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This second issue of the Security and Terrorism specialized Research Bulletin is prepared at an important time, when counter-terrorism efforts dominate international policies world wide. Such efforts have been particularly pronounced in the Gulf region and this Bulletin offers a modest contribution towards assessing and understanding these developments.

Several regional counterterrorism efforts have been recently undertaken by governments in the Gulf region of which new counter-terrorism legislation forms a major part and is the topic addressed in the Bulletin. Regional endeavors to create and enact a solid legal framework in support of the local and international war on terrorism have become self evident from the number of national legislations and regional treaties that have focused exclusively or partially on the task of combating terrorist activities in all its forms, and also from the speed that such laws and treaties have been produced and enforced around the globe.

Apart from the fact that enacting such laws has become a requirement on every state member of the international community according to several United Nations Security Council Resolutions (of which the most important are UNSCR: 1267, 1373, 1540) many states in the Gulf region have also become the targets of terrorist groups. To protect both their own national security and also as a sign of each state’s seriousness in contributing to global counter terrorism efforts, several Gulf states have adopted a legal structure to effectively deal with this growing and dangerous phenomenon as a matter of urgency.

There is no doubt that terrorism today represents one of the cruelest violations of human rights. However, we must also be fully aware of and address the concerns regarding the rights of the accused and the need to protect those rights. The innocent victims of terrorism equally have similar rights and it is the obligation of the state’s security institutions to provide for this basic right to live in peace. As in the case of most national security laws and treaties the central question nonetheless remains as to how to find a fair and workable balance between the protection and the fulfillment of the state’s security requirements on the one hand, and on the other hand respect the requirement of protecting and maintaining the basic rights of the individual against potential injustices and abuses that can sometimes result from a state’s manipulation of such laws.

Issue No. 2 February 2006 Security & Terrorism

Counter-Terrorism in the Gulf Research Bulletin

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Limits to Counter-Terrorism Legislationin International Lawby Professor Stefan Trechsel

Counter-Terrorism Laws and the Gulf Statesby Professor Clive Walker

Regional Counter-Terrorism Laws and Freedom of Expression:Challenges and Limitationsby Dr. Mohammad Abdulla Al-Roken

Maritime Security in the Gulf: Addressing the Terrorist Threatby James A. Russell

Defining Terrorism: A Breakdown of the Counter-Terrorism Lawsby Farida El Agamy

New GRC Publications 25

GRC Publications and Recommended Literature

Upcoming Events 26

The Reconstruction of the Security Sectorin Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine

The Gulf as a WMD free zone (GWMDFZ) : The Case for Regional Disarmament

Support from the EUand the Gulf 29

The Gulf as a WMD free zone (GWMDFZ) from the perspective of the European Union’s non-proliferation policy By Stephan Klement

Memorandum regarding the State of Kuwait’s position on Declaring the Gulf region as a Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction

Making Headlinesin Security Analysis 33

In This Issue

As many cases will show, anti - terrorism legislation, in general, is designed to guarantee a wide, and in a few cases, unrestricted power for the state’s security versus individual security. Fighting terrorism has special and even unique requirements, and unusual and non-standard rationales need to be applied in certain cases owing to the unique nature of the threat.

The subject is one of paramount importance to the collective security of the Gulf region as well as to international peace and stability. In light of the importance of this subject, the counter-terrorism legislation produced in certain Gulf states over the past few years have been translated for the first time by the GRC into English and will be published in the near future. This Bulletin offers an analysis and assessment of these laws and places them in the context of broader security efforts in the region. A major part of the bulletin dissects the different laws in a table format that highlights the major points. This is aimed at helping readers to make a comparison on how national legislations and regional treaties deal with the different aspects of counterterrorism. In addition, the Bulletin contains a number of articles that focus on the same issue written by legal experts and scholars on this topic.

Aside from work on this issue, the Security and Terrorism Program at the Gulf Research Center

continues to develop. Of particular note is the gaining importance of the Gulf as a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone project, which was endorsed by GCC Secretary-General Abdul Rahman Al Attiyah at the opening of the GCC Summit in Abu Dhabi in December 2005. Our next meeting on this project will be held in Cape Town, South Africa at the invitation of the South African Government. Also of great importance to the initiative was a memorandum submitted by the State of Kuwait to the GCC endorsing the idea, which has been translated and printed here for your interest along with an article on the position of the European Union to a Gulf WMDFZ by a representative of the Office on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the Council of the EU.

The GRC hopes that this modest contribution from the Security and Terrorism Program will be of some benefit in improving our understanding of the overall picture of combating terrorism and improving security in the Gulf.

Dr. Mustafa AlaniProgram DirectorSecurity and Terrorism StudiesGRC

Editor-in-Chief: Abdulaziz Sager

Editor: Lana NusseibehProduction Assistant: Farida El AgamyGraphic Designer: Mohammed Saker Publisher: Gulf Research Center

Tel : 00971 4 3247770 (Ext. 431)Fax: 00971 4 3247771Email: [email protected] Web site: www.grc.ae

The Security and Terrorism Research Bulletin is intended to contribute to a constructive discussion of critical security issues facing the Gulf Region. Articles, therefore, do not represent the opinion of the Gulf Research Center but that of the individual author. The Security and Terrorism Research Bulletin is published four times a year in both Arabic and English and can be read on the GRC website at www.grc.ae

Articles may be reproduced, after permission has been obtained from the editor, provided mention is made of the GRC and articles are reproduced with the GRC and author‘s name.

Security & Terrorism Research Bulletin

Introduction

2 I s s u e N o . 2 - F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 6

the perpetrators of terrorism, the motivation to act with extreme violence will continue to be virulent. However, views differ as to where the lines between acceptable and unacceptable means of combating terrorism must be drawn.

I. Sources of International LawIf we look for sources in international law to pro-vide us with answers, we can primarily rely on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR). Although the Covenant has not been ratified by all member states of the United Nations, it has acquired considerable authority as an instrument that implements the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is also important to bear in mind the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the protocols thereto, which prohibit the violation of a number of basic rights. Finally, bearing in mind that this list is far from exhaustive, a number of fundamental rights have now acquired the status of ius cogens. Effectively, this means that these rights have come to form part of the body of com-pulsory rules of International Law. This is certainly true for the prohibition of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments.

II. DerogationsHowever, human rights, with a few exceptions, are not absolute. The right to respect the privacy of a person’s home does not prevent search and seizure. Also, detention on remand is a commonly accepted exception to personal liberty. In addition to the “normal” interferences, the ICCPR and other human rights treaties allow for further derogations during times when a public emergency threatens the nation. Does terrorism constitute such an emergency? It depends. The European Court of Human Rights holds that the term “public emergency” refers to an exceptional crisis or emergency that affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community. These conditions were for example met in Northern Ireland in the late fifties and between 1972 and 1992, when 3000persons were killed and ten times as many injured through violent means.

In my view, the current threat of terrorist attacks can only justify derogation in exceptional circumstances such as those prevailing in Iraq, Afghanistan and parts of Sudan. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that even in an

Introduction:

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the fight against terrorism has been a major concern for the international community and the majority of governments. While the United States wages what they call a “war on terrorism,” a war that has in fact fuelled the recruitment of young people to the banner of Al Qaida, many countries are taking a more measured response by implementing new protective legal measures against terrorist activity. As in many European countries, Switzerland has elected to amend its Penal Code as opposed to issuing new legislation. “Financing terrorism” has been introduced into the Penal Code as a new offence, unlike the United States which has implemented rather extensive new legislation through the Patriot Act. The United Kingdom has also passed protective measures in its Terrorism Bill. In practice, there is a uni-versal consensus that terrorism must be fought through all legal means. Terrorism is a phenomenon that has caused immense human suffering and created a general feeling of insecurity that has affected the daily lives of millions of people.

However; there is a mounting concern in current interna-tional legal debates about the danger of putting forth leg-islation that unduly restricts human rights on a large scale. Countless resolutions, recommendations, reports, political and academic meetings and publications have addressed this issue. Although there is a general agreement that the fight against terrorism must be carried out at all costs for the future of our collective security, justice cannot be enforced through unjust means. There is a general agree-ment that the fight against terrorism should be carried out while respecting the human rights of individuals. Terrorism is not just a technical issue, such as money-laundering; it is supported by strongly held convictions, ideologies and a strong sense of injustice. It cannot be conquered on a physical battlefield alone, because as long as a feeling of being oppressed (whether justified or not) prevails amongst

Limits to Counterterrorism Legislation in International Law

Stefan TrechselProfessor of Criminal Law and Procedure

Switzerland

Although there is a general agreement that the fight against terrorism must be carried out at all costs for the future of our collective security, justice cannot be enforced through unjust means.

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emergency, there are strict limitations to the restrictions that a state can impose. Some fundamental rights, such as protection against torture and the rule nulla poena sine lege (the requirement of a law applicable at the time of the crime), cannot be restricted at all. Furthermore, any restrictions on other rights, such as personal liberty, must remain within the limits of what is required by the exigencies of the situation. This amounts to very limited situations in which derogation can be applied. Finally, there are some rights such as the right to privacy and freedom of speech, which may generally be restricted to the extent that the interference is not arbitrary and is considered necessary. These flexible rules permit anadaptation to situations of emergency, so that no additional powers of derogation are needed.

III. Application of the General Rules to SpecificMeasures in Anti-Terrorism Laws

Laws against terrorism cover various subjects. They may be oriented towards repression, adding new offences to the penal law or increasing the sentence for offences that already exist. They can also be targeted towards prevention, by providing for enhanced surveillance of private communications and public areas. Some can change rules of procedure, in order to facilitate convictions. These must be discussed separately.

A) Amending the Penal Law

As a matter of principle, states are free to decide on the type of behaviour that constitutes an offence and on the sentence applied to such an offence. However, there are restrictions, mainly in the following three areas:

First, criminal law must be formulated with sufficientprecision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. This is a requirement to ensure legal certainty. In the case of anti-terrorism legislation, the danger of using vague words is considerable. It can partly be explained by the fact that there isn’t a generally accepted definition of terrorism. In thecurrent climate, legislators may be tempted to formulate texts which are vague enough to cover all sorts of “undesirable behaviour.” For instance, unwanted criticism of opposition

groups could be punished by legislation in some cases, whereas in other cases they are ignored and labelled as freedom fighters.

Second, behaviour which constitutes the lawful exercise of a fundamental right such as freedom of expression may not be defined as an offence.Third, while states are free to decide upon their system of criminal sanctions, they must respect the principle of proportionality. Excessively severe sanctions may amount to degrading or even inhuman treatment and thereby violate International Law. This may be found in particular, when the death penalty is prescribed for any but the most violent of crimes, leaving aside the fact that a growing portion of the world is increasingly opposing that particular sanction. One of the reasons for such criticism is that so far there is no evidence establishing any increased deterrent effect to capital punishment.

B) Providing for Increased Powers of Surveillance

A very important tool for the prevention and the repression of crimes, including terrorist crimes, is the use of technical means to supervise all kinds of communications, including the transfer of funds. In this area, three aspects are of importance: First, safeguards should be imposed against abuse. Any information obtained as a result of such supervision should not be used for any purpose other than that of combating terrorism. There is always a danger that such means of surveillance are used to spy on the opposition. Second, the supervision may not be used to discriminate against people of a certain religion, ethnic origin, race, nationality or other similar criteria.

