security ties orelectoral connections? and the korea us...

Security ties or electoralconnections? The US Congressand the Korea–US Free TradeAgreement, 2007–2011Jungkun Seo*

Department of Political Science, Kyung Hee University, Seoul,Korea*E-mail: [email protected]

Accepted 25 December 2014

AbstractConventional wisdom is that trade policy is often guided by geopoliticalsecurity considerations. A growing body of research addresses the secur-ity–trade linkage as a plausible cause for executive negotiations over theKorea–US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) in 2007. Yet, the approvalof a trade deal with the Asian ally by America’s legislature in 2011 fea-tures not only ‘security ties’ but also ‘electoral connections’. This paperseeks to examine the question of whether alliance relationships wouldinevitably translate into domestic commitments. Bringing domestic polit-ics into consideration, this article also fills the gap in the literature onCongress-focused research of the KORUS FTA and sheds light on how law-makers strike a balance between the principle of US foreign policy andthe reality of conflicting domestic interests.

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 15 No. 2© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the

Japan Association of International Relations; all rights reserved.For permissions, please email: [email protected]

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 15 (2015) 217–243doi:10.1093/irap/lcu024 Advance Access published on 28 January 2015

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As a Korean War veteran, I have witnessed first-hand how relationsbetween our two great nations have improved dramatically over theyears. Unfortunately, I cannot support KORUS because it will do realharm to the North Carolina textile industry.

Rep. Howard Coble (R-NC)(Congressional Record E1834, 12 October 2011)

1 Introduction

In 2007, South Korea and the United States signed the Korea–US FreeTrade Agreement (KORUS FTA) to further solidify economic cooperationand trade relation between the two military partners. The Democratic-controlled US Congress, however, forced the George W. Bush administra-tion to back out for the time being over the treatment of autos and beef.Finally, in October 2011, the Obama administration submitted theKORUS FTA Implementation bill (H.R. 3080) to the 112th US Congress(2011–2012). The free trade bill was sponsored by Rep. Eric Cantor, themajority leader in the House, and cosponsored by Rep. Sandy Levin, theranking member of the House Committee on Ways and Means. On 12October 2011, the United States House of Representatives passed the tradedeal by a vote of 278–151 and the bill was smooth sailing to the upperchamber, where 83 US senators quickly approved the free trade agreement.

Two years later, the newly elected Korean President Park Geun-hyemade her first overseas trip to Washington in 2013 and addressed a jointsession of the US Congress confirming the US–Korean alliance and con-demning the security threats from North Korea. At the top of her speechon Capitol Hill, the first female President of South Korea thanked fourKorean War veterans still serving in the US Congress; Rep. John Conyers(D-MI), Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY), Rep. Howard Coble (R-NC), andRep. Sam Johnson (R-TX).1 Yet quite interestingly, among these fourKorean War veterans, two of them – Conyers from Michigan and Coblefrom North Carolina – voted against the KORUS FTA. Then puzzling iswhy some US lawmakers chose to defend and others deny a free trade dealwith the 11th largest economy and a key military ally in East Asia.

1 Sean Sullivan. ‘South Korean President: We’ll Deter North Korea,’ The Washington Post,8 May 2013.

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An increasing number of foreign policy scholars are examining thetrade agreements between the United States and Korea as security part-ners across the Pacific (Lim, 2006; Heo, 2008; Koo, 2010; Sohn and Koo,2011; Robertson, 2012; Koo and Jho, 2013). Focusing on trade negotia-tions between these partners, they address the construct of the Korea–USFree Trade Agreement from the perspective of ‘trading for security’(Higgot, 2004; Long and Leeds, 2006). The main argument is that policy-makers on the American side initiated and facilitated a trade deal withSouth Korea as a crucial military ally so that the economy–securitylinkage did play a key role in pressing the trade deal. It is true that theObama administration praised the KORUS FTA as Washington’s firstbilateral trade agreement with a major Asian economy and security partner.

Yet, a closer look at the roll-call votes in the US Congress presents aslightly different story. To be more precise, the passage of the trade dealwith Korea in America’s legislature features the dimensions of not only‘security ties’ but also ‘electoral connections’ and ‘party politics’. Thispaper seeks not to refute the significance of the security–trade linkage inthe approval of the KORUS FTA but to revisit the question of whetheralliance relationships in a geopolitical context would easily translate intodomestic commitments in a representative democracy. In the process ofendorsing executive negotiations for international agreements, howwould the legislative branch and party politics respond? Why did somemembers of the US Congress ratify and others reject the free trade agree-ment with South Korea, as the total of 535 lawmakers from the Houseand Senate represent a diverse set of electoral dynamics and partisanconsiderations?

Few studies have investigated whether US lawmakers would securitizetrade commitments or the logic of Innenpolitik would prevail over theAmerican grand strategy. Filling this gap in the literature on Congress-focused research of the KORUS FTA, this paper investigates whether andhow the imperative of the ‘securitization of trade’ would actually influencecongressional behavior and partisan considerations. My main findingabout the domestic politics of the KORUS FTA approval is that not onlythe nexus of ‘security–trade’ but also the ‘inside-the-belt-way’ politicsincluding the influences of constituency and partisanship matter in tradedeals. US lawmakers care about electoral connections with district votersas well as security ties with foreign allies. This research sheds light on howlawmakers strike a balance between military alliances and electoral

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considerations, when the principle of US foreign policy comes face to facewith the reality of domestic and partisan interests.

The article proceeds as follows. The first section briefly overviews the lit-erature on the linkage between security and trade in the context of domes-tic and congressional politics. Then, I offer information on how membersand leaders of the US Congress addressed the KORUS FTA, particularlywhen beef and automobile negotiations put the trade deal in trouble. Thethird section explores how domestic interests, ideology, and institutions inthe US shaped congressional choices over the trade deal with Korea andthen presents a logistic regression analysis to test what determines roll-callvoting on the KORUS FTA in the US House and Senate. I conclude thispaper with further research agendas to illuminate on how the interactionbetween domestic politics and international relations evolve in the area ofa trade–security nexus in East Asia.

