security in northeast asia

S E C U R I T Y IN N O R T H E A S T A S I A

Naotoshi Sakonjo

A complex configuration of relationships is developing in Northeast Asia, as major military powers such as the Soviet Union and China, as well as Japan, an economic power, and the United States, a big economic and military power which maintains forces in forward deployment, are involved there. Security problems center around the confrontation between the Republic of Korea and North Korea on the Korean Peninsula; the balance of sea and air military power among Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union in the Western Pacific; and the Taiwan issue and its effect on relations between the United States and China.

The Soviet Union's policy goal in this area and the rest of Asia is to keep the non-socialist countries and the United States separated and to expand Soviet influence. However, the Soviet Union has all but failed to achieve its objective over the past 20 years; only North Korea and Vietnam are friendly to Moscow. The Soviet Union has not drawn much interest from other nations concerning the collective security concept it has been promoting since 1969 or its bilateral good neighbor and friend- ship treaties and confidence-building measures (CBM). On the contrary, the non-socialist nations are becoming increasingly apprehensive about the Soviet Union in the face of a buildup of Soviet military forces in the Far East and the strengthening of Vietnamese domination of the entire Indochina region.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union is not quite able to rid itself of a sense of threat from the United States, China, and Japan, feeling that it is being encircled by the three nations. Thus, the Soviet Union has had strong hopes for normalization of relations with China. China dis- played a positive stance in 1982, generating prospects for restoration of normalized relations between Moscow and Beijing.

The United States has suffered a diminution of its credibility among the non-socialist countries in Asia following its setback in Vietnam, the reduction of forward deployment forces, the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, and a change in its military balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. However, the United States has succeeded in turning to its advantage its strategic readiness against the Soviet Union as a result of

NAOTOSHI SAKONJO, Vice-Admiral, JMSDF (Ret.), is a Research Associate at the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, and the author of defense-related articles and a book, Maritime Defense of Japan (Koji-machi Shobo, 1981). He is also a guest editorial committee member of the Sankei Shimbun.

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its reconciliation with China. In view of the moves for resumption of normalized relations between China and the Soviet Union, however, the United States is being pressed to review its policy toward China.

The U.S. policy toward Asia is aimed at checking the expansion of Soviet influence. The Republic of Korea and Taiwan are staunch anti- Communist states, while Japan is a free and democratic country and maintains stability in its domestic affairs and economy. Against such a background, it is profoundly difficult for the Soviet Union to achieve penetration.

The United States has gradually begun to show a tendency to attach importance to Asia because of the increasing volume of its trade with Asia, surpassing that with Europe, and the conspicuous Soviet military buildup in the Far East. However, the United States finds itself in a situation at present where it cannot execute military measures in Asia at will, because since the end of the 1970's the Middle East has become an area of defense responsibility for it, in addition to Europe.

Japan regards the Soviet Union as a potential threat, but does not consider it as serious as the Reagan administration says it is. The United States contends that the Soviet Union not only retains powerful military strength but is willing to implement it directly as it did in Afghanistan. Japan recognizes the power of the Soviet military, but takes the view that it will not be used for any action for the time being.

Thus, Japan is not fully responding to U.S. requests that Japan assume a suitable share of the defense burden in order to protect free nations against the Soviet threat. The Japanese people support a gradual increase in defense power but are against any drastic increase. One key factor contributing to limitations on any sharp Japanese defense buildup is the national budget deficit. Because of difficulties in state finances, one fourth of the government budget is covered by the sale of national bonds, and the accumulated total red ink figure runs up to the equivalent of two years' budget. Also, Japanese public opinion is slightly tilted toward pacifism. However, in the past several years, there has been a significant change in the thinking of the people; a majority of them gave approval to the existence of the self-defense forces.

There are economic and defense frictions between Japan and the United States, with no prospects for an immediate settlement. Japanese newspapers often run anti-American articles, but there is a consensus among the people that Japan must continue to be a member of the free world and that it is indispensable for Japan to maintain cooperation with the United States in order to remain a free nation. Therefore, relations between Japan and the United States are not likely to deterioriate to the point where it would be impossible for them to restore their relationship.