Third, it is of crucial importance that there are effective control mechanisms for the practical use of those means. Generally the impingement upon fundamental rights is only apparent to the targeted person. The obvious solution in those cases is the implementation of effective remedies and modes of oversight. Surveillance, however, is by its essential character secret. Even after the investigation is over it may be necessary to conceal the surveillance from the person concerned, since this might jeopardise the long-term purpose that prompted the surveillance in the first place.Therefore a system of automatic and regulated control must be instituted protecting the individual’s rights in absentia. It is very important that persons outside the administration are involved in the oversight of those secret investigations, e.g. a group of parliamentarians of mixed political orientation.The requirements for effective legal remedies are less complex where economic measures such as the freezing of assets or confiscation are concerned.

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While the United States wages what they call a “war on terrorism,” a war that has in fact fuelled the recruitment of young people to the banner of Al Qaida, many countries are taking a more measured response by implementing new protective legal measures against terrorist activity.

* Note of the Editor:Article 9 ICCPR1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. 2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him. 3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitledto trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement. 4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful. 5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.

In addition to this, it should be a cause of general concern that there seems to be, so far, no remedies whatsoever to oppose the inclusion of a person’s name or group on a list which is ratified by the UN Security Council.

C) Increasing the Period of Police Detention

There is a general assumption that the judiciary protects individuals whereas the police have the practical task of preventing or investigating crimes. The police are equipped with the necessary instruments, whereas the courts must make sure that such instruments are not abused in any way. The danger of abuse finds expression in the rule thateveryone arrested on suspicion of being or having been involved in criminal activity must be brought “promptly” before a judge. It is possible to derogate from this rule even in situations of a public emergency, but the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that any derogation from this rule are very hard to justify, so that in practice it becomes impossible to find situational justification for doing so.

It can be said that this rule, set out in Article 9 of the ICCPR*, is closely linked to the prohibition of torture. The latter can occur in some states when the person is in the hands of the police. If the period of detention is extended, there is a chance that the physical evidence of being ill-treated will disappear prior to the person being brought under the control of the judiciary. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the period is not extended beyond what is absolutely necessary. It is in my opinion, highly doubtful whether an extension beyond the limit of four days, such as the one that has been introduced in the United Kingdom, is compatible with the respect for human rights.

IV. Summing up

Summing up, it can be said that the fight against terrorismis highly legitimate and must be effective. For this purpose, the protection of personal liberty may be weakened; in my opinion and as outlined in my argument above, it is also legitimate to – slightly - restrict the judicial rights to a fair trial in certain situations. However, it is important, and in the long-run it is also crucial that if the fight against terrorism isto be won that the protection of human rights is not neglected

About the Author

Stefan Trechsel was Professor of Criminal Law and Procedure at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland from 1979 until 1999 and at the University of Zurich from 1999 until 2004. In 1975, he was elected member of the European Commission of Human Rights, which he presided from 1995 until 1999. He was also involved in expert work in preparation of legislation on criminal law, criminal procedural law, law on foreign nationals and criminal tax law.

As of August 2005 he was appointed ad litem judge to the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

He was appointed to the Panel of Eminent Jurists of the International Commission of Jurists in 2005, whose task it is to research Terrorism, Counter Terrorism and Human Rights. Trechsel has published, i.a., a Commentary to the Swiss Penal Code and a major treatise on “Human Righs in Criminal Proceedings” as well as numerous academic papers on human rights, criminal law and criminal procedure.

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along the way. Perhaps the most important element is that torture and other forms of ill-treatment including so-called “enhanced questioning” remain absolutely forbidden in any judicial system. Under no circumstances should there be such a thing as a “carte blanche” in this area.

Counter-terrorism Laws and theGulf States

Professor Clive WalkerProfessor of Criminal Justice Studies at the School of Law,

University of Leeds

The expansion of international law

Over several decades, international treaties have emerged in response to terrorism. The most prominent relate to hijacking and attacks upon aircraft,1 ships and related installations,2 diplomats,3 hostages,4 nuclear installations and materials,5 terrorist bombings6 and terrorist financing.7 The pace of development has recently quickened. Erstwhile obstacles to international agreement, such as Cold War rivalries and the sponsoring of national liberations movements, have fallen away as sources of inter-state rivalry. Concurrently, the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 are depicted as a threat to world peace and world order, so international law must play ‘a pivotal role’.8

As a result, a growing body of international laws against terrorism is being implemented by municipal law.9 Indeed, domestic delivery is under scrutiny from the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Committee,10 which has the mandate of hectoring States into taking stern measures. In that light, it is not surprising that several Gulf States have begun to develop counter-terrorism codes, of which I will only deal with the UAE and Qatari laws in this article.

First, the Qatari Law no.3 of 2004 On Combating Terrorism includes enhanced penalties for terrorist offences and specific offences for terrorist organisation, membership, supply, training and aid (including funding) (articles1-13). In order to investigate such activities, suspects can be held for 15 days, renewable for up to six months, and there are wide powers to intercept communications and obtain financial records (articles 18-20). There is encouragement by way of the offer of immunity to those who collaborate with the security forces (article 14).

Second, the United Arab Emirates Federal Decree Law no.1 of 2004 Concerning Combating Terrorist Crimes likewise enacts wide offences for being involved in or with terrorist groups (articles 3-7, 9-20, 22-23), subject again to an immunity for collaborators (articles 21, 24), and imposes enhanced penalties (articles 25-27). It is also an offence to publish terrorist ‘propaganda’, a term which is undefined and does not carry any defence for legitimate journalism (article 8). Investigations are aided by special powers to obtain financial information and accounts may be frozen (article 30-35). Expressing perhaps a signal of political intent and also reflecting the enduring nature of the threat, there is established the National Committee for Combating Terrorism to coordinate and develop government policy and laws (articles 36-37).

The value of counter-terrorism codesThe quandary posed by emergencies such as terrorism is that they require swift and unencumbered executive action. Yet, by granting sweeping measures to fight

1 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (“Tokyo Convention”, 1963); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (“Hague Convention”, 1970); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (“Montreal Convention”, 1971); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1988); Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Montreal, 1991).2 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, (Rome, 1988); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (Rome, 1988).3 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (New York, 1973).4 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (“Hostages Convention”, New York, 1979).5 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (“Nuclear Materials Convention”, New York, 1980); International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear terrorism (New York, 2005).6 UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (A/RES/52/164, New York, 1998).7 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (A/RES/54/109, New York, 1999).8 van Krieken, P.J., (ed.), Terrorism and the International Legal Order (T.M.C. Asser Press Inc., The Hague , 2002) p.vi. See especially UN Security Council in Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001.9 See Sterba, J.P., Terrorism and International Justice (Oxford University Press, New York, 2003).10 http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/.

The quandary posed by emergencies such as terrorism is that they require swift and unencumbered executive action. Yet, by granting sweeping measures to fight terrorism, there is the danger that the crisis might worsen by misplaced authoritarianism

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terrorism, there is the danger that the crisis might worsen by misplaced authoritarianism or that the condition of normality thereby restored will only be temporary. One must therefore consider whether it is justifiable or desirable to resort to ‘emergency’ or ‘special’ laws against terrorism, and, second, assuming their existence, one must consider the normative standards which should govern those laws.

The first level of justification concerns the powers and duties of States. In principle, it is proper for liberal democracies to defend their existence and their values, even if this defence involves some limitation of rights. This standpoint is reflected in Article 5(1) of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:11

Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.

It is also very much the point of the power of derogation from ‘normal’ Covenant standards in time of emergency under Article 4(1):

In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. ‘ Aside from the power to take action, there is a State responsibility to act against political violence. Each State has a duty to safeguard the right to life of its citizens (as under Article 6). International law duties to respond to terror were reinforced by United Nations statements in reaction to September 11, 2001.12

The second level of justification is more morally groundedand points to the illegitimacy of at least some kinds of threat to ‘normal’ life, such as terrorism. The fact is that many of the emanations of terrorism are almost certainly common crimes, crimes of war or crimes against humanity, even

though the political cause of the perpetrator of these “crimes” can arguably be legitimate. The point is highlighted by the UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings – serious offences against civilians are depicted as absolute wrongs.

Threat to security both at the individual and state level is arguably the major preoccupation of late modern society and provides a third reason for the enactment of special laws against terrorism. As a result, those who posit a clear ‘normalcy-emergency’ dichotomy are perhaps living in the past.13 It is not that the emergency laws should be in force and pervasive at all times. The United States’ ‘war’ model in relation to terrorism should not become an accepted norm, for that approach is conducive to a lack of accountability and proportionality and threatens an irrevocable departure from civil society as we understand it today. But to ignore or deny the need to address by law risk in a risk society involves either over-reactionary imprudence or misplaced attachment to rights. It follows that the weight of arguments favour that the State should take proportionate action against terrorism to protect citizens or indeed the State itself, in so far as its essential attributes of democracy and the protection of rights are imperilled.14 In this way, the legislature can secure an important role for itself and the courts if it can pre-empt such a crisis by way of specialist codes against terrorism.

Yet, strong provisos are embedded in this impetus towards counter-terrorism codes. The justification is here set out inthe context of a liberal democratic State. Polities which fail to meet those standards will be less assured in seeking the support of all sections of society against terrorism. Second, the actions against terrorism must not bring down the very values being protected:15

11 (General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 ). Neither Qatar nor the UAE has ratified the Covenant.12 See UN Security Council Resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001, 1373 of 28 September 2001. 13 See Gross, O., ‘Once more into the breach’ (1998) 23 Yale Journal of International Law 440.14 See further Simpson, A.W.B., In the Highest Degree Odious (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) pp.408, 413; Walker, C., A Guide to the Anti-terrorism Legislation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) chap.1; Walker, C., ‘Terrorism and criminal justice’ [2004] Criminal Law Review 311.15 A v SSHD [2004] UKHL 56 at paras.96, 97.

Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community. …. The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve.

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"Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community. …. The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve."

Conclusion

It follows that, while a margin of appreciation will be allowed in an emergency, laws must be subject to constitutionalism - the values of individual rights,16 democratic and legal accountability and review.17 Furthermore, the overall purpose should be the restoration of normal existence without special powers and that, once achieved, special powers should be become quiescent.

16 See Council of Europe, Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism (3rd ed., Strasbourg, 2005).17 See Walker, C.P., ‘Constitutional Governance and Special Powers against Terrorism’ (1997) 35 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1; Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism (Cm.3420, London, 1996) para. 3.1; Privy Counsellor Review Committee, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review Report (2003-04 HC 100) Pt.C3; Home Office, Counter-terrorism powers (Cm.6147, London, 2004) Pt.II para.1; Ignatieff, M., The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (PrincetonUniversity Press, 2004) pp.23-24. No special review mechanisms are specified in the Qatar or UAE codes.

About the Author

Clive Walker is Professor of Criminal Justice Studies at the School of Law, University of Leeds, one of the leading law schools in the United Kingdom. He has written extensively about criminal justice and civil liberties, with terrorism being the most prominent topic. His books have included The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law (2nd ed., Manchester University Press, 1992), The Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oxford University Press, 2002), and (with Hogan, G.) Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (Manchester University Press, 1989), as well as related works on miscarriages of justice, including (with Starmer, K.), Justice in Error (Blackstone Press, London, 1993) and Miscarriages of Justice (Blackstone Press, London, 1999). He was a special adviser to the joint Parliamentary committee on civil contingencies during the 2003-04 session and a book, The Civil Contingencies Act: Risk, Resilience and the Law (Oxford University Press) is in press.

