesuit scholar representing the pope, confirmed that the secretary of state

at the Vatican, Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli (later Pope Pius XII), offered Haile Selassie ?1 million on behalf of Italy in return for his abdica- tion.'7

Father Martindale, who admitted that he had communicated with the negus to obtain his submission, worked with another intermediary, a French count named Louis Sibour, who resided in London. In late

1936, their negotiations failed when the negus refused to accept all the

12 MFA to MC, 11 Sept. 1936; Grandi to MFA, London, 21 Aug. 1936. 13 Galeazzo Ciano, L'Europe verso la catastrofe (Milan, 1948), 124. 14 MFA to MC, 19 Dec. 1936. 15 Ministry of the Interior, Political Police, fiduciary information from London,

7 March 1937. 16 MFA to MC, 19 Dec. 1936. 17 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Public Record Office, Further Correspondence

Respecting Abyssinia, 401/1937/XXIX, no. 45.

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Italian terms.'8 Six months later, in June 1937, Count Sibour told Cardinal Pacelli that Haile Selassie was willing to reopen negotia- tions.19 Ciano answered that the Italian government was even less interested in negotiating than it had been, but that the negus should make his proposals clear and precise and perhaps they would recon- sider.20

Once more Italian diplomacy lost an opportunity for compromise. Perhaps the Italians, confident of sympathy from other nations and in view of the forthcoming recognition of the empire by Great Britain and France, now felt that Haile Selassie was of secondary concern. Yet clearly his submission would have brought peace to Ethiopia and reduced Italy's huge military expenses, which reached about 4 billion lire a year. However, the ignorance and over-optimism of Italian gov- ernment officials prevented a realistic appreciation of the serious

political-military situation in Ethiopia. News of the secret negotiations leaked out, and English newspapers

even reported that Mussolini had promised to send Haile Selassie back to Ethiopia to quell the rebellion once he had abdicated.21 The

pro-British Arab press advocated the restoration of Haile Selassie to the throne in Addis Ababa as a king under the protection of the House of Savoy. It suggested that he be given a status like that of the Indian princes, but with no rights of future succession for him or his heirs. Members of the League of Nations viewed such a com-

promise as faciliating de jure recognition of the Italian conquest.22 Later in December 1937, as his financial situation became precarious,

Haile Selassie again opened talks with the Italian government. Father Martindale had dropped out of the picture, saying that he did not want to be involved in political and financial affairs, so this time the

emperor did not use the Vatican, but proposed the mediatory services of Count Sibour and the Italian Embassy in London. After the initial

steps, Haile Selassie intended to make personal contact with the latter.23 But his probings failed; the Italian government took no im- mediate action,24 and 1937 ended without any practical conclusion.

18 Grandi to MFA, London, 13 Nov. 1937; Ciano to Italian Embassy in London, Rome, 17 Nov. 1937.

19 Pignatti, Italian ambassador to the Vatican, to MFA, 2 June 1937. 20 Ciano to Pignatti, 5 June 1937. 21 News Chronicles, 18 Aug. 1937. 22 Article by Jean Sugab in La Bourse Egyptienne, 27 Nov. 1937. 23 Grandi to MFA, London, 13 Nov. 1937. 24 Ciano to Italian Embassy in London, 17 Nov. 1937.

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Both sides were interested in continuing contact, but neither was

willing to yield enough to reach an agreement. As long as Great Britain did not recognize the Italian conquest of

Ethiopia, Haile Selassie had hopes of regaining his throne. He felt that after the Italian war crimes were made public-he had in mind the use of gas and the massacres that followed the attempted assassi- nation of Rodolfo Graziani, viceroy of Ethiopia-the League of Nations would take a strong stand against Italy. But by the end of 1937 he realized that Great Britain might very well reach a diplomatic accom- modation with the Italians, and he prepared contingency plans to retire to Jerusalem, where he had acquired a house.25 Others reported that the emperor was so discouraged that he planned to retire for life to a Coptic monastery in Palestine.26

On the eve of the British-Italian colonial pact of Easter 1938, Lord

Perth, the British ambassador in Rome, approached Count Ciano,

asking whether Italy would be willing to make political or financial concessions toward Haile Selassie and allow him and his family to return to Ethiopia. The Italians responded that the matter would be taken under consideration only if Haile Selassie assumed the right attitude toward Italy.27 This could only mean his submission and the

recognition of their conquest. Demoralized and on the verge of bank-

ruptcy, Haile Selassie was willing to accept the Italian terms in 1938. To Lord Halifax he expressed his great desire to return to his country and his apparent willingness to submit to Italian demands in exchange for jurisdiction over a small part of Ethiopia. He requested that Lord Halifax inform Italy of his desires in the coming Anglo-Italian talks in Rome. However, Halifax refused to interfere in Italo-Ethiopian affairs 28

