security solutions magazine issue 76

11
AUSTRALASIA’S LEADING SECURITY RESOURCE FOR BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT ISSN 1833-0215 #76 FEB/MAR 2012 $8.95 inc GST / $9.95 NZ Who Are You Really Hiring? Identifying The Threats Within

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Page 1: Security Solutions Magazine Issue 76

ww

w.securitysolutionsm

agazine.comSECURITY SOLUTIONS M

AGAZINEISSU

E 76 FEB/M

AR 2012 - W

ho Are You Really Hiring

A U S T R A L A S I A ’ S L E A D I N G S E C U R I T Y R E S O U R C E F O R B U S I N E S S A N D G O V E R N M E N T

ISSN 1833-0215

#76FEB/MAR 2012

$8.95 inc GST / $9.95 NZ

Who Are You Really Hiring?Identifying The Threats Within

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Who are you hiring? When The Threat Lies Within...

This article looks at the threat from insiders

deliberately or recklessly causing harm to an

organisation. Accidental security breaches –

losing a thumb drive containing corporate files,

or mistakenly including sensitive information in a

company newsletter, are not considered.

Case Studies – What Can Happen When Something Goes Horribly Wrong…The media has revealed a plethora of cases

of trusted employees across Australia and

internationally, causing devastating harm to their

own organisations – whether though violence,

security breaches or property damage.

2002: NSW -Volunteer Firefighter Arsonist – Peter Cameron Burgess Cameron Burgess was a young, unemployed

man who lit his first fire in January 2001 near

his home town of Albury. After watching the

admiration and respect for the firefighters of New

York after the September 2001 attacks, and the

NSW Rural Fire Service after fighting fires in the

Blue Mountains in 2001, 20-year-old Burgess

began a spree of another 15 fires across NSW,

By Fiona Peacock

Security-in-depth is a familiar concept. We

think of a system of layers of security measures,

designed to prevent unauthorised access. The

Deter, Detect, Delay and Respond model brings

to mind the fences and signage; the alarms and

CCTV systems, barriers and secure containers;

and the security response services.

These security measures are obviously

important, but they are to no avail if the person

harming your organisation is wearing your

company identification card and carrying the keys.

Protecting your organisation from the insider

threat begins when you advertise for new staff. A

key phase is clearly the recruitment process, but

personnel security doesn’t stop there. It continues

for the duration of an employee’s engagement and

maybe even beyond. It can be conceived as the

life cycle of the employer-employee relationship:

Advertising, selection process, induction, ongoing

staff development, training and supervision, the exit

phase and, potentially, a post-employment phase.

Employers have to trust their staff but should

have in place a range of strategies to help detect

the warning signs in those few cases where the

trust is going to be breached.

ending only when he was arrested in April 2002.

Burgess had applied to enter the NSW Fire

Service but had been rejected due to lack of

academic ability. He served as a volunteer bush

firefighter with a number of brigades across NSW.

He thought that serving as a volunteer firefighter

might help a future attempt at joining the NSW

Fire Service, but he was often the person calling

in the fires, and first on the scene.

After his arrest by NSW Police Strike Force

Tronto, Burgess pleaded guilty to 16 charges

of arson and was sentenced to two years’ in jail

In 2002, Burgess was just one of at least 17

volunteer bush firefighters charged with arson

nationally between 1998 and 2003.

2006: NSW – Stolen Army Rocket Launchers – Captain Shane Della-Vedova In December 2006, media reports began

emerging that “rogue elements in the Australian

military” had stolen nine armour-piercing anti-tank

weapons, and that the weapons had fallen into the

hands of Sydney’s underworld with terrorist links.

In January 2007, the media reported that Abdul

Rahman had apparently sold seven of the rocket

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launchers (for $5,000 each) to Adnan Darwiche, a

Sydney drug dealer who wanted the weapons for his

drug gang war. Police investigating those drug wars

bought one of the rocket launchers from Darwiche

for $50,000 in September 2006, uncovering the

possible theft of military weapons.

Darwiche allegedly on-sold five of the

launchers to a terrorist group – some Sydney

men who had since been arrested over a plot

to blow up the Sydney Harbour Bridge, and the

Lucas Heights nuclear reactor – investigated

under Operation PENDENNIS.

It was April 2007 when the police finally

announced the arrest of serving Army Captain,

Shane Della-Vedova, and former Defence member,

Dean Taylor.

Della-Vedova was a former Army Warrant

Officer munitions expert with 28 years in the

military. He was convicted of stealing ten rocket

launchers between 2001 and 2003 and selling

them to Sydney’s criminal underworld. Dean

Taylor was Della-Vedova’s brother-in-law. Taylor,

who served 15 years in the Army as a fireman,

also posted to Holsworthy before being medically

discharged. Taylor had offered to supply rocket

launchers and other military weapons to a man he

was visiting in prison.

In April 2007, Della-Vedova gave his version of

events to the court. He claimed that as a normal

day on duty disposing of out-of-date munitions, he

had driven a load of M-72 rocket launchers 300

km from the munitions bunker at Holsworthy Army

Barracks to the School of Infantry in the Hunter

Valley. On his return to Holsworthy, he found that

he had mistakenly left 10 of the launchers in his

Army vehicle. In his “I forgot” confession, Della-

Vedova told police he panicked and hid them in

his Holsworthy office, painting over the serial

numbers with black paint. He then hid them in the

garage of his family home in a nearby suburb. They

apparently stayed there while Della-Vedova was on

deployment to Iraq. Della-Vedova told police that

after removing the weapons “accidentally”, he later

sold them for “a pittance” to a man who wanted them

as trophies.

And the stolen rocket launchers ? One has been

recovered and the other seven are believed to be

still buried in PVC pipes somewhere in bushland,

despite police attempts to locate them.

Despite Della-Vedova’s version of events, this

appears to be a case of military weapons being

stolen to supply to the criminal underworld. What

were the systems in place to account for such

weapons, and have these systems improved to

prevent another such incident occurring ? How

can a serving Defence member be associating with

criminals – visiting them in prison – and not come

to notice?

2009: Victoria – Anti-Terrorism Investigation – Victoria Police Detective Charged With Media LeakOperation NEATH was the joint agency

investigation into the plot by Islamic extremists to

attack Holsworthy Army Barracks near Sydney.

The details of police raids in August 2009 were

allegedly leaked to a journalist of The Australian

and were published hours before the raids were

conducted, potentially endangering the success

of the raids and the safety of the officers involved.

A Victoria police officer, Simon Artz, was charged

in November 2011 with a number of offences

relating to unauthorised disclosures.

2009: USA – Mass Shooting At Fort Hood, Texas – US Army Psychiatrist Charged With MurderIn November 2009, a US Army psychiatrist

walked into a building at Fort Hood, Texas, and

committed fratricide, shooting dead thirteen

and wounding thirty more. Media soon carried

stories that Major Malik Nadal Hasan, a US-

born Muslim, had been calling for Muslims to

rise up and attack Americans, and had been

in angry disputes with other officers about his

views. Other articles suggest that he had been

trying to resign from the Army, and was dreading

being posted to serve in the Middle East. Some

media articles suggest that the shootings were

triggered by senior officers refusing Hasan’s

requests to prosecute some of his patients for

war crimes, based on statements they made

during psychiatric sessions with him.

Two years on, survivors and relatives of those

murdered have filed for damages against the

US Army, saying that the Army knew of Hasan’s

radical beliefs and should have prevented the

incident. Sergeant Munley, a claimant, and one of

the police officers who helped bring down Hasan,

stated, “I brought this claim because I strongly

believe this tragedy was totally preventable and

that the Army swept under the rug what they

knew about Hasan.” The 83 claimants are

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seeking $750 million in compensation from the Army

Hasan faces the death penalty if convicted at the court

martial scheduled for March 2012.

2010: USA – The Largest Leak Of US Classified Documents – Private Bradley Manning And WikileaksIntelligence analyst Bradley Manning is alleged to have

leaked US government cables to the whistle-blowing

website Wikileaks, resulting in the biggest leak of classified

information in US history. The classified documents

included more than 250,000 classified US diplomatic

cables. A cache of nearly 400,000 documents relating to

the war in Iraq, known as “war logs”, were also leaked to

the anti-secrecy site, including a video of a 2007 helicopter

attack in Iraq in which journalists and civilians died.

Private Bradley Manning joined the US Army in

2007, a talented ‘geek’ who had been drifting through

low-paid jobs. In October 2007, he was sent to Iraq as

an intelligence analyst – low ranking, but with access to

phenomenal amounts of highly classified data.

In July 2010, Pte Manning was charged with several

offences relating to stealing secret information. In

March 2011, the US Army charged Manning with

22 additional counts relating to the unauthorised

possession and distribution of more than 720,000

secret diplomatic and military documents. On 12

January 2012, an investigating officer recommended

Pte Manning face a military court martial.

2011: NSW – Quakers Hill Nursing Home Fire – Nurse Charged With MurderIn November 2011, Australians shared their grief over the

death of at least eleven elderly nursing home patients in

a fire at a residential facility. Horror turned to disbelief

when police announced they had charged a 35-year old

male nurse from the nursing home. Roger Dean allegedly

started the blaze in the early hours and then presented

himself for media interviews as a hero who had helped

evacuate some patients from the fatal fire.

Dean had apparently been interviewed by police on

another matter, at his home on Thursday evening, just

hours before the fire began early on Friday morning. He

had been working at the Quakers Hill Nursing Home for

two months, following a dispute with a previous employer.

The Advertising And Recruitment ProcessesThere’s no magic solution – no questionnaire,

psychometric test or interview proforma – that will

enable employers to detect all potential offenders at

the selection process.

Employment screening merely provides a snapshot

of what the person is like at that point in time. People

change across time, as a result of life experiences and

sometimes as a result of their work-related experiences.

If an employer is considering imposing character

or background checks on new employees (such

as checks of credit references, or mandatory drug

testing), these requirements should be mentioned

in advertising of vacancies. To do so, gives a clear

forewarning to potential candidates – some of

whom may opt out of the recruitment process as a

result. It also enhances the professional reputation

of the organisation, making a clear statement of the

standards of character required of their staff.

There are guides on good practice that can assist

an organisation in making their selection processes as

robust as possible – such as the Australian Standards on

employment screening.

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desk and it was several days before anyone noticed.

Is that a team you would want to belong to?]

The language used in government personnel

security policy refers to “any changes in

circumstances” or “concerns about the continued

suitability” of a worker to access classified or

sensitive information.

There is obviously a balance between caring

about a colleague’s welfare, and invading their

privacy, but it is a balance that most mature

adults can find when the culture supports it. That

culture should seek not only to promote good

security awareness, but also workplace health

and safety. Security concerns and duty-of-care

often share common ground, such as if there are

signs of mental illness, drug or alcohol issues, or a

gambling addiction.

In the same way that reporting of, not just

incidents but also near misses, can identify a safety

hazard in the workplace, so can potential personnel

security vulnerabilities be identified. Apart from

a healthy range of social behaviours and security

awareness, an organisation needs sound policies

and procedures for the reporting and analysis of

any issues of potential security concern.

Once your staff are aware of something being

not quite right with a colleague, the systems must

be in place so that they can report their concerns

with confidence that the privacy of the individual will

be balanced with the security requirements of the

organisation, and that concerns are handled with

suitable confidentiality so as to protect the source,

if necessary.

However, it does not stop there. A filing cabinet

full of reported security concerns is of no value

unless someone suitably qualified is analysing those

reports for specific security threats and for systemic

vulnerabilities – and then acting upon those issues.

Underpinning such policies and processes must

be a combination of security induction training and

then ongoing security awareness programmes. It is

important that all staff receive security training during

their induction phase so that they immediately know

what is required of them. Annual refresher training

is then generally considered to be a suitable interval

to retain a level of awareness.

This may take a variety of forms, depending on

the nature of the organisation. At its most formal,

it may be a mandatory requirement to attend

a formal briefing or complete an online training

package. Or it may involve more creative security

awareness activities tailored to the nature of the

organisation. Discussing case studies of other

organisations’ security incidents can be a useful way

of reviewing whether the same could occur in your

own workplace.

If a public servant is required to have ongoing

access to resources classified at PROTECTED,

or above, then the department will need to seek

a formal security clearance for that individual.