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Maritime Security in the Gulf:Addressing the Terrorist Threat

In a little-noticed ceremony in Djibouti on December 12, 2005, Royal Netherlands Navy Commodore Hank Ord relieved his French Navy counterpart – Vice Admiral Jacques Mazars of command over an operation that has come to be known in military circles as Combined Task Force 150, or CTF 150. The task force features coalition participation by the navies of Germany, France, Pakistan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Established after the U.S. assault on Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, this coalition naval force conducts continuous maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, parts of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea – an operational area of an estimated 2.5 million square miles with as many as 14,000 surface vessels on any given day.

Maritime security in the Gulf is critical for both the regional states and the global economy. An estimated 15-16 million barrels of oil per day transits through the Strait of Hormuz to customers around the world, and any disruption of this traffic could have far-reaching effects on the global economy. All these oil tankers lack essential self defense capabilities and provide a relatively easy target for maritime terrorists and pirates. Moreover, shipping container traffic in and through the Gulf has grown dramatically in the last decade. Dubai and the free port area of Jebel Ali is now one of the largest container traffic hubs in the world, with millions of containers passing through Gulf waters annually on to their way to third country destinations. Al Qaeda and other extremist groups are known to have an active presence in the Gulf and have used facilities in Dubai and elsewhere to support their global operations. The importance of the Gulf as a source of oil and as a container transshipment node will only grow in the years ahead, with global oil consumption projected to

grow from approximately 80 million barrels a day in 2005 to 118-120 million barrels by 2020. This will only further increase tanker traffic through the already crowded Strait of Hormuz – and the number of potential soft targets carrying oil and natural gas.

The unpoliced world’s seas provide the essential highway for the increasingly networked and interdependent global economy. Eighty percent of all global trade occurs through seaborne traffic, which totaled an estimated 5.9 billion metric tons in 2002. As much of 90 percent of the world’s

general cargo is packed into twenty-foot equivalent units, or TEUs. It is estimated that 230 million containers pass through international ports on an annual basis. This trade is carried on approximately 46,000 ships that call at 2,800 ports around the world.1 Of these ports, 30 “megaports” have emerged as critical nodes in this interdependent web. There is growing recognition in capitals around the world of the emerging terrorist threat to the world’s oceans – regarded by some to be yet another example of “ungoverned spaces” used by terrorists to plan and execute operations outside the oversight of normative rules-based governance. For example, in September 2005 the Bush Administration released the latest in its series of national security strategy documents titled National Strategy for Maritime Security. The document firmly establishes protection of the seas as a critical mission facing the United States as part of it war on Islamic extremists around the world. While the activities of CTF 150 in and around the Persian Gulf preceded the promulgation of this new document, it is clear that the model established by this coalition naval operation could become a model to emulate elsewhere around the world as the international community grapples with the problem of maritime insecurity.

Building Collective Maritime Security in the Gulf

According to the US Naval Forces Central Command, the purpose of CTF 50 is to “preserve the free and secure use of the world’s oceans by legitimate mariners and prevent terrorists from attempting to use the world’s oceans as a

1 Figures drawn from Michael Richardson, “ A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Institute for South East Asian Studies, February 25, 2004.2 Release #56-05 , 2005, Tom Jones, “Maritime Security Operations: a Critical Component for Security and Stability,” June 7, 2005, US Naval Forces Central Command.

James A. RussellSenior Lecturer in the

Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate

School Monterey, California.

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There is growing recognition in capitals around the world of the emerging terrorist threat to the world’s oceans – regarded by some to be yet another example of “ungoverned spaces” used by terrorists

venue for attack or as a medium to transport personnel or material.”2 In some senses, CTF 150 is the logical outgrowth of the coalition naval operation spearheaded by the United States during the 1990s in the Gulf to enforce the United Nations’ trade embargo on Iraq pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 661 and 665. Under the auspices of the Maritime Intercept Operations, as they came to be called, coalition naval personnel boarded vessels in and around the Persian Gulf for over a decade. The regional cooperation built under MIO during the 1990s built relationships with coalition and GCC navies that laid the foundation for a transparent and open system of maritime security in the Gulf’s confines. That transparency was built though providing Gulf navies with the ability to track maritime traffic in the region through domain awareness provided by a version of U.S. global command and control system.

This approach is now being applied by CTF 150 in a broader context as part of the international effort to combat terrorism and prevent Al Qaeda and other extremist groups from using the seas to target shipping traffic and as means to provide logistical support to support their transnational networks. Efforts in and around the Gulf to police the seas are mirrored in the Mediterranean with NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor and Operation Active Effort spearheading a similar effort aimed at providing maritime security in response to terrorist threats and attacks. 3 The Singapore Navy also is taking the lead to improve maritime security in the pirate-infested waters surrounding the critical chokepoint in the Malacca Straits.4 The Gulf promises to become a critical area for international cooperation between regional and international powers seeking to establish a system of maritime security that may eventually include the critical choke points through which most of the world’s sea borne cargos must pass.

The Threat of Maritime Terrorism and Piracy

The necessity of improving maritime security in the Gulf and elsewhere is obvious. It is clear that Al Qaeda and other

extremist groups are targeting the maritime domain and are using it to support their operations.5 Today, the world’s oceans provide an indispensable component to Al Qaeda affiliated activities transporting people and illicit cargoes that directly and indirectly support their global operations. Shipping insurance giant Lloyds of London has reported that Norwegian intelligence believes that Al Qaeda may own or control between 15-23 freighters flying the flags of Yemen, Somalia, and Tonga.6 The activities of these groups harkens back to terrorism during the 1980s, when Palestinian Liberation Front terrorists hijacked the Italian-flagged cruise ship Achille Laro off Port Said as part of their efforts to secure the release 50 Palestinian prisoners held by the Israelis. It is also known that Al Qaeda extremists mounting the attacks in Istanbul in November 2003 were interested in targeting Israeli cruise ships frequenting the port of Antalya. A brief review of planned and actual operation by Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups reveals the danger posed to maritime security in the Gulf and elsewhere:

• A vessel operated by Al Qaeda delivered the explosives used in the August 1998 attacks on the US Embassies in East Africa that resulted in the deaths of 12 Americans and many more local citizens. • The failed January 2000 attack by Al Qaeda operatives against the USS Sullivan in Aden. The boat carrying the explosives sank during the operation.• In 2001, the Tamil Tigers conducted a coordinated suicide attacks by five boats off the coast of Sri Lanka• In the summer of 2002, Saudi authorities arrested a group of militants plotting to sabotage the world’s largest offshore oil terminal at Ras Tanura.• In June 2002, Moroccan authorities uncovered an Al Qaeda plot to target civilian and military shipping passing through the Strait of Gibraltar. The October 2002 capture of the plot’s organizer, Abd al Rahman Nashiri, revealed e a multi-part strategy aimed at blowing up ships in port, attacking larger vessels such as supertankers from the air, and attacking ships using underwater mines or suicide bombers. Nashiri was also believed to have been involved in a plot to attack the US naval headquarters in Bahrain in January 2002.• The successful November 2000 attack on the USS Cole that killed 19 U.S. sailors.• October 2002 attack on the French-owned supertanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen, which was rammed by a

3 Details of NATO’s operation are provided in Ali Koknar, “Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO,” Institute for Analysis of Global Security, January 24, 2005 as posted at http:/www.iags.org/n012405.htm4 Patrick Goodenough, “Maritime Terror Concerns Prompt New Initiatives in SE Asis, CNSNEWS.com, March 2, 20055 For a broader look at maritime terrorism see Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2004. Also see John Daly, “Al Qaeda and Maritime Terrorism, Part I,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol.1, Issue 4, October 24, 2004, The Jamestown Foundation.6 As cited in Koknar, op.cit.

It is clear that Al Qaeda and other extremist groups are targeting the maritime domain and are using it to support their operations.

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suicide bomber in a small craft. The attack resulted on one death and an oil spill into the Red Sea.• In December 2003, coalition naval forces confiscated three drug shipments from several dhows in the Gulf worth an estimated $15 million. It was later determined that seven of the 45 crewman had links to Al Qaeda, which was using the drug trade to finance its operations.• Unsuccessful April 2004 attack by an unidentified dhow on the Iraqi Khawr al Amaya and al Basrah oil terminals that resulted in the deaths of two sailors and one US coastguardsman. The attack was orchestrated by the Zarqawi network in Iraq. The attack shut down the terminal for two days, resulting in an estimated $40 million in lost oil export revenues. • Unsuccessful rocket attack in August 2005 on the US naval vessels Ashland and Kearsage while docked in Aqaba mounted by terrorists associated with the Zarqawi network in Iraq.

In addition to the terrorist threat to maritime security, the international community is addressing the growing problem of international piracy and smuggling around the world, with CTF 50 leading efforts in and around the Gulf to address this problem. This is a particular problem off the coast of Somalia and in the Northern Arabian Gulf. Reporting by the Office of Naval Intelligence in December 2005 provided to international mariners indicates incidents during the previous month involving hijacking, robbery and kidnapping. A particular focus of CFT 50 is smuggling and possible terrorist maritime activities along the largely unpoliced Makran coast off Pakistan.

Coalition Interoperability and Cooperation

Navies of the Gulf Cooperation Council have yet to formally participate in CTF operations, though it seems clear that these regional navies can and should play a role to help address the threat the threat to shipping on which their economic survival depends. The growing problem of maritime security also suggests that its time for the GCC states to boost their shallow-water coast guard capabilities to operate in the Gulf’s shallow waters that are unsuited for larger naval vessels operated by the CTF 150 coalition partners. The GCC’s lack of formal participation in CTF 150 operations is thought by some to result from their reluctance to be seen endorsing a U.S.-lead initiative associated with the war on terrorism – a “war” without widespread public support throughout the Gulf and the Middle East.

The Bush Administration has outlined an aggressive strategy to build international support for an integrated

effort to strengthen enforcement actions to deal with the maritime threat. As outlined in the National Strategy for Maritime Security, this effort includes such steps as: (1). Implementing standardized international security and World Customs Organization Frameworks for customs practices and standards; (2) Expanding the use of modernized and automated systems, processes and trade-data information to make vessel registration, ownership, and operation, as well as cargo identification, more transparent and readily available; (3) Improving information exchange between intelligence and law enforcement communities on the terrorist maritime threat; (4) offering maritime and port security training to interested countries and prioritizing security assistance programs to offer help in port security and the maritime domain; (5) encouraging all countries to increase their maritime domain awareness capabilities, which can in turn be shared throughout critically important regions.7

The area of maritime security provides the GCC countries with an ideal opportunity to join together with the CTF 150 operations by providing complementary shallow-water capabilities to help police the Gulf, which is populated by thousands of dhows on any given day. The GCC counties have in the past demonstrated only superficial interest in integrating their military forces and providing effective collective defense capabilities. But the issue of maritime security and domain awareness should be embraced by all regional states, all which can offer unique contributions to the daunting task facing the CTF 150 coalition partners to provide maritime security the vitally important waterways in around the Gulf.

