securing development and peace in the niger delta: a social and conflict analysis for change
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Securing
Development
anD peace
in the
Niger DeltAA Social and Confict Analysis or Change
by
PAul frANcis
DeirDre lAPiN
PAulA rossiAsco
sdy ppad pban by h Wdw Wn innana cn sha
Aa Pam and Pj n ladhp and Bdn sa capay
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Securing
Development
anD peace
in the
Niger DeltaA Social and Conict Analsis or Cange
b
Paul FraNcis
DeirDre laPiN
Paula rossiasco
sd ppd f pbn b h Wdw Wninnn cn f sh af Pm nd
P n ldhp nd Bdn s cp
www.ws.
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This study was initially prepared or internal use by the World
Bank. However, the ndings, interpretations, and conclusions
expressed in this volume do not necessarily refect the views o theExecutive Directors o the World Bank or the governments they
represent. The paper carries the names o the authors and should be
cited and attributed accordingly.
To request copies o the paper or or more inormation, please
contact the Wilson Centers Arica Program:
Woodrow Wilson International Center or Scholars
Arica Program
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, DC 20004
Fax: 202-691-4001
Web:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication-series/
research-presented-the-arica-program,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication-series/recent-
publications-the-project-leadership-and-building-state-capacity or
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sta/deirdre-lapin
E-mail: [email protected]
2011 by the Woodrow Wilson International Center or Scholars
Printed in the United States o America
Library o Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Securing development and peace in the niger delta: a social and
confict analysis or change/ by Paul Francis, Deirdre LaPin,
Paula Rossiasco.
ISBN 1-933549-76-9 (PB)
International developmentNigeria. 2. PeacebuildingNigeria.
3. Niger delta confictNiger ia. 4. NigeriaWest arica.
I. Francis, Paul. II. LaPin, Deirdre. III. Rossiasco, Paula.
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Authors
This study has been prepared by Paul Francis, Deirdre LaPin,and Paula Rossiasco.
Paul Francis is a reelance consultant specializing in the social analysis o conict
situations. He has worked in numerous countries in Arica and Asia, and or the World
Bank, the IMF, DFID, and the UN. Dr. Francis undertook anthropological feldwork in
Southern Nigeria in the late 1970s and 1980s, and has since then worked in Nigeria in
a variety o capacities, including the managing o a number o World Bank projects and
studies in the Niger Delta. [email protected].
DeirDre laPin is a ormer Woodrow Wilson scholar and is currently a Senior Fellow
at the Arican Studies Center, University o Pennsylvania. She also serves as a consultant
on peace and development initiatives or international agencies and private industry. Dr.
LaPin has worked on Nigeria or over orty years, frst as a researcher and lecturer at
Awolowo University in Ile-Ie, as a senior advisor or USAID, and or fve years as theresident corporate community development advisor or SPDC in the Niger Delta. She
is a ounding member o the Niger Delta Working Group in Washington, D.C. (http://
ndwgnews.blogspot.com). [email protected]
Paula a. rossiasco is a Social Development Specialist at the World Bank Fragile
States, Conict and Social Development Unit in the Arica Region. She has worked in a
number o ragile, conict and post conict countries in Latin America and Arica- includ-
ing extensive work in Nigerias Niger Delta, both as a researcher in social and conict
analysis as well as a development practitioner, in the areas o conict and crime prevention,demand or good governance and youth employment. [email protected]
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acKNoWleDgeMeNts
This study draws in part upon research undertaken by the authors in the preparation
o an unpublished report Social and Conict Analysis o the Niger Delta, originally pre-
pared or internal use o World Bank sta. Since then it has been substantially revised
and updated by the authors or a wider audience concerned with the uture peace and
development o Nigerias Niger Delta region.
The authors would like to thank the ollowing or their assistance and advice in pre-
paring the earlier report and the present publication. For their research contributions
we are indebted to Aoie Brophy, Ben Jua, Fionnuala ONeill, and Shonali Sardesai.
Our reviewers and advisors included Ian Bannon, Nina Bhatt, Peter Lewis, Chukwudi
Okaor, Foluso Okunmadewa, Precious Omuku, Hawanty Page, Onno Ruhl, Caroline
Sage, Per Wam, and Michael Watts. For shepherding this publication, we thank Joe
Brinley, Mame Khady Diou, Kathryn Hamilton, Derek J. Langord, Steve McDonald,
and Sarah Smith rom the Woodrow Wilson Center.
in Mm f Hwd Wp
th t Pmk
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Foreword
The strategic importance o the oil-rich Niger Delta in southern Nigeriatonational and regional stability and to global energy marketsis a persistenttheme widely discussed in policy and military circles, development agencies, human
rights and peace organizations, and the popular media. Dissent surrounding ty
years o oil activity in the region gained in intensity over nearly two decades until a
Presidential Amnesty in late 2009 brought a measure o peace to the area. Still, the
underlying causes o unrest, including chronic underdevelopment and the weaknesso local leadership, are barely being addressed. The Arica Program and Project on
Leadership and Building State Capacity at the Wilson Center has chosen to publish
this thoughtul and comprehensive study in the hope that it will urther understand-
ing o the reasons why development and peace have been so elusive in the past and
why policymakers and development partners should now actively seize upon this
resh opportunity or peace.
It was in this expectation that my predecessor Dr. Howard Wolpe, himsel a tireless
peacemaker, agreed to write this Foreword. Sadly, he was prevented rom complet-
ing his comments by his untimely death. Nevertheless, his words and actions over a
lietime o dedication to Arica and commitment to peacebuilding and confict resolu-
tion show how deeply he cared about creating a platorm or sustainable peace in the
Niger Delta region. He had a special love or Nigeria. As a young doctoral student he
spent two years in Port Harcourt, and the experience shaped his deep sense o Arican
culture, potential and promise and would inorm his entire career. In 2008 he became
a ounding member o the Niger Delta Working Group, an inormal Washington-based
network or sharing inormation on the changing situation in the region. That same
year, on learning o the late Nigerian President YarAduas plan to organize a NigerDelta Summit, he opened a direct dialogue with its nominated chairman. When the
Summit was succeeded by a Niger Delta Technical Committee, some o its members
and advisors were welcomed at the Wilson Center. It was his conviction that an initia-
tive to build trust between and collaborative capacities among leaders in the area, on the
model o the Leadership Project, could open a new pathway or stronger governance
and development in the delta.
This study Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta: A Social and
Confict Analysis or Change draws together a vast range o inormation about Nigerias
delta region not previously available in a single publication. It richly illuminates thesocial history and underlying causes o unrest in the area. Equally important, the study
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adds to the empirical research available to us about confict prevention and approaches
to post-confict reconstruction in regions harmed by the extraction o natural resources.
It examines the complex interactions between the social, political, economic, envi-
ronmental, and security actors that drive and sustain confict. It also reviews the main
policy responses and initiatives that have already been brought to bear in the delta and
maps out key policy options or the uture.
Encouragingly, the study nds that many o the elements o sustainable pathways
to development and peace already exist, or can readily be realized. What is needed is a
systematic ramework and, most critically, a leadership consensus and the political will to
marshal them. Nigerias development partners are already showing a renewed commit-
ment to support solutions to the deltas challenges. Imaginative dialogue and partnershipbetween them and with critical stakeholders in government, the private sector, civil
society, and communities holds the promise o yielding eective strategies or sustain-
able development and peace that bet the regions unique character and history.
This study, then, emerges at a time o particular opportunity and hope. And yet it
must be noted that the present time also holds a considerable potential risk. Without
appropriate and thoughtul action, the legitimate aspirations o the citizens o the delta
and their compatriots in Nigeria as a whole will, yet again, go unrewarded. Dr. Wolpe
was a great champion o applying confict-sensitive approaches to development in the
context o unrest. For the Niger Delta today, any plan or project must be rooted inpractical and active understanding o the origins and risks o confict in order to sustain
the momentum o peaceul development and avoid planning that does not take into
account the dynamics o confict and its core causes.
Finally, the importance o the issues dealt with in this study extends beyond the delta
or Nigeria as a nation. They are much broader when viewed rom Nigerias place in the
sub-region and the world economy. While the delta is unique, there are also lessons that
can be learned or other confict situations, and especially or the expanding number o
new oil producing countries along the Guinea coast. For all, the key lesson is that peace
is hard work. It requires a leadership committed to equitable government, dialogue with
citizens, and sustainable development.