It is said that relations between Japan and the Soviet Union are at their worst since the two countries normalized relations in 1956. The Japanese people have gradually become more cautious toward the Soviet Union since the Soviet deployment of ground troops in the Northern Territories in 1978, invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and consistent build-up of military forces in the Far East beginning in the second half

SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASlA 89

of the 1960's. However, there are only a few people who anticipate a Soviet assault on Japan in the near future.

The question of the Northern Territories is the biggest sticking point in repairing Japan-Soviet relations. Japan feels deep indignation at the Soviet Union, which recently began claiming that there is no territorial issue in their bilateral relations, although it admitted in the joint Japan- Soviet declaration in 1956, and again in a joint Japan-Soviet communi- que in 1973, that the Northern Territories question remained unsettled.

On the other hand, the Japanese people are strongly inclined to maintain friendly ties with the Soviet Union, Japan's neighbor. Japan's cooperation in the development of Siberia, which the Soviet Union expects, would also benefit the Japanese economy. However, it is believed difficult for the two countries to restore their bilateral relations for the time being in the absence of prospects for a settlement of the North- ern Territories issue.

THE K O R E A N PENINSULA

Internal affairs of the Republic of Korea appear to be in a state of relative calm under the regime of President Chun Doo-hwan. The relative stability of the country was evidenced by the lifting of martial law in 1981 and of a curfew in 1982. Also, the government commuted the death sentence of political dissident Kim Dae-jung to life imprisonment in 1981, and furthermore suspended the execution of his sentence and allowed him to leave for the United States in 1983 to undergo medical treatment. These moves indicated that President Chun was in control of the military and helped contribute more than a little to the restoration of other nations' image of the Republic of Korea. A certain segment of the student population and elements among Korean Christians staged anti-government and anti-U.S, campaigns, but they were brought under control without any serious confusion. It seems that a great majority of the people in the country support the Chun regime.

On the other hand, there has been no change in North Korea's extremely closed national government system. There has been no progress whatsoever in South-North dialogue. Tension and confrontation remain unchanged since the Korean War.

North Korea maintains a large number of ground troops and weapons, It is apparent that the North Korean ground forces have the edge over South Korean military forces even when the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division is included in the latter.

The North Korean air force also has more than twice as many operational fighter planes as the ROK air force. However, many of them are obsolete, low performance planes. On the other hand, in addition to the F-5 and F-4, the Republic of Korea has started licensed production of the F-16. The U.S. air force in the Republic of Korea retains new, powerful, and sophisticated combat aircraft such as the F-16 and A-10. Therefore, it appears that it would be difficult for North Korea to obtain


air superiority, and this difficulty plays an important role in influencing a trend toward ground fighting.

It is assumed that once there is a conflict between the South and North, fighting undoubtedly will be conducted chiefly by ground and air forces and that the navy's role will be extremely limited. North Korea is in possession of 19 submarines, while the Republic of Korea does not possess any. However, the North Korean subs are all outdated and are no threat to the U.S. fleet.

It is apparent that the Republic of Korea has no intention of ini- tiating an assault on the North. Thus, if there is a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, it will occur only if North Korea advances to the South. On that occasion, the following advantages and disadvantages for both sides can be considered: (1) North Korea must first break through large-scale obstacles set up along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) by the Republic of Korea; (2) it is generally said that, theoretically, the attacker must have forces three times as large as those on the defensive. The North Korean military forces will require a large number of personnel, but they can amass them where they wish. They can also choose at will an opportunity for their assault. There is a possibility that the alert time the Republic of Korea can have will be extremely limited; (3) as already mentioned, it will be difficult for North Korea to maintain air superiority; (4) the South Korean capital of Seoul--the center of politics and the economy in the Republic of Korea--is located only 25 miles from the DMZ (as com- pared with 100 miles north of the DMZ for the North Korean capital of Pyongyang); (5) unless such an attack takes place at the same time as an emergency in the Middle East, the Republic of Korea can expect reinforcements from the U.S. 3rd Marine Amphibious Force in Okinawa and the U.S. 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. However, it will take time before they reach the Republic of Korea; (6) the Republic of Korea can also expect support from the U.S. 7th Fleet carrier battle group. Again, depending on where the carrier battle group is situated at the time of the outbreak of the conflict, it will probably take some time before the group arrives in the Republic of Korea; (7) logistics will be the biggest problem for North Korean ground forces. They will need a large volume of fuel, ammunition, foodstuffs, spare parts, and so on.