Similarly, if someone employed in the private

sector is contracted for government work involving

such classified information, they will also require

a security clearance. The majority of Australian

Government clearances are now processed

through the Australian Government Security Vetting

Agency (AGSVA) currently administered through

the Department Of Defence.

The Ongoing Management And Supervision Of Staff – AftercareIt is a good organisational security culture when

supervisors actually know their staff and take an

appropriate level of interest in them. This means

that you can know when something’s not right –

when someone is behaving out of character, when

their standards are slipping, or maybe when they

seem to be espousing new or radical views. It is

only by knowing what is normal that you can detect

was is abnormal. Similarly, it is a sign of a healthy

workplace when colleagues know each other and

show an appropriate level of interest.

[Many have heard the story of an American

office-worker who supposedly died seated at his

A filing cabinet full of reported security concerns is of no value unless someone suitably qualified is analysing those reports for specific security threats and for systemic vulnerabilities

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Security issues should also feature in staff exit

processes. If an employee has held a security

clearance, there are specific requirements,

including notifying the Australian Government

Security Vetting Agency of the change in

employment status. Exit interviews also present

an excellent opportunity for an organisation to

gain some candid feedback on a variety of issues,

including any weaknesses in security practices.

Any specific issues raised, or insights from

departing staff, should be evaluated.

The Final Phase Of The Employer – Employee Relationship – Beyond AftercareSome American government agencies are

particularly adept at keeping former employees

within their networks. This form of extended

aftercare is not just for the social pleasures.

Whether staff have retired or simply moved on,

maintaining those social networks serves to

keep those staff within the watchful gaze of the

organisation’s network. This occasional contact

with the organisation and other former colleagues

can have numerous benefits to an organisation.

That invitation to a Christmas barbeque may

help prevent a former employee from turning

bad and divulging sensitive corporate information

(especially if they left as a result of a grievance). It

may provide an opportunity to detect and intervene

when someone is showing signs of stress – raising

those interrelated issues of security and duty-

of-care (particularly if they resigned due to work-

related stress). Former staff can also be a valuable

talent pool when an organisation is recruiting.

Recycling a good former employee saves on

training and induction, and can deliver someone

with years of corporate knowledge, improved upon

by their intervening experience elsewhere.

A Risk Management ApproachGood personnel security involves applied risk

management. There are some basic principles of

risk management to consider:

The likelihood of a threat being realised is a

function of the threat source’s intent and capability,

combined with the vulnerability of the assets.

How does this apply to personnel security

and the trusted insider? It means that the risk of

deliberate harm from a trusted insider results from

a combination of the individual having both the

intent (the desire) to do harm and the capability

(the skills, knowledge, tools). They can only act on

their intent if there is a vulnerability – an opportunity

arising from flawed security practices.

Risk management is not a perfect process.

When it comes to interpreting or predicting

human behaviour, the best we can hope for is

an educated guess. Suffice to say, the more

educated you are (the more information you

have), the better your guess.

Faced with a potential insider threat, the security

manager faces a number of options – which each

carry their own risks:

One possibility is that your information might

lead to a false positive (reacting to a perceived

security threat, but it turns out that the concern is

unfounded). Alternatively, you might run the risk of

a false negative (you don’t act on the information

available, and a serious incident occurs as a result).

There is even the chance that you might get

it right – correctly identifying and acting on the

concern, or correctly assessing and dismissing

the concern.

In examining the available information, factors

to consider include the impact on the subject of

the allegation, the potential security harm to the

organisation and its stakeholders, legal implications

and the potential impact on reputation, either way.

The level of risk is determined as a function of

the assessed likelihood of the event occurring, and

the anticipated consequence if it does occur.

Fiona Peacock has a Masters degree in Investigative

Psychology from theUniversity of Surrey UK, a

B.Sc Honours degree in Psychology and a B.A

in Criminology from the University of Melbourne.

She has worked in law enforcement, intelligence

and security roles in Australia and the UK for more

than 20 years. She holds a CPP (Board Certified in

Security Management) from ASIS International and

a Diploma in Security & Risk Management. Fiona's

interest is intelligence-led security, applying risk

management principles.

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