Stee McDonaldD f h af Pm nd
P n ldhp nd Bdn s cp
Wdw Wn cnDmb 2011
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Contents
Abbreiations and Acronms i
Eecutie Summar 1
Capter 1: An introduction to te Niger Delta 9
Background and Setting .........................................................................................9
A Turbulent History .............................................................................................12
Objective and Approach .......................................................................................19
Capter 2: Societ and Sources o Instabilit 21
Structural Factors Contributing to The Deltas Instability ......................................24
Driving Factors That Promote Confict ................................................................33
Provocating Factors that Spark Violence and Exacerbate Confict ..........................51
From Instability to Peace: The Case or Development ...........................................63
Capter 3: Tackling te Callenges o teNiger DeltaPast and Current Eorts 69
Government Policies and Interventions .................................................................70
Oil Companies and Regional Development..........................................................82
Development Partners ..........................................................................................90
Translating Past Experience into Future Action .....................................................97
Capter 4: Building a Framework or te Future 101
A Window o Opportunity ................................................................................104
I. Promoting good governance and political participation in the delta ..................105
II. Saeguarding human security ..........................................................................109
III. Ensuring wellbeing and development ............................................................112
IV. Protecting the environment ..........................................................................114
V. Preserving livelihoods .....................................................................................115For a uture o peace and prosperity: Keys to confict-sensitive development ........118
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Anne I: Eamples o Resistance and
Armed Groups in te Niger Delta 123Overview ...........................................................................................................123
Advocacy Groups ...............................................................................................123
Conraternities and Cults ....................................................................................125
Vigilantes ...........................................................................................................126
Militias ...............................................................................................................128
Umbrella Coalitions: MEND and the JRC .........................................................131
Anne 2: Selected Eamples o StrategicCorporate Deelopment Partnersips 133
Anne 3: Ke Actiities in te Niger DeltaSupported b Deelopment Partners 137
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) ...............................................137
Other UN Agencies and Funds ...........................................................................138
World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) ............................138
Arican Development Bank (ADB) ...................................................................141
The European Union/European Commission (EU/EC) ....................................141
The UK Department or International Development (DFID) .............................142
U.S. Agency or International Development (USAID) .........................................142
Reerences 144
list oF Boxes
Box 1.1: Presidential Amnesty or Ex-combatants .....................................................17
Box 2.1: The Niger Delta: A Cultural Mosaic ...........................................................25
Box 2.2: The Many Worrying Warri Wars: 1997, 1999, 2003 ..................................26
Box 2.3: Akwa Ibom and Its Neighbors: Oil Wells and
Border Disputes ....................................................................................................28
Box 2.4 Social Indicators or the Niger Delta ...........................................................40
Box 2.5: Oil Spills in the Niger Delta .......................................................................41
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Box 2.6: Flares Down or the Second Largest Gas Flaring Operations
in the World .........................................................................................................42
Box 2.7: Federal Anti-Corruption Eorts .................................................................46
Box 2.8: Niger Delta State Governors Accused o Corruption by the EFCC ............48
Box 2.9: The Movement or the Emancipation o the Niger Delta (MEND) ............52
Box 2.10: The 2011 Nigerian Elections: Bitter Sweet ...............................................60
Box 3.1: Perceptions o the NDDC and the MNDA ................................................78
Box 3.2: Rising Levels o Oil Company Investment in Community Projects.............87
Box 3.3: A Public-Private PartnershipCassava Enterprise
Development Project (20032009) .......................................................................91Box 3.4: The Youth Empowerment Project (YEP) A Niger Delta
Job Creation and Confict Prevention Initiative ....................................................93
Box 3.5: UNEP in Ogoniland: An Environmental Assessment o
Contaminated Oil Production Sites .....................................................................94
Box 3.6: The Micro-Projects Program (MPP) European Union and
Local Community Development Partners ............................................................95
Box 4.1: Steps to Peace and Prosperity in the Niger Delta ......................................103
Box 4.2: Ten Keys to Confict Sensitive Development or the Niger Delta ..............119
list oF taBles
Table E.1: Overview o the Niger Delta .....................................................................5
Table 1.1: Niger Delta at a Glance ............................................................................10
Table 1.2: Niger Delta Timeline ...............................................................................14
Table 2.1: Factors Infuencing Instability in the Niger Delta .....................................23
Table 2.2: Unemployment and Underemployment Rates 2006
(Youth unemployment).........................................................................................30
Table 2.3: What People o the Niger Delta Dislike Most About Their Region...........34
Table 2.4: Types o Community Confict ..................................................................36
Table 2.5: Poverty Statistics or the Niger Delta ........................................................39
Table 2.6: Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) or
Nigeria 19962010 ...............................................................................................44
Table 2.7: Rivers State Revenue Compared With That o Four OtherArican Countries .................................................................................................44
Table 2.8: Types o Resistance and Armed Groups in the Niger Delta .......................55
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Table 2.9: Overview o Kidnappings and Selected Incidents in the
Niger Delta 20062009 .......................................................................................64
Table 3.1: Derivation: Niger Delta State and Federal Shares o Petroleum Proceeds
1953Present ........................................................................................................71
Table 3.2: NDDC Project Contract Status in 2009 ...................................................75
Table 3.3: State-Level Oil-Producing Area Initiatives ................................................80
Table 3.4: Major Oil and Gas Companies in the Niger Delta ....................................84
Table A3.1: World Bank/IFC Projects in the Niger Delta........................................139
list oF cHarts
Chart 2.1: Nigerias Crude Oil Supply 20012011 ...................................................62
Chart 3.1: The Shell GMOU Model .....................................................................89
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Abbreiations and Acronms
AAPW Academic Associates Peaceworks
ADB Arican Development Bank
AIDS Acquired Immune Deciency Syndrome
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BEITI Bayelsa Income Expenditure Transparency Initiative
BPI Bayelsa Partnership Initiative
bpd Barrels per day
BPD Business Partners or Development
BRACED Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom, Cross-Rivers, Edo and Delta (a regional
commission or economic integration)
CAF Country Analysis Framework
CADP Commercial Agriculture Development ProjectCALM Confict Abatement through Local Mitigation
CDD Community-Driven-Development project o the World Bank
CEDP Cassava Enterprise Development Program
CPE Center or Population and Environment Development
CPI Corruption Perception Index
CPRP Community-based Poverty Reduction Project
CPS Country Partnership Strategy
CNL Chevron Nigeria Limited
CSA Country Social Analysis
CSO Civil Society Organization
CSDP Community and Social Development Project
DDRR Disarmament, Demobilization, Reorientation, and Reintegration
DESOPADEC Delta State Oil Producing Areas Development CommissionDFID United Kingdom Department or International Development
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DPR Department o Petroleum Reserves
DPA Distributable Pool AccountECOMOG Economic Community o West Arican States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community o West Arican States
EDF European Development Fund
EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ESMAP Energy Sector Management Assistance Program
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization
FIU Financial Intelligence Unit
FOSTER Facility or Oil Sector Transparency
FRN Federal Republic o Nigeria
GDP Gross Domestic ProductGGESS Gul o Guinea Energy and Security Strategy
GMOU Global Memorandum o Understanding
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschat r Technische Zusammenarbeit
HDI Human Development Index
HIV Human Immunodeciency Virus
HRW Human Rights Watch
HSE Health, Saety, and Environment
ICG International Crisis Group
IOC International Oil Company
ICPC Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Oenses
Commission
IDA International Development Association
IFAD International Fund or Agricultural Development
IFC International Finance Corporation
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IITA International Institute o Tropical Agriculture (Ibadan)
INEC Independent National Electoral CommissionIOC International Oil Company
IRI International Republican Institute
IYC Ijaw Youth Council
JTF Joint Task Force (Military)
JV Joint Venture
LNG Liqueed Natural Gas
LGA Local Government Area
Mbpd Millions o barrels per day
MEND Movement or the Emancipation o the Niger Delta
MNDA Ministry o Niger Delta Aairs
MOSOP Movement or the Survival o the Ogoni People
MOU Memoradum o Understanding
MPP Micro Projects ProgramMSME Micro Small and Medium Enterprise
N Naira
NDSCA Niger Delta Social and Confict Analysis
NDBDA Niger Delta Basin Development Authority
NDCFI Niger Delta Community Foundations Initiative
NDDB Niger Delta Development Board
NDDC Niger Delta Development Commission
NDRDMP Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan
NDRBDA Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority
NDVF Niger Delta Volunteers Forces
NDPVF Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force
NEGIP Nigeria Electricity and Gas Improvement Project
NEITI Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency InitiativeNESREA National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enorcement Agency
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NIDPRODEV Niger Delta Proessionals or Development
NIDECOPP Niger Delta Coalition or the Advancement o Peace and ProgressNLNG Nigeria Liqueed Natural Gas Company
NLSS Nigeria Living Standards Survey
NOSDRA National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency
NNPC Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation
OMPADEC Oil Minerals Producing Area Development Commission
OPTS Oil Producing Trade Sector
OSOPADEC Ondo State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission
OSI Open Society Institute
PaS Peace and Security Strategy
PCF Post-Confict Fund
PDP Peoples Democratic Party
PETS Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
PTF Petroleum Trust FundPTFNDD Presidential Task Force on Niger Delta Development
PIB Petroleum Industry Bill
PSA Production Sharing Agreement
PSC Production Sharing Contract
RDC Regional Development Council
RSSDP Rivers State Sustainable Development Program
SAIS School o Advanced International Studies
SDN Stakeholder Democracy Network
SEEFOR State Expenditure Eectiveness or Opportunities and Results
SLA Sustainable Livelihood Assessments
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises
SPDC Shell Petroleum Development Company
SPY Supernumerary PoliceSSS State Security Services
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STAND Strengthening Transparency and Accountability in the Niger Delta
UN United NationsUNDP United Nations Development Program
UNEP United Nations Environmental Program
UNICEF United Nations Childrens Fund
USAID United States Agency or International Development
USD United States Dollar
USG United States Government
USIP United States Institute or Peace
WFF World Wildlie Fund
WPA Works Progress Administration
YES Youth Employment Scheme (Bayelsa)
1 US$ = 150 Nigerian Naira rom 2009 to Noember 2011
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BAYELSA RIVERS
IMOABIA
AKWAIBOM
CROSSRIVER
DELTA
EDO
ONDO
Benin City
Sapele
Warri
Nembe
Bonny
PortHarcourt
AbaCalabar
Uyo
Brass
Yenagoa
M n h
N D.
Courtes: Stakeolders
Democrac Network
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Eecutie Summar
Few regions in the world have been as unortunate as Nigerias oil-rich Niger Delta.The deltas abundant natural wealth stands in stark contrast to its palpable under-development. The oil sector accounts or approximately 95 percent o Nigerias export
earnings and over 80 percent o ederal government revenue, but or nearly two decades
the delta has been mired in confict and violence that threatens human security and
the national economy. Following the Amnesty oered by ormer President YarAdua in
2009 to over 20,000 armed ghters, an uneasy quiet has settled over the area. Yet, theundamental conditions o extreme deprivation have remained unchanged. The devel-
opmental challenges acing the Niger Delta are still shaped by its turbulent history and
are closely intertwined with recurrent patterns o instability. With little provocation,
longstanding grievances could once again erupt into another cycle o violence.
This study is based on the exceptionally rich literature available on the Niger Delta
area and ocial documents together with contributions rom an advisory group and the
authors personal engagement with the region. Its goal is to enhance understanding o
the actors that have contributed to violent confict in the Niger Delta, so that develop-
ment partners and government can orm the most appropriate strategies or programs
o intervention in this large and deeply deprived area rich in oil and gas. The main
objectives are to: (i) advance understanding o the unique social characteristics o the
Niger Delta and their infuence on local confict, (ii) outline eorts underway to address
confict-related challenges, and (iii) develop proposals or a confict-sensitive approach
that can be applied by government and non-government actors to help set the region
on a pathway to prosperity and peace.
Despite the regions great potential or prosperity, the Niger Delta aces stubborn chal-
lenges. Although Nigeria is constitutionally a ederation, the system as practiced does notmeet the expectations o a true ederation. Underlying the outward appearance o a mod-
ern administration with ormal structure o institutions are complex, powerul, and deeply
entrenched networks o patronage and political alliances. The political economy o oil
shapes a system in which the central government is the only vehicle or the collection
and redistribution o oil revenues. Given the overwhelming reliance on oil as a source o
public nance, securing access and control over an increasing proportion o oil revenue
has become the main locus o political struggle or stakeholders at all levels and has led to
calls or resource control in the Niger Delta, which have at times resulted in violence.
The volatility o the region is urther compounded by a sense o injustice driv-en by the large numbers o people living in poverty, levels o inequality, subjective
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assessments o personal deprivation, and relative underdevelopment in the national con-
text. Moreover, almost 60 percent o people in the Niger Delta depend on the natural
environment or their livelihood. Destruction o the environment through oil spills and
gas faring has made the poorest communities vulnerable and has direct deleterious
impacts. Fishing and agriculture have been aectedseriously in some areasby pol-
lution related to oil extraction. Hence, protecting the natural environment o the Niger
Delta is closely linked to the protection o the economic wellbeing o its citizens.
Consequently, unemployment and underemployment rates are higher in the core oil
producing states o the Niger Delta than in any other part o Nigeria, and they are more
pronounced in urban areas, reaching levels o ty percent. The dearth o available and
appropriate work limits the avenues available or young people to pull themselves outo poverty. Unemployment, particularly among the youth, has helped to drive and sus-
tain high levels o violence and criminality throughout the delta region. In many cases,
unemployed youth have been recruited into armed groups waging systematic cam-
paigns against the oil industry and the military to urther their demands. At the same
time powerul interests, oten allied with local unemployed youth, take advantage o the
chaotic situation to illegally divert oil revenues and engage in oil bunkering or thet.
In this manner, political ends and criminal means have become dangerously entwined.
Out o these maniestations o confict, several issues emerge as sources o tension in
everyday lie. They include the movement toward social ragmentation rather than socialcohesion; a fawed ederal system worsened by poor governance; limited economic
opportunities associated with an oil-based mono-economy; a political culture oriented
around inormal networks rather than civic rights; and the weak capacity o the state to
ensure the security o its citizens.
Each o these tendencies has its origins in multiple actors that work against stability.
These actors operate at dierent levels o causality and when combined underpin the
regions predisposition to crisis. At the most undamental level structural actors comprise
the latent conditions and the basic ways in which society, government, and the politi-
cal economy work to make the region vulnerable to instability.Driving actorsare the
grievances that emerge rom the structural actors and constitute the perceptions, inad-
equacies, and tensions that suuse the daily lives o many men, women, and youth and
dispose them toward discord. Provocating actors exacerbate latent confict by sparking
violence and crime, oten or prot. Because these actors typically interact and eed on
one another, ending confict is an enormous challenge. Solutions require a holistic strat-
egy that begins with building common agreement and trust around how these issues
must be tackled and galvanizing support or building peace and development.
Investment in the Niger Delta has been grossly inadequate or achieving this aim.Nevertheless, the region has seen a air number o initiatives by the government, oil
companies, and international development partners who in their own ways have sought
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to bring peace and a better lie to its troubled creeks. The responses o government
to the periodic crises in the delta have tended to include heavy-handed repression by
occupying security orces; continuous but inconclusive renegotiation o oil revenue to
be retained by oil-producing states; and the creation o new states, LGAs, and special
institutions intended to develop the delta. Each o these responses has provided streams
o patronage or both local and ederal actors, while bringing negligible benets to the
lives o ordinary delta citizens.
Let with the task o operating in complex and unstable sociopolitical context, where
government services have been ew or nonexistent, oil companies have developed a
means o ensuring the social license so essential to their continued operations. In
doing so, they have reached a provisional balance with communities enabling them tocontinue exploration and production. The extent to which socio-economic benets
have matched their relatively substantial social investments has not always been clear.
Corporate approaches to development and peacemaking have evolved over the years,
becoming more elaborate and sophisticated, and the companies have in time become
major development actors and innovators in their own right.