Once Great Britain had recognized the Italian empire, personalities like Lord Lugard advised Italy to make some concessions to Haile Selassie. Lugard felt that Italy should allow the emperor to rule over

Gojjam province in order to suppress Ethiopians opposing Italian rule there. At the same time Italy could rest its weary soldiers and make much-needed economies.29 Bishop Andre Marie Elie Jarosseau, Haile Selassie's former tutor and a man who had great influence over him, also

25 MFA to MIA, 19 May 1937. 26 Sbrana, Italian consul in Beirut, to MFA, Beirut, 19 Jan. 1937. 27 Ciano, L'Europa verso la catastrofe, 291. 28 MFA to MIA, 12 March 1938. 29 The Times (London), 29 April 1938; Le Petit Parisien, 22 Aug. 1939; La

Garonne, 22 Aug. 1939.

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invited the exiled ruler to recognize Italian sovereignty. By submitting to Italy he could rule with Italian consent.30 According to Swedish Count Gustav von Rosen, who flew the only Ethiopian Red Cross

plane during the war, the Italian government offered Haile Selassie ?1 million to surrender his throne. But Haile Selassie refused, claiming that he wanted to return to Ethiopia to lead the guerrillas, although the British government prevented him from doing so.31 Yet Haile Selassie still sought an influential intermediary to work out an

agreement suitable to both sides. Mediation on the part of French personalities had failed, and the

Vatican had withdrawn its sponsorship. Only the English remained, but for political reasons they would not consent to Haile Selassie's

negotiating with the Italians. The emperor therefore contacted a German authority, since at this time Italy enjoyed close military and

diplomatic relations with that country. Ato Wolde-Giorgis, personal secretary to Haile Selassie, made one last effort to mediate. He sent a letter to Major Hans Steffens, former honorary German consul in Addis Ababa. This letter, presumably written with Haile Selassie's consent, requested that Major Steffens try to bring about an agree- ment between the two parties.32 Major Steffens may not have been

very influential in the Nazi government, but he maintained contacts with highly-placed officials. Was Haile Selassie attempting to enlist the help of Hitler? In 1936 Hitler had supported Haile Selassie's war

against Italy for his own political purposes,33 but by 1938-1939 he

clearly was interested in Italy's lessening its involvement in Ethiopia. Moreover, the threat of war in Europe relegated the emperor and his

problems to a place of secondary importance. He would become valuable to the British again only after Italy entered the war on the German side.

Although negotiations for the abdication of Haile Selassie never reached a positive conclusion, Italian authorities were hopeful that Prince Asfaw Wassen could be persuaded to subscribe to their cause.

Perhaps they wanted to capitalize on the disharmony between Haile

30 Gaetan Bernoville, Monseigneur Jarosseau et la Mission des Gallas (Paris, 1950), 360; Jarosseau to Haile Selassie, 8 Oct. 1938.

31 Interview with Count Gustav von Rosen, Stockholm, 20 Nov. 1970; MFA to MIA, 16 Nov. 1937.

32 Wolde-Giorgis to Steffens, London, 7 Nov. 1938. The letter may have been passed on to Italian authorities either by Major Steffens himself or by the German intelligence service.

33 Manfred Funke, Sanzioni e cannoni (Milan, 1972), 39-51.

675

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Selassie and his eldest son.34 It seemed to intermediaries that the

prince's youth and inexperience, his desire to free himself from his father's authority, and his aversion to the rigid English surroundings of his life in exile made his submission a prospect. Yet Italy failed to offer even this more favorable subject inspiring terms. Government officials treated the young prince arrogantly and greedily, and their

dealings with him lacked common sense. Since October 1936 Ras

Getachew, a former governor of southwest Ethiopia who had joined the Italians, had offered to approach the heir to the throne. Ras Getachew asked if the prince could retain his property and that of his father. He wanted to know if Asfaw Wassen could be made gover- nor of Wollo, or Lekempt, or Leca, or Sayo, or Gore and Maji. If he should refuse to return to Ethiopia and remain in Italy, Ras Getachew

wondered, what kind. of financial reward would be offered him.35 The English press soon reported an Italian suggestion that Haile

Selassie cease all opposition to Italy, and in return his son could

reign under the Italian government in Ethiopia.36 But discussions

began in earnest only in 1939, when all hope for Haile Selassie's sub- mission seemed futile. At one point it seemed that the negotiations with Asfaw Wassen would reach a happy conclusion. In October 1938

Wolde-Giorgis passed through Bouveret (Vallese), Switzerland, and visited Ferdinand Bientry, an engineer who worked in road planning in Ethiopia before the war. Bientry had rendered important service to the Italian intelligence in the country, especially in the logistic information he provided the invading army in the north. Wolde-Giorgis also visited Bientry's wife, Daragonie Beressie, an Ethiopian woman of noble family who had lived at the imperial court in Addis Ababa and had been a friend of Asfaw Wassen since childhood. Asfaw Wassen wrote to Mme. Bientry in Amharic, saying he hoped to apply for special consideration from the Italian government and wanted to know their terms. Maximum secrecy was imperative, since the British

police kept the Ethiopian imperial family under intense surveillance. When Attilio Terruzzi, minister of Italian Africa, was informed of the

prince's letter on 19 March 1939, he gave orders that contacts with Asfaw Wassen were to be pursued.37 The prince was assured that he could take up residence in an Italian city and would be treated ac-

34 MFA to MIA, 19 May 1937. 35 Italian Consulate in Cairo to General Government of Italian East Africa in

Addis Ababa, Cairo, 26 Oct. 1936. 36 News Chronicles, 29 April 1938. 37 MFA to MIA, 17 March 1939; Italian consul in Sion to MFA, no date.

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cording to his royal rank.38 The next day Italian authorities received the disconcerting report that Asfaw Wassen was in Cairo collecting information on the Ethiopian patriots and was planning a coup to liberate Ras Imru, the former governor of Gojjam and Haile Selassie's cousin, from his island prison in Italy.9 The Italian legation in Cairo denied the allegation,40 but it was enough to make the Italians sus-

picious of the prince's real aims. Negotiations slowed; the two ministeries involved, the Ministry of

Italian Africa and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Italian consulate in Sion, Switzerland, could reach no clear agreement on how to handle the situation. On May 6 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Ministry of Italian Africa if it would be willing to pay the travel expenses of an agent to carry Italian conditions to Asfaw Was- sen in London.41 The exact concessions had not yet been settled, however. Not until the end of May did Martino Moreno, director of

political affairs at the Ministry of Italian Africa, draw up a memoran- dum on what appeared to be the indispensable requirements. In sub- mitting the memorandum to Mussolini, Moreno stressed that for the

agreement to have positive repercussions in Ethiopia the prince would have to receive generous treatment, a suitable residence, a small retinue and a number of servants, freedom of movement within

Italy, and freedom from racial discrimination. He advised that Asfaw Wassen be allowed to settle in Turin, where his sister, Princess

Romanework, the widow of Dejatch Beyene Merid, lived. He would reside in a villa under the supervision of the Missione della Consolata. Moreno proposed a stipend of 50,000 lire per month in addition to the salaries of Asfaw Wassen's principal followers, and a car. On his

arrival in Italy the prince was to be received by the duce and the king. Terruzzi approved most of the memorandum on 9 June 1939, al-

though he reduced the stipend to 15,000 lire and denied the retinue, the car, two servants, and the audience with Mussolini or the king.42 On 19 June Ciano ordered the Italian consul at Sion to authorize Mme. Bientry's trip to London, where she would convince Asfaw

38 Terruzzi to MFA, 18 March 1939. 39 G. Marraffa, general and commander-in-chief, Colonial Police, to MFA, Politi-

cal Office, 20' March 1939. 40 MFA to MIA, 11 April 1939. 41 MFA to MIA, 6 May 1939. 42 Memorandum, Martino Mario Moreno, director, Political Office, MIA, to Mus-

solini, May 1939.

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Wassen to accept the terms Moreno and Terruzzi had agreed upon.43 More than a month later Mme. Bientry reported on her visit. Because he liked the Italians very much the prince was willing to submit to

their terms, but he could not make any moves that year because of intense police supervision, either at the order of the British govern- men:t or of his father. He proposed asking his father to let him go to France or Switzerland for his health once his Cambridge University examinations were finished. From there he would visit the Bientry residence to complete the negotiations.44 A few days later Asfaw Wassen called Bientry, who was in Brighton, for further specifications. They decided that on his arrival in Switzerland he would sign a letter of submission, and the Italian government would present him with a document guaranteeing that his rank and prerogatives as a prince would be recognized in his country. Ie also asked for ?50,000 for his personal use, of which ?10,000 would be paid in advance to the

many persons who favored his submission. Bientry advised the Italian authorities to use tact and patience in handling negotiations; once Asfaw Wassen submitted, he argued, many other exiled Ethiopians would do the same.