The United States has carried out its commitment in defense of the Republic of Korea since the start of the Korean War in 1950. It has continued to help defend the Republic of Korea from the standpoint of being the leader of the free world, and that it has to defend the ROK because the latter has achieved economic development and is an anti- Communist democratic state. Furthermore, if the Korean Peninsula fell into the hands of Communist forces, it would constitute a serious hin- drance to the defense of Japan and the Western Pacific.

The United States withdrew the U.S. 7th infantry division from the Republic of Korea in 1971, a year after the Nixon Doctrine was announced. The then-new President Carter announced in January 1977 that he would pull the U.S. 2nd infantry division out of Korea in accord- ance with his presidential campaign pledge, but the withdrawal plan was

SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA 91

put in the deepfreeze in July 1979 until the end of 1981. President Reagan, who succeeded President Carter, announced in January 1981 the cancellation of the troop pullout plan.

President Carter's human rights diplomacy worsened rocky relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea. However, President Reagan's focus on the maintenance of an anti-Communist and anti-socialist posture by free and democratic countries has improved U.S.-ROK relations conspicuously. To be sure, a human rights problem exists in the Republic of Korea. Because South Korea has long been in a state of tension and confrontation with the North, it may be inevitable for that country to place restrictions on human rights to a certain degree.

North Korea receives military and economic assistance from both China and the Soviet Union. However, it is difficult to make any judg- ment on which has more influence over North Korea and how big such influence is.

It is recognized that the possibility of an outbreak of conflict on the Korean Peninsula is slim, for the following reasons:

1. It is considered indispensable for North Korea to receive logistical support from China and the Soviet Union, or from either of the two, in order to make a thrust into the South. But both China and the Soviet Union strongly hope for the maintenance of the status quo on the Ko- rean Peninsula, or in other words, for peaceful co-existence between the Republic of Korea and North Korea. Therefore, it is presumed that China and the Soviet Union give tacit approval to the United States keeping its forces in the Republic of Korea.

2. Even if North Korea tried to push southward, direct military intervention by the Soviet Union and China would be inconceivable. Thus, North Korea would have to fight combined U.S.-ROK forces all by itself. It is believed that North Korea could not maintain any confidence in victory.

In order to deter North Korea from advancing into the South in the future as well, it is necessary to retain a military equilibrium. With respect to the strengthening of military power in the future, it is believed difficult for North Korea to achieve any additional increase in manpower because its population is half that of the Republic of Korea and it is already allocating more than 20% of its GNP to military expenditures in spite of the fact that its economy is in serious trouble. The ROK's military outlay accounts for about 6% of the country's GNP. It will also be difficult for the ROK to increase its military manpower if it intends to continue achieving economic growth.

The Republic of Korea and North Korea are both expected to continue in their efforts to improve the quantity and quality of their military hardware. It is naturally expected that North Korea, like Cuba, will receive the MIG-23. Against such a possibility it is necessary for the ROK to strive to achieve modernization of its ground and air forces. The ROK has recently succeeded in greatly improving its arms production capacity. However, it is assumed that it still has not caught up with North Korea in arms for ground troops. The Republic of Korea must continue


to raise the level of its arms output capacity and at the same time should try to stockpile military materials. But the stationing of U.S. troops in the Republic of Korea is necessary for the time being.

The United States is moving ahead with its efforts to modernize equipment of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, and at the same time, as stated previously, is going ahead with the deployment of sophisticated combat aircraft, such as the F-16 and A-10 in the Republic of Korea. The deployment in Okinawa of three AWAC's belonging to the Stategic Air Command is expected to demonstrate their tremendous might in de- tecting any North Korean surprise attack on the Republic of Korea, and in command control of airplanes.

Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro of Japan visited the Republic of Korea in January 1983 and produced considerable results in reinforcing friendly bilateral relations. There were reports forecasting the strengthening of military cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea. However, genuine Japan-ROK military cooperation is hardly conceivable. This is because the peoples of the two neighboring nations do not look for Japan-ROK military cooperation. There is a deeply-rooted anti-Japanese feeling among Koreans based on bitter ex- perience during Japan's colonial rule. On the other hand, Japan cannot maintain military cooperation with any other country except for the United States from the viewpoint of mere interpretation of the Consti- tution. Also, Japan holds a strong feeling that it should not cooperate militarily with countries other than the United States. As a result of the Prime Minister's visit to the Republic of Korea, the two countries reached agreement on the outstanding issue of economic cooperation. Japan initially was opposed to the ROK's proposal for economic cooperation because Korea tied it in with her security as well as that of Japan. Military cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea probably will not go beyond the framework of an exchange of information, mutual visits by ranking officers of both countries, and goodwill visits by warships of both nations for the foreseeable future.

However, military bases in Japan are expected to play the role of powerful rear logistical support bases or of staging points for U.S. forces in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This was proved in the Korean War. The U.S. military forces in Japan are authorized to use their bases in the country in the event of an emergency in the Far East under Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. It is obvious that the United States regards a conflict on the Korean Peninsula to be the most likely possible emergency in the Far East. In that event, the United States would expect an offer of maximum convenience from Japan. The two nations began study of the concrete substance of such an offer of convenience in 1982.

J A P A N A N D THE N O R T H W E S T E R N PACIFIC

The Republic of Korea considers North Korea, but not the Soviet Union, a direct threat to it. Japan, however, views the Soviet Union as


a threat to it. But the Soviet Union may have no intention of resorting to armed action against Japan or in the Northwestern Pacific, since military action against Japan would draw it to an armed confrontation with the United States, something the Soviet Union wants to avoid at all cost. Japan and the Soviet Union would engage in hostilities only if fighting broke out between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East or Europe, and it affected this part of the world and the Soviet Union attacked Japan.

The Soviet Union is using propaganda campaigns and other activities to alienate Japan from the United States and China and to expand pro-Soviet elements in Japan. However, as stated earlier, the Japanese people have stepped up their precautions against the Soviet Union. Communism has lost its appeal in Japan, a nation which has achieved economic growth and where a majority consider themselves middle class. Infiltration of Communism in Japan is considered difficult. How- ever, opposition political parties and some of the nation's mass circu- lation newspapers are anti-American. The Soviet Union may look at on Japan as an easy target for Soviet propaganda and maneuvering.

Soviet military forces in the Far East which are sometimes said to include just those deployed in areas east of Lake Baikal, but which here are considered to include the forces stationed along the entire Sino- Soviet border, have been greatly strengthened since the mid-1960's. Improvement in both quality and quantity of the Soviet forces in the Far East continues at present. There are about 50 ground force divisions, with the bulk of them targeted on China. About three divisions are deployed in Sakhalin and the Northern Territories. But because there are limits to the Soviet military transportation capacity, a threat of Soviet invasion by ground and air cannot be recognized for the present. It is safe to presume that the duty of the troops in Sakhalin and the Northern Territories is to defend the areas of their assignment.

The Soviet air force is very powerful, but in the event Soviet bombers and fighter bombers launch an assault of Japan, the scope of their attack will likely be limited by the radius of action of the fighters es- corting them (probably MIG-23's alone).

The Japanese air self-defense force is introducing the F-15, mod- ernizing the F-4, getting the E2C early warning aircraft, and renovating the BADGE system. The F-15 is definitely a better performing plane than the MIG-23. The modernized F-4 is also believed fully capable of pitting itself against the MIG-23. Soviet fighter planes still continue to depend largely on ground command control. It is doubtful whether they will be able to carry out effective air battles when they fly more than 300 miles and meet Japanese interceptor fighters which operate under ground command control.