Nigerias traditional development partners, multilateral and bilateral, have supported a
number o programs o varying scale and design in the delta. While their engagement has
been somewhat reluctant, sporadic, and remote, some successul initiatives have been estab-
lished. Despite the lack o a common planning ramework, coordination among donors isstrengthening around a converging vision that espouses local participatory development,
good governance, improvements in inrastructure, and employment generation. In addi-
tion, a growing number o successul public-private partnerships have been established
between the government, donors, and oil companies. Community-based trusts, regional
oundations, civic monitoring groups, and other orms o institutional innovation have
also begun to emerge. Increasingly, all development actors have begun working in concert
within and across sectors, aware that pooling strengths and risks maximizes opportunities
or overcoming the regions monumental development decit.
Everyone concerned with the uture peace o the Niger Delta recognizes that the
Amnesty oered to ormer combatants has opened an unprecedented window o
opportunity. Keeping the window open will require an urgent and coordinated pro-
gram o confict-sensitive development supported by the government, donor partners,
civil society, communities, and the private sector. Addressing the drivers o unrest is vital
to checking the resurgence o vigilantism or expansion o illicit livelihoods. Any rise in
crime and insecurity could postpone the long-awaited dialogue on the regions uture.
It could halt development plans or the region, threaten oil and gas production, and
scale back business investments and job opportunities.Restoring hope and condence in the people o the Niger Delta is a key element o
the transormation agenda or 20112015 proposed by President Goodluck Jonathan.
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In that spirit, this study proposes a collaborative ramework or the uture rooted in
this studys analysis o challenges acing the region. Components include ve pillars on
which a durable peace can be built: (i) good governance and political participation, (ii)
human security, (iii) wellbeing and development, (iv) protecting the environment, and
(v) securing livelihoods. For each pillar, the government, oil companies, development
partners, civil society, and communities have vital roles to play. National leaders, oil
companies, and the international community have all come to realize that, or peace to
hold, swit and sustainable development o the region is the only alternative.
To meet this challenge, this study proposes ten guides to confict sensitive develop-
ment or the Niger Delta:
1. Be mindul o the regions vulnerability to a long history o confict, underde-
velopment, political marginalization, and environmental harm.
2. Focus on local priorities: accelerated development, saety rom crime, political
rights, environmental protection, and opportunities or employment.
3. Maintain an ongoing dialogue with all types o local groups and listen to their
separate expectations, opinions and concerns.
4. Put people in charge o their own utures through initiatives that are locally
driven, managed, and monitored.
5. For every uture intervention, assess the potential to exacerbate or mitigate
local confict dynamics; avoid creating winners and losers.
6. Link confict mitigation to development strategies; aim to make peace a devel-
opment outcome rather than a pre-condition or engagement or assistance.
7. Pool the risks o development investment by seeking reliable and committed
partners in government, civil society, communities and the private sector.
8. Encourage responsible corporate practice toward people and the environmentin line with international perormance standards.
9. Promote security and peace by upgrading the public relations skills o local
police and armed service personnel; link them to community peacebuilding
institutions.
10. Strive to be fexible, but remain ocused and persistent.
By supporting and applying these methods o confict-sensitive planning, all riends
o the Niger Delta can contribute to peace a durable peace that becomes an outcomeo collective eorts or regional development and their crowning achievement.
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taBle e.1:
Oeriew o te Niger Delta
Economic Importance o Oil
ns y dds y d s s, w bs 95% xs, 80 85% s, d xy 32% ss ds d(gDp). n s s d a d by. is bss w sd 36.2 b bs Jy 2007. Ds ys w,gDp s 2,400 uSD, d y s wdsdb 50% ss $1.25 dy).
Background
o d s ss d s y, kw s n
D. ts s kd by d d dd. o x s b-s dsy d, , ds y. t s dsdd by () d w ks s ss , d () s dd, sd by sqs xsf, ss, . d dss s s s d .
History o the Conict
32 n D1 (22% ns ), d 62% bw 30. t s y s w 40 d s w sk120 y b s d ds. t ijw s s; sd isk, ub, ibb-ek, d ib sb-s. hsy, s d b w s . S ns dd 1960,
fs bw s, s, d d sd . i 1966 is B, d n D v F, dd dd n Ds ps rb d d s w s sd d s. S sss w B 1967, sss ys d y (w b s) 19691999. D dss s 1999, s d s D b s w y b s ss d w .cs f w s, w , d w sys sss d ys, d qs, d d.ad s wd sys s s d s dds , d yd y k d s by
s, d kd d .Main Stakeholders in the Niger Delta
FederalGovernment
rs xs, ys, d qy sd dds dsb d, s, d s.
State and LocalGovernments
t d n D ss 13% s d s w y d, w sy y 36 n ss. t sbs s s fw s ss d s s sd ssd d. g sks db , b s b d w s d w, s ds. t ss d s, s ss d szs ds d.
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Main Stakeholders in the Niger Delta
RegionalDevelopmentInstitutions
t n D D css (nDDc, 2000) s dd byb b d dsy ss d js . t msy n D as (mnDa, 2008) s d j s jsd s s y. i , zs sw d d dq , s ss, k sy d d-d.
International Oil
Companies
ab w dz s (iocs) .ny y b nDDc d dy d d s s wy q s s w . isy, d js y bs-
d ss d b dk sw ds, ngos, d ss ss. a s, ioc y js b d bydq d -d d sy.
Resistance andArmed Groups
S 1990s, y ss d d s d, b j 2005 d b m e n D (menD). tyy y s dd, s s s s dd , s s d. my s jsy s ss d js b w ssw s sqs dsy y. ty dd , s s, d dq s s d by x.a b s k d s s s y d kd s.t s s d wks y ds, s - dy s, d y d sy xds. i ob 2009 20,000 x-bs dasy d b ds, dbz, , d (DDrr) w 2015.
Communities
ms d w n D y dssd
d dsdd s s n. ty sd y y b ss, d y dss ds w b. cfs b d w s ss bs d s. B dsd s s y y s w bs, b sy s sxbd jsy d s d s s d dss bds. Sys sw s wbs sss b b d w d.
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Notes
1 Since 2000, the unctional denition o the Niger Delta has comprised the 9 oil producing
states in the south-south and south-eastern geo-political zones o the country: Abia, Akwa Ibom,
Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers, an area o 112,000 km2. The human
population o this zone, at 32 million, exceeds that o all but ve Sub-Saharan Arican countries.
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ln wmn pddn n
k n Nmb.
Courtes: Paul Francis
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cHaPter 1
An introduction to teNiger Delta
F
ew regions in the world have been as unortunate as Nigerias oil-rich Niger Delta.
The deltas abundant natural wealth stands in stark contrast to its palpable under-development. The oil sector accounts or some 95 percent o Nigerias export earnings
and over 80 percent o ederal government revenue, but or nearly two decades the
delta has been mired in confict and violence that has threatened human security and
the national economy. Following the Amnesty oered by ormer President YarAdua to
over 20,000 armed ghters, an uneasy quiet has settled over the area. Yet, the undamen-
tal conditions o extreme deprivation have remained unchanged. The developmental
challenges acing the Niger Delta are still being shaped by its turbulent history and are
closely intertwined with recurrent patterns o instability. With little provocation, long-
standing grievances could once again erupt in another cycle o violence.
BacKgrouND aND settiNg
Nigerias oil-rich Niger Delta is situated in the south o Nigeria and centers on the
natural delta o the Niger River. All o Nigerias oil production takes place on the land
or waters o the nine oil producing states comprising the extended delta region. (Some
o the deltas key eatures are summarized in Table 1.1 below.) Beginning in late 2005
and until Amnesty was oered to reedom ghters in mid-2009, escalating unrest led to
signicant losses in production, at times exceeding 65 percent. Addressing the underly-
ing causes o crisis in the delta has important implications or the economy and security
o the whole o Nigeria. For this reason, maintaining the current ragile peace in the
region has become a national policy imperative.
