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Security DimensionsInternational & National Studies

From Personal to Global Security

SD

Edited byJanusz GierszewskiZbigniew KuźniarJerzy Ochmann

Juliusz Piwowarski

Scientific JournalNo. 18 (2/2016)

EditOrial BOard

Edited by:assoc. Prof. Janusz Gierszewski, Ph.d. (Poland)

lt. Zbigniew Kuźniar, Ph.d. (Poland)Prof. Jerzy Ochmann, Ph.d. (Poland)

assoc. Prof. Juliusz Piwowarski, Ph.d. (Poland)

Editor-in-Chief:assoc. Prof. Juliusz Piwowarski, Ph.d. (Poland)

Executive Editors:Jarosław dZiuBińsKi, M.a. (Poland)radosława rOdasiK, M.a. (Poland)

scientific Editor:Prof. Witold POKrusZYńsKi, Ph.d. (Poland)

language Editors:Prof. Mirosław sKiBNiEWsKi, Ph.d. (usa)

robert OttENBurGEr (uK)Prof. Judr. Mojmír MaMOJKa, drsc., dr.h.c. mult. (slovakia)

statistical Editors:doc. ing. Jaromir MlYNEK, Csc. (slovakia)

tadeusz ratusińsKi, Ph.d. (Poland)

technical edition and cover:Jarosław dZiuBińsKi, M.a. (Poland)

Publisher:university of Public and individual security aPEirON in Cracow

ul. Krupnicza 3 31-123 Kraków

Funding body:university of Public and individual security aPEirON in Cracow

Copyright © by:university of Public and individual security aPEirON in Cracow, Kraków 2016

Printed edition: 100 copies

Frequency of issue: Quarterly

Contact person: assoc. Prof. Juliusz PiWOWarsKi, Ph.d. (editorial board and publisher)

university of Public and individual security aPEirON in Cracowul. Krupnicza 3 31-123 Kraków

tel. (12) 422 30 68; fax (12) 421 67 25 e- mail: [email protected]

Journal also available at:www.security-dimensions.pl

issN 2353-7000 (previously: issN 2299-4041)

indexation: MNisW: 7 points

index Copernicus international: 73,96 (7,18) points

assoc. Prof. tomasz alEKsaNdrOWiCZ, Ph.d. (Poland) assoc. Prof. tadeusz aMBrOżY, Ph.d. (Poland)Prof. Gerhard BaNsE, Ph.d. (Germany)assoc. Prof. iryna BasYsta, Ph.d. (ukraine)assoc Prof. stefan BiElańsKi, Ph.d. (Poland)Prof. Yuriy BOshYtsKYi, Judr. (ukraine)Wojciech CZaJKOWsKi, Ph.d. (Poland)Prof. František haNZlÍK, Ph.d. (Czech republic)Gen. Prof. Natalia KalashNiK, (ukraine)Brig. gen. (ret.) Prof. ing. Miroslav KElEMEN, Ph.d., drsc. (slovakia)doc. Judr. Štefan KOčaN, Ph.d. (slovakia)adam KrZYMOWsKi, Ph.d. (Poland)Prof. Jerzy OChMaNN, Ph.d. (Poland)Col. Gs ing. ivo PiKNEr, Ph.d. (Czech republic)

assoc. Prof. Juliusz PiWOWarsKi, Ph.d. (Poland)Prof. Judr. ing. Viktor POrada, drsc., dr.h.c. mult. (Czech republic)Gen. ing. andor ŠáNdOr (Czech republic)Prof. Judr. Karel sChEllE, Csc. (Czech republic)Prof. Mirosław J. sKiBNiEWsKi, Ph.d. (usa)Prof. stanisław sulOWsKi, Ph.d. (Poland)Col. Katarina ŠtrBaC, Ph.d. (serbia)Prof. Łukasz trZCińsKi, Ph.d. (Poland)assoc. Prof. alessandro VitalE, Ph.d. (italy)Prof. Janusz Józef WęC, Ph.d. (Poland)Judr. Jozef Zat’KO, general poručik iCOCriM (slovakia)assoc. Prof. Vaiva ZuZEVičiŪtĖ, Ph.d. (lithuania)

1. Theory of securiTy sTudies:Prof. Kuba JaŁOsZYńsKi, Ph.d. (Poland)2. Technology:assoc. Prof. inga V. uriadnykova, Csc. (ukraine)3. MarTial arTs and physical culTure:Prof. tadeusz aMBrOżY, Ph.d. (Poland)Prof. stanislav dadElO, Ph.d. (lithuania) 4. arMy and disposiTional groups:Brig. gen. (ret.) Prof. ing. Miroslav KElEMEN, Ph.d., drsc. (slovakia)Prof. Witold POKrusZYńsKi, Ph.d. (Poland)5. law:Prof. Judr. Karel sChEllE, Csc. (Czech republic)6. hisTory:doc. Judr. Vladimir ZOuBEK, ll.M., MBa. (Czech republic)assoc. Prof. stefan BiElańsKi, Ph.d. (Poland)7. poliTics:assist. Prof. alessandro VitalE (italy)Prof. Janusz WęC, Ph.d. (Poland)

8. forensic science:Prof. Judr. ing. Viktor POrada, drsc., dr h. c. mult. (Czech republic)Prof. Janina ZięBa-Palus, Ph.d. (Poland)9. eThics and philosophy:Prof. Łukasz trZCińsKi, Ph.d. (Poland)10. securiTy engineering:Prof. ing. Karol BalOG, Ph.d. (slovakia)Gen. aleksander NEJEdlÝ (slovakia)doc. ing. Jozef saBOl, drsc. (Czech republic)11. proTecTion of persons and properTy:ing. Paweł PaJOrsKi, M.a. (Poland)12. MaTheMaTical aspecTs of securiTy culTure:ing. tadeusz ratusiński, Ph.d. (Poland)13. Medical and Kinesiological aspecTs of securiTy culTure:Prof. dariusz MuCha, Ph.d. (Poland)M.d. dorota szczeblowska, Ph.d. (Poland)

Subject editorS:

Scientific board:

Prof. Carlos Eduardo Pacheco aMaral universidade dos acores (italy)Prof. Eliseo BErtOlasi, Ph.d. l’istituto di alti studi in Geopolitica e scienze ausiliarie (italy)Prof. Wojciech CYNarsKi, Ph.d. uniwersytet rzeszowski w rzeszowie (Poland)andrzej CZOP, Ph.d. Wyższa szkoła Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego i indywidualnego „apeiron”w Krakowie (Poland)Prof. stanislav dadElO, Ph.d. Vilnus Gediminas technical university (lithuania)Jerzy dEPO, Ph.d. Krakowska akademia im. andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego (Poland)assoc. Prof. Jacek dWOrZECKi, Ph.d.Wyższa szkoła Policji w szczytnie (Poland)adam GOŁuCh, Ph.d. Górnośląska Wyższa szkoła handlowa im. W. Korfantego w Katowicach (Poland)Judr. Wojciech M. hrYNiCKi, Ph.d. Wyższa szkoła Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego i indywidualnego „apeiron” w Krakowie (Poland)Prof. Kuba JaŁOsZYńsKi, Ph.d. Wyższa szkoła Policji w szczytnie (Poland)assoc. Prof. Krzysztof KaGaNEK, Ph.d. akademia Wychowania Fizycznego w Krakowie (Poland)doc. Judr. Štefan KOčaN, Ph.d. akadémia Policajného zboru v Bratislave (slovakia)doc. ing. Jozef MartiNKa, Ph.d. slovak university of technology in Bratislava (slovakia)Krzysztof MiChalsKi, Ph.d. Politechnika rzeszowska w rzeszowie (Poland)

Prof. ing. Jana MüllErOVá, Ph.d. Žilinská univerzita v Žiline (slovakia)prof. andrzej MisiuK, Ph.d.university of Warsaw (Poland)Prof. Jerzy OChMaNN, Ph.d. Polska akademia umiejętności (Poland) assoc. Prof. antoni OlaK, Ph.d.university College of Enterprise and administration in lublin (Poland)Bogusław PŁONKa, Ph.d. Wyższa szkoła Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego i indywidualnego „apeiron”w Krakowie (Poland) Prof. Francesco sidOti, Ph.d.l’uuniversita` dell’aquila (italy)Prof. sergii Viktotovych sliNKO lviv university of Bussines and law (ukraine)Prof. lyubomyr sOPilNYK, Ph.d. lviv university of Business and law (ukraine)doc. Paeddr. samuel uhriN, Csc. akademia Pomorska w słupsku (Poland)Prof. Bernard WiśNiEWsKi, Ph.d. Wyższa szkoła Policji w szczytnie (Poland)Prof. larisa a. YaNKOVsKa, Ph.d. lviv university of Business and law (ukraine)assoc. Prof. Mirosław ZaBiErOWsKi, Ph.d. Wyższa szkoła Oficerska Wojsk lądowych im. Generała tadeusza Kościuszki we Wrocławiu (Poland)doc. Vasyl ZaPlatYNsKYi, Csc. National aviation university (ukraine)doc. Judr. Vladimir ZOuBEK, ll.M., MBa. Policejní akademie české republiky v Praze (Czech republic)

board of reviewerS:

Contents

Scientific Pivot

Juliusz PiwowarskiThree Pillars of Security Culture • 16

theory of Security

Janusz Gierszewski, Juliusz PiwowarskiTheoretical Basics of Societal Security • 30

international Security

Martin horemužSoft Power in the current foreign Policy of the russian Federation: Resources, Possibilities, Limits • 50

holiStic PerSPective of KineSioloGical aSPectS

of Security culture

tadeusz ambroży, amadeusz Kwiatkowski, Dariusz Mucha, Juliusz Piwowarski

changes in the physical endurance of kickboxers in the preparatory phase • 80

Dariusz Mucha, tadeusz ambroży, teresa Mucha, Katarzyna chudyba, Krzysztof latinek

the location of Points Within the chinese Macrosystem in the Zone of reflexology of the Microsystems of Feet and Hands • 92

internal Security

antoni olakModern understanding of national Security. Introduction to the Issue • 106

victor GrechaninovPrevetion of emergency Situations as the Main task of Single State System for Civil Protection • 121

DiSPoSitional GrouPS

urszula Soler, Damian DudaSecurity culture of the Paramilitary youth organizations on the example of legia akademicka Kul ( John Paul ii catholic university of lublin) • 132

Marcin Płoteklevel of Service Discipline of Militiamen illustrated By the Example of Olsztyn Voivodeship • 148

leGal Security

Krzysztof Jerzy GruszczyńskiGrexit as a Challenge to the European Integrity • 164

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The editorial Boards accepts papers of at least 10 pages in length. Papers must be in english (either British or american). We also accept papers in other Congress languages (one or two for each issue). Submission of such paper must be consulted with the editorial Board.Papers should be sent via e-mail to:[email protected], or via traditional post to:university of Public and individual Security aPeiron in cracowul. Krupnicza 3, 31-123 Kraków.articles should be saved into a Word- compatible file (.doc, .docx, .rtf ). Font type: 12 Times New Roman CE or an equivalent Cyrillic font; single space of 1.5 lines; standard margins (2.5 cm); alphabetic, numbered refer-ences at the end of the text.

each paper should include:a) Abstract in English of maximum 200 words underlying the main points of the article. it should be informative and self-explanatory without refer-ence to the text of the manuscript. it should include any essential results that support the conclusions of the work.b) An extended abstract of ca. 1.500 characters with spaces, which should follow the structure of the article. This abstract is intended for Polish read-ers and, if submitted in english will be translated into the Polish language.c) 3-5 key words, both in the language of the paper and in english. Key-words must differ from the words used in the title of the paper.d) Short biographical note of the author.e) references should only include publications cited in the article and should be fitted to the pattern provided below:- For books: rosa r., Filozofia bezpieczenstwa, Bellona, Warszawa 1995.- For articles from periodicals: Koziej S., Bezpieczeństwo i obronność

Unii Europejskiej, „Myśl Wojskowa”, 2005, no. 1.- For articles in books: Kudelska M., Filozofia Indii - kilka uwag

wstępnych, [in:] Filozofia Wschodu, v. i, B. Szymanska (ed.), uniwersytet Jagielloński, Krakow 2001.

information for authorS

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f ) Footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page and follow the patternprovided below:- For books: r. rosa, Filozofia bezpieczeństwa, Bellona, Warszawa 1995.- For articles from periodicals: S. Koziej, Bezpieczeństwo i obronność

Unii Europejskiej, „Mysl Wojskowa”, 2005, no. 1.- For articles in books: M. Kudelska, Filozofia Indii - kilka uwag

wstępnych, [in:] Filozofia Wschodu, i, B. Szymanska (red.), uniwersytet Jagiellonski, Krakow 2001.

- For sources already cited, use the latin term: ibidem, op. cit., etc.Quotations should be marked with double inverted commas. for embed-ded quotes, use »...«.Pictures, charts and illustrations: 300 dpi.The editorial Board reserves the right to shorten and edit the papers.all articles are reviewed in double-blind system.We do not provide for payments.authors should enclose a signed statement acknowledging the genuine-ness of the text (preferably, a scan of such a document).By publishing in “Security Dimensions” authors transfer the copyrights to the papers to the Publisher. Please enclose a statement to that effect.Please remember that such phenomena as ghostwriting and guest author-ship are unacceptable as they are a manifestation of scientific misconduct. all detected cases will be reported to relevant institutions. in every case of co-authorship, authors are obliged to enclose a statement of contribution (all document forms are available on the website).By submitting a paper author accepts the policy of the journal.

Publication ethics and Publication Malpractice statementThe journal Security Dimensions: International & National Studies is dedi-cated to following best practices on ethical matters, errors and retractions. The prevention of publication malpractice is one of the important respon-sibilities of the editorial board. any kind of unethical behavior is not ac-ceptable, and the journal does not tolerate plagiarism in any form. authors submitting articles to Security Dimensions: International & National Studies affirm that manuscript contents are original. furthermore, they warrant that their article has neither been published elsewhere in any language fully or partly, nor is it under review for publication anywhere.

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The following duties outlined for editors, authors, and reviewers are based on the coPe code of conduct for Journal editors. editors, authors, and reviewers will also adhere to the Security Dimensions: International & Na-tional Studies Policies.for all parties involved in the act of publishing (the author(s), the journal editor(s), the peer reviewers, the society, and the publisher) it is necessary to agree upon standards of expected ethical behavior.

Author ResponsibilitiesReporting standards authors reporting results of original research should present an accurate account of the work performed as well as an objective discussion of its significance. underlying data should be represented accurately in the manuscript. a paper should contain suffi-cient detail and references to permit others to replicate the work. fraud-ulent or knowingly inaccurate statements constitute unethical behavior and are unacceptable. originality and plagiarism The authors should en-sure that they have written entirely original works, and if the authors have used the work and/or words of others that this has been appropri-ately cited or quoted. Multiple, redundant, or concurrent publication an author should not in general publish manuscripts describing essentially the same research in more than one journal or primary publication. Parallel submis-sion of the same manuscript to more than one journal constitutes unethi-cal publishing behavior and is unacceptable. Acknowledgement of sources Proper acknowledgment of the work of others must always be given. authors should also cite publications that have been influential in determining the nature of the reported work. Authorship of a manuscript authorship should be limited to those who have made a significant contribution to the conception, design, exe-cution, or interpretation of the reported study. all those who have made significant contributions should be listed as coauthors. Where there are others who have participated in certain substantive aspects of the research project, they should be named in an acknowledgement section. The cor-responding author should ensure that all appropriate coauthors (according to the above definition) and no inappropriate co-authors are included in the author list of the manuscript, and that all co-authors have seen and ap-proved the final version of the paper and have agreed to its submission for publication. all co-authors must be clearly indicated at the time of manu-

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script submission. Requests to add co-authors after a manuscript has been accepted will require approval of the editor. Disclosure and conflicts of interest all authors should disclose in their manuscript any financial or other substantive conflict of interest that might be construed to influence the results or their interpretation in the manuscript. all sources of financial support for the project should be disclosed.Fundamental errors in published works When an author discov-ers a significant error or inaccuracy in his/her own published work, it is the author’s obligation to promptly notify the journal’s editor or publisher and cooperate with them to either retract the paper or to publish an ap-propriate correction statement or erratum.

editor ResponsibilitiesPublication Decisions & Accountability an editor a journal is re-sponsible for deciding which articles submitted to the journal should be published, and, moreover, is accountable for everything published in the journal. in making these decisions, the editor may be guided by the policies of the journal’s editorial board and/or the policies of the pub-lisher, as well as, by the legal requirements regarding libel, copyright in-fringement, and plagiarism. The editor may confer with other editors or reviewers when making publication decisions. The editor should maintain the integrity of the academic record, preclude business needs from com-promising intellectual and ethical standards, and always be willing to pub-lish corrections, clarifications, retractions, and apologies when needed. Fair play an editor should evaluate manuscripts for their intellectual content without regard to race, gender, sexual orientation, religious belief, ethnic origin, citizenship, or political philosophy of the author(s). Confidentiality an editor and any editorial staff must not disclose any information about a submitted manuscript to anyone other than the cor-responding author, reviewers, potential reviewers, other editorial advisers, and the publisher, as appropriate. Disclosure, conflicts of interest, and oth-er issues an editor will be guided by coPe’s Guidelines for retracting articles when considering retracting, issuing expressions of concern about, and issuing corrections pertaining to articles that have been published in Security Dimensions: International & National Studies. unpublished mate-rials disclosed in a submitted manuscript must not be used in an editor’s own research without the explicit written consent of the author(s).

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Reviewer ResponsibilitiesContribution to editorial decisions peer review assists the editor in making editorial decisions and, through the editorial communication with the author, may also assist the author in improving the manuscript.Promptness any invited referee who feels unqualified to review the re-search reported in a manuscript or knows that its timely review will be im-possible should immediately notify the editor so that alternative reviewers can be contacted.confidentiality any manuscripts received for review must be treated as confidential documents. They must not be shown to or discussed with others except if authorized by the editor.standards of objectivity submitted papers are evaluated in peer re-view system by two independent (not affiliated in the author’s institution), anonymous reviewers. Double-blind review standard is implemented: au-thor and reviewers do not know each others’ identity; the list of particular articles’ reviewers is never published.Phenomena as guest authorship and ghostwriting are unacceptable as a manifestation of scientific misconduct. all detected cases will be re-ported to relevant institutions.reviews should be conducted objectively. Personal criticism of the au-thor(s) is unacceptable. reviewers should express their views clearly with appropriate supporting arguments and give a clear conclusion for accept-ance or denial of the article.Acknowledgement of sources reviewers should identify relevant published work that has not been cited by the author(s). any statement that an observation, derivation, or argument had been previously report-ed should be accompanied by the relevant citation. reviewers should also call to the editor’s attention any substantial similarity or overlap between the manuscript under consideration and any other published data of which they have personal knowledge.Disclosure and conflict of interest privileged information or ide-as obtained through peer review must be kept confidential and not used for personal advantage. reviewers should not consider evaluating manu-scripts in which they have conflicts of interest resulting from competitive, collaborative, or other relationships or connections with any of the au-thors, companies, or institutions connected to the submission.

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Publisher Responsibilitieseditorial autonomy Security Dimensions: international & national Studies is committed to working with editors to define clearly the respec-tive roles of publisher and of editors in order to ensure the autonomy of editorial decisions, without influence from advertisers or other commer-cial partners.Intellectual property and copyright university of Public and indi-vidual Security apeiron in cracow ensures the integrity and transparency of each published article with respect to: conflicts of interest, publication and research funding, publication and research ethics, cases of publication and research misconduct, confidentiality, authorship, article corrections, clarifications and retractions, and timely publication of content. Scientif-ic misconduct in cases of alleged or proven scientific misconduct, fraud-ulent publication, or plagiarism the publisher, in close collaboration with the editors, will take all appropriate measures to clarify the situation and to amend the article in question. This includes the prompt publication of a correction statement or erratum or, in the most severe cases, the retrac-tion of the affected work.

what iS aPProPriate for uS?We welcome submissions on widely comprehended security. Papers of non- scientific character that consists merely of opinion are generally rejected. our rule is to define “security” broadly, so the topics of analyses we are in-terested in are numerous, below please find only few examples of them:1. Theory of security studies, including new propositions of definition

of relevant concepts and attempts of applying existent theories that are important for contemporary securitology.

2. Technology, i.e. analysis of all kinds of technological aspects of national and international security.

3. Martial arts, papers regarding philosophy of modern and traditional Budo as well as analysis of work-outs for athletes training hand-to-hand combat.

4. Dispositional groups, analysis of schooling, trainings and work of uni-formed services, antiterrorists and other.

5. Law, analysis of legal aspects of national and international security and order.

6. History, new interpretations of or new information on historical events.

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7. Policy, analysis of contemporary security policy issues.8. Forensic science and criminalistics.9. Ethics, analysis of ethical aspects of administration, praxeology, combat

sport etc.10. Security Engineering, systems dealing with disruptions raging from

natural disastres to malicious act.11. Protection of persons and property.

if you are not sure whether your article is appropriate for the journal, please contact the editorial board ([email protected]).

Scientific Pivot

SECURITY DIMENSIONSInternatIonal & natIonal StudIeS

NO. 18; 2016 (16–27)

Three Pillars of securiTy culTure*1

assoc. Prof. Juliusz Piwowarski, Ph.D.University of Public and Individual Security APEIRON in Cracow, POLAND

ABSTRACT

the article presents a proposal for multidisciplinary scientific platform, as a basis for security studies. it includes not only the military but mostly non-military aspects of secu-rity. an emphasis is put on security culture, the main pivot of the “Security Dimensions” as a scientific journal, with three pillars of the security culture concept: mental and spiritual (individual dimension), legal and organizational (social dimension), material.

ARTICLE INFO

Key wordsSecurity culture, security studies, multidisciplinary, pillars

* The article has been firstly published in “Security Dimensions” No 14, and is repeated as a manifest of scientific pivot of the journal; J. Piwowarski, Three Pillars of Securi-ty Culture, “Security Dimensions. International and National Studies”, 2015, no 14, p. 10–16.

this article is an invitation for co-creating interdisciplinary scientific plat-form. the aim is to provide such a mutual understanding, that allows to achieve a certain coherence and the comparability of the security studies research results, in the frame of “Security Dimensions”, a transdisciplinary scientific journal, created by me as an editor-in-chief, in accordance with the motto e pluribus unum.

the proposed platform is the scientific category known as security cul-ture, with her three pillars: individual, social, and material, connected with such scholars as alfred louis Kroeber or Marian cieślarczyk.

***

three Pillars of Security culture

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the development of the human being, and daily functioning of the social collectivities, formed by families, local communities, including pro-fessional groups – is accompanied by a continuous erection of edifice of culture. the phenomenon of culture is the whole material and nonmaterial embedded elements of the legacy of people.

In 1871 English anthropologist Edward Tylor formulated a definition of the concept of culture1. according to tylor, culture includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society. american anthropologist of culture alfred louis Kroeber (1876–1960) presented the concept of culture, which is the inspi-ration for the idea of the pillars of security culture. in his concept presented in The Nature of Culture (1952), the three components of culture are mate-rial reality, social culture, and ethical culture with related values2.

***

english philosopher and sociologist, roger vernon Scruton, as an apol-ogist of Western culture, highlights importantly – “culture is important”. this statement, in globalization era, does not reverberate all around us so strongly that it does not need to be repeated after Scruton, and confirmed in the specific actions3. to teach others, that “culture is important”, we must therefore first begin with ourselves. nowadays the false interpre-tations of freedom are very common, depriving us of culture, that give us patterns of behavior in accordance with specific standards and rules. interpretations exempting us from obligations or responsibilities, result in aberrations in subarea of culture known as security culture. there have been a threat that our culture can be devaluated, and morality will be eliminat-ed, to the detriment of human security.

the phenomenon of security culture is a part of culture in wide sense. “as being clearly shaped, a cultural domain is accompanied by a man from the dawn. as many anthropologists conclude, with Malinowski in the lead,

1 e. B. tylor, Primitive Culture , Vol. 1, Vol. 2, John Murray, London 1871. 2 a. l. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1952; Idem,

Configurations of Culture Growth, University of California Press, Berkeley 1944.3 Action in sociology is a kind of human conduct, to which their operators (the authors) imply some meaning. Such recognition of action category widespread thanks to theso-ciology of Max Weber – today is considered to be a rudimentary sociological category: Max Weber, Gospodarka i społeczeństwo. Zarys socjologii rozumiejącej, (Wirtschaft und Ge-sellschaft, Tübingen 1922), Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 2002, p. 6.

Juliusz Piwowarski

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providing security lays at the root of humanizing and constituted a conditio sine qua non not only of the survival of the human species, but also the development of other sectors of human culture”4.

***

you may discover that the phenomenon of culture and security, operate in a very similar way:1. Both for security and for culture – in parallel – the importance have two

simultaneously occurring parameters: space and time.2. Physical space gives, as an example, the possibility of “regions of secu-

rity” (or “regions of threats”), and at the same time allows the culture to expand on more and more territory.

3. the time parameter provides a frame of reference in which it lasts on a given territory, culture-building process identical with the develop-ment process of human bodies, small, medium and large social groups and whole societies-nations – this development determines the level of their security.

4. the development process is, by definition and common sense, the mechanism of response to any threats or even – as defined in the securi-ty term – can be considered an analogon of the phenomenon of security.

5. culture is in the particular civilization not only some “added value”, but it is an autonomous self-defenceness potential of a given civilization active persons or entities – in the fields of political, military, cultural, eco-nomic, ecological, legal, organizational, cybernetic or technical activities.

6. culture in relation to the different active persons or entities that function under its impact, from a personal to a global scale, provides such a mech-anism, which may significantly affect the attitudes and behavior of these active persons or entities in certain situations, processes, or “points-in-time” events, carrying a variety of opportunities, risks and threats.

7. culture can also be a theoretical model, having the power to explain, being applicable in security studies.

***

4 S. Jarmoszko, Nowe wzory kultury bezpieczeństwa a procesy deterioracji więzi społecznej, [in:] Jedność i różnorodność. Kultura vs. kultury, e. rekłajtis, r. Wiśniewski, J. Zda-nowski (red.), Aspra-JR, Warszawa 2010; B. Malinowski, Naukowa teoria kultury, [in:] Szkice z teorii kultury, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1958, p. 101.


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The cultural turn has been popularized by american philosopher and sociologist fredric Jameson and his collection of essays The Cultural Turn5. Postmodernism pointed the culture, as the main element of social issues discourses. if “the culture is the whole material and spiritual ele-ments of the legacy of people, embedded and enriched in the course of history, transferred from generation to generation (…)”6 and its compo-nents are the principia reducing the risks of social coexistence, cultural patterns, moral presumptions and behavior adequate for given social col-lectivity, in consequence, it affects the formation of social facts and arti-facts belonging to the subarea of culture, which is the security culture. at the beginning of the 21st century the cultural turn in social sciences was prestigiously institutionalized by creation of the center for cultural So-ciology at the University of Yale in 2001.

the effects of research on security issues (security studies), belonging to the nonmaterial elements of embedded legacy of people, are an im-portant part of a security culture, which used to be only a part of inter-national relations. over time, this scientific approach gained importance and autonomy. today, its fields, realism or idealism, thanks to constructivist breakthrough, which came in the 1980s in security studies, can be used for research both the active persons or entities, in different scales, not only in the whole state scientific perspective. they are applied from the scale of the active persons by the scale of the entities up to the societies-nations and their states. a brief definition of the security culture, is proposed by the author of this article, as follows:

Security culture is the whole material and nonmaterial elements of embedded legacy of people, aimed at cultivating, recovering (if lost) and raising the level of safety specified active persons or entities. It can

5 f. Jameson, The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern 1983–1998, verso Books Publ., London – New York 1998; Idem, Globalization and Political Strategy, [in:] „new left review”, 4 ( July–August, 2000); Idem, Postmodernism and Cultural Theo-ries. Lectures in China (Houxiandaizhuyi he Wenhualilun), Shanxi teacher’s university, Xi’an 1987; Idem, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Duke uni-versity Press, Durham 1991; see G. Steinmetz, State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, New York 1999; M. Jacobs, L. Spill-man, Cultural sociology at the crossroads of the discipline, [in:] „Poetics. Journal of em-pirical Research on Culture, the Media and the Arts” 2005, 33, p. 1–14; V. E. Bonnell, l. hunt, Beyond the Cultural Turn, University of California Press, Berkeley 1999.

6 „Kultura” [„culture”], Mała Encyklopedia PWN, Warszawa 1996, p. 445.

Juliusz Piwowarski

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be considered in terms of individual – mental and spiritual, social and physical dimensions.

Developed, the so-called spectral version of the definition of a security culture, showing the importance of security consciousness for acting person or entity7, is indicated below. it is the result of the Polish-ukrainian co-operation, as a result of research program (2013–2014), that took place in Cracow Research Institute for Security and Defence Skills APEIRON. the au-thors of the definition are Juliusz Piwowarski (CRISD APEIRON, Poland) and vasyl Zaplatynski (National Aviation University in Kiev, ukraine).

Security culture8 is the whole material and nonmaterial elements of embedded legacy of people in military and nonmilitary spheres – that is, the widely understood autonomous defence of active persons or entities. This phenomenon is a trichotomy, that create three overlap-ping dimensions:

- mental and spiritual (individual dimension),- legal and organizational (social dimension),- material.Security culture is used for realization the specified aims and needs:1. Effective control of emerging threats, obtaining the status of a sat-

isfyingly low level of threats.2. Recovery of security in a situation where it has been lost.3. Optimization, for a specified active persons or entities, of the level

of multiareal understood security.4. To encourage in the social and personal consciousness about the

need for self-improvement and trichotomal (mental/social/mate-rial) development, along with enabling the motivation and atti-tudes that result in individual and collaborative activities, result-ing in a comprehensive development of acting persons or entities, including their autonomous defenceness.

the precursor of the security and defence culture studies in Poland is Marian cieślarczyk. it should be noted that the defence in this concept is concerned, despite schematic approaches, far beyond the military sphere. 7 See a. Zduniak, n. Majchrzak, Świadomość emocjonalna jako dystraktor w procesach ba-

dawczych bezpieczeństwa, [in:] Metodologia badań bezpieczeństwa narodowego, vol. 3, Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2012.

8 J. Piwowarski, Ochrona VIP-a a czworokąt bushido. Studium japońskiej kultury bezpieczeń-stwa, [w:] Bezpieczeństwo osób podlegających ustawowo ochronie wobec zagrożeń XXI wie-ku, P. Bogdalski, J. Cymerski, K. Jałoszyński (red.), Szczytno 2014, s. 451.


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By “defence” cieślarczyk means also the non-military potential. this po-tential enables effective tackling and preventing the occurrence of threats and to react on threats at the moment of their real occurrence. Professor Marian cieślarczyk gives the following definition of a security culture:

Security and defence culture is a kind of social matrix, “the pattern of basic assumptions, values, norms, rules, symbols, and beliefs that influ-ence the perception of the challenges, opportunities and (or) threats, and the way of feeling security and thinking about it, behaviour and activities (cooperation) of active persons or entities connected with this, in a varie-ty of ways »articulated« and »learned« by them in the education of broad sense, including internal and external integration processes in natural adaptation and other organizational processes, as well as in the process of strengthening the widely (not just militarily) understood defence, serving the harmonious development of these active persons or entities, and the achievement by them widely understood security, for the benefit of each other, as well as the environment”9.

the concept of Marian cieślarczyk shows that security and defence cul-ture is manifested in the following three dimensions:

1. The first dimension –ideas, values, and spirituality of the human being,2. The second dimension – social impacts of the organisation and sys-

tems of law,3. The third dimension – material aspects of human existence.the above components Marian cieślarczyk called “pillars of a culture

of security”. they are named, respectively, mental-spiritual, organizational and legal, and material pillars. the components of these pillars interpen-etrate, despite peculiarities. for example, knowledge as a component of the first pillar, is also an element of the second pillar, having the organiza-tional-legal and technical-innovative nature. the concept of security cul-ture allows, in many cases, the integration of multidisciplinary studies on security and defence issues. this concept includes also the emotional and rational understanding of safety as a neutralizing agent against controlled (for the time) and legitimated “aggression”. Security culture, its suitably high level, allows us to avoid the temptation of an aggressive “win” for the higher needs, what is the need for “being an impregnable”.

9 M. cieślarczyk, Kultura bezpieczeństwa i obronności, Wydawnictwo akademii Podla-skiej, Siedlce 2010, p. 210.

Juliusz Piwowarski

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***

Paying attention to the definition of security culture phenomenon, we can see that this combines all aspects of social life: spirituality, social compe-tence, materiality and their coherent, holistic implementation. it promotes security, conceived both as a value (1st pillar of security culture), as the de-sired state (1st, 2nd and 3rd pillar of culture) and as a process, which aim is to use the heritage of generations, repeated and evolving in three areas of the human individual, human population and the material dimension of human existence – continuously thanks to the functioning of the intersub-jective phenomenon, which is a cross-generation national transmission10. Se-curity is implemented through the defence function, also understood very broadly – not only understood as a category of military considerations.

cieślarczyk writes: “from my research, it appears that today, but also in the foreseeable future, thinking about defence only in terms of the mili-tary is insufficient”11. Similarly, emma rothschild in the article What Is Security?12, 1995, specifies the need to redefine the category of security in the process of extending its concept. the concept of defence concerned in individual and social (collective) context is almost synonymous with the concept of a security culture. here you can talk about the existence of a coherent, although multithreaded security culture, for the level of which, of the utmost importance are, inter alia, education and teaching, identity and social constraints, and challenges associated with conscious effort, which is aimed at self-improvement of man, and on this basis the improvement created of social organizations, for example, in the spirit of the community, as it suggests the american sociologist, communitarianist,

10 Generation – the term can be through the following determinants of this social phenom-enon: a) genealogical relation of parents and children – it occurs for example in the Bible, or pedigree, b) para genealogical – an extension of the previous definition on the whole societies, c) „registered” (all of the peer groups) and d) cultural; see M. Wallis, Koncepcje biologiczne w humanistyce, [in:] „fragmenty filozoficzne”, seria ii, tadeusz Kotarbiński (red.), Warszawa 1959; similar differentiation of the generation term, gives M. ossowska, Koncepcja pokolenia, [in:] „Studia Socjologiczne” 1963, 2, but the first of her typologies is limited to the genealogical type (parents–children relation) and cultural-genealogical (teacher–pupil relation).

11 M. cieślarczyk, Kultura bezpieczeństwa i obronności, Wydawnictwo akademii Podla-skiej, Siedlce 2010, p. 11.

12 e. rotschild, What Is Security?, ”Daedalus”, Vol. 124, No. 3, Summer 1995, p. 53–98.


23

amitai etzioni13. according to etzioni “the man does not exist as long as there is no socially; what he is, depends on his social being, and his use of this social being is irrevocably linked to who is. it has the ability to control his inner being, while the main path for self-control leads to connect with other, similar active persons, in social activities”14.

***

“American and English universities securitology is equated with the con-cept of security culture”15, as Leszek Korzeniowski observes. The use of the security culture category is recorded among a large number of re-searchers of transdisciplinary and very capacious issue, which is a mod-ern security science.

for example, nick Pidgeon is among these authors16. the issue of suitability of scientific term security culture for research carried out by securitologists, according to Korzeniowski, is confirmed “through the Zohar”17. in the united States, Dove Zohar popularized his own concept and corresponding category – an equivalent to the concept of security – which is security climate. a research team from illinois State univer-sity, led by hui Zhanga studied the concerned issues of one hundred seven articles in which security culture or security climate phrases were contained. effect of comparative analysis was a prove for both concepts equity, with only one reservation, that the term security climate includes more psychological aspects than security culture18. however, so as not to leave any further doubts, “must be added that both concepts in terms of 13 a. etzioni, Spirit Of Community: The Reinvention American Society, touchstone, new

York 1994.14 a. etzioni, Aktywne społeczeństwo, Zakład Wydawniczy Nomos, Kraków 2012, p. 22.15 l. Korzeniowski, Securitologia. Nauka o bezpieczeństwie człowieka i organizacji społecznych,

EAS, Kraków 2008, p. 39.16 n. Pidgeon, Safety culture and risk management in organizations, “the Journal of cross

cultural Psychology” Cardiff University 1991, No 22, p. 129–140; J. S. Carroll, Safety culture as an ongoing process: Culture surveys as opportunities for enquiry and change, “Work & Stress” 1998, No 12, p. 272–284; M. D. Cooper, Towards a model of safety culture, “Safe-ty Science” 2000, No 36, p. 111–136.

17 D. Zohar, Safety climate in industrial organizations: Theoretical and applied implications, “Journal of Applied Psychology”, 1980. No 65, p. 96–102.

18 h. Zhang, D. a. Wiegmann, t. l. von thaden, Safety Culture: a concept in chaos?, ur-bana champaign: university of illinois, http://www.humanfactors.uiuc.edu/reports& PapersPDFs/humfac02/zhawiegvonshamithf02.pdf, accessed 2008-12–25.

Juliusz Piwowarski

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subject and research methods of securitology, as the security science” – concludes finally Korzeniowski19.

***

you could say that modern social sciences put culture on a pedestal. as ulf hannerz20 states “culture is everywhere”, while Mahmood Mamdani21 adds that “culture is a matter of life and death”. in addition, with the cul-ture “is to be reckoned with”, as recalls Samuel huntington22. as previ-ously noted, culture as a whole of the material and spiritual achievements of humankind gathered, adhered and enriched in the course of its history. it affects decisively, but often it happens unnoticed, the research by a man this kind of social facts and artifacts, that belong to a specific, divided into fixed pillars, through which societies (Nations) can address certain types of threats, political and military, to a threat to national identity. these pillars and their potentials, being a preserved heritage of society, settle national security culture.

in opinion of many security scientists, this very important social phe-nomenon, studied in all scales of human threats-ranging, from personal scale through national, international to a global scale – is always somehow rooted in the phenomenon of cultural trichotomy23.

References:

1. Bonnell v. e., hunt l., Beyond the Cultural Turn, university of califor-nia Press, Berkeley 1999.

2. carroll J. S., Safety culture as an ongoing process: Culture surveys as oppor-tunities for enquiry and change, “Work & Stress” 1998, No 12.

3. cieślarczyk M., Kultura bezpieczeństwa i obronności, Wydawnictwo Akademii Podlaskiej, Siedlce 2010.

19 l. Korzeniowski, Securitologia…, op. cit., s. 39.20 u. hanerz, Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning, colum-

bia University Press, New York 1992; Idem, Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture, Columbia University Press, New York 1992.