2 ‘Securitizing trade’: international relationsand domestic politics

The prospect that ‘trade brings security’ has been an enduring theme forscholars of international relations (Bliss and Russett, 1998; Mansfieldet al., 2000; Higgot, 2004; Aggarwal and Urata, 2006; Koo, 2010). Muchresearch has shown that free trade agreements not only bring togetherexisting military allies but also bring about new security partnerships(Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994; Long and Leeds, 2006). Duringthe Cold War, the ‘trade–security’ nexus was a compelling logic in themaking of US foreign policy. Also, in the post-9/11 era, the war against ter-rorism has further strengthened the linkage between military alliances andeconomic cooperations. Indeed, a host of studies have paid attention to thesecurity–trade linkage as a plausible explanation for recent trade deals.

More specifically, scholars of international security suggest that securitypartners tend to trade more than non-partners due to a concern over‘security externalities’. This concept focuses on gains from trade, whichcould potentially empower nonmilitary allies. Exploring the relationshipbetween international power politics and international open markets, Gowa(1994, 6) claims that ‘the real-income gains that motivate free trade are alsothe source of security externalities that can either impede or facilitate trade:Trade with an adversary produces a security diseconomy; trade with an allyproduces a positive externality’. As a result, security allies are likely to value

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trade relations as an effort to strengthen their defense partnership. A sub-stantial body of research suggests that the concept of ‘trade following theflag’ constructs and constrains state behavior in international politics.

Yet, while trade agreements are often guided by geopolitical securityconsiderations, it is not clear whether domestic interests and national insti-tutions would simply give the green light to free trade with military allies.As a matter of fact, ever since the notion of the ‘second image reversed’ byGourevitch (1978) and the ‘two-level games’ by Putnam (1988) under-scored domestic–foreign interactions, a continuous trend of scholarshiphas investigated whether and how international security strategies affectdomestic trade agreements and vice versa (Rosenau, 1967; Bauer et al.,1972; Destler, 1986; Rogowski, 1987; Ikenberry et al., 1988; Lake, 1988;Simmons, 1994; Bailey et al., 1997; Shoch, 2001; Karol, 2007; Seo, 2010).Keohane and Milner (1996), for instance, address the impacts of inter-nationalization on domestic politics, with a focus on the distinction betweenwinners and losers from internationalization. They claim that demands andchanges in international relations tend to reshape domestic interests andconflicts that in turn should entail modified mobilization and coalitiontransformations.

According to Fearon (1998, 303), ‘a large body of work explores domestic-political sources of protectionism in trade policy that is suboptimal forvoters/consumers’. Due to democratic and representative systems of foreignpolicymaking, Fearon suggests that states might end up choosing a sub-optimal trade policy that has little to do with geopolitical security strat-egies. When it comes to the divide in international relations studies,Chorev (2007) elaborates on the regime shifts in American protectionismover time through the relative ‘weight’ of explanatory power betweendomestic and international factors. In short, Milner (1998, 759) points outthat ‘IR theorists must bring a systematic analysis of domestic politics intothe field’ to better understand peace and prosperity.

More specifically, a growing body of research explores a diverse dimen-sion of the trade agreements between the United States and South Korea.To begin with, Lim (2006) points to the uncharacteristic push of theKORUS by the leftist Roh Moo-Hyun government in South Korea. AsPresident Roh had been friendly toward labor unions and hostile againstUS foreign policy, the trade deal was considered quite puzzling not only tohis supporters but also to conservative opponents. Some scholars arguethat the new political and security environments brought to the Korean


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Peninsula after the end of the Cold War offer the answer. For instance, inresponse to Lim’s (2006) mystery, Heo (2008) emphasizes the role of tradeagreements in strengthening security ties between the United States andSouth Korea. Despite the rise of anti-American sentiment in Korea,according to Heo, the Roh administration realized that the signing of theKORUS FTA would restore the US–Korea alliance relationship andrestrict the threats from a nuclear North Korea.

Other scholars have examined the negotiation processes between themilitary partners across the Pacific Ocean. Koo (2010) and Sohn and Koo(2011), with a focus on the changing imperatives of security–trade linkagefrom the Cold War to the post-Cold War to the 9/11 periods, confirm thatthe delayed approval of the KORUS FTA is an evidence of the difficultyfacing the United States in fully revitalizing the logic of securitizing tradeeven in the post-9/11 era. Koo and Jho (2013) also point out that institu-tional bases and ideological beliefs shape and reshape the perceptionsand strategies of trade negotiators in both countries. On the contrary,Robertson (2012) argues that due to the specific characteristics of theKorea–US trade deals, South Korea’s national style in negotiation turnsout to be not as significant as in other negotiation processes.

What is largely understudied in the literature on the KORUS FTA inparticular as well as the trade–security nexus in general is about the scopeand significance of domestic components in international agreements.Thus, it is imperative to analyze the free trade agreements between theUnited States and South Korea from the diverse perspective of domesticand partisan politics. Obviously, in a representative democracy, the USCongress is supposed to translate a set of ideological preferences, constitu-ency interests, partisan strategies, and institutional structures into the votechoices of yea or nay (Cronin and Fordham, 1999). The next section tracesthe pivotal players and their position pivots in the context of party politicsand congressional debates over the KORUS FTA from 2007 through 2011.It explores how US lawmakers weigh in on the logic of the security–tradenexus in a period of political polarization and economic recovery.