Over hal o the Niger Delta region is made up o a network o creeks and small
islands, making it very dicult to navigate and to establish large settlements. The rural
population tends to live in small, scattered hamlets o 50 to 500 persons, some maintain-
ing links with larger towns such as Port Harcourt and Warri. The regional population,estimated to be 32 million, represents over one th o the national total; 62 percent are
below thirty years o age. This population is also extremely heterogeneous, with approx-
9
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taBle 1.1:
Niger Delta at a Glance
General
9 States185 LGAs
S-S Z: akw ib, Bys, css r, D, ed, rs
exdd n D ds: ab, i, d od d ss
Population 32 (22% n ), 2/3 d 30 ys
Population density265 k; 13, 329 ss, 94% w < 5,000
Ethnic groups/languages40 s; d 120 y b sd ds
Land area 112,000 k d s d; d s 75,000 k
Ecological zonescs b sdy d; sw; sw sw;wd s
Natural Resources p, s, , d, , z, b d
Livelihoodsa d s (48%); d (17%); ss (10%);ed/ (7%)
Social/Economic Indicators
Inant mortality rate 120 sd (n: 100 sd)
Unemploymentesd y y (s 1524): 40%
o S-S: 24% (2006)
Poverty 43% y (2004); 75% ss s
Water76 80% s d 50 55% b s d ss s dk w
EnergyFwd s y y s 73%
34% s ss w, w b
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Oil and Gas Production
Crude oil production,mid-2011
ab 2.3 bd (d ds); 3.2 bd sdy; ss 95% ns x s d 80% d
o , 25% d ws s d sb (20062009), s 65%. pd 2.6 bd Fby 2006 1.3 bd my 2009, d j s bw bs d y b
asy.
Main internationaloperators and principalNigerian companies; allhave onshore operationsexcept ExxonMobil
S (S p D cy, n, ld);c (c n, ld.); exxmb (mb pdud); e (n a o cy); t (e) (t e&pn ld, y epnl)
Main terminals/oshoreplatorms
By isd (S), Bss r (e/a), ess (c),Fds (S), Kw ib (mb), odd (t),p (c), .
Oil reserves 36 b bs11
wd, 2d a; sd s 41 ys
Natural gas reserves 187 b 7 s s ss wd
Oil/gas pipelines & felds o 7,000 k s; 606 ds
Gas plants/LNG30; nlng p w 6 s; 2 lng s s Bssd ok
Environment
19582010: s. 546 s sd; . 300 ss y10.8 /y
19862003: 50,000 s s dsd
Q1 2010: 32% ssd s fd (127 b)
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imately orty dierent ethnic groups speaking 120 mutually unintelligible languages and
dialects. O these, the Ijaw, who speak our distinct dialects, comprise the largest ethnic
group. Others include the Ibibio-Ek, Urhobo, Isoko, the Itsekiri, and Igbo sub-groups
living in both the western and eastern delta.1
Fishing and agriculture have historically been the main occupations in the delta, and
they continue to account or almost hal o employment. In urban areas, the inormal
sector predominates, notably trade, comprising twenty percent o overall employment
and services, which constitute nine percent (NDDC 2005, p. 20). Young people tend to
engage less in agriculture, and they oten migrate to urban areas in search o livelihoods.
While the percentage o people living in poverty in the Niger Delta is statistically
lower than the national average,2
the region perorms poorly in comparison with therest o the country on social indicators such as education, health, and the quality o the
natural environment. For example, the region has among the highest levels o inant
mortality in Nigeria, a statistic commonly used as a proxy or measuring general welare.
Rates o unemployment and under-employment in the Niger Delta states are especially
high despite their large oil revenues, reaching more than orty percent among youth.
This condition has contributed signicantly to youth restiveness in the region.
a turBuleNt History
The history o the Niger Delta provides some insight into its unique position in
Nigeria and the ways in which it has come to view itsel. Its characteristics include
a longstanding outward orientation, initially built on trade; dynamic, ragmented and
competitive governance; and a erce sense o independence in the ace o perceived
domination by outsiders.
Even beore it was ocially incorporated into the British Empire in 1900, the Niger
Delta had a long history o external commercial engagement. (Table 1.2 gives a time-
line o key events in the regions history.) Early outside contact was primarily through
the export o slaves, and ater the British banned the slave trade, palm oil become a key
export commodity. The Royal Niger Company dominated governance and trade, and
considerable hostility to its exploitative monopoly practices culminated in an attack
on its Akassa headquarters by the king o Brass in 1895. The Company subsequently
sold the territories it controlled to the British Government in 1900. The Oil Rivers
Protectorate was ormed, later incorporated into the Southern Protectorate and then
amalgamated in 1914 into a unied Nigeria. The region was governed under the system
o indirect rule through appointed indigenous chies, and where these did not exist,the colonial authorities created them. While ostensibly allowing a degree o sel govern-
ment, this system could generate considerable popular resentment. In 1929 the women
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o Aba in the Niger Delta were provoked by rumors o a new income tax and came into
direct and violent conrontation with the police. More than ty women were killed in
the riots that ollowed (ICG 2006a, p. 4).
During the transition to Independence in the 1950s, the ethnic minorities o the
Niger Delta began to express their concerns over the orm that the Nigerian edera-
tion would take. The Willink Commission was charged with investigating them. In its
conclusions, the Commission rejected demands or the creation o new states, but it
did recommend that a national board be created to address the specic problems o the
region (HRW 1999). The Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) was subsequently
established in 1961 or a ten-year period. Largely ineective, the boards work was dis-
rupted by the civil war in 19671970.The rst major episode o violent militancy in the Niger Delta occurred in February
1966, on the eve o the succession o the Eastern Region, or Biara, which included
the eastern oil producing delta. Isaac Boro, an Ijaw born in Oloibiri and leader o the
Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), declared the independence o the Niger Delta
Peoples Republic, consisting o the present day Rivers and Bayelsa States. Boros abor-
tive twelve-day revolt anticipated the Biaran civil war. Both conficts were motivated
by the control o oil revenue. Boro called or oil companies to negotiate directly with
his government rather than with the national authorities. Over a year later in May 1967
the Eastern Region renamed itsel the Republic o Biara, plunging the country intocivil war. In the same month, the ederal government broke the East into three states.
One o them was Rivers State, which included many o the minority groups o the
delta, as well as the bulk o the oil producing areas. However, any expectations o greater
resource control were disappointed, as the ederal military government transerred the
control o oil resources to itsel through legislation both during and ater the war (Obi
2005).3 The 1969 Petroleum Decree gave the ederal government ownership and con-
trol o all petroleum resources in the country. In 1978 the Land Use Decree nationalized
all land under the administration o state and local governments.
The centralization o resources reduced tensions between the dominant ethnic
groups o the ederation, the Hausa, the Yoruba and the Igbo. At the same time, it exac-
erbated tensions between these large groups and the numerous minorities, especially
those in the Niger Delta, who became increasingly marginalized rom the political and
economic systems. This, together with the progressive degradation o the environment
due to oil exploitation and impoverishment, increased the minorities eelings o rustra-
tion against the ederal government (Ebeku, 2001).
In the 1990s, Ken Saro-Wiwas Movement or the Survival o the Ogoni People
(MOSOP) launched an era in the Niger Delta that was characterized by protests andsubsequent repression. Although MOSOP espoused non-violence, confict opened
throughout the region along many axes: between ethnic groups, within ethnic groups,
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taBle 1.2:
Niger Delta Timeline
1400searly 1800s
t s d ss d n D.
Early 1800smid-1900s
a B bs s w s d 1807, ds d . t , kw s o rs p, bs p S n.
1914 t S d n n ps d.
1946t S p s y ddd es d Wsrs.
1956o s s dsd qs w ob; sx by S 1958.
1960n s dd d py sys w y 3 s.
1963t Fs n rb s d. nd azkw bs ys s sd.
1966is B, ijw, ds 12-dy , d dd n D rb.
19661969 Fs d y . c rs S s s y S-S.
19671970n c W bs w d dd rb B (es r) my 1967 d ds Jy 1970 w d B.
1969p D s d ws d ss.
1978t ld us D zs d d s d s.
19791983 Sd n rb.
1990moSop sss o B rs. a d s u, ikw w, bs s j y ss.
1993td n rb s d d sbsqy bd. Swdws o.
19931999g. ab dsss d ss d s n syss d J 1998. abbk sds d ss s dy 1999.
1995K S-Ww, moSop d, s xd w 8 s.i ss sd d d sss nd n D s sy sd.
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19972003t sss ws ss W 1997, 1999, d 2003. t ws od d od sy skd ss w JtF 1999.
1998t K D by ijw ys ds s y d, s-d d js s w s dd wdw dsy.
1999F n rb bs, d ss 13% s. psd obsj ss s d s 2007. n DD css s d.
2004
m d Dkb as s o ls Fs dds - w s n S. psd obsjs p a dsbd d ds s d ss. i s s .