21 M. Mamdani, Beyond Rights Talk and Culture Talk: Comparative Essays on the Politics and Rights and Culture, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2000.

22 S. huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2007.23 See i.e. l. W. Zacher, Jednostkowe i społeczne konteksty i wyzwania dla bezpieczeństwa,

[in:] Metodologia badań bezpieczeństwa narodowego, vol. 3, Akademia Obrony Narodo-wej, Warszawa 2012.


25

4. cooper M. D., Towards a model of safety culture, “Safety Science” 2000, No 36.

5. etzioni a., Aktywne społeczeństwo, Zakład Wydawniczy nomos, Kra-ków 2012.

6. etzioni a., Spirit Of Community: The Reinvention American Society, Touchstone, New York 1994.

7. hanerz u., Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture, columbia uni-versity Press, New York 1992.

8. hanerz u., Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning, Columbia University Press, New York 1992.

9. huntington S., The Clash of Civilizations, Simon and Schuster, new York, 2007.

10. Jacobs M., Spillman l., Cultural sociology at the crossroads of the disci-pline, „Poetics. Journal of empirical research on culture, the Media and the Arts” 2005, 33.

11. Jameson f., Globalization and Political Strategy, „new left review”, 4 ( July–August, 2000).

12. Jameson f., Postmodernism and Cultural Theories. Lectures in Chi-na (Houxiandaizhuyi he Wenhualilun), Shanxi teacher’s university, Xi’an 1987.

13. Jameson f., Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Duke University Press, Durham 1991.

14. Jameson f., The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern 1983–1998, Verso Books Publ., London – New York 1998.

15. Jarmoszko S., Nowe wzory kultury bezpieczeństwa a procesy deterioracji więzi społecznej, [in:] Jedność i różnorodność. Kultura vs. kultury, e. re-kłajtis, R. Wiśniewski, J. Zdanowski (red.), Aspra-JR, Warszawa 2010.

16. Korzeniowski l., Securitologia. Nauka o bezpieczeństwie człowieka i or-ganizacji społecznych, EAS, Kraków 2008.

17. Kroeber a. l., Configurations of Culture Growth, university of califor-nia Press, Berkeley 1944.

18. Kroeber a. l., The Nature of Culture, university of chicago Press, Chicago 1952.

19. Mała Encyklopedia PWN, Warszawa 1996.20. Malinowski B., Naukowa teoria kultury, [in:] Szkice z teorii kultury,

Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1958.

Juliusz Piwowarski

26

21. Mamdani M., Beyond Rights Talk and Culture Talk: Comparative Essays on the Politics and Rights and Culture, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2000.

22. ossowska M., Koncepcja pokolenia, „Studia Socjologiczne” 1963, 2.23. Pidgeon n., Safety culture and risk management in organizations,

“The Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology” Cardiff University 1991, No 22.

24. Piwowarski J. , Ochrona VIP-a a czworokąt bushido. Studium japońskiej kultury bezpieczeństwa, [w:] Bezpieczeństwo osób podlegających ustawo-wo ochronie wobec zagrożeń XXI wieku, P. Bogdalski, J. cymerski, K. Ja-łoszyński (red.), Szczytno 2014.

25. rotschild e., What Is Security?, ”Daedalus”, Vol. 124, No. 3, Sum-mer 1995, p. 53–98.

26. Steinmetz G., State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, New York 1999.

27. tylor e. B., Primitive Culture, Vol. 1, Vol. 2, John Murray, Lon-don 1871.

28. Wallis M., Koncepcje biologiczne w humanistyce, [in:] „fragmenty filo-zoficzne”, seria II, Tadeusz Kotarbiński (red.), Warszawa 1959.

29. Weber M., Gospodarka i społeczeństwo. Zarys socjologii rozumiejącej, (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tübingen 1922), Państwowe Wydaw-nictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 2002.

30. Zacher l. W., Jednostkowe i społeczne konteksty i wyzwania dla bez-pieczeństwa, [in:] Metodologia badań bezpieczeństwa narodowego, vol. 3, Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2012.

31. Zduniak a., Majchrzak n., Świadomość emocjonalna jako dystraktor w procesach badawczych bezpieczeństwa, [in:] Metodologia badań bezpie-czeństwa narodowego, vol. 3, Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warsza-wa 2012.

32. Zhang h., Wiegmann D. a., von thaden t. l., Safety Culture: a concept in chaos?, urbana champaign: university of illinois, http://www.human factors.uiuc.edu/Reports&PapersPDFs/humfac02/zhawiegvonsham ithf02.pdf, accessed 2008-12–25.

33. Zohar D., Safety climate in industrial organizations: Theoretical and applied implications, “Journal of Applied Psychology”, 1980. No 65.


27

Author:

juliuSz PiwowarSki – currently (since 2010) serves as the Rector of the university of Public and individual Security “apeiron” in cracow. the founder of cracow research institute for Security & Defence Skills APEIRON (2012) at the University of Public and Individual Security “apeiron” in cracow. an initiator of international cooperation of Slovakia, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Italy, Germany and the USA. In 2009 earned his doctorate degree in the field of religious studies at the faculty of Phi-losophy at Jagiellonian university in cracow (Poland) and the Ph.D. the-sis pertained to the issues of security culture contained in the tradition of the ethical code of the Samurai “Bushido”. So far Juliusz Piwowarski is the author of two monographs published abroad, eleven monographs published at Polish publishers and near-ly a hundred scientific articles published at Polish and foreign scientific magazines. his main interests are security sciences, philosophy of security, social psychology, sociology, pedagogy, praxeology and science of morality conceived as a constituent of the first pillar of security culture.

Cite this article as:

J. Piwowarski, Three Pillars of Security Culture, “Security Dimensions. in-ternational and National Studies”, 2015, no 14, p. 10–16.

theory of Security


NO. 18; 2016 (30–48)

TheoreTical Basics of socieTal securiTy

assoc. Prof. Janusz Gierszewski, Ph.D.Pomeranian University in Słupsk, Institute of National Security, POLAND


ABSTRACT

Problems related to social security can be seen as a particular type of security in various aspects. in the literature of political science, economics, sociology or security studies there are different concepts of characterizing this category. the issue of social security is a complex and ambiguous, because this phenomenon is dynamic and depends on many factors. This work is an attempt to answer the question of what are the theoretical basis of social security on the basis of the security studies and whether it can enter the other, closely related to national security category concept, eg. social security of the nation. the reference point for discussion is the system of national security. authors proposed a definition of societal security of the nation and pointed out the main elements characterizing this concept as an opposition to the social security, understood in terms of welfare state. the other rationale for the choice of topic is also a need to shape the way to solve scientific problems of modern science on the basis of security studies, including those related to operationalization of concepts and gaps in knowledge, which should focus on the search for representatives of this new scientific subdiscipline.

ARTICLE INFO

Article historyReceived: 14.04.2016 Accepted 06.05.2016

Key wordssecurity, theory of security, national security, societal security, security culture

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theoretical Basics of Societal Security

Introduction

according to the current dynamics of the Global village civilization1, the study of the phenomenon referred here by the authors as societal security, has become a necessity and the need for democratic society and state, one of the priorities of the national Security culture (nSc). the main research category taken are the societal security threats. there is a rich literature of the range of many scientific disciplines, showing this type of threats. until recently in the scientific approach to national security2 the terms “social security” and “societal security” have not been used. for some time these issues became to be combined with the state’s existence, its ter-ritorial integrity, durability of structures and ensurance of the freedom of development, for example cultural and social development, increase in the quality of life for the citizens, their prosperity3.

according to the authors, the introduction of societal security on the ground of security studies offers slightly different cognitive capabilities – it can be regarded as the field of national security, which is an essential condition for the security of many other entities. the analysis of the Pol-ish literature shows that societal security has emerged in the works about the functions of state. it was connected with the function of social policy (social security) and to national security4, having – thanks to the globali-zation – references to international security.

Public security and societal security

Societal security in the literature is interpreted differently. if we assume that the term is located in the management field, that is the process of

1 M. Mcluhan, Q. fiore, War and Peace in the Global Village, Bantam Books, new York 2001.

2 comp. Z. Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 1983.

3 o. Waever, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agen-da in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, London 1993, p. 23; A. Skrabacz, Bezpieczeństwo społeczne. Podstawy teoretyczne i praktyczne, Elipsa, Warszawa 2012, p. 32–37; D. Hafe-meister, Physics of Societal Issues: Calculations on National Security, Environment, and Energy, Springer, New York 2014; S. Kiamba, Societal Security and Migration, lambert Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken 2012; M. Taylor, The Legitimate Claims of National Security, “foreign affairs” (council on foreign relations, inc.), no 52 (1974), p. 577.

4 J. Kukułka, Bezpieczeństwo a współpraca europejska: współzależności i sprzeczności in-teresów, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe”, 1982, vol. 7; W. Kitler, Bezpieczeństwo narodowe RP. Podstawowe kategorie. Uwarunkowania. System, AON, Warszawa 2011, p. 40, 50–52.

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Janusz Gierszewski, Juliusz Piwowarski

“coordination of collective efforts for achieving the objectives of organiza-tion, using techniques in organized structures based on designated tasks”5, such an approach can be applied to all organisations operating in the area of widely understood security. it can therefore by said that so understood management involves the conscious, rational shaping of relationship be-tween organizational extracted elements of societal security system, with its creativity, flexibility and efficiency aimed at achieving the state of secu-rity in its particular sector6 and to maintain it at the desired level.

However, we can put quite a relevant question. Namely, whether in terms of subject of knowledge and practices for security studies do the management ranges of societal security and management in other areas of national security are identical? if not, what features distinguish the activi-ties in the area of societal security from security in other areas such as po-litical security, economic, etc.? Do all institutions have the same functions and powers in the area of security management in the state? Where does the coordination centre is?

Societal security is associated with reduction of probability of unde-sirable phenomena occurrence and the reduction of risks associated with issues of survival, quality of life and national identity, while public security – directly with the protection of life, health and property of cit-izens form risk of terrorist attacks7.

therefore societal security is a social function of national security cul-ture (nsc), representing the whole material and nonmaterial elements of embedded legacy of people in military and nonmilitary spheres – that is the widely understood autonomous defence of active persons or entities. Soci-etal security, of individual and national scale, is an area of social interactions co-developed by streams of different fields – mental, socio-legal, material. Social and cultural capital complement each, giving the effect of synergy.

the analysis of government departments in the context of the four nodal functions of the state, societal security is put to labour and social

5 B. Kaczmarek, cz. Sikorski, Podstawy Zarządzania. Zachowania organizacyjne, ed. ii, Łódź 1999, p. 38; G. A. Cole, P. Kelly, Management Theory and Practice, international Thomson Business Press, Stamford 2011.

6 Sectors of security – areas constituting the thematic ordering of analysis processes in security studies (horizontally extending the idea of security); B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security studies in the Post-Cold War Era, hemel Hempstead, Harvester 1991.

7 J. Gierszewski, Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne. Zarys systemu, Difin, Warszawa 2013, p. 18.

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policy (social function) and culture and national heritage. taking into account the fact that it can be can assigned to the government general administration, it indicates their menial nature to the society forming the nation.

We should here underline the fact that security studies for the flag-ship designatum take their highly interdisciplinary nature. for example, tomasz aleksandrowicz is of the opinion that the “interdisciplinarity is far beyond the area of knowledge of the social sciences (in which security studies in Poland are included) is (...) as a constitutive element of the se-curity studies’ identity”8.

interdisciplinarity is “an interaction of two or more disciplines” which can mean both the “simple exchange of ideas”, as well as “mutual integra-tion of concepts, methodologies, procedures, epistemology, terminology and data leading to the organization of research and didactics in quite a wide area”9.

a single scientific discipline in fact is not able to respond to all societal security considerations10. certainly we can also try to decompose state se-curity area into different subsystems, depending on the purpose of applied system analysis and applied criteria of division and put the outlined thesis as following.

It can be assumed that societal security is an important category of national security.

But can we say, in turn, that societal security is the whole of conditions and institutions that protect the state and its citizens from phenomena threating social order related to the existence and national identity? in the further part of this work we will try to answer this question. The concept of societal security is present in normative and executive legal acts. the scope of use of these concepts in the legislation of different rank is con-stantly increasing due to the role of security. however, it should be noted that the concepts relate to the tasks and functions of the state (here: ordi-nal, providing-social and cultural). the concepts are not always precisely defined in law, therefore causing some questions. In the first of them it is 8 t. r. aleksandrowicz, Tożsamość nauk o bezpieczeństwie, [in:] Tożsamość nauk o bezpie-

czeństwie, S. Sulowski (ed.), Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2015, p. 56.9 centre for educational research and innovation, Interdisciplinarity: problems of teach-

ing and research in universities, Paris: OECD, 1972, p. 25–26.10 Bezpieczeństwo społeczne w XXI wieku w ujęciu socjologicznym, pedagogicznym, prawnym

i nauk o zarządzaniu, M. Such-Pyrgiel (ed.), WSGE, Józefów 2013.

34


the source of security in the constitution11 and its relationship to other values protected in the basic law.

Societal security can not be associated only with the tasks of the public authorities but also with their competences, tasks and role in the system of state security.

the concept of “security” occurs in the constitution in different con-texts. Social security (not societal) was linked to “social protection”, as the article 67 says: citizen has the right to social protection in the event of incapacity for work due to illness or disability, and after reaching re-tirement age. the scope and forms of social protection is defined by enactment [„obywatel ma prawo do zabezpieczenia społecznego w razie niezdolności do pracy ze względu na chorobę lub inwalidztwo oraz po osiągnięciu wieku emerytalnego. Zakres i formy zabezpieczenia społec-znego określa ustawa”].

in addition, „the unemployed citizen, not voluntarily and without other means of subsistence, has the right to social protection, whose scope and forms are defined by enactment” [„obywatel pozostający bez pracy nie z własnej woli i niemający innych środków utrzyma-nia ma prawo do zabezpieczenia społecznego, którego zakres i formy określa ustawa”]12.

among the constitutional obligations of the state are caring about life, health and property of citizens and meeting their needs, at least in the amount corresponding to the life minimum. in Poland about the understanding of the above term spoke the constitutional tribunal, indicating that the term encompasses the entirety of the benefits from public funds granted to the citizen in need13. in the framework of this institution, it is possible to extract the three categories, which together make up the social security system:1) social insurance,2) social protection and its last link of complementary character,3) social assistance14.

11 Dz. U. 1997, Nr 78, poz. 483, z 2001 r. Nr 28, poz. 319; 2006, Nr 200, poz. 1471; 2009, Nr 114, poz. 946.

12 Ibidem, art. 67.13 Judicial decision of Constitutional Tribunal, 19.11.1996, K 7/95, OTK 1996, p. 416.14 J. Gierszewski, Organizacja systemu bezpieczeństwa społecznego, Difin, Warszawa 2013,

p. 242 and foll.

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the implementation of these tasks in the area of societal security must always have in mind the self-development needs of person.

the simplest division assumes the existence of two subsystems, respon-sible for external security and internal security of the state.

the first of the specified subsystems is designed to counter any threats that may restrict or prevent (or significantly impede) the free and stable development in key areas of social life15. the second is a subsystem of internal security of the state, which, according to Bernard Wiśniewski, is an extracted part of national security system, a system of authorities and public administration, methods and modes of action related to protection of constitutional order, life and health of citizens and national assets from unlawful activities, as well as effects of natural disasters and catastrophic technical events16.

it seems that the above definition does not include all elements, as they have to meet more conditions that are necessary to guarantee the full ability to counter different threats – i.a. difficult situations in the social dimension.

It should be noted that in Poland the concept of societal security has not yet penetrated legislation and public institutions forming the base of the national security system, nor the doctrines and institutions relat-ed to culture or social security.

By the state of threats to so understood national security such situa-tions can be understood where as a result:17

- essential interests of the nation are threatened,- state institutions in their current shape are not able to satisfactorily solve

the occurring problems,- negative phenomena in society that are reflected in the weakening of de-

fence capabilities of the state,- explicitly decreases the probability of completing historical aspirations of

the nation, its position within the international community is threatened.In this sense social security is related to the desire of state to ensure

the proper functioning of institutions responsible for solving social problems of society affecting the security of the state.

15 J. Gierszewski, Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne. Zarys systemu…, p. 16.16 Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, B. Wiśniewski (ed.), aon,

Warszawa 2004, p. 62.17 K. Kiciński, Socjologiczne problemy bezpieczeństwa narodowego – prognozy, przewidywa-

nia, [in:] Wybrane problemy socjologii wojska, J. Kunikowski (ed.), vol. 1, Warszawa 1998.

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then reasonable will be the use of term “social security in the state” and relate it to individuals and social groups, such as family, local communities or national minorities. operating area of national security (state securi-ty), consists of defence, protective, social, and economic subsystems, which was shown below in a simple graph.

Graph 1. Strategic Areas of National Security

Source: own study of authors on the basis of the National Security Strategy 2014.

the essence of the protective measures in the area of national security is to provide the conditions for maintenance of constitutional order, in-ternal stability of the state, common security and public order, shared and

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individual material and nonmaterial resources, as well as the functioning of critical infrastructure18.

The essence of activities in the field of societal security is to create secure conditions for spiritual and material development of the nation19.

Graph 2. Internal Security Subsystems

Source: own authors study inspired by nSS

Protective security subsystem can be quite easily extracted from the op-erating area of national security, because it corresponds to the current tasks carried out mainly by the Minister of internal affairs. however, does this solution meet all the requirements of internal security threats prevention of the state in all spheres of social development?

Parts of the internal security system should tackle security threats in the area of societal security.

the point here is not the so-called “departmental thinking” because its contradictory to the system solution and the principles of separation and accuracy. however, the modular construction should be assumed, which is represented in the scheme presented by the authors above.

18 Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego 2014, Warszawa 2014, p. 33.19 Ibidem, p. 38.

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the functioning of the individual executive subsystems, i.a. societal se-curity should be coordinated by Ministers appointed by the Prime Minis-ter, responsible for societal spheres (family, work and social policy, culture and national heritage). these authorities should form part of the security management system of the state as essential elements of a subsystem of national security. however, it is worth noting that regardless of detailed competences of the main bodies of the executive, there will always remain the area requiring coordination of several bodies in the name of higher purpose, which is national security. as has been already mentioned soci-etal security consist of constitutional values.

the structure of the societal security concept

the issue of social security can be seen in the context of the role of the state as an active-in-security entity. If we raise the question whether the state is a dominant entity providing societal security, then the answer will be positive, because social work and responsibilities in social policy were 4,9% of the expenditure of the state budget for the year 201420 by 4,7% planned for 2015, and the majority of the protests and requests from this area is directed to state institutions and, in particular, to the government. In the year 2014 for culture and protection of national heritage planned state budget spending was exactly 3 274 175 000 zł. In the budget act for the year 2015 for this purpose 2 981 045 000 zł was allocated.

if we ask further whether the role of the state in this area changes, the answer is positive. Modern state more and more tasks of the area of societal security transmits to the local self-governments and non-govern-mental organisations.

Societal security is a non-homogeneous category, which with the lack of consensus in different scientific disciplines of understanding this term, leads to diverse its perception. there are also more or less successful at-tempts to define this term on the ground of security studies.

The primary research issue is to get the answer to the question what are the theoretical basis for societal security? than we can think about whether societal security is synonymous with social and cultural security or as a national security category, in interest of security studies researches,

20 Dz. U. 2014, poz. 162 (the compulsory social insurance is missed, which in the year 2015 is to be 24,1% of state expenditures i.n. 82 828 760 zł.).

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differs from the other sciences in this aspect of the research, which will be expressed in the posed questions and concepts?

the state should create the potential and certain guarantees for im-proving the living conditions and protection of national identity. State aid is essential for some social groups, especially marked by social exclusion. There are more questions – who should be helped? how long should the help last? who is to give help? is the decentralisation of tasks from the sphere of societal security, understood narrowly as social security, or cul-tural, does not accidentally affect negatively the functioning of the system of national security? the authors of the article are above all completely convinced that the societal security research should not take place in iso-lation from the paradigms of security studies.

of course, the theoretical conceptions of other scientific disciplines can be also somewhat useful but they may not be treated as the sole explana-tion of the complex matter of the phenomenon of societal security. Stabil-ity and security of a state is guaranteed by the participation of a number of factors. in some paradigms certain factors are of critical importance, in others they are marginal21.

Besides, many security researchers believe that so far the most perfect form of securing human needs in this area is the state22.

21st century brought a change in the perception of national security. While traditionally security was understood mainly in military or political terms, today it touches virtually every field of activity of the active-in-se-curity entity which a nation state is. it was influenced by the copenhagen School and so-called socio-cultural security sector. its leading represent-ative Barry Buzan said that after the dissolution of the bipolar world sys-tem, security needs to be treated holistically, due to the internationalisa-tion of many types of threats23. Societal threats are organically connected with the concept of national security, though they have different nature,

21 See Rozporządzenie Ministra Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego z dnia 8 sierpnia 2011 r. w sprawie obszarów wiedzy, dziedzin nauki i sztuki oraz dyscyplin naukowych i arty-stycznych (Dz. U. 2011 nr 179 poz. 1065).

22 W. Kitler, Bezpieczeństwo narodowe. Podstawowe kategorie, dylematy pojęciowe i próba systematyzacji, „Towarzystwo Wiedzy Obronnej. Zeszyt Problemowy”, 2010, No. 1 (61), p. 19.

23 r. floyd, Human Security and the Copenhagen School ’s Securitization Approach: Con-ceptualizing Human Security as a Securitizing Move, „Human Security Journal”, vol. 5, Winter 2007, p. 38.

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strength and scale of the impact on the various active-in-security entities, in which social relationships can be analised24.

Defining the societal security aims is also important for the function-ing of the state. in Poland, the Strategiczny Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa narodowego [Strategic review of the national Security] stressed that national security system should be analysed also in terms of the evolu-tion of threats and diagnose areas that challenge the stability of the state. While the Strategia Bezpieczeństwa narodowego [Strategy of nation-al Security] of 2014 includes societal security to the social subsystem and associates it with i.a. protection of national heritage, demographic threats or social security25. Societal security should be seen, on one hand, in an existential dimension, as the protection of livelihoods of people, meeting their needs, this also allows the realisation of vital aspirations. on the other hand, it is associated with the evaluation of activities of the institutions established to minimize social (societal) threats.

What is important, the prepositional term (corresponding to the question what?) “social” (societal), is a type of subject approach to-wards security.

We continue asking questions – on whom societal security is de-pendent? what does it depend on? on the society-nation, from person’s own or state’s activity? whether it is a separate set or is part of a wider set-system? who and to what extent should create conditions that allow the proper development and the proper functioning of individuals and social collectivities in nation state? analysis of Polish scientific liter-ature of the subject allows to note that social security is yet defined inconsistently. for example, when we are talking about the protection of society against a variety of threats, maybe correctly we should specify them as a security of society in the state, meaning an objective state, subjectively reflected in public consciousness26. But now, when we are talking about social security, assistance provided to individuals and so-

24 comp. t. Biernat, J. Gierszewski, Poczucie bezpieczeństwa społecznego młodzieży w ma-łym środowisku, Akapit, Toruń 2013, p. 14–15.

25 Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Warszawa 2014, p. 52–53.26 M. hillman, r. hutchison, A Resource Conscious Society Paperback, Policy Studies insti-

tute of University of Westminster, London 1991.

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cial groups within the specified system and associate them with the economic (social) dimension27.

Social security is also associated with the protection of national iden-tity, known as the ability to maintain the culture, customs or language. in this approach, it is not only about preventing social and economic misery, but also protecting national identity and its threats connected with e.g. migration.

Graph. 3. Elements of Social Security in Horizontal Perspective

Source: J. Gierszewski, Bezpieczeństwo socjalne, społeczne a bezpieczeństwo społeczne państwa w ujęciu systemowym i sekurytyzacji, WSAiB, Gdynia 2015.

Despite the similar names – societal security (security of identity28) and social security – these are not the same concepts. The first concerns the process of constructing group identity (history and culture of the nation), while social security is identified with a guarantee to meet the existential needs of society. according to representatives of the copenhagen School, societal security category is connected with the protection of society (na-

27 See l. hofreiter, Wstęp do studiów bezpieczeństwa, Krakowskie towarzystwo eduka-cyjne, Kraków 2012, p. 92–94.

28 other names can be found: societal, rooting.

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tion) from unwanted influence of other cultures, and social security with the nation’s ability for physical survival29.

Between these concepts, there is a functional link only if social con-ditions affect the collective self-identity. an example can be a pogrom of Polish Gypsies in Mława30, or the war in Bosnia, where the Serbs living in the countryside feel threatened by Muslims living in the urban areas31. the two groups differed not only in professed religion but also in a degree of prosperity.

In the sphere of societal security, a source of conflict may be either only socio-cultural difference or a same economic diversification – or – national identity in conjunction with economic differences.

today, societal security is expanding in the vertical plane (“an object of security becomes, next to the country, a social group or a single person”) and horizontal (“security contains non-military sectors, which traditional-ly were not included, i.a. social and cultural factors”)32.

identity of a nation is shaped over centuries, creating a national cultural capital based on the material and spiritual resources, religious and moral values system and national symbolism. all of these values are transferred from generation to generation. a concern about loss of cultural identity, and thus national, always was and will be present. today in Poland and eu countries there are legitimate concerns that arise from actual threats: i.e. the uncontrolled influx of mass culture, and, above all, mass migration and a crisis of values.

an analysis of the Strategia Bezpieczeństwa narodowego [national Security Strategy] (Graph 1) tells us that the state itself assigns the pri-mary responsibility for effectiveness of national security system and iden-tifies priorities for action here. an important becomes the determination of societal security level co-relation with the effectiveness of organization. So not only the state of societal security should be analised but also the

29 See o. Weaver, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, P. lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, Pinter, London 1993, p. 23.

30 a. Giza-Poleszczuk, J. Poleszczuk, Cyganie i Polacy w Mławie konflikt etniczny czy społeczny?, Raport opracowany na zlecenie CBOS, Warszawa 1992.

31 r. c. nation, A History of the War in the Balkans 1991-2002, Didactic Press, San Die-go 2015.

32 comp. J. czaputowicz, Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego państwa – aspekty te-oretyczne, [in:] Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego państwa, S. Dębski, B. Gór-ka-Winter (eds.), Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2003, p. 22.

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process of “organizing” it and the relationships with the environment of an active-in-security entity what a nation state is. Such a distinction will allow us to divide societal threats into social threats and cultural threats33.

Graph. 4. Elements of the Social Subsystem

Source: J. Gierszewski, Bezpieczeństwo socjalne, społeczne a bezpieczeństwo społeczne państwa w ujęciu systemowym i sekurytyzacji, WSAiB, Gdynia 2015.

you can indicate, after the copenhagen School, that societal security, assigned here to so-called to socio-cultural security sector, is characterised 33 comp. Bezpieczeństwo społeczne: pojęcie, uwarunkowania, wyzwania, a. Skrabacz, S. Su-

lowski (ed.), Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa 2012 (here were analysed i.a. the role of state in creation of social security and threats of common crime or for modern family).

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on one hand by its high degree of ties with a person (an acting-in-se-curity individual), being an individual carrier of national culture security and with the society (the nation) on the other hand (an acting-in-security entity), that is at the same time, the depositary, the guardian and the de-veloper of national security culture.

the second area of societal security, being a social sphere, applies to individuals and the economic aspects of their lives, by which identity can affect the level of identification with the society creating a nation, from full participation in social life, to marginalisation and exclusion34. Societal security is related to the response of state to the poor living conditions, re-sulting in a social security guarantee, so that in a situation of need you can count not only on yourself, family, charity, or the market. in conclusion, in the area of societal security there are two thematic areas:1. Socio-cultural (societal security), with both individual dimension

and social dimension, very strongly associated with the collective, na-tional identity,and

2. Social (social security), which is associated with the existential dimen-sion of an acting-in-security individual.An enquiry made among Polish publications leads to the conclusion

that societal security, treated as a holistic approach to the national identity and social issues, although being referred to them by scientific authorities, is still in need for analysis in the context of national security system.

Marek leszczyński, writing about “social security”, de facto draws at-tention to the institutional impact of a nation state causing more or less active shaping of societal security. he points the legal and organizational steps (social area and ii pillar of national security culture) carried out by different entities that are intended to ensure a fair standard of the existence of individuals and social groups. he divides societal security into a devel-opment security (human capital), social security – guarantee of minimum income and social transfers and security of community (social capital)35.

34 comp. J. Gierszewski, Wykluczenie społeczne a bezpieczeństwo państwa, [in:] Bezpiec-zeństwo w administracji, gospodarce i biznesie. Aksjologia zjawisk kryzysowych w admin-istracji i sektorze publicznym, M. chrabkowski, c. tatarczuk, J. tomaszewski (ed.), WSAiB, Gdynia 2013, p. 65–89.

35 M. leszczyński, Bezpieczeństwo społeczne Polaków wobec wyzwań XXI wieku, Di-fin 2011, p. 59.

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Conclusion

considerations take the content of the societal security as a system, em-phasizing the integral elements of the system, such as law, institutions or growth factors related with the social security and national identity.

therefore, outlining in general a complex problematic situation, it should be stressed that the issue of societal security research is interesting also because of a new quality situation of relatively recent separation of branches of security studies.

So far, there is not an unique and unquestioned answer to what societal security is and what exactly is its role in national security system. it becomes essential to determine the convention and the scope of understanding of social security category from the perspective of the risks in relation not only to the individuals or social groups but most of all to the national security system. Such an approach focuses attention on the sphere of organization and effectiveness of security system in the social and cultural area.

the authors emphasize that the creation of a model of analised reality, which is the branch of societal security, should be made using a method that is compatible with the scientific perspective adopted in security stud-ies. in this way we can show the mechanism of expansion of current “social security” concept, indication of new threats to the system, and indication of institutions responsible for minimizing with an indication of the levels of their organization.

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2. Bezpieczeństwo społeczne w XXI wieku w ujęciu socjologicznym, pedago-gicznym, prawnym i nauk o zarządzaniu, M. Such-Pyrgiel (ed.), WSGe, Józefów 2013.

3. Bezpieczeństwo społeczne: pojęcie, uwarunkowania, wyzwania, a. Skra-bacz, S. Sulowski (ed.), Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa 2012.

4. Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, B. Wiśniewski (ed.), AON, Warszawa 2004.

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6. Brzezinski Z., Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Ad-viser, 1977–1981, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 1983.

7. Buzan B., People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester 1991.

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11. Dz. U. 1997, Nr 78, poz. 483.12. Dz. U. 2001, Nr 28, poz. 319.13. Dz. U. 2006, Nr 200, poz. 1471.14. Dz. U. 2009, Nr 114, poz. 946.15. Dz. U. 2014, poz. 162.16. floyd r., Human Security and the Copenhagen School ’s Securitization

Approach: Conceptualizing Human Security as a Securitizing Move, „hu-man Security Journal”, vol. 5, Winter 2007.

17. Gierszewski J., Bezpieczeństwo socjalne, społeczne a bezpieczeństwo społeczne państwa w ujęciu systemowym i sekurytyzacji, WSaiB, Gdy-nia 2015.

18. Gierszewski J., Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne. Zarys systemu, Difin, War-szawa 2013.

19. Gierszewski J., Organizacja systemu bezpieczeństwa społecznego, Difin, Warszawa 2013.

20. Gierszewski J., Wykluczenie społeczne a bezpieczeństwo państwa, [in:] Bezpieczeństwo w administracji, gospodarce i biznesie. Aksjologia zjawisk kryzysowych w administracji i sektorze publicznym, M. chrabkowski, C. Tatarczuk, J. Tomaszewski (ed.) WSAiB, Gdynia 2013.

21. Giza-Poleszczuk a., Poleszczuk J., Cyganie i Polacy w Mławie konflikt etniczny czy społeczny?, Raport opracowany na zlecenie CBOS, Warsza-wa 1992.

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24. hofreiter l., Wstęp do studiów bezpieczeństwa, Krakowskie towarzy-stwo Edukacyjne, Kraków 2012.

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30. Kitler W., Bezpieczeństwo narodowe. Podstawowe kategorie, dylematy pojęciowe i próba systematyzacji, „towarzystwo Wiedzy obronnej. Ze-szyt Problemowy”, 2010, No. 1 (61).

31. Kukułka J., Bezpieczeństwo a współpraca europejska: współzależności i sprzeczności interesów, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe”, 1982, vol. 7.

32. leszczyński M., Bezpieczeństwo społeczne Polaków wobec wyzwań XXI wieku, Difin 2011.

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34. nation r. c., A History of the War in the Balkans 1991-2002, Didactic Press, San Diego 2015.

35. rozporządzenie Ministra nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego z dnia 8 sierpnia 2011 r. w sprawie obszarów wiedzy, dziedzin nauki i sztu-ki oraz dyscyplin naukowych i artystycznych (Dz. U. 2011 nr 179 poz. 1065).

36. Skrabacz a., Bezpieczeństwo społeczne. Podstawy teoretyczne i praktycz-ne, Elipsa, Warszawa 2012.

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(Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.), No 52 (1974).39. Waever o., Buzan B., Kelstrup M., Identity, Migration and the New

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and the New Security Agenda in Europe, Pinter, London 1993.

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Authors:

januSz GierSzewSki – the area of his scientific interest is the issue of na-tional security, in particular the organization of the social security system. Due to the multidisciplinary nature of security studies, he also concerns institutional and legal aspects of security. the author of several scientific works analising various aspects of security and public order.


J. Gierszewski, J. Piwowarski, Theoretical Basics of Societal Security, “Se-curity Dimensions. International and National Studies”, 2016, no 18, p. 30–48.

international Security


NO. 18; 2016 (50–77)

sofT Power in The currenT foreign Policy of The russian federaTion: resources, PossiBiliTies, limiTs

Martin horemuž, Ph.D.Catholic University in Ruzomberok, SLOVAKIA

ABSTRACT

this paper aims to analyze soft power in the contemporary foreign policy of the russian federation. the structure of the present article is based on the basic normative and methodological definition of soft power. the third and also the main part of the text tries through an analytical approach to map and identify resources and real options as well as discern limits of russia’s current use of soft power.

ARTICLE INFO


Key wordsforeign Policy, Post-Soviet Space, russia, Soft Power

Introduction

Changes to the political map of the world in the late 80s of the last century indicated later structural changes in international relations that have been continuing with varying intensity to the present. the radical transforma-tions of the global environment grew mainly from the new geopolitical situation – the end of the Cold War and the bipolar arrangement system of international relations, the collapse of the Soviet union, the formation of new independent states, the growth of nato with the inclusion of

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Soft Power in the current foreign Policy of the russian federation…

countries of the former Soviet bloc, deepening and intensification of in-tegration processes in europe etc. the new reality and at the same time a challenge is the structural growth and qualitative deepening of mutual interactions, interdependences within the international system both be-tween sovereign states on a bilateral level and also within the international and regional organizations on a multilateral level1. the nature of all these transformations were based not merely on the establishment of a new power – political configuration but especially from qualitative transforma-tions of the very system of international relations that reflected shifts in the newly created power configuration, which had a direct impact on the level of relations between the participants. in addition to the institutional dimension of the whole system of international relations, starts to increase the emphasis being placed on functionality of the system, this can be re-viewed primarily in terms of the dynamics of relations within the system itself. the function can then in a more relevant way outline the operation of the system as a whole. the background to these changes and the natu-ral development led the russian federation to shape its post-communist/post-totalitarian identity and statehood. this formation was complicated not only by the “post-Soviet” past, historical heritage of the totalitarian state and a long term of ideology and burdened social structures but was made considerably more difficult by the deep internal political, economic and social crisis that the entire process of creating a “new” identity and statehood entailed.

soft Power in International Relations

from the point of view of research focus and scholarly interests in in-ternational relations, the category and notion of power belongs among the basics in the research of political relations. in the context of transfor-mations and changing environment in international relations, this topic started to be confronted intensely with new concepts and models, as for example the concept of soft power. in spite of the diversity and existence of several concepts of power, the basic starting category and variable for any research of international relations is power which is defined mostly as the ability of a state to influence, in accordance with its goals, the behav-

1 a. Čemez, Globalization: International, Political, Social and Economic Aspects [in:] Eco-nomic, Management and Law, J. Jurkova (ed.), Srbsko razvojno udruženie, Bački Petro-vac 2013, p. 14–15.

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Martin horemuž

iour of other states, and that even against their will. With respect to this definition, the concept of soft power emphasizes and works with the tools such as attractiveness and appeal as opposed to the traditional instruments of pressure and threat of using the power. the concept of soft power is a relatively new one and it is the result and reflection of development in the last two decades of the dynamically changing practice in international relations2. Despite its unquestionable substantiation and relevant place in the theory of international relations, this concept remains criticized by many authors and that mostly for its interpretational ambiguity as well as excessive normativity. another reason is that it still constitutes a relatively unexplored research field and a challenge for deeper analyses and research. for the purposes of this paper, soft power is considered as the essential variable, which is used to identify the sources as well as its possibilities and limits of its practical application in the russian foreign policy. in method-ological and theoretical terms, it will draw from Joseph nye’s definition, which identifies three primary sources of soft power: culture, political val-ues and foreign policy. With respect to content definition of soft power, nye claims that it operates mainly on the principle of persuasion of other actors by means of following or agreeing with norms and institutions pro-ducing desirable behaviour. according to nye, soft power can also rely on appealing to certain values or the ability to create the agenda in the way that it forms the others’ preferences3. however, it is necessary to mention that in the political sphere, the political values can serve as the source of soft power only in case when the state itself follows them from inside as well as outside4. While achieving the foreign political goals by means of soft power, the state does not need to make use of so many expensive tra-ditional economic or military sources and can attain the same if not higher efficiency. this is one of the reasons why soft power is sometimes defined in opposition to hard power.

the positive tools in foreign economic relations within the framework of soft power are mostly economic benefits, which are usually the preferential access to the market of the given country, breaking down of business barri-

2 J. nye, Soft Power, “Foreign Policy”, 1990, no. 80.3 Ibidem; Idem, Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics, Public affairs, new

York 2004.4 l. flanderová, Soft power: Mít či nemít? Mezinárodní politika, www.iir.cz/article/soft-

power-mit-ci-nemit, accessed 18.02.2015.