7 National Strategy for Maritime Secuirty, The White House, Washington, DC, September 2005, pp. 14-15.

About the Author

James A. Russell is a senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, where he is teaching courses on Middle East security affairs, terrorism, and national security strategy. He also performs sponsored research for a variety of U.S. government organizations.

His articles have appeared in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Comparative Strategy, Middle East Policy, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Joint Forces Quarterly, Naval War College Review, the Nonproliferation Review and Contemporary Security Policy.

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With the emergence of the global phenomenon of what are now known as “terrorist crimes”, many countries have had to confront this phenomenon through a variety of possible means. The Gulf States are no exception to this global trend. Methods of addressing this serious problem have included the issuing of legislation that defines the acts associated with these serious crimes, which affect the internal and external security of the state and also stipulating laws containing severe punishments. These punishments give state agencies a much broader authority than previously, justified by the exceptional nature of these crimes.

Some of the Gulf states have tackled the legal aspect of combating terrorist crimes through a variety of laws. The most significant of these are Act 3 of 2004 in Qatar (issued on February 16, 2004 and comprising of 23 articles), the decree of Act 1 in the UAE (issued on July 28, 2004 and comprising of 45 articles), and Act 13 of 2005 in the Republic of Iraq (issued on November 7, 2005 and comprising of 6 articles). Also, the government of the Kingdom of Bahrain has submitted a draft law for combating terrorism (in March 2005 comprising of 34 articles) to be discussed by the Parliament. However, this draft law has not been passed till now because it has been met with rejection and protest in the Parliament and by a large number of civil society organizations.

By stipulating counter-terrorism legislation, or proposing and effectively applying such legislation, the four states must aim to protect individuals, citizens and expatriates under their jurisdiction against terrorist acts. This is the obvious obligation on the part of any state. On the other hand, and in compliance with resolution no. 80/2005 passed by the UN Human Rights Commission on April 21, 2005, states must also ensure that any procedure taken to combat terrorism shall comply with their commitment to International law, and particularly International Human

Gulf States Counter - Terrorism Lawsand Freedom of Expression

Mohammad Abdulla Al-Roken Associate Professor of

Public Law, UAE University,

Member of Gulf Research Center Editorial Board

Rights law, such as the mentioned resolution, which states the following: “[they] must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism complies with their obligations under International Law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.”

In general counter-terrorism laws are criticized for failing to find this required balance between the security of society and the preservation of individual rights and freedoms. In this regard, the present article will deal with the relationship

between the laws of combating terrorism in the Gulf states and specifically the freedom of opinion and the right of expression.

Freedom of opinion is one of the basic freedoms guaranteed by international and regional covenants and is captured in the articles of the constitutions of the Gulf states. Article (19) of the International Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights confirms that each human (being) has the right to have his or her opinion and to the expression of this opinion without constraint or intervention. The same principle can be found in the European Convention on Human Rights (article 10) and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (article 9) and the American Covenant on Human Rights (article 13) and the Arab Charter on Human Rights (article 32).

One cannot deny the fact that the groups that resort to violence to terrorize and threaten the security of nations, attempt to promote their goals and methods to polarize supporters and financiers, and to recruit members. States see themselves confronted with these attempts, and have a duty to defeat them by stipulating the legal grounds that will provide governments with the required authority and power to deal with this kind of threat.

For the purpose of this analysis, I will review the Acts of the UAE, Qatar and Iraq and the draft law of Bahrain for combating terrorism and in particular discuss the articles dealing with individual opinions, media, and the publication and distribution of opinions amounting to terrorist crimes.

In the decree of Article 1 of 2004 in the UAE, we find that article (8) stipulates imprisonment for a period not

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Freedom of opinion is one of the basic freedoms guaranteed by international and regional covenants and is captured in the articles of the constitutions of the Gulf states

exceeding five years for promoting verbally or in writing or by any other means any of the (“terrorist”) acts or purposes provided for in the Act. The punishment in this Act targets the original perpetrator; the one, who actually promotes these acts. It is not restricted to verbalization or writing as the Act includes any methods, such as symbols, images, drawings, etc.

The UAE Act extends the punishment to accomplices, by criminalizing the promotion of terrorist acts via the possession of circular notes, publications or cassette recordings, provided that these means are intended for circulation or to inform others. Also, those who possess printing or recording facilities, which are used, even temporarily to print, record or broadcast any material related to or instigating terrorist acts are even subject to the penalty of the original perpetrator.

In the state of Qatar, counterterrorism law has not specifically addressed the question of expression of opinion relating to terrorist acts, and this means that it considers expressing opinion even when it addresses ‘terrorist’ acts is a normal crime but not a ‘terrorist’ crime. However, Article (19) allows the Public Prosecution to monitor communications and record what goes on in public and private locations if this benefits in the investigation of terrorist crimes. However, this interception is limited to a period of 90 days at most, only to be extended after that by the judiciary.

In the draft law of the Kingdom of Bahrain, we find that article (10) criminalizes exploitation of religion, the dissemination of provocative propaganda, extremist ideas, raising placards, spreading drawings and other means of stirring sedition. Article (12) aims to punish anyone who promotes terrorist crimes by any means and who possesses circular notes and publications that promote these crimes, or who possesses facilities of printing or recording used temporarily to record or broadcast terrorist acts. Furthermore, article (29) gives the Public Prosecution the authority to wiretap and monitor not only communications, but messages, printed matters, packages, and the recording of what goes on in public and private places.

The Iraqi law does not deal precisely with the question of promoting and possessing materials and recordings pertinent to terrorist acts, but it criminalizes ‘instigating violence.’ This however is outlawed without a specific definition of the meaning of “instigation.” It states in article (3) that this could include a group of acts amounting to crimes against state security among them the attempt to

undermine the ability of the security forces in whatever form (beyond the freedom of expression.)

Passing these laws has had an impact on the local and international level, especially regarding their effects on the general issue of public freedom, and specifically affecting the right to opinion and expression. The most important observations and criticisms of the legal articles regulating this issue can be summarized as follows:

• In their totality, the laws have not given a clear definition of the term ‘terrorism’. The term ‘terrorism’ is originally a foreign word that is derived from a western environment to describe particular acts. The meaning of ‘terrorism’ in the Arabic language does not tally with the description of the actual circumstances intended to be criminalized by these legislations. This contradicts the principle of precision of the penal act whose ultimate goal is the ‘Juridique Securite’ (Securite Juridique): to protect the individual. These require the enacting of specific rules through which the actual safety of the individual is achieved.

• The scope of “terrorist” crimes is wide, containing acts that sometimes can be listed under political opposition activities or the right to practice public freedoms such as criticizing the government as a vent for the expression of opinion. This has led a Kurdish politician Mr. Mahmoud Othman, member of the Iraqi National Assembly, to say that the formulation of the act of terrorism in Iraq could be applied to all opponents of the government.

• The role of the state with regards to the freedom of opinion and expression is twofold: a positive one via which its three branches of power protect and maintain this freedom, and a negative one via which the three branches of power refrain from taking actions that constrain or restrict the freedom of opinion and expression. Counter-terrorism Legislation in the Gulf States stipulate harsh constraints on the freedom of expression in such a way that many people fear to express their opinions, to analyze terrorist acts, or to talk about the goals of these acts to avoid being entrapped in the mesh of legal articles.

• The legal articles mentioned above contain a lot of vague, imprecise and nebulous phrases when measured against the definition of the International Commission of Jurists, put forth in meeting (34) of the General Assembly of the UN against torture on May 10, 2005. The vagueness of these articles contravenes the basic principle upon which the penal law is based- nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege; i.e. no crime and no penalty except with accordance to a previous legal provision. Examples of

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About the Author

Dr. Mohamed Abdulla Al Roken is an Associate Professor of Public Law at Faculty of Shari’a and Law at UAE University, Al Ain. A UAE national, Graduate of Al Ain University (1985, LL.B. Hons.); he received his LL.M. and Ph.D. in Constitutional Law from the University of Warwick, Coventry, England in 1992. Dr. Al Roken was the Chairman of the UAE Jurists Association (1998-2004) an apex body of the legal profession in UAE. Further, Dr. AL Roken is National Vice President of International Association of Lawyer (“UIA”), France (2002- date). He is a member of the International Association of Constitutional Law (IACL), American Society of International Law (ASIL), and International Bar Association (IBA).Dr. Al Roken has written several legal research papers and articles which have been published in leading international law journals, amongst others “Human Rights under the Constitution of UAE” in Arab Law Quarterly, vol.12, part 1, 1997; “Historical and Legal Dimensions of UAE/Iran dispute over three Gulf Islands” in Al Abed, Ibrahim and Peter Hellyer (edts.) United Arab Emirates: a new perspective, Trident Press Ltd, London, 2001. and the author of 7 books.

these elastic and vague expressions within the context of terrorism include “sympathizing” “sensational propaganda”, “extreme ideas”, “causing damage to the national unity or social peace”, and “sectarian sedition”. This kind of vagueness has undoubtedly formed a serious threat to the freedom of opinion and expression.

• The counter-terrorism laws in the Gulf states have given state agencies broad authority to tackle terrorist crimes and thus form a threat to basic freedoms. The Qatari law and the Bahraini draft law allow wiretapping and monitoring of individual communications for a renewable period of ninety days. This makes individuals hesitant to freely express their opinions, even if they have no connection to terrorism. This is due to their fear of being liable to trial under the criminalizing provisions of the laws. Also, the possibility of recording of conversations, which is a violation of the right to privacy, has broadened in scope to include not only what goes on in public places, but also conversations and discussions in private locations. This state of affairs may threaten another basic freedom- the freedom of assembly.

• These legislations do not consider innocent intention a reason to hinder punishment. If an individual merely broadcasts or says something, this is not considered a terrorist crime if it cannot be proved that the speech or writing was made with criminal intention- i.e. terrorizing peaceful people. In light of the existing articles, the law may go as far as accusing anyone who expresses an opinion or writes a commentary about terrorist acts of promoting such acts, and the burden of proving his innocence and good intentions will fall on the individual.

• The Gulf legislations have not addressed the special “criminal intention” in the act of promoting terrorist activities. The promoters of audio or written media materials are not supposed to know that what they are promoting is a criminal terrorist act. Rather, the burden of proving their knowledge of the criminality of their work falls on the public prosecution. Also, the motive for committing the crime, that is what drives someone to promote media materials or to verbally express terrorist views, must be proven. If the purpose of a promotion of opinions or expression is to spread terror among people or recruit them in a specific terrorist organization, the person concerned will be convicted and punished. The burden of proving this special purpose again lies with the Public Prosecution. The same principles apply to the crime of possession. The wordings of article (8) of the UAE Act and article (12) in the Bahrain draft Law attest to the fact that the sheer possession of publications or records is committing a crime

whether the owner knows the nature of what he possesses or not. The two laws have not specified the existence of criminal intent on the part of the owner of these things and thus contradict the general principles.

• As an example, one of the unusual rules is article (20) of the UAE law; it punishes with a period not exceeding ten years any person who instigates a terrorist crime, under the condition that the instigation did not have consequences. Instigation usually takes the form of speech, i.e. an opinion promoted publicly. What is noticeable here is that the instigator in this case might receive a double punishment in comparison to the actual perpetrator who is in a better position. The person who commits the crime of promoting a terrorist act is punished in compliance with article (8) for a period of imprisonment not exceeding five years. The instigator committing this crime, on the other hand, is punished in compliance with article (20) and gets a double imprisonment if the instigation does not have consequences. The imprisonment increases in cases where there are consequences

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Counterterrorism Laws and Treaties:Background and Definitions

Farida El AgamyLegal Research

AssistantGulf Research Center

Since 1937, when the League of Nations tried to promulgate the adoption of the International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which would have contained a comprehensive definition of terrorism1, the international community has enacted several instruments aimed at preventing and globally punishing terrorist acts.

In spite of the fact that there were very early attempts, however, the international community has failed to produce a comprehensive definition and a universally accepted document on what can be considered an act of terrorism.

Yet recently, as various states and regional bodies have focused their own legislative efforts on counterterrorism measures, we have seen the emergence of a variety of definitions and ways to handle this issue. Influenced by UN Security Council Resolution 1337 that obliges states to take specific action in relation to countering terrorism, as well as by the increased concern with growing terrorist activity, in 2004, the Gulf enacted two national counterterrorism laws in Qatar and the UAE. This was followed by the Bahraini Parliament discussing a draft counterterrorism law and by Iraq, issuing its law in 2005. With the present chart, we aim to create an overview of some of the laws and treaties enacted to counter terrorism. By juxtaposing the various dispositions, we hope to show similarities and differences in the basic understanding of the problems and in the ways by which they can be approached. Our primary objective is to develop some sort of comparison between the Gulf state legislations on the issue of counterterrorism on the one hand and the legislation of other states. At the same time, we attempt to draw another comparison between a number of regional treaties and agreements dealing with inter-state cooperation in the field of counterterrorism.

The chart is of course not exhaustive and will be subject to frequent change due to legislative processes on the national and international level. International Counter Terrorism Measures

The following chart shows that even though the amount and sophistication of national legislation and international treaties increased after terrorism activities on a global level intensified and in particular the fight against terrorism following the attacks of September 11, every legal document on

counterterrorism takes a different approach to the definition of terrorism. Some try to provide a mere description of the act of terrorism, while others attempt to actually define the act of terrorism in an objective way or simply list any crime that is classified as a terrorist crime.

As clearly stated in several reports of the United Nations,2 there is no globally recognized or internationally agreed upon or comprehensive definition of terrorism. However, in the UN Document “A more secure world: Our shared responsibility / Report of the UN Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats” the authors of the report state several elements that should be taken into account when discussing a definition of terrorism: First of all, the panel confirms that the use of force against civilians by the state is regulated by the "Geneva Conventions" and could constitute a war crime but would not fall under the definition of terrorism. Secondly, the panel states that a definition of terrorism should restate that any acts under the 12 (since 2005 “13”) anti-terrorism conventions are terrorism and that terrorism during a time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. The actual definition according to the panel should be pursuant of principles they set out, as inserted in the chart below. The report of the panel reflects the ongoing, complex discussion about the legality of counterterrorism measures, whilst emphasizing the need for strong and effective ways to deal with terrorism.

1 "All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public"2 Report of the independent expert on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Robert K. Goldman, 2005 (E/CN.4/2005/103), Section 32; “Terrorism and Human Rights” Progress Report prepared by Ms. Koufa, Special Rapporteur, Commission on Human Rights, 53rd Session, 2001 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31), Section 24ff.

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3 United Nations Charter, Article 39.4 United Nations Charter, Article 41.5 Talmon, 99 A.J.I.L 175 (183)6E.g. S/RES/1267 (1999); S/RES/1373 (2001); S/RES/1377 (2001); S/RES/1455 (2003); S/RES/1456 (2003); S/RES/1535 (2004); S/RES/1540 (2004); S/RES/1566 (2004); S/RES/1617 (2005); S/RES/1618 (2005); S/RES/1624 (2005).7 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, (Tokyo Convention), 1963; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), 1970; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), 1971.8 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979.9 See: www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_conventions.html10 See: http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33168.htm11 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/criminal/terrorism/doc/sec_2004_688_en.pdf12 http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conventions/terr-roots.htm

According to the UN Charter, the Security Council may take certain measures3, binding on the states, when there is a threat to international peace4. In recent years the general consensus has been that international terrorism poses a threat to peace and security and that the Security Council therefore has the right to adopt international law.5 There are about 12 important Resolutions6 on terrorism from recent years. In most of these Resolutions, the Security Council condemns terrorist acts and calls upon states to coordinate their counterterrorism efforts, to enact legislation or to accede to international treaties. Thus, the UN Security Council requires individual states to fight terrorism on two different levels, national and international.

In addition to the Security Council Resolutions, the UN counts as many as 12 major multilateral treaties and protocols that form the main body of international law in the fight against terrorism. In 2005, a further convention was added on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism. These 13 Conventions were enacted to regulate specific aspects of terrorism, such as the seizure of and commitment of crimes aboard aircrafts7, the taking of hostages8 and others9. These treaties mostly define their own specific scope of application and oblige parties to establish criminal jurisdiction over offenders. They contain no globally accepted definition of terrorism. Yet, despite various calls of the UN Security Council, many states are still not party to these conventions.

Fighting Terrorism on a regional level

In relation to regional legal instruments, the European Council Framework Decision is well worth mentioning. The Framework Decision of 2002 is a principal EU document in the fight against terrorism today. The Council Framework

Decision is accompanied by many further decrees addressing detailed problems faced by the European countries, such as those defining specific measures to combat terrorism or the regulation on the exchange of information10. The council decision was designed in 1999 and 2000 and serves the purpose of coordinating counterterrorism measures in the member states and enhancing their effectiveness. In 2004 the European Commission issued a report, showing the implementation of the Council Framework decision in 13 of the European Member states11.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) issued its Counterterrorism Convention at its 26th session in the capital of Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou in 1999 as a reaction to a great number of emerging extremist movements in the 1990’s12. The convention entered into force in 2002, after ratification by the required number of states. This Convention excludes the struggle against foreign occupation and aggression and the fight for liberation and self-determination from the definition of terrorism, in case such a struggle complies with international law. Yet, there is still reluctance among states to ratify these conventions in general.

The League of Arab States equally adopted a convention on terrorism, and the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism was signed by the interior ministers of Arab states at a meeting held at the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States in Cairo on 22 April 1998. The convention entered into force on 7 May 1999.

With this said, it is clear that to implement the content of these international and regional instruments, countries must enact national measures to ensure effectiveness. National Laws countering Terrorism

Many countries complied with their obligations under international law (UN conventions, Security Council Resolutions or other Treaties) by either issuing a specific counter terrorism laws or by amending their Penal Laws, in order to establish jurisdiction over terrorist acts. The

The international community has failed to produce a comprehensive definition and auniversally accepted document on what can be considered an act of terrorism.

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13 Various US institutions have different definitions for terrorism14 Report of the independent expert on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Robert K. Goldman, 2005 (E/CN.4/2005/103), Section

examples mentioned in the present chart are all from countries that implemented or aim to implement specific counterterrorism legislation separately from their criminal code.

For the sake of comparison we have chosen to list the Draft counterterrorism law of The Kingdom of Bahrain, the laws of the State of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and the Republic Iraq as well as the US Patriot act13, the UK Terrorism Act and the Indian legislation.

With the exception of the UK Terrorism Act, all these laws and the draft law have been enacted after 9/11 and clearly show similarities in the way they address the problem. However, as can be seen from the chart, the definition of terrorism, of terrorist groups, the rights of the accused and the use of capital punishment are approached in very different ways.

Elements of Counterterrorism instruments

We aim to compare four areas that are commonly addressed in counterterrorism conventions or laws: the definition of terrorism, the definition of a terrorist group, the rights to due process and fair trial and the use of capital punishment.

We believe it is indispensable to have a clearly understandable legal structure governing the actions of non-state actors and they should be as clear as the laws governing the behavior of state actors, such as the Geneva Conventions and the whole framework of regulations completing them. To have such a clear legal structure, the need for a comprehensive definition of terrorism and of the actors such as terrorist groups is obvious.

Another important area, which should be addressed by every counterterrorism instrument, is the question of the judicial process rights of the accused person. This means, also counterterrorism has to respect the Rule of Law14. According to Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.” Finally, we have established that the use capital punishment as punishment for terrorist crimes appears in various laws. The use, however is not the same in each law, but in depth analysis would go beyond the scope of this article.

About the Author

Farida El Agamy has a Masters of Law from the University of Fribourg, Switzerland and specialized in Swiss law, European Law, international Human rights and Humanitarian law. She has studied English Constitutional law at the University of Bristol, UK. In 2003 she worked for the UNHCR in Geneva and was an intern at the Court of First instance in Maastricht, NL in 2004. Among other extracurricular activities, she actively worked with Amnesty International and participated in Legal competitions.

At the GRC she is working for the Research Program on Security and Terrorism issues as well as on several other legal projects.

After concluding her experience with the GRC, Farida will go back to Switzerland to take the Swiss Bar exam.

According to Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him."

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Resource

Definitions or descriptions of Terrorism

Definitions of Terrorist Groups

Security Council

Resolutions

The following is not as such recognized as universal Definition:Security Council Resolution 1566(2004)Art. 3Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences withivn the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophi-cal, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature;

The Security Council Resolutions only mention specific groups by name, but give no constitutive ele-ments For example:The Consolidated list of individuals and entities belonging to or associ-ated with the Taliban and Al Quaida Organisation as established and maintained by the 1267 Committee.

Conventions of the United

Nations

Every Convention only defines its own scope of application.However, the International convention for the suppression of the financ-ing of Terrorism 1999 defines its scope of application as being:Art. 2(1)(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; (ed.: reference to the 12 UN counter Terrorism Treaties) or(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

Not mentioned

European Union

Council Framework

Decision2002/475/

JHA of 13 June 2002 on

combating terrorism

Art. 1(1)Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts referred to below in points (a) to (i), as defined as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of:— seriously intimidating a population, or— unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or— seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization

Art.2(1)For the purposes of this Framework Decision, ‘terrorist group’ shall mean: a structured group of more than two persons,established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences. ‘Structured group’ shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commissionof an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.


Resource



Arab Convention

on the Suppression of Terrorism,

signed at a meeting held at the

General Secretariat

of the League of

Arab States in Cairo on

22 April 1998

Art. 1(2) TerrorismAny act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seek-ing to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize a national resources.Art. 2(a) All cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determi-nation, in accordance with the principles of international law, shall not be regarded as an offence.

Not mentioned

Convention of the

Organization of the Islamic

Conference on

Combating International Terrorism, adopted at

Ouagadougou on 1 July

1999

Art. 1“Terrorism” means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States.

Art. 2a. Peoples’ struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime.

Not mentioned

Treaty of the Arab Gulf

Cooperation Council

Countries for Combating Terrorism

4 May 2004

Art. 1(2)Terrorismmeans any act of violence or threat to use violence,regardless of its motive or purpose, undertaken to commit an individual or collective crime and aimed at causing panic among people or intimidating them by harming them or by subjecting their life, freedom or security to danger or inflicting damage on the environment or on any public or private facility or property, or at occupying or expropriating the same or subjecting any national resource to danger.

