security malware and defenses tanenbaum & bo, modern operating systems:4th ed., (c) 2013...

48
Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Upload: howard-beasley

Post on 02-Jan-2016

215 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Security

Malware and Defenses

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 2: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

The Security EnvironmentThreats

Security goals and threats.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 3: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Computer Security Triad

• Three key objectives are at the heart of computer security

Data and

services

Availability

Confidentiality

Integrity

Page 4: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Malware

• Malicious software– Trojan hourses, virus, worms,.. Etc

• Today’s malware is all about stealth• Infected machines report back to attacker, its

address, information…??• Attacker uses backdoor to control the infected

machine…. Make it a zombie. A collection of zombies is called a botnet

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 5: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Malware• Criminals can rent out botnets• Keyloggers• Identity theft• Malware can lay in wait for something interesting• Malware can interfere with competition’s

production process• Malware could target another person in the

company to discredit that person

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 6: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Types of Malware

• Trojan Horse• Virus• Worm• Spyware• RootKits

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 7: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Trojan Horse

• Transport means…Getting victims to download virus without attacker’s intervention.

• Now you have to get the victim to run it

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 8: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Trojan Horse

• Download program somewhere in users PATH.(Find directory not secured)

• Pick a name of a mistyped command ‘la’. If the user mistypes ‘ls’ as ‘la’, the Trojan will run.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 9: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Trojan Horse

• Legitimate, but malicious, user• Puts an infected version of ‘ls’ on the system.• Call admin……

cd/home/mal ls –l

• Admin just ran Trojan with superuser privileges

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 10: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Viruses

• Virus is a program that can reproduce itself by attaching its code to another program.

• Often written in assembler or C.• Attacker infects a program on his own

machine, then gets that program distributed.• Once installed on victim’s machine, it remains

dormant until executed.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 11: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Virus• Once activated…

– Executes it payload– Often waits for a specific date or time– …. We want to make sure the virus is well

distributed before people start noticing it.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 12: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Different Kinds of Viruses

1. Companion2. Executable Program3. Memory4. Boot sector5. Device Driver6. Macro7. Source code

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 13: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

1. Companion Virus• Old virus type• Runs with the program is supposed to run• Ex: in old MS-DOS

– We install a program named prog.com– When user enters prog, instead of prog.exe, our

infected program is executed.– We’ll call prog.exe after our malicious activity and

no one will be the wiser

• Can also be done with symbolic links

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 14: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

2. Executable Program Virus

• Overwrites the executable program with itself.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 15: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Executable Program Viruses (1)

A recursive procedure that finds executable files on a UNIX system.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 16: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Executable Program Viruses (2)

A recursive procedure that finds executable files on a UNIX system.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 17: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Executable Virus

• Overwriting virus is easy to detect….• Parasitic virus: this virus attaches itself to the

program to do the bad thing, but allows the program to function normally afterward.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 18: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Executable Program Viruses (3)

(a) An executable program. (b) With a virus at the front. (c) With a virus at the end. (d) With a virus spread over free space within the

program.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cavity Virus

Page 19: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

3. Memory-Resident Viruses

• Stays in RAM, either hiding at the top of memory or down among the interrupt vectors (the last few hundred bytes are generally unused)

• Capture one of the interrupt vectors– Putting it’s own address there– Call the interrupt after it does what it does– Benefit.. It can run in system mode

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 20: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

4. Boot Sector Virus

• Virus that overwrites the master boot record or boot sector.

• Requires intimate knowledge of the operating system’s internal data structure

• Copies the first sector of the boot sector to a safe place so it can call it later.

• At start-up, it copies the virus to RAM

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 21: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Boot Sector Viruses

(a) After the virus has captured all the interrupt and trap vectors. (b) After the operating system has retaken the

printer interrupt vector. (c) After the virus has noticed the loss of the printer interrupt vector and recaptured it.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 22: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

5. Device Driver Viruses

• Infect the device driver – it’s just a executable programs that live on disk

• Device drivers are always loaded at boot time and may run kernel mode.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 23: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

6. Macro Viruses

• Virus attached to macros in Microsoft Office.• Send the infected word document to

someone.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 24: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

7. Source Code Viruses

• Very portable• Looks for C code and changes it to call the

virus.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 25: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Worms

• Self-replicating program• Moves itself through the network and system

without the victims help.