2005
as s sd i Sb. as menD, w s Db s b d s n D.Kd wks, ks s, d sb d bk s.
2006i y s n s k d y 2.6 bd
s d y .
2007psd Yad d vp gdk J w a s dd n D; hy ok, j menDs s, s sd a.
2008
i J 2008 menD s d s B; Sb menD o W sds y bbds rs S; e tb d ob zd. a psd tc n D s d d wy wd . i s sd ds, msy n Das s d.
2009
o 15 my JtF s j y s menD ws d ss k d kd sds d ss; gb zd; sds f s. o ds 1.3 bd w menD -ks. a psdasy s d by s menD ds ob 4, d 20,000 x-bs dy ds.
2010
o 6 my gdk J s sw s psd dy w d psd Yad d ss. o 1 ob, 50 idd asy b s d by bbs. hyok d s b cs sd w s.
2011
J s d s psd, w d, s d s a dd s d ns sy. t psds s d, s dd n D .
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within communities, between generations, between the state and communities, and
between oil companies and communities. All o these avenues o confict became
increasingly polarized and militarized, as stakes were raised and weapons became more
accessible. Even ater the 1999 return to democratic rule, the army, navy, and paramili-
tary police continued to be regularly deployed and oten resorted to orce as a means
o dealing with protests (HRW 2002, p. 2). Meanwhile, demands or local ownership
o lands and oil resources grew among other ethnic groups in the region. An All Ijaw
Youths Conerence that convened in December 1998 at Kaiama (the ormer home o
the hero Isaac Boro) crystallized the Ijaw struggle or resource control in the Kaiama
Declaration. It subsequently became an article o aith or the Ijaw nation. By 2005
violent community conficts in Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta state typically numberedbetween 120 and 150 per year, and over ty armed groups with an estimated 20,000 to
25,000 armed youths were operating in the oil producing region (UNDP 2007, p. 3).
Hostage-taking and attacks on oil acilities became common occurrences, particularly
with the emergence in December 2005 o the umbrella militant group calling itsel the
Movement or the Emancipation o the Niger Delta (MEND).
In mid-2009 a major deeat o armed groups by the military led ormer President
YarAdua to oer Amnesty to all combatants who agreed to disarm. Two years on, more
than 26,000 ex-combatants have been engaged at various stages o a locally designed pro-
gram or their disarmament, demobilization, reorientation, and reintegration (DDRR).A special advisor to the President is overseeing this continuing process. A ragile peace,
punctuated by very occasional outbreaks o violence, currently reigns (see Box 1.1).
From the start, the trust o ex-combatants in the post-Amnesty Program has resided
in the persona and oce o the President. This trust transerred easily rom the late
President YarAdua to Goodluck Jonathan, who is a son o the Niger Delta. The political
and nancial capital o the presidency has thus ar served as a guarantee o peace. Still,
ex-combatants wield considerable power, leveraging the latent threat o renewed vio-
lence to gain contracts, political avors, and generous welare. In addition, hundreds o
young men and women still clamor to be included in the Amnesty Program, although
registration has been ocially closed (SDN 2011b). The military response has been
a get tough policy, ordering immediate surrender o all remaining arms (Folarinmi
2011). This growing problem may become larger in 2015 when the training, reinte-
gration, and payment o stipends are scheduled to end (Ujah 2011). Sustainable peace
in the longer term will require more substantial attention to the underlying actors o
regional instability, including regional development.
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BOx 1.1: PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTy FOR Ex-COMBATANTS
as s s k my 2007, psd u ms Yad -d psd p i w d s n D d skd
d menD d d t p y s -
d. ts s w sd d sk sy
bd ds ds w d y ss j sk
(JtF), o rs h. S s sy w xdd
s bw d-2008 d ob 2009. ty w bd, bs
s w sk y wd d.
t d my 2009, w j s bw JtF d t
ps b s k. a dd - sssd s menD d s d ds, d ds w
d by asy. t p ws s sd, -
s psd, dd 4 ob 2009. m 20,000 d -
d s y d ds, sdd by s s d d
psd. t d d 18 bs,
299,032 ds , 3,831 ws, 4,377 zs, 2,072 xss,
d b k s (addj 2010). nss, s ws s
.
t psd asy ws s y d s sdd
by y s psd Yads w . F w
ys s b sy n D. Sd s b
y qsd by JtF. gs dd ds s wd
d w d q sd d bs s sd d-
2011. a 26,358 x-bs (d y 1,000 w) w
jd s-asy p s d , s
$660 2011 (ak 2011). e s y sd n65,000
($433), s w, ss s sb y dsbd d sy sd by ds
(ak 2011). (S dssd x-bs d
ks d k s.)
r d x-bs s ky asy
p. By d-2011, 19,567 d w ssd qd
w-wk - s. Sbsq sks s -
s d y d ss 3,221 sy s 60
n ss. ts , 1,019 d szd s-
S a, u.S., mys, rss, pd, g, S lk, d ps (uj 2011; e, 2011) s b bd-
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, bsss , szd d s wd, d -
sy ds. oy w b d sd sb
(Arican Examiner, 16 as 2011).
t ss qk s x-bs sss-
sy, asy p s ds s
sy js jbs d s d
d . t n g s qsd -
yb d sss w d s, sks ,
d sy jb . i ss, dsy d y 3,000
s, d s w d s b
ds, w y y s w bys.
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oBjective aND aPProacH
The developmental challenges acing the Niger Delta are closely intertwined with pat-
terns o violent confict and instability in the region. They are also driven by history.
Behind the changes in the regions economic and political systems that have unolded
over the past two hundred years, certain continuities are apparent. Most notable are
those associated with the contestation with outsiders over control o local resources and
the attendant sense o being unairly exploited.
Our goal in undertaking this study is to enhance understanding o the actors that
have contributed to violent confict in the Niger Delta so that development partners
and the government can orm the most appropriate strategies or programs o interven-tion in this large and deeply deprived area rich in oil and gas. Our objectives are to take
a close look at the actors that drive or mitigate violent confict in the Niger Delta,
to examine the dynamic relationships between them, and to draw conclusions or the
uture peaceul development o the region.
The study is based on the exceptionally rich literature available on the Niger Delta
area, together with documents and contributions rom an advisory group. The security
situation precluded meaningul eld consultations, and this must be accepted as a limita-
tion o the study. However, all o the authors have recently visited the region several times,
and one previously lived and worked in the area or an extended period o ve years.Chapter Two will examine the main challenges acing the delta and identiy the
principal economic, social, and political actors that have contributed to the high level
o confict in the region, its escalation, and de-escalation. Chapter Three analyzes past
eorts to tackle these challenges in order to improve our understanding o how their
strengths, weaknesses, and potential pitalls might guide uture programs and interven-
tions. In particular, it reviews the opportunities arising rom these eorts, including the
recent Amnesty or ex-combatants, and the risks o returning to the past cycle o vio-
lence. Finally, Chapter Four considers actions that the government, oil companies, and
development partners can adopt to simultaneously build peace and promote sustainable
development in the Niger Delta.
Notes
1 The Igbo are the dominant ethnic group in eastern Nigeria and dominated the old Eastern
Region and the brie break-away Republic o Biara between 1967 and 1970.
2 The national average or poverty incidence in 2004 was 55%, whereas the regional average
was 37%.
3 Decree No. 15 1967; Oshore Oil Revenue Decree No. 9 1971; and Decree No. 6 1975.
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Kn Dk ix f od cb, N. Phph b
cd Mdnd . 1895.
Courtes: Eliot Elisoon Potograpic Arcies, National Museum o Arican Art,
Smitsonian Institution (EEPA 1996-0019-0104)
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cHaPter 2
Societ and Sources o Instabilit
Perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, the Niger Delta exemplies theparadox o poor human and social development in an environment o riches. Theregions abundant natural resources, especially its oil, oer a potential oundation or
development and prosperity. Instead, while providing Nigeria most o its wealth, the
delta remains underdeveloped and aficted by confict and violence. A national debate
over how to share oil revenue between ederal, state, and local levels, and between oil
producing and non-producing states remains an ongoing point o political contention.
