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05/02/2005 10:0he secret Downing Street memo - Sunday Times - Times Online

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The Sunday Times - Britain

May 01, 2005

The secret Downing Street

memo

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYESONLY

DAVID MANNINGFrom: Matthew RycroftDate: 23 July 2002S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, FrancisRichards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan,

Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Ministeron 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No furthercopies should be made. It should be shownonly to those with a genuine need to know itscontents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence andlatest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was toughand based on extreme fear. The only way tooverthrow it was likely to be by massive militaryaction. Saddam was worried and expected anattack, probably by air and land, but he was notconvinced that it would be immediate oroverwhelming. His regime expected theirneighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knewthat regular army morale was poor. Real support forSaddam among the public was probably narrowlybased.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. Therewas a perceptible shift in attitude. Military actionwas now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted toremove Saddam, through military action, justifiedby the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But theintelligence and facts were being fixed around thepolicy. The NSC had no patience with the UNroute, and no enthusiasm for publishing material onthe Iraqi regime's record. There was littlediscussion in Washington of the aftermath aftermilitary action.

CDS said that military planners would briefCENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 Augustand Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 UStroops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a moveup to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deploymentto Kuwait).

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(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by anIraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with theair campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardousoption.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, withbasing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for eitheroption. Turkey and other Gulf states were alsoimportant, but less vital. The three main options forUK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus threeSF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets inaddition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in NorthernIraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqidivisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US hadalready begun "spikes of activity" to put pressureon the regime. No decisions had been taken, buthe thought the most likely timing in US minds formilitary action to begin was January, with thetimeline beginning 30 days before the USCongressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss thiswith Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear thatBush had made up his mind to take military action,even if the timing was not yet decided. But thecase was thin. Saddam was not threatening hisneighbours, and his WMD capability was less thanthat of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should workup a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow backin the UN weapons inspectors. This would also helpwith the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire forregime change was not a legal base for militaryaction. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC

authorisation. The first and second could not be thebase in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of threeyears ago would be difficult. The situation might ofcourse change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a bigdifference politically and legally if Saddam refusedto allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change andWMD were linked in the sense that it was theregime that was producing the WMD. There weredifferent strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran.If the political context were right, people wouldsupport regime change. The two key issues werewhether the military plan worked and whether wehad the political strategy to give the military planthe space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet ifthe US battleplan was workable. The military werecontinuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, ifSaddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad didnot collapse and urban warfighting began? Yousaid that Saddam could also use his WMD onKuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would notgo ahead with a military plan unless convinced thatit was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK

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interests converged. But on the political strategy,there could be US/UK differences. Despite USresistance, we should explore discreetly theultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ballwith the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allowthe inspectors back in only when he thought thethreat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the PrimeMinister wanted UK military involvement, he would

need to decide this early. He cautioned that manyin the US did not think it worth going down theultimatum route. It would be important for the PrimeMinister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UKwould take part in any military action. But weneeded a fuller picture of US planning before wecould take any firm decisions. CDS should tell theUS military that we were considering a range ofoptions.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the questionof whether funds could be spent in preparation forthis operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full detailsof the proposed military campaign and possible UKcontributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the PrimeMinister the background on the UN inspectors, anddiscreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice onthe positions of countries in the region especiallyTurkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister afull intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: theAttorney-General would consider legal advice with

FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

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