3 The US Congress and the KORUS FTA: pivotalplayers and position pivots

To what extent did the reasoning of the ‘security–trade’ nexus actually winthe hearts and minds of Capitol Hill in the legislative processes of the

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KORUS FTA approval? In the end, it is an empirical question of whetherand why the legislative branch would make or break executive free tradeagreements with its security partners. Under trade promotion authority(TPA), popularly known as ‘fast track’, granted to the Bush administrationin 2002, the US Congress had to hold a straight up or down vote on theKORUS FTA, without any amendments allowed. Seeking to make thebest use of TPA, trade negotiators from both the US and South Koreanadministrations struck the free trade deal on 30 June 2007, just one daybefore the expiration of fast track.2

Just three weeks prior to the trade deal completed between the US andSouth Korea in 2007, Senator Max Baucus issued a strong statementagainst the trade agreement with the US’s security ally on the KoreanPeninsula. The moderate Democrat from Montana, where beef is a majorexport, claimed that ‘Beef is obviously critical for my state. But othermembers also have very serious concerns, including those related to rice andautos’.3 The veteran chair of the Senate Finance Committee with jurisdic-tion over trade fiercely pointed out that South Korea needed to open its beefmarket to US products without any conditions. Yet, in 2011 when theDemocratic President sought to end a four-year impasse on a free trade withKorea, the senior Democrat softened his opposition and asked US TradeRepresentative Ron Kirk to demand consultations with Korea. Finally, theObama administration secured support from the powerful chair of theFinance Committee as Senator Baucus ‘praised Agriculture Secretary’sannouncement that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) willincrease funding dedicated to promote U.S. beef sales in Korea’.4

Another pivotal player in the US Congress who was initially hostileagainst the KORUS FTAwas then House Trade Subcommittee Chairman,Rep. Sandy Levin of Michigan. Taking issue with the imbalance of theautomobile trade between South Korea and the United States, the

2 While not having asked for a congressional renewal of TPA during his first four years,President Obama delivered the State of the Union Address in January 2014 in which he for-mally requested trade promotion authority from US Congress in pushing for Trans-PacificPartnership (TPP) free trade negotiations. For further analysis of the TPP and the US domes-tic politics, see Solis (2012).

3 The long-time chair also suggested that ‘If Korea refuses to be a good trading partner on beefwhen all the available science and international standards support the safety of our supply,how can we trust their trade commitments on other issues?’ The Hill, 7 June 2007.

4 The Senate Finance Committee, Communications Office, 4 May 2011.


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Michigan Democrat during the George W. Bush administration joined theparty leadership, including Speaker Pelosi, the House majority leader, andthe Ways and Means Committee chair, in its disapproval of the trade dealwith Korea. However, as in the case of Senator Baucus’ pivotal shifts inposition, in 2010 the ranking member of the House Ways and MeansCommittee applauded the changes to the KORUS FTA made in thefollow-up negotiations, as a co-partisan president owned the White Houseand economic recovery was still a long way off. With the United AutoWorkers also on board in December 2010 for the free trade agreementswith Korea, the influential voice among the Democratic rank clarified hisstrong support for the KORUS FTA and effectively provided politicalcover for other Democrats from industrial states.

In essence, this paper investigates the interactions between internationalagreements and domestic commitments by revisiting the 112th USCongress (2011–2012) and its passage of the KORUS FTA.When it comes tothe costs and benefits of free trade with South Korea, different states simplydisplayed dissimilar levels of support. For example, not a single Housemember from the state of Washington failed to endorse the high-profile tradedeal with the world’s 11th largest economy. On the contrary, 12 out of 13lower-chamber representatives from North Carolina sought to vote down theObama administration’s top trade agenda. Thus, a case in point regardingdomestic variations over trade agreements is to compare a states’ economicstakes with its congressional support for the passage of the KORUS FTA.

Table 1 presents the portion of exports to Korea by state from 2008 to2010 and the percentage of the House state delegations in favor of theKORUS FTA during the 112th US Congress (2011–2012). Two findingsstand out. First, diverse states in the United States have different stakes intrade with Korea, ranging from the highest (10.33% for Alaska) to thelowest (0.48% for North Dakota) percentage of the state’s total export.Obviously, some states export more heavily to Korea than others. Second,economic interests in trade with Korea are not equal from state to stateand furthermore not necessarily consistent with the state delegations’support of the KORUS FTA in the House. Hawaii, for example, rankssecond in terms of its rate of exports to Korea, and yet one out of twoDemocratic House members from Hawaii voted against the KORUS FTA.On the contrary, while Florida’s export to Korea percentage (0.72%) ranks47th out of 50 states, 21 out of 25 Florida delegations to the House (84%)supported the trade deal with Korea.

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It is also interesting to see the divergent voting rationale articulated by agroup of like-minded foreign policy hawks on Capitol Hill. For instance,Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), an outspoken critic of North Korea and thechair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, delivered a floor speech to

Table 1 Exports to Korea and support of the KORUS FTA, selective states

State State’s export toKorea percentagea

State State’s house delegationsupport percentage of theKORUS FTAb

Alaska 10.33 Alaska 100.00

Hawaii 9.36 Arkansas 100.00

Maryland 3.01 Alabama 85.71

Maine 3.00 Colorado 85.71

Alabama 2.84 Florida 84.00

Texas 2.71 Oregon 80.00

New York 2.44 Tennessee 77.78

North Carolina 2.22 Wisconsin 75.00

Tennessee 1.86 Indiana 66.67

Utah 1.86 Michigan 66.67

Iowa 1.83 Missouri 66.67

Wisconsin 1.63 California 50.94

Indiana 1.58 Hawaii 50.00

Arizona 1.52 Maryland 50.00

West Virginia 1.48 Connecticut 40.00

Illinois 1.47 Iowa 40.00

South Carolina 1.42 New Jersey 38.46

Michigan 1.40 Nevada 33.33

Ohio 1.38 NewMexico 33.33

Nevada 1.02 South Carolina 33.33

Mississippi 0.80 North Carolina 7.69

North Dakota 0.48 Vermont 0.00

For instance, I calculate the percentage of Alaska’s exports to Korea (10.33%), given theinformation that Alaska’s shipments of merchandise in 2010 totaled $4.2 billion and Alaskaexported an average of $434 million in goods to Korea from 2008 to 2010.For instance, I calculate the percentage of North Carolina’s House delegation supportregarding the KORUS FTA (7.69%), given the fact that only 1 out of 13 House members fromNorth Carolina voted for the KORUS FTA.Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration.