On the other hand, the air self-defense force is lagging behind conspicuously in missile and ammunition preparedness and in the com- pletion of defense shelters and a base air defense system. It is also weak against electronics interference. In short, there are considerable defects in the Japanese air defense system. However, it still would be difficult for

94 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

the Soviet Union to gain air superiority in a short period of time. The U.S. air force keeps the F-15 and AWAC's in Okinawa, and it

is expected that the former will display its might in air defense while the latter will be most effective in warning and command control. The United States is also scheduled to deploy the F-16 at Misawa in the four-year period starting in 1985. The F-16 is equipped with an air-to- ground and air-to-surface ship offensive capability.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet maintains a large number of major combatant surface ships, attack submarines, and bombers. Of these, the major combatant surface ships below the Minsk class are said to be chiefly assigned to the defense of Soviet nuclear missile submarines. Therefore, it is not considered probable that they would pose a challenge to the U.S. fleet operating in the Northwestern Pacific, or launch assaults on the sea lanes. Also, the lack of air cover and the shortage of underway replenishment ships will not permit such operations.

Thus, Soviet attack submarines and bombers are considered capable of posing a direct threat to Japanese and U.S. warships as well as merchant ships. Some Soviet attack submarines are assigned to the mission of defending the Soviet SSBN and coastal sea waters, but many may be directed at U.S. fleets, particularly the U.S. carrier battle group in the Pacific, while others may keep their attention on the sea lanes. In case the U.S. fleet is not located in the Northwestern Pacific, many more Soviet attack submarines could be assigned to sea lane interdiction.

The Japanese maritime self-defense force will defend the sea lanes extending 1,000 nautical miles from the Japanese coast with its de- stroyers, frigates, and anti-submarine aircraft. It will also use these same units plus attack submarines to take charge of stopping enemy submarines from sneaking out of Japanese straits and of clearing mines with its mine-sweepers and mine sweeping helicopters if they are laid in Japanese ports, harbors, and waterways.

The main objective of Soviet navy bombers is to keep an eye on U.S. naval fleets, especially the carrier battle group, but they can also launch assaults on vessels on the sea lanes. If they avoid Japanese air space, and advance into the Northwestern Pacific via Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, Japan for the moment has no means to defend the air space over the sea lanes. In order to resolve this problem, there will be no choice for Japan but to deploy interceptor fighters and early warning aircraft on Iwojima, which is being completed as a base for training flights. The United States strongly wishes Japan to do so because such a measure would make a great contribution to the U.S. fleet in support- ing air defense.

The U.S. 7th Fleet is a forward deployment force deployed in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean and maintains a quick readiness posture. In the event of an emergency the 7th Fleet will get reinforcements from the U.S. 3rd Fleet in the Eastern Pacific (whose force level is about double that of the 7th Fleet). Aircraft carriers and large landing vessels with amphibious capabilities form the core of the 7th Fleet, whose mission is to engage in offensive operations called "force projections." The


carrier-borne U.S. 7th Fleet aircraft may raid bases for Soviet submarines and bombers. However, the 7th Fleet will not be assigned to the defense of the sea lanes. The U.S. carrier battle group is especially noted for its advanced anti-submarine and air defense capabilities, but they are strictly for the defense of the Japanese self-defense forces.

In other words, the maritime self-defense force and the U.S. navy differ in their missions and characters. It must be noted here that, contrary to what is generally said, the maritime self-defense force cannot fill the vacuum in case the U.S. fleet is deployed in the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf.

However, the P3C's deployed in Japan (Okinawa and Misawa) are expected to contribute to the defense of the sea lanes in the northwestern Pacific, while it is considered possible that some of the attack submarines in the Pacific will cooperate with the maritime self-defense force in ASW barrier operations in the three Japanese straits.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet's activities will be considerably restricted in case of an emergency. Since most warships are based at Vladivostok, they must pass through one of the three Japanese straits in order to move on to the Sea of Okhotsk or the Northwestern Pacific. There is a danger for Soviet warships of ending up like rats in a trap as the result of a joint Japan-U.S. operation to prevent them from leaving the straits.