The proceeds o Nigerias oil production have increasingly ed corruption, violence, and
the associated militarization o political and civic lie. At the local level, communities
have come into confict with oil companies and the security orces over land acquisi-
tion, environmental damage, cash payments, employment opportunities, and the provi-
sion o social services. Competition over the benets derived rom oil extraction has
also set communities and neighbors against each other.Ideology, which is oten a dicult actor to manage, is not a primary driver o
violence in the Niger Delta. Agitation usually centers on issues o local liberties and
opposition to a government seen as corrupt and unresponsive. Oten, these issues com-
bine with collective and personal interests. Together, they underpin the rallying calls o
true ederalism, resource control, sel-determination, and social justice that have
recurred in the rhetoric o Niger Delta activists over decades and have served to mobi-
lize supporters within and outside the region. The gr ievances o local communities were
amously rst articulated in the 1990 Ogoni Bill o Rights. In the twenty years since,
the non-violent approach espoused by the Bills authors has given way to region-wide
rustration and confict characterized by growing complexity, violence, and intractabil-
ity. With increasing militancy, armed groups have arisen, waging systematic campaigns
against the government and oil companies to urther their demands. At the same time,
powerul interests, oten allied with local unemployed youth, have taken advantage o
the chaotic situation to illegally divert oil revenues and engage in oil bunkering or
thet. In this manner, political ends and criminal means have become increasingly and
dangerously entwined.
The last two decades have seen a pattern o violent episodes interspersed with inter-
ludes o uneasy calm. Violence reached a crescendo in May 2009 with a erce battle
between the military and armed groups in the western delta. An unprecedented show o
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government orce was switly ollowed by a Presidential Amnesty oered to all militants
in the region who agreed to come orward and disarm. The post-Amnesty period since
October 2009 has been relatively calm, and yet the underlying causes o confict, which
are the subject o this chapter, remain largely unaddressed. Inaction on the part o the
government and its partners perpetuates conditions that could spark renewed violence.
Unrest in the Niger Delta has its origins in multiple actors having to do with soci-
ety, the economy, politics, culture, and security. These actors operate at dierent levels
o causality, and together, they underpin the regions predisposition to crisis. At the
most undamental level, structural actors comprise the underlying conditions and the
basic ways in which society, the government, and the political economy work to make
the region particularly vulnerable to instability.Driving actors are the grievances thatemerge rom the structural actors and constitute the perceptions, inadequacies, and
tensions that suuse the daily lives o many men, women, and youth and dispose them
toward discord. Provocating actors exacerbate latent confict by sparking violence and
crime, oten or prot. Their interplay generates a palpable tension that occasionally
erupts into outright violence.
Table 2.1 below elaborates each o these categories o actors more systematically
by examining them against ve key issues that have thwarted the search or stability in
the delta. The rst is a trend toward social ragmentation rather than social cohesion;
second, a fawed ederal system worsened by poor governance; third, limited economicopportunities associated with an oil-based economy; ourth, a political culture oriented
toward inormal networks rather than civic rights; and th, the weak capacity o the
State to ensure the security o its citizens. These issues are rooted in the underlying
socio-political structures and culture o Nigeria as a whole. Together they constitute a
set o circumstances that are not merely causes o discontent and oci o protest but also
sources o manipulation and proteering by political, criminal, or militia actors who
incite violence to urther their interests.
These actors also interact with one another, making sustainable solutions to these
issues a challenge. Many o them cut across several issues at once. For example, the illicit
oil trade, or oil bunkering, has roots in economic actors (prot rom instability), as
well as security actors (development o illicit and criminal markets) and cultural/politi-
cal actors (primacy o inormal networks). Their interplay weaves a web o discontent
in which many Niger Deltans are trapped.
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taBle 2.1:
Factors Inuencing Instabilit in te Niger Delta
SocialGovernmentSystem
EconomicCultural /Political
Security
High SocialFragmentation
FlawedFederalism
PoliticalEconomyo Oil Patrimonialism
Weak StateCapacityto ProtectCitizens
StructuralFactors
S bdw s,wk bdbw s
Y B
S, wky
S s.dsyss
hddy
cs
Wks- zss
py wks
Wk w
Sysydddd
lds S
DrivingFactors
hd s ds
tss ss bs
ifs
W-ks- sys
Ss qy
lk s,sdd
ss
p d
ed
lss dds
ps
pd y
r-skb
lk bsydby
hybs
as
c
pyd dqd
sys
ProvocatingFactors
Wkss dss
ps ss
Ss z
ud-s
p sby, .. bk
p ss
rds
vjs
psys
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structural Factors coNtriButiNg to tHe DeltasiNstaBility
Social Factors: Social FragmentationThe Niger Delta is a patchwork o over orty sel-identied ethnicities, urther divided
into about 120 mutually unintelligible dialect and sub-dialect groups stretching rom
the coastal backwaters into the upland arming regions (Box 2.1).
Oiland its political economyhas created confict between communities and oil
companies, other communities, and security orces since shortly ater independence
in 1960. Issues o contention have included payments o various kinds to communi-
ties, land acquisition, and environmental damage. During these conficts, ethnic divi-sions are oten exploited to mobilize support against other groups, sometimes rupturing
the peaceul ties between longstanding neighbors. In addition, a strong bond typically
develops within groups, while bridging between groups that once cooperated with one
another is weakened. A well-known example o heightened inter-ethnic confict is the
three waves o violence that enguled the Warri area between 1997 and 2003 (Box 2.2).
As the Warri Wars illustrate, demographic characteristics o the delta also make the
region more prone to instability. Within this region, 62 percent o the inhabitants are
below thirty years o age, unemployment is high, and there are ew opportunities or
advancement. Youth are easily mobilized or protest, violence, or criminal activity. Stateswith large oil revenues have especially high rates o unemployment and under-employ-
ment, a condition that has contributed to youth restiveness and their persistent demands
or rents rom politicians and oil companies.
Goernment Sstem: Flawed FederalismThe structure o Nigeria has undergone changes since independence. In 1960 the
country had three regions, each dominated by one o the major ethnic groups: Hausa,
Yoruba, and Igbo. By 1966 the establishment o a ederation with twelve states oered
some delta ethnicities additional autonomy through the creation o Rivers and Bendel
States. By 1976 there were nineteen states, and by 1996 the number had grown to 36
plus the Federal Capital Territory in Abuja. Similarly, when the Local Government Area
(LGA) was created as a new governing unit by the ederal military government in 1979,
there were initially 300. Today Nigeria has 774 LGAs, 185 o which are located in the
nine oil producing states.
Despite this ragmentation, the extent o autonomy granted to the states has remained
limited, particularly during the two main periods o military rule. In act, the creation
o states and LGAs is the outcome o two simultaneous but opposing processes. Onetendency is to satisy the demands o local and ethnic (or sub-ethnic) minorities by
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BOx 2.1: ThE NIGER DELTA: A CULTURAL MOSAIC
ls d d sss ijw ds d, s b 7,000 ys . ab
s, ijw s ns s y
Yb, ib, d hs. t wd ks d ss s
sd s, sd s ws s ss w
s -ijw s s w -
. ty d isk (d Yb) d ub d isk
(b ssd w ed d B ). ib d s (ndkw,
ukw) s D S ws n r, w s (eb,
ikw, eky) d s rs, i, d ab Ss. akwib d css rs Ss ibb, a, d ek s.
Ws b s d s ss, ijw
d s ws d y s sd
xdd y ws d ws ds b. Sw s s
s w sy d d d w b d
ds s d dd s ds. td
dd s d s nb, okk, By isd,
e-Kb, d od cb, w y-ss w , dd by k,
amanyanabo. tyy, ws sd by s s d s, jd, -
y, , d ss. a ijw w sy
d s n D, y w y zd
wdy -d. Bds bw ss w , ds
d dy, d d dss bw s wdsd.
F sd s y-ss y sy d y d
ss w ijw s d w -ijw bs.
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BOx 2.2: ThE MANy WORRyING WARRI WARS: 1997, 1999, 2003
W D s s sd s w n D ph. t s ijw, isk d ub s
W s ds, d d f s y d
ss. e w ws d s s
s dsy d d d ss
y. t s w d m 1997. t ijw, w d bbd
w (lga) d W Sws, dsd
ss dqs wd b d ijw y, s
y d ssd, b isk-sk w. hdds dd ss
w s, d d ws sy ds-d. t f d sd W. By 2008 ijw ys d
24-dy s d w y k 20 S d c s d
s dw -d ns d. i Db y ijw Y
c d 500 ds K dd ws
d d ss d d wdw s d
y s ijw y. ts ws s K D.
t lga dqs ws s sd w sd W
css bk my 1999, d d. o 200 w d
kd ds d by ijw d isk s. ts , ub s b
s. tsds s w dsyd d dds sds ds-
d. W ws d w. i J, wy d psd obsj sd
. a d , s ssd W ad, w
skd s s d d d bs s.