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ers, developmental help with respect to third states, transfer of technologies, granting of loans and guarantees5. furthermore, the area of soft power in-cludes also the ideological means helping to spread ideas connected to the particular state. these tools mostly concentrate on political elite and public opinion of other countries. in this context, public democracy is often men-tioned. it is based on the assumption that the country’s image and reputation are public property, which can create environment either enabling or disa-bling individual action6. the area of public diplomacy, whose importance is underlined by the development of modern communication technologies, includes the statesmen’s speeches, work with the media with international impact, support of ideologically compatible groups within other states as well as attendance of international cultural events abroad with the purpose of creating positive awareness about the given state7.

the ideological sphere includes creating good reputation abroad focus-ing on the positive image (so-called branding) in the world community and achieving better standing among other states. the main tool for achieving support from other members of the international community is the attrac-tiveness of offered ideas and approaches together with the reputation of their holders. Branding is especially important for countries which under-went radical systemic change and transformation (russia included), because it becomes a tool whose role is to introduce the new or confirm the existing identity of a particular state, its idea about how it wants to be perceived, mainly by that group of states to which it wants to belong. identity and its presentation become part of strategy of public diplomacy by means of “sto-ries” about the state and its place in time and space8.

evaluation of the Russian Federation Post-soviet Development: the Roots of Russian soft Power and the Basis from which it Began

for the russian (post-Soviet) political elite the change started after the collapse of the USSR – an intense, although initially uncertain and cha-

5 h. Savigny, l. Marsden, Doing Political Science and International Relations. Theories in Action, Palgrave Macmilan, Hampshire 2011, p. 53.

6 J. Peterková, Veřejná diplomacie – jen módní pojem nebo skutečná změna, “Mezinárodní vztahy”, 2006, no. 3.

7 P. Drulák, r. Druláková, Tvorba a analýza zahraniční politiky, vŠe oeconomica, Pra-ha 2007.

8 J. Peterková, Veřejná diplomacie – jen módní pojem nebo skutečná změna, “Mezinárodní vztahy”, 2006, no. 3, p. 91.

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otic search for a new ideological framework and paradigm on which it would be possible to shape foreign policy and at the same time respond to current political, security and economic issues9. During the 90s of the previous century within this process of “searching” for a substitute ide-ology and paradigm the ideological directions of eurasia and (russian) geopolitics became important10. the early years of post-transformation development had a great impact on the foreign policy of russia also at-lanticism. the atlanticism in foreign policy, the “degradation” of russia and its position within the system of international relations, defeatism towards the international financial institutions and excessive orientation towards the “West” (so called Westernization of russia) developed rela-tively quickly among the ruling political elite, including president Yeltsin and this was socially and politically untenable as a new russian idea11. Equally unsuccessful was the process of “accepting” Eurasian ideas and geopolitics. this acceptance of thoughts and expectations regarding ide-ological currents did not materialize. More specifically the society did not accept and identify with the initial constants and premises of these directions because of their own excessive static nature, orientation to the past rather than future, but especially the inapplicability to the contem-porary (critical) position of russia. russia’s strong traditions and intel-lectual background did not foster liberalism and other liberal ideational currents (including atlanticism as mentioned above)12. the real political

9 J. holzer, Politický systém Ruska. Hledání státu, CDK, Brno 2001; A. G. arbatov, Rus-sia and the West: The 21st Century Security Environment, Sharpe, east West institute, New York 1999.

10 n. K. Gvosdev, c. h. Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy. Interests, Vectors and Sectors, SaGe Publications, London 2014, p. 55–57; K. Pleshakov, Russia`s mission: The third epoch, “International affairs (Moscow)“, 1993, no. 1; A. Sergunin, Russian Post-Soviet For-eign Policy Thinking at the Cross-Roads: Changing Paradigms, „Journal of international Relations and Development“ 2000, no. 3; A. Kubyshkin, A. Sergunin, The Problem of the “Special Path” in Russian Foreign Policy (From the 1990s to the Early Twenty-First Century), “Russian Politics and Law”, 2012, no. 6.

11 n. K. Gvosdev, c. h. Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy. Interests, Vectors and Sectors, SaGe Publications, London 2014, p. 57; A. Duleba, K. Hirman, Rusko na konci Jeľcinovej éry. Zahraničná a vnútorná politika, rozširovanie NATO a záujmy Slovenska, ivo, Bratisla-va 1999; J. Holzer, Politický systém Ruska. Hledání státu, CDK, Brno 2001, A. Kozyrev, Diskussija o tom, kakoj byť vnešnej politike Rossii, “Meždunarodnaja žizn”, 1993, no. 2.

12 lilly B., Russian Foreign Policy Toward Missile Defense. Actors, Motivations, and Influ-ence, Lexingon Books, Lanham 2014.

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impact was very marginal, not to mention the fact that it was liberalism and liberal currents (political, economic) that had been associated with almost all negative phenomena of the post-communist transformation process of the country after 1991. This development and the discourse around the question of post-Soviet identity and statehood heralded its result and present form as well as helped to establish a solid base and framework for current instruments and content, a “filling” with russian soft power concepts. therefore, russia’s form of soft power with regard to political values is based on strict antiliberalism, conservatism, russian nationalism and a state-paternalistic approach13.

the final transitions in the process of completing the post-Soviet identity and the statehood of Russia occurred after 2000. It was at this time that the new President, v. Putin, started to fully and professionally develop the technology of power in the model of a controlled (managed) democracy. although the model of controlled democracy, especially as seen in election procedures and results had already been applied during Yeltsin’s era; the new sophisticated forms, the means and specifically the methods and tools of controlled democracy were achieved under Pres-ident Putin’s “qualitatively” higher dimension. It was in the first presi-dential term of office for Putin (2000–2004) when the basic institutional foundation of controlled democracy became hierarchically and “person-ally rebuilt” as a vertical of power, which among other issues incorpo-rated the party of power (the political party “united russia”), strong economic structures and financial groups but also the media both fed-eral and regional14. the negative political image that was evoked in the democratic (Western) world by the term “managed democracy” led to the reshaping and “transformation” to the term: “sovereign democracy”15. Sovereign democracy should primarily ideologically serve to legitimize the power of Putin, and at the same time to justify his governance and the need for a sovereign democracy with reference to the particularities and specificities of the russian political system. Sovereign democracy 13 D. Kollár, Ideologické prúdy ruskej zahraničnej a bezpečnostnej politiky a interné vplyvy na

jej tvorbu, [in:] Bezpečnostné forum 2015, J. ušiak, J. lasicová, D. Kollár (eds.), Belia-num, Banská Bystrica 2015.

14 a. Jack, Inside Putin´s Russia. Can there be reform without democracy?, oxford university Press, New York 2004.

15 n. Popescu considers the concept of sovereign democracy as one of the content attrib-utes of the Russian “soft power” (Popescu 2006).

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was established to elaborate the official state ideology in order to distract everyone from the political chaos of the 90s16. in the practical sphere the aim of sovereign democracy is the reasoning for and interpretation of decisions of the ruling establishment in internal and foreign policy. in the context of sovereign democracy as a pragmatic ideology the main idea becomes the legitimization of the empowerment of the state posi-tion and its structures (administration, bureaucracy, army, secret services, military-industrial complex, the fuel-energy complex) in all areas of po-litical, social, economic and cultural life17. the whole concept of sover-eign democracy, the political system of contemporary russia is based on its historical predisposition for primacy of the state over the individual and society – known as state-centrism. The sate-centric concept plac-es the state as the hierarchically highest placed institution and entity. other structures of the state are directly derived from it and at the same time subordinate to it. the idea of a strong state as an institution that includes and supplies everything is the historical constant whose genesis has long-lasting philosophical, historical and imperial roots formed sev-eral centuries ago, and so continues to prop up political values of russian soft power (antiliberalism, conservatism, nationalism)18.

When considering foreign policy, sovereign democracy is nothing more than an expressed vision by russia as being one of the independent poles of world politics in a multipolar world19. exactly this idea of a multipolar world is one of the basic starting points of the theses that Moscow with its political values of soft power offers at the international level as well as to state and non-state members of the global community. current multi-vec-tor diplomacy as a practical political doctrine within a multipolar arrange-ment for international relations seeks to balance its influence within the system of international relations and institutions (also regional), by means of active and purposeful diplomatic action focussed on key actors within

16 Duleba a., Ruská federácia pred prezidentskými voľbami 2008, www.sfpa.sk/sk/publikacie/ analyzy/?nrok=2008, accessed 10.02.2015, p. 4–6.

17 r. connolly, The Economic Sources of Social Order Development in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe, Routledge, Abingdon 2013, p. 126–127.

18 P. Dutkiewicz, Missing in Translation: Re-conceptualizing Russia`s Developmental State, [in:] Russia the Challenges of Transformation, P. Dutkiewicz, D. trenin (eds.), new york University Press, New York 2011.

19 a. Duleba, Ruská federácia pred prezidentskými voľbami 2008, www.sfpa.sk/sk/publikacie/ analyzy/?nrok=2008, accessed 10.02.2015.

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international politics20. Sovereign democracy should create manoeuvring room in international relations sufficient to realize a foreign policy which would fulfil the exclusive political dominance of russia across the entire post-Soviet space, to which it feels entitled. the claim is declared in all of its official foreign policy and security documents adopted from 1992 to the present. the framework of russian “soft power” which is an integral part of its foreign policy with those countries in the post-Soviet space is based on a common history, language, cultural proximity, and a predispo-sition, i.e. relatively high trade and economic exchanges and attractiveness of russian labour and product market21. the idea of a multipolar world “offered” within the framework of russian soft power represents an alter-native political model to accommodate the arrangement of a new system for international relations. the alternative to this is a clear delimitation against the uSa and the cultural hegemony of the Western model of de-mocracy with values based on political and economic liberalism22. the eu with its extensive potential of soft power offered in the form of attractive benefits arising from the signatures of the association agreements and access to the united eu market is seen by Moscow as the greatest threat to its dominance in post-Soviet space. for russia this means a huge chal-lenge, which must be answered. in response to Moscow’s reaction to the launch of the eu project, the so called policy of “european neighbour-hood cooperation”, came the intensification of the eurasian economic integration and the development of its own political concept of soft power.

in conclusion it is possible when examining the assumptions of rus-sian soft power to assert that the first of the above mentioned dimensions serves sovereign democracy by legitimizing the foreign policy decisions directly or indirectly applied in relation to former Soviet republics and by using all available tools, including hard power as well as soft power. in the second dimension sovereign democracy creates an ideological platform upon which to offer an alternative (global) and universal political model using russian soft power. this model is created and justified on strict 20 o. oliker, K. crane, l. Schwartz, c. yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy. Sources and Im-

plications, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica 2009; J. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham 2009.

21 f. hill, Moscow Discovers Soft Power, „Current History“, 2006, no. 2.22 a. Zagorski, Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy Approaches, [in:] The Multilateral

Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, e. W. rowe, S. torjesen (eds.), routledge, new York 2012, p. 48–50.

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delimitation and differentiation against the current model created by the Western world mainly the uSa and at the same time it is also closely and in fact inextricably linked to this model. these statements also indirectly indicate the strong dominance of pragmatism in russian foreign policy.

the Course of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation after 2012: new Impulses and Preconditions for soft Power

The expected onset of Putin into the presidential chair in May 2012 for-mally ended the process of “exchange” at the highest political and con-stitutional post of the Russian state. The priorities of his “new” 6-year presidential mandate already declared while he was in function of prime minister between 2008 and 2012. These priorities indicated that in the coming years he will in the foreign policy emphasise those steps and ac-tions that will lead to the strengthening of economic power and political positions of russia in the global economy and in the system of interna-tional relations. an ambitious goal that Putin has set is the russia’s in-clusion in the top five largest economies in the world by 201523. this goal should be supported not only by Moscow’s entry into the Wto formally ended in 2012, but especially by the new economic dimension oriented on foreign policy24. the basic contours and parameters of foreign policy offi-cially published in May 2012 by the Decree no. 605 “On Measures to Im-plement the Foreign Policy Course of the Russian Federation”, adequately highlight the economic dimension of foreign policy. In July 2012 within the speech to the members of the diplomatic corps Putin referring to the decree recalled that the diplomacy must in the near period use diplomatic instruments more effectively to support russian economic and business interests abroad. in this context he directly spoke of a factor of soft power as future integral part of foreign policy, emphasizing that in the russian understanding the soft power should be based on promoting the (russian) interests through conviction and obtaining sympathy25.

23 v. Putin, Vladimir Putin on foreign policy: Russia and the changing world, valdai Discu-sion Club, www.valdaiclub.com/politics/39300.html, accessed 22.02.2015.

24 M. horemuž, Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy and the Post-Soviet Area: The Eco-nomic Dimension, [in:] Panorama of Global Security Environment, M. Majer, r. ondre-jcsák (eds.), CENAA, Bratislava 2013, p. 228–229.

25 M. horemuž, Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy and the Post-Soviet Area: The Eco-nomic Dimension, [in:] Panorama of Global Security Environment, M. Majer, r. ondre-jcsák (eds.), CENAA, Bratislava 2013, p. 230.

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In February 2013 published an updated Concept of Russian Federa-tion foreign Policy explicitly incorporates the factor of Soft power into (textual) doctrinal form, showing (emphasis) on improving the applica-tion of “soft power” and identifying the best forms of activities in this area. the new concept postulates that the ongoing global economic processes and the rapidly changing situation in the world require not only a new vision of foreign policy but mainly access to markets. one of the primary objectives in the economic dimension of this foreign policy involves the strengthening of russia’s positions in the global trade and economic sys-tem, providing diplomatic support to national economic operators abroad, preventing discrimination against Russian goods, services or investments; making use of the potential of international and regional economic and financial institutions to that end26.

the concept directly but rather tersely defines the factor of “soft pow-er” as a comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives when building civil society potential, information, cultural and other methods and technologies rather than traditional diplomacy and is becoming an indispensable component of modern international relations27. at the same time, increasing global competition and the growing potential of crisis sometimes creates a risk of destructive and unlawful use of “soft power” and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize their political situation, ma-nipulate public opinion, including under the pretext of financing cultural and human rights projects abroad28. regarding the aforementioned factor of “soft power” the concept further emphasizes that economic, legal, scien-tific, environmental, demographic and it factors are becoming as impor-tant for states in influencing world politics as military power. of increased relevance are also issues related to sustainable development, spiritual and intellectual education of the population, improving its well-being and

26 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E 0039B16D, accessed 13.01.2015.

27 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2 E0039B16D, accessed 13.01.2015.

28 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, § 25, www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2 E0039B16D, accessed 13.01.2015.

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promoting investment in human capital. the concept also considers the economic independence of states as the key factor of international stabil-ity while it does not specific precisely what this means in the increasingly interconnected and globalized world. the concept also indirectly points to the necessity for creating an effective framework for the use of “soft power” in the foreign policy of russia. the fact that the concept does not clearly define and does not deeply justify the nature and framework of the “soft power” factor, but possibly focuses within minimal space on what the soft power factor “should include”, which refers to the entire content ambiguity, current lack of fulfilment, but also the high variability of the term “soft power” itself29.

the eu’s policy towards the former post-Soviet republics has become one of the biggest challenges for russian foreign policy and its concept of soft power in practical terms since 2011. After the most comprehensive enlargement of the eu and the integration of countries of the former Eastern bloc in 2004 (including Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) possibly after the acceptance of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU in 2007 the question of next access and procedure of the EU towards the post-Soviet countries became not only legitimate but urgent. the result became the policy of the eastern partnership which within the european neighbour-hood Policy offered to some former post-Soviet republics a political and institutional platform for mutual dialogue and development of relations30. The policy of Eastern Partnership approved by the EU in 2008 and offi-cially implemented a year later, was in response to the interest of armenia, azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and ukraine in building closer relation-ships with the eu. the main objective of the eastern Partnership policy is mainly an effort to deepen political and economic relations of the above six countries with the eu. one of the dimensions of the eastern Partnership policy is the process of negotiations regarding association agreements, possibly the agreements of affiliation. the signing of these agreements should bring the former post-Soviet republics involved in the eastern Partnership policy, in addition to deepening of political dialogue, the legal

29 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2 E0039B16D, accessed 13.01.2015.

30 W. Gizicki, Eastern Partnership – for Security and Cooperation, „Politické vedy”, 2012, no. 2, p. 139.

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obligations and responsibilities to implement reforms and align national legislation with european legislation. the second dimension is a form of economics and is based on a real vision of initializing of a free trade zone agreement between the eu and the individual state participating in the eastern Partnership policy31. the agreement regarding the free trade zone is especially “attractive” to the former post-Soviet republics because their application will lead to removal of the majority of existing restrictions on mutual trade and so allow free access to the goods and services of the eu market, gradual economic integration into the internal eu market and ultimately the formation of a new economic space. on the other hand, it creates pressure on these countries to adopt internal reforms with a view to achieving competitiveness as one of the basic requirements of action within the internal eu market. ultimately in the long-term perspective it will lead to substantial changes in foreign trading partners, a reorientation of exports and imports as well as a change in the structure and compo-sition of the commodities to be traded among states located in the “free trade zone”. considering the fact that some of the post-Soviet states are heavily dependent on the russian market for several key (sensitive) goods means that changes in foreign exchange trading could have considerable geopolitical impacts since Moscow would de facto lose these states as the most important “ economic “instruments of its own foreign policy. an-other important consideration within the framework of soft power which the european union offers to the countries participating in the eastern Partnership policy is the question of visa facilitation, the ultimate objec-tive being a visa-free regime which trades with eu countries32.

in the interpretation and thinking of russia the eastern Partnership represents a threat or disruption of its own “privileged” and dominant sta-tus in the post-Soviet space. Moscow is fully aware of the fact that the eu offers an economically attractive model of political cooperation with di-rect economic / political benefits in addition to the open possibility of full membership which is not ideologically or historically burdened. the east-ern Partnership Summit in Vilnius held in November 2013, especially the non-signature of the association agreement between the eu and Kiev

31 a. Duleba, v. Benč, v. Bilčík, Policy Impact of the Eastern Partnership on Ukraine, re-search Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava 2012.

32 a. Duleba, v. Benč, v. Bilčík, Policy Impact of the Eastern Partnership on Ukraine, re-search Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava 2012, p. 63–64.

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which in fact initiated the events in ukraine, fully demonstrated the deep contradiction between the EU and Russia on questions of substance and the final objectives of the eastern Partnership policy. Moscow considers this eu policy a hostile tool, possibly a direct political instrument leading to the europeanisation of the post-Soviet space at the expense of russia, weakening the political and economic ties between russia as a former centre and the individual post-Soviet republics at its periphery. in vilnius the association agreement was endorsed and a free trade zone with Mol-dova and Georgia, which had long sought to escape the russian sphere of influence was created. this raised negative reactions in Moscow rejecting potential threats associated with the action (closure, possible difficulties for Moldovan and Georgian products getting to russian markets). these two countries see the eastern Partnership policy as a key policy tool which should put them closer and more firmly anchored within european po-litical, economic and integration structures. other countries participating in the eastern Partnership policy are azerbaijan, armenia, Belarus and in a significant manner also the ukraine. up until the overthrow of the Government of v. yanukovych these countries considered the policy of the eastern Partnership of eu a rather good opportunity to balance and neutralize political influence and pressure from russia but also as an op-portunity for participation and involvement in this project as much for political reasons as for economic benefits. therefore the approach of these countries to the eastern Partnership policy is rather modest and selective (i.e. participation only in selected projects), and also expressed as having pragmatic purposes.

an important outcome of the summit in vilnius was the further de-veloped view that acceptance of this political declaration confirmed the main objective of the eastern Partnership as the political association and economic integration of involved partners with the eu. Soft power of the eu therefore in relation to selected countries in post-Soviet space represents a constantly open process, a mutually beneficial relationship based on support, tangible economic benefits of the eu, a specific polit-ical vision in exchange for the fulfilment of reforms as well as european political, economic and legal norms and standards for these countries. in contrast russia offers to the post-Soviet republics an alternative project of economic integration i.e. its own soft power featuring a relatively wide range of instruments: simplification of cross-border arrangements and

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travelling, a targeted immigration policy, rules allowing access to the rus-sian market including the labour market as well as specifically preferential prices on energy commodities. a significant difference in the application of soft power by the eu and by russia towards the post-Soviet states is the fact that Moscow does not apply the principle of reciprocal and mu-tually advantageous relations but retains a largely one-sided relationship in favour of russia. this is one of russia’s policy responses to the east-ern Partnership of eu. from the perspective of russian foreign policy eurasian economic integration is the regional institutional platform and tool whose ultimate goal is to establish political and economic dominance in the post-Soviet space. While soft power is not a goal it is a means to achieve this objective. this is one of the reasons why there are opinions and evaluations claiming that eurasian union, or rather the whole concept of economic integration of post-Soviet area and its structures (customs union and common economic Space) emerges from the defensive char-acter and aims at protection of russian interests from the influence of the eu, but also china and islamic countries. as it happens, it is documented by evaluation by some analysts who consider the customs union of rus-sia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to be an institutionally created space and op-portunity for russian expansion and export of their production (especially cars and machinery) as a competition to the eu and china they would not otherwise be able to compete with.

one of the most important dimensions of russian soft power is how it values the russian political system as identified above. the post-Soviet space in political science theory and practice is characterized by the exist-ence of multiple non-democratic and authoritarian regimes: azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, tajikistan, turkmenistan and uzbekistan. the main goal of several political elites and clans of these undemocratic regimes continues to be the preservation of political power. the political values promoted within the foreign policy of the russian soft power offer just that possi-bility. although such a view and analysis is considerably oversimplified, the relationship between russia and several post-Soviet republics is much more difficult, complex and multidimensional, nevertheless it is one of the legitimate and empirically substantiated views, which subsequently allows understanding of the general nature of the relationships33. Political leaders

33 a prime example in this respect is uzbekistan, where after a violent suppression of an-ti-government protests in Andijan in 2005 and subsequent international criticism (EU

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and elites in the countries participating in the policy of the eastern Part-nership of eu (Belarus, armenia and azerbaijan) see the possible imple-mentation of the values and principles of the eu as a threat to their own power position as well as to the very nature of their regimes. therefore these states are politically oriented to some degree towards russia which represents a greater guarantee of “rigidity” and the status quo of undemo-cratic and internally corrupt political regimes.

Post-soviet space: Resources, Limits and Failures of Russian soft Power

current starting positions and also limits of the current russia’s soft power are partly the result of the “Soviet period” and the legacy of the past-rus-sian “imperial tradition”. after World War ii, the Soviet union possessed relatively high political capital for the successful application of soft power within the international relations. this capital stemmed mainly from the victory over nazi Germany, but also from the achievements in the field of culture, art, literature, science and technology (cosmonautics). although in the context of the bipolar division of the world and the ongoing con-frontation “east” versus “West” there was a tendency for one of the blocks rather the result of a pragmatic decision than an ideological opinion, some countries have “voluntarily” decided to build images of some hybrid mod-els of socialism (african and arab socialism, latin american socialism). in the Western european countries there was the attractiveness of the socialism ideas (communism) in the ‘50s, but also even in the early ‘60s represented by the existence of strong communist parties that, in a certain

and uSa) regarding violations of human rights, the regime of President i. Karimov carried out a “pragmatic” foreign-political shift. the shift was based on the secession of uzbekistan from the regional association of post-Soviet states GuuaM (Georgia, uzbekistan, ukraine, azerbaijan, Moldova) which combined countries strongly criti-cal and at the same time unsupportive of the integrative structures of the post-Soviet space (ciS, cSto, eurasec, cu and eeu) “controlled” by Moscow. Karimov also ended the presence of uS troops dislocated in the country due to the operation “en-during freedom” in afghanistan, and also decided to join the security pact: collective Security treaty organization (cSto) actually controlled by Moscow. the cautious foreign policy convergence of tashkent with russia did not criticize the undemocrat-ic regime of i. Karimov which included human rights violations resulting from the pragmatic foreign policy stance of uzbekistan. this pragmatism also documented the reality that i. Karimov entered the eurasian economic community (eurasec) in 2006 but by 2008 he suspended membership in this organization (in fact he resigned) as in 2012, Uzbekistan also left the CSTO.

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period, participated directly to the government (italy, france). howev-er, the ideas of the Soviet system in intellectual and artistic circles were having the highest support. events in hungary, but especially in czecho-slovakia, however, finally buried the last illusions about the true nature of the communist totalitarian system, respectively, any considerations of its any kind of reform. Moreover, in the context of the onset of post-material society, the ideology that legitimized the communist system, began, re-garding the content, to get emptied and exhausted, respectively, began to be confronted with the emergence of the new post-material values34. the economic problems of the uSSr and the entire communist bloc in the 70s and 80s definitely predetermined the development that ended with the collapse of communism and the Soviet union itself.

at the moment, russia has a number of advantages for implementing a soft power strategy in its neighbourhood: the presence of large rus-sian minorities; a shared history; cultural and linguistic proximity; a larger economy and energy resources. the Kremlin’s soft power tools include cultural and linguistic programmes, scholarships for foreign students, well-equipped media outlets, Christian Orthodoxy, and a visa-free regime with many neighbours that makes russia’s labour market relatively acces-sible35. one of the most obvious means of enforcing soft power, which the russia’s foreign policy has been also appropriately using, is the russian minority living in the so-called near abroad, a term officially used for the countries of the former Soviet Union. After 1991, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, more than 25 million ethnic Russians, respectively cit-izens, who have been ethnically endorsed as russians, found themselves outside the territory of the russian federation. in some countries, their share, even more than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, represents more than 30%36. the second group consists of people who,

34 r. inglehart, Modernizaton and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1997; R. In-glehart, Modernization and Democracy, [in:] Democracy versus Modernization. A Di-lemma for Russia and for the World, v. inozemtsev, P. Dutkiewicz (eds.), routledge, Abingdon 2013.

35 e. tafuro, Fatal Attraction? Russia`s Soft Power in its Neighbourhood-Analysis, www.eurasia review.com/29052014-fatal-attraction-russias-soft-power-neighbourhood-analysis/ , accessed 02.02.2015.

36 D. B. Malysheva, Etničeskie konflikty na juge SNG i nacionaľnaja bezopasnosť Rossii, „Mirovaja ekonomika i meždunarodnyje otnošenija”, 1994, no. 3.

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though nationally and ethnically aren’t identified as “russians”, but use russian language as a mother tongue, or they consider its use in everyday communication for matter of course. the presence of the russian minor-ity and russian language actually creates sufficient flexibility for the real-ization of soft power on the platform of such structures and institutions such as the media, educational institutions, culture and art institutes, but also science and sport. the importance of the russian minority and lan-guage factor is also pointed out in the foreign Policy concept of the rus-sian federation, which emphasizes: protecting rights and legitimate interests of compatriots living abroad on the basis of international law and treaties con-cluded by the Russian Federation while considering the numerous Russian di-asporas as a partner, including in expanding and strengthening the space of the Russian language and culture37. after all the experience with the russian language, as a tool for political power, russia actually inherited from the Soviet times. the russian language in the Soviet era actually became with the communist ideology one of the integrating elements, even though prescriptive and often violently designated, assisting in cultural unifica-tion of the Soviet space. another one was the Soviet nationality policy, which, under the guise of internationalization (unity and the brotherhood of nations) and “Sovietization” of the country has actually meant a pur-poseful russification of individual republics of the uSSr. this systematic process mostly reflected in the central asian countries, where a number of key positions and positions in administration, government, power com-ponents, in education, as well as, technical professions were held by the russian community, which has been in most cases “resettled and moved” here. this process was fostered by the practical and “real” life, in which the knowledge of the russian language, together with the affiliation to the communist Party, became an essential precondition to raise the social and economic position of the Soviet society at the time. the emergence of new independent states, deteriorating socio-economic, as well as, security

37 conception highlights further aims in relation to the russian minority abroad, sup-porting consolidation of organizations of compatriots to enable them to effectively uphold their rights in the countries of residence while preserving the cultural and ethnic identity of the russian diaspora and its ties with the historical homeland, and provide conditions for facilitating voluntary relocation to the russian federation of compatriots willing to do so; Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, § 39 d, www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D, accessed 13.01.2015.

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conditions, political instability, the application of the authoritarian way of governing, withdrawal of financial support for cultural and artistic devel-opment led, in the 90s, to the gradual leaving of Russian minorities from the republics of the former Soviet union and their return to russia38. this return was over and above supported also by Moscow, which sought to partially address the demographic decline of own population with it. transformed local communist elites of the former post-Soviet states that have successfully incorporated in the official state policy of nationalism, “welcomed” the departure of ethnic russians. russian minority was in fact, by the political representation of these countries, perceived as some internal threat, respectively, a possible pretext and justification for polit-ical interference and pressure from russia. former post-Soviet republics has already been, since their independence, seeking to create a stronger sense of national identity through the language, which ultimately leads to a weakening of the russian language retreat from the position on the me-dia market (press, radio, television), the scientific research and education institutions, manifested subsequently, for example, by the lack of intelli-gence and qualified teachers to teach Russian language39. the overall de-cline and fall of the russian language was also confirmed by the deputy of the Russian Ministry of Education V. Kaganov, who, in December 2013, said to the agency taSS that the number of russian-speaking population in the world has fallen since the collapse of the USSR by 100 million. although Kaganov did not specify the data source and the structuring of this decline by individual countries or regions, the overall trend of decline is undisputed and remains a persistent phenomenon40.

Protection of the russian-speaking minority has also become one of the “official” reasons of russian “involvement” in the current ukrainian

38 a. P. tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham 2013.

39 S. Blank, Russia’s Waning Soft Power in Central Asia, „the Diplomat”, www.thediplo-mat.com/2015/01/russias-waning-soft-power-in-central-asia/, accessed 25.01.2015.

40 this outcome strongly suggests that while state support for the propagation of the Russian language abroad is a point in Russia’s 2009 national security strategy, Mos-cow is apparently steadily if somewhat unobtrusively failing to achieve its goals. and this testifies to a continuing failure to actualize russia’s soft power despite an enor-mous state investment; S. Blank, Russia’s Waning Soft Power in Central Asia, „the Diplomat”, www.thediplomat.com/2015/01/russias-waning-soft-power-in-central- asia/, accessed 25.01.2015.

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crisis. the decision of the new political representation of ukraine to revoke russian as the second state language can be viewed as a political mistake. Although, this decision was rather quickly revised, Russia has used this fact properly medially and propagandistically to promote their own inter-pretation and vision of the situation by saying that the new government in Kiev is fully controlled by the nationalists, radicals “Bander`s” and “fas-cists”. this was also one of the reasons why Moscow decided to act sooner in the situation, respectively, to act as it acted. the too intensive war led in the mass media has also become one of the dimensions of the conflict in ukraine (whether political or military)41. russia realized the importance of the information and media war already in the so-called first chechen War (1994–1996), which it failed to win, also due to the mismanagement of information coverage of the events and the total media campaign. it is due to this failure, as well as, the professionally led media campaign by NATO during the Kosovo crisis (1999), or the reporters and information coverage of military operations of the uS and its allies in afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) that Russia took away a number of lessons. Mos-cow, in connection with further development of public diplomacy, has in-vested considerable funds into media, news and information coverage and “own” interpretation of events at home and abroad in. creating a positive image of the russian state, as well as, its official top political leaders has become the main goal of public diplomacy42. tv channel russia today

41 Minister of foreign affairs, S. lavrov, commented the war in the information field and its possible impacts in the following way: the events in and around ukraine have demonstrated that we face increasing, often unfair competition in matters of shaping public opinion. unprecedented measures to discredit russian politics and distort the image of our country are being taken..... it is important to do everything possible to elucidate russia’s position in international affairs, to convey truthful information to the public abroad, and to strengthen contacts not only with those inclined towards constructive engagement with us, but also with players still under the prejudiced in-fluence of a bygone era; E. Chernenko, Russia`s new soft power doctrine. Russia Direct, www.russia-direct.org/russian-media/russias-new-soft-power-doctrine-could-be-summer-blockbuster, accessed 08.01.2015.

42 the Winter olympics in Sochi should have helped to improve the russia’s image in the world, as well as the upcoming FIFA World Cup in 2018, on which were (will be) spent colossal funds with questionable effect. On the other hand, the official budget of rossotrudnichestvo federal agency that aim is to preserve russian influence in the commonwealth of independent States (ciS) and the strengthening of friendly ties to support Russia’s political and economic interests, was in 2014 only 79 million USD.

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was created for this purpose, which should care mainly about improving russia’s image abroad. it is broadcasted in english, while it has to offer “fair and independent” (i.e., “the Kremlin”) view of the current political events at home and abroad. the reorganization of the russian state agen-cy ria novosti should also improve the positive image of russia abroad. Its new boss D. Kiselev, shortly after assuming office in 2013, introduced the creation of a government-sponsored project “Sputnik” - a network of intelligence centres in 34 countries. Those centres should create radio, so-cial media and agency news content in local languages.

In 2008, at the executive level, by Presidential Decree the following institutions were established, the federal agency for the commonwealth of independent States, compatriots living abroad, and internation-al humanitarian cooperation (rossotrudnichestvo), which is from the point of management subordinated actually to the Ministry of foreign Affairs. In connection with the events in Ukraine in 2014, the head at the time K. Kosachev pointed out that the agency should make an ef-fort to change the perception of russia by the international community. this was also one of the reasons for initiating the preparation of the new soft-power doctrine entitled Integrated Strategy for Expanding Russia’s Humanitarian Influence in the World43. the public was first time officially notified about the upcoming version in July 2014 at a meeting of the head of agency K. Kosachev, which was also attended by foreign Min-ister S. lavrov. Withdrawal of the head of rossotrudnichestva K. Kosa-chev, in December 2014, was probably due to the failure of the Agency in relation to ukraine. current discussions in the media show the need to reorganize the agency, in the form of direct subordination to the Pres-ident’s agency, respectively, its inclusion into the presidential adminis-tration44. it cannot be ruled out that the planned reorganization of the agency may be associated with the new looking at “soft power”, which was presented at a press conference of the centre for Political analysis at the end of October 2014. The authors of the analytical study come to the conclusion in it that the essential element of soft power is the 43 e. chernenko, Russia`s new soft power doctrine. Russia Direct, www.russia-direct.org/

russian-media/russias-new-soft-power-doctrine-could-be-summer-blockbuster, ac-cessed 08.01.2015.

44 v. Martynjuk, Sobytja na Ukrajine pokazali: Rossotrudničestvo provalilo rabotu s soot-ečestvennikami. KM.RU, www.km.ru/v-rossii/2015/01/16/ministerstvo-inostrannykh- del-rf/753579-sobytiya-na-ukraine-pokazali-rossotrudni, accessed 18.01.2015.

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person of President Putin. the personality of President Putin, dispos-ing of international authority and political experience is the fact, which the soft power of russia should be based on, according to this “study”. the analytical document, however, is more of the propagandistic nature, than a serious analytical study45. in the context of anti-russian sanctions implemented in connection with the events in ukraine by the eu and the uS, after the annexation of the crimea that are behind persistently high domestic popularity of v. Putin, it seems that the document should further develop (strengthen) a specific personality cult of russian Presi-dent. S. Karaganov offers a more realistic assessment of soft power, who believes that russia has been suffering from a lack of “soft power” in the long term, which led to military aggression not only in ukraine, but also in Georgia in 2008.

the absence of soft power results in a power, confrontation, and in extreme cases, military conducted approach of Moscow to the solution of disputes and conflicts. the second one is without any doubts an un-completed process of internal modernization of the russian state and its individual structures and segments (political, economic, social, cultural), which results in the non-creation of a sufficient area nor potential for russia to become an attractive, and by external actors accepted, gravita-tional center for the “surrounding periphery“ (post-Soviet area). the fun-damental problem in the contemporary form of russia’s modernization remains its adaptation to current political and economic model, in other words the state-centric concept. emphasis is put on the decisive role of the state (state-owned companies and administration) in the whole process of modernization. in this regard criticism of expert authorities in an apt way names modernization through several attributes: authoritarian moderni-zation46 requirements of which mean orientation and purpose are given from the “top”, managing modernization47 hitting the model of controlled democracy with the in advance intended result or conservative modern-

45 Kolektiv, russkaja Soft Power, centr političeskovo analyza, „Političeskij doklad”, Moskva 2014.

46 o. Kryshtanovskaya, Authoritarian Modernization of Russia in the 2000s, [in:] What Does Russia Think?, I. Krastev, M. Leonard, A. Wilson (eds.), ECRF, London 2009; a. a. razuvaev, Modernizacija sverchu. Vzgljad, Delovaja Gazeta, www.vz.ru/columns/ 2013/7/8/640393.html, accessed 12.02.2015.

47 S. Meister, The Failure of Managed Modernization, “DGAPstandpunkt”, 2011, no. 4.

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ization48 which focuses on social stability and consolidation of existing structures and social order.

as part of the former uSSr, russia corresponds to the biggest econ-omy, but by its long-term stagnating share in the global GDP (3,326% in 2014) is far behind the USA (16,277%), China (16,479 %) or the EU (16,939%) (Economy Watch 2014)49. What is currently being offered by russia in the economic alternative “soft power” is primarily a relatively large market from the perspective of a number of citizen, even though with a lower purchase power of the citizen, access to the labor market to citizen (labor migrants) from former post-Soviet republics (in particular tajikistan) and supplies of energy raw material at “preferential” prices in the event that the given country is in its foreign policy oriented towards Moscow, respectively it accepts its foreign-political interests. right the energy policy remains the most efficient and effective tool of the russian soft power50; however, very debatable and controversial, because from the aspect of utilization and targets it is construed not to achieve bilateral advantages, but on the principle of the creation of unilateral dependency and achievements of, for russia, favorable foreign-political, economic and safety targets.

as a conceptual and system attempt for a change in perceiving rus-sia and its efforts to create an attractive economy center, it is possible to designate steps and measures leading to the intensification of a polit-ical process of the economic integration of the post-Soviet area. even though the economic integration is in place continuously at various levels from the breakup of the uSSr, its successful development from

48 W. h. cooper, Russia´s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States, CRS Report Service, 2009; D. Trenin, Russia`s Conservative Moderni-zation: A Mission Impossible?, carnegie Moscow center, www. carnegie.ru/publica-tions/?fa=41108#5, accessed 20.02.2015.

49 A rapid growth of China in the last two decades was seen until 2008 by the constantly growing volume of a mutual trade exchange with central-asia countries (in particular with respect to Kazakhstan) and by a growth of investments into key economic sec-tors of central-asia countries (power sector, transportation, raw-material processing) and trade relationships and investments are from the side of Peking accompanied by cultural, educational and other promotional activities in the Pr sector, which results in a gradual erosion of the impact of Russian and its “soft power”; I. Sadykzhan, Chi-na-Central Asia Trade Relations: Economic and Social Patterns, “the china and eurasia Forum Quarterly”, 2009, no. 1, p. 48–49.

50 f. hill, Moscow Discovers Soft Power, „Current History“, 2006, no. 2, p. 342–343.

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the beginning of the 90ties is prevented by the same problems51. the concept of an economic integration of the post-Soviet area implement-ed through the eurasia economic union is primarily a project of the political-economic integration52. its principal target is to create an area of the russian geopolitical influence, which would have both institu-tional and political-economic forms. the eurasia integration is being built as a political project “from above”, with the understanding that the political principles, ethical and moral values and international re-lations of the power on which it stands are diametrically different than those on which the eu is being built, to which it alone often compares to. Such structural political presumption follows from the fact that the “congeniality” of russia has been and is eurasian, statehood centric, in which a state is placed on the “pedestal” as a universally valid time-less value53. other segments (including economy, society, culture) are

51 v. Shadurskij from the Belarus state university assumes that the cause of failure of economic or in broad terms political integration of the post-Soviet area are factors which in the whole process on a different level and intensity show as disintegrative centrifugal tendencies: 1. Incompleted economic reforms in the individual post-So-viet republics including the absence of harmonisation of economic interests. 2. High dependence economics and foreign business of post-Soviet countries on energetic ma-terials especially mineral oil and gas. 3. Insufficient atractivity of Russia as a centre (core) of integration and the associated low effectivity realized integrational projects. absence of ukraine in the integrational groups and structures. influence of foreign actors on the politics of states of the post-Soviet area. absence of legal mechanism on solving legal disputes; V. Shadurskij, Ekonomičeskaja integracija na postsovetskom pros-transtve: problemy i perspektivy, Belarus State University, Minsk 2010.

52 n. K. Gvosdev, c. h. Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy. Interests, Vectors and Sectors, SAGE Publications, London 2014; R. Donaldson, L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, Routledge, taylor & francis, abingdon, Oxon 2014.

53 according to Putin, russia is the centre of a civilisation, the russian World. a rus-sian-ukrainian-Belarusian community is at the core of this world, and its principal area encompasses the post-Soviet space inhabited by russian-speaking people. Putin said: “the eurasian union is a project for maintaining the identity of nations in the historical eurasian space in a new century and in a new world”. the identity of this integrating post-Soviet space is to be based on a presumed special spiritual and civili-sational community, referred to as the “Russian world” (Russkiy mir); M. Menkiszak, The Putin doctrine: The formation of a conceptual framework for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area, p. 2, www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-27/putin-doctrine-formation-a-conceptual-framework-russian, accessed 27.03.2014;

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subordinated to it, contrary to the Western civilization, where they are autonomous on the state, or places to an identical level with the state. also that is a reason why it will never be in line with democratic po-litical institutions, ethical progress and geopolitical hegemony of the West. furthermore, the biggest weak point in the entire concept and construction of the economic integration of the idea alone, which is preferably oriented to the past, withdraws from it through a reference to “previous economical relationships”.

Conclusion

even though the theory of international relationships “hard power and soft power” are understood as separate and divided categories, in practice they run in close interaction, and the two constantly supplement and strengthen each other. a diametrically different case in this aspect is the russian federation, which not always applies the above dimension of cognition of the power to its own foreign policy. right as a result of frequent misunderstanding and a suitable balancing of the elements of hard power and soft power in its own foreign policy, the current ability of russia to attract and affect other states is very strongly diminished and decreased. russia nowadays is not able to apply soft power to obtain support with individual governments in post-Soviet republics, not even with wide population of such countries. one of the reasons of such a sta-tus is the fact that Moscow still believes that policy established on liberal principles such a law-abiding country, economic cohesion and democra-cy has in international relationships only a small significance. also that is the reason why it prefers in foreign policy (neo) realistic tools of power primarily established on realistic policy, i.e., on the policy underlying power and practical factors, and not on ideological and ethical standards. Moreover, the logic of a realistic approach of russia in foreign policy is also supported by historical experiences, strong imperial tradition, but also a specific manner of forming and creating of the post-Soviet iden-tity and statehood.

n. K. Gvosdev, c. h. Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy. Interests, Vectors and Sectors, SAGE Publications, London 2014; R. Donaldson, L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, Routledge, taylor & francis, abingdon, Oxon 2014, p. 48–49.

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49. Shadurskij v., Ekonomičeskaja integracija na postsovetskom prostranstve: problemy i perspektivy, Belarus State University, Minsk 2010.

50. tafuro e., Fatal Attraction? Russia`s Soft Power in its Neighbourhood-Anal-ysis, www.eurasiareview.com/29052014-fatal-attraction-russias- soft-power-neighbourhood-analysis/, accessed 02.02.2015.

51. trenin D., Russia`s Conservative Modernization: A Mission Impos-sible?, carnegie Moscow center, www. carnegie.ru/publications/?-fa=41108#5, accessed 20.02.2015.

52. tsygankov a. P., Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in Na-tional Identity, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham 2013.

53. Zagorski a., Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy Approaches, [in:] The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, e. W. rowe, S.Torjesen (eds.), Routledge, New York 2012.

Author:

martin horemuz – Department of Political Science, faculty of arts and letters, catholic university in ruzomberok, Slovakia


M. horemuž, Soft Power in the Current Foreign Policy of the Russian Fed-eration: Resources, Possibilities, Limits, “Security Dimensions. interna-tional and National Studies”, 2016, no 18, p. 50–77

holiStic PerSPective of KineSioloGical aSPectS

of Security culture


NO. 18; 2016 (80–91)

changes in The Physical endurance of kickBoxers in The PreParaTory Phase

assoc. Prof. tadeusz ambroży, Ph.D.The Faculty of Physical Educ. & Sport, University of Physical Education in Cracow, POLAND

amadeusz Kwiatkowski, M.a.The University of Physical Education in Cracow, POLAND

assoc. Prof. Dariusz Mucha, Ph.D.The Faculty of Physical Educ. & Sport, University of Physical Education in Cracow, POLAND


ABSTRACT

the aim of the paper was to analyze: training effectiveness in the preparatory period, changes in contestants’ aerobic and anaerobic capacity in the preparatory period, changes in contestants’ motor abilities in the preparatory period, to compare the level of selected parameters of anaerobic capacity measured by means of Wingate test and aerobic capacity measured by means of Beep-test of kickboxing contestants with the results of contestants training similar martial arts. the research has been carried out on three contestants of uKS Gladiator club who achieve high sports results. an analysis of obtained results shows that the training employed in the preparatory phase has been appropriately planned and effective enough. Both aerobic and anaerobic capacity in the preparatory phase has increased significantly. anaerobic capacity of the examined contestants is higher than capacity of the contestants in the control group. their aerobic capacity, on the other hand, is lower than in the control group. When planning further training in the future greater attention should be paid to developing aerobic capacity.

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changes in the physical endurance of kickboxers…

Introduction

Achieving high sports results and breaking ever new records requires co-operation of numerous specialists. their achievements gathered in training methodology enable a good trainer to assist a sportsperson in obtaining excellent results. the theory and methodology of sport is a scientific disci-pline which draws on the expertise of anatomy, physiology, biomechanics, medicine, pedagogy, psychology and other sciences. a trainer has to be aware of the fact that he/she can train a champion, but also that incor-rectly chosen training forms can result in injury or overtraining or simply discourage a sportsperson from doing sport. a training process is very complicated. in its course the possibilities of an organism are developed, motor skills are taken to a higher level, but personality changes as well. Regardless of its aim – whether it is victory in competitions or improving skills – one has to remember about fundamental training rules: - Versatile physical development – it is preparation of an organism for

further specialist work, but also an important factor in shaping a healthy and harmonious body.

- Development of specialist features – it is necessary to achieve high re-sults in kickboxing, and its fundamental aim is to develop prominent features required in this sports discipline.

- Improving technique – basing on general and specialist physical fit-ness one may build and develop technique in standard and complicat-ed conditions.

- Tactics – it is a very important element on the road to championship, it consists in purposeful employment of technique and competition of as-sumptions developed in advance to achieve success in a fight.

- Volitional features – self-confidence, courage, character often decide about victory in case of competitors’ balanced physical abilities.

ARTICLE INFO


Key wordsmartial arts, kickboxing, physical endurance

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tadeusz ambroży, amadeusz Kwiatkowski et al.

- Prevention – health examinations, treatment and prevention of injuries, rehabilitation after being injures – these are factors which are of great importance in a trainer’s work.

- Enriching contestants’ theoretical knowledge – a contestant who has fundamental knowledge of physiology, anatomy, the theory of training, nutrition, biological renewal is more aware of the above mentioned as-pects. he/she will be aware of the fact that they are as important as de-veloping motor features1.While drawing up a training plan in kickboxing one has to adjust it

to the activity calendar. Periodization of training is made on its basis, namely the training plan is divided into smaller training periods that are easier to complete.

for the purposes of kickboxing contestants, two main periods in which trainers participate in contests are distinguished. a trainer should be at the top of its form in april-May because this is the time when the most important contests in season take place, e.g. Polish champion-ships, european cup or World cup and in September when europe-an and World championships are held. Selection of contestants to the national team takes place after each macrocycle. contestants who have achieved the greatest success in the most important contests of the sea-son are selected to the national team. appointments to the team are sent after each macrocycle.

A preparatory phase in kickboxing lasts about 4 months and it can be divided into two smaller sub-phases: a general preparatory phase and spe-cialist preparatory phase. the main aim of the general preparatory phase is preparing organism to further training by increasing the level of selected motor skills. in this phase one has to remember about developing the basic technique and tactical assumptions. Participation in contests in the pre-paratory phase is not reasonable. the main abilities developed in the gen-eral preparatory phase are strength and endurance. the special preparatory phase is a transition phase to the participation phase. the volume of effort is still high, but the majority of effort, 70-80%, is directed at specialist effect. the main developed abilities are dynamics, speed and speed endurance. in this phase sacks and Thai pads are used to repeat elements of technique. at the end of the specialist preparatory period, the volume of effort is low-

1 K. Wieczorek, Kick-boxing: podręcznik dla instruktorów [Kick-boxing: a handbook for instructors], Siemiatczyce 1994.

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ered for the benefit of its intensity. General development exercises still play an important role and constitute approximately 30% of training volume.

at the end of this phase it is advisable to start participating in less important contests in order to enter the participation period more easily.

the aim of training in the participation phase is to increase a contest-ant’s level of abilities and his psycho-physical characteristics to the max-imum. As many as 90% of exercises in this phase are targeted exercises. training aims are achieved by using special loads and participation in con-testants. Most exercises are done with a partner and include some element of competition. exercises are done in proper clothing to create conditions as similar to the real fight as possible. training intensity increases and load decreases. More and more time is spent on biological renewal and regeneration, which is to release craving for training and fight. We can distinguish between two sub-phases in the participation phase: pre-par-ticipation sub-phase and main contest sub-phase. in the pre-participation sub-phase contestants participate in testing competitions so that the train-er has a possibility to see a participant’s abilities and introduce appropriate modifications into training in order to eliminate errors. the sub-phase of main competitions has to be directed at specialists physical development. in this phase contestants have to prepare for main competition. the fun-damental forms of training are: - hitting pads with the trainers,- speed drills with tools,- sparrings,- general development exercises, often sports games.

the main tasks of the transition phase are full relaxation after train-ing and participation load, biological and psychological renewal, treating injuries. the transition phase lasts from two to four weeks. in this phase training forms should be radically different from forms typical for kick-boxing. Supplementary sports (skiing, water sports and swimming) can be used. an important element is changing the environment in which the contestants spends time (post-season camp). the transition phase is also the time to analyze the past season and prepare a plan for the next training cycle. at the end of the transition period intensity increases, which enables to enter the next macrocycle smoothly2.2 Trenerzy Kick-boxingu radzą [Kick-boxing trainers give advice], K. Wieczorek (ed.),

a collective work, instytut Wychowania fizycznego i Sportu - towarzystwo Sportowe. Warszawa 2003.

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the aim of the paper was:- to analyze training effectiveness in the preparatory period,- to analyze changes in contestants’ aerobic and anaerobic capacity in the

preparatory period,- to analyze changes in contestants’ motor abilities in the preparatory

period,- to compare the level of selected parameters of anaerobic capacity meas-

ured by means of Wingate test and aerobic capacity measured by means of Beep-test of kickboxing contestants with the results of contestants training similar martial arts.

Material and methodology

the research has been carried out on three contestants of uKS Gladiator club who achieve high sports results: the silver medalist of World cup in kickboxing kicklight -42kg, K.G., the bronze medalist of World Cup in lowkick -55kg, S.Sz. and W.N., a double gold medalist of Championship of Poland in lightcontact and kicklight, selected to represent Poland be-fore 2013 European Championship. Contestants train in two sections of UKS Gladiator Club, in Binczarowa and Grybów.

the research has been taken three times for each contestants. analysis of anaerobic capacity was conducted in the faculty of Sport of the uni-versity in Presovie in Slovakia on 05.11.2013, 12.12.2013 and 12.01.2014. anaerobic capacity was measured by means of a thirty-second wingate test, which was taken on Monark894E cycle ergometer. The measures parameters were: Pmax – maximum power (W/kg), Pavg – average an-aerobic power (W/kg) and FI – power decrease index (%). What is more, on 06.11.2013, 13.12.2013 and 13.01.2014 in Grybów, Małopolskie voivodeship, international Physical fitness tests were taken as well.

Research results

When analyzing data in Table.1 it can be noted that the highest progress in anaerobic capacity was achieved by W.n. whose Pmax amounted to 11,25% at the time and its average value is 9,82 W. The lowest progress in maximum power has been observed in S.Sz., in case of whom this param-eter increased only by 1,39% and its average value amounted to 10,68 W. a significant increase of Pmax has also been observed in K.Ś. his Pmax in the course of tests was 9,56% and its value amounted to 13,35 W. It

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should be mentioned that a number of other factors such as regeneration, nutrition, involvement in training tasks and sport lifestyle influence train-ing effectiveness.

Tab. 1. Results of wingate test

examined contestants

test Measured parameter S. Sz. W. n. K.Ś.

1

PP 10,6 9,23 12,58

aP 8,59 6,9 8,73

fi 40,09 48,42 54,76

2

PP 10,69 9,83 13,56

aP 8,56 7,27 9,57

fi 41,06 54,2 49,23

3

PP 10,75 10,4 13,91

aP 8,4 7,59 9,68

fi 42,79 50,09 55,35

Average maximum power (Pmax) [W • kg -¹] of the examined con-testants of UKS Gladiator Club is 11m28 W. In comparison to results of contestants training other sports, it is a surprisingly high result. Pmax of judo contestants examined by means of wingate test was 11,6 W. Howev-er, it should be mentioned that these judo contestants are senior contest-ants. When comparing the obtained results with the results of the Polish taekwondo national team3 it turns out that Pmax of the contestants of UKS Gladiator Club is higher by 0,83W. The results look even better in comparison with average results of Polish Kickboxing national team4, in this case they are better by 1,45 W (table 2).

3 B. Długołęcka et al., Wydolność f izyczna zawodników uprawiających kick-boxing i taek-won-do [Physical endurance of kick-boxing and taekwon-do contestants], „Medycyna sportowa”, 2006 vol. 22 p. 40–45.

4 e. elegańczyk-Kot, J. Karolkiewicz, a. nowak et al., Metaboliczne konsekwencje wysiłków fizycznych o dużej mocy na przykładzie zawodników uprawiających kick-boxing

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Tab. 2. Average maximum power results of the examined group and other martial arts

GroupWingate test

Pmax (W/kg)

uKS Gladiator 11,28

taekwondo national team 10,45

Kickboxing national team 9,38

Judo 11.6

Tab.3. The results of physical fitness test in the examined group

examined contestants

test test no. S. Sz. W. n. K. Ś.

cardiorespiratory endurance 1 1440 840 1280

2 1440 840 1340 3 1500 880 1400

Standing long jump 1 224 152 201

2 226 163 200 3 227 163 205hand grip strength test 1 33,5 28,1 49,5

2 33,5 27,8 49,5 3 33,8 28,1 50

arm hang 1 16 0 38

2 16 0 40 3 18 0 42

[Metabolic consequences of great physicall effort by the example of kick-boxing con-testants], Med. Sportiva, 2003, 7 (3), p. 157–166.

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4x10m run 1 9,43 10,56 9,56 2 9,25 12,56 9,45 3 8,66 12,56 8,7Sit-ups 1 28 28 32 2 28 30 32 3 30 31 32forward bents 1 25 15 10 2 25 15 11 3 27 15 11

1000m(s) run 1 220 230 240

2 220 228 235 3 219 227 231

When comparing all contestants it can be noted that K.Ś. obtained the best results. in seven out of eight tests he improved his results and in car-diorespiratory endurance test the maximum distance run increased by as many as 120 m. The worst results were obtained by W.N., who improved her results only in case of four out of eight tests. in the remaining tests her results did not change or were worse, which can be caused by the fact that she did not participate in training because of sickness. the parame-ter which improved significantly in all contestants was cardiorespiratory endurance. Good results were obtained also in standing long jump test. the lowest improvement has been observed in suppleness and abdominal muscles test.

Table 4 presents a comparison of results of UKS Gladiator contestants with the results of contestants training different martial arts obtained in cardiorespiratory tests. the compared parameter was maximum oxygen consumption, namely vo2max

5.

5 a. ronikier, Fizjologia sportu [Physiology of sport], B.T. Warszawa 2001.

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Tab.4. A comparison of maximum oxygen consumption in contestants training different martial arts

type of sportMaximum oxygen consumption (ml/kg/min)

Men Women

Box 60-65 -

Wrestling 60-65 -

Judo 55-60 48-52

fencing 45-50 40-45

uKS Gladiator 44,13 40,43

Maximum oxygen consumption in uKS Gladiator club points out to great differences between the research and the control group. Definite-ly the best results have been obtained by box contestants, their vo2max amounts to even 60ml/kg/min. The lowest VO2max rate in the control group was that of fencing contestants, which amounted to 45-50 ml/kg/min. the contestants of uKS Gladiator club rank lower than the contest-ants of all control groups.

Discussion

the preparatory phase plays an extremely important role in the train-ing cycle. the manner in which a contestant spends this time will affect the whole season. it is the preparatory phase when such motor skills as strength, speed, endurance are developed. the initial ability of body adap-tation to physical activity decides about the ability to endure hard effort. a good measure of its level are some physiological parameters which pro-vide information about the contestant’s current condition. Determining these values and their changes in the course of the preparatory phase can be helpful in predicting the effect of subsequent stages of training6. Be-cause of the employed comparative analysis, it can be stated that with respect to changes determining aerobic capacity, whose fundamental pa-

6 a. Jaskulski, a. Jaskulska, Podstawy fizjologii wysiłku f izycznego z zarysem fizjologii człowieka [introduction to the physiology of physical effort with an outline of human physiology], Wrocław 2006.

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rameters is maximum oxygen uptake7, the contestants of uKS Gladiator obtained considerably lower average results than the contestants of the control group, in which the highest values of VO2max were obtained by boxers. this is probably caused by the fact that the control group was in the participation phase, which is the time when contestants should ob-tain the greatest results, and the contestants of uKS Gladiator club were in the preparatory phase, which is the time when form is developed. in anaerobic capacity tests the examined contestants obtained better results than almost all control groups, except for judo. Both groups train in the same club, they are subjected to the same training loads, which is reflected in similar values of changes in anaerobic parameters. in relation to stand-ards, the result of K.Ś. comes under the “elite” category, the result of W.n. in the “above average” category and the result of S.Sz. in the “excellent” category. the results of anaerobic tests of other authors whose expertise are martial arts are similar, which points to similar training aims in differ-ent martial arts. very similar results to the results obtained in this paper were obtained by the participants of the research by Batra8, who studied contestants of taekwondo itf. When observing other results of motor tests, it can be noted that each time they were higher, which means that the employed training was effective. the greatest progress is observed in cardiorespiratory test and standing long jump test. the smallest training effects have been observed in suppleness tests and abdominal muscles test. in case of suppleness, this was surely caused by the fact that it is an ability which develops slowly, it takes more time to observe any effects. in the course of employed training abdominal muscles were trained very often and that is why such a low index of effectiveness of improving this feature is surprising. after inserting the results of international Physical fitness tests to scores by Pilicz9 it turns out that S.Sz. is characterized by a high level of physical fitness and W.n. and K.Ś. by average level of physical

7 r. Kubica, Podstawy fizjologii pracy i wydolności fizycznej [introduction to physiology of work and physical endurance], AWF Kraków, 1999.

8 a. Batra, Wydolność beztlenowa a poziom sportowy zawodników Taekwon-do ITF [an-aerobic capacity and the level of sports skills of taekwon-do itf contestants], „Sport Wyczynowy”, 2012 nr 4, p. 117–123.

9 S. Pilicz, r. Przewęda, J. Dobosz, S. nowacka-Dobosz, Punktacja sprawności f izycznej młodzieży polskiej wg Międzynarodowego Testu Sprawności fizycznej [Scoring of phys-ical fitness of Polish teenagers according to the international Physical fitness test], Warszawa, 2003.

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fitness. it should be noted that after the end of the preparatory phase analyzed in this paper, W.n. won a silver medal in Polish championships and two medals in the Polish cup, as a result of which she was selected to the national team which will represent Poland in World championships in italy. however, sports results obtained in childhood cannot be treated as an explicit indicator of future sports possibilities and predispositions of a contestant. This is supported by that fact that only 20-25% of contest-ants maintain their position in sport after moving from teenage category to seniors10, and it is the task of trainers to train contestants in such a way which would increase this low figure.

Conclusion

an analysis of obtained results shows that the training employed in the preparatory phase has been appropriately planned and effective enough. Both aerobic and anaerobic capacity in the preparatory phase has in-creased significantly. anaerobic capacity of the examined contestants is higher than capacity of the contestants in the control group. their aerobic capacity, on the other hand, is lower than in the control group. When planning further training in the future greater attention should be paid to developing aerobic capacity. it is recommended to carry out such tests cyclically, which would enable to accurately determine training effective-ness, and thus modify the training process so that it is as beneficial to the contestant as possible.

References:

1. Barabasz Z., Zadarko e., nizioł e., Nabór, selekcja i system szkolenia w sporcie wyczynowym dzieci i młodzieży – wybrane zagadnienia [re-cruitment, selection and the training system in competitive sports in case of children and teenagers – selected issues], PWSZ Krosno, 2009.

2. Batra a. Wydolność beztlenowa a poziom sportowy zawodników Taek-won-do ITF [anaerobic capacity and the level of sports skills of taek-won-do itf contestants], “Sport Wyczynowy”, 2012 nr 4.

10 Z. Barabasz, e. Zadarko, e. nizioł, Nabór, selekcja i system szkolenia w sporcie wy-czynowym dzieci i młodzieży – wybrane zagadnienia [recruitment, selection and the training system in competitive sports in case of children and teenagers – selected is-sues], PWSZ Krosno, 2009.

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3. Długołęcka B. et al., Wydolność f izyczna zawodników uprawiających kick-boxing i taekwon-do [Physical endurance of kick-boxing and taek-won-do contestants], „Medycyna sportowa”, 2006 vol. 22.

4. elegańczyk-Kot e., Karolkiewicz J., nowak a. et al., Metaboliczne kon-sekwencje wysiłków fizycznych o dużej mocy na przykładzie zawodników uprawiających kick-boxing [Metabolic consequences of great physicall effort by the example of kick-boxing contestants], Med. Sportiva, 2003, 7 (3).

5. Jaskulski a., Jaskulska a., Podstawy fizjologii wysiłku f izycznego z zary-sem fizjologii człowieka [introduction to the physiology of physical ef-fort with an outline of human physiology], Wrocław 2006.

6. Kubica r., Podstawy fizjologii pracy i wydolności f izycznej [introduction to physiology of work and physical endurance], AWF Kraków, 1999.

7. Pilicz S., Przewęda r., Dobosz J., nowacka-Dobosz S., Punktac-ja sprawności f izycznej młodzieży polskiej wg Międzynarodowego Testu Sprawności Fizycznej [Scoring of physical fitness of Polish teenagers according to the International Physical Fitness Test], Warszawa 2003.

8. Wieczorek K. (ed.), Trenerzy Kick-boxingu radzą [Kick-boxing train-ers give advice], a collective work, instytut Wychowania fizycznego i Sportu - Towarzystwo Sportowe, Warszawa 2003.

9. ronikier a., Fizjologia sportu [Physiology of sport], B.t. Warsza-wa 2001.


t. ambroży, a. Kwiatkowski, D. Mucha, J. Piwowarski, Changes in the physical endurance of kickboxers in the preparatory phase, “Security Dimen-sions. International and National Studies”, 2016, no 18, p. 80–91


NO. 18; 2016 (92–104)

The locaTion of PoinTs wiThin The chinese macrosysTem in The Zone of reflexology of The microsysTems of feeT and hands

assoc. Prof. Dariusz Mucha, Ph.D.The Faculty of Physical Educ. & Sport, University of Physical Education in Cracow, POLAND

assoc. Prof. tadeusz ambroży, Ph.D.The Faculty of Physical Educ. & Sport, University of Physical Education in Cracow, POLAND

teresa Mucha, M.a.Podhale State Higher Vocational School, Institute of Biomedical Sciences in Nowy Targ, POLAND

Katarzyna chudyba, M.a.The Faculty of Physical Educ. & Sport, University of Physical Education in Cracow, POLAND

Krzysztof latinek, Ph.D.The Faculty of Physical Educ. & Sport, University of Physical Education in Cracow, POLAND

ABSTRACT

Purpose: the aim of the research was to reflect the location of Biologically active Points (BaP) in microsystem of feet and hands reflex zone.Methods: We analised the database, including the cochrane library, Medline, PubMed, etc. on microsystems of hands and feet. the results of the chinese reflexology points locations of feet and hands microsystems are shown in the tables.Results: In the hands microsystem there are 46 points, and in the feet microsystem we located 70 points from the 12 meridians. In the feet and hands microsystem there are

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the location of Points Within the chinese Macrosystem…

Introduction

health security may be described as a lack of health risks, but it may also become a symbol of chances which are given by widely understood pre-ventive and educational activity. acupressure is a chinese method of treat-ment which has been practiced for thousands of years. human, animal, plants and even rocks have this kind of energy that circulates in the body constantly through delineated pathways called meridians. all meridians consist of specified number of chinese points. By acting on them we may affect our health and appearance through the nervous system.

Modern reflexology has developed since the research on the central nervous system started and the term ,,reflex” was coined. reflex therapy has already been known in ancient times, as evidenced by the wall painting discovered in Egypt in the tomb of an Egyptian doctor – Ankmahor of Saqqara, dated back to 2500–2330 BC, which shows men engaged in feet and hands massage. in the italian alps bas-relieves were discovered, they depict feet with marked zones used in reflexology. acupressure was used by cavemen 15 000 years ago, which of course were the instinctive actions of pressing the painful spots with fingers and later with stones1.

In 1930, on the basis of their own research, Riley and Ingham devel-oped the ingham Method of reflexology, known as foot reflexology. ing-1 D. c. Beyers, Better health with foot reflexology, ingham Publishing incorporated, Pe-

tersburg 1994, p. 1–44; Z. Garnuszewski, Renaissance acupuncture, Medyk, Warsza-wa 2008, p. 29–37.

22 independent points, 8 of which are located in the feet reflex zone, and 14 in the hands reflex zone.Conclusions: In the reflex zone of the ,,own organs” there are three BAP points − KI1 kidneys meridian points are situated on the sole side of the right and the left foot and the heart meridian point HT8 which is located on the left palm side. It turned out that the majority of chinese points located within the reflex zone of feet and hands, are located outside the reflex zones of their organs.

ARTICLE INFO


Key wordsBiologically active Points, chinese points, macrosystem, feet microsystem, hands microsystem

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Dariusz Mucha, tadeusz ambroży et al.

ham is believed to be a precursor in foot reflexology since she created the map of foot zones and in her book entitled ,,Stories the feet can tell” she described the disease units on which she performed a massage2.

the first publications on reflexology which were published in europe and which included theoretical and practical foundations and the meth-odology of foot reflex zones massage were:

,,foot analysis: the foot path to self-discovery” by and ,,therapeu-tic microsystems of human body”3. the basis of activity in reflexology is the regulation of the organ and system functional status in the hu-man body by means of the stimulation of biological active spots BaP in the meridian system of the macrosystem and reflex zones located in the microsystems. the microsystems can be broadly divided into diag-nostic and diagnostic- therapeutic ones, which include feet and hands microsystems as well4.

the macrosystem is related to the following theories: the concept of tao, the law of five elements and the flowing life energy or Qi. this energy flows through energy channels called meridians which create a net-work in the human body. the connections between organs and meridians are called collaterals. the points located on the surface of the body are called biologically active points BaP, acupuncture points aP or chinese points. the free flow of Qi is also possible thanks to luo branches which connect yang and yin meridians in the system of upper and lower limbs, so they appear in feet and hands Microsystems5.

2 t. Kasperczyk, S. Kmak, Acupressure and reflexology other methods, Kasper, Kraków 2003, p. 9–29; T. Kasperczyk, Meridians, points, and Chinese prescription, Jet, Kraków 2007, p. 23–86.

3 a. Grinberg, Foot Analysis: The foot path to self-discovery, INNE, Bydgoszcz 1993, p. 7–23; D. Mucha, Microsystems therapeutic of human body, terenia, Kraków 1997, p. 147–178.

4 W. Batkiewicz, Microkinesitherapy, “reflexology”, 2009), 3, p. 2–10; A. DeSamuel, Very New waves in very old meridians: Quantum medical physics of the living, “acupunc-ture & electrotherapeutics research”, 1996, 21(1), p. 15–20; J. M. Gleditsch, Forty years of acupuncture experience in an ENT practice, hno, 2011, 59(12), p. 1185–1190; D. Mucha, Diagnostic and therapeutic microsystems of human body, “reflexology”, 2009, 1, p. 19–23; D. Mucha, Reflective zone of hands microsystem, “reflexology”, 2009, 1, p. 24–27; P. Wills, The reflexology manual: an easy-to-use illustrated guide to the healing zones of the hands and feet, Pagina, Kłodzko 1992, p. 12–45.

5 t. Kasperczyk, Meridians, points, and Chinese prescription, Jet, Kraków 2007, p. 23–86.

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Purpose

the aim of this study was to catalog the BaP location within the feet and hands reflexology microsystems. We tried to demonstrate if in the reflec-tive zones of diagnostic and therapeutic microsystems of feet and hands there are the independent BaP and where they are located. We also tried to determine the BaP meridians which are in the own organs reflective zones on feet and hands.

Methods

We made a review of the database, including the cochrane library, Med-line, PubMed, etc. on microsystems of hands and feet. on this basis we cataloged reflexology points of the microsystems of hands and feet. the results are presented in the tables.

Results

There are 116 meridian points in the microsystems of feet and hands, in-cluding 70 ones located in the feet reflex zones: 35 points on each foot, and 46 ones located on the hand reflex zones: 23 points on each hand (Table 1).

Table 1. A list of acupuncture points of particular meridians located in feet and hands

Meridian foot left + right hand left + rightLung – LU 0 3Large intestine – LI 0 5Stomach – S 5 0Spleen – SP 5 0Heart – H 0 3Small intestine – SI 0 5Urinary bladder – UB 8 0Kidney – K 8 0Pericardium – PC 0 3Triple burner – T 0 4Gallbladder – GB 5 0Liver – LIV 4 0total 35 x 2 = 70 23 x 2 = 46

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there is one BaP in the sole side of the foot. it belongs to kidney meridian – it is the KI1 point. It is located in the reflex zone of kidney, both on the right and the left feet. this is one of the few biologically active points which are located in the reflex zone of the own organ. the KI1 point is an independent one, which means that if we reflex in the kidney zone, we affect the KI1 point as well, which is used, among oth-ers, in the epileptic seizures. There are 14 Chinese acupuncture points on the dorsal side of the foot. these are the points of the four merid-ians: 4 points of stomach, 1 point of spleen, 5 points of gallbladder and 4 points of liver. The stomach meridian has 5 points located on the dorsal side of the foot: Chongyang (S42), Xiangu (S43), Neiting (S44), Lidui (S45). Jiexi (S41) is located near the tarsal joint. None of them is situated in the reflex zone of the stomach. Whereas one of them, namely S43 is located in the reflex zone of the diaphragm, and the point S44 is an independent one. It is used as a painkiller in limb, spine or head dysfunctions. Spleen meridian has one point situated in the dorsal side of the foot – Yinbai (SP1). It is not situated in the zones of spleen, but in the zone of mandible. the meridian of gallbladder has 5 acupuncture points which are located in the dorsal side of the foot. These are: Qiuxu (GB40), Zulinqi (GB41), Diwuhui (GB42), Ji-axi (GB43), Zuqiaoyin (GB44) none of which is located in the reflex zone of gallbladder. Point GB43 is located in the reflex zone of the organ of balance. Liver meridian has 4 points situated in the dorsal side of the foot. These are: Dadun (LIV1), Xingjian (LIV2), Taichong (LIV3), Zhongfeng (LIV4). None of them is located in the reflex zone of the liver, but in the reflex zones of other organs: LIV1 is in the zone of mandible, LIV2 is at the boundary between larynx and trachea zone and the thoracic duct zone, LIV3 is in the thoracic duct zone and LIV4 is at the boundary of inguinal lymph nodes. There are 11 Chinese acu-puncture points on the inside part of the foot. These include: 4 spleen points and 7 kidney points. the spleen and pancreas points are: Dadu (SP2), Taibai (SP3), Gongsun (SP4) and Shangqu (SP5). None of them is situated in reflex zones of spleen. three of them, however, are located in the zones of other organs: SP2 is in the zone of the cervical vertebrae, SP3 is at the boundary of thoracic vertebrae and SP5 is in the zone of visceral lymph nodes. the kidney meridian points located on the inside part of the feet include: Rangu (K2), Taixi (K3), Dazhong

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(K4), Shuiquan (K5), Zhaohai (K6), Fuliu (K7) and Jiaoxin (K8). None of the first five points is located in the zone of kidney. Whereas point K7 is not situated in any reflex zone, the rest of them are located in the reflex zones of other organs: K2 is in the zone of thoracic vertebrae, K3, K4 and K5 are in the zone of womb or prostate, K6 is in the hip joint and K8 is in the zone of the esophagus and haemorrhoids. Points K7 and K8 are located in the zone of tarsal joint. There are 8 points on the external part of the foot. these are the bladder meridian points, rang-ing from Kunlun (UB60) to Zhiyin (UB67). None of them is located in the reflex zone of this organ. Six points are situated in the reflex zones of other organs: (UB60) is in the zone of abdomen, Pucan (UB61) is in the sex glands: ovary, oviduct and testicles, Shenmai (UB62) is in the zone of the hip joint, Jinmen (UB63) is in the zone of the knee, Jinggu (UB64) and Shugu (UB65) are not located in any of the reflex zones, and Tonggu (UB66) and UB67 are at the boundary of the organ of balance (Table 2).

Table 2. A list of points of particular meridians located in various parts of the foot

foot left + right

Meridian Plantar side

Dorsal side

external side

internal side

ankle joint

Stomach – S 0 4 0 0 1

Spleen – SP 0 1 0 4 0Urinary bladder – uB 0 0 8 0 0

Kidney – K 1 0 0 5 2

Gallbladder – GB 0 5 0 0 0

Liver – LIV 0 4 0 0 0

1 x 2 = 2 14 x 2 =28 8 x 2 = 16 9 x 2 = 18 3 x 2 = 6

total 70

There are 46 Chinese acupuncture points in the hands microsystems: 23 points on each hand. There are 6 meridian points on the right hand

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(including 3 ones on the palm side of the wrist): 2 lungs points Yuji (LU10) located in the zone of intestines and Taiyuan (LU9 situated at the boundary between the coccygeal vertebrae and the spine), 2 heart points Shenmen (h7) located at the boundary between the coccygeal vertebrae and the spine and Shaofu (H8) situated in the zone of lungs/chest/ribs), 2 pericardium points Laogong (PC8 which are not located in the zone of the organ, but in the reflex zone of liver, and Daling (Pc7) situated in the zone of lymph/oviduct/deferent duct which is an independent point). Three points: H7, PC7 and LU9 are located in the zone of the carpal joint. There are 17 biologically active points on the upper parts of the hands (including 14 points on the dorsal side of the hand and 3 ones on the dorsal side of the wrist). These include the fol-lowing meridian points: 1 lung point, 5 large intestine points, 1 heart point, 5 small intestine point, 1 pericardium point and 4 triple burner points. the point of lung meridian, that is located on the upper part of the hand, is Shaoshang (LU11). It is an independent point used in the treatment of burns and is located in the reflex zone of antrum. there-fore, in this case we affect both the point and the zone. the points from Shangyang (LI1) to Yangxi (LI5) are large intestine points on the upper part of right hand, four of which are situated on the reflex zones of other organs: LI1 and Erjian (LI2) are located in the reflex zones of antrum, Sanjian (LI3) is in the reflex zone of lungs and chest; Hegu (LI4) is not located in any reflex zones of right hand. However, there is an independent point used in numerous diseases, that is why it is con-sidered to be a universal one – this is Yangxi (LI5) found in the zone of womb/prostate. The point Shaochong (H9) of heart meridian is lo-cated in the reflex zone of the arm. it is an independent point used in treatments of faints and amnesia as a reviving point. By affecting it, we also affect the zone in which it is situated, that is the zone of the arm. Small intestine meridian points, which are located on the upper part of the hand include Shaoze (SI1), Qiangu (SI2), Houxi (SI3), Wangu (SI4) and Yanggu (SI5). All of them are found in the reflex zones of other organs, namely: SI1 and SI2 are in the zone of antrum, SI3 is in the zone of the knee and elbow, SI4 is in the zone of pelvis/hip and sciatic nerve, SI5 is in the zone of ovary or testicle. Points SI1 and SI2 are independent. Whereas the former is used as a reviving point, the

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latter is used in epileptic seizures. Both of them are located in the reflex zone of antrum, which means that by affecting points SI1 and SI2 we affect this zone as well. The point Zhongchong (PC9) of pericardium is not located in the reflex zone of its organ, but in the zone of antrum. The acupuncture points of triple burner are Guanchong (T1), Yemen (T2) and Zhongzhu (T3). All of them are located in the reflex zones of various organs: TB1 is in the reflex zone of antrum, TB2 is in the reflex zone of the arm and lungs/chest, T3 is in the zone of liver and Yangchi (T4) is in the zone of lymph/oviduct/deferent duct. Similarly to the palmar aspect of the hand, there are acupuncture points on the upper part of the hand in the area of the carpal joint. these are three meridian points: small intestine point − SI5, large intestine point − LI5 and triple burner point – TB4. The points on the palm aspect of the left hand are located in the same way as on the right hand. the acu-puncture points, which are situated in the area of the carpal joint, are located in the same places as well. the only difference is the location of points HT8 and PC8, which results from a different location of reflex zones on the right and the left hands. The point H8 located on the left hand is found in its reflex zone, that is in the zone of lungs/chest/ribs/heart (there is not a reflex zone of heart on the right hand). the point PC8, on the other hand, is located in the reflex zone of pancreas (on the right hand it is located in the zone of liver). BaP on the upper part of the left hand are located in the same way as on the right one with the exception of four points: LI3, LI4, T2 and T3. The point LI3 is lo-cated in the reflex zone of lungs/chest/rib/heart (on the right hand it is located in the zone of lungs/chest), the point LI4 is located in the zone of stomach/pancreas (on the right hand it is not located in any zone), the point TB2 is located in the zone of lungs/chest/ribs/hear (on the right hand it is located in T2 zone of lungs/heart), the point T3 is not located in any reflex zone (on the right hand it is located in the zone of liver). the points in the wrist area are in the same reflex zones as those located on the palm aspect of the hand, near the wrist (Table 3).

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Table 3. A list of points of particular meridians located in various parts of the hand

hand left + right

Meridian Palmar side Dorsal side carpal joint

Lung – LU 1 1 1

Large intestine – LI 0 4 1

Heart – H 1 1 1

Small intestine – SI 0 4 1

Pericardium – PC 1 1 1

Triple burner – T 0 3 1

3 x 2 = 6 14 x 2 = 28 6 x 2 = 12

total 46

All in all, there are 22 independent points in the microsystems of feet and hands. There are 8 independent points of three meridians located on feet (four on the left foot and four on the right one): one stomach point – S44, one of the bladder – UB60, two kidney points – K1 and K3. There are 14 independent points of five meridians located on hands (7 points on each hand): one lung point – LU11, one large intestine point – LI4, two heart points – H7 and H9, two small intestine points – SI1 and SI2 and one pericardium point – PC7 (Table 4).

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Table 4. A compilation of independent points located in the foot and the hand

independent points

Meridian foot left + right hand left + right

Lung – LU 0 1 (LU 11)

Large intestine – LI 0 1 (LI 4)

Stomach – S 1 (S 44) 0

Spleen – SP 0 0

Heart – H 0 2 (H 7, H 9)

Small intestine – SI 0 2 (SI 1, SI 2)

Urinary bladder – UB 1 (UB 60) 0

Kidney – K 2 (K 1, K 3) 0

Pericardium – PC 0 1 (PC 7)

Triple burner – T 0 0

Gall bladder – GB 0 0

Liver – LIV 0 0

4 x 2 = 8 7 x 2 = 14

total 22

Discussion

the research on the effectiveness and impact on the human body by mac-rosystem and microsystems develop independently in several directions. from the earliest years, scientists are trying to describe the changes in the biochemistry of the human body under the influence of stimulation the points of chinese and reflexology, among others within the microsystem of hands and feet. individual studies highlight the increased secretion of neurohormones and their role in the intensity of pain, or change in the concentration of vasopressin and oxytocin6. it was shown the influence of

6 J. yang, W.y. liu, c.y. Song, B.c. lin, Only arginine vasopressin, not oxytocin and en-dogenous opiate peptides, in hypothalamic paraventricular nucleus play a role in acupuncture

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stimulation of selected acupuncture points on the change in the electrical activity of the brain, which are accompanied by specific clinical effect in the form of changes in heart rate7. the tomography of the posithrone emission was used to locate such brain parts which are available for a sig-nificant increase in glucose metabolism after the stimulation of the specif-ic acupuncture points8.

the above study did not aim to prove and present the acupuncture, since it is known that acupuncture affects the functioning of the body’s multifaceted, and the stimulation of different points within the macrosys-tem and reflexology within the microsystems bring positive results, while cataloging the macrosystem points within the reflexology of hands and feet should help to strengthen the researches of the usage of the points of chinese and reflexology which have the same anatomical location.

Conclusions

In the hands microsystem there are 46 points from six Chinese meridian: lung, colon, heart, small intestine, pericardium, and triple warmer. they represent more than 7% of all the major BAP of the main meridians. In the feet microsystem there are 70 BAP of the six meridians: stomach, spleen and pancreas, bladder, kidney, gallbladder and liver. they represent just over 11% of all the main points of the Chinese main meridians. In the microsystems of feet and hands there are 22 independent BAP, 8 of which are located in the areas of feet reflexology (S44, UB60, K1, K3), and 14 points are located in the areas of hands reflexology (LU11, LI4, H7, H9, SI1, SI2, PC7). They represent 19% of all Chinese points located on the feet and hands. In the reflexology of ,,own organs”, there are 3 BAP: kidney meridian KI1 − contained on the plantar side of the right and the left foot and the heart meridian H8 − located on the palm of the left hand

analgesia in the rat, “Brain Research Bulletin”, 2006, 68(6), p. 453–458; J. Yang, Y. Yang, J.M. chen, W.y. liu, c.h. Wang, B.c. lin, Effect of oxytocin on acupuncture analgesia in the rat, neuropeptides, 2007, 41(5), p. 285–292.

7 M.S. Kim, h.D. Seo, K. Sawada, M. ishida, Study of biosignal response during acupunc-ture points stimulations, [in:] Conference Proceedings IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society, 2008, p. 689–692.

8 l. yin, X. Jin, W. Qiao, J. Sun, X. Shi, J. tian, D. yin, S. yao, M. Shao, h. Zeng, B. Shan, y. tang, K. Zhu, PET imaging of brain function while puncturing the acupoint ST36, “Chinese Medical Journal”, 2003, 116(12), p. 1836–1839.

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side. These three points are slightly more than 2% of all BAP located within the microsystems of hands and feet, and 27% relatively to the num-ber of the independent BaP situated in those microsystems.

References:

1. Batkiewicz W., Microkinesitherapy, “reflexology”, 2009, 3.2. Beyers D.c., Better health with foot reflexology, ingham Publishing in-

corporated, Petersburg 1994.3. DeSamuel a., Very New waves in very old meridians: Quantum medi-

cal physics of the living, “acupuncture & electrotherapeutics research”, 1996, 21(1).

4. Garnuszewski Z., Renaissance acupuncture, Medyk, Warszawa 2008.5. Gleditsch J.M., Forty years of acupuncture experience in an ENT practice.

HNO, 2011, 59(12).6. Grinberg a., Foot Analysis: The foot path to self-discovery, inne, By-

dgoszcz 1993.7. Kasperczyk t., Kmak S., Acupressure and reflexology other methods, Kasper,

Kraków 2003.8. Kasperczyk t., Meridians, points, and Chinese prescription, Jet,

Kraków 2007.9. Kim M.S., Seo h.D., Sawada K., ishida, M., Study of biosignal response

during acupuncture points stimulations, conference Proceedings ieee engineering in Medicine and Biology Society, 2008.

10. Mucha D. Microsystems therapeutic of human body, terenia, Kraków 1997.11. Mucha D., Diagnostic and therapeutic microsystems of human body,. “re-

flexology”, 2009, 1.12. Mucha D., Reflective zone of hands microsystem, “reflexology”, 2009, 1.13. Wills P., The reflexology manual: an easy-to-use illustrated guide to the

healing zones of the hands and feet, Pagina, Kłodzko 1992.14. yang J., liu W.y., Song c.y., lin B.c., Only arginine vasopressin, not

oxytocin and endogenous opiate peptides, in hypothalamic paraventricular nucleus play a role in acupuncture analgesia in the rat, “Brain research Bulletin”, 2006, 68(6).

15. yang J., yang y., chen J.M., liu W.y., Wang c.h., lin, B.c., Effect of oxytocin on acupuncture analgesia in the rat, “neuropeptides”, 2007, 41(5).

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16. yin l., Jin X., Qiao W., Sun J., Shi X., tian J., yin D., yao S., Shao M., Zeng h., Shan B., tang y., Zhu K., PET imaging of brain function while puncturing the acupoint ST36, “chinese Medical Journal”, 2003, 116(12).


D. Mucha, t. ambroży, t. Mucha, K. chudyba, K. latinek, The Location of Points Within the Chinese Macrosystem in the Zone of Reflexology of the Microsystems of Feet and Hands, “Security Dimensions. international and National Studies”, 2016, no 18, p. 92–104

internal Security


NO. 18; 2016 (106–120)

modern undersTanding of naTional securiTy. inTroducTion To The issue

assoc. Prof. antoni olak, Ph.D.University College of Enterprise and Administration in Lublin, POLAND

ABSTRACT

Security is one of the most appreciated values in the social and individual dimension. ensuring public security of a given society is an essential condition for the development of both individuals and the state understood as an organized group of individuals. every citizen has a constitutionally guaranteed right to their behavior. the constitution also recognized the independence, the territorial integrity of the state and the inviolability of borders as the supreme value. Poland as a sovereign and democratic Member State of the un, oSce, nato and the eu adopted the stable and continuous national security as a priority objective.

ARTICLE INFO


Key wordsPublic safety, national security, democracy, security

1. Introduction

Security is one of the most appreciated values in the social and individ-ual dimension. ensuring public security of a given society is an essential condition for development of both individuals and the state understood as an organized group of individuals. nowadays every citizen is guaranteed constitutional right to their behavior.

the constitution also recognized the independence, the territorial in-tegrity of the state and the inviolability of borders as the supreme val-

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Modern understanding of national Security…

ue. Poland as a sovereign and democratic member state of the un, the oSce, nato and the eu adopted providing a stable and continuous national security as a priority objective1.

the term of “security” derives from the latin sine cura, by which polit-ical stability was understood. “Secretarias” means the secure state, the state of confidence, security and peace, and it also indicates the lack of threat and protection against dangers2. over time, more and more new defini-tions arose, which took into account various aspects.

traditional, narrow understanding of security was a result of experience of the World War ii. at that time, the greatest threat was an armed conflict. therefore, military force was the most important aspect of security. tradi-tional national security is associated with military defense of the country against military threats, and its implementation is connected with art of war.

During the cold War, analysis of national security referred to national structures, which primarily guaranteed extensive military potentials. the state of security meant expansion of the potential so that it was able to fend off threats3.

the “cold War” period in europe was/is associated with arms race, lack of democracy and constant opposition to military aggression. now-adays, it is believed that this approach was ethnocentric and too subor-dinate to the selected factors (mainly cultural) and it did not take into account many aspects.

Wider concept of security spread in the seventies and eighties, when it was found, that various components should be taken into account while analyzing security – not only the military threats. It should be noted that national security is not only state protection against physical assault, but also the protection of, by using multiple measures, economic and political interests, the loss of which would mean that there is lack of core national values, contained in the constitution4.

1 J. Wojnarowski, M. Kuliczkowski, M. olszewski, Udział organów administracji rządo-wej i sektora gospodarczego w przygotowaniach ochronno-obronnych RP, aon, Warsza-wa 2012, p. 7.

2 S. Kaczor, Bezpieczeństwo w czasach pozornego pokoju i spokoju, [in:] Bezpieczeńst-wo i obronność w świetle współczesnych wyzwań i potrzeb: ujęcie naukowe, pedagogiczne i edukacyjne, J. Kunikowski (ed.), Akademia Podlaska, Siedlce 2010, p. 49.

3 K. Żukrowska, Pojęcie bezpieczeństwa i jego ewolucja, [in:] Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodo-we. Teoria i praktyka, K. Żukrowska, M. Grącik (eds.), Warszawa 2006, p. 21–22.

4 J. Stańczyk, Współczesne pojmowanie bezpieczeństwa, Warszawa 1996, p. 21.

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nowadays, factors contributing, supporting and complementary to mil-itary actions begin to have an increasing meaning5. currently, the concepts which take into account the political, economic, environmental, social and military components, which are placed in an international context.

the eighties of the twentieth century and especially their end, indicate the changes happening at many levels of life which enabled looking at the security from various perspectives and dimensions. the security was seen in the terms of:- subjective – as certainty of existence and survival of participants of na-

tional and international relations,- objective – as means and ways shaping the certainty of the state of pos-

session of the participants of national and international relations and the institutions that guarantee a certain level of safety,

- functional – enabling the assessment of the dynamics and evolution of subjective and objective aspects of security and its participants6.

changes in the meaning of security were also associated with the left from the narrow security approach. in the contemporary science, two ways of understanding security can be noticed7:

- narrow context (negative) of treating security as a lack of threats. the es-sence of this point of view is the analysis of impact of entities, which are undertaken to protect against threats which may harm its internal values,

- broad context, which is characteristic mainly to open societies. this ap-proach mainly concentrates on shaping such conditions, which enable the achievement of a high degree of probability of survival, possession and development of the individual. considerable attention is paid in this regard to the activities of and entity and its ability to cooperate with the environment”.the “narrow” context was a kind of simplification. the lack of threats

is not impossible to achieve in practice. Such an approach did not take into account the progress and civilization development. the broad context is active, it searches for new solutions, and not only detects new threats. 5 A. Mróz-Jagiełło, A. Wolanin, Współzależność obszarów badań nauki o bezpieczeństwie

i nauki o obronności, ,,Obronność”, 2012, no. 2, p. 77.6 r. Zieba, Pozimnowojenny paradygmat bezpieczeństwa, [in:] Bezpieczeństwo międzyna-

rodowe po zimnej wojnie, R. Zięba (ed.), Warszawa 2008, p. 16.7 M. cieślarczyk, Bezpieczeństwo i obronność w świadomości współczesnej młodzieży, [in:]

Wychowanie patriotyczno-obronne: tradycje i współczesność, r. Kalinowski, J. Kunikow-ski (eds.), Siedlce 2004, p. 124.

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to the wide understanding of the security refers, inter alia, J. Stańczyk, according to whom security has two essential components: the guarantee of inviolable survival of a given entity and the freedom of its development8.

Widening of the scope of security has caused the emergence of many planes, which may be analyzed independently of each other, despite being related to each other. there is universally valid thesis that there is no once and for all established security. it is a process, which varies depending on a number of phenomena that occur in society.

W. Pokruszyński interprets this as a continuous activity of individals and local communities, states and international organizations in creating a desired state of security9. While explaining the essence security, S. Koziej draws attention to the high dynamic and changeability of the phenome-non, which is to ensure the possibility to survive and the development of own interests in certain conditions. the implementation of these interests is to take place by taking challenges, reducing the risks, using the oppor-tunities and by the risk prevention10.

following the opinion of r. Zięba, security includes assurance of the needs of existence, survival, security, stability, identity (sameness), independ-ence, protection of level and quality of life. Security, being the crucial need of a human being and social groups, is, at the same time, the basic need of the coun-tries and international systems, its absence causes concern and sense of danger11.

W. Pokruszyński has a different approach to security. according to him, it is not only the state, but also the opportunities of development. the author claims that, in the analysis of security, in various dimensions, challenges and threats must be clearly distinguished, because only a ho-listic approach can lead to an objective assessment of the phenomenon12.

Security is also a situation characterized by a lack of risk of losing some-thing which is particularly valuable: health, work, tangible goods, respect and feelings. this is also the state of being unthreatened, of the peace and

8 r. Jakubczak, J. filis, Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w XXI wieku, Warszawa 2006, p. 14.

9 W. Pokruszyński: Bezpieczeństwo narodowe u progu XXI wieku, Warszawa 2008, p. 24.10 S. Koziej, Między piekłem a rajem. Szare bezpieczeństwo na progu XXI wieku, to-

ruń 2006, p. 7. 11 J. Kunikowski, Bezpieczeństwo współczesnego człowieka, [in:] Przygotowanie dzie-

ci i młodzieży do działania w sytuacjach zagrożenia zdrowia i życia, M. cieślarczyk, G. Wierzbicki (eds.), Siedlce 2008, p. 13.

12 W. Pokruszyński, Teoretyczne aspekty bezpieczeństwa, Józefów 2010, p. 5–9.

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certainty. in another context, security is a mental or legal state, in which the entity has a sense of certainty and is supported by a well-functioning legal system. Security is also freedom from threats, fear or attack13.

the subject of security can be any entity, which aims at freedom of real-ization of own interests in specific conditions. this may be single persons, groups, nations and international communities. therefore, security can be classified as personal, group, national and international14.

according to Polish language dictionary, security is a mental or legal state, in which the entity has a sense of certainty, and is supported by another person or by a well-functioning legal system; the opposite of danger15.

Such a literal interpretation leads to the conclusion that security can be considered in two aspects. in the wide context, it is the whole of order and social institutions, which protect the state and its citizens against phenome-na threatening legal order, and in the narrow context of public security is the protection of regime against attacks on the main state institutions16.

nowadays a common feature of definition of security is understanding of the term as social process. this is based on constant taking actions, which aim at improving mechanisms ensuring the sense of security. Being the subject of laws of motion of social systems in an important element of understanding security as a process. Dynamism in defining the security is associated with fluctuations in ambient conditions, the progress of civ-ilization and the range of needs of individuals. understanding of security in international relations is seen as a process of changeable dynamics and intensity is of particular importance. the process is a determinant of com-pliance and conflict of interest of states and international systems17.

national security is a status obtained as a result of properly organized defense and protection against any military and non-military threats, both external and internal, using the forces and resources from different areas of activities of the state18.

13 a. Pieczywok, Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa wobec zagrożeń i wyzwań współczesności, Warszawa 2012, p. 22.

14 S. Koziej, op cit., p. 7.15 Słownik współczesnego języka polskiego, B. Dunaj (ed.), Warszawa 1996, p. 51.16 Słownik języka polskiego PWN, M. Szymczak (ed.), vol. 1, Warszawa 1995, p. 139.17 J. Stańczyk, op cit., p. 18–19.18 Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, B. Balcerowicz (ed.), Warsza-

wa 2002, p. 29.

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national security, however, can be consider not as a state but as a pro-cess, which includes all protective and defensive activities, which aim at the creation of proper conditions for functioning of state in international arena. this process also includes opposing all challenges and threats to national security19.

according to J. Kukułka, the core values, that make up the national security, include most importantly:20

- survival (national, ethnic and biological), for which each country is pre-pared to sacrifice other values, since they lose sense in case of the threat to the survival of an entity itself,

- territorial integrity (in a physical, national and state sense),- political independence (in the sense of political system, self-governance

and freedom of affiliation),- quality of life (in the sense of the living standards, the level of socio-eco-

nomic development and cultural system), which requires a lot of com-mon sense, so it is not treated overly ambitious. the threat of any of these four values leads to a limitation of the vital

interests of the country and thus means a reduction in national security.constantly evolving threats have an influence on the new perception of

the national security. nowadays, there is a new phase of international rela-tions, in which contemporary threats have become global and may apply to any country. The beginning of 21st century abounds in clear evolution of threats, among which the most troublesome are the threats of natural dis-asters and terrorist attacks. they threaten the society directly, affecting the functioning of people, countries and institutions, especially economic and social. While threats accompanied the human being from the beginning of existence, the menace of civilization transformed its nature and range with the development of civilization. terrorism has considerable influence on functioning of the society. it greatly affects the social and political life on the scale of the states and the international community. terrorism is a force, brutal intimidation of people living in accordance with the law, in order to force ideological (most frequently) benefits21.

19 W. Kitler, Obrona narodowa III RP: pojęcie, organizacja, system, Warszawa 2002, p. 48.20 J. Kukułka, Bezpieczeństwo a współpraca europejska: współzależności i sprzeczności intere-

sów, ,,Sprawy Międzynarodowe”, 1982, no. 7, p. 34.21 r. Borkowski, Cywilizacja, technika, ekologia. Wybrane problemy rozwoju cywilizacyjnego

u progu XXI wieku, Kraków 2001, p. 65.

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nowadays terrorism is seen as a strategic concept of asymmetric warfare by non-state entities22.

the asymmetry should be understood as the ability to use all kinds of differences in the broadly understood potentials of the sides – from the material side to the psychological – both before and in the course of taking action in order to achieve advantage over the opponent23.

asymmetry is derived from the Greek language (asymmetria) and it means the lack or the violation of symmetry. according to the above defi-nition, the subject of the conflict which uses unconventional means and techniques should be considered as the asymmetric threat. This type of threats may include weapons of mass destruction, activities using informa-tion technology and tactical concepts24. asymmetric threats refer to both military and non-military sphere. they include thinking, organization and activity different from the opponent’s, including the use of all the differences in broadly understood potentials of the sides. Their objective is to maximize their own advantage while using your opponent’s weaknesses in order to achieve dominance or greater operational flexibility25. asymmetric opponent, who does not follow any rules, has large freedom of action, which facilitates the achievement of many benefits.

the transfer of terrorism from the regional to international area has the biggest impact on the latest changes of terrorist organizations’ strategy. the borders have disappeared for today’s organizations.

terrorism is also characterized by continuous crossing not only the bor-ders, but also well-known and accepted forms of attack. threats emerge in new areas, and terrorists do not respect any moral and ethical rights. transnational nature of action caused also structural transformations. 22 M. adamczuk, Ewolucja strategii i metod działania islamskich ugrupowań terrorystycz-

nych i ich wpływ na bezpieczeństwo Polski, ,,Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe”, 2011, no. 3, p. 199; A. Krauz, Nowe wydanie terroryzmu z wykorzystaniem broni CBRN we współ-czesnej cywilizacji śmierci, „Edukacja – Technika – Informatyka, Wybrane problemy edukacji technicznej i zawodowej”, no 5, 2014-1, vol. 1, p. 285–293.

23 P. Gawliczek, J. Pawłowski, Zagrożenia asymetryczne, AON, Warszawa 2003, p. 18.24 R. Białoskórski, Wyzwania i zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa XXI wieku, Warszawa 2010,

p. 29; A. Krauz, Internet narzędziem groźnej broni cyfrowej dla infrastruktury krytycznej globalny świecie wiedzy, „Edukacja – Technika – Informatyka, Wybrane problemy edu-kacji technicznej i zawodowej”, no 4, 2013-1, vol. 1, p. 388–399.

25 t. Szubrycht, Analiza podobieństw operacji militarnych innych niż wojna oraz działań pozwalających zminimalizować zagrożenie asymetryczne, ,,Zeszyty naukowe akademii Marynarki Wojennej”, 2006, XLVII, no. 1, p. 144.

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there has been a noticeable change in the control of terrorist groups and in their organization.

future suicide bombers began to be recruited from among the citi-zens of various countries and nationalities, connected only by ideology, for which they are able to sacrifice their life. uniform and centralist groups operating within a single country cease to function, and groups of network structure appear. it is connected with the decentralization of the structure, which consists of a lot of operationally, logistically and financially inde-pendent departments26.

the internationalization and the increased brutalization of terrorists’ methods prove that contemporary world has entered the era of the new quality of terrorist threats, which constantly affects regional, national and international security. the factors described above are global phenomena, which have influence on both the international environment as well as threaten the security of individual countries. in addition, they caused the redefinition of the term of security. Going back to theoretical considera-tions on national security, it is worth discussing the term of state security. Both concepts are correlated. according to the J. czaputowicz they are identical: national security, i.e. security of the state, refers to ensuring the ter-ritorial integrity, sovereignty, the freedom of choice of political road and the conditions of prosperity and development27.

the security of the country is determined by the state of internal stabil-ity of country interpreted on the basis of absence of threats. Such percep-tion of security enables its division into external and internal28.

it is the actual condition of internal stability and sovereignty of the state, which reflects the lack of or existence of any threats (in the sense of meeting the basic existential and behavioral needs of the society and treat-ing the country as a sovereign entity in the international relations.

National Security is often equated with security of the state, because it derives from the existential needs of human communities organized into states. this is, however, a simplification, since in the multinational coun-

26 M. adamczuk ,op cit., p. 210–213.27 J. czaputowicz, Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego państwa-aspekty teoretyczne,

[in:] Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego państwa, S. Debski, B. Górka-Win-ter (eds.), Warszawa 2003, p. 13.

28 S. Dworecki, Zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa państwa w koncepcjach programowych partii parlamentarnych w Polsce po 1989 roku, Warszawa 2009, p. 248.

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tries the interests of some nations do not have to be consistent with inter-ests of the titular nation and the state.

therefore, the national security is protecting the internal values of the entity, of each social group, nation and state and providing conditions for the implementation of the tasks resulting from these values. it should ensure that, among other things, the protection of such values as: survival of the population, the socio-economic system, the prevailing ideology, the prestige of the state in the international environment, the interests of own citizens abroad, the economic progress, the standard of living of the population, etc.

the terms of security of the state and the national security take into ac-count various factors of internal and external (international) nature. Quite often both terms are treated as synonyms, while the national security is a broader concept. While the security of the state suggests focusing pri-marily on the security of the state as an institution, the “national security” emphasizes to a greater extent the protection of the interests of not only the state as a whole, but also society and its components, including units.

the use of this term is, therefore, most appropriate in relation to dem-ocratic countries, based on free market economy, in which the rights of individuals and social groups are of key importance. Given the above, na-tional security can be defined as the ability of the state and its nation (so-ciety) to provide the assurance of survival (state as an institution, nation as an ethnic group, the biological survival of the population), territorial integrity, political independence, internal stability and the quality of life.

this certainty is shaped by negative actions involving the elimination of external threats and those emerging under the state and by positive ac-tions ensuring the survival, possession (identity), the functioning and the freedom of development of the state and nation (society).

considering in detail the range of national (state) interests within the spectrum of security, one can distinguish a number of different values that are contained within it. apart from protecting the physical length of the state and nation (superior value in comparison to others), they cover a whole range of characteristics determining the free development.

r. Stemplowski through a secure state understands the state that can realize its raison d’état. therefore, he indicates the factors which must occur for the state to have such an opportunity:1. existential conditions:

a) objective: minimal: territorial integrity, the ability to defend against aggression, the ability to halt the epidemic and to minimize the ef-

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fects of disasters; optimal: state sovereignty, demographic and eco-nomic growth, potential of the police and the intelligence, the value of community.

b) subjective: a sense of security, citizens’ welfare.2. institutional conditions: the institutions of democratic state, a rational or-

ganization of the market, education system, mass media.3. functional conditions: preventing the emergence of threats, the state’s

ability to perform its functions, the maintenance of international rela-tions (military alliances, strategic partnership), the analysis of the infor-mation and formulation of the assessments of meeting specific criteria of security in order to choose the appropriate courses of action, cultural development of the state and society, social control.State security is achieved within the specified, time-varying system,

existing in a given, historically shaped, international community. the term security system can be understood as a dynamic combination of several key factors determining its essence. this is a multifaceted structure, based on a specific system of political, military, economic and ideological-cultur-al forces, which is the subject to adaptation and self-regulatory processes and which has its axiological dimension29.

State security and national security in the Polish legal system are unambiguous. the constitution sometimes refers to the state security (rP), and sometimes to the national security (establishing national Se-curity council)30.

as is clear from the analysis above, security is a broad and differently defined concept, according to the adopted criteria. however, most of the definitions of national or state security, underlines its importance in the functioning of state and providing adequate protection for citizens31.

Security has subjective nature, and being the supreme need of human beings and social groups, is, at the same time, a fundamental need of countries and international systems, and its absence causes anxiety and state of emergency.

Security in the individual dimension is the sense of security of every citizen, his assessment of the risks. Depending on the region of the coun-

29 J. Wojnarowski, Podstawy prawne bezpieczeństwa, AON Warszawa 2004, p. 14-15.30 S. Koziej, Bezpieczeństwo: istota, podstawowe kategorie i historyczna ewolucja, ,,Bezpie-

czeństwo narodowe” 2011, no. 2, p. 20.31 J. Bieniek, Bezpieczeństwo i obronność jako nowe dyscypliny naukowe, „obronność, Ze-

szyty naukowe” 2012, no. 2, p. 6.

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try and the personal experience this feeling may be different. however, in the state dimension, these are the feelings of citizens in general, as well as the safety of the country as a whole. the state security policy should take a series of needs of the society into account, which are related to security. If a country meets all its functions – the citizens feel safe.

the safety of an individual is conditioned by many aspects, and one of the main aspect is the level of the security of the state in which the indi-vidual lives. the need for security is a fundamental need of every human being and it accompanies him from birth until death.

according to the theory by a. Maslow higher needs arise only when the need of security is satisfied. otherwise, a human being is character-ized, typically, by a low level of motivation to meet the needs which are higher in the hierarchy. to counteract this situation through the efficient functioning, is the task of the state. the entity feels safe in the country which is at peace, having a job, financial resources, insurance etc.32

nowadays, apart from state protection a lot of attention is paid to ensuring the freedom of development to the entities, which include, for example: unhindered social-economic and cultural development, the in-crease of the quality of life and achieving prosperity. The meaning of val-ues close to a human being increases.

the concept of security which largely corresponds to the notions of the society functions in countries with democratic systems. this results from the fact that entities perceive safety in particular as an opportunity to provide a dignified (in economic terms) life to oneself and one’s relatives, as healthy natural environment etc.

The consequence of such concept is the statement that that the activ-ities of the state cannot be limited only to providing military security. it should be implemented on a large scale and operate on a maximum num-ber of levels, and, most importantly, take into account such values as: so-cial peace, prosperity, justice, economic balance or common good. Security, therefore, is a state and a process of ensuring not only military security but also the duration and continuous development of the state and society33.32 G. Wierzbicki, Przygotowanie obronne społeczeństwa. Tradycyjne i współczesne ujęcie

problematyki, [in:] Uwarunkowania procesu edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa, J. Kunikow-ski (ed.), Siedlce 2012, p. 30-31.

33 K. loranty, Bezpieczeństwo społeczne państwa [in:] Bezpieczeństwo i obronność w świetle współczesnych wyzwań i potrzeb: ujęcie naukowe, pedagogiczne i edukacyjne, Siedlce 2010, p. 54.

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on the basis of contemporary challenges and threats, the basic needs of the society in the field of security are extracted. according to the position of W. Kitler, two major areas of security can be isolated34:

society waiting for the state to provide it with the needs of existence and development, while knowing that the state can be exposed to a variety of risks, crisis situations, due to political, social and cultural factors etc.;

“the hardships of everyday life”; which should include, inter alia: the negative effects of the development of civilization, criminal activity and natural disasters etc.

the complexity and multidimensionality of the concept should be rec-ognized in the analysis of the evolution of the understanding of the security. not without significance is the fact that it is dependent on an increasing number of new challenges. this paper describes one of the latest threats, which has an influence on the shape of global security, but also on the se-curity of individual states - terrorism. however, the threats are constantly evolving. factors affecting the new redefinition of security may include cy-ber-terrorism, religious extremism, organized crime, threats to the security of information systems and much more. Modern understanding of safety should be considered on a local, national, as well as international scale.

References:

1. adamczuk M., Ewolucja strategii i metod działania islamskich ugrupowań terrorystycznych i ich wpływ na bezpieczeństwo Polski, ,,Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe” 2011, nr 3.

2. Białoskórski R., Wyzwania i zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa XXI wieku, Warszawa 2010.

3. Bieniek J., Bezpieczeństwo i obronność jako nowe dyscypliny naukowe, ,,obronność . Zeszyty naukowe” 2012, nr 2.

4. Borkowski r., Cywilizacja, technika, ekologia. Wybrane problemy rozwoju cywilizacyjnego u progu XXI wieku, Kraków 2001.

5. cieślarczyk M., Bezpieczeństwo i obronność w świadomości współczesnej młodzieży, [in:] Wychowanie patriotyczno-obronne: tradycje i współcze-sność, R. Kalinowski, J. Kunikowski (eds.), Siedlce 2004.

6. czaputowicz J., Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego państwa – aspekty teoretyczne, [in:] Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego pań-stwa, S. Debski, B. Górka–Winter (eds.), Warszawa 2003.

34 G. Wierzbicki, op cit., p. 33.

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7. Dworecki S., Zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa państwa w koncepcjach progra-mowych partii parlamentarnych w Polsce po 1989 roku, Warszawa 2009.

8. Dziekański P., Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne wyzwaniem współczesnego regionu – próba oceny syntetycznej, „Kultura BeZPiecZeŃStWa NAUKA – PRAKTYKA – REFLEKSJE” 2014, No 16.

9. Dziekański P., Finance region for sustainable development. Synthetic de-scription of f inancial condition, Volume 27/Number 2/2015 Nr. 2(27)2015 vaDyBa Journal of Management.

10. Jakubczak r., filis J., Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w XXI wieku, Warszawa 2006.

11. Gawliczek P., Pawłowski J., Zagrożenia asymetryczne, Warszawa 2003.12. Kaczor S., Bezpieczeństwo w czasach pozornego pokoju i spokoju, [in:] Bez-

pieczeństwo i obronność w świetle współczesnych wyzwań i potrzeb: ujęcie naukowe, pedagogiczne i edukacyjne, J. Kunikowski (ed.), Wyd akade-mii Podlaskiej, Siedlce 2010.

13. Kitler W., Obrona narodowa III RP: pojęcie, organizacja, system, War-szawa 2002.

14. Koziej S., Bezpieczeństwo: istota, podstawowe kategorie i historyczna ewolucja, ,,Bezpieczeństwo narodowe” 2011, no 2.

15. Koziej S., Między piekłem a rajem. Szare bezpieczeństwo na progu XXI wieku, Toruń 2006.

16. Krauz a., Nowe wydanie terroryzmu z wykorzystaniem broni CBRN we współczesnej cywilizacji śmierci, „Edukacja – Technika – Informatyka, Wybrane problemy edukacji technicznej i zawodowej, rocznik nauko-wy” Nr5/2014-1/Część 1.

17. Krauz a., Internet narzędziem groźnej broni cyfrowej dla infrastruktury krytycznej globalny świecie wiedzy, „Edukacja – Technika – Informaty-ka, Rocznik naukowy” Nr 4 /2013-1/ Część 1, Wybrane problemy edu-kacji technicznej i zawodowej.

18. Kunikowski J., Bezpieczeństwo współczesnego człowieka, [in:] Przygoto-wanie dzieci i młodzieży do działania w sytuacjach zagrożenia zdrowia i życia, M. Cieślarczyk, G. Wierzbicki (eds.), Siedlce 2008.

19. J. Kukułka, Bezpieczeństwo a współpraca europejska: współzależności i sprzeczności interesów, ,,Sprawy Międzyna-rodowe”1982, no. 7.

20. loranty K., Bezpieczeństwo społeczne państwa, [in:] Bezpieczeństwo i obronność w świetle współczesnych wyzwań i potrzeb: ujęcie naukowe, pedagogiczne i edukacyjne, Siedlce 2010.

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21. olak a., labuzik M., Europska Unia. Vybrané Témy, Stowarzyszenie „EDUKACJA NAUKA ROZWÓJ” Ostrowiec Św. 2013.

22. olak a., Bezpieczeństwo Rodziny w warunkach globalizacji, WSZMiJo w Katowicach, Katowice 2013.

23. olak a., oleksiewicz i., Wieczorek S., Bezpieczeństwo i zagrożenia społeczne. Zarys problematyki, AMELIA Rzeszów 2012.

24. Mróz-agiełło a., Wolanin a., Współzależność obszarów badań nauki o bezpieczeństwie i nauki o obronności, ,,Obronność” 2012, nr 2.

25. Pieczywok a., Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa wobec zagrożeń i wyzwań współczesności, Warszawa 2012.

26. Pokruszyński W., Bezpieczeństwo narodowe u progu XXI wieku, War-szawa 2008.

27. Pokruszyński W., Teoretyczne aspekty bezpieczeństwa, Józefów 2010.28. Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, B. Balcero-

wicz (ed.), Warszawa 2002.29. Stemplowski r., Horyzont poznawczy i polityczny pojęcia ,,bezpieczeń-

stwo państwa”, [in:] Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe czasu przemian: zagrożenia – koncepcje – instytucje, R. Kuźniar, Z. Lachowski (eds.), Warszawa 2003.

30. tyrała P., olak a., Prakseologia w edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa, AMELIA 2012.

31. Stańczyk J., Współczesne pojmowanie bezpieczeństwa, aon, Warsza-wa 1996.

32. Szubrycht t., Analiza podobieństw operacji militarnych innych niż woj-na oraz działań pozwalających zminimalizować zagrożenie asymetryczne, ,,Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej” 2006, r. Xlvii, nr 1.

33. Wierzbicki G., Przygotowanie obronne społeczeństwa. Tradycyjne i współczesne ujęcie problematyki [w:] Uwarunkowania procesu edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa, J. Kunikowski (ed.), Siedlce 2012.

34. Wojnarowski J., Kuliczkowski M., olszewski M., Udział organów ad-ministracji rządowej i sektora gospodarczego w przygotowaniach ochronno-obronnych RP. Praca naukowo-badawcza, Warszawa 2012.

35. Żukrowska K., Pojęcie bezpieczeństwa i jego ewolucja, [in:] Bezpie-czeństwo międzynarodowe. Teoria i praktyka, K. Żukrowska, M. Grą-cik (eds.), Warszawa 2006.

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36. Zięba r., Pozimnowojenny paradygmat bezpieczeństwa, [w:] Bezpie-czeństwo Miedzyna-rodowe po zimnej wojnie, r. Zięba (ed.), Warsza-wa 2008.

Author:

antoni olak – lecturer in Wyższa Szkoła Przedsiębiorczości i admin-istracji in lublin and Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu i Przedsiębiorczości in os-trowiec Świętokrzyski, faculty of national Security.


a. olak, Modern Understanding of National Security, “Security Dimen-sions. International and National Studies”, 2016, no 18, p. 106–120


NO. 18; 2016 (121–130)

PreveTion of emergency siTuaTions as The main Task of single sTaTe sysTem for civil ProTecTion

ing. victor Grechaninov, Ph.D.Ukrainian Research Institute of Civil Protection, UKRAINE

ABSTRACT

it has been demonstrated that it is possible to decrease the number of emergency situations (eS) and dangerous events (De) and to lessen the impact them by concentrating efforts on prevention of their appearance. in order to do so it is necessary for the state to introduce a new system of anthropogenic hazards monitoring, recognition and management of risks, aimed at their minimization. implementation of the risk-oriented approach in its substance represents the reform of the united state system of public Security.