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urge her colleagues to ratify the trade agreement with the South.5 Yet, Rep.Hunter (R-CA), another leading hawk in the Republican House, disagreedand claimed that ‘perhaps most troubling about KORUS FTA is the unin-tended economic boost it will give to China, currently South Korea’slargest trading partner’ (Congressional Record, E1834, 12 October 2011).

Accordingly, with respect to the linkage between security and trade, anupfront test would be to systematically examine whether foreign policyconservatives are more likely to support trade agreements with securityallies than others.6 The National Journal, a nonpartisan publication cover-ing American politics, offers a measure of foreign policy conservatismbased upon key roll-call votes cast by members of the US Congress in theprevious year. Ranging from 0 to 100, higher scores denote more inter-nationalist and assertive stances in foreign policy votes.7 Table 2 showshow senators’ foreign policy conservatism scores match up with their votechoices over the trade deal with Korea. Considering that the US Senatetends to favor free trade and that only 15 senators voted against theKORUS FTA, it is not surprising to find that foreign policy conservativesshow an overwhelming degree of enthusiasm toward free trade with Korea,except for Sen. Coburn (R-OK), a fiscal hawk from Oklahoma. In add-ition, a majority of senators opposed to the KORUS FTA reveal that theirforeign policy conservatism ratings are relatively low, with Sen. Tester(D-MT) scoring only 17. As a result, conservative foreign policy membersof the US Senate tend to support the trade agreement.8

5 As a matter of fact, the floor speech delivered by Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) clearly signifiedthe reasoning of trade–security nexus. ‘There is more at stake than just increased exports …At a time when much of the world is waiting to see if the US will retreat from its responsibil-ities, passage of this free trade agreement will serve as a clear demonstration of our enduringcommitment to our ally South Korea and our determination to defend our interests through-out East Asia.’ (Congressional Record E1831, 12 October 2011).

6 For an excellent analysis of the US foreign policy ideology, see Narizni (2003).

7 Although widely used, National Journal’s ratings are not always satisfactory, like any othervoting scores. Some raise questions over the fairness ofNational Journal ratings. For example,Clinton et al. (2004) rejected the National Journal’s analysis that Senator John Kerry, theDemocratic nominee for president for 2004, was the most liberal senator in 2003. Instead,they found that the Massachusetts senator was only the 20th most liberal member of the107th US Senate.

8 Given that the key votes used to National Journal’s measure foreign policy conservatism havelittle to do with trade issues, it is safe to say that the voting ratings have no correlations withlawmakers’ positions on trade policy. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer on this criticalpoint. For the details of the key votes employed to calculate National Journal’s 2012 foreignpolicy conservatism, see the Appendix.

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Table 2 Foreign policy hawks and voting on the KORUS FTA, 112th US Senate (2011–2012)

Senator State Foreign policyconservatism score

Party KORUS FTA vote

Barrasso WY 94 R Yea

Coburn OK 94 R Not voting

DeMint SC 89 R Yea

Hatch UT 89 R Yea

Kyl AZ 89 R Yea

McCain AZ 89 R Yea

Corker TN 87 R Yea

Hutchison TX 85 R Yea

Inhofe OK 85 R Yea

Thune SD 84 R Yea

Bingaman NM 17 D Yea

Feinstein CA 17 D Yea

Hagan NC 17 D Nay

Klobuchar MN 17 D Yea

Leahy VT 17 D Nay

Tester MT 17 D Nay

Schumer NY 14 D Yea

Mikulski MD 13 D Yea

Akaka HI 8 D Yea

Cardin MD 8 D Nay

Durbin IL 8 D Yea

Lautenberg NJ 8 D Yea

Reid NV 8 D Nay

Boxer CA 0 D Yea

Brown OH 0 D Nay

Gillibrand NY 0 D Yea

Harkin IA 0 D Nay

Merkley OR 0 D Nay

Rockefeller WV 0 D Nay

Source: http://www.nationaljournal.com/.Source: CQ’s Politics in America (2012) and the Library of Congress http://thomas.loc.gov.


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What about partisan responses to the KORUS FTA in committees dir-ectly related to security concerns and international relations? Do memberssitting on the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committee over-whelmingly support the trade deal with a pivotal military partner in EastAsia, regardless of their party labels? Figure 1a and b compare and con-trast how Republican and Democratic members of the Committees onArmed Services and Foreign Affairs in the House positioned themselvesover the KORUS FTA voting. It is worth noticing that congressionalmembers of the international and security committees showed strong par-tisan flavor in their vote choices concerning the KORUS FTA. While 31out of 35 Republican members of the Armed Services Committee favoredthe KORUS FTA (89%), only 8 out of 26 Democrats sitting on the samecommittee supported the trade deal (31%).

Figure 1 (a) Committee membership, partisan position, and consent to the KORUS FTA: thecase of the House Armed Services Committee in the 112th US Congress. (b) Committeemembership, partisan position, and consent to the KORUS FTA: the case of the HouseForeign Affairs Committee in the 112th US Congress.

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Also, in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Republican membersstrongly backed the KORUS FTA (76%), compared to Democrats (32%).A simple chi-square analysis confirms that Republican members clearlyendorse the KORUS FTAvis-à-vis Democrats, irrespective of the fact thatboth party members sit on the Armed Services and Foreign AffairsCommittees.9 Contrary to the expectation that transnational and defensecommittee members would collectively support free trade with Korea, par-tisan politics turns out to be a crucial factor in governing vote choices bylawmakers. In the end, multivariate analyses are warranted to comprehen-sively examine whether the security–economic nexus has prevailed in con-gressional approval of the KORUS FTA, controlling for a variety of votedeterminants ranging from partisanship to ideology to constituency.

4 The KORUS FTA and the 112th US Congress(2011–12): an empirical analysis

To understand the whole process of free trade agreements moving forwardfor approval, it is critical to examine how members of US Congress respond.Ultimately, it is the US Congress on the American side that has the final sayabout the destiny of any free trade agreement with foreign countries. Thissection examines whether and which members of US Congress actuallyfollow the logic of the trade–security nexus by testing altogether the influ-ence of constituency, ideology, party, and members’ own characteristics. Asprevious research has paid scant attention to domestic sources of trade agree-ments with security allies, this paper shifts the focus onto domestic and con-gressional politics of free trade deals with Korea, a fast-growing economicpowerhouse in East Asia.

Examining how congressional members behave in the context of domes-tic and electoral politics, Mayhew (1974) famously observes that law-makers are ‘single-minded seekers of re-election’ so that credible votingrecords representing constituency preferences are vital for their re-electionefforts. Also, lawmakers as party members often seek to maximize electoralbenefits from their party reputation. In the end, while a legislator’s votingrecord is a ‘personal’ position, a party’s policy stance is a form of ‘collective’

9 Chi-square is 21.60 in the case of the Armed Services Committee and 8.70 in the ForeignAffairs Committee. Both are greater than the critical value of 6.63 at the significance level of0.01 so that the null hypotheses of no party effects on voting decisions are rejected with 99%confidence level.


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position (Key, 1955; Burnham, 1970; Canes-Wrone et al., 2002; Hillygusand Shields, 2008). Both positions are critical for the party’s rank-and-filemembers. Mayhew (1974, 61) concludes that congressional behavior has agreat deal to do with position taking, which is ‘the public enunciation of ajudgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest to political actors…and the statement may take the form of a roll call vote’. In sum, positionstaken by members of the US Congress stem from individual as well as col-lective deliberations in legislative decisions over international commit-ments and alliances.

Ultimately, then, what made some lawmakers endorse the KORUS FTAImplementation bill early on and other members seek to deny the crucialAsian security ally a free trade deal? Among the normal voting determi-nants, such as constituency interests, members’ characteristics includingideology, and partisan strategies, what would stand out as a key drivingforce for the passage of the KORUS FTA? The question is why it seems quitecomplicated for the free trade deal between the security allies to be approvedand implemented, despite the fact that next to NAFTA, the KORUS FTA isthe second largest free trade agreement for the United States and that SouthKorea is America’s seventh largest trading partner and a critical securitypartner in the Asia-Pacific region. The dependent variable is vote choicesmade by congressional members and coded 1 for yea and 0 for otherwise.Using logistic regression methods of the roll-call vote records in both theHouse and Senate, I test the influences of the constituency, members’ charac-teristics and preferences, along with political parties.

First of all, when it comes to the constituency inputs, I have included thepercentage of Obama’s vote share in the 2008 presidential election tomeasure any negative influence of the constituents’ liberal ideology againstfree trade deals (Jackson and Engel, 2003; Biglaiser et al., 2004). Withrespect to any positive impacts of economic interests on lawmakers’ votechoices, the portions of service sector, rural population, and states’ export toSouth Korea (not available for the House analysis) are incorporated into themodels (Schiller, 1999). Moreover, I use the percentage of college graduatesas the measurement to test the hypothesis regarding lawmakers fromcapital-abundant districts and states to be more supportive of the KORUSFTA. As Scheve and Slaughter (2001) indicate, a high level of college gradu-ates creates capital-abundant districts and states, which tend to prefer tradeliberalization. And, the Korean population percentage is also included tocheck any ethnic influence on lawmakers’ trade preferences.

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In addition, congressional members’ own characteristics often matter interms of trade policy preferences and voting decisions (Shepsle, 1992;Burden, 2007). Lawmakers with legislative seniority and electoral securityare hypothesized to endorse free trade. And, National Journal’s foreignpolicy conservatism ratings are introduced as the main proxy for thetrade–security nexus. Basically, I argue that members with hawkish foreignpolicy positions are more likely to value trade relations with security alliesthan other lawmakers. In the meantime, I repeat the logistic regressionanalyses through three different models to find out whether the KORUSFTA votes are truly motivated by security concerns regardless of overallideological standings (Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate Scores) orunited partisan positions.10

Tables 3 and 4 report the results from the multivariate logistic regressionanalyses of the House and Senate voting on the KORUS FTA, respectively.First, National Journal foreign policy conservatism variables, a proxymeasure of the security–trade nexus, well explain congressional members’voting on the KORUS FTA in both chambers. In the House Model (I)case, the predicted probability of a member scoring 91 on foreign policyconservatism voting for the KORUS FTA would be 90% higher than amember with a score of 0, whereas the Senate Model (I) shows 41% differ-ence between the highest and lowest scoring senators.

Also in the case of the lower chamber, the influence of foreign policyconservatism is still relevant even after the consideration of members’overall ideology and party membership, as reported in the Model (II) and(III). This finding in particular confirms that security concerns do matterfor House members’ voting decisions on free trade with the security ally inEast Asia. The Senate, however, shows the loss of explanatory power offoreign policy conservatism, as the other models include ideology andparty. And yet, the main inquiry in this paper is to see whether not onlythe logic of ‘securitizing trade’ but also domestic, electoral, and partisaninterests play a critical role in determining congressional behavior towardtrade agreements with foreign allies.

Do US lawmakers care less about electoral connections with domesticvoters than security ties with foreign allies? Through the case study of theKORUS FTA passage in the US Congress, the empirical findings confirm

10 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this distinct point about legislative motivationsof security concerns among congressional members.


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Table 3 Logit analyses of House voting on the KORUS FTA 2011

Model (I) Model (II) Model (III)

Obama 0.002 (0.017) 0.016 (0.019) 0.016 (0.019)

Service 0.046 (0.066) 0.051 (0.067) 0.056 (0.067)

Rural 0.003 (0.009) 0.003 (0.009) 0.003 (0.009)

College 0.060*** (0.019)+ 61% 0.057*** (0.020)+ 58% 0.056*** (0.020)+ 57%

Korean population 0.482** (0.227)+ 28% 0.486** (0.225)+ 28% 0.493** (0.224)+ 30%

Years in service 0.007 (0.016) 0.006 (0.016) 0.003 (0.016)

Fresh 0.360 (0.456) 0.084 (0.495) −0.040 (0.510)

Vote margin 0.010 (0.012) 0.000 (0.013) −0.004 (0.014)

Foreign policy conservatism 0.072*** (0.009)+ 90% 0.061*** (0.012)+ 84% 0.060*** (0.011)+ 83%

DW-Nominate Scores – 0.943 (0.616) –

GOP – – 1.147* (0.599)+ 22%

Constant −6.043*** (1.759) −5.798 (1.769) −5.853 (1.760)

N 427 427 427

Log-likelihood −170.99 −169.78 −169.11

Correctly predicted 82.9% 83.8% 83.4%

Pseudo R2 0.38 0.39 0.39

*P<0.10, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01; standard errors are given in parentheses. Italicized numbers reflect the percentage point change in the predictedprobability of voting for the KORUS FTA when a relevant independent variable moves from minimum to maximum values, while holding all othervariables at baseline values (continuous variables are held at mean values and dichotomous variables are held at zero.)

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that constituency considerations, electoral expediency, and partisan posi-tions also have statistically significant influences. First of all, the percentageof Korean population in their districts heavily affects House members’voting decisions related to the trade deal with Korea. In 2011, the minimumand maximum values for the percentage of Korean immigrants in congres-sional districts were 0 and 6.59 (New York’s 5th district).11 Additionally, thepredicted probability of a House member with 6.59% of Korean populationvoting for the KORUS FTA is ∼28–30% higher than a member with 0%Korean residents. On the contrary, the Korean population in states does notnecessarily translate into senators’ decisions on the free trade deal withSouth Korea.

Table 4 Logit analyses of Senate voting on the KORUS FTA, 2011

Model (I) Model (II) Model (III)

Obama −0.090 (0.071) −0.073 (0.075) −0.107 (0.073)

Service −0.213 (0.220) −0.232 (0.233) −0.238 (0.229)

Rural −0.036 (0.028) −0.046 (0.029) −0.050 (0.031)

College 0.036 (0.123) 0.060 (0.126) 0.060 (0.125)

Export to South Korea 0.064 (0.217) 0.070 (0.217) 0.084 (0.215)

Korean population 2.961 (1.915) 2.400 (1.901) 2.517 (1.868)

Years in service 0.30 (0.037) 0.047 (0.039) 0.043 (0.039)

Vote margin 0.014 (0.046) 0.016 (0.046) 0.014 (0.046)

Foreign policy conservatism 0.044*** (0.016)+ 41% 0.017 (0.022) 0.024 (0.020)

DW-Nominate Scores – 2.912 (1.936) –

GOP – – 1.661 (1.234)

Constant 6.187 (5.926) 6.561 (6.375) 7.510 (6.407)

N 100 100 100

Log-likelihood −30.99 −29.55 −30.04

Correctly predicted 87% 88% 88%

Pseudo R2 0.32 0.35 0.34

***P<0.01; standard errors are given in parentheses. Italicized numbers reflect thepercentage point change in the predicted probability of voting for the KORUS FTA.

11 During the 112th Congress (2011–2012), New York’s fifth congressional district was 6.59%Korean, the highest in the country. Rep. Gary Ackerman (D-NY) had represented this dis-trict for 30 years, and since 2013, Rep. Gregory Meeks, another Democrat, has replaced him.


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The portion of college graduates is another constituency factor that ledmembers in the lower chamber to strongly support the KORUS FTA. Inaddition to the factor endowment perspective offered by Scheve andSlaughter (2001), Broz (2005) also suggests that voters with a higher edu-cation are fully aware and consistently supportive of the need for inter-national financial rescues in the wake of economic crises in Mexico andEast Asia. In the House, congressional members from the districts with ahigh portion of college graduates tended to approve the KORUS FTA.The predicted probability of a representative with college graduates con-stituting 67% of the total population voting for the KORUS FTA is∼57–61% higher than a representative with 0% college graduates.

Party membership was critical in the House. The Republican Party incontrol of the lower chamber was overwhelmingly in favor of the KORUSFTA, and their support was statistically significant. To be more precise, par-tisan breakdown in terms of the KORUS FTA passage is as follows: 219yeas and 21 nays by GOP, compared to 59 yeas and 130 nays by the HouseDemocrats. In the Senate, all 15 nay votes came from the DemocraticParty, except for Olympia Snowe, the retiring Maine Republican. Yet, stat-istically speaking, party label does not provide any significant explanatorypower in terms of vote choices on the KORUS FTA, as the upper chamberoverwhelmingly supports trade liberalization (Karol, 2007).

In sum, not only security concerns but also domestic interests influencethe way members of the US Congress vote free trade deals with Korea assecurity partner. Two main findings stand out from the empirical analysesof congressional voting on the KORUS FTA. First, foreign policy conser-vatism as a measurement of trade–security nexus figures prominently inboth chambers. Particularly, in the House side, neither overall ideologicalposition nor party membership drowns out lawmakers’ security motiva-tions in terms of trade voting. Second, the influence of constituency signi-fies the House voting on the KORUS FTA. Lawmakers from the districtswith a significant number of college graduates or Korean immigrants tendto be highly supportive of free trade with South Korea.

5 Conclusion

Trade policy is guided by geopolitical calculations, with economy andsecurity being intimately linked. Thus, a growing number of scholars addressthe linkage between security and trade as the basis of the Korea–US Free

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Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). The Office of the United States TradeRepresentative also suggests that ‘as the first US FTAwith a North Asianpartner, the KORUS FTA is a model for trade agreements for the rest ofthe region, and underscores the U.S. commitment to, and engagementin, the Asia-Pacific region’.12 In addition, recent studies have begun toaddress US trade policy as a tool of containing China in the Asia-Pacificregion. In his recent analyses of ‘a contest for supremacy’ between theUnited States and China, Friedberg (2011) claims that instead of a‘Cold-War’ type military alliance and presence, American policymakershave become increasingly interested in forming free trade agreements(FTAs) to effectively slow down the economic influence of Beijing.

Then, the question is how American lawmakers in the context ofdomestic politics understand and approach the balance between geopolit-ical demands and electoral politics. This paper has explored the dynamicsof congressional politics over the course of approving free trade deals witha security ally and analyzed how and why the controversial trade agree-ment could survive in American politics, now highly divided over thefuture course of American foreign policy. Empirical findings show that notonly the ‘security–trade’ nexus but also the influences of constituency andpartisanship matter in the approval of the KORUS FTA. Despite thefanfare over the trade agreement with the world’s 11th largest economy, acloser look at the roll-call votes by members of the US Congress revealsanother politics as usual.

In sum, this paper illuminates how lawmakers in the context of domes-tic politics approach international agreements by striking a balancebetween security ties and electoral connections. As the debate over tradewith Korea overlapped with an era of partisan gridlock and a polarizedCongress, the KORUS FTA continued to be another partisan football(Theriault, 2008). Then, in the wake of America’s financial crisis in 2008and recent North Korean provocations, the Obama administrationwielded its political muscle to push through the trade deal. The Koreatrade deal seems to have provided rare bipartisan cooperation between theRepublican House and the Democratic President. The analyses of con-gressional voting decisions contribute to a better understanding ofAmerican foreign policymaking in the context of domestic and electoral

12 http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta (3 August 2013, datelast accessed).


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http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta










politics, wherein the political center is arguably disappearing and extremeideologies are dominant.

Future research is warranted to move from just one country case studyto more comprehensive analyses of trade–security nexus in internationalrelations. To better understand the conflicting or compensating influencesof security and domestic motivations, it would be great to expand the listof countries with which the United States maintain security alliances aswell as trade relations. With a focus on the countries such as New Zealand,the Philippines, and Japan, the research would keep pressing the questionof whether policymakers and representatives weigh their security and eco-nomic interests differently when voting on FTAs with allies rather thannon-allies. In short, further comparative analyses of the trade–securitynexus not only in global setting but also in domestic context shouldadvance our understanding of how trade and security interact with eachother in the era of securitizing trade.

Funding

This study was supported by the National Research Foundation of Koreagrant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2013S1A3A2054311).

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Appendix

Key votes used to calculate National Journal’s 2012Foreign Policy Conservatism

The Congressional Record roll-call number is followed by the bill number,a description of the vote, the date, the outcome, the prevailing side – con-servative (C) or liberal (L) – and the weight given to each (from 1 for thelowest weight to 3 for the highest) based on how closely the vote fits theoverall pattern.

Senate Foreign Issues (22 votes)

33/S1813 Bar the export of crude oil transported by the Keystone XL pipe-line unless the ban is waived by the president. March 8. (33–65; 60 votesrequired for passage) C-2.

52/HR3606 Invoke cloture on an amendment reauthorizing theExport-Import Bank of the United States. March 20. (55–44; 60 votesrequired for cloture) C-3.

91/HR2072 Terminate the Export-Import Bank. May 15. (12–86; 60votes required for passage) L-1.

92/HR2072 Prohibit the Export-Import Bank from making loans incountries that hold debt instruments of the United States. May 15. (9–89;60 votes required for passage) L-1.

93/HR2072 Restrict the ability of the Export-Import Bank to makeloans and require it to maintain a ratio of capital to the outstanding princi-pal balance of loans and loan guarantees of not less than 10 percent. May15. (36–62; 60 votes required for passage) L-3.


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94/HR2072 Restrict the ability of the Export-Import Bank to financefossil-fuel projects overseas. May 15. (37–61; 60 votes required for passage)L-3.

95/HR2072 Prohibit an increase in the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank until it initiates negotiations to eliminate export-financingprograms. May 15. (35–63; 60 votes required for passage) L-3.

96/HR2072 Send to the president a bill reauthorizing the Export-Import Bank. May 15. (78–20; 60 votes required for passage) L-2.

121/PN267 Invoke cloture on the nomination of Mari Carmen Aponteto be ambassador to El Salvador. June 14. (62–37; 60 votes required forcloture) L-3.

144/S3240 Prohibit assistance to North Korea under the Food forPeace Act unless the president issues a national-interest waiver. June 20.(59–40) L-3.

145/S3240 Prohibit assistance to North Korea under the Food for PeaceAct. June 20. (43–56) L-3.

181/S3364 Invoke cloture on a bill providing tax breaks for relocatingbusinesses from overseas to the United States. July 19. (56–42; 60 votesrequired for cloture) C-3.

187/S3414 Invoke cloture on a bill to create voluntary cybersecuritystandards for owners of vital computer networks. Aug. 2. (52–46; 60 votesrequired for cloture) C-3.

196/S3576 Set limitations on aid to Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, and othernations. Sept. 22. (10–81; 60 votes required for passage) L-1.

202/S3414 Invoke cloture on a bill dealing with the security and resili-ency of the cyber and communications infrastructure of the United States.Nov. 14. (51–47; 60 votes required for cloture) C-3.

205/Treaty Doc. 112–7 Proceed to consideration of the UnitedNations-approved Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities.Nov. 27. (61–36) L-3.

210/S3254 Express the sense of Congress that U.S. combat operations inAfghanistan should end by Dec. 31, 2014. Nov. 29. (62–33) L-2.

212/S3254 Prohibit the transfer of detainees at Guantánamo Bay to theUnited States. Nov. 29. (54–41) C-3.

213/S3254 Make it unlawful to detain a U.S. citizen apprehended in theUnited States without a charge or trial. Nov. 29. (67–29) L-1.

214/S3254 Ensure sufficient sizing of the civilian and contract-servicesworkforces of the Defense Department. Nov. 30. (41–53) C-2.

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219/TReatyDoc.112–7 Ratify the United Nations-approved Conventionon the Rights of Persons With Disabilities. Dec. 4. (61–38; 66 votesrequired for passage) C-3.

235/HR5949 Require a report on the impact of the FISA AmendmentsAct of 2008 on the privacy of the people of the United States. Dec. 28.(43–52; 60 votes required for passage) C-1.

House Foreign Issues (32 votes)

56/HR3408 Impose requirements that oil transported through theKeystone XL pipeline be used in the United States. Feb. 15. (173–254)C-3.

58/HR3408 Require that 75 percent of the iron and steel used for theconstruction of the Keystone XL pipeline come from North America. Feb.15. (193–234) C-3.

184/HR3523 Allow critical-infrastructure owners and operators toreceive vital cybersecurity information. April 26. (167–243) C-3.

224/HR2072 Reauthorize the Export-Import Bank. May 9. (330–93) L-1.242/HR5326 Bar the use of funds for the Commerce Department’s

Select USA program. May 9. (209–217) L-3.264/HR4310 Limit the use of Defense Department funds for the war in

Afghanistan to those required for a troop withdrawal. May 17. (113–303)C-2.

266/HR4310 Require trials for detainees at Guantánamo Bay to beheld there and not in the United States. May 17. (249–171) C-3.

268/HR4310 Eliminate language in a bill requiring that new long-rangestrike bombers be capable of carrying strategic nuclear weapons. May 17.(112–308) C-2.

269/HR4310 Reduce spending for the Ground-Based MidcourseDefense missile system. May 17. (165–252) C-3.

270/HR4310 Eliminate indefinite military detention of any persondetained in U.S. territories and possessions. May 18. (182–238) C-3.

271/HR4310 Clarify that persons detained in the United States by themilitary are not denied the writ of habeas corpus. May 18. (243–173) C-3.

278/HR4310 Decree that the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons toSouth Korea would destabilize the Western Pacific region and would notbe in the national security interests of the United States. May 18. (160–261) C-3.


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279/HR4310 Require the Pentagon to report to Congress regardingwhether nuclear-weapons reductions pursuant to the New START pact arein the national security interests of the United States. May 18. (175–245)C-3.

280/HR4310 Prohibit the president from making unilateral reductionsto U.S. nuclear forces. May 18. (241–179) C-3.

281/HR4310 Lessen the impact of across-the-board sequestration cutson the Pentagon. May 18. (220–201) C-3.

282/HR4310 Reduce Pentagon spending by $8 billion from the levelauthorized by the House Armed Services Committee. May 18. (170–252)C-3.

283/HR4310 Limit funds to any institution or organization establishedby the Convention on the Law of the Sea. May 18. (229–193) C-3.

285/HR4310 Appoint a special envoy for Iran to ensure that all diplo-matic avenues are pursued to avoid a war with Iran and to prevent Iranfrom acquiring a nuclear weapon. May 18. (77–344) C-2.

286/HR4310 Prohibit nonproliferation activities with Russia until theU.S. certifies that Russia is no longer providing support to the Basharal-Assad regime’s efforts to suppress the Syrian people and that Russia isnot providing technology or equipment to Iran, North Korea, or Syria thatcontribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction. May 18.(241–181) C-3.

288/HR4310 Ban any reductions to the strategic nuclear triad pendingfindings regarding Russia. May 18. (238–162) C-3.

291/HR4310 Authorize funding for the Defense Department for fiscal2013. May 18. (299–120) C-2.

293/HR4348 Instruct conferees on a highway bill regarding ‘BuyAmerican’ language in the legislation. May 18. (245–169) L-2.

319/HR5325 Prohibit the use of funds for the U.S.-China Clean EnergyResearch Center. June 6. (181–229) L-2.

332/HR5325 Reduce funding for nuclear-weapons technology programsby $298 million. June 6. (138–281) C-3.

477/HR5856 Reduce the funding for missile defense by $75 million.July 18. (150–268) C-3.

479/HR5856 Reduce the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund by $175million. July 18. (228–191) L-2.

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482/HR5856 Prohibit the use of funds to operate or maintain morethan 300 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. July 18. (136–283)C-3.

484/HR5856 Reduce defense appropriations by $1.7 billion. July 18.(91–328) C-1.

489/HR5856 Reduce defense appropriations by $7.6 billion. July 19.(171–243) C-3.

491/HR5856 Prohibit the use of funds to reduce the nuclear forces ofthe United States in contravention of the Arms Control and DisarmamentAct. July 19. (235–178) C-3.

493/HR5856 Prohibit use of funds to reduce the number of certainnuclear-weapons delivery vehicles. July 19. (232–183) C-3.

583/HR6213 Prohibit the Energy Department from making loan guar-antees unless 75 percent of materials are produced in the United States.Sept. 14. (175–234) C-3.


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security ties orelectoral connections? and the korea us...

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