Fy, d 1999 D S ssby ssd b d lga
dqs ijw-sk w y sd.
uy, W ad dd q ds. rwd ss bk
d s d 2003 y s. t s sk ws by ub ys b d wds
dsd. ty kd isk , d s-
d fs w y bk s. vs fd
s . W s ss b s, b 2,000
s ess w d by c (cnl). S (SpDc) d
dzs s s Fds. m 40% ns d-
ws s , s S d c fw ss w dsyd by s,
d s w dzd. psd obsj d s s sy s d
ks w n D ds d s. Fy, y dd dy w ds w s d d d, bkd by
. ts b b dd s s W css.(Sources: hrW 2003, l 2006, ws ss)
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granting them their own administrative units; the second consolidates the strength o
the ederal government by keeping the growing number o states and LGAs relatively
weak (Barkan et al. 2001).
Since the restoration o civilian democratic rule in 1999, the degree o autonomy o
the 36 states has increased. However, the hybrid centralized/ederal political structure
o the country has created tensions between the center and the states which still rely in
large measure on the decisions and resources o the ederal government. In principle,
state and local governments are responsible or nearly all public unctions with the
exception o deense, the police, external relations, and customs; yet, they remain scally
dependent on the center. Their autonomy is also limited by the provision o the 1999
Constitution, which bars states rom having their own constitutions or passing legisla-tion that contradicts national legislation. The power o the ederal government over
weak state and local governments has heightened ethno-regional competition across
Nigeria, and in the multi-ethnic Niger Delta it has contributed to a sense o depen-
dency and marginalization (Collier and Sambanis 2005).
Nigerias political economy continues to be dominated by a ederal system shaped
largely as a vehicle or the redistribution o centrally collected oil revenues (Suberu
2005). Contention over the distribution o these revenues has been, as it continues to
be, the source o much political debate inside and outside the Niger Delta. Given the
overwhelming dominance o oil revenues, controlling them has increasingly becomethe main locus o political struggle or Nigerian stakeholders at all levels. In the land
and waters o the Niger Delta, where nearly all oil reserves are located, the high stakes
involved have led to a call or greater resource control and have requently led to
violence (Watts 2004c). Attempts to accommodate the claims o Niger Delta states have
been made by granting them a greater share o oil revenues. The 1999 Constitution
guarantees oil producing states a minimum o 13 percent o ederal income derived
rom production. Nevertheless, the 13 percent derivation and the creation o special
institutions that channel resources to the region1 have had limited success in bringing
about a lasting political solution. Indeed, the tensions in center-periphery relations have
become all the more vocal and violent ollowing the restoration o civilian government
in 1999. The incentives created by the political economy o revenue distribution have
also ueled rivalries between groups and states over issues such as the location o oil
wells and boundaries, oten resulting in violent clashes, as illustrated in Box 2.3 below.
The evolution o the Nigerian Government system has also created tensions between
the traditional legal and governance systems and the constitution and laws o the mod-
ern Nigerian state. The introduction o new institutions and legal rameworks during
the colonial and post-colonial periods has weakened traditional notions o authority andcontrol over land and natural resources which have their origins in pre-colonial social
and political structures. However, traditional leaders continue to command considerable
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BOx 2.3: AKWA IBOM AND ITS NEIGhBORS: OIL WELLS AND
BORDER DISPUTES
W css r d akw ib Ss w s ss, s s
y, sy, , y, , d y. ny q
css r wks akw ib (Kdz 2009). hw, s
akw ib S css r S 1987, b s
ss bd bw w ss. Bd ss
y d d bd ss. ty
b xbd by -dd s d lga bds w s
s, dd by bw w ss, s ss
d s bs s w ss .ts dss ss d y sks bs s
ss b ss s. m bds s s b
. i 2002 ss ws d by d ds
xd s s d . ts s -
d s w dsbd d ss (Bssy . . 2002).
W s s/s dy ws bd 2004, fs -
s d s . rs S, akw ibs ws b, s
b d. akw ib d 256 ws b rs S, s w s
76 ws d css r. a s ws dd by psdy,
w css r s 76 ws d rs 50 s w. B 2007
akw ib d ss d sdd q 171 dd ws
rs S. css r ws s qd s s 76 ws akw ib. ts
s ws s bdy, b bdy bw n d
c. i 2008 ns Bkss s c css
r w s ds s s. as s, ws sd s -
d ss d s d .
Ds bk d w bds, ws, d d ds, ssbw s ss d b ss q ys. i
2007 s css r d akw ib d s s
j js, ss, d f s-
ss. ld fs d s . i as 2008, x, azb ads
dy d s rs S akw ib d kd
ik ud s q ibb d. t ss s s sd,
d ds (Vanguard, 25 a 2010). tdy, w, s
s s ssd w 100,000 ss dsd w
d Bkss. mw, k y d css r S, s J2010 J ds d s d d
s s d .
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respect and authority in Nigeria, especially in cases o inter-ethnic or inter-communal
disagreements over land or boundaries. Each community careully protects its religious
belies, political r ights, and physical security, and community vigilante groups based on
youth clubs or age grades have a long history in the region.
Two pieces o Federal legislation, the Petroleum Decree o 1969 and the Land Use
Decree o 1978, are particularly credited with having undermined local control over
resources in the delta. The Petroleum Decree gave the central government ull own-
ership and authority over the countrys oil and gas reserves. It restated and strength-
ened the Mineral Oils Ordinance o 1914 and its subsequent amendments, which made
oil and minerals legal property o the British Crown. The Land Use Decree o 1978
nationalized all land, both urban and rural, and handed its administration to state andlocal governments. In place o the customary land tenure that existed in Nigeria prior
to 1978, this decree established a new system whereby statutory and customary rights
o occupancy ormed the basis o land-holdings (Francis 1986). Communities in oil
producing areas o the country had previously been accustomed to negotiating directly
with oil companies over access to land and compensation (Ebeku 2001). Ater 1978
however, state governments had the power to revoke rights o occupancy in the case
o overriding public interest, including (under Section 28) the use o land or mining,
mineral extraction, and the construction o pipelines (Allott 1978).
Resentment o these laws was central to the grievances against the ederal gov-ernment articulated in the Ogoni Bill o Rights in 1990. Later, the 1998 Kaiama
Declaration by Ijaw youth described the Land Use and Petroleum Decrees as laws
that rob our peoples/communities o the right to control o our lives and resources
(Kaiama Declaration 1998).2 In both cases, public demonstrations were ultimately met
with violent government repression, exacerbating the sense o political exclusion and
economic marginalization elt by these and other Niger Delta communities.3
Economic Factors: Te Political Econom o OilThe oil industry, on which the Nigerian economy clearly depends, is highly capital-
intensive and creates little demand or local (especially unskilled) labor in the Niger
Delta. While there has been considerable oreign and domestic investment in the oil
and gas sectors, there has been much less investment in manuacturing and agriculture.
Furthermore, it is possible at times that oil revenues have (through the mechanism o
the Dutch Disease) put upward pressure on the exchange rate, making exports with-
in the agricultural and manuacturing sectors less competitive in the world economy
(ANEEJ 2004). Degradation o the natural resource base has also undermined employ-
ment opportunities.The predominance o the inormal sector makes it dicult to quantiy unemploy-
ment in Nigeria, and the ormal sector has seen periods o economic stagnation since
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the 1990s (EIU 2007). It is clear to the most casual observer that youth unemployment
and underemployment are serious problems. Ocial gures indicate that the unem-
ployment rate or youths 15 to 24 years old in the South-South zone or 2006 was 24percent, higher than any other zone in Nigeria (see Table 2.2 below or 2006). The
town o Oloibiri, the location o Nigerias rst oil well, was reported to have a youth
unemployment rate o 50 percent (Brown 2006). A recent World Bank study shows that
jobs or youth throughout Nigeria are in decline (Treichel 2010), and youth unemploy-
ment gures as high as 70 percent are popularly cited today in the region.
Unemployment and underemployment