Art. 2 (a)Instances of conflict using various means, including armed struggles against foreign occupation and hostilities for the purpose of liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered an offence; however, any act which prejudices the regional unity of any Contracting State shall not fall within this definition.

Not mentioned

19w w w. g rc . a e



Draft Law of Bahrain

on Counter Terrorism

Art. 1In the implementation of the provisions of this law, terrorism means any threat or use of force or violence, whatever the motives or the purposes, resorted to by the criminal in carrying out either an individual or collective criminal project, in order to disable the provisions of the constitution or the laws or the rules, to disrupt the public order; to expose to danger the safety and security of the kingdom; or to harm the national unity or the security of the international community, if the act harms individuals or disseminates among them horror or panic or puts in danger their lives, freedoms or security; or damages the environment; the public health; the national economy; the public or private facilities, buildings and properties; or their occupation or obstructing their work, or obstructing the public authorities or religious buildings or educational faculties from doing their work.

Art. 6Whoever creates, establish-es, organizes or manages, in violation of the provisions of the law, an association, body, organization, group, gang or a branch thereof; or has a leading position therein, for the purpose of calling, by whatever means, for obstruction of the provi-sions of the constitution or the laws or preventing the states’ institutions or the public authorities from car-rying out their duties; or the attack against the individual liberties of the citizens or any other freedoms and pub-lic rights guaranteed by the constitution and law; or to harm national unity, if terror-ism was among the means used to achieve or execute the objectives called by the association, body, organi-zation, group, gang or the branch of one of them; shall be punished by the death penalty.

UAEFederal Decree

Concerning Combating

Terrorist Crimes

Of 29 July 2004

Art. 2In application of the provisions of this Decree Law, a terrorist act means any act or omission by the offender in carrying out a single or collective criminal plan with the aim to cause panic among people or to intimidate them thereby breaching public order or endangering the safety and security of society, harming persons or subjecting their lives, freedom or security to danger including the kings and heads of states, governments, ministers and members of their families, any official representative or officer of a country orinternational organisation of a governmental characteristics and the members of their families living with them who are protected by the international law or inflicting damage on the environment, a public or private utility or propertyor the occupation or expropriation thereof or subjecting a natural resource to danger

Art. 3Any person, who establishes, founds, organizes or runs an association, entity, organisation, centre, group or gang or acts as a leader or chief thereof for the purpose of committing a terrorist act provided for in this Law shall be liable to the penalty of death or imprisonment for life. The court shall order the disbanding and closure of the premises of such association, entity, organisation or centre.


Resource



The Qatari law on

Combating Terrorism issued on

16 February 2004

Art. 1In application of the provisions of this Law, the offences provided for in the Penal Law or in any other law, if they are committed for terrorist purposes, shall be considered terrorist offences The purpose shall be deemed an act of terrorism, if the motive behind the use of force, violence, threat or intimidation, is to disrupt the operation of the provisions of the Revised Provisional Constitution or the law, breach public order, endanger the safety and security of the society and harm the national unity, and it results or might result in harming the people, causing them to panic or subjecting their life, freedom or safety to danger, inflicting damage on theenvironment, public health or the national economy, or harming, expropriating or impeding the performance of public or private utilities, installations or property or preventing or hindering the public authorities from discharging their functions.

Art. 3 Any person, who establishes, founds, organizes or runs a group or an organisation of whatever description, in a manner contrary to the law, for the purpose of committing a terrorist offence, shall be liable to the penalty of death or imprisonment for life.The Penal Code of Qatar Art. 84 provides a definition ofillegal associations.

IraqLaw on

Combating Terrorism

7 November 2005

Art. 1Definition of TerrorismAny criminal act committed by an individual or an organized group targeting an individual, a group of individuals, communities, official or non-officialorganizations, causing damage to public or private property for the purpose of breaching the security situation, stability and national unity or of causing panic, fear and alarm among people or of causing chaos and disorder in order to attain terrorist ends.

Not mentioned

United Kingdom Terrorism Act 2000

Art. 1. (1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where- (a) the action falls within subsection (2),(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (2) Action falls within this subsection if it- (a) involves serious violence against a person,(b) involves serious damage to property,(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.

Art. 40 (1) In this Part “terrorist” means a person who- (a) has committed an offence under any of sections 11, 12, 15 to 18, 54 and 56 to 63, or(b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.(2) The reference in subsection (1)(b) to a person who has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism includes a reference to a person who has been, whether before or after the passing of this Act, concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism within the meaning given by section 1.

Art. 3(1) For the purposes of this Act an organisation is proscribed if- (a) it is listed in Schedule 2, or(b) it operates under the same name as an organisation listed in that Schedule.

(…) (5) For the purposes of subsection (4) an organisation is concerned in terrorism if it- (a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism(b) prepares for terrorism,(c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or(d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism.

21w w w. g rc . a e

Resource



Unitingand

Strengthening America

by Providing Appropriate

Toolsrequired to intercept

and obstruct Terrorism

(USA Patriot Act) Act of

2001

The PATRIOT Act refers to the definition in the US code:

Title 18 of the US Code, Section 2331As used in this chapter— (1) the term “international terrorism” means activities that— (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended— (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum; (...)(5) the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that— (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended— (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d):—The term “terrorist group” means any group that practices, or has significant subgroups thatpractice, international terrorism.

India The

Prevention of Terrorism

Act, 2002Act No. 15 of

2002

Art. 3Punishment for terrorist acts.-(1) Whoever,-(a) with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or byany other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means whatsoever, in such a manner as to cause, or likely to cause, death of, or injuries to any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community or causes damage or destruction of any property or equipment used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government or any of her person to do or abstain from doing any act;(…)

Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, “a terrorist act” shall include the act of raising funds intended for the purpose of terrorism.

Art. 3(b) is or continues to be a member of an association declared unlawful under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), or voluntarily does an act aiding or promoting in any man-ner the objects of such association

Art. 18(4) For the purposes of sub-section (3), an organi-sation shall be deemed to be involved in ter-rorism if it- (a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism, (b) prepares for terrorism, (c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or (d) is otherwise involved in terrorism


Resource

Judicial rights of the Accused Death Penalty

Security Council

Resolutions

Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005)Art. 4 (…)Stresses, that States must ensure that any measures taken to implement paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this resolution comply with all of their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law, and humanitarian law (…)

Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003)Art. 6States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law. SameSecurity Council Resolution 1372 (2001) Art. 3(f)

Not

mentioned

Conventions of the United

Nations

International convention for the suppression of Terrorist Bombing 1997Art. 14Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including international law of human rights.

Similar phrasing can be found in:Hostages Convention 1979 Art. 8 (2)International Convention for the suppression of Acts of nuclear Terrorism 2005Art. 12

Not

mentioned

European Union

Council Framework

Decision2002/475/JHA

of 13 June 2002 on

combating terrorism

Art. 1(2)This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of altering the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.

-> See Treaty on the European Union Art. 6

Not

mentioned

Arab Convention

on the suppression of Terrorism

Not mentionedNot

mentioned

23w w w. g rc . a e

Resource

Resource

Judicial rights of the Accused Death Penalty

Convention of the

Organization of the Islamic Conference

Not mentionedNot

mentioned

Treaty of the Arab Gulf

Cooperation Council

Countries for Combating Terrorism

4 May 2004

Preamble Asserting their respect for human rights;

Art. 37 (1)In all cases described in the preceding two Articles, theprovisional detention may not exceed sixty days fromthe date of arrest.

Notmentioned

Draft Law of Bahrain

on Counter Terrorism

Art. 30 (2)/(3)The judicial arrest officer is required to hear the accused and send him to the Public Prosecution after the end of the period mentioned in the paragraph above.

The Public Prosecution must interrogate the accused after no more than three days and then decide whether to keep him in pre trail detention or release him.

Mentioned in :Art.3; 6; 13;22; 25

UAEFederal Decree

Concerning Combating

Terrorist CrimesOf 29 July 2004

Art. 33Any person against whom the decision of the public prosecutor is issued in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 (note of the editor: freezing of Assets)of this Decree Law may complain before the competent court. If his complaint is rejected, he may complain again every three months from the date his complaint was rejected. The complaint shall be in the form of a report to the competent court and the court president shall fix a date for its consideration which shall be notified to the complainant and to any interested party. (…)

Mentionedin:Art.3;6;9;11; 14;15;16;17;18;19

The Qatari law on Combating

TerrorismNot mentioned

Mentioned in:Art.2; 3; 6; 7;11

IraqLaw on

Combating Terrorism

Not mentionedMentioned in:Art. 4

United Kingdom Terrorism Act

2000

See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005e.g. Art.10

Notmentioned

USA Patriot Act Not mentioned

Not mentioned except:(Sec.812)„(…) other unishments) than the penalty of death (…)“

India The Prevention

of Terrorism Act, 2002

Act No. 15 of 2002

Not mentionedMentioned in:Chapter II, 3. (2)(a)


GRC Forthcoming Publications

Gulf StatesCounter-Terrorism Laws and TreatiesPublished by the Security and Terrorism Research Program

Abstract:

Since 9/11 and the globalization of terrorist activity, the Gulf States have experienced an increase in Counter- Terrorism legislation, both on the regional and national level. This has led to the existence of a variety of definitions of Terrorism and of classifications of crimes and levels of involvement in terrorist

activities – all valid simultaneously in the Gulf States. This legal publication aims to clarify the situation by offering a comprehensive collection of the main Counter- Terrorism laws and treaties.

Language: Arabic and English

Gulf StatesCounter-Terrorism Reports to the UNPublished by the Security and Terrorism Research Program

Abstract:

On 28 September 2001, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, adopted Resolution 1373 (2001), establishing the Counter-Terrorism Committee (the CTC). Under this resolution, all member States are requested to submit annual reports to the CTC on

national steps taken to implement Counter Terrorism measures and laws.The UN Security Council has also established further reporting Systems in relation to Counter-Terrorism: Resolutions 1455 and 1540 establish the obligation of States to report on Terrorist Activities and on the prevention of use of WMD for Terrorist aims.The present publication collects all the reports in Arabic submitted by the nine Gulf states up to the date of publication and thus offers a good insight over the development of Counter-Terrorism measures in the region.

Language: Arabic

The Case for a Weapon of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Gulf (GWMDFZ)Mustafa AlaniProgram Director and Senior Advisor, Security and Terrorism Studies

Abstract:

This research paper examines the case for promoting the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Gulf region. The paper looks at the critical issues surrounding the proliferation of

WMD in the Gulf, and puts forward the argument that a Gulf WMDFZ is essential to the future security and stability of the region. The argument is premised on the idea that governments must pursue a sub-regional to regional approach to their security issues in order to achieve the long-term objective of declaring the entire region of the Middle East a WMD Free Zone. In this sense, it adopts an entirely novel approach to nuclear proliferation issues in the region.

Language: Arabic and English

25w w w. g rc . a e

GRC Forthcoming Publications


Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors Andrew ClaphamOxford University Press

Abstract:

The threats to human rights posed by non-state actors are of increasing concern. Human rights activists increasingly address the activity of multinational corporations, the policies of international organizations such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, and international crimes committed by entities such as armed opposition groups and terrorists. This book presents an approach

to human rights that goes beyond the traditional focus on states and outlines the human rights obligations of non-state actors. Furthermore, it addresses some of the ways in which these entities can be held legally accountable for their actions in various jurisdictions.

The political debate concerning the appropriateness of expanding human rights scrutiny to non-state actors is discussed and dissected. For some, extending human rights into these spheres trivializes human rights and allows abusive governments to distract us from ongoing violations. For others such an extension is essential if human rights are properly to address the current concerns of women and workers. The main focus of the book, however, is on the legal obligations of non-state actors. The book discusses how developments in the fields of international responsibility and international criminal law have implications for building a framework for the human rights obligations of non-state actors in international law. In turn these international developments have drawn on the changing ways in which human rights are implemented in national law. A selection of national jurisdictions, including the United States, South Africa and the United Kingdom are examined with regard to the application of human rights law to non-state actors.

For more information please visithttp://www.oup.co.uk/isbn/0-19-928846-1

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directionsand Policy Options in the New CenturyJames A. Russell Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract:

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a major concern and the Middle East is at the forefront of U.S.-led efforts to counter and control their spread.

This vital book examines specific countries and the interplay among political, economic, cultural and regional factors driving decisions whether to acquire WMD. The result is enhanced understanding of the challenge proliferation poses to U.S. strategy and policy and to the wider international community.

Available for online purchase from Amazon.com

Publication Date: February 5, 2006

Further Reading:

South Africa has had a unique experience in denuclearization that serves as a good lesson for other regions in the world. Ever since the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction has

been at the centre of world attention and continues to be a critical issue in international relations. The idea of creating a WMD Free Zone is not a new one, but forms an important pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The denuclearization of

Upcoming Events

The GRC With the support of the Government of South Africa hosts Workshop on “The Gulf as a Weapons of Mass

Destruction Free Zone: The Case for Regional Disarmament”May 2-3 2006, Cape Town, South Africa

Gulf Research Center (GRC), The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

and The National Defense University (NDU) Co-host Workshop

“The Reconstruction of the Security Sector in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine”

Geneva, SwitzerlandThe reconstruction of the security in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine is a critical task facing these newly re-emergent nations. Despite their situational differences, all three countries are facing similar obstacles and challenges in building a national armed forces and security sectors capable of taking over the reigns of security in each of these countries. The workshop will discuss and outline the reconstruction of the security sector in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine and the challenges that lie ahead for these newly reconstructed national armies, police and security forces.

The meeting will combine the experiences of three newly emergent states, facing similar and differing challenges, and the role of external powers (namely the United States, NATO and other countries) in offering help and assistance in the formidable task of reconstructing their military and security institutions. Such a process is an international and regional task and not solely a national one.

The impact of a successful process leading to the establishment of effective military and security forces in these three states will have a positive effect on national, regional as well as international stability and peace. Failure could have a disastrous impact on all levels.

Participation: By invitation only Date: To be announced shortly.

27w w w. g rc . a e

Dr. Mustafa Alani, Program Director, Security and Terrorisn Studies, GRCMr. Abdulaziz Sager, Chairman, GRC, Her Excellency Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Minister of Foreign Affairs, South Africa

geographical areas covering several states eradicates the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons which may emerge from regional or sub-regional considerations. Countries that are confident that their neighbors do not possess nuclear weapons may not be inclined to acquire such weapons themselves. This reasoning applies to all types of weapon of mass destruction.

The Gulf region is the only region to have experienced the use of WMD since 1945 and is therefore in great need of a comprehensive regional arms control framework. The escalating tension in the region has made this issue a growing point of concern amongst regional governments. This workshop will be the third in a series of meetings organized by the GRC as part of its recently created Research Program to promote declaring the Gulf region a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (GWMDFZ). The Research Program was created following a workshop hosted by the GRC here in Dubai on December 11-12, 2004 which launched the initiative. High level representatives from countries in the region, as well as international experts and academics, along with representatives from a number of regional and international organizations took part in a two day -closed workshop discussion on the highly critical issue of WMD proliferation in the region and the ramifications of these developments on countries in the Gulf as well as the international community. The second meeting held in Stockholm was co-sponsored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as part of their mission to conduct research on questions of conflict and co-operation for international peace and security and with the endorsement of the European Union. The second meeting ended with the support of all the regional delegates from the Gulf who were present endorsing the project and committing to taking the idea up with their governments. This third meeting in collaboration and with the co-operation of the government of South Africa aims to continue the discussion to promote a regional disarmament project in the nine states of the Gulf based on the principle that all states in the region must reject the proliferation of WMD. The objective is to push the process from a Track II diplomatic path to a Track I official level. It is our hope that like other disarmament processes before, we can encourage regional governments to adopt this idea officially and begin the process of creating a WMDFZ in the Gulf.

Objectives of the Workshop: • To understand the process that led to the denuclearization

of South Africa and analyze how the lessons learnt can be applied to the Gulf region • To outline and understand the concerns and obstacles in the road to creating a free zone, based on the statements of each regional delegate • To transfer ownership of the project from the GRC to one or more governments in the region, thereby pushing the process from Track II to Track I

ParticipationBy invitation only.

Upcoming Events


The selection of our negotiating partners and the continuation of negotiations with the EU3 will be commensurate with the requirements of our cooperation with the Agency regarding nondiversion of the process of uranium enrichment to non-peaceful purposes in the framework of the provisions of the NPT. In this context, several proposals have been presented which can be considered in the context of negotiations.

The Islamic Republic of Iran appreciates the positive contribution of South Africa and H.E. President Mbeki personally in the resolution of the nuclear issue and cognizant of South Africa’s active role in the IAEA Board of Governors would welcome its active participation in the negotiations.

Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmood AhmadinejadPresident of the Islamic Republic of Iran before the Sixtieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly New York — 17 September 2005

GULF WMDFZ - A View from the EU

The Gulf as a WMD free zone (GWMDFZ) from the perspective of the European Unionʼs

non-proliferation policy 1. The EU non-proliferation policy

The development of a strong and credible Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including on non-proliferation issues, is a key element in protecting the values and interests of the European Union. The adoption by the European Council in December 2003 of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD has added additional weight to the global non-proliferation efforts of the European Union.

The EU WMD Strategy is linked to the European Security Strategy (ESS) which identifies the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery, and, in particular, the danger of WMDs or related material and technology falling into the hands of non-state actors, as a major threat to the European Union and its citizens. The main thrust of the EU’s Strategy against the proliferation of WMD is based on prevention, effective multilateralism and international co-operation. This gives rise to many activities of both a political and diplomatic nature.

The preventive approach of the WMD Strategy is based on addressing the root causes for states’ efforts to acquire WMDs and related material and technology. In practical terms, this translates into efforts to prevent proliferation from happening at all.

As far as effective multilateralism is concerned, the EU aims at strengthening the existing international non-proliferation system by supporting all the international conventions, treaties and regimes in the non-proliferation field. In particular, the EU promotes the strengthening of the UN, the UN Security Council and UN agencies in charge of verification, and the implementation of relevant UNSC Resolutions. This is why the EU provides financial assistance to the IAEA, the OPCW and in the future to the CTBTO. The EU is also fully committed to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540.With regard to international co-operation, the EU is making non-proliferation a key issue in its relations with third countries, including through appropriate assistance

programmes. This means that economic, legal and political instruments are used in order to address non-proliferation matters.

The EU provides financial assistance in the form of EU Joint Actions to certain activities of the IAEA and the OPCW. A Joint Action is an instrument available under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is based on a unanimity decision by the 25 EU Member States.

In relation to UNSC Resolution 1540, the EU is prepared to provide assistance to other countries for the implementation of their commitments. The

participation in the G8 Global Partnership Programme has also been an instrumental forum for the EU in relation to international cooperation for the provision of assistance in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament to the Russian Federation.

In the nuclear non-proliferation field, it is the EU’s conviction that compliance with the NPT must be reinforced and the nuclear safeguards system has to be strengthened. Therefore, the EU promotes the universal application of the IAEA Additional Protocol and considers it to be the new verification standard. In 2005, the EU prepared a Common Position for the NPT Review Conference which is a legally binding position for all EU Member States. Despite the unsatisfactory result of the NPT Review Conference, the EU’s position remains unchanged. There is no alternative to the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and one should not give up working for its implementation. In this context, it is also important to continue to support an early entry-into-force of the CTBT.

To be credible worldwide and to protect its citizens efficiently, the EU itself needs to take the lead by having the highest

1 The views expressed are the personal opinion of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of his institution.

29w w w. g rc . a e

Stephan Klement1

Office of the HighRepresentative s̓

Personal Representative on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction,Council of the European

Union, Brussels

The main thrust of the EU’s Strategy against the proliferation of WMD is based on prevention, effective multilateralism and international co-operation

non-proliferation standards within the EU. In the area of export controls, which is extremely important for non-proliferation purposes, the EU has carried out a peer-review exercise in order to harmonise and raise the standard.

The EU has decided to include a clause on non-proliferation in bilateral agreements with third countries. This is a universal policy for the EU and is undertaken towards all countries with whom the EU enters into contractual relations. It reflects the importance the EU attaches to non-proliferation and to the necessity to strengthen the fight against it on a global scale. If necessary, the EU is prepared to consider the provision of assistance to countries in order to help them meet their non-proliferation commitments, e.g. in the area of export controls.

So far, the EU has agreed on a non-proliferation clause in the agreements with several countries and negotiations are ongoing with many others, including with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). There are also elements on non-proliferation in the action plans, which have been agreed with neighbouring countries in the framework of the EU’s neighbourhood policy.

2. EU’s regional non-proliferation efforts

The EU WMD Strategy identifies regional conflicts as one of the root causes for the proliferation of WMD. Therefore, in addressing these root causes, the EU attempts to contribute to fighting the proliferation of WMD.

The Middle East region is a particularly critical case where the proliferation of WMD could lead to the most serious consequences. The EU’s efforts in the framework of the Barcelona process are aimed at bringing stability, security and economic development to the Mediterranean region. The establishment of a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free zone of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical, biological, and their delivery systems has been a declared ultimate objective of the Barcelona process from its beginning.2

More recently, efforts to develop the security dimension within the Barcelona framework have been strengthened and an initiative to organise an ad-hoc meeting on WMD non-proliferation, disarmament and regional security in the Mediterranean region within the framework of the Barcelona process has been launched. The Foreign Ministers of Barcelona partners have agreed in principle to convene such an ad-hoc meeting. Discussions on the terms of reference

for the planned meeting are making good progress and there is a good chance that it will be convened during the course of the year 2006.

There are other regions where the EU is involved in order to address challenges to the international non-proliferation regime.

The Iranian nuclear programme is a key nuclear proliferation concern for the international community as a whole. This has been the reason for France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with the support of the EU High Representative, to launch a diplomatic initiative with the objective to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. These efforts led to the Paris agreement of November 2004 which obliged Iran to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and to provide objective guarantees for the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Unfortunately, negotiations were interrupted in August 2005 when Iran resumed uranium conversion activities, a clear step against the understandings of the Paris agreement. Iran’s decision to restart enrichment activities in January 2006 and its announcement to cease the provisional application of the IAEA Additional Protocol were additional steps in the wrong direction and have further undermined confidence in Iranian intentions. However, there is still room for diplomatic efforts to continue and to find a solution through the negotiating process in case Iran is prepared to re-establish the appropriate environment for the resumption of negotiations.

The case of the DPRK is of particular importance since it was the first and so far the only country which declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Its announcement of February 2005 to have developed nuclear weapons has provoked even stronger concerns. Nevertheless, the successful outcome resulting from the round of the six-party talks in September 2005 have inspired a more optimistic

2 c.f. chapter on political and security co-operation: Establishing a common area of peace and stability, Barcelona declaration, adopted on 28 November 1995.


With regard to a possible GWMDFZ, there are good reasons to assume that it would contribute to make progress towards the overall objective of increasing stability and security in the Middle East region as a whole. Moreover, the establishment of a GWMDFZ could be an important first step on the way to achieve the ultimate objective of a WMDFZ in the Middle East, as set out in the Barcelona declaration.



About the Author

Stephan Klement is the Personal Representative for the non-proliferation of WMD in the Council of the European Union. He has held previous posts in the field of non-proliferation in the ExternalRelations Division of the IAEA and in several services of the European Commission, including as an assistant to the Euratom safeguards director.

He obtained a PhD in physics and international law from the University of Vienna, Austria.

His areas of special interest focus on nuclear non-proliferation matters.

outlook to the future. Having participated in the KEDO exercise over almost 10 years, the EU has always confirmed its readiness to actively contribute to the implementation of a solution emerging from the six-party process.

3. EU’s approach to a NWFZ and more specifically to the concept of a GWMDFZ

From a nuclear non-proliferation perspective, the EU is a multifaceted actor because it is composed of NWS, NNWS, states belonging to a nuclear armed alliance, states in favour of nuclear energy, and other states opposed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, the EU has always been a good testing ground for nuclear non-proliferation issues. Most recently, this has become apparent with the adoption in April 2005 of the EU Common Position for the NPT 2005 Review Conference.3 This Common Position is a good example that it is possible to bring together the views of 25 EU Members States with different priorities and sensitivities.

While the NPT Review Conference did unfortunately not succeed in adopting substantive recommendations, the EU’s Common Position was referred to on repeated occasions as a good starting point to enter into negotiations aimed at achieving a possible compromise.

This Common Position also welcomes the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) in general, and of a WMDFZ, including their means of delivery, in the Middle East region. The EU position is fully in line with the general principles for the establishment of NWFZ/WMDFZ, as set out in the UN framework.

With regard to a possible GWMDFZ, there are good reasons to assume that it would contribute to make progress towards the overall objective of increasing stability and security in the Middle East region as a whole. Moreover, the establishment of a GWMDFZ could be an important first step on the way

Equal importance will have to be given to the development and implementation a credible and robust verification system in order to build confidence within the region and create a credible precedent for the later expansion of a GWMDFZ to the Middle East region as a whole.

3 OJ L106, pp. 32-35 of 27.04.2004.

to achieve the ultimate objective of a WMDFZ in the Middle East, as set out in the Barcelona declaration.Taking into account the specific sensitivities of the region concerned, particular attention would have to be paid to ensure the most adequate geographic scope for, and a clear-cut definition of prohibited activities within a future GWMDFZ. Equal importance will have to be given to the development and implementation of a credible and robust verification system in order to build confidence within the region, thereby creating a convincing precedent for the potential expansion of a GWMDFZ to the Middle East region as a whole.

This Common Position also welcomes the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) in general, and of a WMDFZ, including their means of delivery, in the Middle East region. The EU position is fully in line with the general principles for the establishment of NWFZ/WMDFZ, as set out in the UN framework.

31w w w. g rc . a e

1 The GCC States are an inalienable part of the larger Arab world and the call for making the Gulf region free from WMD is a necessary and an urgent demand. It is an important first step, and a mandatoryprelude, an appropriate commencement, towards the attainment of the objective of declaring the entire Middle East region as free from Weapons of Mass Destruction.

2 Making the Gulf region free from WMD, as well as the regional and international commitments and obligations such a project entails, will consolidate the prospects of success for making the Middle East free of these weapons and will add to the credibility and transparency of the Arab attitude in its efforts and aspirations to achieve this goal.

3 If the proper conditions and the required will exist to address a key concern related to Arab security, no effort should be spared to pursue and implement this objective. It would be wrong to undermine or destroy such an opportunity under the claim that it is not inclusive. Minimizing the risks that threaten the security and stability of the region, where it is feasible, is a duty that cannot be ignored or postponed.

4 On a daily basis, security in the Gulf region is still facing the consequences of three destructive wars in the

past three decades. Accordingly, it is the right, but also the duty of the region to do everything in its power, according to its own requirements, to protect its national interests and maintain its stability without affecting the regional security as a whole.

5 The initiative to make the Gulf region free from WMD is an urgent necessity for safeguarding the security of the region. Any failure in achieving this objective through adopting confidence-building measures as a basis toeliminate any WMD in the region, could lead to an era of dangerous instability that could start with a costly arms race and probably end with a much more devastating military conflict. Particularly if a new military confrontation developedconcerning Iranian nuclear capabilities, such a conflictwould make the three previous wars in the Gulf look trivial in comparison to the destructive capability of the weapons available today and the widened potential battlefield,

6 An entire world free from WMD is still only a dream and a noble aspiration of people all over the globe. However, this should not thwart any efforts aimed at the creation of specific geographical areas that are free from WMD therebypreventing the proliferation of WMD in the future. Such steps will facilitate dealings with the regions already in possession of these weapons.

The State of Kuwait *Memorandum regarding the State of Kuwaitʼs position on

Declaring the Gulf region as a Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction

* This Official Memorandum was presented by the Foreign Ministry of the State of Kuwait to the GCC member states onDecember 14, 2005Source: Al Hayat Daily, January 2, 2006

This memorandum has been translated into English by the Gulf Research Center and is not an official translation.The Center bears no responsibility for any of the content contained herein.

GULF WMDFZ - The Gulf perspective


The secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council urged Iran ahead of a summit by the oil-rich bloc on Sunday to join it in an agreement that would pledge to make the region nuclear free.

“It is necessary to reach an agreement between the GCC, Iran, Iraq and other countries like Yemen to make the Gulf region free from weapons of mass destruction and nuclear arms,” said Abdulrahman al-Attiyah late Saturday after a meeting of GCC foreign ministers in Abu Dhabi to prepare for the summit.

The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the majority of which are staunch US allies.

Iran is accused by Israel and the United States of using its civilian nuclear program to cover a weapons program, something Tehran strongly denies.Attiyah, a native of Qatar, said such an agreement, if

concluded, could be later expanded to include Israel and other powers in the region.

He said he was extending the invitation to Gulf neighbour Iran in his “own name” and not that of his organisation.

“We do not want to see a nuclear race in the region. Iran’s reactors are closer to our coast

than to Tehran itself,” he said.

Sunday’s summit, which comes 25 years after the GCC was established, is expected to focus on issues affecting regional stability such as the fight against terror and the situation inIraq, according to Attiyah.

Gulf WMD Free Zone (GWMDFZ) Supported by the Gulf Cooperation Council

Gulf leader urges Iran to make region nuclear free Agence France-Presse

18 December 2005

ITP BusinessAn atomic argument12 February 2006Mustafa Alani“The Iranian programme now has no justification in theregion apart from the fact that it is going to be used as a political instrument to terrify other countries and dominate the region.”

Araa Radicalization of Chechen Conflict and Arabinvolvement: an analysis12 February 2006Faryal Leghari

“As a way to maintain the unity of Russia, the government in Moscow tends to interpret all major conflicts or oppositionmovements as an Islamic threat and has found it useful to

exploit its usage under the guise of dealing with a “Islamic threat” that translates as terrorist and radical, in order to justify the brute repression methods it has applied.“

The Guardian Ransom Kidnappings Growth Industry in Iraq 7 February 2006Mustafa Alani

Handelsblatt (Germany)The Gulf awakens: Even the Gulf states are showing concern about the nuclear policy of their northern neighbor6 February 2006Christian Koch

“An Iranian Nuclear Power in the Gulf is not an acceptable alternative. Given past Iranian hegemonic aspirations in the

Making Headlines in Security Analysis

GULF WMDFZ - The Gulf perspective

“It is necessary to reach an agreement between the GCC, Iran, Iraq and other countries like Yemen to make the Gulf region free from weapons of mass destruction and nuclear arms,”

33w w w. g rc . a e

region, the GCC States are not ready to live in the shadow of an Iranian nuclear bomb or to have their existence threatened given the constant possibility of an Iranian nuclear strike.”

The New York TimesGulf States join call for tougher action toward Tehran1 February 2006Mustafa Alani

The Daily StarStrategic Road Map for Improving Ties26 January 2006Abdulaziz Sager

“Notwithstanding the historic ties between Saudi Arabia and India, which have been sustained by the current oil, trade and expatriate dynamics, the way forward for the two countries rests on developing a paradigm that hinges on strategic political, economic and security dimensions.”

RadioFreeEuropeIran: Arab Countries Voice Concern, Urge Caution Over Tehran’s Nuclear Program 23 January 2006Mustafa Alani

Associated Press Iran Sanctions Could Drive Oil Past $10022 January 2006Mustafa Alani

South China Morning PostMIDDLE EAST: In tape, ‘bin Laden’ offers US truce, threatens new strikes20 January 2006Mustafa Alani

ReutersANALYSIS-New tape, old threats as bin Laden breaks silence19 January 2006Mustafa Alani

Pipeline Magazine2006 is testing times for GCC, says Gulf Research Centre16 January 2006Mustafa Alani“Due to the failure of group defense strategy development

set in the framework of the GCC systems, the countries in the region are moving toward individual armament policies.”Daily Times, Pakistan14 January 2006Iraq still a soft target for suicide bombersMustafa Alani

Khaleej TimesStrategic change for Saudi security3 January 2006Abdulaziz Sager

“In light of the serious security and political challenges that the Kingdom and the region are facing today, the decision to reorganise the [Saudi] National Security Council could not have come at a more appropriate time.”

The Daily StarNew realities prompt Saudi security changes 2 January 2006Abdulaziz Sager

Nato ReviewArab perspectives on NATODecember 2005Mustafa Alani

“For the Arab public, NATO has no separate identity from those of the Western powers and states that created the alliance and constitute its members.”

AraaEffective European role in Gulf security25 December 2005Christian Koch

The PeninsulaIran’s nuclear imbroglio must be defused, and fast 16 November 2005Lana Nusseibeh

“Closing the loopholes in the non-proliferation regime through which Iran has defended its actions so far would make sense. Although neither side wants to concede in the present standoff, the current climate of negotiations is not conducive to finding a solution for Iran’s nuclear ambitionsbut is tending rather to a confrontation at a time when the US can least afford it.“

Gulf Yearbook 2005-2006Gulf Yearbook 2005-2006

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2005-2006

Political and Social Developments in the Gulf

Economic Developments in the Gulf

The International Relations of the Gulf

Defense and Security Issues in the Gulf

Making Headlines in Security Analysis


Gulf Yearbook 2005-2006Gulf Yearbook 2005-2006

9984 432 22 39984 432 20 7

Gulf Yearbook 2005-2006 (English copy)Gulf Yearbook 2005-2006 (Arabic copy)

$75$75

2005-2006

Political and Social Developments in the Gulf

Economic Developments in the Gulf

The International Relations of the Gulf

Defense and Security Issues in the Gulf

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