Asfaw Wassen was concerned that once he had signed his submis- sion he would be discarded, that his fate would be etre laisser tom- ber.45 Yet the answer of Italian Ministry for Africa to his demands was positive under the circumstances. They found the request of

?50,000 exorbitant, but were willing to fix a sum as personal com-

pensation. They categorically refused his demand to title, rank, and rights as a prince of Ethiopia, since all imperial rights had been transferred to the king of Italy on 18 May 1936. They might have considered giving Asfaw Wassen a title, as they had done in Libya with Hassuna Pasha Caramanli, but such a title would be only honor-

ary. Asfaw Wassen would under no circumstances be allowed to return to Ethiopia.46

The unwillingness of the Ministry of Africa to accept Asfaw Was- sen's terms produced a snag in the negotiations. One sticking point was the question of a title. Other Ethiopian noble families in exile had been able to retain their titles; some served in Addis Ababa as

43 Ciano to Italian Consulate in Sion, 19 June 1939. 44 Ciano to MIA, 3 July 1939. Ciano merely forwarded the letter from the

consul of Sion to Ciano, 24 June 1939. 45 MFA to MIA, 3 Aug. 1939. This includes the letter from the consul of Sion

to Ciano of 29 July 1939. 46 MIA to MFA, 17 Aug. 1939.

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Page 13: Secret Talks for the Submission of Haile Selassie and Prince Asfaw Wassen, 1936-1939

TALKS FOR THE SUBMISSION OF HAILE SELASSIE, 1936-1939 679

advisers to the government in matters concerning the Ethiopian people. His residence in Turin might give Asfaw Wassen's followers the idea that he was being kept in a splendid exile. Italy had spent a great deal of money on the Italo-Ethiopian war and the operation of colonial

policy, now officials suddenly baulked at a mere ?50,000 in exchange for Asfaw Wassen's support. Yet Bientry felt that despite the limita- tions the prince would in fact still be willing to accept an Italian offer, but he needed an advance of ?10,000 badly to distribute among those who would facilitate his department from England.47 The Italian

government thought ?10,000 (about 1 million lire) too high a sum, and suspected that Bientry had padded the request to include a per- centage for himself. The Ministry of Italian Africa then proposed that enough money be forwarded to facilitate the prince's leaving England, with a substantial amount as personal compensation to be

put at his disposal once he arrived in Italy.48 The new offer meant that Bientry would have to make another trip to England to deliver the last of the Italian proposals.49 But for unknown reasons Bientry was denied an entry visa by the English authorities,50 perhaps because British intelligence discovered his activities.

With the Italian entry into the war, the Ministry of Italian Africa broke off negotiations with Asfaw Wassen.51 The talks had cost Italy only 6,377 lire, the price of transportation for Bientry and his wife between London and Sion.52 Significantly, the consul at Sion had paid the sum personally for reasons of secrecy.53

An examination of the secret relations between Italy and Haile Selassie and his family raises the difficult problem of ascertaining the intentions of the Ethiopians. On the Italian side, a certain political and military advantage lay in demonstrating to the world that Haile Selassie or Asfaw Wassen could be bought for the Italian cause. Their submission would have been an important step toward the complete occupation of the country. An agreement would have denied the

patriots their focus, since they saw their role as preparing the way for Haile Selassie's return. The emperor's abdication would have put

47 MFA to MIA, 14 Oct. 1939; consul of Sion to MFA, 4 Oct. 1939. 48 Terruzzi to MFA, 7 Nov. 1939. 49 MFA to MIA, 20 Dec. 1939; consul of Sion to MFA, 6 Dec. 1939. 50 MFA to MIA, 3 May 1940. 51 MIA, Political Office, to MFA, May 1940. 52 Terruzzi to General Government of Italian East Africa, 29 Nov. 1940. 53 G. Migliocco, commander of the colonial troops in Naples, to MFA, Naples,

27 June 1941.

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Page 14: Secret Talks for the Submission of Haile Selassie and Prince Asfaw Wassen, 1936-1939

680 ALBERTO SBACCHI

an end to resistance and guaranteed the full support of the popula- tion. The Ethiopians, on the other hand, may have made overtures to discover Italian interests and pinpoint Italian weaknesses. Perhaps they hoped that lengthy negotiations would distract the Italians from their harassment of the patriots or would reveal to world opinion that Italy needed a member of the imperial family to solve its military, political, and economic problems in East Africa.

It is possible, but not certain, that Haile Selassie and Prince Asfaw Wassen were toying with the Italians. Their motives remain specu- lative, as neither man nor their close friends and associates have

approached the subject. The emperor's official biographers and his

autobiography54 do not consider the period from 1937 onward, least of all his negotiations on abdication. Clearly, however, on several occa- sions during the period between 1935 and 1943 Haile Selassie consid- ered an agreement with the Italians, an agreement which might have been reached had the Italians been less ambitious and foreign powers less interfering.

54 Haile Selassie, My Life and Ethiopia's Progress (Addis Ababa, 1973). The

autobiography is written in Amharic. For a critical review of the book, see the Times Literary Supplement, 3 (1 June 1973), 717.

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