ARTICLE INFO


Key wordsmonitoring of emergency situations, analysis of emergency situations, anthropogenic hazards, anthropogenic risks, emergency situations

according to statistics, the number of people who died annually and were maimed as a result of emergency situations in the country over the past twenty years, unfortunately, almost failed to be reduce. annual material losses from fires in recent years exceeded 2 billion UAH [1 UAH is about 0,0401 USD – ed.]. In particular, in 2011, it was 2 659 billion UAH, and in 2015 – more than 3 billion UAH.

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the risks with which we have to deal in our state are different, and their scale is increasing constantly. Solution of the problem of anthropo-genic security is one of the main directions of minimization of negative consequences of emergency situation. So, the purpose of the work is sci-entific justification of a new strategy creation for the prevention of eS in ukraine.

today, scientists have not yet proposed an unified approach to math-ematical modeling of risk assessments. the concept of “risk” is often as-sociated with a probability of unwanted event. thus, the law of ukraine “on extremely Dangerous objects” gives the following definition: risk – the degree of probability of a negative event that may occur at certain times or in certain circumstances at the territory of Extremely Dangerous Object and / (or) outside it. in the law of ukraine “on the Main Principles of State Supervision (oversight) in the area of commercial activity” a follow-ing definition can be found: risk – a quantitative measure of danger, taking into account the probability of negative effects from the economic activities and the size of possible losses from them.

the analysis of existing mathematical definition of risk showed that despite intensive development in the last decade, methods of analysis and risk assessment, there is still considerable uncertainty regarding the “risk” term in ukraine. the nationwide accepted system of terms in the theory of risk, that reflected as well as in scientific works and some regulations, is absent [1].

the risk is a category of market economy. the need for taking into account the contingencies and uncertainties in the analysis of danger is recognized not only by experts on industrial safety, but also by the employ-ees of state agencies. the relevance and important practical significance of this problem certify numerous publications and recently adopted regula-tions on safety declaration of high danger.

reducing anthropogenic risks should be a part of national security strategy. analysis of the causes of eS of anthropogenic origin gives the base for conclusion that their reduction can be done by complex solution. this must include the creation of modern monitoring system of anthro-pogenic security of economic activity of entities, using the latest infor-mation technology and transfer the main efforts from the response and consequences liquidation of ES to their prevention.

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Prevetion of emergency Situations…

We propose the following algorithm of risks management (Fig.1):

Figure 1. The algorithm of risks management

in modern practice, to formalize risk r is widely used a model that connects the likelihood of negative events Pi (accidents) and likelihood of possible losses Wi as a result of such events:

r=∑iPiWi (1.1)

if i = 1, than R = PW. Note that 0≤P≤1.

According to the formula (1.1) both a possible uncertainty of an event that leads to undesirable consequences and magnitude of these effects can be explained.

risk assessment should include the development of unfavorable events for the different scenarios that require synthesis formula (1.1):

r=∑ijPijWij (1.2)

where the index i refers to events, index j – appropriate continuity.

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in the scientific literature, using an expression for a risk assessment as an integral:

R=∫F(W)p(W)dW (1.3)

where F (W) – weight function of losses, through which the effects of various nature are reduced to a single (e.g. cost) damage assessment; p (W) – density of random variable W [1].

risk Management is a risk-based targeted activity to implement the best possible ways to reduce it to an acceptable (small) level. risk assessment must be in quantitative dimension. Risk analysis is realized by the scheme:- identification of hazards,- monitoring,- analysis (assessment and prediction) of threats,- analysis of possible effect on enterprise and personnel,- risk analysis for population dwelling in the possible affected area,- risk analysis of consequences of emergency for the surrounding environment.

risks determination due to analyzing data obtained as a result of the monitoring enable to determine:- what might be (will be happen) – which ES or DE,- why, how and for what reasons this may occur,- when and where this can happen,- which consequences might be.

in its turn this makes it possible to take decisions and do the appro-priate actions to risk reduction to avoid (prevent) possible undesirable eS or De.

the next stage is risk Prediction which is its assessment at the mo-ment (time) and for the future, taking into account trends of changes in conditions of risk, by whole forecasting of potential eS of man-made origin and a hard work to prevent them. for this purpose it shall be conducted internal and external monitoring of objects, their technolo-gy, equipment and control of personnel training that has been already shown in Figure 1.

the current structure of emergency warning system inherited from the Soviet union is not effective today. it does not meet current economic complexity of the state, demands of the time and legislation of the mar-ket economy [8]. Considering the single state system for civil protection (hereinafter – SSSCP) – we can observe imperfections in its structure with rudiment elements [2, 3]. It used to work well only in the USSR,

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when there were sectorial ministries and one-party system. currently, the company is not subject to any relevant ministries or state administration.

Supervision of anthropogenic hazard (risk) is assigned to the inspec-tions of The State Emergency Service of Ukraine (hereinafter – SES of ukraine) which are not able to perform its functions effectively due to lack of knowledge of technological processes and risks. the same inspector should check different types of enterprises with different technological industries: metallurgical complex, mining and processing plant, chemical plant, gas station, railway station, and so on.

Modern SSSCP in Ukraine and its components – prevention of emer-gency, it is necessary to build according to the realities of the economy, including the submission of enterprisers to owners – only juridical entities or individuals. it is essential to identify the place and role of economic activity in SSSCP correctly [11].

any reform and activities in the field of population and territories pro-tection will be extremely ineffective if they are not regulated by the state law. a special place in the protection of population and territories from emergency takes science and technology policy. therefore there are two key directions of improving the prevention of emergency situations – the implementation of risk oriented approach (roa):- change of management structure and legislations, improvement of emer-

gency situations risks passports of regions etc.- development and implementation of methods, programs, models, i.e. the

entire spectrum of information technology devices (Fig. 6).this work has already begun by State emergency Service of ukraine

and the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine [4].for whole scale, prediction of possible man-made risks in the coun-

try, a new single automate monitoring system of security management and eS prevention should be created. the most effective economical approach to improving the current system of state monitoring is the introduction of modern data processing and transformation of infor-mation. this provides changing of the shape of the accumulation and storage of information on the status of risk-carriers objects. on the basis of using of information technologies involves the construction of mon-itoring information system with multi-level conversion of information form in which conclusions about the state of objects made on the basis of heuristics multifactor models.

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Figure 2. The algorithm of ROA implementation

for this purpose, it is necessary to create four-levels hierarchy of infor-mation transformation in technology of multi-level monitoring [9, 10]. In-formation technology of monitoring of anthropogenic security with mul-ti-levels transformation of information will work reliably if only a system of monitoring (situational) centers at national, inter-regional, and regional levels are created and conduction of constant internal and periodic external monitoring on subjects (objects) – sources of risk, as shown at Fig. 3.

Figure 3. The system of monitoring of anthropogenic dander in the country

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for realization of mentioned approach it is needed to create new meth-ods of forecasting and preventing, first of all, a method of monitoring as the assessment of the risks of danger on different objects and their man-agement that is to say ROA [5]. The monitoring results allow managing risks namely track them and, if necessary, adjust (Figure 4).

for the purpose of objective evaluation, it is important to create an insti-tution of risk estimators companies which get licenses and work on methods consistent with SeS of ukraine. they will give the information about risks to insurance companies, agencies of SeS of ukraine and local authorities.

Figure 4. The system of anthropogenic risks determination of enter-prises and their management

the principles of proposed roa:- estimator company gets a license for specific types of objects,- identifies risks of an object, about which reports to the responsible execu-

tives of object, SeS of ukraine, local authorities and insurance companies,- risks must be insured; the level of premiums depends on the risk level

defined by estimators company,- company employees are held criminally responsible for the correctness of

the risks (in accordance with approved procedures).analysis of the existing state and propositions regarding an improve-

ment of the monitoring of potentially dangerous objects to determine the

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degree of risks and their management were published in several works [5, 7, 8, 9]. Currently, there are several types of models and software to detect risks of man-made origin. Some models of eS and the develop-ment of their potential effects have been described in given publications [7, 9, 10].

according to the World health organization methodology, risks are divided into:- Small (low premium),- acceptable (large premium),- large (very large premium + commitments to reduce to acceptable one).

It is shown on fig. 5.

Figure 5. Distribution of risks by method of World Health Organization

inspection of SeS of ukraine, if necessary, checks fulfillment of en-terprise the requirements of an estimator company to reduce a risk. At the same principle a system of emergency prevention in most european countries and the uSa is built. currently, the eu is developing unified rules for roa for all member countries. even in russia since the last four years a system of roa has been implemented.

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all enterprises are business entities of all forms of ownership during getting permits and licenses sign an obligation to prevent security risks to an unacceptable level and their reduction in cases of high level.

conversion to the roa will reduce significantly budgetary spending on prevention of emergency situations, shifting the costs to enterpris-es-sources of risk and insurance companies. it will allow increasing signifi-cantly the effectiveness of emergency situations prevention while reducing the number of people in managerial apparatus.

Conclusions

1. the reform of anthropogenic security management is needed in the country.

2. Monitoring of anthropogenic security of business entities, risk oriented approach in the management of hazard – this is the reform of emergen-cy prevention.

3. It should be created a four-level hierarchy system of monitoring tech-nology of anthropogenic danger.

4. effective monitoring of anthropogenic hazard, objective analysis of its status and management of emergency situation prevention are possi-ble only within the implementation and application of modern infor-mation technologies.

References:

1. Лисиченко Г.В., Природний, техногенний та екологічний ризики: аналіз, оцінка, управління, видавництво Наукова думка, Київ, 2008.

2. Кодекс цивільного захисту України. Законодавство України. [Елек-тронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5403-17.

3. Постанова Кабінету Міністрів України «Про затвердження По-ложення про єдину державну систему цивільного захисту»від 9.01.2014 № 11.

4. Постанова Кабінету Міністрів України «Про схвалення Концепції управління ризиками виникнення надзвичайних ситуацій техно-генного та природного характеру» від 23.01.2014 № 37.

5. Бєгун В.В., Безпека життєдіяльності (забезпечення соціальної, техногенної та природної безпеки) / В.В. Бєгун, О.П. Науменко. – К., 2014. – 328 с.

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6. Морозов А.А., Проблемно-ориентированный контент-анализ в структуре системы поддержки принятия решений (СППР) / А.А. Морозов, В.И. Вьюн, Г.Е. Кузьменко // Математические ма-шины и системы. – 2011. – № 3. – с. 98–104.

7. Кропотов П.П., Бєгун В.В., Калиненко Л.В., Створення сучасної системи моніторингу безпеки – актуальна державна та науко-ва задача / Десята Міжнародна науково-практична конференція «Математичне та імітаційне моделювання систем МОДС 2015» / Тези доповідей – Чернігів., 469 с.

8. Гречанінов В.Ф., Бєгун В.В., Негрієнко С.В., Необхідність інформа-ційних технологій у паспортизації регіонів щодо можливих надзви-чайних ситуацій / Десята Міжнародна науково-практична конфе-ренція «Математичне та імітаційне моделювання систем МОДС 2015» / Тези доповідей. – Чернігів., 469 с.

9. Ситуаційні центри. Теорія і практика. НАН України, ІПММС. – К., 2012. – 347 с.

10. Сопко І.В., Харченко О.В., Структуризація моделей для консолі-дації даних в багаторівневих ієрархічних моніторингових систе-мах / Десята Міжнародна науково-практична конференція «Ма-тематичне та імітаційне моделювання систем МОДС 2015» / Тези доповідей. – Чернігів., 469 с.

11. Загальні вимоги до розвитку і розміщення потенційно-небезпеч-них виробництв з урахуванням ризику надзвичайних ситуацій техногенного походження / Наукові керівники:С.І. Дорогунцов, В.Ф. Гречанінов. – К., 2005 – 118 с.

Author:

victor Grechaninov – head of the department of civil protection de-velopment, ukrainian research institute of civil Protection (ukrricP)


v. Grechaninov, Prevetion of Emergency Situations as the Main Task of Single State System for Civil Protection, “Security Dimensions. interna-tional and National Studies”, 2016, no 18, p. 121–130

DiSPoSitional GrouPS


NO. 18; 2016 (132–147)

securiTy culTure of The ParamiliTary youTh organiZaTions on The examPle of legia akademicka kul (John Paul ii caTholic universiTy of luBlin)

urszula Soler, Ph.D.John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, POLAND

Damian Duda, M.a.John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, POLAND

ABSTRACT

article shows youth paramilitary organisations activities and structure. the pre-Great War organisations and their role for regaining independence is shown, as well as official forming of academic military units fighting for Polish independence. then the structure and tasks of organisations at that time are showed and compared with their role and ideas during the communist period. Mainly author focus on 21st century and present model of youth paramilitary organisations functioning and their role for the society – on the example of legia akademicka form lublin.

ARTICLE INFO


Key wordslegia akademicka, youth, paramilitary, patriotism, civic society, security culture

The beginning of the 21st century has seen significant changes in per-ception of national defence and citizens’ contribution in its creation. the shifts were more of a revolution in terms of restoring public benefit or-

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Security culture of the Paramilitary youth organizations…

ganizations, and of any civic initiative. the importance of those changes is particular, since any grassroots initiative seemed suspicious, especially during communist dictatorship. national defence, and security culture creation seemed even more suspicious.

the term security culture itself is not new. it derives from the nine-teenth-century definition which describes any human activity, security being one of them. cieślarczyk claims that security culture comprises basic assumptions, values, norms, rules, symbols and beliefs which affect the perception of challenges, chances and/or threats. his definition also includes the perception of security, and correlating behaviour and actions of the citizens who acquired these and articulated as part of their edu-cation. organizational processes of internal integration and external ad-aptation, and of defence strengthening fall under this definition as well. these elements make it easier for those people to develop and achieve the idea of security which benefits all1. the term security culture itself is gradually more often analysed by scholars2. With time, Security Sciences became a separate science field. this definition of security is not under-stood as a military category, but mainly as a social one. here, upbringing and teaching, identity and bond, hard work resulting in self-perfection of units and groups are of utmost importance. the above description fits academic legion Kul very well.

History of Legion – foundation and the second World War

During the independence burst it became clear that without resorting in-active military reserves, restoration of Polish army would be impossible. Genesis of creating paramilitary organizations in Poland goes as far as to the beginning of the 20th century. The contemporary Austrian authorities gave countenance to founding the army. they also sought human resourc-es to refill their own military forces. the first World War was an oppor-tunity for using the troops trained in Polish military units. they were soon to hasten the restoration of Polish army3. the paramilitary organi-zations under Józef Piłsudski, such as Riflemen’s Association and Polish

1 M. cieślarczyk, Kultura bezpieczeństwa i obronności, Wyd. AP, Siedlce 2010, p. 210.2 comp. J. Piwowarski, Three Pillars of Security Culture, „Kultura Bezpieczeństwa. nau-

ka – Praktyka – Refleksje”, 2015, no 19, p. 34–44 and others.3 J. Gaul, Na tajnym froncie. Działalność informacyjna-wywiadowcza polskich organizacji

niepodległościowych w latach 1914–1918, Warszawa 2001, p. 60–62.

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Rifle Squads, who fought as a part of Polish Legion became a foundation to commissioned and non-commissioned cadres of restored Poland4. the voluntary fight for restored homeland had a huge impact on the social life of the Second republic of Poland. voluntary mobilisation referred to Po-spolite ruszenie (lit. mass mobilisation) of Kingdom of Poland, and many historical uprisings. it ultimately strengthened the national identity of the contemporary citizens whose homeland did not exist formally when they were born.

Although the requirements of choosing the corps were very strict (they depended on degree which very often was closely connected with one’s social status), in the end each Pole was granted the right to fight for and serve their homeland, regardless the background. homeland defence had no longer been a domain of the nobles only. In 1920, through the appeal to countrymen on mobilization, prime minister Witos rooted the idea of being legally equal, and showed benefits of being a Pole. It was especially important during the interwar period5. after joining the army, many peo-ple of lower status encountered civic education for the first time which re-sulted in changing their definition of homeland. they soon learnt that the whole nation, not only the country they were born in, was their home. the army consisted of not only educated the citizens, but also raised the rep-resentatives of all professions, political parties, religions, or ethnic groups. Putting elements of security culture as a goal of civic care allowed to tidy up the system of social values.

an appeal of commander in chief addressed to students in Poland encouraged the creation of student companies and battalions within big-ger academic environments, among them being lublin, cracow, Poznan, vilnius, and lviv. the initial tasks of students in uniforms was guarding service, maintaining public order, or representative functions6. it could be stated that the main stimulus for creating the solid and fully armed stu-dent subunits was academic independent youth congress. the congress took place at the beginning of November 1918 in Lviv, today Ukraine. At the time, ukrainian national council of Western ukrainian’s People re-public led to war which was almost equal to losing Polish Lviv.

4 W. lipiński, Walka zbrojna o niepodległość Polski 1905–1918, Warszawa 1935, p. 20.5 D. Kowalska, Naród zbudowany nad trumną, „Focus Historia”, 2013, no 9 (77), p. 34.6 e. Walczak, 36 pułk piechoty Legii Akademickiej, Pruszków 1994, p. 3–5.

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On 11 November, during debates in Warsaw, Academic Pedagogical committee established the legion, adepts of which were trained in War-saw university of Sciences, Warsaw university, and Warsaw university of life Sciences. the so-called Student army was barracked in Warsaw. On 3 December 1918 the unit was granted the rank of infantry regiment, and given the number 36. The amount of students being part of the unit defines its character – out of 1 200 soldiers, 800 of them were students7. When it came to the range of the new unit, Marshal Józef Piłsudski him-self took the soldiers’ oath, which was equal to gaining very high recogni-tion of the Polish society8. a few months later the new soldiers were sent to lviv to the rescue. the participation of the regiment in the Battle of Warsaw, and Kiev offensive in 1918–1920 were its first important events. the loss taken during the battles gave the foundation of the ideal of heroic Polish soldier. it became an ideal worth imitating. not only had it to do with civic society, but primarily with creating a model of a student whose life is given as sacrifice on their homeland’s altar.

Until the end of the Legion’s activity, 36 soldiers were conferred upon the war order virtuti Militari. the decoration is a symbol of recognizing the valour of students and the followers of their tradition9. Since 1921 the regiment began to hire employees. the regiment referred to customs of academic symbols until the end of its activity. one of such was funding the flag of the unit solely by the students and authorities of Warsaw univer-sity, Warsaw university of Sciences, Warsaw university of life Sciences, and Warsaw School of economics. the final shape of the regiment deco-ration – a unique reward conferred upon the most recognized soldiers by Chapter of orders – was that of cross, with miniature coats of arms of the universities10 mentioned.

When the borders of Poland were formed, both the administration and social interest in paramilitary organizations began to decrease. the May coup d’État was one of the reasons of the change. it was when Mar-shal Józef Piłsudski ordered to put greater importance to civil defence 7 Ibidem, p. 4.8 S. Pomarański, Zarys historji wojennej 36-go Pułku Piechoty Legii Akademickiej, Warsza-

wa 1930, p. 25.9 Ibidem, p. 63.10 Z. Sawicki, a. Wielechowski, Odznaki Wojska Polskiego 1918–1945. Katalog Zbioru

Falerystycznego: Wojsko Polskie 1918–1939. Polskie Siły Zbrojne Na Zachodzie, Warsza-wa 2007.

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courses, and to physical training11. Until 29 November 1937, when these courses became compulsory during military training, there were no sanc-tioned state organizations which would train the future cadres. through the State office of Physical training and Military Defence, the Military Affairs Minister established headquarters of Academic Legion. It became the sole responsibility of the legion to train students since12.

it was the responsibility of the universities to establish specialized or-ganizations to train their own students. the universities were establishing their legions to provide basic infantry training for one year. each university was supplied with uniforms, equipment, and arms by Polish Army. This enabled the trainings to be fully executed. the final stage of these trainings were camps of academic legion. these were to prepare the students for the specificity of wartime. Mostly, the camp trainings were provided for units no larger than companies (80 people), and on the basis of particular specialties. the name “Military and Social camp” illustrates the character of the training. cracow academic legion continued the process until World War II. The last camp took place in July 1939 in Sorocko near Trembow-la13. Kazimierz Walter, scholar and sports instructor, was appointed training commander. Previously, he was a lieutenant (res.) of Polish army.

the analysis of photographic documentation towards shaping the so-cial awareness of security culture enables to break down the activities tak-en into several categories14. the first includes the events connected with patriotic and religious rituals and celebrations of Polish army. the ac-ademic legion unit in Serocko used to demonstrate parade drills to the locals, participate in holy Masses, and in hoisting of the national flag. the celebrations were held with the accompany of the local brass band, and representatives of local authority. every demonstration of army presence in minor countries, especially disputable lands of Poland and its neigh-

11 a. ignatowicz, Przygotowanie obronne społeczeństwa w Polsce (1921–1939), Warsza-wa 2010, p. 296.

12 More on organisation and service submission within Military affairs Ministry could be found in the book of regina czarnecka, Organizacja Ministerstwa Spraw Wo-jskowych (MSWojsk.) w latach 1918–1921, “Biuletyn Wojskowej Służby archiwalnej”, 2005, no 27.

13 M. Maszowska-rzeszutko, Kazimierz Walter – współzałożyciel AZS, „akademicki Przegląd Sportowy”, 1993, no 7.

14 Specifically, the Obóz Wojskowo-Społeczny Legii Akademickiej Sorodku, Lipiec 1939 al-bum; the photographic documentation is stored in KUL Academic Legion Archive.

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bours, is a manifestation of readiness to defend the current borders, and of preventive might. the positive reception of society was highly motivating for the legionnaires to continue their training. they were becoming even more aware of importance of their duty, and encouraged to take up spe-cialized service as means of guarantee of Polish sovereignty15.

another category of events is community service executed by the young soldiers. the service also affected both citizens and the legionnaires. apart from physical duty, which all participants did, the commander also as-signed more specialized duties to the students with accordance to their degree and preferences. Physical duty meant assistance within households: during harvest period, taking care of household animals, or amelioration of local roads. Specialized duty could be treated as a sort of profession-al internship since among the responsibilities were activities connected directly with their future professions. for instance, students of medicine were working in local clinics, students of humanities did in orphanages, future lawyers educated the local people in scope of civics. these activities showed that military uniform not only stood for the symbol of homeland defence, but also for the caring role of the state which is able to give its society the feeling of security in many other spheres of life.

another major category of activities was battlefield training. execu-tion of the training programmes ensured continuity in providing inactive armed forces which were to join commissioned and non-commissioned corps. Basing on the historical independence bursts regardless social sta-tus, it was important to keep army on permanent standby to possibly pro-mote the tactical units at least one rank higher in the military hierarchy. By joining the army, the citizens contributed to promote military service which in the end stood for civic maturity. the first World War gave rise to the conscription of Poles to enemy armies which very often forced the Poles to kill their compatriots. this was the reason for finding ways to being exempted from military service, or desertions. new training stand-ards were primarily to change the social perception of military service as dehumanizing. it was believed it would eventually to be used for interests standing in great opposition to values learnt at family home.

15 uniformization of the interwar period society refers to chivalric ethos of specific cus-toms. The customs were put equal to such legal regulations as uniform code, or general one of armed forces of the republic of Poland. More on raising values of uniformiza-tion: M. Barbasiewicz, Dobre maniery w przedwojennej Polsce, Warszawa 2012.

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all-development activities are also worth mentioning. Pedagogical sys-tem promoted the physical training based lifestyle among the youth to create the image of citizens who take care of their own development in favour of national defence16. this thesis is confirmed by the growing pop-ularity of both already existing sports and defence associations, and of the new ones whose members differ with regard to age, interest, or sex. it was particularly seen in case of Military education of Women17.

Academic Legion of the Catholic University of Lublin and its role in creating social models in favour of supporting security

after Second World War, socialism has also entered social and defence or-ganizations. new ruling model assumed creation of a social bonds between the authorities and society. hence, the Polish youth was to be raised in the spirit of socialism. In 1976 the responsibilities of social and defence or-ganizations were uniformed by the act on General Defence obligation of the People’s republic of Poland. the act states that the responsibilities of those organizations were subject to the needs of Polish People’s army18. associations and unions became truly free and autonomous after the trans-formation of the political system, and exercise of the Law on associations, 7 April 1989. Some organizations could not be legalized by the communist authorities because pre-war traditions were not accepted19. after transform-ing the political system, these organizations joined the already existing ones.

the change of the political system also brought the change of the au-thorities’ perception of the sports and defence organizations. current mil-itarisation of everyday life, which conjured up the ideas of socialism, was discouraging new organizations from attempting to use system solutions. as a result, security culture could be prolonged only by means of grass-roots initiatives which very often revived pre-war traditions and models. When the amount of the organizations had started to grow nationally – 16 comp. l. Szymański, Kultura f izyczna w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej, Wrocław 1995,

p. 39–50.17 More on Military education of Women: e. Zawacka, Czekając na rozkaz: Pogotowie

Społeczne Organizacji Przysposobienia Wojskowego Kobiet w przededniu II wojny świa-towej, Lublin 1992; M. Wiśniewska, Przygotowanie obronne kobiet w Polsce w latach 1921–1939, Toruń 2007; Regulamin organizacyjny / Organizacja Przysposobienia Wo-jskowego Kobiet, Warszawa 1939; M. St. Wittekówna, Wojskowa Służba Kobiet w SZP-ZWZ-AK, Pruszków 1999, p. 16.

18 Organizacje Paramilitarne Obronne, [in:] Mała encyklopedia wojskowa, vol. II, p. 537–538.19 Dz.U 1989, nr 20, poz. 104.

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no longer episodically affecting such spheres of everyday life as culture, upbringing the youth, or creating new models of civic responsibility – it became clear that such potential cannot be ignored. in other cases the lack of system solutions gave way to establishing new organizational and social structures whose mission was to make up for the objectives which the current legal authorities failed to achieve20.

In the years 2003–2009 Ministry of National Defence, through univer-sity military defence units, trained students for the needs of Polish army. inactive force training course (hitherto KSr), being voluntary in its character, was to be replaced by university of inactive cadets. it trained inactive commissioned officers to join the future corps of command cad-res21. Students who did not participate in military training for different reasons, or simply did not complete it, joined the Studies of civic training Kul. in this way, the idea of creating the Student association academ-ic Legion KUL (hitherto AL KUL) – reviving the pre-war character of training – appeared. On 26 March 2004 Academic Senate filled the appli-cation for creating the association. cooperating with the Studies of civic training Kul started to gain more members, namely the students who have had completed the military service but did not follow any further forms of military education since.

the legal act governing the scope of activity was rules of academic as-sociation “al Kul”22. initially, the activity of the association was conduct-ed only on academic grounds, and by cooperation with national Defence Ministry, with the net of military units in the whole country. General provi-sions of rules refer to social character of the association. this automatically broadens the model of training conducted as part of KSr. eventually, the provisions serve to shape civic attitude within academic society. as a result, the youth who joined the association displayed a very different attitude towards the training as opposed to those enrolling to study23. 20 See K. Wójcik, Rezerwisto! Powołaj się sam!, https://obronanarodowa.pl/artykuly/

display/rezerwisto-powolaj-si-sam/, accessed 14.02.2016.21 resolution of national education and Sports Minister, and of health Minister from

October 2nd on way of conducting civic education courses for male and female stu-dents (Dz.U. nr 174 poz. 1686, with amendments).

22 Regulamin Stowarzyszenia Studenckiego Legia Akademicka KUL, http://www.kul.pl/ o-nas,11412.html, accessed: 13.02.2016.

23 Legia Akademicka KUL werbuje i szkoli na żołnierzy, http://www.dziennikwschodni.pl/lublin/n,140319469,legia-akademicka-kul-werbuje-i-szkoli-na-zolnierzy.html, ac-cessed: 14.02.2016.

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from the beginning the main objective of al Kul was to perform training nationally by commissioned and non-commissioned officers work-ing in the units of Polish army. the officers were delegated by the units who provided training grounds. the host’s approach towards the training was crucial. they performed a standard military training which nobilitated the participants. it was important to motivate the students even more to promote the model of patriotism which relies on voluntary action. the units which conducted the trainings were: 3rd Mechanized Brigade, Romuald Traugutt Aviation Forces Training Centre, Tadeusz Kościuszko 1st Warsaw Armoured Brigade, 25th Air Cavalry Brigade, Polish Air Force Academy, 6th Storm Assault Brigade, Polish Naval Academy, Border Guard Training centre Koszalin, General tadeusz Kościuszko Military academy of land forces, and air force training centre24.

Rooting security culture in society – activities of AL KUL

after ten years since creation of al Kul, the status formula and ways of its realization was broadened. imperfection of national security system de-termined the social pressure which, in turn, forced the changes mentioned to happen. the professionalization of Polish army which took place, and the shift of social attention to conflicts happening outside our country were the factors due to which extramilitary national defence was severe-ly neglected. one of the most important parts of paramilitary defence were units of civic Defence which are currently a fiction. the official data mentioning them do not reflect reality25. also the formula of defence ed-ucation in secondary schools has been broken which resulted in the civic education subject giving way to education for Safety. the new subject has been totally deprived of defence theme. currently, it boils down to teaching first aid only. the only common and compulsory part of defence education has been cancelled26.

another grassroots problem which also remains to be solved is the op-eration of secondary schools which provide military education. as of today

24 Legia Akademicka KUL, „Przegląd Strzelecki arsenał Miesięcznik federacji organ-izacji Proobronnych”, 2015, no 3 (118), p. 19.

25 More on civic Defence formation: informacja o wynikach kontroli Przygotowanie struktur obrony cywilnej do realizacji zadań w okresie wojny i pokoju, Warszawa 2012.

26 Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa, http://www.oswiata.abc.com.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/edukacja- dla-bezpieczenstwa-zamiast-przysposobienia-obronnego, accessed: 14.02.2016.

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there are more than 200 secondary schools, with about 20 000 students, which provide defence education. So far, national Defence Ministry spec-ified the requirements of those classes to be met. However, no tools were given to achieve this goal. this makes the school authorities to ask defence non-government organizations27 for help.

Student association al Kul takes numbers of initiatives to affect the shaping of security culture. these could be broken down into the follow-ing categories:- actions taken in favour of sustaining public security and order, - defence education of society, - promotion of patriotic and civic attitude.

the association took first anticrisis actions on the turning of the year 2010. A new profile of organization has been created, namely being on standby to take actions supporting state mechanisms to sustain nation-al security and order. On April 2010, the Chancellery of the President asked specific defence organisations to help secure the mourning cele-brations held in Presidential Palace in Warsaw. During the celebrations it was possible to pay tribute to the late presidential couple, which attracted citizens from different regions of the country. this made the celebration a form of permanent civic gathering28. Members of al Kul were part of emergency services. their role was to ensure the continuity of movement during visits in Presidential Palace, to monitor the dangers resulting from creating clusters of anonymous people who were not controlled previously, to position health patrols in strategic points, and to act as a link between other emergency services and decisive centre in the chancellery. Society saw this role as an example of arranging the element of social activity as part of supporting the state structures to ensure public order. Such behav-iour model showed that it was possible for society and public order organ-izations to cooperate, and even to self-organize during social gatherings.

a month later, there was one of the biggest floods in Poland. Dwelling territories were deluged in almost every voivodeship. the flood paralysed

27 See: Decyzja Nr 10/Szkol./P7 Ministra Obrony Narodowej, 21 January 2015 on in-troducing the “educational programme minimum to be realised as part of innovative civic education programme, or education for safety, or training programmes for the members of non-governmental organizations required to sign the agreement with the military school or training facility commander”.

28 More on mourning celebration and security conducted are showed in the film “Soli-darni 2010” of E. Stankiewicz, J. Pospieszalski, Poland 2010.

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traffic, household infrastructure, and considerably worsened functionality of the locals. lack of system solutions to involve non-government organ-isations in the rescue operations made it very difficult to help the needy. these actions, taken in collaboration with local self-governments were a part of another grassroots initiative. Depending on the priority of needs, the legionnaires took different actions, like levee strengthening, evacua-tion of the locals in danger, keeping connection between rescue services, preventive actions to eliminate social anxiety, and in the last stage of the flood, removing its effects. these actions were taken until the end of July in the following cities: Janowiec, Bogatynia, Płock, and Dobrzyków.

until recently al Kul supports civic initiatives by arranging emer-gency, health, or logistic services. among the examples of initiatives taken, one could enumerate providing security for events of student and local governances, for prayer, or educational and cultural celebrations. current-ly, the task of providing security of National Youth Day 2016 lies ahead of the Association. National Youth Day 2016 takes place both in Lubelskie voivodeship, and in cracow. here, the association has been incorporated in the security system on the request of organs of public administration. al Kul has been invited to be a member of the advisory and consultative team, established by the voivode, to deal with matters of security of the guests visiting lublin during the event29.

another set of events refers to defence education of different social groups. the oldest event of this type was the defence and “cool-army” sports competition30. the competition was highly popular both among stu-dents and soldiers. the association invited students of lubelskie voivode-ship, representatives of military schools, and military service organizational units, and other ones which root patriotic ideals. the prime goal of the com-petition was to promote national defence among the students, military high school students, and communities of lubelskie voivodeship. another goal was to integrate the students with representatives of military institutions. The programme – apart from purely technical competitions – included the points connected with popularization of defence and national security.

29 The first meeting of the team is to take place on 18 February 2016; the copy of invita-tion to the team can be found in the archive of the author (the wording of the lublin Voivode from February 2nd 2016).

30 Cool Armia, http://lublin.dlastudenta.pl/studia/artykul/COOL_ARMIA_2011,67790.html, accessed: 08.02.2016.

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When al Kul gained its own logistic apparatus, and instructor and equipment base, it started running its own training and education activity. first, military trainings were addressed to more students. it is no longer required to be a member of AL KUL. Among the self-invented initia-tives, the following courses are worth enumerating: self-defence for female students “Safe Student” (“Bezpieczna Studentka”), first aid for new stu-dents (in cooperation with Work Safety regulations Kul Department), sports shooting, Basics of connectivity31. less professional defence initi-atives demanded specialized trainings. this enabled providing the whole gamut of courses addressed to a wide group of members of paramilitary organisations and high school military students. very often participation in the courses ends up with constant social and educational cooperation. an example of such is education of high school military students in the following facilities: 14th secondary school in Lublin, 3rd school complex in Puławy, secondary school military school centre in Zamość.

the attempt of teaching the role of Western european defence or-ganisations resulted in arranging training ground exercises conducted with cooperation with local self-governances. for the locals watching the training it was an important signal that self-defence groups are able to organise themselves to defend the country, especially in relation to social anxiety caused by the conflict in eastern ukraine32. On October 12th and 13th 2013, in cooperation with the Obronanarodowa.Pl movement, the national manoeuvres “company Performing Delay operations Świdnik 2013” were performed. Until recently it was the biggest training of urban warfare type in Poland. Western formations territorial Defence inspired the idea of placing the army outside of barracks and training grounds to test one’s skills in an ordinary environment33.

the manifestation of national symbols, or ones referring to history of Polish arms, or to national patriotism, became an important ritual of strengthening identity in society. Participation in state and religious cel-ebrations partially granted association the representative function of the Polish army. association suggested support of both military and civic in-stitutions which would hand down state traditions. apart from common

31 Bezpieczna studentka, http://www.kurierlubelski.pl/tag/bezpieczna-studentka-lublin.html, accessed: 13.02.2016.

32 K. Miękus, Nie masz 500 żyć, „Malemen”, 2015, no 5 (52), p. 30.33 Obrona Narodowa, https://obronanarodowa.pl/news/display/195/, accessed: 13.02.2016.

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customs such as flower offering or arranging flag bearer, the legionnaires participated in the celebrations in ways which were typical for army only, namely through installing military posts. an example of honour post put in a glorious spot among national symbols was the one arranged by al KUL members on 17 September 2015 at the Anonymous Soldier Grave “for you, my dear homeland” in Warsaw during the first gathering of De-fence organisations.

By means of reference to university customs, on 17 May 2013 AL KUL was conferred upon the flag, and the patron – sub-lieutenant Jan Bołbott. the ceremony could be said to revive the memory of the long forgotten hero34. acceptation of the patron was also seen as cultivation of memory of the contemporary equivalent to Border Guard Service. An objective source of assessment of the legionnaires’ contribution to promotion of security culture are official awards. Some are congratulatory letters and acknowledgement addressed to the Board of association, or to universi-ty authorities. they authenticate the association contribution in shaping the culture of security. a particular form of confirming the legitimacy of the models created is being conferred upon with different decorations by institution of different character – medals, honour orders, badges (both association as a whole, and each member individually). the most fre-quently conferred decorations are the department – Medal for defensive merits of the country (three-degree), conferred by head of national De-fence Ministry – church – “Militio Pro Christo”, and “Blessed Reverend Jerzy Popiełuszko Medal” conferred by Military Ordinariate of Poland – and organisational ones – “Medal for firefighting merits”35.

summary

Shaping social awareness of security culture is not an easy task. it is con-nected with creating plenty of new structures, but primarily with chang-es regarding the social awareness of citizens. communist apathy towards grassroots initiative of citizens has also entered security sphere. restoration 34 Sub-lieutenant Bołbott was born in 1911. Studied on department of law, and econom-

ic and social sciences of the Catholic University of Lublin. In August of 1939 was mo-bilised to fortress Battalion “Sarny”, and became the commander of “tynne” pluton in 4th company. Died a heroic death on September 20th 1939 in a bunker explosion near tynne country after four days of struggle against red army.

35 Kolejne medale od MONu, http://legiaakademicka.pl/aktualnosci/kolejne-medale-od-monu/, accessed: 14.02.2016.

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of social awareness requires the change of perception of defence organisa-tion and of the army. Militarisation of everyday life during the mid-50s, which conjured up the ideas of socialism, was discouraging new organiza-tions from attempting to use system solutions. Without these it will be very difficult to create inactive military force which eventually should become one of the most important parts of modern defence system.

this article has described, on the basis of the al Kul, one part of the republic of Poland security system which consists of student defence organisations. Their prime goal, following the Legion of 1918, is to root national patriotism, and to create civic society. they are one of the most important elements of security culture. elements whose potential has yet to be appreciated and put to proper use.

References:

1. Barbasiewicz M., Dobre maniery w przedwojennej Polsce, Warszawa 2012.2. Bezpieczna Studentka, http://www.kurierlubelski.pl/tag/bezpieczna-

studentka-lublin.html, accessed: 13.02.2016.3. cieślarczyk M., Kultura bezpieczeństwa i obronności, Siedlce 2010.4. Cool Armia, http://lublin.dlastudenta.pl/studia/artykul/cool_

ARMIA_2011,67790.html, accessed: 08.02.2016.5. czarnecka r., Organizacja Ministerstwa Spraw Wojskowych (MSWojsk.)

w latach 1918–1921, „Biuletyn Wojskowej Służby Archiwalnej”, 2005, no 27.

6. Decyzja Nr 10/Szkol./P7 Ministra Obrony Narodowej z dnia 21 stycz-nia 2015 r. w sprawie wprowadzenia „Minimum programowego re-alizowanego w ramach innowacyjnych programów przysposobienia obronnego lub edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa oraz programów szkolenia członków organizacji pozarządowych, wymaganych do podpisania po-rozumień z komendantem szkoły wojskowej lub ośrodka szkolenia”.

7. Dz.U. 1989, nr 20, poz. 104, 7 April 1989, Law on associations. 8. Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa, http://www.oswiata.abc.com.pl/czytaj/-/

artykul/edukacja-dla-bezpieczenstwa-zamiast-przysposobienia- obronnego, accessed: 14.02.2016.

9. Gaul J., Na tajnym froncie. Działalność informacyjna-wywiadowcza pols-kich organizacji niepodległościowych w latach 1914–1918, Warszawa 2001.

10. ignatowicz a., Przygotowanie obronne społeczeństwa w Polsce (1921–1939), Warszawa 2010.

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11. Informacja o wynikach kontroli „Przygotowanie struktur obrony cywilnej do realizacji zadań w okresie wojny i pokoju”, Warszawa 2012.

12. Jarmoszko S., Nowe wzory kultury bezpieczeństwa a procesy deterio-racji więzi społecznej, [in:] Jedność i różnorodność. Kultura vs. kultury, E. Rekłajtis, R. Wiśniewski, J. Zdanowski (eds.), Warszawa 2010.

13. Kolejne medale od MONu, http://legiaakademicka.pl/aktualnosci/kolejne -medale-od-monu/, accessed: 13.02.2016.

14. Kowalska D., Naród zbudowany nad trumną, „Focus Historia”, 2013, no 9 (77).

15. Legia Akademicka KUL werbuje i szkoli na żołnierzy, http://www. dziennikwschodni.pl/lublin/n,140319469,legia-akademicka-kul- werbuje-i-szkoli-na-zolnierzy.html, accessed: 14.02.2016.

16. Legia Akademicka KUL, [in:] “Przegląd Strzelecki arsenał Miesięcznik Federacji Organizacji Proobronnych”, 2015, no 3 (118).

17. lipiński W., Walka zbrojna o niepodległość Polski 1905–1918, Warsza-wa 1935.

18. Maszowska-rzeszutko M., Kazimierz Walter-współzałożyciel AZS, „Akademicki Przegląd Sportowy”, 1993, no 7/93.

19. Miękus K., Nie masz 500 żyć, “Malemen”, 2015, no 5 (52).20. Obrona Narodowa, https://obronanarodowa.pl/news/display/195/, ac-

cessed: 13.02.2016.21. Organizacje Paramilitarne Obronne, [in:] Mała encyklopedia wojskowa,

vol. ii.22. Piwowarski J., Three Pillars of Security Culture, „Kultura Bezpieczeńst-

wa. Nauka – Praktyka – Refleksje”, 2015, no 19.23. Pomarański S., Zarys historji wojennej 36-go Pułku Piechoty Legii

Akademickiej, Warszawa 1930.24. Regulamin organizacyjny / Organizacja Przysposobienia Wojskowego Ko-

biet, Warszawa 1939.25. Regulamin Stowarzyszenia Akademickiego Legia Akademicka KUL,

http://www.kul.pl/o-nas,11412.html, accessed: 13.02.2016.26. resolution of national education and Sports Minister, and of

Health Minister from October 2nd on way of conducting civic edu-cation courses for male and female students (Dz.U. nr 174 poz.1686, with amendments).

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27. Sawicki Z., Wielechowski a., Odznaki Wojska Polskiego 1918–1945. Katalog Zbioru Falerystycznego: Wojsko Polskie 1918–1939. Polskie Siły Zbrojne Na Zachodzie, Warszawa 2007.

28. Szkolenie kadetów ze szpulek, http://www.mmpulawy.pl/artykul/ zgwot-2012-szkolenie-kadetow-ze-szpulek, accessed: 29.04.2014.

29. Szymański l., Kultura f izyczna w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej, Wrocław 1995.

30. Walczak e., 36 pułk piechoty Legii Akademickiej, Pruszków 1994.31. Wiśniewska M., Przygotowanie obronne kobiet w Polsce w latach 1921–

1939, Toruń 2007.32. Wittekówna M. St., Wojskowa Służba Kobiet w SZP-ZWZ-AK,

Pruszków 1999.33. Wójcik K., Rezerwisto! Powołaj się sam!, https://obronanarodowa.pl/

artykuly/display/rezerwisto-powolaj-si-sam/, accessed: 14.02.2016.34. Zawacka e., Czekając na rozkaz: Pogotowie Społeczne Organizacji

Przysposobienia Wojskowego Kobiet w przededniu II wojny światowej, Lublin 1992.


u. Soler, D. Duda, Security Culture of the Paramilitary Youth Organiza-tions on the Example of Legia Akademicka KUL ( John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin), “Security Dimensions. international and national Studies”, 2016, no 18, p. 132–147


NO. 18; 2016 (148–162)

level of service disciPline of miliTiamen illusTraTed By The examPle of olsZTyn voivodeshiP

capt. Marcin Płotek, Ph.D.Police Academy in Szczytno, POLAND

ABSTRACT

the article reveals militia work from olsztyn voivodeship. it shows the first years of the command and the problems handled by the officers, the state of professional discipline, the level of education and training.

ARTICLE INFO


Key wordscitizens militia, history, Warmia and Mazury, level of service discipline, Milicja obywatelska

after the takeover of power in the so-called recovered territories [tak-en from Germany after II World War – editors] Polish administration started the work on establishing state institutions. among numerous of-fices of state administration that started from scratch, an important role was played by the organs of law enforcement and public safety. Service discipline is an important factor affecting the functioning of the whole organisation and the proper implementation of tasks by the officers. the aim of this work is an attempt to approximate the level of discipline of the Militia (hereinafter MO – acronym of Polish name Milicja Obywa-

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level of Service Discipline of Militiamen…

telska) of the provincial garrison command in olsztyn. it will present examples of activities of officers in the first period of the creation and work of Mo units in Warmia and Mazury and indicate possible reasons for their behaviour.

the source of knowledge about the activities of Mo bodies, attitudes of officers, their discipline and preparation for service comes from, apart from the information coming from representatives of central and local government, the reports of judicial employees of olsztyn appeal. they are important because they are an external evaluation of the work and behav-iour of Mo officiers. however, very critical judgements also flowed from militiamen themselves. first of all, negative opinions were expressed by provincial commanders responsible for discipline.

the article presents the cases that are exemplification of the general situation which developed in the second half of the forties of the twen-tieth century the ranks of the militia garrison of olsztyn, the regional capital. Basing on the description of the conditions in which the first of-ficers worked, the way they operated, their attitude to the society and the problems that occurred on and off duty one can conclude about the state of the morale of the then law enforcement officers. the analised period are the first years of functioning of the Militia in the province of olsztyn from 1945 to 1949. It was the time of militia units establishing and the formation of their structures. the history of Mo does not enjoy as much interest as the history of the office of Public Security1. an important work is the one by Piotr Majer, describing the past of the formation from its inception to 1957. There one can find information about the work of the militia of Warmia and Mazuria2. the subject of the work of Mo units has been discussed in books by Bohdan Łukszewicz3, Marcin Płotek4, ryszard tomkiewicz5. older ones include first and foremost the work by

1 J. Dworzecki, Police in Poland. Selected Issues, Kraków 2011, p. 241.2 P. Majer, Civic Militia 1944–1957, Genesis, organization, work, place in the power appa-

ratus, Olsztyn 2004.3 Ł. Łukaszewicz, Military District Court in Olsztyn 1946–1955, Outlines of the Mono-

graph, Olsztyn 2000. 4 M. Płotek, Difficult Beginnings. The Mazury District 1945–1946, Dąbrówno 2011;

idem, Officers of Civic Militia from the Perspective of Judges of Olsztyn Appeal, [in:] 95 Years of Police Forces in Poland, E. Ura, S. Pieprzny (eds.), Rzeszów 2015.

5 r. tomkiewicz, Everyday Life of Inhabitants of Post-war Olsztyn 1945–1956, Olsztyn 2003.

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B. Łukaszewicz6 and the commemorative book published for the 25th anniversary of Mo and political secret police7.

archival materials used in this article are stored in the archives of the State in olsztyn. they include a team of the court of appeal in olsztyn and the institute of national remembrance in Bialystok.

On 14 March 1945 four administrative districts were formed. They were led by the government’s plenipotentiaries. they were to supervise the institutions and bodies other than the military and judiciary. On 23 May 1945 Jakub Prawin, the plenipotentiary in charge of the Mazurian Dis-trict symbolically took civil power from the hands of the representatives of the Soviet troops8. the coercive apparatus in post-war Poland played an important role in gaining and strengthening the hegemony of the com-munists. the management of Polish Workers’ Party were aware that the assumption of power and its maintenance ought to be done, among others, with the help of the so-called people’s oppression apparatus which in-cluded the Militia, the office of the Security and the army9. the staffing structure of the MO Provincial Headquarters was created from the of-ficers of the “lublin” operational group who arrived on 7 april. its direc-tor was the first provincial commander, Mjr Józef Pacyna-Głowacki10. on 16 April the eighty-person “Kielce” group arrived, commanded by Lt Eu-geniusz Gałka. Between 15 and 17 June another one hundred militiamen arrived, this time from the “Bydgoszcz-Poznań” group. officially, the pro-vincial command in Olsztyn started operations on 14 April.

Then, from June to July 1945 officers delegated from the MO Provin-cial Headquarters formed the district headquarters of MO (hereinafter

6 B. Łukaszewicz, For New Poland. From the History of the Apparatus of Safety and Public Order in Warmia and Mazuria in the Years 1945–1950, Olsztyn 1989.

7 h. Panas, r. Wachowiec, t. Willan, W. Zamecki, In the Service of the Nation in Warmii i Mazuria. XXV years of Civic Militia and Political Secret Police, Olsztyn 1969.

8 K. lesiakowski, The Role of the District Office of Public Security in Central Poland and in the Regained Territories in the Years 1945–1947, [in:] Communist Authorities Towards the Regained Territories after WW II, S. Łacha (ed.), Słupsk 1997, p. 41.

9 K. lesiakowski, The Role of the District Office of Public Security in Central Poland and in the Regained Territories in the Years 1945–1947, [in:] Communist Authorities Towards the Regained Territories after WW II, S. Łacha (ed.), Słupsk 1997, p. 41.

10 B. Łukaszewicz, op. cit., p. 27. 3 IV 1945 the Chief Commandant of MO upon the Order no 5 established five operational groups with a view to organising MO in the Regained Territories. Olsztyn group was formed by 4 officers and 172 militiamen.

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KP Mo)11. Problems with violation of discipline by Mo officers were of-ten the cause of complaints arising from the administration of the district. Governors had serious problems with the stabilization of relationships with law enforcement and public safety bodies. Especially in mid-1945 the office of attorney for the District of Mazury received a lot of com-plaints on the way Mo operated. the head of the county in the Prussian Iławka wrote in the report of June 1945 that the local MO unit consisted of five officers and the commander. the skills of the officers were disas-trous, which according to him, meant that it was “absolutely necessary to look after them”. for example, one of them shot himself because he could not handle the weapon and the commandant travelled to olsztyn with a subordinate, and never returned. therefore, the three other militiamen were disarmed and sent back to the capital district12.

in the same month the representatives of the Morąg county assessed the work of law enforcement bodies as “beneath all criticism”. officers were characterised by the absence of subordination, alcohol overuse and ignoring their superiors. During his visit to the barracks the governor found the commander and other police officers “with chicks in bed, not on duty”13. Also, the Governor of Kętrzyn in July 1945 negatively rated the work of the militiamen from the district. Despite the fact that this was a small unit, the officers were characterised by the lack of discipline. the commander of the municipal administration disregarded the orders of the county administration. the militiamen robbed both Poles and Germans of food. Alcohol was the source of quarrels with the employees of the State repatriation office14. A similar situation took place in August 1945. In Gierdawy the Governor characterized the militia as follows: “(…) the Mo staff consist of the element without proper moral values and responsible training. the commander of the county, a very young man, without proper service preparation, does not have his subordinates’ ear, the state of securi-ty has not improved since the day of Mo arrival”. later, the governor still complained about the conduct of officers which even worsened the already 11 Ibidem. P. Majer gives 17 April 1945 as the date of the beginning of the work of the

Mo command of the Province, see P. Majer, op. cit., p. 115 as cited in Z. Jakubowski, The Creation and Work of the Apparatus of Safety and Civic Militia in the Western and Northern Territories (1945–1950), “Historical Notebooks ASW”. 1988, vol. 8, p. 20.

12 Ibidem. p. 143.13 ibidem.14 Ibidem, p. 144.

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hard situation in the district. In January 1946 complaints regarding the brutality of the Militia flowed every day. they robbed the German popu-lation. there was even a situation in which militiamen began to plunder the neighboring district of Kętrzyn. instead of decreasing, crime increased due to the conduct of Mo servicemen. the state of affairs was explained in the following way: “the commander of the Mo station is illiterate and makes use of his son who is not a militiaman, either. the command-er’s wife also interferes with the work of the militia”15. in the report of May 1946 the Mrągowo county governor pointed out that the security situation was still unsatisfactory. the reasons included young and poorly trained militia officers who did not understand the nature of the work of security institutions16.

The problem with the quality of staff was also noticed by the pro-vincial commander of MO, Józef Pacyna-Głowacki. In August 1945 he complained about the lack of people with the appropriate work and life experience. also, it lacked properly prepared officers who would be able to take over positions of district commanders. the commander of the Province did not hide that some militia officers had had to be expelled because they were inexperienced and “of low moral level”. the problem was that it was not anybody who could replace them. in the assessment of the commander the militia needed “the healthiest element” and the local one was demoralised17.

the level of discipline and low morale of the officers can be illustrated by the example of MO station in Dąbrówno. In this unit it was decided to change the position of the commander because of “continuous drunk-enness and rows” inspired by the until then leader. Between the previous and the new commander there was a conflict due to the introduced dis-cipline and a change of the current conduct of officers. as a result, after a few rows, a try to rebel other militiamen from the station and attempted shooting of the new commandant, the former commander together with his son defected from the ranks of Mo18.

15 Ibidem, p. 144–145.16 Ibidem, p. 143. 17 Ibidem, p. 141–142.18 The Institute of National Remembrance, Bi, 120/198, p. 11–19. Decade report on the

work of MO Provincial Command in Mazuria District of 5 June 1945 for the period between 25 May and 5 June 1945.

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Since the beginning of the functioning of the militia in the District of Mazury representatives of the judiciary evinced a negative attitude to the work of officers. Judges and prosecutors severely evaluated the attitude and behavior of militiamen. among others the Prosecutor of the court of appeal in olsztyn Zygmunt Kałapski pointed out that the officers did not have proper training and required the selection which would ensure the proper assortment of staff. he stressed that the ranks of the militia had to employ honest people, because property left unguarded in recovered territories was a “temptation” and “depraved people”19.

In September 1945 the judge of the District Court in Elk Władysław Markowski informed the President of the District court in elk Władysław Wilanowicz of the fact that militiamen in Pisz failed to carry out their duties. Moreover, they themselves were involved in the armed attacks20. In the January 1946 in decade report of the external service of the Pisz district command it was written that the state of morale of the militia left much to be desired. a part of rank and file officers do not understand their obligations. Drunkenness among them was frequent, which was the cause of scandals and failure to attain the tasks posed. Both the work done in the field by non-commissioned officers and political and educational talks, warnings or penalties imposed by the commander of the district did not bring the expected results21.

On 15 October 1945 prosecutor A. Frackowiak carried out an inspec-tion of one of the Mo stations around Prabuty. the staff of this unit was the commandant and four militiamen who had arrived two days earlier. The militiamen complained about the lack of basic equipment and chan-cellery utensils. the officers were young people without proper training, totally unprepared for the tasks they were entrusted with. Working con-ditions they encountered, the extremely poor state of the personal supply and bad food meant that they were dejected and discouraged. also, they

19 State Archive in Olsztyn, The Court of Appeal in Olsztyn, 2806/3, p. 259–260. [Au-gust 1945 ] A copy of the document of prosecutor Z. Kałapski adressed to the minister of justice in Warsaw.

20 State Archive in Olsztyn, The Court of Appeal in Olsztyn, sign. 2806/3, p. 346–350. The report from 21 September 1945 by W. Markowski, a judge of the Court of the Province of the service travel to Biała Piska and Pisz.

21 The Institute of National Remembrance, Bi, sign. 120/45, p. 14. Decade report no 1 of external service of the MO Province Command in Pisz for the period from 23 De-cember 1945 to 3 January 1946.

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did not receive proper uniforms and warm coats. regarding the board, they were left to “their own ingenuity and gaining food on their own”22.

another type of problems occurred in the district of Giżycko. on 13 September 1945 the District Cross-party Committee in Giżycko complained about the inactivity and drunkenness of the district command staff. in the letter to the provincial command they demanded that militia officers and their superiors be removed from their positions. the officers not only ignored the decisions of the governor, but also intoxicated had feuds with mayors, village heads and local people. Moreover, the perpetra-tors of theft and brawling which they committed under the influence of alcohol. there were also clashes with the soldiers of the red army23.

Difficulties in the functioning of the Giżycko militia were also perceived by the representatives of the judiciary. In 1945 the shameful behaviour of militia officers in the area of Giżycko county was described by Judge of the District court in Giżycko odo Klasse in the following manner:

in the city there exist the District command of Militia, the Municipal command of Mo and the District Security command. the skills of the functionaries of these units is the worst possible. Discipline almost none. attitude miserable. in connection with the present action for the expulsion of the Germans across the oder, there take place scandalous acts abuse by the militia. inhumane treatment, raking everything, in-cluding milk for babies, raping women, beatings, etc. Displaced Ger-mans are completely removed from the law. the attitude of the Militia to Polish citizens is also reprehensible. no prosecutor’s office on site produces total impunity. the district office is cluttered with complaints about the conduct of the Militia and can do nothing. therefore, any assimilation activity among Masurians is paralyzed. Masurians, seeing unprecedented abuse from the authorities, and, on the other hand, suc-cumbing to the German agitation go to Germany together with Ger-mans, and the country is getting depopulated of farmers. [...] if the mor-al and educative state of the Militia were raised to an at least possible level, public security in the county and in the city would be satisfactory. the current security state, still possible to withstand owes its condition only to the fact that the discussed areas are not of special interest for

22 State archive in olsztyn, the Prosecutor’s office of the court of appeal in olsztyn, 2819/10, p. 13. Letter from 18 October 1945 of a prosecutor of the District Prose-cutor’s office of the regional court in olsztyn a. frąckowiak to a prosecutor of the Prosecutor’s office of the court of appeal in olsztyn Z. Kałapski.

23 M. Płotek, op. cit., p. 144.

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the incoming criminal element, as these are areas already deserted and virtually devoid of portable possessions, suitable for easy plunder and removal. on the other hand, the militia sell the plundered things to the Germans at low prices and that makes different individuals arrive here to purchase these things, who, of course, take this opportunity to culti-vate the so-called looting24.

the situation in Giżycko was not improved by the creation of the dis-trict court and the prosecutor’s office. Prosecutor Zdzislaw Książkiewicz believed that cooperation of the prosecution and Mo county commands as well as the District offices of Public Security was “downright hostile”. the bad relationships were caused by the fact that the so-called security leadership “developed a complex of superiority and complete independ-ence from any authority or control factors”. according to Z. Książkiewicz people working in Mo and uB were “a jumble of different, often crimi-nal types”. the staff consisted of “fortuitously employed candidates” who, making the most of the situation, “ruled in a specific way”.

Due to the lack of military courts the Citizens’ Militia for quite a long period of time was subject to competences of common courts. Meanwhile, the provincial command, followed by individual county commanders, did not want to accept this state law. this thus formed a paradoxical situation. numerous crimes committed by the militia officers were not prosecut-ed because military courts the officers would be subject to, had not been created yet. ordinary courts or prosecutors’ offices were not handed over proceedings concerning the offenses committed by militiamen because commands did not notify of them. the prosecutor had to fight with the authorities of Mo for the cases against the militia to be handed over to his office. the victims were mostly intimidated natives, remaining silent. this situation meant that among the militia a sense of utter impunity became predominant. later, cases against the officers were taken over by the prosecution of the Military District court in olsztyn. Disciplinary dismissals of secret political police and Mo employees and conducted training affected the quality of work25.

24 M. Płotek, Officers…, p. 71.25 State archive in olsztyn, the Prosecutor’s office of the District court in Giżycko

(hereinafter: APO PSOG), sign. 2572/1, p. 247. Report from 21 January 1947 by Z. Książkiewicz on the work of the Prosecutor’s office of the District court in Giży-cko for the period from 18 February 1946 to 1 January 1947.

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the prosecutor of the court of appeal in olsztyn Zygmunt Kałapski at the congress of judges and prosecutors of appeals of Gdańsk, olsz-tyn and Toruń in November 1945 stated that within three months police work had improved thanks to the attitude of the provincial commander of Mo. Z. Kałapski was aware that militia officers consisted of a “raw and untrained element and sometimes irresponsible people”. there were attempts to change this state of affairs by improving the quality of work by making court employees participate in briefings, conducting lectures and providing immediate guidance. the fight against crime was impeded by the lack of well-trained militia forces. Kałapski cited examples of acts of abuse and crimes committed by Mo officers. investigating judge of elk applied a preventive measure in the form of detention in relation to seven officers and the commander of the city Mo station in Pisz. the reason for this preventive measure was a robbery carried out by militiamen on 9 October 1945 on two farmers in a village commune of Duży kocioł. In another case, four militiamen from the Pisz command of the district, go-ing from house to house, deprived the inhabitants of clothes. one of them was taken into custody. in Giżycko militiamen showed not only a lack of subordination but also basic knowledge on how to conduct investigations. the treatment of their citizens was considered reprehensible. in addition, prosecutors were confronted with incidents of insufficient uniforms of of-ficers and delayed payment of salaries, which was the cause of bitterness and pushing for bribery or even robbery26.

Problems with the maintenance of discipline in the ranks of Mo occurred and in subsequent years. Commanders of the province pointed out the lack thereof manifesting itself mainly in drunkenness and neglect of official duties. therefore, attempts were made to heal the situation in different ways. In September 1947 the commander of the province Bru-no Skuteli issued a special order concerning the lack of discipline and its loosening in the organizational units of Mo in which he stated that lately the state of discipline in the units had deteriorated. one could also notice widespread drunkenness among the militia, as evidenced by the following facts.26 State Archive in Olsztyn, The Court of Appeal in Olsztyn, 2806/47, p. 173–177. Sit-

uational report from 31 October 1945 delivered by a prosecutor of the Court of Ap-peal in olsztyn Z. Kałapski at the convention of judgies and prosecutors of apeals of Gdańsk, Olsztyn and Toruń on 3 and 4 November 1945. Formally, the District Prose-cutor’s Office in Olsztyn started work on 1 May 194; see. B. Łukaszewicz, op. cit., p. 32.

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In the MO District Headquarters MO in Szczytno on 17 September 1947 officers arranged a carousal in a store, as a result of which they beat each other and caused a fuss in the city, beating outsiders.

In the MO District Headquarters in Górowo Iławeckie an intoxicated militiaman on duty shot that command chauffeur, with whom he previ-ously drank alcohol.

On 28 September 1947 an officer of the District of Osterode, while under the influence of alcohol, shot at six people at a dance, as a result of which three persons died.

in addition, Skuteli stated that the militia behaved inappropriately in public places. Frequently the appearance of a militiaman was scruffy, of-ficers wore unbuttoned clothes and did not care about the cleanness of their uniforms. While apprehending civilians they performed professional duties intoxicated, which was the reason for frequent assault and battery. this indicated a lack of responsibility and discipline in performing offi-cial duties. therefore, he recommended that the political and educational department of the Mo command of the Province held a series of talks aimed at raising the moral level of officials. county commandants had to tighten discipline in the subordinate units through reinforced controls both during and after the service and immediately react to the slightest signs of a breach of discipline. the commander of the province forbade officers to attend public parties until further notice. the militiamen sent to the parties on duty did not have the right to stay inside the building where they were held.

in addition, everyone, regardless of rank and position, who perpetrated drunkenness, negligence of duties and deliberate breach of professional discipline was to be held to strict accountability, including bringing the matter to Military District Prosecutor’s office in olsztyn. he made the commanders and deputies for the political education responsible for the moral state of his subordinates. causing moral decay and allowing drunk-enness in the command of the district could be the cause of deprivation of the position of the commander and taking him to military court27.

The situation did not improve in subsequent years. The evidence might be the fact that morale still was not appropriate. Discipline, which was still at a low level, sought improvement. among others this was to be achieved

27 The Institute of National Remembrance, Bi, 120/319, k. 50. Special order no 23 of the MO commander of the province lieutenant colonel B. Skuteli from 29 September 1947.

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by a special order No. 46 of 12 May 1948 of the voivodeship commander Lt. Col. Joseph Marchwiński. In the order in question the commandant stressed that the formation created on the basis of the Decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation of 7 October 1944 “became a legal and public service of formation of Public Security”. its task was to protect the security, ensure peace and order, but the militia was also the “armed wing of the People’s Democracy”.

accordingly, J. Marchwiński ordered all officers, irrespective of their degree, to be role model for citizens as well as to avoid situations that “would cause offence to the militia uniform”, particularly:

a. alcohol abuse,b. reckless incurrence of debt,c. squandering and theft of state property,d. bribery,e. relationships with notorious characters,f. vulgar referring to citizens.apart from that, Marchwiński stressed that incidents of abuse of power

by officials of Mo happened. first of all, it was about forcing the beating of the detained and remaining in custody to acknowledge the blame or obtain incriminating evidence. as emphasized by the commander, beating people was contrary to the law and “tainted the entire apparatus of Mo in the eyes of society”. Therefore, in April 1948, not following these rules resulted in expelling seven officers and sentencing fifteen militiamen to 10–14 days in prison. At the same time he instructed the head of special branch to conduct an accelerated investigation against the interim com-mander of the Mo station in rybno for the abuse of power, specifically, beating people and to take the matter to the Military Prosecutor’s office in olsztyn. also, in the next two cases he ordered the referral of the case to the same prosecutor’s office. in the case of an officer of the operation-al platoon of the Mo Provincial command in olsztyn for allowing the arrested to escape and common drunkenness and the commander of the militia station in Małdyty for “inaction of power”.

Political and educational officers carried out a series of talks aimed at raising the moral level of Mo officials. commanders of the county were to “tighten discipline” in the subordinate units by enhancing control over the militia officers in the on and off duty. commandants and their deputies for politics and education were responsible for the moral state of their sub-

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ordinates. Marchwiński threatened that officers of Mo, regardless of the degree and position held, allowing the drunkenness, beatings, ill-treatment of citizens on and off duty and will be held to strict accountability, including bringing the matter to the Military Prosecutor’s office in olsztyn28.

the problem of binge drinking among militiamen appeared in later years. it was so serious that the commander of the provincial Mjr Jan Konieczny issued another special order. the document pointed out that in the region of olsztyn there was noticeable weakening of discipline in the ranks of Mo, primarily due to alcohol abuse by officers. “common drunk-enness in Mo units largely weakened the militia vigilance, undermined the authority and trust in bodies of Mo and gave up arms to the enemies of Polish People’s republic”. according to the commander, “the enemy used the incidents of offenses against militia and party discipline and tried every possible means to inspire his fancy, hostile work even among the less conscious Mo officials, urging them to commit various crimes”.

As negative examples of the conduct of officers, the commander quoted an incident involving two militiamen of Mo command of the Province in Węgorzewo who, being drunk, stripped naked in the presence of civil-ians. one of them lost his service weapon. in a show trial held in the Mo Provincial command the District Military court sentenced the men-tioned militiamen to prison.

Elsewhere, on 4 November 1949 the drunk commander of the militia station in Kumielsk, situated in the district of Pisz, shot three people with a pistol, the mayor of the local municipality, the chairman of the munici-pal People’s council and a random person. Moreover, he tried to shoot an encountered underage girl, but his gun got jammed. By the verdict of the District Military court the militiaman was sentenced in summary pro-ceedings to triple death penalty and ten years in prison. he was imposed a total penalty of death.

Major J. Konieczny ordered to treat cases of drunkenness on and off duty as a criminal offense under the provisions of the criminal code of the Polish army. he ordered those responsible, regardless of rank and position held to be apprehended immediately and, together with a report, brought to the disposal of the Department of Special Militia for further

28 The Institute of National Remembrance, Bi, 120/319, k. 112. Special order no 46 of the MO commander of the province lieutenant colonel Józef Marchwiński from 12 May 1948.

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investigation. also, department heads who would not respond to the iden-tified drunkenness among officers were to be brought to disciplinary and even criminal liability29.

Basing on the above mentioned reports it can be concluded that the discipline of the militia of the regional capital olsztyn was at a low level. it was reflected in a certain attitude towards the public, as well as their approach to their duties, or as in cases of a few officers even beginning a life of crime. you can see that the levels of demoralization in many cases reached a high degree. the reason for this state of affairs was mainly weak vocational training of the new Mo personnel, which was symptomatic of the whole country30. candidates preferred for service were of work-ing-class or peasant origin, which at that time was associated with low levels of education overall. in the case of the recovered territories should be noted that the first Mo staff consisted of people who came to the area from outside.

this was the reason for the lack of social ties, which occurred on the ancient lands. hence the officers did not know the environment in which they worked, they found it alien or even threatening. they had no sense of belonging to the environment in which they served. this led to aberrations in their behavior. there was also no proper recruitment and selection of personnel. verification of the Militia ranks had not proceeded until the time of service. in many cases these were random people, not necessarily honest, who should never enter the ranks of the Militia. We must also remember that the war had left a negative imprint on humans, in many cases leading to their demoralization. in addition, in the first years of the organization of coercive apparatus, officers worked in poor social conditions. They lacked adequate food or uniforms, not to mention the regular payment of wages. this situation led to the fact that the of-ficers got by, in some cases, committing a crime, and, the sense of impunity and the possessed power encouraged such behavior. executives, who were to act as role models and enforce proper performance of their duties, also did not meet expectations. What is more, many militiamen were young 29 The Institute of National Remembrance, Bi, 120/319, k. 240. Special order no 80 from

14 November 1949 on combating drunkenness in Mo ranks and increasing the level of discipline issued by Maj. Jan Konieczny, the Mo commander of the Province in olsztyn.

30 More widely the state of staff in the first years of Mo operation was described by P. Majer in the aforementioned work.

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people with no experience of life, which were yet to be properly shaped as officials responsible for order and security of the society. these and other factors contributed to the decrease in discipline among the Militia officers serving in the Warmia and Mazury in the forties of the twentieth century.

References:

1. Dworzecki J., Police in Poland. Selected Issues, Kraków 2011.2. Jakubowski Z., The Creation and Work of the Apparatus of Safety and

Civic Militia in the Western and Northern Territories (1945–1950), “his-torical Notebooks ASW”, 1988, vol. 8.

3. lesiakowski K., The Role of the District Office of Public Security in Cen-tral Poland and in the Regained Territories in the Years 1945–1947, [in:] Communist Authorities Towards the Regained Territories after WW II, S. Łacha (ed.), Słupsk 1997.

4. Łukaszewicz B., For New Poland. From the History of the Apparatus of Safety and Public Order in Warmia and Mazuria in the Years 1945–1950, Olsztyn 1989.

5. Łukaszewicz Ł., Military District Court in Olsztyn 1946–1955. Outlines of the Monograph, Olsztyn 2000.

6. Majer P., Civic Militia 1944–1957, Genesis, organization, work, place in the power apparatus, Olsztyn 2004.

7. Panas h., Wachowiec r., Willan t., Zamecki W., In the Service of the Nation in Warmii i Mazuria. XXV years of Civic Militia and Political Se-cret Police, Olsztyn 1969.

8. Płotek M., Difficult Beginnings. The Mazury District 1945–1946, Dąbrówno 2011.

9. Płotek M., Officers of Civic Militia from the Perspective of Judges of Olsz-tyn Appeal, [in:] 95 Years of Police Forces in Poland, e. ura, S. Pieprzny (eds.), Rzeszów 2015.

10. tomkiewicz r., Everyday Life of Inhabitants of Post-war Olsztyn 1945–1956, Olsztyn 2003.

Other Sources11. the institute of national remembrance12. State archive in olsztyn

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Author:

marcin Płotek – capitain, Ph.D. in history. Doctoral degree: Pultusk academy of humanities. employment: Senior lecturer in Police acad-emy in Szczytno. Scope of interests: contemporary history, history of Warmia and Mazury region.


M. Płotek, Level of Service Discipline of Militiamen Illustrated By the Ex-ample of Olsztyn Voivodeship, “Security Dimensions. international and National Studies”, 2016, no 18, p. 148–162

leGal Security


NO. 18; 2016 (164–189)

grexiT as a challenge To The euroPean inTegriTy

JuDr. Krzysztof Jerzy Gruszczyński, Ph. D.Warsaw Management University, POLAND

ABSTRACT

the paper analyzes the prospect of Greece exit know as “Grexit” from eu, whereas the Treaties have a specific legal regime on withdrawing – Article 50 TEU which was added to the treaties by the treaty of lisbon. it confirms the possibility to leave the eu that many (but not all) legal observers believed existed beforehand. no fully-fledged Member State has in fact left the eu before or after the entry into force of the treaty of lisbon, although some parts of Member States have done so. Before the treaty of lisbon, this was accomplished by means of treaty amendment. one of the important question is whether would it be possible for Greece to withdraw a notification to leave the eu? in the article an argument will be raised that other Member States and the eu institutions are arguably legally obliged to refuse debt relief for Greece, in accordance with the treaties’ no bail-out rule.

ARTICLE INFO


Key wordsWithdrawal from the european union, accession negotiation

…leaving the club altogether, as a few advocate, is legally possible – we have an ‘exit clause’ – but it’s not a matter of just walking out. It would be legally and politically a most complicated and unpractical affair. Just think of a divorce after forty years of marriage… Leaving is an act of free will, and perfectly legitimate, but it doesn’t come for free.

the President of the european council, herman van rompuy in a speech on 28 February 2013 of the complexities of leaving the EU

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Grexit as a challenge to the european integrity

there is no reference in the eu treaties to any power of a Member State to leave eMu once it joins, or of the eu institutions to remove that Member State from eMu, whether it agrees to that or not. a Member State can only leave eMu by leaving the eu, but there is no treaty power to throw a Member State out of the eu, or to suggest that Grex-it1 might ever be under the obligation to leave. In mid-May 2012, the financial crisis in Greece and the impossibility of forming a new govern-ment after elections led to strong speculation that Greece would leave the eurozone shortly. this phenomenon had already become known as “Grexit” and started to govern international market behaviour. econo-mists have expressed concern that the phenomenon may well become a self-fulfilling prophecy2. On 9 February 2015, UK Prime Minister Da-vid cameron chaired a meeting to discuss any possible ramifications in the event of an exit. During the meeting of the G-20 finance ministers in Istanbul, 2015, ministers came to conclusion that a Greek exit from the eurozone would be very difficult for the world’s economy and po-tentially very damaging for the european economy.

in the past we observed the case of Greenland which withdrew from the European Communities (EC) in 1985 after gaining a high level of internal autonomy from Denmark in 1979. The Greenland electorate voted on 23 February 1982 on whether to stay in the EC, deciding by 52% to 48% against continued membership (turnout 75%). There were not easy negotiations between the Greenland Government and the Danish Government, and the Danish Government and the european commission, particularly with regard to fisheries. the council of Min-isters adopted a Decision on the terms of Greenland’s withdrawal on 20 February 1984, and Greenland finally withdrew from the EEC on 1 February 1985. Greenland became associated with the EU as an Over-seas country and territory (oct) through the Greenland treaty. the Treaty base for Greenland’s withdrawal was the former Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome (now Article 48 TEU), which provided for amend-

1 the “Grexit” term was introduced by citigroup’s chief analysts Willem h. Buiter and Ebrahim Rahbari on 6 February 2012.

2 economists who favour this radical approach to solve the Greek debt crisis typically argue that a default is unavoidable for Greece in the long term, and that a delay in organizing an orderly default (by lending Greece more money throughout a few more years), would just wind up hurting eu lenders and neighbouring european countries even more.

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ments to the ec treaties and entry into force following ratification by all Member States “in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”. The special status and commercial agreements linked to Greenland’s withdrawal were agreed in protocols to the amendment treaty, and various legal instruments were agreed by all the Member States. Greenland continued to receive eu funding after withdrawal and had tariff-free access to the community market for fisheries products in return for satisfactory ec access to Greenland waters for the duration of the fisheries agreement. Articles 198–204 TFEU, Association of the Over-seas Countries and Territories, apply to Greenland, subject to provisions set out in Protocol No. 34 annexed to the TFEU on special arrangements for Greenland fisheries.

Article 2 of the Protocol attached to the Greenland Treaty clarified that there would be a transitional period during which Greenlanders, non-national residents and businesses with acquired rights under EU law would retain these rights3. the eu treaties did not provide for with-drawal from the euro. in addition, the basic conditions for eu mem-bership outlined in the 1993 “Copenhagen criteria”, include the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the adoption of the acquis communautaire and “the aims of political, economic and monetary union” – in the case of the latter, subject to prior adherence to the neces-sary convergence criteria. there appears to be little doubt that the Mem-ber States’ intention was for eMu to be irreversible and irrevocable.

the Treaty Establishing the European Communities in 2006, as it stood after the nice treaty changes but before the lisbon treaty ones, pro-vided for the irreversibility and the irrevocability of the move to eco-nomic and Monetary union (eMu), much as originally provided in the 1992 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht treaty), negotiated with-drawal from the eu would not be legally impossible even prior to the ratification of the lisbon treaty and that unilateral withdrawal would undoubtedly be legally controversial; that, while permissible, a recently enacted exit clause is, prima facie, not in harmony with the rationale of 3 The Commission shall make proposals to the Council, which shall act by a qualified

majority, for the transitional measures which it considers necessary, by reason of the entry into force of the new arrangements, with regard to the maintenance of rights acquired by natural or legal persons during the period when Greenland was part of the community and the regularization of the situation with regard to financial assistance granted by the community to Greenland during that period.

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the european unification project and is otherwise problematic, mainly from a legal perspective; that a Member State’s exit from EMU, without a parallel withdrawal from the EU, would be legally inconceivable; and that, while perhaps feasible through indirect means, a Member State’s expulsion from the eu or eMu, would be legally next to impossible.

the lisbon treaty repealed the eMu Protocol and articles on eMu were amended to remove the timetable for the move to stage three of eMu, but the irrevocability of the adoption of the euro was specified in the following articles of the amended consolidated versions of the treaty on european union and the treaty on the functioning of the european union if Greece wanted to leave the euro it would have to leave the eu first4.

While Article 50 allows a Member State to leave the Union, the nego-tiations for withdrawal and the framework for its future relationship with the eu could be complicated and therefore take some time to agree. even if there is the political will for a fast track approach to applying article 50 – which is quite possible – negotiating withdrawal would not be easy or swift. it may have become commonplace to discuss a Grexit the practi-calities and implications of such a decision are far more complicated and daunting than many outside observers tend to acknowledge.

it is not even clear that Greece can leave the common currency. the eu’s Lisbon Treaty does not make such provision – it only considers a country leaving the european union. and in theory a country cannot be forced out of the bloc – it has to decide of its own accord whether it wants to stay.

it is hard to predict the economic impact of the Greece’s eu mem-bership, or equivalently, the costs and benefits of withdrawal. Framing the aggregate impact in terms of a single number, or even irrefutably demon-strating that the net effects are positive or negative, is a formidably diffi-cult exercise. this is partly because many of the costs and benefits are, in certain respects, subjective, diffuse or intangible; and partly because a host of assumptions must be made about the terms on which the Greece would depart the eu. any estimations of the effects of withdrawal will be highly sensitive to such assumptions, and can thus be embedded with varying degrees of optimism.

4 “leaving is straightforward: it involves a member state notifying the european coun-cil – that is, the leaders of EU countries – that it wants to go. The Council then agrees the terms of the exit via a qualified majority.

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The right of withdrawal, in Article 50 of the Treaty on European union (teu), as amended by the lisbon treaty provided for Mem-ber States to leave the eu if they wanted to and sets out a procedure for a voluntary withdrawal from the union according to a State’s own constitutional requirements. EU law is part of Greece law and its en-actment has given this country citizens, companies and state authorities certain rights and obligations5. a departing State could resign from the EU under Art. 50 TEU and then apply to rejoin. That would comply with the legal formalities of the Treaties; however, the economic collapse unleashed by such a departure may make it unlikely that the remaining members of the eu would welcome the departing State back. further-more, technically under the treaties, the rejoining state would be obliged to sign-up to the euro as soon as the economic tests set out in the teu were fulfilled (unless an opt-out were negotiated), thus rendering this method of departure less useful.

Article 50 of the amended Treaty on European Union (teu) allows a Member State unilaterally to leave the eu in accordance with its own constitutional requirements e.g. member state which decides to withdraw shall notify the european council its intention. in the light of the guide-lines provided by the european council, the union shall negotiate and con-clude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the union. that agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the european Parliament. article 218(3) specifies that The Commission, or the High Representative of the union for foreign affairs and Security Policy where the agreement envis-aged relates exclusively or principally to the common foreign and securi-ty policy, shall submit recommendations to the council, which shall adopt a decision authorizing the opening of negotiations and, depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged, nominating the union negotiator or the head of the union’s negotiating team. 5 Greece could simply leave the EU without invoking clause of art. 50 because the mem-

bership of the eu depends upon the European Communities Act, and Greek Parliament could end that membership by repealing that act. See also J. h. h. Weiler, Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International Organization: The Case of the European Economic Community, “Israel Law Review”, 1985, 20, p. 282, 287.

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the decision to leave does not need the endorsement or formal agree-ment of the other Member States. Withdrawal can happen, whether or not there is a withdrawal agreement, two years after the leaving State notifies the european council of its intention to withdraw. however, the terms of Article 50 TEU imply an orderly, negotiated withdrawal. Article 50 of the treaty on european union provides a mechanism for states to withdraw from the eu. it is not intended to provide a mechanism for Member States to force a renegotiation of the terms of their existing membership of the eu whilst remaining within the eu. the withdrawal process that Article 50 sets out does include a period of negotiation.

However, Article 50(2) makes clear that this negotiation follows a de-cision by a Member States to leave and states that the purpose of this negotiation is to set out the arrangements for a Member State’s with-drawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the European Union. In addition, Article 50(4) deprives the withdraw-ing State not only of a vote on the terms of the withdrawal agreement but also of the right to take part in discussions about that agreement in either the european council or the council. the Prime Minister, by contrast, envisages a British Government playing an active and positive role in securing reforms of the eu as a whole, including through chang-es to the treaties.

In accordance with Art. 50(2) TEU, a withdrawal agreement is an in-ternational agreement between the eu and a departing country. taking into account the potential comprehensiveness of such agreement, it may fall within different categories of competence, which are either shared between the eu and its member states or exclusively of the european union. unless it is decided otherwise, a withdrawal treaty may have to be concluded as a mixed agreement, making the ratification procedure much longer and more complex as it will involve the member states. it has to be emphasized that a departing country will be treated as a third country during such negotiations. Moreover, unlike accession treaties, withdrawal agreements do not form part of eu primary law. thus, unless a special formula is developed, they cannot amend the treaties on which the eu is based. this implies that alongside an international treaty regulating with-drawal, the remaining member states would have to negotiate between themselves a treaty amending the founding treaties in order to repeal all provisions touching upon the departing country. further complexities may

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be added if a departing country chooses to make a rapid move from the eu to the european economic area (eea) instead. that would necessi-tate a third treaty regulating the terms of accession to efta and a fourth to deal with the accession to the EEA. The latter would require the ap-proval of the eu and its member states, the eea-efta countries and the departing/joining country.

a withdrawal includes a number of complex issues through negoti-ations with the other eu Member States, including a new relationship with the common agricultural and common fisheries Policies, revised trade rules with eu Member States and with third parties, changes to the arrangements for the free movement of workers throughout the eu and eea areas, to name but a few. the Greek government would probably ne-gotiate transitional arrangements to take account of these and other mat-ters, and then establish a new relationship with the eu. it has been argued that a Greece could apply for a membership in the european economic area (eea), a treaty between the eu, its Member States, and norway, iceland and liechtenstein which extends the eu’s internal market rules to the associated States.

Art. 50 states that a Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union, in accordance with its own constitutional requirements, it means that a sovereign state may decide on the exit6. this is man-ifestly a voluntary choice, because there are no rules in the treaty 6 on the principle of sovereign statehood as an immutable constitutional principle,

and hence a limit on the transfer of sovereign powers to the european union, see, for example, P. Kirchhof, [in:] Handbuch des Staatsrechts II, third edition (2004), par-agraph 21, point 84; idem, [in:] Europarecht, 1991, supplement 1, p. 11 (13); Ran-delzhofer, [in:] Grundgesetz (as updated in Oct. 2008), Maunz/Dürig (eds.), Article 24(1), point 204; Herdegen, [in:] Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift, 1992, p. 589 (592); Murswiek, [in:] Der Staat, 32 (1993), p. 161 (162 et seq.); Di Fabio, [in:] Der Staat 32 (1993), p. 191 (199 et seq.); P. M. Huber, [in:] Thüringer Verwaltungsblätter, 1994, p. 1 (2); Breuer, [in:] Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, 1994, p. 417 (423-4); fink, [in:] Die Öffentliche Verwaltung, 1998, p. 133 et seq.; Streinz, [in:] Grundgesetz, Sachs (ed.), fifth edition (2009), Article 23, point 84; Rojan, [in:] Grundgesetz, von Münch/Kunig (eds.), Vol. 2, fifth edition (2001), Article 23, point 15 (with refer-ences); Classen, [in:] Grundgesetz, von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck (eds.), Vol. 2, fourth edition (2000), Article 23, point 4; Hillgruber, [in:] Handbuch des Staatsrechts ii, third edition (2004), paragraph 32, points 41 and 108; Isensee, [in:] Handbuch des Staats-rechts II, third edition (2004), paragraph 15, points 30 et seq. and 196; Broß, [in:] Festschrift für Hans Hablitzel, 2005, p. 55 (57-8 and 60). For opposing opinions see Scholz, [in:] Maunz/Dürig (eds.).

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stating that a Member State ‘shall’ withdraw from the union in any particular circumstances7.

Article 50(3) TEU then sets out the timing of withdrawal whereas the Greece and potential uK would cease to be eu Member State either at the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, ‘failing that’, two years after the notification of its intention to withdraw from the eu, unless the european council and Greece unanimously agree to ex-tend that period. Of course, Article 50 applies to any Member State that might choose to leave at any desirable time. in accordance with article 50(4), during this period, the Greece could not participate in discussions concerning it in some EU institutions – namely the European Council and the council, which comprises Member States ministers, therefore ‘a qualified majority’ vote would be recalculated without the Greece.

an official notification to withdraw will automatically result in the Greece ceasing to be a Member State of the eu, as of two years from the date of notification, unless one of two things happens: a withdrawal agreement sets a different date, or the Greece and the remaining Member States (voting unanimously) agree to extend that time limit. Presumably the date of the withdrawal agreement could be set either before or after the two-year default time limit.

Art. 50 provides for the negotiation of a withdrawal arrangement, not a deal on the Greece’s future relationship with the eu, therefore Article 50(2) refers only to taking account of that ‘future relationship’ in the withdrawal arrangement. it seems that the details of the withdrawal arrangement and the treaty establishing that future relationship would be closely linked. the additional withdrawal treaty(ties) would aim to regulate a transition period before the treaty on the future relationship entered into force.

Article 50(3) of the Lisbon Treaty provides that the Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into

7 a Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the european council of its intention. in the light of the guidelines provided by the european council, the union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrange-ments for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union. it shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the european Parliament.

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force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period8. Such reading, however, would undermine the obligation to conclude an agreement laid down in Article 50(2) of the Lisbon Treaty. This raises the issue of the meaning of Article 50(3) of the lisbon treaty and its impacts on the obligation of the eu to con-clude a withdrawal agreement.

the lisbon treaty has direct effect on the validity and applicability of EU law. Therefore, Article 50(3) of the Lisbon Treaty generally implies that the Greece will no longer be bound by eu law after its termination of the Lisbon Treaty. Consequently, EU law would no longer be applied to all future rights and obligations of Greek individuals and entities after its termination.

the two-year negotiation period set out in the lisbon treaty in com-bination with the requirement to conclude a withdrawal agreement al-lows the following interpretation: the two-year period may be under-stood as an ‘escape clause’ for the parties if either party breaches good faith in terms of insufficient efforts in negotiations or unreasonable con-ditions for withdrawal. the lisbon treaty, as a primary source of eu law, provides requirements for the legitimacy of all other sources of EU law that may be invoked against any eu legal act “which is intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties”9 brought for judicial re-view to the CJEU under Article 263 of the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, the withdrawal agreement from the eu and the withdrawal agreement as such may have to comply with the lisbon treaty and the rules of legiti-macy of eu legal acts.

8 Lisbon Treaty (2009), Art. 50(3).9 Lisbon Treaty (2009), art. 263 states that The Court of Justice of the European Union

shall review the legality of legislative acts, of acts of the council, of the commission and of the european central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the european Parliament and of the european council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. it shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, of-fices or agencies of the union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. it shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the eu-ropean Parliament, the council or the commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of power.

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Especially art. 50 TEU defines the following stages of a negotiated withdrawal:

1. Formal notice: The withdrawing Member State must first send a formal notice to the european council. the council is vested with the power and responsibility to negotiate and conclude the withdrawal im-plementation agreement. By exercising this power and responsibility, the council, as opposed to the Member States, thus also acts as a treasurer and custodian of the “legal heritage of rights” of the individuals emphasized by the ecJ in its well-established jurisprudence. the latter is, in my opinion, the key to understanding the withdrawal provision, which is an attempt to harmonize traditional, state-centered sovereignty and the more modern type of sovereignty or autonomy of supranational organizations.

2. Adoption of negotiating guidelines: The European Council issues guidelines on the basis of which the council negotiates the terms of exit and future relationship between the eu and that Member State a long negotiation period under Article 50 TEU would be necessary because “withdrawal from the union would involve the unravelling of a highly complex skein of budgetary, legal, political, financial, commercial and per-sonal relationships, liabilities and obligations”. the two-year negotiating period would aim to conclude both the withdrawal agreement and any consequent amendments to the EU Treaties.

The negotiations would take place in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (tfeu). the eu-ropean commission, taking into account the european council’s guide-lines, submits a recommendation to the council, which adopts a decision authorizing the opening of the negotiations and nominates the union negotiator or the head of the eu’s negotiation team.

the council of Ministers, having obtained the consent of the eP (i.e. the eP has a right of veto over the withdrawal agreement), concludes the agreement, acting by a Qualified Majority Vote (QMV – roughly two-thirds). During the negotiation, the withdrawing Member State would continue to participate in other eu business as normal, but it would not participate in council or european council discussions or decisions on its own withdrawal.

the withdrawing state would be released from its obligations under the treaties upon entry into force of the withdrawal agreement, or two

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years after its notification to the european council. this period may be extended by unanimous agreement.

3. Negotiated arrangement: The terms of exit and post-exit relation-ship are negotiated by the eu on the basis of recommendations by the Commission (Article 218(3) TFEU) and the Council decides by a quali-fied majority after receiving the consent of the european Parliament. the Member State wishing to withdraw from the eu notifies the european Council of such intention (para. 1). As such, this notification does not have any direct terminating legal effect. instead, a minimum period of two years, which may be best described as a notice period, for negotiat-ing the terms and conditions of a withdrawal and its implementation in the form of a withdrawal implementation agreement, is triggered by the Member State’s notification to the european council. the withdrawal implementation agreement needs to take account of the framework for the “future relationship” between the withdrawing Member State and the eu. as it appears, the drafters of the constitutional treaty thus assume that some kind of (legal) relationship will still remain between the union and the withdrawing Member State even after the withdrawal has come into effect. though not expressly mentioned in the provision, any legal consequences of the withdrawal regarding the rights and obligations for any natural persons and legal entities affected by the withdrawal need to be dealt with. in the absence of a well-drafted withdrawal implementa-tion agreement, the specific legal consequences will remain open to doubt. What, for instance, should happen to the employees of the union who are nationals of the withdrawing Member State? What will be the fate of the union’s offices on the territory of the withdrawing Member State? and can nationals of the withdrawing Member State still be eligible for schol-arships sponsored by the eu? is the withdrawing Member State obligated to pay its outstanding contributions?10 Both the union and the withdraw-ing Member State will have a vital interest in concluding a withdrawal implementation agreement. it needs to be noted in this context, however, that an express legal obligation to negotiate and conclude such agreement is only imposed on the council, not on the withdrawing Member State11.

10 See Klabbers, An Introduction To International Institutional Law, 2004, p. 126.11 As an example in Germany constitutional requirements for a withdrawal of the Fed-

eral republic of Germany would include an amendment of the German Basic law (Grundgesetz), to be resolved in accordance with Article 79(2) of the German Basic

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after Greece will decide to exit the eu, it can of course apply to be-come a new Member State. new MS do not automatically join the euro-zone, but they become a MS ‘with a derogation’, in accordance with article 139 TFEU, like for example Poland and Sweden. There is an obligation to strife towards entry into the eurozone, but re-entry is dependent on a (political) decision by the council. the disadvantage is that, even if exit and re-entry to the union would coincide, there would be a considerable delay before Greece could leave, because national ratification procedures are unpredictable and needless to say burdensome.

eurozone

Leaving the EU raises many legal as well as economic and political ques-tions. eu law is an integral part of the law of every member state and an exiting member state would need to consider the effect of exit, not only on its legal rights and obligations as against other member states, but also on the rights and obligations of its domestic corporations, financial insti-tutions, governmental entities and citizens. Article 3 (4) of the Treaty on european union (teu) provides that the union establishes an economic and currency union and that the euro is its currency12. Article 119 (2) of tfeu provides that the activities of the eu encompass the single cur-rency. TFEU Article 128 (1) provides that the Euro bills are the only legal tender within the EU. TFEU Article 139 provides for certain exemp-tions for so-called Member States with a derogation – the EU Council adopted a resolution (2000/427) on 19 June 2000 which states that Greece does not belong to the Member States with a derogation. original reso-lution 2000/427 which declared Greece to be a Member State for which no derogation applies (with the consequence that after such resolution Greece would be a Member State to which a derogation applies within the meaning of Article 139 TFEU) and such Council adopting the re-sulting amendments to the euro introduction regulation on the basis of

law by two-third majorities in both the federal Parliament (Bundestag) and the fed-eral council (Bundesrat).

12 in terms of its economy and financial markets, the eurozone plays an important role globally, especially as compared to past break-up countries. the eurozone nations currently account for roughly 20% of global GDP (measured in current US dollars at the market exchange rate), with GIIPS countries alone accounting for 6,7% of global output.

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Article 140 TFEU13. however, even though such eu council regulation would have direct effect in all relevant Member States and would need to be recognized by all courts in all Member States, it would not automati-cally be binding on courts of countries outside of the eu, and would not necessarily change contracts governed by a law which is not the law of a Member State.

Following an informal summit in Brussels on 23 May 2012, the Eu-rozone heads of state issued a message of support for Greece and stated a collective wish that Greece remains within the eurozone. the euro-zone leaders also urged Greece to stay in the course on austerity and to complete the reforms demanded under the terms of its bailout. in the wake of the summit, however, it was widely reported that the eurozone leaders have been advised to prepare contingency plans in the event that Greece were to exit the single currency. Given the potential consequences, the government of a member state contemplating an unilateral withdraw-al from eMu would need to weigh up whether the devil they know is a worse prospect than life outside the eurozone. a member state in fi-nancial difficulties can always choose to default on its sovereign debt and remain within the euro, since there is currently no mechanism for ejecting a member state from either eMu or the eu.

a default by Greece would not preclude her remaining in the euro-zone. in practice, however, a defaulting eurozone member state is like-ly to remain within the eurozone only with the support (financial and political) of the other eu member states and institutions such as the ecB and the iMf. a default would be expected to lead to a global debt relief arrangement and a form of restructuring proposal being offered to creditors of the defaulting state. eurozone member states are facing significant challenges in reducing public and private deficits and stimu-lating growth. in Greece, this has been combined with political instabil-ity which has led to widespread discussion as to whether or not Greece may exit the eurozone (whether in the short, medium or longer term). a Greek exit would undoubtedly increase the potential for sovereign and corporate defaults.

13 It is possible – the revocation of EU Council Regulation 2596/2000 of 27 November 2000, pursuant to which Greece was added to the list of Member States who par-ticipate in the euro, so that Greece would be removed from the list of participating Member States.

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there are no specific provisions in the current eu treaties for the ex-pulsion of a member state from the Eurozone or the EU – even if a mem-ber state is in serious breach of its obligations under those treaties. there is also currently no mechanism for the eurozone member state to leave the eurozone voluntarily without also leaving the eu. the intention was very clear that monetary union was intended to be an irrevocable process14. the lack of a pre-existing legal framework for an exit from the eurozone does not, however, make it impossible. there are three theoretical exit routes:

there is no mechanism under the treaty of european union (teu), as amended by the lisbon treaty, for the unilateral withdrawal from the monetary union of a state which remains an eu member state. Such step would constitute a breach of its treaty obligations, be unlawful as a matter of public international law, and may affect the legal analysis of any subsequent redenomination by the courts and tribunals of other eu member states. in particular, unilateral withdrawal may affect international recognition of sub-sequently passed domestic monetary legislation by the withdrawing state.

a possible withdrawal by one or more states from the eurozone raises the potential difficulty of determining whether euro denominated ob-ligation remains an euro obligation or if payment will need to be made in the new currency of the withdrawing state. the starting point is that questions on the interpretation and performance of obligations are gen-erally determined by the law applicable to the contract. however, where an obligation is expressed in a particular national currency, the principle of lex monetae dictates that there is an implicit choice of law of that coun-try to determine the denomination of the payment obligation.

the lex monetae rule, or “state theory of money,” provides that the law of the nation of the currency in which the debt is expressed, shall decide what constitutes the currency. although euro is, legally speaking, the currency of the eu, it is also the legal tender of each individual euro-zone member. accordingly, pursuant to the lex monetae principle, an eu nation is free to exercise its sovereign powers to substitute a new national currency for the euro currency and to then, by national law, establish a conversion rate for the exchange of former euro obligations into the new national currency. While the exercise of this sovereign right may be considered as perfectly legal under the withdrawing state’s constitutional

14 Article 140 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union expressly refers to the “irrevocable” fixing of the conversion rates.

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structure, such action may very well breach eu treaty provisions, and thus be considered by other member states as a violation of eu law and international obligations if carried out unilaterally.

this widely recognized principle must usually be applied regardless of the law expressed to govern the obligation itself. the difficulty with euro denominated obligations is that there is no single country desig-nating the lex monetae; Euro is a supra-national enterprise. In the event of non-consensual (and therefore unlawful) eurozone withdrawal, en-forcement of a redenominated debt obligation in a foreign tribunal may prove problematic. Where he withdrawing state remains an eu member state, the Brussels i regulation will apply and any decision by the local courts would be enforceable within an eu member state.

however, this is subject to a general carve-out where it would be man-ifestly contrary to public policy to do so, something that a court may con-sider to be the case in the event of a unilateral eurozone withdrawal.

The “continuity of contracts principle” – which is widely followed throughout the world’s major legal systems – would ensure that both do-mestic and international contracts expressed in the eurozone would re-main valid and enforceable even though the euro may no longer be the legal tender of the obligor under the contract. assuming that the new currency unit is considered as a “reasonable substitute performance” for the original euro payment provision, this legal principle would, in effect, thwart the classic defenses to contract enforcement such as “impossibility of performance,” “frustration of contract” and “commercial impracticabil-ity”, which might be posited by disgruntled parties. this continuity of contracts principle was in fact imposed upon all eu member states as a matter of law during the introduction of the euro currency. Most na-tions (and uS states) applied this provision within their own legal systems in order to provide stability during the euro transition.

any withdrawal by Greece from the european union also includes withdrawal from the eurozone, because the provisions that govern the eurozone are not part of a separate treaty they are included in the tfeu. once a eu Member State has left the organisation, it no longer has the rights and duties that the treaty imposes with respect to the eurozone15.

15 The term “qualified majority” is defined by TFEU Article 238(3)(b). See consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 238(3), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83).

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there are three potential options for leaving the eurozone: (1) a fullfledged exit from the European Union,(2) an exit via an amendment to the Treaties,(3) an exit via the clausula rebus sic stantibus16.

three ways of exiting by Greece the euro area are:1) through exit from the Union (and re-entry),2) through Treaty amendment,3) through the Council’s decision.

the european council has to be notified of any intention to withdraw and an agreement setting out the terms for such withdrawal would need to be negotiated, approved by the european Parliament and then adopted by the council of the european union. the exiting member state is re-leased from its obligations under the eu treaties at the earlier of the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement and the second anniversary of its withdrawal notification.

the obligations of the euro are linked to the membership of a Mem-ber State to the eu. if a member state exits the union, the treaties are no longer applicable to that state17.

according to the principle of good faith, the Member States must take all appropriate measures to fulfil their obligations arising out of the lisbon treaty and may do nothing detrimental to the proper func-tioning of the eu. this principle contains both positive and negative obligations for Greece as a Member State, namely (i) the obligation to

16 Such options do not offer an adequate substitute for a right to withdraw unilaterally from the eurozone.

17 See for example: a. Łazowski, Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership, “European Law Review”, 2012, vol. 37, p. 523–540; J. Herbst, Observa-tions on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: Who are the ‘Masters of the Trea-ties’? “German Law Journal”, 2005, vol. 6, 1755–1760, http://www.germanlawjournal. com/pdfs/Vol06No11/PDF_Vol_06_No_11_1755-1760_Special%20Issue_Herbst.pdf, accessed 27.11.2013; Leaving the EU (Research Paper 13/42, House of Commons Library, 01 July 2013), p. 9–16, http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP13-42, accessed 27.11.2013; P. Nicolaides, Withdrawal from the European Union: A Ty-pology of Effects, 2013, p. 210–219, http://www.maastrichtjournal.eu/pdf_file/ITS/MJ_20_02_0209.pdf, accessed 27.11.2013; T. Oliver, Europe without Britain: Assessing the Impact on the European Union of a British Withdrawal (SWt research paper, Ger-man Institute for International and Security Affairs), 2013, http://www.swp-berlin. org/fileadmin/-contents/products/research_papers/2013_RP07_olv.pdf, accessed 27.11.2013.

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take all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of the obliga-tions arising out of the Lisbon Treaty; (ii) the obligation to facilitate the achievements of the EU tasks; and (iii) the “obligation to abstain from any measures which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the treaty”. the court of Justice of the european union (cJeu) ex-tended the duty of cooperation to reciprocal duties of cooperation between the eu and its Member States by its practice. in the lisbon treaty18, the mutual nature of this principle has been established explicitly under Article 4. Consequently, the principle of sincere cooperation governs the actions of the eu and Greece in all areas relating to the objectives of the lisbon treaty.

Greek government is likely to pass legislation (the “new currency law”) establishing (i) its exit from the eurozone and/or the eu, (ii) a new national currency (the “new Drachma”), (iii) the fixed exchange rate for automatic conversion of all existing euro payment obligations between the euro and the new Drachma, and (iv) the automatic redenomination of euro deposits, contracts and obligations into the new Drachma. the new currency law of Greece would be expected to address its scope and application by reference to factors such as: the identity and place of incor-poration or residence of the depositor, parties or obligor; the location of the account; the governing law of the contract or obligation; and the place of payment under the contract or obligation.

Greece, having exited, would have to reapply as a new applicant to the EU and would have to meet the accession requirements, including fiscal requirements, applicable to any country seeking to join the EU. It may be difficult for Greece to satisfy all the necessary requirements in the short term. Another complicating factor is that the treaty requires member states to adopt the euro upon meeting the specified criteria (i.e. adoption of the euro is not voluntary for eu member state unless, like the uK and Denmark, it negotiates an opt-out).

in the case of exit, many businesses may find that their euro deposits/accounts with banks in Greece (whether the national bank, domestic bank or domestic branch of a foreign bank) and the euro payment obligations under their financial and commercial contracts with entities connected with Greece (including its citizens, corporations and financial institu-

18 See for example: Case C-230/81 Luxembourg v European Parliament [1983] ECR 255, para 37; Case C-65/93 European Parliament v Council [1995] ECR I-643, para. 23.

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tions), have been converted into new Drachma as a result of the appli-cation of the new currency law. this would give rise to numerous legal and practical difficulties. creditors of euro denominated obligations that are converted into new Drachma are likely to suffer considerable losses as the new currency is expected to fall in value against the euro. Such cred-itors are likely to want to challenge the application of the new currency law and the conversion. if the redenomination of accounts, contracts and obligations becomes the subject matter of litigation (be it before the do-mestic courts or before foreign courts), complex conflict of laws questions are likely to arise.

Grexit from the eurozone may in certain circumstances be unlawful, i.e. where the exit has occurred in breach of eu law. By the same reason-ing, the validity of any New Currency Law may also be questionable. Cap-ital and foreign exchange controls imposed as a consequence of the exit may or may not be lawful, depending on their terms and the availability of relevant exemptions in the eu treaties and iMf articles of agree-ment. therefore, there is likely to be a considerable period when legal certainty as to these measures is absent. More practically, the scope of the redenomination provisions in the new currency law may be unclear as regards certain types of contractual arrangements. currency law would be introduced in accordance with an expedited timetable and would be likely to focus on domestic/retail assets and liabilities and not necessarily focus on complex financial and/or international or cross-border contracts. lack of certainty as regards contractual obligations is likely to result in delayed performance of those obligations, which in itself could have significant knock-on effects.

International law

Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties from 1969, parties of international treaty can sometimes invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the trea-ty or simply as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty. can this provision – also known as the clausula rebus sic stantibus – be brought to bear on the issue at hand by Greece?

the drafters of the vienna convention on the law of treaties sought to resolve these doctrinal rifts by creating a rebuttable presumption that

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states may not unilaterally exit from a treaty that lacks a denunciation or withdrawal clause19.

treaty clauses that authorize exit are pervasive. they are found in a wide array of multilateral and bilateral agreements governing key trans-border regulatory issues, including human rights, trade, environmental protection, arms control, and intellectual property. More intriguingly, exit clauses impose different types and degrees of restrictions on a state’s abil-ity to legally withdraw from a treaty and the obligations it imposes. and occasionally, exit clauses are absent altogether, raising the possibility that exit may be implicitly precluded as a matter of international law20.

Grexit implicates domestic foreign affairs issues distinct from those raised by treaty breaches. a country’s failure to comply with its treaty commit-ments may stem from a variety of causes, ranging from simple inattention or inadvertence, to delays or re-source constraints, to deliberate decisions of national policy. Depending on the explanation, such noncompliance can be attributed to legislators, executive branch officials, judges, private parties, or some combination thereof. the mere fact that not all of the Member States have ratified the vienna convention is irrelevant in this context. like many other principles enshrined in the vienna convention, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus constitutes a rule of customary international law. as such, it is binding on all the Member States as well as on the european union itself. furthermore the court of Justice of the european union itself has acknowledged this fact. therefore, the fact that an exit from the eurozone concerns only part of the TFEU – namely the provisions on the Eurozone –

19 Article 56 of the Convention provides that an agreement: which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not pro-vide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: (a) it is established that the par-ties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) A right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty. vienna con-vention, supra note 1, art. 56(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345. Treaties that contain express termination clauses are not governed by Article 56 and, in the absence of an express withdrawal clause, cannot be denounced prior to the time when the termination clause takes effect.

20 See S. rosenne, Breach of Treaty, Cambridge 1985, p. 117–125; I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Manchester University Press 1984 (2d ed.), p. 188–190; J. N. Moore, Enhancing Compliance with International Law: A Neglected Remedy, Va. J. Int’l L., 1999, 39, p. 881; A. E. David, The Strategy of Treaty Termination: Lawful Breaches and Retaliations, New Haven and London 1975, p. 159–202 which discusses alternatives to unilateral termination and the le-gal procedures used to achieve them.

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does not necessarily prevent the application of the clausula rebus sic stantibus either. at least according to some voices, this doctrine allows not only for the termination or suspension of a treaty, but may also – and more relevant to the problem at hand – as the basis for a right to demand the revision of a tue.

variety of opinions were mainly based on the idea whether eu law is qualified as part of public international law or whether it should be de-termined as an autonomous legal order. the prevailing view was that the establishment of the EU was for an unlimited period and consequently, Member States could not withdraw. however, eu Member States in-sisted on the necessity to recognize an inherent right of withdrawal for any Member State21. the lisbon treaty withdrawal is an inherent right of states that can be waived only by an express provision precluding exit or by other unequivocal evidence (such as in the travaux pré-paratoires) that the parties intended to prevent withdrawals. the legal route for leaving the eu is laid down in the eu treaty since lisbon in article 50. Before the coming into force of this article it was doubtful whether a MS could unilaterally decide to leave the EU. Article 50 has ended this debate and describes the process through which a MS can leave the un-ion. cooperation between the exiting MS and the others in this process would be useful, but is not legally required.

the eu treaties contain detailed rules on signing up to the eurozone, which apply to every Member State, with exceptions of Denmark and the uK22. those two member states have special protocols giving them an opt-out from the obligation to join eMu that applies to all other Member States. after the treaty of lisbon, there’s a special procedure relating to small parts of Member States (or their associated territories) becoming less (or more) connected to the eu23. As mentioned Article 50 gives the possibility for Member States to leave the eu, and it is clearly the only legal route to leave, as a matter of eu law. there is no possibility to throw

21 See for example: P. athanassiou, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some Reflections, “European Central Bank Legal Working Papers Series”, 2009, no. 10, p. 8–22, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/-scplps/ecblwp10.pdf, accessed 26.10.2013.

22 the drafters of the Maastricht treaty wanted to ensure that monetary union went ahead, and express rules on leaving eMu would have destabilized it from the outset.

23 But it does not apply to entire Member States, or even to territories linked to the uK (the channel islands, the isle of Man and Gibraltar).

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a Member State out of the eu against its will, although its membership could be suspended if there are serious and continued breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (article 7 teu). that clause has never been used to date either24.

a withdrawing Member State that is also a member of the eurozone will have to adopt a new national currency. the exchange rate between the new currency and the euro will depend on whether the withdrawing Member State has healthy public finances or whether it is debt laden. in the latter case, its new currency will almost certainly depreciate signifi-cantly against the euro. then the servicing of euro-denominated debt will become costlier and perhaps impossible. this is the reason why a eu-rozone member is unlikely to leave voluntarily and if it leaves it is likely at the same time to default on its obligations. Since this has never happened in the EU, the legal consequences are possible25.

We have to add that parallel with article 50 TEU, all MS together could create a new provision in the treaty that would set out the process for ex-iting the euro. Shaping the process through which a MS could leave the euro (but stay in the eu), would not be an increase in the competences of the Union and would be an amendment of part 3 of the TFEU. A simpli-fied revision procedure – like the one used for the amendment of article 136 TFEU – could therefore be used. Approval (similar to ratification) of all MS would be required and there is the same disadvantage of option. another possibility is that a treaty amendment would add a protocol to the treaties which would give a MS a special position with regards to the Eurozone, like for example for the UK and Denmark. The benefit – or

24 See P. Athanassiou, op. cit.; J. Herbst, Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: Who are the ‘Masters of the Treaties’? “German Law Journal”, 2005, vol. 6, 1755–1760, http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol06No11/PDF_Vol_06_No_11_1755-1760_Special%20Issue_Herbst.pdf, accessed 27.11.2013; H. Hofmeister, Should I Stay or Should I Go? – A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU, “European Law Journal”, 2010, vol. 5, p. 589–603; A. Łazowski, CEPS Commentary, “European Law Review”, 2012, vol. 5, p. 523–540.

25 M. feldstein, The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability, 1997, vol. 11, J. ECON. PERSP., p. 23, 41–42. american economists in particular were quite skeptical. Cf. van overtvelDt, supra note 7, at 62. See also J. Bibow, The Markets Versus the Eurosystem, [in:] The Euro, The Eurosystem, And The European Economic And Monetary Union, D. ehrig, u. Sta-roske, O. Steiger (eds.), 2011, p. 159, 161; W. Hankel et al., The Euro-Project at Risk 4 (ctr. for european integration Studies (Zei)), Working Paper.

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disadvantage – would be that such a protocol would only apply to one Member State and would not set a precedent (at least not legally).

it is possible for the council to decide (probably unanimously and with the consent of the european Parliament) that a MS will no longer be part of the eurozone and will become a MS ‘with a derogation’, by with-drawing its earlier decision on entry into the eurozone. With regard to the membership of the eurozone, either a MS is part of the eurozone, or it has a derogation (or it has a special position, see option 2). So if a MS wants to exit the euro without leaving the eu or waiting for a treaty amendment procedure, it will have to acquire the status of ‘MS with dero-gation’ some other way26. this looks problematic because for all Members of the eurozone the council has decided that it fulfilled the necessary conditions and hence would become a Member of the eurozone.

this is not completely unproblematic from a legal point of view, be-cause what is the basis of the competence for the council to do this? there are two possibilities: first, one could argue that a competence to decide on a matter always includes the competence to retract that decision. this is quite unconvincing because in most cases where such a competence to re-tract is recognised, it is on the basis of an explicit provision, which would not be necessary if this theory was universally recognized.

Second, this retractile power can be derived from the ‘flexibility clause’ of article 352 TFEU, which grants the Council – on a proposal from the Commission and with consent of the European Parliament – the ability to unanimously adopt the appropriate measures to attain one of the objec-tives set out in the treaties27.

So, it must be ascertained that for a MS to stay in the eurozone would not endanger the union’s values and the continued existence of the eu-rozone as a whole. then it would be possible to take a decision retracting the decision to enter the eurozone. or it could be argued that staying in the eurozone would be so devastating for the well-being of the people of cyprus (and the rest of the peoples of europe) that an exit would be le-gitimate in light of the objectives treaties. obviously the ecB thinks that 26 Article 139 regulates the terms of this ‘derogation’: “Member States in respect of which

the council has not decided that they fulfil the necessary conditions for the adoption of the euro shall hereinafter be referred to as ‘Member States with a derogation’.”

27 These objectives are set out in article 3 TEU: “(1) The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. (…) (4) The Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro”.

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an exit is not allowed under the treaties, as does the commission. the strongest argument the ecB rises is that the treaties provide that when the decision is taken to abrogate the derogation, the rate of exchange be-tween the euro and that MS’s currency will be irrevocably fixed. however, this provision (Article 140 TFEU) seems to apply only to the phase of the transition to the euro and not to any new currency that MS might intro-duce. the commission merely refers to the ‘framework’ of the treaties as support for the irrevocability of the membership of the euro area. Would the ecJ block option and the answer is probably not, given the involve-ment of the commission and the european Parliament in a decision. it would truly be a political decision to let Grexit the eurozone. it would not be easy, but it is possible.

Conclusion

Article 50 TEU, while providing for a special procedure for Member States to leave the eu, does not mention that the agreements which can be concluded with a departing Member State can include treaty amend-ments. This is important because unlike Article 49, such agreements must be agreed by QMV and there is no requirement of ratification by national parliaments. In any event, Article 50 specifies that a Member State can leave the eu unilaterally even without such agreement. a departure of a Member State would necessarily entail at least technical amendments to the treaties, to delete references to that Member State.

exiting the eu by Greece is not an easy task, both for the ue and its troubled member state. the levels of integration have gone so far that a departure of a member state will have profound legal, economic and political implications for the divorcee and for the eu. one may hope that the Greece government is fully cognizant of this reality and does not push renegotiated membership terms too far or even head for the exit. Grexit should not be the triumph of imagination over common sense or hope over experience, but a decision based on a very thorough political, eco-nomic and legal analysis, as the consequences in all possible respects will be profound for all parties involved. Withdrawal of Greece or the exit of another Member State will have an important impact on other Member States. If one Member State can leave Union, this raises question for all Member States. the anti-european parties will see it as a victory and

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another Member States might, more importantly, use the exit option to threaten and strike down policies, if Greece withdraws.

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K. J. Gruszczyński, Grexit as a Challenge to the European Integrity, “Se-curity Dimensions. International and National Studies”, 2016, no 18, p. 166–189

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