The Sea of Okhotsk, including the Soya Strait, becomes icebound during the winter, making it difficult for Soviet warships to operate there. The Soviet fleet will find it difficult during the winter to maintain the sea lanes linking Petropavlovsk and Siberia's coastal province. The Soviet surface ships in the Sea of Japan are constantly to be exposed to the threat of U.S. warplanes based in Japan.

The military power likely to face off at sea will be submarines and bombers vs. surface ships, or submarines vs. submarines, anti-submarine aircraft vs. submarines, or bombers vs. fighter planes. Thus, it is difficult to answer the question of how one views the military equilibrium in the northwestern Pacific. However, in view of the Soviet military buildup involving submarines and bombers, it is certainly necessary for the United States to enhance its anti-ground, anti-surface ship, anti- submarine, and air defense capabilities, while Japan must try to upgrade its anti-submarine, anti-air, and minesweeping capabilities for the defense of 1,000 nautical miles of sea lanes. Furthermore, it is necessary for the two nations to improve their capabilities to contain Soviet ships in the Sea of Japan by blocking their passage at the three straits in an emergency.

I N T E R M E D I A T E R A N G E NUCLEAR MISSILES

The United States and the Soviet Union are continuing in their negotiations on intermediate range missile deployment in Europe. The U.S. "zero option" calls for abolition of all Soviet intermediate range missiles, including those deployed in Asia. But it is inconceivable that the Soviet Union would accept the U.S. proposal in its entirety. It might


be better to take into account the possibility of the Soviet Union keeping intact the approximately 100 SS-20's already in deployment in Asia, or of shifting those dismantled in Europe to Asia as Foreign Minister Gromyko declared in January 1982, even in the event the United States and the Soviet Union reach an accord in the negotiations.

As against the Soviet Union's SS-20's and backfire (air force) bombers, the United States holds only carrier-borne aircraft, and this imbal- ance is more conspicuous in this part of the world than in Europe. It is speculated that as for Soviet intermediate range missiles (mostly SS-20's and some SS-4's and 5's), the bulk of them are deployed in consideration of Chinese nuclear weapons. And although the Republic of Korea and Japan are fully within the range of the Soviet intermediate range missiles, the West has no weapons to meet them. It is possible that the carrier-borne U.S. warplanes--like backfire bombers and fighter bombers--may be held in check by the air defense system. There is no means of defense at all against missiles such as the SS-20.

Yet in Japan and the Republic of Korea, like NATO in 1979, there is no request whatsoever for deployment of intermediate range U.S. missiles, and the United States appears to have no plan to keep them in Asia.

However, as already mentioned, the nuclear equilibrium will be restored when the United States begins installing nuclear cruise missiles aboard attack submarines and major combatant surface ships. It is considered desirable that one air squadron of the B-52's stationed on Guam be replaced by aircraft carrying cruise missiles.

CONCLUSION

In order to maintain and strengthen security in Northeast Asia, it is necessary for each of the following nations to make efforts on matters mentioned below by itself or with other states:

The Republic of Korea 1. Attach importance to economic development. 2. Modernize military forces, especially ground and air strength.

Japan 1. Attach importance to economic cooperation with the Republic of

Korea. 2. Improve defense power significantly, particularly anti-submarine,

air defense, and logistical support capabilities.

The United States 1. Attach importance to its policy toward Asia. 2. Maintain and modernize regional forward deployment forces. 3. Quickly restore nuclear equilibrium in the region. 4. Restore relations with China after fallback over such questions as

Taiwan, trade, and transfer of high technology.


Between States 1. Maintain friendly relations between Japan and the Republic of

Korea, between the United States and the Republic of Korea, and between Japan and the United States.

2. Strengthen military cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea, and between Japan and the United States.

ERRATA Two dates were printed incorrectly in Professor Young-whan Kihl's article, "Korea's Fifth Republic: Domestic Political Trends," in Volume I, Number 2 (June 1982) of the Journal. On page 38 the date of President Park Chung-hee's assassination was printed as October 16, 1972; the correct date is October 26, 1979. On page 39 the year of President Chun Doo-hwan's graduating class at the Korean Military Academy was printed as 1965; the correct year is 1955.

security in northeast asia

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