• Robert Morris Internet worm of 1988

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 26: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Spyware

• Runs on the victims machine with victim knowing, doing things behind victim’s back

• 3 Broad categories– Marketing– Surveillance– Zombie army

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 27: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Actions Taken by Spyware (1)

1. Change the browser’s home page.2. Modify the browser’s list of favorite

(bookmarked) pages.3. Add new toolbars to the browser.4. Change the user’s default media player.5. Change the user’s default search engine.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 28: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Actions Taken by Spyware (2)

6. Add new icons to the Windows desktop.7. Replace banner ads on Web pages with those

the spyware picks.8. Put ads in the standard Windows dialog

boxes9. Generate a continuous and unstoppable

stream of pop-up ads.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 29: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Rootkit

• A rootkit is a program or set of programs and files that attempts to conceal it’s existence

• Usually contains malware

• Where they hide is how they are defined….

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 30: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Types of Rootkits (1)

Five kinds of rootkits – issue is where do they hide?1.Firmware rootkit2.Hypervisor rootkit3.Kernel rootkit4.Library rootkit5.Application rootkit

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 31: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Types of Rootkits (2)

Figure 9-31. Five places a rootkit can hide.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 32: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Rootkit Detection

• Read the files in the directory– Unless the dir system call is infected

• Timing related– Does something take longer than it should

Sony Rootkit

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 33: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Defenses

• Firewall• Antivirus• Code Signing• Jailing• Model-Based Intrusion Detection• Encapsulating Mobile Code• Java Security

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 34: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Defense 1: Firewalls

A simplified view of a hardware firewall protecting a LAN with three computers

•No packets can enter or exit the LAN without approval from Firewall•Stateless Firewall – Packet header information is used in approval•Stateful Firewall – Firewall tracks connections … may inspect packets.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 35: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Defense 2: Antivirus

• Some techniques– Virus Scanner

• Goat file to attract a virus– After analysis of virus, add to database known viruses

• Store file lengths– If they change…. Potential problem

• Hunt for decryption procedure– If virus compresses to fit in pgm size..

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 36: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Virus Scanners (1)

Figure 9-33. (a) A program. (b) An infected program. (c) A compressed infected program. (d) An encrypted virus.

(e) A compressed virus with encrypted compression code.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 37: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Antivirus (2)

• Some techniques– Integrity Checkers

• Compute checksum for clean files

– Behavioral Checkers• Monitor all activity• Word shouldn’t overwrite a file

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 38: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Defense 3: Code SigningUsing digital signatures to sign code

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 39: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Defense 4: JailingThe new program’s execution is monitored in a jail. System call is transferred to jailer who makes the decision if it is allowed.Like running in a debugger.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 40: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Defense 5: Model-Based Intrusion Detection

• Intrusion Detection System (IDS)1. Network-Based IDS

• Focused on incoming packets

2. Host based IDS• Static model-based intrusion detection

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 41: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Model-Based Intrusion Detection

• Static model-based intrusion detection– Implemented using jailing technique– Learn the ‘good’ behavior of a program from

program model. • Compiler can generate it and the author certifies it

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 42: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Model-Based Intrusion Detection

(a) A program. (b) System call graph for (a).Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 43: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Defense 6: Encapsulating Mobile Code

• Problem:– Javascript, applets, agents…– Things that want to execute on our machines– Things we may want to let execute on our

machines

• Defensive methods– Sandboxing – Interpretation

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 44: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Sandboxing

(a) Memory divided into 16-MB sandboxes. (b) One way of checking an instruction for validity.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

• Divides virtual address into 2 regions:

• One for data• One for code

• Confines applet to a limited range of virtual addresses enforced at runtime

• Guarantees the applet cannot jump to code outside its code or reference data outside data sandbox

Page 45: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Interpretation

Run applets interpretively. Every instruction can be examined by interpreter.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 46: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Defense 7: Java Security

Checks on applets include:1.Does applet attempt to forge pointers?2.Does it violate access restrictions on private-class members?3.Does it try to use variable of one type as another?4.Does it generate stack overflows or underflows?5.Does it illegally convert variables of one type to another?

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 47: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

Java Security (2)

Some examples of protection that can be specified with JDK 1.2.

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.

Page 48: Security Malware and Defenses Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved

End

Tanenbaum & Bo, Modern Operating Systems:4th ed., (c) 2013 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved.