Select Committeesunder Scrutiny

by Lucinda Maer and Mark Sandford

July 2004

ISBN: 1 903903 31 0

First Published July 2004

Copyright © The Constitution Unit

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ForewordThis report forms part of the Constitution Unit’s research into the scrutiny process. The Unit iscurrently engaged on a two-year project examining the process of ‘scrutiny’ by committees at alllevels of government in the UK: national; devolved; regional and local. This briefing is the sixth outputof the project (see Appendix 3 for details of other outputs).

The aim of this report is to summarise the types of scrutiny practised in the House of Commons andanalyse the effectiveness of the different types of scrutiny being carried out. We makerecommendations for ways in which select committees’ working practices could be improved anddraw conclusions on their practices to date. We also compare the types of process and the methodsused by Westminster select committees with those used at local and devolved level and hope thatthis report will be helpful to those in other parliaments and assemblies whose scrutiny committeesare still young by comparison to those at Westminster.

Select committees in the House of Commons and the House of Lords are the main focus of non-partisan scrutiny and overview of Government policy and executive decisions. The current system ofdepartmental select committees in the House of Commons was established in 1979. Unlike the newparliaments and assemblies of the UK, the Westminster select committees do not fit into any ‘granddesign’ of parliamentary functioning and are to a large extent still developing in their role. As theydevelop, the powers afforded to them and their pattern of work changes also. In recent years, selectcommittees have often found themselves at the centre of proposals for strengthening Parliament.This report is set in the context of the Modernisation agenda put into effect under Robin Cook’sLeadership of the House of Commons (June 2001–March 2003).

There are, of course, other scrutiny mechanisms within the House of Commons. Members ofParliament scrutinise the executive through a series of methods: oral questions to ministers, oralquestions to the Prime Minister, written questions to ministers, debates in the chamber and inWestminster Hall, and in the scrutiny of legislation through debates and Standing Committees.

We took a case-study approach to our research. We focused on four departmental selectcommittees and chose a number of reports from each of these committees. The case-studies werechosen with help from our contacts in the House of Commons. We wanted to ensure that a range ofdifferent types of report were studied.

Research took place through studying the final reports of each inquiry. Verbatim transcripts ofhearings were studied, as were meeting minutes. Some 20 interviews were carried out with MPs,clerks, officials as well as witnesses and specialist advisers. Non-attributable quotes from therespondents are used in the analysis below.

Although there are also select committees in the House of Lords, Joint Committees of both Houses,and other committees such as the Public Administration Select Committee which do not monitor adepartment, these fell outside the scope of this study, as did the work of the Public AccountsCommittee in the House of Commons.

We would like to thank all of the officials and members of the House of Commons who agreed to beinterviewed as part of this inquiry. We would also like to thank Oonagh Gay, Tom Healey, SimonBurton, Paul Seaward, Andrew Kennon, Meg Russell, and Robert Hazell for their continued help andassistance through this stage of the project. We would also like to thank Kaifala Marah for hisassistance on scrutiny of estimates and expenditure.

Lucinda MaerMark Sandford

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ContentsForeword 3

Executive Summary 7

Formal Structures and Powers 9

The work of the Select Committees of the House of Commons 13

The Inquiry Process 19

Expertise and Support 27

Outputs 31

Impact and follow-up work 35

Conclusions and Recommendations 41

Appendix 1: List of Committees of the House of Commons 43

Appendix 2: Standing Order no. 152 44

Appendix 3: Effective Scrutiny Publications 45

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Executive Summary• The access that select committees have to people, persons and papers is crucial to carryingout effective scrutiny. There need to be clear protocols about the circumstances in which namedofficials can be expected to appear before committees and Ministers should not resist giving evidenceto committees other than their own if matters within their remit are crucial to a particular inquiry. Thegovernment should use Freedom of Information principles when responding to requests forinformation by committees. Further to this, committees might want to consider how they might usethe legislation strategically to gain access to documents.

• In May 2002 the House of Commons agreed core tasks for select committees. The overalleffect of the core tasks has been to encourage select committees to carry out the full range ofactivities currently open to them. The recent increases in the number of committee staff and thecreation of the Scrutiny Unit, which has expertise in financial and legislative issues, has greatlyincreased the capacity of select committees to carry out more routine and rigorous scrutiny. However,committees still spend the majority of their time on policy based inquiries and have considerablescope in setting their own agenda.

• Committees need to set priorities for themselves over a period of time, planning first, majorissues to cover, secondly specific inquiries, and thirdly the scope of each inquiry. However,committees also have to remain flexible enough to deal with issues as they arise and include routinetasks in their work plans.

• Committees have several sources of expertise open to them including appointing specialistadvisers to assist with specific inquiries. However, the process of appointment is ad hoc. Togetherwith a more formal procedure for appointments, job descriptions should be provided for specialistadvisers. Committees should also consider how they might use commissioned pieces of researchfrom outside experts to enhance their inquiries.

• Select committees attempt to influence the behaviour not only of the government, butParliament and the press. They seek to inform debate in the chamber, and produce documents fordebate. Increasingly committees have sought to influence the behaviour of political actors byinfluencing the media and both encouraging and informing a wider debate.

• The government is obliged to respond to committee reports within 60 days. However,responses are often late and the quality of the response is often questionable. A way of improving thesystem would be for the 60 day response to be an initial response with a further response one yearlater allowing for serious consideration of recommendations.

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1. The current system of select committeesdates from the nineteenth century whencommittees were used to report on specificissues of concern to Parliament. However, theidea that routine examination of policy oradministration could improve government did notdevelop until the latter half of the twentiethcentury. During the 1960s more systematicscrutiny committees were established. Sixcommittees were established on agriculture,science and technology, education and science,race relations and immigration, overseas aid anddevelopment and Scottish affairs. Thesecommittees were known as the CrossmanCommittees, after their instigator—the thenLeader of the House of Commons, RichardCrossman. In 1971 a new ExpenditureCommittee was established to replace aprevious committee on Estimates with six sub-committees to scrutinise various areas ofgovernment expenditure, and some of theCrossman committees were disbanded.

2. A review was carried out by the ProcedureCommittee in the dying years of the minorityLabour Government of 1974–79. It found that thebalance between the executive and parliamentwas “now weighted in favour of the Governmentto a degree which arouses widespread anxietyand is inimical to the proper working of ourparliamentary democracy”.1 The committeecarrying out the review recommended that theExpenditure Committee and the remainingCrossman Committees should be replaced with12 committees, responsible for the scrutiny ofeach government department. The reforms wereimplemented by the incoming ConservativeGovernment in 1979. The new committees satalongside the long established Public AccountsCommittee, the Select Committee on theParliamentary Commissioner for Administrationand the committee responsible for the House’sorganisation.

StructuresSize and Membership

3. There are currently 18 departmental selectcommittees in the House of Commons.2 Houseof Commons select committees have normallyconsisted of 11 members and this remains theirstandard size. Two are different: Northern IrelandAffairs has 13 to allow for the representation ofminority parties; Environment, Food and RuralAffairs has 17 to enable it to operate two sub-committees reflecting the two departmentswhose merger in 2001 created DEFRA.

4. Members of Commons select committeesare selected in broad proportionality to theparties’ overall strength in the House ofCommons (although this is not obligatory underStanding Orders and is varied to allow seats forthe very small parties). In the 1997 and 2001Parliaments this means that in a committee with11 members, there should be 7 Labourmembers, 3 Conservative members and 1 minorparty member. The Liberal Democrats aregrouped in with the other minor parties and theirrepresentation across the committee system asa whole broadly reflects their size in the House.The application of proportionality means that theparty of government holds a majority on everyselect committee of the House of Commons.

5. There also is no formal rule about the partybalance of committee chairs. In theory, chairsare elected by the committee members from oneof their number. In practice, however, a decisionis reached through the ‘usual channels’ on whichparty, and which individual, should occupy thechair of which committee.3 In May 2002 MPsrejected the possibility offered to them to removethe place of the whips in the appointmentprocess.

Powers6. The remit of the departmental selectcommittees is set out in the House of CommonsStanding Order No. 152 which establishes

Formal Structures and Powers

1 HC588, 1977–78.2 A full list of the Committees of the House of Commons and House of Lords is available at Appendix 1.3 For more information on the Usual Channels see, Rush M. and Ettinghausen C., Opening Up the Usual

Channels, The Hansard Society, 2002.

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them.4 The House of Commons has delegatedpowers to select committees to send forpersons, papers and records. In theory thisgrants them the power to require any person orbody to attend a meeting of the committee to giveevidence orally, to invite any person or body tosubmit evidence in writing or to require anyperson or body to submit specified documents toa committee. The power to send for persons andpapers is only enforceable by a resolution of theHouse (where the government can use itsmajority). So in practice committees have tonegotiate with the executive when calling forparticular individuals from government and thecivil service.

7. Erskine May states that “Members of theHouse, including Ministers, may not be formallysummoned to attend as witnesses before selectcommittees”.5 Although a committee cannotcompel a minister to appear, in practiceconvention dictates that ministers do appear.One of the core tasks of committees agreed inMay 2002 was that they should take evidencefrom each Minister in their department at leastonce a year. In April 2002 the Prime Ministerannounced that he would give evidence to theLiaison Committee twice a year after previouslyrefusing to give evidence to the PublicAdministration Select Committee on theMinisterial Code.

8. Ministers generally only resist appearingbefore a select committee if it is not the selectcommittee which monitors their department, andrefusal to do so is very rare. The Health SelectCommittee took evidence from ministers fromboth the Department of Education and theDepartment for Culture, Media and Sport as wellas from the Department of Health during theirinquiry into Obesity during 2003–04. In recentyears there have been particular difficultiesgetting ministers from the Treasury to giveevidence to departmental select committeesother than their own. For instance in April 2002the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown,refused to give evidence to a sub-committee ofthe then Transport, Local Government and theRegions Committee on PPP for the tube. TheTreasury is a special case, however, astheoretically they could be called to give evidence

to any committee on almost any inquiry.However, where Treasury matters are a crucialpart of an inquiry they should not resist givingevidence and usually do not. The governmentneeds to be as flexible in its accountabilitymechanisms as it can be in its policy making andadministration.

9. When calling representatives of thegovernment to give evidence, select committeeshave no power to require a particular individual toattend. The government maintains thatappearance of civil servants before selectcommittees is governed by the OsmotherlyRules.6 However, these rules are governmentrules and have never been formally accepted byParliament. The normal course is for the selectcommittees to leave it to the departmentconcerned to nominate the appropriate civilservant. If they do require specific individuals,there is no obligation for them and not other civilservants to attend. In 1986 the DefenceCommittee’s investigation into the WestlandAffair centred on the exchange of informationbetween specific individuals in government. Thegovernment refused to allow the namedindividuals sought by the committee to appearand twice sent the cabinet secretary instead. Inrecent years the ability to call named officials hasseveral times been obstructed. For instance inMarch 2002 the Cabinet Office refused to allowLord Birt (a then unpaid strategy adviser ontransport issues) to give evidence on theTransport Sub-committee’s review of the 10 YearPlan for Transport.

10. Private individuals can be compelled toattend select committee hearings and can befound in contempt of Parliament if they fail to doso. They have in the past been required toanswer all questions put to them.

11. Despite the power to call for papers, selectcommittees cannot formally order a Secretary ofState to produce papers. The chairman of acommittee may seek to move a motion in theHouse, but in practice this is unlikely to occurbecause of the lack of opportunit ies forbackbenchers to move motions, and unlikely tobe successful because of the government’smajority in the House. Under the 1997 version of

4 See Appendix 2.5 Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice, 22nd Edition, 1997, eds Donald Limon and W R McKay, p.648.6 For more information on the Osmotherly Rules see: House of Commons Library Standard Note, The

Osmotherly Rules, SN/PC/2671, January 2004.

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the Osmotherly Rules, the government hascommitted to releasing information tocommittees in line with openness proceduresfirst introduced with the Code of Practice onGovernment Information in 1994. The Freedomof Information Act 2000 will replace the Code ofPractice when it comes fully into force in 2005.Select committees may want to use theFreedom of Information Act strategically to maketargeted requests for information.

12. Following the Hutton Inquiry into thecircumstances surrounding the death of DrDavid Kelly, the Liaison Committee raisedconcerns with the Prime Minister regarding thelevel of access to information and witnessesgiven to Lord Hutton compared with that given toHouse of Commons select committees.7 TheLiaison Committee stated in its 2003 annualreport that “the Government has undertaken toco-operate as fully as possible in the provision ofinformation to parliament. It is thereforereasonable to expect that select committeesshould receive Government co-operation as fullyas an inquiry set up by the government itself.”8

The Prime Minister has agreed to undertake areview within government of its guidance toofficials on the availability of witnesses andevidence.

13. Select committees and the governmentneed to agree clear protocols about thecircumstances in which named officials canbe expected to appear before committees.The government should use FOI principleswhen responding to requests forinformation. They should respond within thestatutory deadline for responses to requestsfor information and give reasons forexempting information.

Sub-committees and ad hocCommittees14. Each select committee has the power toappoint a sub-committee, and the EnvironmentFood and Rural Affairs Committee has the powerto appoint two sub-committees. The ODPMCommittee has a sub-committee which consists

of all of the members of the Committee. Thepurpose of this arrangement in practice is toallow other members to take the chair for smallenquiries. Normally the sub-committee will meetweekly for about three weeks or so, produce ashort report or carry out a quick scrutiny process,then do nothing for another month.

15. Although sub-committees can be a flexibleway of increasing the capacity of the committee,and allowing members to lead individual piecesof work, they do come at a considerable costboth to staff and members.

“Staffing a sub-committee to be effectivereally means doubling your staff.”

16. Sub-committees on their own are not ananswer to increasing the capacity of selectcommittees because they stretch the fixedlevel of support available to the committee,and members find it difficult to find extra timeto sit on them.

17. Select Committees also have the power towork with one another. Select committees andsub-committees can hold concurrent meetingswith one or more other Commons select or sub-committees, and any committee of the House ofLords. In practice, however joint meeting andworking of committees is rare. This is because ofthe level of co-ordination, support and timerequired to organise and staff such a committee.One notable success has been the“Quadripartite Committee”: the Defence, ForeignAffairs, International Development and Trade andIndustry Committees have co-operated on acontinuing basis since 1997 to examine andreport on the government’s new series of annualreports on strategic export controls. Generally,however, the caveats regarding sub-committeesalso apply to joint working.

7 See also the Foreign Affairs Committee, First Special Report Session 2003–04: Implications for the Work of theHouse and its Committees of the Government’s Lack of Co-operation with the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Inquiryinto the Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC 440.

8 House of Commons Liaison Committee, Annual Report for 2002, First Report of Session 2003–2004, HC 446,para. 89.

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Core Objectives of Select Committees18. In May 2002 the House of Commonsagreed proposals of the Liaison Committee ondefining the common objectives for selectcommittees along with a raft of other measures.9

Select committees had increasingly been seenas a central part of strengthening parliamentagainst the executive. Two influential reports, ofthe Commission to Strengthen Parliament (TheNorton Commission) and the Hansard

Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny (TheHansard Commission), had both givensignif icant focus to the work of selectcommittees as well as their membership. TheLiaison Committee proposed the core tasks as away of achieving “a more methodical and less adhoc approach to the business of scrutiny” andsuch a l ist was also proposed by theModernisation Committee. The list of core tasksthe House agreed are in Box 1 below.

Box 1

OBJECTIVE A: TO EXAMINE AND COMMENT ON THE POLICY OF THE DEPARTMENT

Task 1: To examine policy proposals from the UK Government and the European Commission inGreen papers, White papers, draft Guidance etc, and to inquire further where the Committeeconsiders it appropriate.

Task 2: To identify and examine areas of emerging policy, or where existing policy is deficient, andmake proposals.

Task 3: To conduct scrutiny of any published draft bill within the Committee’s responsibilities.

Task 4: To examine specific output from the department expressed in documents or other decisions.

OBJECTIVE B: TO EXAMINE THE EXPENDITURE OF THE DEPARTMENT

Task 5: To examine the expenditure plans and out-turn of the department, its agencies and principalNDPBs.

OBJECTIVE C: TO EXAMINE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPARTMENT

Task 6: To examine the department’s Public Service Agreements, the associated targets and thestatistical measurements employed, and report if appropriate.

Task 7: To monitor the work of the department’s Executive Agencies, Non-Departmental PublicBodies, regulators and other associated public bodies.

Task 8: To scrutinise major appointments made by the department.

Task 9: To examine the implementation of legislation and major policy initiatives.

OBJECTIVE D: TO ASSIST THE HOUSE IN DEBATE AND DECISION

Task 10: To produce reports which are suitable for debate in the House, including Westminster Hall, ordebating committees.

9 For a description and discussion of the May 2002 reforms to select committees see Phil Cowley, ‘Parliament:More revolts, more reform’ pp 198–201, in Parliamentary Affairs, OUP, April 2003.

The work of the Select Committees of the Houseof Commons

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19. The core tasks can be seen both as adescriptive list of the types of work thatcommittees have done over the last twenty-fiveyears, and as a prescriptive l ist tel l ingcommittees what they ought to be doing. As theLiaison Committee has introduced a requirementthat select committees should report on theirperformance against these tasks some peoplesee them as having this latter effect with respectto some of the less ‘sexy’ tasks of selectcommittees.

“What they have done is force committees tolook at the areas of their remit that they haveleast been interested in. It has always beeneasy to get committees interested in bigpolitical subjects: government policydocuments and that sort of thing. Less sowith public expenditure, delegatedlegislation, pre-legislative scrutiny….Committees don’t want to be seen not taking[the core tasks] seriously and it does meanthat, given the committees know they will bereporting at the end of the year against thecore tasks, part of the way through the yearwe ask how far we are fulfilling thesethings.”

20. However, others do tend to look to the coretasks retrospectively. Those who admitted thisapproach found that for them, the core taskswere descriptive of their practices.

“We tend to apply them retrospectively to seewhether we have done our core tasks ratherthan seeing them as an agenda…. Havingsaid that we haven’t found it at all difficultto link our work to the core tasks.”

21. Obviously not all of the tasks are equallyapplicable to all committees every year. Theremay not be any draft legislation published by thedepartment in the session, or any major publicappointments to report on. However, in terms oftaking evidence from government ministers on aregular basis, examining departmentalexpenditure and supplementary estimates, thedepartmental annual report and the department’sPublic Service Agreements, almost all of ourinterviewees noted an increase in this activity asa result of having to report against them.

“You look at a task and you think ‘are wedoing that? If not, why not?’ and if there is areason why not then fine.”

22. The overall effect of the core tasks hasbeen to encourage select committees tocarry out the full range of activities currentlyopen to them. They have given a strongerhand to chairs and clerks in encouragingcommittees to take part in more routinescrutinies rather than just policy basedinquiries, hence perhaps achieving more‘methodical scrutiny’ as intended. However,committees still spend the majority of theirtime engaged in policy based inquiries andhave considerable scope in setting theirown agenda.

23. This study has not looked at case studiesacross the total range of possible selectcommittee tasks. For instance, we have notlooked at scrutiny of draft legislation—a subjectwhich the Constitution Unit hopes to return to inthe future.10 The majority of this report looks atthe non-routine work of select committees.Committees’ performance against the moreroutine of their tasks is outlined briefly here.

Evidence from the Minister24. If the core tasks were designed to beprescriptive and introduce a more methodicalapproach to scrutiny, the area in which they haveperhaps had the most success is therequirement to take evidence from each Ministerin the Department at least once a year.Committees are now doing this regularly, and areseeing the value in it.

“One of the things that the LiaisonCommittee recommended was that we shouldhave every Minister in the departmentbefore us at least once a year. We had oneminister in that we didn’t have planned tocome before the committee as part of anyinquiry for quite a long period of time. Ithink in some respects that was a good ideabecause the committee is reminded that it isimportant to review previousrecommendations and see how they areactually implemented…. It is very easy to

10 For further information on Parliamentary Scrutiny of Draft Legislation see Power, G., Parliamentary Scrutiny ofDraft Legislation 1997–1999, The Constitution Unit, 2000.

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concentrate on sexy areas and miss outsome very important areas.”

25. Respondents from the Health, ODPM andConstitutional Affairs committees all linked theincrease of this activity to its inclusion in the coretasks. The Education Select Committee hadregularly started to take evidence from Ministersin 2001.

26. Respondents also indicated that therequirement to take evidence from a particularminister had made them focus on issues theywould not have done otherwise. With theevidence sessions published on the web, oftensingle evidence sessions with ministers are notfollowed by the publication of a report. Thismakes the committee more flexible, enabling it toquestion ministers on issues arising over abroader sphere, including expenditure issues,than just for the two or three large inquiriesplanned in any one session. Single evidencesessions with ministers have allowed thecommittee to cover more ground within theirdepartment without necessarily solicitingevidence and producing a report.

Appointments27. One of the more problematic tasks forselect committees is the requirement to“consider and if necessary report on majorappointments by a Secretary of State or othersenior Minister”.11 Although this is somethingwhich some select committees have been doingregularly for many years, such as the TreasuryCommittee which has taken evidence from eachnew member of the Monetary Policy Committeesince 1998, select committees have no power bywhich they can decide against an appointee ormake government reconsider its choice.

“I think it is one of the more problematictasks which have been given to selectcommittees because we are not Congressand we don’t have the power to say yes orno to anybody.”

“This is based on the US model, but sincethe committees don’t have power to confirm,simply taking evidence from someone who

has got a new job, unless it is anopportunity to put views to a new appointeerather than the other way round, is notnecessarily a useful process.”

28. There is therefore little point in using anevidence session as an interview after the eventof appointment. The Treasury Select Committeeregularly takes evidence in ‘confirmationhearings’ in order “to establish whether thosenominated to the Monetary Policy Committee ofthe Bank of England fulfilled the criteria which wespecified, namely demonstrable professionalcompetence and personal independence of theGovernment”. In one case they have reportedagainst an appointment, questioning whether theappointee (Mr Allsopp) possessed “the skillsrequired to take part in meetings of the MonetaryPolicy Committee”. They then called on theChancellor of the Exchequer to rethink MrAllsopp’s appointment with no effect.12 Aseparate argument to be had, although not withinthe scope of this research, is whether selectcommittees should have any role in the selectionprocedure for major appointments by theirdepartment.

29. However, this is not to say that a singleevidence session with a major appointee at thebeginning of their tenure is not a valuable activityfor a committee. It can be an opportunity for acommittee to put down a marker to theappointee, to discover the appointee’s views ontheir priorities which may help the committeeitself plan its agenda. The threat of such hearingsmay also have an impact on what appointmentsare made. It gives the committee something torefer to when taking evidence from the appointeeagain and can enable the committee to build up arelationship of trust with the individual which maybe useful for both parties for years to come.

“In a way it is like having in ministersstraight after the election. It is putting thebase marker down. A couple of years onyou can go back to what they said.”

30. In its report on the appointment of the newChief Inspector of Schools the Education SelectCommittee used its report as an opportunity toquestion the appointment process itself,

11 Select Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons, First Report 2001–2002: Select Committees,HC 224, February 2002, para 34.

12 Treasury Select Committee, The Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England: Confirmation Hearings,Seventh Report of 1999/2000, HC 520, para. 5.

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alongside the new appointee’s priorities forOFSTED.13 The report describes the processthat led to the appointment of Mr Bell and sets outhis qualifications and career. It goes on todiscuss the issues covered in his oral evidencebefore recommending that the appointment ofHer Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Schools shouldbe subject to Parliamentary approval.

31. The Constitutional Affairs Committeereceived a “valedictory” memorandum from theoutgoing Chief Executive of the Legal ServicesCommission which provided “much usefulmaterial both for the session with his successorand for future scrutiny of the work of the LegalServices Commission”.14 One intervieweestated “when someone is leaving anappointment, that is when they would love to giveevidence and then tell you precisely what theythink.” It would be useful for committees totake evidence from major appointmentstowards the end of their appointment whenthey have more of an insight, and less tolose, by giving full and frank evidence.

Annual reports32. Although committees had always shownsome interest in departmental annualreports, that interest has increased sincethe publication of the core tasks, and theircapacity to give the reports proper attentionhas increased with the creation of thecentral resource unit of the Scrutiny Unit inNovember 2002. As the Scrutiny Unit carries outthese tasks for several of the committees, itallows comparisons to be made about the qualityand content of reporting across departments aswell as year on year within the same department.The ability to carry out this work has greatlyadded value to the process. The work of theScrutiny Unit is outlined more fully below but it isworth noting the effect that the core tasks havehad:

“Quite a lot of my colleagues havecommented that chairmen previously werenot interested in annual reports andsupplementary estimates and are now

saying ‘well shouldn’t we be doing a bit ofthis?’”

Examining the expenditure of thedepartment33. Objective B, “to examine the expenditure ofthe department”, tackles what has traditionallybeen seen as a weakness of select committees.The Hansard Commission found thatcommittees gave a “low priority” to finance byselect committees.15 Since the Commissionreported, the Scrutiny Unit has been establishedto provide expertise and support to selectcommittees especially concerning financialissues.16 The introduction of the Scrutiny Unitand the requirement to report against thisobjective in committees’ annual reports meansthat financial scrutiny is becoming part of theregular routine business of the committees.

34. The annual reports of the departments canprovide a ‘way in’ to looking at expenditure. Someselect committees have a regular annual hearingwith the Minister and senior officials where theannual report is looked at alongside expenditureissues it raises.

“The routine the committee has got into withthe departmental annual report is everysummer it will have the senior officialsfollowed a week or two later by theSecretary of State to talk about generalissues regarding the finance of thedepartment.”

35. Recently, select committees’ attention hasincreasingly become focused on thesupplementary estimates: the changes duringthe year to the expenditure plans of thegovernment. These provide more interest forcommittees than the main estimates as theydraw attention to things which are changing in thedepartment and allow before rather than after theevent scrutiny. The Scrutiny Unit examines thesupplementary estimates for the committeesand identifies areas of interest, suggestingwritten questions to be sent to the department.

13 House of Commons Education and Skills Committee, Appointment of New HMCI, Fourth Report of Session2001–2002, HC 830.

14 HC (2003–04) 446.15 Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny, The Challenge for Parliament: Making government

more accountable, Hansard Society, 2001, para. 5.8.16 See section from para. 101 on the Scrutiny Unit below.

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“The Scrutiny Unit has raised that act [ofprobing into estimates and expenditure],and has put departments on the spotbecause they get regular questions—theyusually turn out to be mistakes or thenumbers are wrong. It has exposed somefinancial weaknesses which is a goodthing.”

“Some of the supplementary estimates thathave come in we have sent questions on—‘why have you suddenly added £150m in forthis’—we’d better write to the ministers andask them to explain.”

36. Select committees are also becomingmore attuned to looking at the financial issueswhen considering policy.

“When we look at the policy we look at themoney side of things. For instance, whereare you going to get the money to payeducational maintenance allowances. Welook at the money as a means to an endrather than scrutinising the estimates like anaccountant would.”

For instance, the Health Select Committeeasked the Scrutiny Unit to assist them in lookingat the use of private health care by the publicsector. The Unit worked out that the cost per itempurchased from the private sector was likely tobe on average around 40% higher than the sametreatment from the NHS.

37. The Health Select Committee has its ownmethod of monitoring the expenditure of theDepartment of Health. Every year since 1991 thecommittee has sent a Public ExpenditureQuestionnaire (PEQ) to the department. Thequestionnaire is roughly the same year on year inorder to get comparable figures. It is prepared,and interpreted for the committee, by a panel ofhealth finance experts. The responses from thequestionnaire are analysed and the Minister isquestioned on issues arising.

38. One of the traditional limitations on financialscrutiny has been the difficulty in fully engagingmembers’ interest. The level of specialismrequired to interpret figures has always meantthat such work has been predominantly staff led.It is work which more naturally lends itself toscrutiny by correspondence rather than byevidence session. Members’ interests are morefocused on policy issues rather than figures, and

they find examination of finances both lessinteresting and less rewarding than inquiring intoa major new policy initiative or area of concern.

39. Even with the added complement of theScrutiny Unit, select committee resources aretiny compared to those of the government.Rather than attempting or aiming to establish a“mirror bureaucracy”, the Scrutiny Unit and theselect committees try to target their resources atareas where they will have the most effect. Again,the supplementary estimates and the annualreport, as well as ongoing policy issues, providethe best target. Concentrating onsupplementary estimates, linkingexpenditure to policy, and added staffsupport has meant that members’ interestsare more fully engaged and committees arebecoming more effective and focused in thisarea.

40. It is not surprising that committees spendmost of their time doing policy-based inquiries,as well as timely investigations into events andappointments, rather than scrutinising estimatesand expenditure. It is much harder for this lattersort of work to be member rather than staff ledbecause of the level of specialism and detailinvolved. Further to this, with the limited capacityof a departmental select committee’ssecretariat, even when supplemented by theScrutiny Unit, total scrutiny of expenditure,estimates and supplementary estimates is notgoing to be achieved. It is also harder to engagethe interest of the members and the public indetailed budget scrutiny. The area where thistype of work has captured the imagination ofmembers is where it interacts with policydecisions rather than accountancy errors. Selectcommittees must focus on a few areas wherebudgetary scrutiny produces informationregarding policy rather than attempt to do theimpossible.

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41. For the work committees do on policy,performance and administration they use aninquiry process. Although all inquiries differ, thebasic structure remains the same. Roughlyspeaking, an issue is identified, a specialistadviser is appointed, written evidence issolicited, oral evidence is taken, and then thecommittee publishes a report. However, anumber of choices are made at various pointswithin this process which can impact on theeffectiveness of the output (the report) and theoutcome (the change in perceptions or policy areport might produce). This chapter provides a

typology of inquiries, identifies the key choicesmade during an inquiry and suggests ways inwhich these choices should be faced. Thefollowing chapter then identifies the resourceswhich select committees have access to andways in which they can be used.

Classification of case studies42. Although the common objectives outlinedabove can be one way of classifying committeereports, this study uses its own typologydeveloped in Scrutiny Under Devolution.17 This

Box 2: Typology of scrutiny reports

Strategic Policy Review: These are large-scale forward-looking reviews into widely-drawnpolicy areas. Despite being forward looking in their focus, these reviews often look in depth atrecent approaches to the policy field.

Forward Policy Proposals: These focus on particular issues or policies. These may be inspiredby government actions or proposals.

Event Inquiries: These are backward-looking reviews of one-off events.

Non Departmental Public Bodies: These are inquiries looking at the work of arms-lengthagencies.

Appointments: These are one-off evidence sessions, which may lead to a report, with a recentappointment made by the department which is of public interest.

17 See Sandford, M., and Maer, L., Scrutiny Under Devolution: Committees in Scotland, Wales and NorthernIreland, The Constitution Unit, London, November 2003, p.12.

The Inquiry Process

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typology was not intended as a group of hard andfast categories, but as a means to identifying therange of work that committees can carry out. Asopposed to the categories above, it is based onthe subject of the inquiry rather than the taskswhich committees may perform as part of aninquiry.

43. Table 1 shows our case study inquiries andthe type that we have applied to them. Box 2gives a brief explanation of each typology. Themajority of this report refers to work done underour headings of ‘forward policy proposals’ and‘strategic policy reviews’ as broadly speaking thisis where Committees themselves focus most oftheir energy. Our case studies were chosen inclose consultation with members of our steeringcommittee and reflect a range of activities ofcommittees.

Choosing issues“One of my concerns is that the way weselect topics is really very much ad hoc andrather hit and miss.”

44. Even within the broad themes of strategicpolicy reviews and forward policy proposals,there is a lot of scope for committees to chooseissues to focus on. Major departments producehundreds of policy papers and proposals everysession. A committee is simply not capable atlooking at every idea that comes out ofgovernment, every facet of a department’s work,and every area where improvements can bemade.

“I would like to be able to say to you thatany major policy like [Foundation Trusts] isbound to be looked at by a departmentalselect committee. The problem with that isthat most of the main reforms we haven’tactually looked into like the complete re-organisation of the NHS.”

45. Each committee needs to set prioritiesfor itself over a period of time: planning firstmajor issues to cover, second specificinquiries to include as part of theexamination of the issue, and third the scopeof each individual inquiry. For instance, the

Education Committee has recently focused onsecondary school education and has planned anumber of large inquiries on that theme whichhave been interspersed with shorter one-offsessions and short inquiries. This approachappears to be popular with other committeesalso.

“The committee aims to have a plan for asession broadly of a major inquiry that itwill undertake that can be built on over theyear.”

“We tend to pick two major subjects a year.With the remaining time we will questionministers and do mini-reports on things thatare of concern to us and our constituents.”

46. Committees should also leave time intheir schedule to deal with routine businessand issues which arise that the committee islikely to want to consider.18 Two examples ofarising issues were the inquiry into thegovernment’s proposals for the new SupremeCourt and Judicial Appointments Commissionand the Health Select Committee’s inquiry intoFoundation Trusts. The decision by the ODPMSelect Committee to do an inquiry intosustainable communities was made when itbecame known that John Prescott, DeputyPrime Minister, was about to announce a hugespending programme on the four ‘growth areas’in the South East.

“We chose it because it was a topical issueand a flagship policy of the government andthere was controversy surrounding it andconcerns about some to the proposals.”

“The committee cleared the decks and putaside its inquiry into immigration matters. Itgot stuck into this inquiry. It is very unusualto have something so big that you say fine,whatever we have done so far we put onhold.”

However, if committees only respond to thegovernment in choosing issues to inquire into,they miss out on carrying out pro-active forwardlooking inquiries such as the inquiry into Obesitycarried out by the Health Select Committee. Not

18 In 1997 the Defence Select Committee agreed and published its aims and objectives, including how manyagencies should be considered per year and which visits should take place and how regularly. See DefenceSelect Committee, First Special Report 1998–99: Annual Report for session 1997–98, HC273, March 1999.

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only should committees respond to thegovernment, but they should pressurise thegovernment into action in areas they areneglecting by setting the agenda:

“We have a range of responsibilities and wecannot let the government write all of ouragenda. Indeed, that would distract us fromissues they may not be interested in.”

47. The impetus to carry out these less routineinquiries comes from the members, and usuallythe chair is most influential in this regard. As oneinterviewee explained “All chairmen have bees intheir bonnet, and that is reflected in the range ofenquiries we’ve embarked on.” A chair that weinterviewed claimed to know himself what thefocus of the select committee’s work would beover the next session of parliament, even if therest of the committee didn’t know yet.

Timetabling48. Once a plan for the upcoming months hasbeen made, each inquiry then has to be scopedin greater detail and a timetable for the inquiryproduced. It became clear through the researchthat to let an inquiry expand beyond its originalscope and time frame was considered a cardinalsin by committee staff and they were adept atdevising ways to avoid this. This contrasts withthe first years of the devolved assemblies where‘inquiry creep’ was relatively common.19

49. One such way is to set deadlines which arelinked to external factors. For an inquiry such asthe Constitutional Affairs Committee’sinvestigation into the government’s proposals forthe Supreme Court and Judicial AppointmentsCommission, the external deadline was set bythe government—the committee needed toproduce a report in time for the second reading ofthe legislation in order for it to have any effect:

“We had a timetable which was really to limitthe evidence session to about five or sixweeks…we were intending to report by theearly part of the year because we wanted toget the report out before the bill wasintroduced so that sets a limit on who youcan have.”

50. If a deadline is not set by external factors,committees can create an external factor byinviting a minister to give evidence on a particulardate. Inquiries almost always end with anevidence session with the Minister and once atime with a minister is set it is difficult to change,hence the inquiry needs to be drawing to a closewithin a specified time frame. The rationale forthis structure was explained as follows:

“The idea is that you take your civilservants up front because they can deal withthe detail of the policy. Then you put hardpolicy questions to the Secretary of State [atthe end]. By then everyone has told youtheir beliefs and had their moan and toldyou everything. You are almost at the stagewhen you are writing your report and in asense you are almost trying out some of theissues and recommendations on the ministerto see what he says or how he reacts. Or youmight give them one last chance to defendthe policy you are about to attack.”

“The classic way of ensuring an end-date isto book a minister. Once you have got aminister you don’t want to say actually afterwe have had a minister we will think of acouple more boring associations. Theinquiry is over.”

51. With longer inquiries, working out at thevery beginning the preferred end date can be verydifficult: “The aim is to work out how manyevidence sessions it will take…. It is not reallyquite possible with a major inquiry to work outhow long it is going to take.” One way of makingsure longer inquiries do not drag is to divide theinquiry into two phases, the second phaseplanned as a result of what was discoveredduring the first phase.

“quite a lot of committees do a phase one ofan inquiry and then think, what have wefound out that we need to find out, and thendo phase two.”

52. A common way of setting about the designof an inquiry is to begin with a private seminarwhere experts within the field are invited to makepresentations to the committee setting out key

19 See Sandford M. and Maer L., Scrutiny Under Devolution: Committees in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland,Constitution Unit, November 2003, pp 15–17.

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issues within the subject and discuss thepossible way forward for the select committee.

“They have introductory seminars, theyhave academics in, they go on a visit first,they don’t draw up their terms of referenceuntil they have talked to various odd-bodsor experts, they invite comments from thepublic before they do so.”

53. All these attempts to set clear boundariesaround an inquiry do not necessarily lead to a setof objectives for each inquiry. Committees do nottend to set themselves targets other than justgetting the right evidence in to lead to a reportpublished within a set timetable. For instance,objectives could be set, as they were in theConstitutional Affairs Select Committee inquiryinto the Supreme Court and the JudicialAppointments Commission, to influence thesecond reading debates when legislation wasintroduced, with a secondary target ofencouraging the government to publish thelegislation in draft. Without setting objectivesat the start of an inquiry, it is very difficult topoint to achievements at the end. As onerespondent indicated: “you can onlyevaluate the output or outcome if you knowwhat you want to achieve in the first place”.

Written Evidence54. Committees usually begin the substantivepart of their inquiry by issuing a call for writtenevidence. The most common method is bysending a press release round to the usualsuspects and the trade press.

“What we do is we have a press list ofaround 500 people. All calls for evidenceare in the form of a press release thatautomatically goes to all those people sothat is good and wide. The second thing wedo, more often than not, is to targetparticular organisations that we really dofeel we ought to hear from and it isgenerally the usual suspects.”

55. The aim is not to receive large numbers ofdocuments, but to gather well argued evidencewhich can then be circulated or advertised tomembers. In Northern Ireland and Walesespecially, calls for written evidence arecirculated much more widely than this. The‘Schools of the Future’ inquiry carried out by theNational Assembly for Wales solicited evidence

from every school in Wales. In Northern Irelandadvertisements are regularly placed innewspapers calling for evidence. As discussedbelow, the difference is in part due to thedifference in attitude to the role of Parliament inconsulting “ordinary people”. As one respondentstated:

“We get tonnes of evidence. If it startedincreasing I’m not sure we could deal withit.”

56. Although it is true that there is a limit to theamount of written evidence a committeesecretariat can be expected to process, there isa danger of committees being unable to breakout of consulting the ‘usual suspects’ only.Recent increases in staff for committees shouldenable more energy to be invested in solicitingevidence from key groups and individuals whomight not be consulted regularly and issuingbetter targeted calls for evidence. If public opinionis sought, committees should considerconducting polling or focus groups as is donemore regularly in the Scottish Parliament ratherthan attempting to reach them through traditionalmeans. Committees could be clearer aboutwhat they are trying to get from any given callfor evidence, and perhaps send questionsfocusing on different areas to different sortsof witnesses.

57. However, there is a further problem withreceiving large amounts of written evidence:members are unlikely to have time to read andevaluate hundreds of responses. Clerks alreadysometimes use their own judgement in choosingwhich written memoranda to send to themembers, and whether to issue a précis of someof the evidence provided. Some clerks simplyadvertise a list of evidence to the members whocan then choose which pieces they would like toreceive. It is standard practice to circulate allmemoranda provided by those later called to giveoral evidence. Clerks should always provide asummary of the evidence highlighting themost important and interesting points, and alist of all the memoranda received.

Oral Evidence58. Oral evidence is usually taken from a sub-set of those who provided written evidence. Theusual practice is to take evidence from officialsfirst, followed by representative groups andvarious experts, with evidence from the

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responsible minister or Secretary of State last.The choice of the witnesses who appear in themiddle section of the inquiry is shaped by themembers, clerks, and specialist advisers.

Briefing members

59. One of the main duties of the committeesecretariat is to produce briefing materials formembers for oral evidence sessions. Allbriefings contain some level of backgroundinformation along with suggested questions formembers. Some contain biographicalinformation on the witness. Some contain muchmore heavy background material than others.For instance one brief the researchers wereshown included annexes comparing informationoverseas as well as almost three A4 pages ofbackground for each set of questions.

60. When asked what kind of briefing producesthe best prepared members and best evidencesessions answers were mixed:

“We aim for around 15–20 questions withsupplementaries that are suggested. Wewrite a brief so that members can come incold, read the background, and get to seewhy they are asking the questions. It makessure that the inquiry runs in an orderlyway.”

“You can give them an A4 sheet with 20questions on it and you can have a reallygood evidence session and you can givethem a 13 page briefing and have a badevidence session….”

61. Before every public evidence session, thecommittee meets in private and the questionsprepared by the clerks are divided amongst themembers. As the quality of the evidence sessiondepends to a large degree on how well preparedthe members are, clerks and specialist adviserssometimes give short oral presentations at theseprivate sessions. This is a way of ensuring thatall members are fully briefed and recognise thekey points which the evidence session is aimingto elucidate, rather than simply circulating abriefing and hoping members have a scheduledtime to consider it, and the witnesses’ writtenmemoranda, carefully. However, theeffectiveness of such sessions can be limited bythe failure of members to attend and arrive ontime to the private sessions.

Asking questions

62. The way in which you ask a question canaffect the kind of answer you expect to receive. Ina system where so much emphasis is put on thewritten record of an evidence session, membersmust attempt to get relevant and thoroughevidence from their witnesses. Westminsterselect committees are often vilified for beingcombative in nature, and often intimidating forwitnesses. Our respondents, however, stressedthe importance of creating a non-combativeatmosphere.

“It should be just natural. Obviously wewant people to feel comfortable. They maywell be nervous per se. If they are on edgethen it is confrontational and they are notgoing to respond as fluently and as well aspossible.”

“I’m not one who believes that frightenedwitnesses are very helpful to the committee. Ithink if you can get people thinking aboutwhat they are saying and responding toquestions rather than reading some sort ofpre-prepared brief which some do then youget a better session.”

63. When questioning ministers, memberslikewise claimed to not be on the attack:

“I like to get ministers, if possible,expressing ideas, giving some thought notjust to what is going on now and defendingwhat we have got but where might we go andwhy aren’t we going in another direction.”

Or, as another put it:

“Whatever you ask doesn’t really make adifference because [the Minister] can talkthe hind legs off a donkey on any subjectand wander off vaguely on the subject.”

64. However, there is an obvious element oftheatre about a select committee hearing andmembers can sometimes use evidencesessions as such, rather than on focusing ongetting the most from their witnesses:

“how far is it theatre, and how far is itinquisitorial? You’ve got to have it a bittheatrical, or people lose interest in it, but ifit gets too theatrical it’s a bit unfair on thewitnesses.”

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65. We have said in our past two reports thatshort questions are often most effective ineliciting a valuable answer as the witness hasless room to be evasive and less opportunity tomiss the point of the question. In the House ofCommons, members were not so quick to give apreferred ‘type’ of question. There was less useof oral evidence sessions to get factualinformation out of witnesses. Evidence sessionsare more about testing arguments and credibility.There is much more of a culture of sendingwritten questions to departments by committeesor asking Parliamentary questions by membersto clear factual errors or misunderstandings.

“My initial instinct is that factual questionsaren’t suited to oral evidence sessions toomuch because you should have sorted thosethings out before. You can always write aletter and ask.”

66. The emphasis on the written record canlead members to speak for longer during theirquestioning in an attempt to get points onto thetranscript. One member stated that:

“Sometimes the person asking the questionwants to get something on the record. I’m asguilty of that as anyone.”

67. Reading long statements into the record isnot the best use of an evidence session andchairs generally ensure that this activity is kept toa minimum level. However, it must always beremembered that the members of committeesare also members of parliament and thereforeare politicians. Although party politics usuallytakes second place at committee table,politicians are bound to try to use the committeeas a vehicle for gaining profile for themselves andpursuing their own political interests.

Information gathering“I think all evidence is largely a symbolicactivity and there is far too much of it. It isvery difficult to get committees to think whatother ways there are of doing things.”

68. The work of select committees is basedaround taking evidence both in writing and as oral

evidence. Oral evidence is transcribed andpublished alongside the written evidence and thereport. The image of 11 MPs sitting around ahorse-shoe shaped table with one or twowitnesses sitting before them is only part of thework that select committees do in gatheringinformation. However, it is the most public part,often televised and always web broadcast(though occasionally in audio only), withtranscripts available within a week of the witnessappearing before them. Committees also doother forms of information gathering which aremore or less unseen by those outside. Forinstance we have already mentioned seminarsoften held at the beginning of an inquiry in order tohelp define the boundaries of the investigationand focus the committee on key themes. Anotherform of gathering information is by undertakingboth domestic and international visits.

69. Select committees may apply to theLiaison Committee to seek funding for overseasvisits. In the 2002–2003 session 14 of the 18departmental select committees went onoverseas visits at a total cost of £892,000.20

70. Domestic visits were carried out by all ofour case study committees during that lastsession. For instance, the ODPM SelectCommittee took oral evidence during their visitsto Taunton and Newcastle as part of theirinquiries into reducing regional disparity. In itsannual report on 2002–2003 the LiaisonCommittee lists examples of evidence takenfrom “an increasingly diverse range ofwitnesses”, and domestic informal visits whereno evidence is taken.21 Informal visits provide away of members connecting with members ofthe public, those involved in front-line servicedelivery, and users of the services they provide.

“What we find most helpful is to undertakedomestic visits. We find that by going to aschool or a hospital or meeting youngpeople you get more feel for popular feelingthan by some attempts to tap it formally.”

71. However, the process of informal evidencetaking can be difficult. Although the informality ofthe process is in itself rewarding through theaccess it gives committees to front line staff and

20 Source: House of Commons Sessional Returns 2002–2003.21 House of Commons Liaison Committee, First report of session 2003–2004: Annual Report for 2003, HC 446,

para. 65.

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service users, it also provides difficultiesespecially due to the lack of a written transcript.Firstly, no record of the visit appears on thecommittee’s website although it might bereferred to within the final report. Very rarely anote of the visit is included as an appendix to thereport; this is routinely the case in the LondonAssembly. Secondly the lack of a transcriptmeans that it is difficult to make solid use of theinformation gathered. The memories and notesof those on the visit are relied upon to captureviews and facts.

“More of it goes on than appears in public.That is what visits, especially domestic visits,are really about. There are disadvantages.You get eleven members on a visit and theywill come back with eleven differentaccounts of what they heard so how much itcan actually feed into an inquiry isproblematic.”

72. However, others were of the opinion thatthe availability of a written transcript had becomemore of a security blanket for select committees:

“The output from a formal evidence sessionis a transcript. The advantage of that is thatyou have a very thorough record ofeverything that is said. There is a tendencyfor committees to cling to that.”

73. Information on domestic andinternational visits by select committeescould be included on the committees’websites. Written briefings on committeevisits could be included more often as anappendices to reports. This would allow anaccurate and agreed record to be made of theevent and the process would be moretransparent thereby allowing acknowledgementand rewarding select committees for this work.

74. However, the amount of time a committeecould give to this task is affected by theirpriorities. Unlike at the devolved level and in localgovernment, select committees do not see it asone of their key tasks to gauge public opinion andfind out what ‘people think’. For instance in the

Northern Ireland Assembly, an inquiry intotourism included two large conferences whereindividuals involved in the Tourism industry wereinvited to participate. Their views were thenchannelled into the formulation of the report.22

Overview and scrutiny panels in localgovernment see great value in going out andspeaking to service users.23 The committees ofthe Scottish Parliament have a ‘Participation andevents’ budget to enable them to carry out thissort of work. Select committees see consultationas being something that governments andpolitical parties facilitate when making policy, andtheir role more of a consulted body rather than aconsulting body. Although MPs represent theviews, concerns and interests of theirconstituents, the select committee is not themain forum for this part of their work.

“If you are looking into the railways youdon’t really want 10,000 people telling youhow awful they are.”

75. However, select committees do have a roleto play in the wider agenda of Parliament‘reconnecting’ with the public.24

“Select committees are not primarily there tofind out what the public thinks aboutthings…but of course because of theconcern with public engagement moregenerally with Parliament, committees getasked to do more to make sure that it is moreaccessible to the public.”

76. For those committees who are interestedin engaging with the public for various inquiries,one method of doing so is through onlineconsultations run through the Hansard Society.However, these can be expensive (a recentonline consultation carried out by theModernisation Committee cost just over £9,000)and not necessarily effective in every situation.

77. Select committees do not have individualbudgets to commission research from a leadingexpert on an issue. The Liaison Committeecontrols a budget of £50,000 a year for researchwhich is available to all 18 select committees. It

22 See Sandford M., and Maer L, Scrutiny under devolution: Committees in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland,November 2003.

23 See Sandford M., and Maer, L., Old Habits Die Hard? Overview and Scrutiny in Local Government, February2004.

24 The Select Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons has held an inquiry into ‘ConnectingParliament with the Public’ during the 2003–2004 session.

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is little known and not always fully used. In the2002–2003 session of Parliament, the total costof ‘work commissioned, specialist publicationsand interpretation’ was £20,300. Compared tothe £890,000 spent on overseas visits and the2003–2004 (financial) year’s budget of £240,000for research commissioned by the committeesof the Scottish Parliament this figure is relativelysmall. Although their own staff capacity isgrowing, and select committees are increasinglyable to commission research from the ScrutinyUnit on issues on which they have expertise,there is very little engagement with outsideresearchers. Although academics are oftenappointed as specialist advisers to selectcommittees (see from para. 93 below) they arenot appointed on the basis of carrying outresearch for select committees but to hold thecommittee’s hand and guide them through aninquiry. Commissioned research from outsideexperts, whose outputs could be published as anappendix to reports, would greatly enhance thework of select committees. Committees needan adequate budget for commissioningresearch and guidelines and procedures onhow to use it. 25

78. There are limitations on select committees’abil i ty to innovate, both f inancially andstructurally. As one respondent stated:

“Over the years there is a limit to what youcan do with a basic structure of 11 Memberswanting to look into a thing—howdifferently can it be done?”

25 In the Scottish Parliament there are currently four bidding rounds for the research budget each year. Thebudget is held by the Participation Services Division, but the decisions are made on spending by theConvenors group. For research at a cost of over £5,000 invitations to tender must be sent out. Becausecommissioning research can be a lengthy process, it requires forward and strategic thinking by thecommittees.

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Committee staff79. Each committee is allocated betweenthree and seven staff, of which one or two areclerks to the committee. Clerks are generalistcivil servants working for Parliament who willwork for a number of committees and holdvarious other positions within Parliament duringtheir career. Their skills are complemented bycommittee specialists who are appointed on afixed term basis to each committee in order tobring knowledge particular to the departmentalsubject area to the committee team. During 2003the House undertook a review of selectcommittee resources. The report recommendedthat each departmental committee shouldreceive 1.5 extra members of staff. AdditionalCommittee Specialists have already beenappointed, as have Inquiry Managers. Further tothis, one press officer has been appointed towork with a group of select committees andfurther appointments are expected.

80. The Liaison Committee has committeditself to a “system of regular review updates, toensure that select committees are never againexpected to carry out evolving duties with out-of-date resources”.26

Specialist Advisers81. As outlined in the Standing Orders,specialist advisers can be appointed by selectcommittees to assist with their inquiries “either tosupply information which is not readily availableor elucidate matters of complexity”. For almostevery inquiry at least one specialist adviser isappointed. Quite often committees appoint morethan one specialist adviser to avoid allegations ofbias in their reporting or to cover all aspects of aninquiry. For instance the Constitutional Affairsinquiry into the Supreme Court and JudicialAppointments Commission used two specialadvisers, one leading on each facet of the inquiry.

82. Unlike in the devolved assemblies there isno formal method by which specialist advisersare appointed. There is no open advertising forthe posts, and often no formal interviewprocedure. When members and clerks wereasked about how specialist advisers were

appointed, it emerged that they themselvesrecognised that there was a lack of openprocedures.

“The way in which you get specialistadvisers is a bit haphazard in a way…. Tosome extent inertia plays a role. If there issomeone you have worked with who youknow is good you tend to favourreappointing them.”

“To an extent it is a random process.”

83. In general, select committees discusspossible specialist advisers. The members,chair and the clerks suggest names. Clerks mayseek the opinion of other specialists in the areaand may carry out initial research of the subjectin order to identify possible candidates. In thecase of the Education Select Committee whereinterviews are held with potential advisers,members from all three parties are included inthe interviews to ensure there is no political bias.

84. There is also no real job description forspecialist advisers. What they contribute seemsvery much to depend on the time they haveavailable and their own understanding of the role.Generally, specialist advisers guide thecommittee through complex issues, often actingas a backstop for them:

“One of the things is that they are a safetynet. They ensure that we are not barking upthe wrong tree. They act as guides through asubject. At the start of an inquiry they canidentify the main themes….”

“You could broadly describe it as stoppingthe committee from looking stupid.”

The tasks that specialist advisers carry outincludes suggesting witnesses to provide oralevidence, drafting questions for evidencesession, advising on overseas experience andcommenting on, and drafting sections of, the finalreport.

85. However, very occasionally specialistadvisers do not add much to an inquiry, and

26 Standing Order No. 152(4)(b).

Expertise and Support

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instead take up time rather than add to thecapacity of a committee secretariat.

“[Specialist advisers] are a mixed blessing.I have learnt that some of them are verygood and some of them are actively bad….”

“People are disappointing, misunderstandtheir role, are simply a nuisance, but othersare splendid and can ensure the quality of areport or a brief.”

86. The ad hoc approach of the House ofCommons to appointing specialist advisers isobviously open to criticism. Although there maybe an argument that it would be difficult to run aformal appointment process in the timescaleopen to committees, the more committees plantheir work ahead, the less of a problem this willbecome. They also do already know the skillsand experience they would be looking for in anadviser. As one interviewee stated, “You are notnecessarily looking for people who have strongviews. Strong views make good witnesses. Whatyou are looking for is someone who shows goodknowledge and analysis of the subject.”

87. Another option would be to keep a list ofapproved advisers on a central database withinthe Department of the Clerk of the House.People interested in becoming specialadvisers could register their interest andsubmit their CVs. Committees could thensearch the list for relevant experts and drawup a short list. This is a process similar to that inthe Scottish Parliament whereby there is a placeon the website where potential specialistadvisers can register their interest. Onerespondent commented that “we are not good atsharing our special advisers betweencommittees because very often they havetransferable skills”. A central register of potentialappointees would help correct this.

88. A more formal approach to appointmentsshould be complemented with jobdescriptions for specialist advisers outliningtheir key tasks and duties through theinquiry process. This would demarcateboundaries of responsibility for the adviser,perhaps preventing difficulties that manyrespondents reported of specialist advisers notbeing aware of what was wanted and neededfrom them.

Scrutiny Unit89. The Scrutiny Unit was established inNovember 2002 following the House ofCommons’ acceptance of proposals of theModernisation Committee and the LiaisonCommittee. The Unit provides specialist supportfor committees on expenditure matters and draftbills, together with support for committeesexperiencing staff shortages or with a suddenunexpected increase in the amount of work. Theyalso provide the clerking team for draft bills whichdo not go to an existing select committee. Thereare 18 members of staff at the Scrutiny Unitincluding accountants on secondment from theNational Audit Office, lawyers, a statistician, aneconomist and an estimates specialist.

90. As noted in the sections above on routinescrutiny, the Scrutiny Unit has significantlyexpanded the capacity and the ability of selectcommittees to carry out work on the more routineaspects of scrutiny, and also has provided aresource for research during policy basedinquiries which require financial backgroundinformation. For instance, the Health SelectCommittee asked the Scrutiny Unit to provideassistance with its inquiry into Foundation Trustsby producing a flow diagram showing how thefunding flows to foundation hospitals differedfrom funding flows to other hospitals. TheEducation Committee used them to do somecomparative work on OFSTED compared toother inspectorate organisations.

“It has certainly helped us to do a broaderrange of things that we would not haveordinarily done. They have been veryuseful.”

“Without any question [the Scrutiny Unit]has extended the Committee’s ability to do itsjob.”

91. There has been a wide variation in the useof the Scrutiny Unit by committees. One reasonfor this is that those committees which have hadto deal with draft legislation have had more use ofthe Unit. Also, those which have beenunderstaffed have had more substantial use oftheir time. Even allowing for these disparities,however, there are some committees whichhave barely used the Unit. When questioned onthis, respondents indicated that there were somecommittees whose chair or clerk had not beensupportive of the creation of the Scrutiny Unit and

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who now resisted using it. This was thoughtgradually to be breaking down. Thosecommittees who have used the Unit are pleasedand positive with the work that it has done, so it isa pity that others have been slow to respond.

92. A crucial test for the Scrutiny Unit will be thework that they carry out on the upcomingSpending Review in 2004. It will be the firstSpending Review since the Unit was created andwill provide an opportunity to link their expertiseon financial matters with the policy implicationswhich arise from them.

“…if we can get a quick interpretation ofwhat the Spending Review means fordepartments and programmes and cancriticise, give an accurate analysis, thatwould be a key task.”

As select committees are required to considerpublic service agreements as part of their workon scrutiny, the existence of the Unit will hopefullygive an added capacity to do this effectivelyfollowing the Spending Review itself.

93. The Scrutiny Unit has undoubtedlyincreased the capacity and ability of selectcommittees to carry out scrutiny in areaswhich have a financial or other specialistaspect to them. They have not only takenpressure off committee staff on more routineinquiries but also provided specialist skillsfor specific inquiries. By committees learningthe value of commissioning research internally,they will perhaps begin to see the possibilitieswhich commissioning external research wouldhave.

Members94. Members of Parliament themselves haveconsiderable expertise and experience on whichto draw. Very often, members of committeeshave backgrounds related to the work of theselect committee. The membership of the HealthSelect Committee includes two social workers(including the Chair of the committee), twodoctors, and a former health minister; and themembership of the Constitutional AffairsCommittee includes a number of members witha legal background. Further to their relevantexperience before entering Parliament, MPs alsobring experience from their constituencies totheir work as committee members. Althoughmembers should not explicitly use select

committees to seek remedies for constituencyissues, the knowledge gained through carryingout casework is of use to the members.

95. Having members with a background in thesubject area means that they have a real interestin the subject matter and that they are more alertto some of the issues: “It is harder to pull the woolover their eyes.”

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96. The main output of almost every inquiry is areport which includes conclusions andrecommendations for government action.Reports are drawn up by the clerk in closeconsultation with members. Clerks begin bybringing to the committee a ‘Heads of Report’which outlines the shape and scope of the report.That is then discussed and agreed by thecommittee. The clerks then produce a report inclose consultation with the committee chair whobrings the final report to the table as his or herreport. This is then discussed, amended and ifnecessary voted on by the committee members.

97. Members of the committee get the draftreport in advance of these private deliberativemeetings. The more conscientious members willhave marked in the written transcript pointswhich they wanted included in the report as theinquiry progressed. They will then look to seewhether the report reflects their interests, andwhether they can agree with itsrecommendations and conclusions. As onemember said:

“We go through it and we will look to thingswe may not like or are weak or too strong.We go through it line by line and page bypage.”

98. If members are less conscientious inkeeping track of an inquiry as it progresses, it ismuch more difficult to then take an active anddetailed part in discussions on drafts as often afair amount of time can pass between the end oforal evidence sessions and the production of areport. As one member commented:

“By the time a detailed draft comes back tomembers it can be three or four monthslater….”

99. The most difficult part of a report to writeare the recommendations and conclusionsbecause clerks have to reflect the views of thecommittee which might well be diverse, as wellas allowing the conclusions to follow clearly fromthe evidence received. This can be difficult incases where political beliefs run strong within thecommittee. As one clerk commented:

“it is very clear to me what [are] the mosteffective recommendations the committee

can come up with. I have to leave themcompletely to one side and think whatrecommendations are they going to want.And separately perhaps whatrecommendations are they going to be ableto agree. The presumption is in favour of aunanimous report so we are trying to getsome sort of compromise. Sometimes wecan’t do that and we have to decide whetherto go to the wall.”

Politics100. Select committees have no actual power toeffect change. Their only power comes from theirability to influence the agenda and the actorsaround them. They are able to do that as a resultof their cross-party nature, their expertise, andthe fact that they report on the basis of expertevidence. If a cross-party consensus is lost, theability for the committee to effect change islimited. This was echoed time and time again byrespondents:

“If you have a straightforward partisansplit in a committee then that is a dangerousdevelopment because it undermines theauthority of the report.”

“My experience of doing reports is that themost effective reports that you can do arethose where you have the consensus ofmembers.”

101. However, it can be inevitable when lookingat some areas of policy that there will be a dividein opinion. For instance, the Health SelectCommittee’s report into Foundation Trusts wasonly finalised after three divisions were held onamendments. For this report, the split was notacross parties but within parties. However, theCommittee attempted to minimise division by notsetting out to question whether FoundationTrusts should go ahead at all. Instead they lookedat the feasibility of the government’s proposals inpractical terms.

Recommendations and Conclusions102. Select committee reports all contain keyconclusions and recommendations outlined inbold and l isted in the report. Therecommendations and conclusions of the report

Outputs

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are the most crucial part of the report—it is thesethat committees seek to persuade thegovernment to act on. Getting the drafting ofthem right is a crucial part of committee work.Too banal and the committee is stating theobvious; too detailed and the committee may notgenerate interest outside a specialist audience;too aspirational and they might not work or bepossible to achieve; too in line with currentthinking and the report will not move a subjectforward or challenge the government in any way.Hence, there are very different sorts ofrecommendations open to committees to make.The choice they make depends on what they setout to achieve. If the aim is to put something onthe public agenda, aspirationalrecommendations serve a purpose. If the aim isto achieve change, more detailed and practicalrecommendations are more likely to produce apositive response.

103. There was a general feeling amongstrespondents that committees should move moretowards the practical and detailedrecommendations and away from aspirationalones. For instance, with a subject l ikeFoundation Trusts, the Health Select Committeewas highly unlikely to be able to persuadegovernment that the proposed reform should beshelved. Whether or not the members felt this, itwould have been a pointless recommendation tomake because it was not going to happen.Instead they looked at what they could achieve,which was to produce changes in the detail of theproposed legislation. The report thereforefocused on two key issues: “will the proposedchanges bring about improvements for patientswho are treated by foundation hospitals? Andwhat implications will the proposed changeshave for patients being treated in the rest of theNHS?” The recommendations and conclusionsfocus on delivering the policy in the best possibleway:

“I think the best kind of recommendation isone that says ‘whether or not we agree withthe whole policy we accept it but theevidence says that the way you are going toset out [on it] is going to weaken yourability to achieve its purpose and we havean idea that will make it more effective’.”

“What I think the more skilful chairs enableis that you open the crack in departmentswith an idea and build on that idea. Sorecommendations have to be feasible within

the overall political philosophy of thegovernment…. They have to be wellsupported; they have to show a coalition ofsupporters within civil society. You have toshow they are affordable. And you have toshow that they can be done gradually.”

“Members think they are good at solvingproblems and often they are not. They arevery good at describing problems in arealistic and honest way which agovernment is not always very good atdoing. They may find a solution.”

104. Making recommendations realistic can bea difficult task for a select committee which hasnowhere near as much information as theexecutive. Being able to cost them and ensurethey are possible within the legal frameworkmeans perhaps recommending less, but makingsure those recommendations which are madeare impossible to dismiss for purely practicalreasons:

“We need to harden our recommendations.Firstly, only make recommendations that areworth making. Secondly, think about howlegally watertight, how cost effective theyare so that what you come up with mightonly be half a dozen recommendations, butthey have been really thought about.”

“I personally think it is a very unevenprocess. I think I have a staff of six or sevenpitted against an employer of 2 millionpeople with a budget of £60 billion. I think itis amazing that anything we do is listened toreally.”

105. However, some reports do not seek torecommend practical watertightrecommendations. Some want to challenge thegovernment, introduce new ideas to the policyagenda or contribute to debate. It is not onlygovernment that committees seek to influence.They also seek to influence the behaviour ofother politicians in the Parliamentary processand increasingly seek to influence the media. Ifcommittees give more thought at the beginningof an inquiry to those they wish to influence, andwhat value an inquiry might add, they will be morefocused in their approach and more likely tosucceed. Often committees do tend to do this,but not perhaps in a strategic or fully consciousway. Recommendations and conclusions shouldreflect the aims and objectives of the inquiry.

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106. It is important to point out that often veryimportant recommendations made by selectcommittees are in fact accepted and acted uponby the government. For instance the governmentaccepted the Health Select Committee’srecommendation in their sexual health inquiry toremove a flawed chlamydia test in favour of amuch more reliable one, thus preventing somewomen from becoming inferti le as aconsequence of the disease being undetected.Following the Constitutional Affairs Committee’sinquiry into the Children and Family CourtAdvisory and Support Service, whichrecommended that there should be afundamental review of board membership, theminister subsequently invited the resignation ofeach member of the Board.

107. Government responses torecommendations will normally be drafted by acivil servant who has been involved in briefing theministers who appeared at the enquiry. Theresponses are derived by comparing therecommendations against government policy,and are signed off at ministerial level. It is rare forresponses to indicate a substantial rethink as adirect result of select committee criticism: rather,policy is tightened and ideas enabled to percolatethrough departments via committee reports.

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108. There are a number of ways of measuringthe impact and effectiveness of selectcommittee work. Looking at the governmentresponse, the development of policy over alonger time period, the reactions of otherpoliticians and the media can all be consideredas ways of measuring success.

Government responses109. A way in which the effectiveness of selectcommittees has been measured in the past is bylooking to see how positively the governmentresponds to the report. The government isobliged to respond to select committee reportswithin 60 days of their publication and theirresponses are published by the committee.However, using a government response as aguide to the success of a report is only onemeasure of success. Where there areaspirational or challenging issues contained in areport, the government response is unlikelyradically to alter existing policy within 60 days ofpublishing a report. Often, recommendations arerejected in a government response but mightlater be adopted by the government who thengive no credit to the committee. Where they doaccept recommendations, there are oftenvarious factors at work.

110. For example, the government response tothe Health Select Committee contained twocommitments to amend the Health and SocialCare (Community Health and Standards) Bill:

“The Government acknowledges theconcerns raised by both the select committeeand the standing committee scrutinising theHealth and Social Care (Community Healthand Standards) Bill. The Government hastherefore tabled amendments for the ReportStage of the Health and Social Care(Community Health and Standards) Billwhich will strengthen the legislativerequirements of the governance of the NHSTrust.”27

“In recognition of these concerns, theGovernment intends to support amendments

to the Health and Social Care (CommunityHealth and Standards) Bill.”28

111. This alone may look like a success for theselect committee. However, the governmentresponse should be considered within the widerpolitical context. As one respondent put it:

“the government was so worried that theywouldn’t have a majority that anything thatwas going to buy them votes on the floor ofthe House of Commons they would do.”

112. Another factor which makes governmentresponses a difficult measure of success is therequirement for them to be produced in 60 days.Although this means the select committee doesnot send a report off into the ether (which is oftenthe case at local authority level) the ability for thegovernment to produce a considered responseis limited. This is particularly true where reportsmake a large number of strategic-levelrecommendations, as it takes time for civilservants to co-ordinate a cross-departmentalresponse and ensure that it does indeedaccurately reflect government policy:

“I think it is almost completely useless. Itfocuses the committee too much on a list ofrecommendations. I think the 60 day periodis wholly unrealistic for a number ofcomplicated ideas that a committee isputting forward. I think it is very rare indeedthat the government response has anyintellectual quality.”

“Some of the problem is that if you are goingto receive a response in 60 days thegovernment is going to start drafting itwithin two or three weeks of the report beingintroduced and that doesn’t give enoughtime for policy development…. You couldargue that if they responded six months or ayear later they would have more of a chanceto consider things.”

113. Previously, research into the work of selectcommittees has crit icised the quality ofgovernment responses. The Hansard

27 The Government Response to the Health Committee’s Second Report of Session 2002–2003 into NHSFoundation Trusts, Cm 5876, July 2003, p. 8.

28 Ibid, p. 8.

Impact and follow-up work

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Commission recommended that “Governmentreplies should conform to a set of minimumstandards. These should include an undertakingthat a reply should address each of thecommittee’s specific recommendations andoblige the Government to formally publish theirresponse.”29 Unfortunately, the quality ofgovernment responses does not seem to haveimproved:

“We expect to see as bland an attempt to fobyou off as possible.”

“[Responses] are 80% bland, 10%impertinent and 10% unhelpful. But withoutthem you would be throwing the report intothe wind.”

“This year, the Committee published fivespecial reports consisting of responses toour reports. Twice we considered theGovernment response to beunsatisfactory…. The response of the DfESto the Committee’s report on A LevelStandards failed to address one of our keycriticisms, namely that the new examinationsystem was not piloted before beingimplemented nationwide. We returned theresponse and later received a revised reply,giving a commitment that any majorexaminations introduced in future would bepiloted. The Committee thus asserted itsright to a detailed and considered responseto its recommendations from theDepartment.”30

114. The Government does often fail to meet the60 day time limit. The Liaison Committee annualreport from 2003 points out that althoughdepartments have become more efficient atmeeting the deadline than the previous year,there have been some noticeable examples offailure. This includes the Work and PensionsCommittee who, nearly a year after publishingtheir report into the future role of the SocialSecurity Advisory Committee, had not received agovernment response to their inquiry.

115. One way of improving the system ofgovernment responses would be for thegovernment to give an initial response after

60 days, but a more detailed response oneyear later allowing for serious discussion ofrecommendations. Not only might thisincrease the quality of governmentresponses, but government might be forcedinto linking changes in policy to the work ofselect committees more closely. Often atpresent, when the government does changepolicy a number of months on from thepublication of the select committee report,the change of policy is branded as agovernment initiative even if the originalidea had emerged through selectcommittees. It would also encourage thebest practice of committees that follow uptheir work on a more routine basis. It wouldprovide a tool to monitor the work ofgovernment in areas of interest over alonger time period.

Relationship with the department116. The nature of the relationship between thecommittees and those they monitor is a delicatematter. Good and close relationships betweenthe two can provide more effective passing ofinformation and more of a concern to informcommittees of department’s plans. For instance,giving committees advance notice ofgovernment announcements and plans preventsselect committees from mirroring consultationwork of government departments. During theinquiry into the government proposals for theSupreme Court and Judicial AppointmentsCommission, the DCA let the ConstitutionalAffairs select committee use the responses tothe government’s consultation as writtenmemoranda, and published the responses in fullon their website. The process is two-way:committees should inform governmentdepartments of pro-active work they are planningto carry out as they may be able to discover thedepartment itself is keen to reform this area.Good exchanges of information can lead to thecommittee adjusting its t imetable toaccommodate important upcoming work.

117. However, creating a close relationship canbe problematic. It can lead to an unwillingness tocriticise and too great an influence by thedepartment on the committee’s agenda. As one

29 The Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny, The Challenge for Parliament: MakingGovernment Accountable, 2001, para. 3.42.

30 Education and Skills Select Committee, The work of the committee in 2002–2003, HC348.

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clerk explained, “there is this kind of internationalfreemasonry of bureaucrats so we all feelsympathy for the people who are working forministers. You can get too close…. But I think thefault more often lies in the other direction.” A goodrelationship with the department can help thecommittee to prioritise, and to ensure that itchooses the fright topics for inquiry at the rightstage to have some influence on thedevelopment of policy or the outcome. Creatinga trusting relationship with the departmentcan be invaluable to the committee to helpwith planning its upcoming work.

118. If the relationship is too distant andadversarial there can be a lack of trust betweenthe two sides, and a lack of a free flow ofinformation which can be of use to a committee.If a department assumes a committee is going tokick it down from the start on an issue, it is likelyto be more obstructive than otherwise. As onerespondent stated, “When the Secretary of Statethinks the chair has it in for him there is nothingmuch you can do about it.” Getting therelationship right requires considerable skill. Therelationship operates at two levels: clerk to civilservant and committee chair to minister.

119. On the clerk to official level, the formal andinitial point of contact is between the clerk and theparliamentary liaison officer in the department.However, this individual is not always the mosteffective person to contact about committeebusiness. The liaison officer is unlikely to havedetailed knowledge of the subject at hand. If aclerk wants information on a particular issue or todiscuss an inquiry it is more usual that theyspeak directly to the civil servant who deals withthat policy. Good relations between officials isuseful to both the department and the selectcommittee, and clerks are becoming moreproactive in building these relations:

“There are more of the younger [clerks]who get hold of the relevant official, not theparliamentary clerk…. They have a longcup of tea together.”

120. Occasionally situations will arise wherechairs have to approach ministers overdifficulties with co-operation. For instance, achair might have to directly approach a minister

from another department if civil servants fromthat department are resisting coming before thecommittee but these instances are rare (seesection above on select committee powers).

Influencing parliament and thepress121. Select committees also attempt toinfluence the behaviour of parliamentarians.Often they will seek to influence and informdebate in the chamber. Indeed, one of theobjectives for select committees is to assist theHouse in debate and decision. The ConstitutionalAffairs Committee set out on its inquiry intoJudicial Appointments and a Supreme Court forthe UK with this objective in mind: “The purposeof the inquiry is to examine the Government’sproposals and responses to the two ConsultationPapers and to define the main issues in order toinform the second reading debate.”31 In the eventthere were four separate references to the reportduring the debate. This can be seen as asuccess. Also, although the government did notproduce a Constitutional Reform Bill in draft formas recommended by the committee, thecommittee’s recommendation may have been afactor in the House of Lords deciding to send theBill to a special select committee for furtherscrutiny.

122. A further way of select committee reportsaffecting what goes on in the chamber of theCommons is by linking reports to other debates.Select committees can make a request of theinitiator of the main business that the report is‘tagged’ to the debate. If the initiator agrees, anote appears under the title of the debate namingthe committee report as a relevant document. Astime to debate select committee reports islimited (see below) this is a useful device to raisethe discussion and dissemination of selectcommittee work.

123. Increasingly, however, select committeeshave sought to influence the behaviour ofParliament and the government by influencingthe media and encouraging and informing awider debate. Although this cannot be measuredin the same way as the number ofrecommendations which receive a positive

31 House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, First Report of Session 2003–04: Judicial appointmentsand a Supreme Court (court of final appeal), HC48-I, para. 3.

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response or number of citations in the chamber,it can be just as influential:

“If it shapes the debate and the agenda thatis positive. If it pushes the issue ahead inpublic perception, if it makes people thinkand revise their views or come up with ideasto improve a situation that is all a bonus.”

124. Respondents also pointed out that it is notjust at the publication stage of a report that selectcommittees can exert influence. Members of theHealth Select Committee cited the ongoinginquiry into obesity as an example of where aselect committee’s interest in an issue can sparkmedia interest leading to a national debate.

“The very fact that our committeeannounces that it will do an inquiry can beinfluential.”

“If you look at our obesity inquiry, I doubtthat many of the recommendations wouldmake the slightest bit of difference to whatthe government says it will do. For instanceif we call for a ban on advertising duringchildren’s television the government will sayno. But we have taken evidence for a yearnow and every time I put my television orradio on they are talking about obesity. Wehave been part of the process of raisingawareness of this huge public healthdisaster that is looming over us.”

125. However, this can fail to happen. TheEnvironment Food and Rural Affairs Committeepublished the report of i ts inquiry intoGangmasters in September 2003. Five monthslater when the Morecambe Bay Cocklers tragedyoccurred, suddenly the media spotlight was onthis issue and the government announced plansto back a Private Members’ Bill.

126. It was widely recognised that presscoverage for select committee work was largelya good thing as by influencing the mediaParliament was influencing the government byputting things into the public agenda. As onemember stated: “Without press interest what arewe? We have no influence other than speakingout in public.” However, there was some concernthat if committees focused too much on whatwould play well with the media they could wellbecome distracted from the more routine or lessheadline grabbing topics hence limiting the

effectiveness of committees to carry out seriousand detailed work.

“There is a tension between a report whichis a report to the House, a formal documentand the modern world which is aboutinfluencing opinion and debate.”

127. There was also a concern that often presscoverage was gained by committees who gavestark criticism to the government departmentand its minister. The creation of an adversarialrelationship in the public eye was considered bysome to endanger effective scrutiny:

“You’ve got a decision. You can use a selectcommittee just to kick the government thewhole time on everything. To my mind thatsomewhat devalues the process. Yes you geton the Today programme but thegovernment then resents it because all thesecommittees have Labour majorities. Thegovernment then digs its heels in. Or youcan have a more philosophical approach.You come up with what you think will be anintelligent contribution to the debate devoidof political point scoring. Then if the mediathink it is a sensible contribution to thedebate you get on the media.”

128. The way that parl iamentary selectcommittees interact with the media has seensomething of a revolution in recent years. Thecapacity and ability of committees to engage withthe media has been increased by theappointment of a full-time Select CommitteeMedia Officer in 2003.

“Previously clerks ran the public relationsside of things and I don’t think we did it verywell. Most clerks sent out a press notice andthat was it.”

129. The increase in the number of media staffin the House of Commons may encourage thecommittees to plan more effectively the type andvolume of media interest required for anyparticular report. Also, there is an issue aboutwhat is interesting about the inquiry: theannouncement that an inquiry will take place,revelations or interesting discussion during theoral evidence sessions, or at the publication ofthe report. Committees are now routinelysending out press releases in advance of everyoral evidence session and at every reportpublication. This may not be either necessary or

39

advisable as committees risk swamping thepress with so much information, so that what isnewsworthy becomes lost in the noise.

“If you set out at the start what kind ofmedia attention you want to get you aremore likely to get it….”

Producing documents to debate130. Core task number 10 is “to produce reportswhich are suitable for debate in the House,including Westminster Hall, or debatingcommittees”. This a different activity from theobjective it sits under—“To assist the House indebate and decision”. It is this latter core taskwhich we now address.

131. There are few opportunities to debateCommons select committee reports on the floorof the House of Commons. In the first 10 years ofthe select committees (1979–1989) only four ofaround 500 reports were debated. Thisincreased to 29 reports being debated between1997 and 2000. The introduction of ‘paralleldebates’ in Westminster Hall in 1999 hasenabled far more reports to be debated, butnormally these debates are very poorly attended.

132. There are currently 30 opportunities a yearfor debates on committee reports (six on the floorof the House during annual estimates days and24 in Westminster Hall). A committee whichwants to follow the publication of a report with adebate must apply to the Liaison Committeewhich decides which reports should have priority.Many of our interviewees told us that there was‘no queue’ for debates in Westminster Hall yetalmost all saw some value in ensuring debate. Itis considered an opportunity to give a report anairing six months down the line, forcing thegovernment to reply, and encouraging theopposition parties to make position statementson the issue. However, there was a feeling thatoften debates in Westminster Hall on Committeereports were just a chance to air rehearsedpoints of view. Debates on select committeereports would perhaps be more useful if, asrecommended above, departments werecompelled to respond to the committeereport more fully after a longer period.

“It serves some value. I wouldn’t go overboard on it. It is sometimes rehearsing fixedpositions. Occasionally it is worth doingjust to evaluate after six months.”

“The committees volunteer for these. Thereisn’t a vast queue because often committeesthink there is no point in debating itfurther.”

Follow up133. In order for select committees to monitorthe government’s response and their owneffectiveness, committees must follow up thepublication of their report. This may be throughsustained press coverage, through debates inWestminster Hall, through questioning theminister on issues subsequently and by carryingout a follow-up inquiry. (For instance, theEnvironment Food and Rural Affairs Committeeis carrying out a follow-up inquiry onGangmasters.) However, there is often notsufficient planning of which methods to use forwhich inquiry, and no routine tracking ofcommittee recommendations.

“One approach is to tell the department toregularly update you on all itsrecommendations, which is what theNorthern Ireland Affairs Committee used todo which is very irritating for thedepartment….”

134. Following up every single recommendationcould be a disproportionate drain on selectcommittee resources. One report can havearound 40 recommendations. And eachcommittee can publish around 8 reports persession. To monitor the government’s behaviouragainst all these recommendations would bedisproportionate to the benefit produced. Whenreceiving the government response, thecommittee should pause, reflect and prioritisethe issues which they particularly care about andhave a realistic prospect of achieving change. Asystem of prioritising issues andrecommendations, and then tracking themover the following Parliament would be ofgreat use to committees. In order to do this,committees should decide when consideringthe government’s response to their report,which of the responses and which of theirown recommendations they particularly wishto pursue, and could set those out in a shortreply to the government’s response.

135. If departments were obliged to give a ‘12months on’ report to select committees as part ofthe response process, this itself would be aneffective method of follow up for committees as

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the responses are likely to be more considered.Issues of continuing interest should regularlyappear on the agenda when questioningministers during routine evidence sessions.

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Conclusions and Recommendations• Select committees and the government need to agree clear protocols about the circumstancesin which named officials can be expected to appear before committees. The Government should useFreedom of Information principles when responding to requests for information from selectcommittees. They should respond within the statutory deadline and give reasons for exemptinginformation. Further to this, select committees should consider how they might use the legislation toenhance their inquiries.

• The overall effect of the core tasks has been to encourage select committees to carry out thefull range of activities currently open to them. They have given a stronger hand to chairs and clerks inencouraging committees to take part in more routine scrutinies rather than just policy based inquiries,hence perhaps achieving more ‘methodical scrutiny’ as intended. However, committees still spendthe majority of their time engaged in policy based inquiries and have considerable scope in settingtheir own agenda.

• Single evidence sessions with ministers have allowed committees to cover more ground withintheir department without necessarily soliciting evidence and producing a report. This makes thecommittee more flexible.

• It would be useful for committees to take evidence from major appointments towards the end oftheir appointment when they have more of an insight, and less to lose, by giving full and frankevidence.

• Although committees had always shown some interest in departmental annual reports, thatinterest has increased since the publication of the core tasks, and their capacity to give the reportsproper attention has increased with the creation of the Scrutiny Unit.

• Concentrating on supplementary estimates, linking expenditure to policy, and added staffsupport has meant that members’ interest is more fully engaged and committee are becoming moreeffective and focused at examining the expenditure of the department.

• The Scrutiny Unit has undoubtedly increased the capacity and ability of select committees tocarry out scrutiny in areas which have a financial or other specialist aspect to them. They have notonly taken pressure off committee staff on more routine inquiries but also provided specialist skills forspecific inquiries.

• Sub-committees are not an answer to increasing the capacity of select committees becausethey stretch the fixed level of support available to the committee, and members find it difficult to findextra time to sit on them.

• Each committee needs to set priorities for itself over a period of time: planning first major issuesto cover, second specific inquiries to include as part of the examination of the issues and third thescope of each individual inquiry. Committees should also leave time in their schedule to deal withroutine business and issues which arise that the committee is likely to want to consider. Creating atrusting relationship with the department can be invaluable to the committee to help with planning itsupcoming work.

• Without setting objectives at the start of an inquiry, it is very difficult to point to achievements atthe end. If committees give more thought at the beginning of an inquiry to those they wish to influence,and what value an inquiry might add, they will be more focused in their approach and more likely tosucceed.

• Committees should be clearer about what they are trying to get from any given call for evidence,and perhaps send questions focussing on different areas to different sorts of witness. Clerks should

42

always provide a summary of the evidence highlighting the most important and interesting points, anda list of all the memoranda received.

• Information regarding domestic visits by select committees could be included on thecommittees’ websites. Written briefings on committee visits could more often be included asappendices to reports.

• Committees need an adequate budget for commissioning research and guidelines andprocedures on how to use it.

• People interested in becoming specialist advisers could register their interest their interest andsubmit their CVs. Committees could then search the list for relevant experts and draw up a short list.A more formal approach to appointments should be complemented with job descriptions for specialistadvisers outlining their key tasks and duties through the inquiry process.

• One way of improving the system of government responses would be for the government togive an initial response after 60 days, but a more detailed response one year later allowing for seriousdiscussion of recommendations. Not only might this increase the quality of government responses,but government might be forced into linking changes in policy to the work of select committees moreclosely. Often at present, when the government does change policy a number of months on from thepublication of the select committee report, the change of policy is branded as a government initiativeeven if the original idea had emerged through select committees. It would also encourage committeesto follow up their work on a more routine basis and provide a tool to monitor the work of government inareas of interest over a longer time period.

• A system of prioritising issues and recommendations, and then tracking them over the followingParliament, would be of great use to committees. In order to do this, committees should decide whenconsidering the government’s response to their report, which of the responses and which of their ownrecommendations they particularly wish to pursue, and could set those out in a short reply to thegovernment’s response. Issues of continuing interest should regularly appear on the agenda whenquestioning ministers during routine evidence sessions.

• The increase in the number of media staff in the House of Commons may encourage thecommittees to plan more effectively the type and volume of media interest required for any particularreport.

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Appendix 1: List of Committees of the House ofCommons

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Appendix 2: Standing Order no. 152152.—(1) Select committees shall be appointed to examine the expenditure, administration and policyof the principal government departments as set out in paragraph (2) of this order and associatedpublic bodies.

(2) The committees appointed under paragraph (1) of this order, the principal departments ofgovernment with which they are concerned and the maximum numbers of each committee shall beas follows: […]

(3) Each select committee appointed under this order shall have the power to appoint a sub–committee, and the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee shall have power to appoint twosub–committees.

(4) Select committees appointed under this order shall have power—

(a) to send for persons, papers and records, to sit notwithstanding any adjournment of the House, toadjourn from place to place, and to report from time to time;

(b) to appoint specialist advisers either to supply information which is not readily available or toelucidate matters of complexity within the committee’s order of reference; and

(c) to report from time to time the minutes of evidence taken before sub–committees, and to lay uponthe Table of the House the minutes of the proceedings of sub–committees; and the sub–committeesappointed under this order shall have power to send for persons, papers and records, to sitnotwithstanding any adjournment of the House, to adjourn from place to place, to report from time totime the minutes of their proceedings, and shall have a quorum of three.

(5) Unless the House otherwise orders, all Members nominated to a committee appointed under thisorder shall continue to be members of that committee for the remainder of the Parliament.

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Appendix 3: Effective Scrutiny PublicationsMark Sandford and Lucinda Maer, Issues of Importance, The scrutiny role of the London Assembly, July2004, 43pp, £10.00.

Mark Sandford and Lucinda Maer, Old Habits Die Hard? Overview and scrutiny in local government ,February 2004, 57pp, £10.00.

Lucinda Maer and Mark Sandford, The Development of Scrutiny in the UK; an overview of proceduresand practice, January 2004, 58pp, Available on line.

Mark Sandford and Lucinda Maer, Scrutiny under devolution: committees in Scotland, Wales andNorthern Ireland, November 2003, 51pp, £8.00.

Mark Sandford and Lucinda Maer, Annotated Bibliography of Effective Scrutiny, Available on line (pdf)

Mark Sandford and Lucinda Maer, Effective Scrutiny in the Devolved Institutions, ESRC DevolutionProgramme Briefing No. 6, February 2004, 6pp.

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ISBN: 1 903903 31 0